In spite of UN air surveillance of the
Yalu, China made these moves unobserved.
The accomplishments of the CCF (Chinese
Communist Forces) against an army which was far better
armed, and which enjoyed total air supremacy, are truly
remarkable. Although the NK had been well armed by Russia,
and carefully prepared for their invasion of the South,
the CCF were so ill-equipped to challenge a modern army
that it is almost understandable why our Far East
Command initially thought they were an ineffective
rabble of "volunteers". Armed with a
bewildering mixture of British, US, Japanese and other
weapons, presenting an incomprehensible logistics
problem, without heavy artillery or tanks, and no air
power, it was difficult for high command to take them
seriously. Plus, they gave no obvious sign of their
entry, let alone their large numbers, until they first
attacked.
Trained and battle hardened in guerilla
warfare, the CCF carried none of the baggage of a
modern army. Masters of concealment, they moved and
fought best by night. Wearing thick, padded, green or
white uniforms, caps with a red star, carrying a
personal weapon, grenades, 80 rounds of ammunition, a
few stick grenades, spare foot rags, sewing kit and
a week's rations of fish, rice and tea, their
working day began about 7 pm. They marched until about
3am, then prepared camouflaged positions for the day.
Only scout units moved during daylight, to determine
routes for the next night's march, and they were
ordered, under penalty of death, to freeze motionless
if they heard aircraft. Their only heavy weapons were
mortars, but they came in increasingly vast
numbers.
The CCF didn't begin seriously
fighting until October 25, when it crushed the ROK 6th
Division in an attack that increased and lasted for 10
days, further smashing back our 1st Cavalry Division
with the ROK units. In the east, the 7th Marines had
our only successes, in relief of battered ROK units at
the Sudong Gorge, 30 miles below
Chosin. The 7th killed around 1500 Chinese, destroying
the fighting capability of the CCF 124th division in a
brutal 3-day battle.
|
1stMarDiv commander General Smith
had been determined that the Marines would be successful in their
first battle with the CCF, which they were. But
the 124th was only one division in the CCF 42nd
Army. General Smith wondered where the other two
divisions were.
|
This probing first CCF strike
effectively ended the Eighth Army offensive, for the
moment.
At this point, understanding High
Command's actions becomes difficult.
The CIA was the source of global Intel,
and MacArthur was expected to act in accordance with
the CIA analysis. That had been faulty until now,
mis-reading the potential for North Korea invading the
South in the first place. Now, the CIA and the JCS felt
China would not come into the war without Soviet
approval, which they felt would not happen since the
Soviets would not risk a global nuclear conflict, and
so MacArthur was left in ignorance of the Intel that
would have alerted him to their true intent. Unaware of
the CIA's error, MacArthur had sent 8th Army toward
the Yalu at top speed, sacrificing preparation for
haste as at Inchon, to complete the destruction of the
North Korean armies before China could get permission
to act. In the event, China was not at all a Soviet
puppet, and had begun entering North Korea in force on
October 18, and 8th Army was racing into a well
prepared trap by powerful veteran army.
After China's initial attack, it
might still be possible to deny that there was
sufficient evidence to indicate China's entry into
the war in force, but not to deny that they were
entering it at all. Granted that combat reports were
sometimes conflicting, and that the CCF tried to
confuse their strength by giving false unit names to
their divisions. Nevertheless, they had come in
sufficient strength to hammer Eighth Army while they
chose to fight them, and clearly could come in hundreds
of thousands, if they wanted to. Whatever errors of
judgment the CIA and JCS had made, China had definitely
made a statement on the battlefield, which should have
been carefully evaluated by the armies on the field. A
basic military mandate is to prepare for what the enemy
is capable of doing, not what you think he might do.
That's the difference between sound tactics, and a
gamble.
Growing daily more optimistic because
of Chinese inactivity, and without Intel otherwise from
the CIA, Far East Command ordered Eighth Army and X
Corps to stage for an assault to "End the war by
Christmas."
But, the Chinese had only withdrawn to
replenish their supplies, continue their build-up, and
assess the lessons they had learned. Their successes in
the west had been accomplished with only units of 3
Field Armies, and had given them great confidence based
on detailed information of Eighth Army strengths and
weaknesses. When Eighth Army began its "Home For
Christmas" assault, The CCF was ready.
By November 24, from left to right on
line, Eighth Army consisted of: I Corps, with the 24th
Division, the British 27th Brigade, and the ROK 1st
Division; IX Corps, with the 2nd and 25th Divisions and
the Turkish Brigade; and ROK II Corps, with
their 6th, 7th and 8th Divisions. 1st Cav was in
reserve. In all, about 135,000 troops.
In the east, X Corps had about 100,000
men: the 1st Marine Division (22,000), and the
Army's 7th Division, with the under-strength 3d
Infantry Division in reserve at Wonsan; and the ROK I
Corps, consisting of the 3rd and Capital Divisions,
operating along the east coast.
Total UN strength was about 250,000
men, plus a huge advantage in tanks, artillery,
aircraft and ships.
Facing Eighth Army was the CCF 13th
Army Group, of about 180,000 men. In addition,
effective NK strength had again grown to about
100,000.
In the east, the CCF faced X Corps with
Song Shilun's 9th Army Group, consisting of 4
armies, of 12 divisions and about 120,000 men. One of
the lessons the Chinese had learned was from the only
defeat their first probes had undergone, the
destruction of the 124th division by the 7th Marines.
The main objective of the entire 9th Army Group was the
destruction of the 1st Marine Division.
On Friday, November 25, following a
tremendous artillery barrage, Walker's Eighth Army
jumped off from the Chongchon River. To reach the Yalu,
and end the war. The Marine assault from Yudam-ni was
delayed until November 27.
Eighth Army's advance seemed to go
well, for a day. Opposition was so light, and the
desire to reach the Yalu and end the war so great, that
General Walker's divisions were speeding along
without protecting their flanks, or maintaining
artillery support capability for advanced units. On the
night of November 25-26, the CCF struck.
Following their evaluations of the
initial fighting, they struck the ROK II Corps. By
morning, they had torn an 80-mile penetration of our
lines, exposing the entire Eighth Army right flank, in
particular the 2nd Division. The Turkish Brigade was
virtually thrown in the gap, and destroyed. By evening,
November 27, the reserves of the 1st Cav and the
British Brigade were thrown in as well ... not to press
on to the Yalu, but to assist in the withdrawal of all
Eighth Army forces.
In the east, the 1st Marine Division
and the 31st
Regimental Combat Team were locked in vicious
battle against enormous odds.
For Eighth Army, the results had been
catastrophic. On November 29, Walker ordered a general
withdrawal, starting the longest retreat in U.S. Army
history. Within 6 weeks, Eighth Army fell back 275
miles, abandoning huge amounts of material and
suffering almost 10,000 casualties. Retreating across
the Chongchon River, then below the 38th parallel,
pausing momentarily at the frozen Imjin, then
abandoning Seoul. The Chinese advance finally ran out
of logistical steam 45 miles south of Seoul at
Pyontaek, and UN forces formed a fairly stable defense
base.
In retrospect, China made the same
mistake MacArthur had made earlier. She could have
re-established North Korea on the Internationally
accepted boundary of the 38th Parallel, by force of
arms against the US and the UN. This would have been a
near-incredible military and political victory for the
emerging Communist nation, and one which would have
been accepted by the entire rest of the world. China
could easily have forced North Korea's leader Kim
Il Sung to accept a return to peace, at very least
under an Armistice agreement which would have been a
victory for him as well.
Instead, flushed with their easy
victories, seeing a possibility of throwing the West
entirely out of Korea by force and uniting it under
their North Korean satellite, China moved its own
armies south of the 38th. What would have been an
acceptable defense against threats to its Manchurian
borders became simple aggression.
A great military and political victory, already
accomplished, became an invasion of an already savaged
peaceful country.
Ultimately, it led to China losing the
victory it had already won, and causing millions of
additional casualties for all sides in a bloody
extended war. A war eventually ended on a battle line
mostly in North Korea, and much more defensible than
the politically determined line along the 38th
parallel. And an armistice much more militarily secure
for South Korea than China could have so easily forced
on us, simply by stopping military action when she
reached the old borders.
UN troops who fought for the UN in
these campaigns generally fought with great bravery and
determination. Notably the British, and Australians. And
the Turkish Brigade, badly deployed, virtually without
effective communications to adjacent units, almost
totally wiped out in the initial Chinese attacks.
In all honesty, this can not be said of
the Eighth Army as a whole. Inexperienced garrison
troops to begin with, unprepared by training or
psychology for the savagery of infantry combat, they in
general performed very, very poorly.
All too often, they lacked the
ingrained skills and combat discipline of effective
infantry combat units. Specifically, they frequently
failed to study the terrain about them, and use it to
their advantage. They were largely road-bound, without
guaranteeing the security of their flanks. They failed
to routinely control the high ground menacing them and
their supply routes. As small units, they too often
lacked the mind-set and basic combat techniques, and
the resolution, essential to effective ground
combat.
Although individually often quite brave, as
groups they frequently retreated without even fighting.
In many cases, they abandoned all their heavy weapons
in defensible positions. Eighth Army virtually fled
from the Chinese army, veterans of their fierce Civil
war, whose strengths were not fire-power but rather
mobility, deception, surprise, and determination.
CCF weaknesses, in many cases, became
strengths because of their unfamiliarity to our forces.
Their guerrilla war against the Nationalists had
tightly disciplined the CCF, and accustomed them to
movement and attack at night. This protected them from
our air supremacy and made us fight on our least
familiar terms. Instead of radio communications, below
the regiment level the CCF used bugles, whistles and
colored rockets. This wild accompaniment to massed
night assault behind a rain of eerie green tracers
helped greatly to psychologically undermine the
resistance of our forces. Our 24th Infantry Regiment
(25id) had coined the term "bug-out" as a
tactical objective when facing potential combat, and
bug-out describes much of our Eighth Army actions until
CCF logistics became too extended for them to keep
chasing us.
In reality, when once accepting the
need for combat, Americans have always been very
dangerous fighting men. When lead by competent officers
up with their platoons and companies, when toughened
and guided by experienced NCOs, when integrated and
fighting as common teams, American troops are equal to
anyone. With our greater firepower, and its greater
range, we were fully capable of breaking up and then
destroying the CCF assaults. We later proved this when
we counter attacked and once again drove past the 38th
parallel, inflicting terrible casualties on the
enemy.
When we did re-organize and strike
back, our surge through and over the CCF was only
halted for political reasons (hopefully wisely, but a
question even today). This resulted in the formation of
the MLR and a series of vicious small-unit
battles during the prolonged stalemate of armistice
discussions. We did have the Right Stuff, but we needed
to re-learn how to develop and use it.
But at the time, as the Chinese
appraised us after their initial probing assault:
"The U.S.Army relies for its main power in combat
on the shock effect of coordinated armor and artillery
... and their air-to-ground attack capability is
exceptional. But their infantry is weak. Their men are
afraid to die, and haven't courage to either press
home a bold attack or defend to the death. They depend
on their planes, tanks and artillery. At the same time,
they are afraid of our firepower. They will cringe
when, in an advance, they hear firing ... Their habit
is to be active during the daylight hours. They are
very weak in attacking or approaching an enemy at night
... They are afraid when their rear is cut off. When
transportation comes to a standstill, their infantry
loses the will to fight."
This seems to have been an accurate
assessment of most of our Army, at that time and place.
But it led to China making the terrible error of
allowing the sweet scent of easy victory in the
northwest to send her armies crashing over South
Korea's legitimate borders, toward an apparently
easy total victory.
But ... Americans who were properly
trained and conditioned for combat were a different
problem altogether. The fighting withdrawal of our 1st
Marine Division from Chosin should have given the CCF
much more to think about than it apparently did, in
understanding the limitations of pitting massed troops
against vastly superior fire-power, when that power was
exercised by competent fighting men. Eighth Army's
recovery and eventual crushing counter-attack back
across the 38th might have been inferred from 1st Mar
Div's actions because ... our Marines were
superb.
Yudam-ni was a small town sitting in a
long, narrow north-south valley bisected by the Main
Supply Road (MSR). The valley of Yudam-ni gives off
into 5 smaller valleys, each separated from the next by
a high, hilly ridge complex. North-northeast lies the
Reservoir, and to the south is Toktong pass, a
bottleneck reached by a steep, narrow section of the
one-lane MSR.
On November 27, there were nearly 4
Marine rifle battalions and the bulk of 3 artillery
battalions positioned at Yudam-ni, about 7,000 men.
While staging for their assault over the next 40 miles
to reach Eighth Army, fate had brought most of the 5th
and 7th Marine regiments together, instead of isolating
them on different sides of the Reservoir. Moreover,
strong elements of Divisional headquarters were in
Hagaru-ri, 14 miles back. Through prudent and skeptical
organization, all main fighting elements of the entire
1st Marine Division were in mutually supportive
positions within 35 miles of each other along the
lonely, single track MSR, instead of isolated beads on
a string, as X Corps orders might well have made
them.
Moreover OP Smith, 1st Marine Division
Commanding General, had initiated the construction of
an airfield at Hagaru-ri, and ammunition and supply
dumps within supporting range of all Division units.
General Smith was not cautious, he was careful. His
foresight saved the Division, or rather made it
possible for the Division to save itself. General
Almond's over-confident aggression almost lost the
division anyway, and did cost X Corps the 32nd
Infantry.
Uninformed of the CCF attack which was
smashing Eighth Army, the 5th and 7th Marines'
orders were to secure the surrounding ridges of Yu Dam
Ni, and attack NW toward Kanggye in the heart of north
central Korea. Tactically, they were to move over the
40 miles of Taebaek mountains to secure Eighth
Army's right flank, the ROK II Corps.
Also unknown to the two forward Marine
Regiments, they were at that time almost surrounded by
3 CCF divisions, about 30,000 men, about the same
number that earlier drove the whole Eighth Army back to
the Chongchon River. Plus, 7 CCF divisions were moving
behind them. The entire CCF 9th Army Group was moving
to cut the MSR in sections, to divide and then crush
our famed 1st Marine Division.
Carefully, methodically, knowing that
whatever High Command said they had already met and
defeated one CCF division and were certain there were
more around, the Marines began their assault. By the
next day, the entire 25 miles of MSR between Yudam-ni,
Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri was enfiladed by the Chinese, and
the Marines at those isolated towns were under vicious
and unrelenting attack by almost overwhelming numbers
of veteran CCF infantry.
On the Reservoir's east coast, a
full Chinese division, expecting to find an isolated
5th Marine Regiment, found instead less than 3000 men
of the 7th division's 31st RCT, and were crucifying them.
With no reinforcement possible from the embattled
Marine battalion at Hagaru-ri, Lt. Col Don Carlos Faith (Task
Force Faith) and the 1053 officers and men of 1st
Battalion 32 Infantry fought bravely against
overwhelming odds, but died with the rest of 31RCT.
Today, the remains of the unknown men who fell there
still lie unmarked in that barren wasteland.
On November 30, X Corps ordered the
Marines to withdraw. So began an incredible breakout
and 13-day fighting retreat by about 20,000 troops,
spread out loosely over a narrow, mountainous, one-lane
supply road, covering about 78 miles to the Sea of
Japan and Hungnam. For the first 35 miles, from
Yudam-ni to the Army's 3rd Infantry Division
positions at Chinhung-ni, the Marines were on their
own, battling continuously with 10 CCF divisions.
The 1st Marine Division took full
advantage of its artillery and air support ... but it
also time and again fought the Chinese man-to-man,
hand-to-hand, night and day, while cut off from the
rear and with transportation at a dead stop. In the
bitterly cold, sub-zero winds of Chosin, as in steaming
jungles of an earlier war, the Marines never lost their
will to fight, or their capability of fighting
effectively.
Heavily outnumbered, the Marines
successfully defended against every attack, and in turn
successfully attacked the Chinese wherever they had cut
off the MSR. The Marines not only fought their way out,
they brought out their wounded, and most of their dead
and equipment.
In the map below, key features of the
tortuous, hill by hill struggle out of the entrapment
are shown. It was a remarkable achievement, by any
standards.
Chosin was a major defeat.We were
driven from the field of battle. Of the 25,000 of our
troops who faced the 120,000 Chinese at Chosin, 6,000
were killed, wounded or captured, and at least 6000
others suffered frostbite. During their 13 day walking
battle back, 1st Mar Div suffered 718 dead, 192 missing
and 3,508 wounded, plus their frostbitten
casualties.
But the Chinese paid a terrible price for their
victory. Marine records say they killed 25,000 Chinese
and wounded 12,500 others. The Army estimated an
additional 5,000 Chinese casualties. In addition, an
estimated 30,000 Chinese were frostbitten. Thousands of
Chinese studded the mountains of Chosin, squatting with
rifles slung on their shoulders, packs slung on their
backs, sheathed in snow, frozen to death. 72,500
casualties in toto, 60% of their 120,000 man army, to
defeat 25,000 of our troops.
These figures may show the true
significance of the Chosin battle. Had the CCF, i.e.
Mao, not attacked 1st Mar Div at all, but only placed a
few divisions in blocking positions along the exit end
of the one-lane road through the Taebaek mountains,
they might have won all of Korea. Once Eighth Army
broke and began their precipitous retreat the
uncommitted 100,000 troops, instead of being killed or
wasted in the frozen wilds of the Taebaeks, would have
been free to continue the CCF assault when it later
slowed down. The over-extended 1st Mar Div would have
been withdrawn anyway, for obvious tactical reasons.
With such a large, fresh supply of reserves, the CCF
might well have again defeated Eighth Army when they
finally made a stand, and continued on to take
Pusan.
...
In 1951, 1st Mar Div went on to cripple
another NK division around Pohang-Andong, spearhead
Operation Killer, fight in Operation Ripper and also
the Punchbowl, and were assigned in 1952 to the
Jamestown Line defending the approaches to Seoul.
(Incidentally protecting 606th AC&W Squadron at
Kimpo, where I returned to Korea in '52 as Radar
Field Engineer, supporting F-86 interceptions in MiG Alley).
The 10 CCF divisions which directly engaged the 1st
Marine Division in Chosin were completely used up. They
never saw action again during the Korean War.
One stark confirmation of the terrible
losses suffered by the 4 CCF armies was that they were
unable to follow our retreating forces and threaten our
retreat from Hamhung-Hungnam. Although we supported the
withdrawal with massive air and sea power, with 3id
positioned as rear guard, had the Chinese been strong
enough to attack us effectively there, X Corps might
still have been lost. As it was, the CCF was grateful
to stay back, re-group, and observe.
When the division finally got to
Hungnam, they found Our Navy waiting. The 1st Division
will probably never forget Admiral Fletcher at
Guadalcanal, but at Hungnam our Navy boarded them all,
just part of our evacuation of 105,000 troops, and
91,000 civilians who would have been added to the list
of murdered had they stayed behind.
Defeat or whatever, the fighting
withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division was one of the
proudest actions in the history of the entire Marine
Corps. More, it shows what all Americans are capable
of, when properly trained for combat, and properly
led.
...
Personally, I have always thought that
the two weeks the
Marines spent circling off Wonsan in what they
derisively call "Operation Yo-Yo", while we
cleared the mines menacing their landing, saved the
1st Division, probably all of X Corps, and possibly all
of Korea. Had 1st Mar Div been ashore earlier, General
Almond would surely have sent them into the Taebaek
mountains earlier, and into them further, to link up
with Eighth Army's right flank. That would have
been the ROK II Corps. When the Chinese smashed through
the ROKs, exposing Eighth Army's right flank, the
Marines would have been exposed, as well, and far more
extended. More, the CCF foot infantry would have been
far less extended into the murderous frozen wastes, in
trying to encircle them.
The Marines barely made the 35 miles of their retreat
from Yudam-ni to Chinhung-ni. Had they been stretched
over another 35 miles of Taebaek mountains, it might
well have been 35 miles too far. Had they even just had
time to begin their attack from Yudam-ni on November 25
instead of the 27th, they might have penetrated
inescapably into the Chinese ambush. The CCF might have
been able to entrench their forces at the key MSR
bottleneck of Toktong Pass (so valliantly won and
defended by Fox company), and divide and attack the 7th
and 5th Marines and their artillery separately and
destroy them, and then the 1st Marines, piecemeal.
Had the 1st Marine Division been
crushed without desperate loss to the CCF, Hungnam
would have fallen, and the rest of X Corps would have
been rolled up like a carpet. Had these 120,000 troops
then been available in the south, the CCF might well
have continued on to force Eighth Army all the way out
of Korea.
Just my personal opinion.
...
The 3rd Infantry Division, supported by
Naval gunfire including the nine 16" guns of the
USS Missouri, were the last major UN forces evacuated
from Hungnam, as shore installations were destroyed.
My own ship Wantuck, APD 125, had led the way by landing
troops from 3/5 at Inchon. Our squadron mate Begor,
APD
127, helped X Corps safely withdraw at Hungnam. We
were the first and the last.
Now, the job for all of us was to get
back to the 38th, and stay there. On December 23,
General Walker was killed in a vehicle accident. On
January 15, new commander General Ridgeway sent our
troops back through Osan and Suwan. On January 25, I
and IX corps slaughtered Chinese in a 20-mile swath,
and once again reached the Han River.
The tide had turned once again.
...
In May, 12 full-strength Chinese
divisions, supported by 40,000 North Korean troops,
attempted to destroy the US Second Infantry Division in
an assault on the scale of Chosin. 2nd ID was well dug
in, behind fields of mines and barbed wire, and held
fast although the hard-hit ROKs fell back and exposed
2id's right flank. They were supported by the
French and Dutch Battalions, their tank battalions,
five battalions of massed artillery, B-26 bombers,
their right flank was re-occupied by the the 3rd
Division, and the 1st Marines protected their left
flank, enabling full use of their 9th Infantry
Regiment. The result is known as the May Massacre.
On May 19, in one eight minute period,
more than 2,000 rounds of artillery were fired in front
of one company alone, "K" Company, 38th
Infantry. By June 5, during 20 days of continuous
fighting, the Indianhead Division and its supporting UN
battalions crushed the cream of the armies of Red
China. Ten enemy divisions had been committed against
the 2d Division with soldiers from an additional 2
communist divisions identified among the thousands of
dead who littered the battle-field.
Evidently the Chinese high command had
not learned the key lessons from Chosin: Marines or
Army, when American fighting men are well trained and
led, and personally committed, they are the equal of
any in the world; and sending lightly armed foot
soldiers against determined troops, entrenched,
supported by the might of modern armor, artillery and
air power, is little short of murder.
...
The UN established a defensible line,
mostly north of the 38th parallel, and settled into a
vicious but relatively stable Main Line of
Resistance while truce talks slowly ground their
way to agreement over the next two years.
...
On July 27,
1953, the fighting finally stopped.
