 |
After being discharged from the
Navy and
PHIBPAC in 12/51, I was privileged to serve as
radar tech rep with 606th
AC&W Squadron in 1952-53. We were located
at
K14, at the Han above Kimpo Air Base, with
the whole 1st Marine Division between us and the
Chinese armies, and provided radar coverage of
the skies over North Korea. We helped alert our
F-86 Sabres to MiG squadrons there, and to make
MiG interceptions, as well as provide position
information for all UN aircraft.
|
When operating over northwestern
Korea, in "MiG Alley", the Sabres'
range restricted them to some 20 minutes over the
Yalu, whereas the MiG-15s were within a few
minutes flying time of their bases in Manchuria.
Apart from the Sabre's range problems, it was
also inferior to the MiG-15 in various aspects of
performance.
|
This page is part of a web
site primarily intended to provide a little
information and background on Infantry small arms
used during the Korean War, together with some
history links and an obtainable bibliography.
Still, the overwhelming air superiority UN forces
enjoyed over all ground combat centers was of
such vital importance that it must be mentioned.
Our air surveillance and attacks always kept the
slender Communist logistics lines under maximum
pressure, as well as restraining their troop
movements to the night. And, at night, suspicious
supply routes were illuminated by "Lightning
Bug" C-47s. They dropped parachute-flares
which provided four to five minutes of brilliant
illumination, which were immediately exploited by
our bomber and fighter-bomber strikes. Their
armor and rolling stock were virtually at our
mercy.
During five days of the Chinese
Communist advance (1/1/51-1/5/51), Fifth Air
Force claimed 8,000 Communist troops as
casualties. During the entire advance, they
claimed 40,000 casualties. During their fighting
withdrawal from Chosin, Marines were virtually
escorted by prop-driven F4U Corsairs.
When the Korean War ended(?) with
a Cease Fire on 27 July, 1953, the air units of
the USAF, US Navy, US Marine Corps and allied air
forces had flown 1,040,708 sorties. They had
succeeded in mastering the enemy air forces to
such an extend that UN ground forces had seldom
come under air attack. Conversely, communist
troops were harassed night and day by air attacks
ranging in scope from massed raids by B-29
bombers to strafing runs by fighter-bombers.
Tactical air power was therefore a key to this
conflict.
Given the impossibility of
discussing this air activity in detail, this
discussion will just touch on the two principal
antagonists in the air battles for which I was
one trivial cog of the background: the F-86A-5
Sabre and the MiG-15.
The primary missions of our Air
Force during the KW were armed reconnaissance,
close air-support and interdiction. The versatile
F-84 Thunderjet fighter-bomber combined good
range characteristics - 670 miles when carrying
wingtip tanks - with a heavy armament of six
calibre .50 MGs, plus up to 4,000 lbs of bombs or
rockets. This meant the F-84 could carry out all
primary missions with equal facility, plus had
the range, firepower and maneoeuverability to fly
bomber escort.
One of the significant results of
China's entry into the war was the resurgence
of communist air power.
MiG-15 jet fighters
operating from airfields around Antung in
Manchuria, which was off-limits to US air
attack, many flown by Soviet
instructors to the Chinese, established
ascendence over the F-84, B-29s and other prop-driven UN
aircraft.
|
 |
This ascendency was quickly
challenged, and from then on the primary battles
in the skies of North Korea were between the
MiG-15 and the F-86A.
The MiG could outclimb the Sabre
at all altitudes, although the latter was
marginally faster in level flight. The MiG's
greater operational ceiling gave it an initial
advantage in combat, yet although it had a
greater initial acceleration in a dive, the
heavier Sabre had the advantage in a sustained
dive. The MiG's zoom climb and tight turning
characteristics (except at high speeds) were
valuable, but the fighter's good points were
counterbalanced by such undesirable features as
poor control at high speeds, a low rate of roll
and directional instability at high altitudes.
Its heavy armament (two 23mm and one 37mm cannon)
was better suited to bomber interception than to
fighter-vs-fighter combat; but the Sabre's
six 0.5 cal MGs, while having a faster rater of
fire, lacked the range and hitting power
necessary for jet combat. On the plus side, the
Sabre had the marvelous K14 radar gun-sight,
which gave enormous assistance to our pilots,
particularly in derivative movement information
of enemy aircraft, which gave invaluable
lead-time in dog-fights.
Sabres operating in MiG Alley
faced large formations of 50 to 70 enemy fighters
flying at heights of 50,000 ft or more, which the
American fighters could not match. This meant
that the US fighter pilots had to evolve tactics
to cope with a "bounce" by
fast-flying MiGs diving down on them from high
altitude at a time and place of the enemy's
choosing. The solution was the "jet
stream" of 16 Sabres divided into
four-aircraft flights, each of which entered the
Alley at five-minute intervals and at different
altitudes between 27,000 and 33,000 feet. The
Sabres flew at high speed (typically Mach 0.87,
so as soon as one flight was engaged by the MiGs
the others could rapidly converge on the combat.
The flights adopted a "fluid four"
tactical formation, comprising two element
leaders each covered by a wingman. So, although
operating at a considerable initial disadvantage
against the high-flying MiGs, the mutually
supporting Sabre formations were able to meet the
MiG's bounce with a vigorous
counter-attack.
The Sabre's combat record in
Korea was, by any standards, impressive. Of the
900 aerial victories claimed by USAF pilots
during the war, 792 were MiG-15s shot down by
Sabres. The MiGs in their turn managed to knock
down only 78 Sabres. American fighter pilots thus
established a ten-to-one kill/loss ration in
their favor.
Documented postwar research
indicates there were actually only about
379 US victories. The Soviets claimed to
have shot down more than 650 Sabres, while
USAF records show 224 F-86s lost to all
causes, including non-combat.
Whatever the actual
victories and losses F-86 pilot-performance
in combat was remarkable, quite an
accomplishment, against the odds.
Bert
Kortegaard
|
 |
Air Interdiction Effectiveness
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
The Foundations of Freedom are the Courage of Ordinary People and Quality of our Arms
|
|