8th Cav lost about half its
equipment in the bitter fighting as CCF 39th
Army placed roadblocks in front of and behind
the road-bound US 1st Cavalry Division forces.
Initially over 1,000 men of the Regiment were
missing, but after stragglers had returned to
our lines losses were determined to total only
about 600 men. 8th Cavalry's equipment
losses included 12 105-mm howitzers, 9 tanks, 1
tank recovery vehicle as well as extensive
mortar and small arm weapons. The regiment was
inoperable, until casualties and equipment
could be replaced.
The CCF claimed over half the
regiment was annihilated, which gives some idea
of the problem of accurately determining battle
results. As regards equipment, they were in the
ballpark, as regards troop losses they were way
off. Just given as a figure without detailed
explanation, both the Chinese and UN reports
are reaasonable ... but misleading.
The ROK 7th Regiment at Kojang,
and ROK 15th Regiment (at Unsan with 8th Cav)
were almost totally destroyed, losing all their
equipment and weapons. The CCF 1st Phase
campaign was a staggering success for them ...
and defeat for our forces.
For some reason, probably
because of the faulty CIA Intelligence given
them as to China's intentions, this did not
alarm UN High Command sufficiently to modify
their plans and withdraw and re-form Eighth
Army into continuous defensible positions with
in-depth capability, reliable communication
links between all units, and the coordinated
artillery support proper when facing large,
dangerous and unknown enemies.
For about three weeks, such
withdrawal and digging in would have been
possible. After that, it was too late.
The entire Army was to pay the
price for this lack of Military Intelligence,
and Leadership.