Phases of CCF Korean War Campaign
Entry into Korea: October 16, 1950
The Polibureau decided
on October 8 to send CCF to Korea but debated 10
days on whether to act without Soviet support. On
the night of Oct. 16 1950, a unit of 42d army of
the 13th Army Group
crossed Yalu. On Oct. 18, Chairman Mao issued the
final order for four CCF armies and 3 artillery
divisions to enter Korea on Oct.
19.
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First Phase Campaign: Oct. 28 - Nov. 5, 1950.
The first campaign
began on the morning of Oct. 25, when the 118th
Division of 40th Army wiped out an infantry
battalion of ROK 6th division.
The main CCF action was done by
the 39th army on the western front, which
captured Unsan on Nov.2. In the process, it
destroyed most of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, part
of 5th Calvary and 2 ROK regiments, driving the
UN forces back to the Chongchon river.
In the east, the 124th
and 126th Divisions of the 42d army engaged the
7th Marines and ROK I Corps.
While gaining
experience of the fighting capabilities of UN
forces, the CCF concealed their strength since
only about 30,000 CCF infantry actually engaged
Eighth Army, achieving success through experience and tactics, rather
than firepower. In
consequence, the US estimate of total CCF
strength was only 40,000, whereas it was actually
nearly 150,000.
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Second Phase Campaign: Nov. 25 - Dec. 24 1950.
After the first
campaign, CCF broke off contact with the UN
forces to assess the information gathered and
await the response. They decided the UN forces
were highly vulnerable, and when MacArthur sent
them across the Chongchon in a "home by
Christmas" drive, the CCF was
ready.
At dusk of Nov. 25
1950, CCF forces attacked in force on US 25th and
2d divsions and ROK 7th and 8th divisions. 38th
army and 42d army shattered the ROK 7th Division
and ROK 8th Division, causing both divisions to
collapse and thus expose the right flank of the
Eighth Army. On Nov. 26, facing encirclement by
CCF armies, the Eighth Army north of Chongchon
river started to withdraw. On Nov. 27, main
forces of the 38th army pressed towards 2d
Division, after smashing the Turk brigade
guarding the flank on Nov. 28, while its 113th
Division penetrated deep into UN line, marching
45 miles in 14 hours cutting off the withdrawal
route of the UN forces south to
Sunchon.
To escape the closing
encirclement north of Chongchon, the whole Eighth
Army started to retreat on Nov. 29. Blocked by
CCF 113th Division, US 2d Division fought
fiercely to escape south to Sunchon, in the
meantime, US 1st Calvary Division and British
29th Brigade attacked north trying to open the
blocks by the CCF 113th Division. On Dec.1, UN
forces were ordered to retreat to south of 38th
parallel. Since mechanized UN forces retreated
very fast, the main CCF forces stopped pursuit,
only a small CCF force followed the fleeing UN
troops, recovering the North Korea capital
Pyongyang.
On the eastern front,
9th Army Group attacked X Corps on Nov.27. The
9th Army entered Korea in such haste that most of
its soldiers had no winter clothing, and suffered
severe casualties due to frostbite. Despite these
difficulties, its 20th army successfully divided
and encircled large groups of UN forces near the
Changjin (Chosin) reservoir, including two Marine
regiments. Although the UN forces broke out the
encirclement, 9th Army Group inflicted heavy
casualties on the 1st Marine Division and 7th
Infantry division, in particular, virtually
annihilating Task Force MacLean/Faith. The X
Corps retreated to the port of Hungnam, where
105,000 fighting men and 90,000 civilians were
evacuated by sea.
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Third Phase Campaign: Dec.31, 1950 - Jan. 8, 1951
CCF and NKPA forces of
300,000 men attacked along a 200km front. In a
week, UN forces retreated to the 37th parallel.
Concerned about a possible UN amphibious assault
from rear and CCF logistic difficulties, Peng
Dehuai halted pursuit.
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Fourth Phase Campaign: Jan. 25 - April 21, 1951.
On Jan 25, 1951, UN
forces counter-attacked using 16 divisions, plus
3 brigades and 1 airborne regiment, a total of
230,000 men. The CCF fought a delaying retreat in
the west and east, looking for opportunity to
attack in the center.
In the west, US 25th
Division, 3d Division, 1st calvary Division, 24th
Division, British 27th Brigade, 29th Brigade,
Turkish Brigade, ROK 1st Division, ROK 8th
Division attacked the CCF and NKPA positions.
After fierce fighting, the second line of defense
of the CCF 50th army and NKPA 1st division was
broken, main forces of these two forces retreated
back across the Han river.
In the east, US 2d
Division, 7th Division, 187th Airborne RCT and 5
ROK divisions pushed north against the CCF 125th
Division and NKPA 5th Divisions. On Feb. 11,
124th Division of 42d army counter attacked,
117th Division of 39th army cutting off the ROK
forces. On Feb.12, CCF destroyed 3 regiments of
ROK 8th Division, destroyed part of US 2d
Division and part of ROK 3d and 5th Division,
plus 4 artillery battalions. Due to the severe
losses of X Corps, Ridgway ordered an
investigation of General Almond.
The CCF again began
withdrawing in the west on Feb. 17. On February
9, US 1st calvary, 1st Marine Division and two
other divisions renewed its attack on CCF center
section, and on March 15, UN forces re-captured
Seoul. On March 31, CCF and NKPA forces withdrew
back to 38th parallel and the fighting continued
to April 21. by this time, CCF 3d, 19th and 9th
Army Groups reached north of the 38 parallel,
these fresh troops consisted of 10 armies, about
240,000 men. At the time, UN had about 231,000
non-ROK and 120,000 ROK force at the front line,
facing about 240,000 CCF, but halted their
attacks. UN forces advanced 100 km (60 miles) in
this campaign.
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Fifth Phase Campaign: April 22 - June 10, 1951
On April 11, 1951,
General MacArthur was relieved. April 22, 3 CCF
army groups attacked along the UN line in the
west. The left group broke the UN defenses
immediately and progressed very smoothly. The 3d
battalion of 354 regiment of 118th division
penetrated 30km into UN line and fought UN force
one to many, repelled the attacks of 1st Cavalry,
British 28th Brigade and Canadian 25th Brigade,
held its advanced postition until joined with its
main forces. The center group smashed the Turkish
brigade and forced UN to retreat. The right group
smashed the British 29th Brigade and destroyed
part of ROK 1st division. On April 29, CCF closed
in on Seoul, however, UN forces fought and
retreated in an orderly fashion, CCF was unable
to encircle major UN forces, the whole attack
became a "frontal push" and Peng halted
the attack.
On May 16th the CCF
shifted its attack to the east, 60th Division of
20th army penetrated 25 km deep into UN line,
cutoff the withdraw route of ROK 3d and 9th
Division. 81st Division and 60th Division
together smashed ROK 5th and 6th Division. On May
18, ROK 3d and 9th Division tried to break out,
and was largely destroyed by CCF 20th army. On
May 19th, CCF engaged in heavy fighting with the
US 2d division and one French battallion. Peng
Dehuai ordered to halt the attacks along all
fronts and withdraw north. However, in the
withdraw process, some CCF armies (which entered
Korea recently) underestimated the UN's
capability to counter attack, they did not devise
careful withdraw CCF ns and their rear guard
force was insufficient, these errors resulted in
many gaps in the withdraw line, many units lost
contact with the main forces and were encircled
by UN forces. Most of the CCF units successfully
broke out and returned back. However, one CCF
division, the 180th Division suffered a total
loss, which was the only divisional level loss
for CCF in the Korean war.
On June 10, both sides stopped near the 38
parallel and took defensive
positions.
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Stalemate: June 10, 1951 - July 27, 1953
The truce talks began
in July 1951, concluding in July 1953. The
fighting continued during these truce talks while
fighting continued. However, both sides had taken
defensive positions and the battle line more or
less stablized with some hills and wastelands
exchanging hands over and over. At the beginning,
the UN was more aggressive and fought hard to
take a few hills with heavy casualties, after
that, the fighting was more or less used to show
strength and to help the
negotiations.
Although there would be
no more big maneuvers committing many Armies
(except one battle right before the end of war),
the total casualty for each side resulting from
these static wars was even greater than the
previous campaigns.
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CCF Unit
Hierarchy
An army in the CCF was
like a Corps in American infantry, consisting of
3 divisions of about 10,000 men each, however
actual division strength was usually
7000-8500.
A CCF division has
three 3000-men regiments. A normal US division
consisted of three regiments of infantry, three
battalions of 105mm artillery, 1 battalion of
155mm artillery, an anti-aircraft battalion, a
tank battalion and other supporting units,
totalling 20,000 men.
A CCF army group
consisted of several CCF armies, and compares
with a US Army (such as the Eighth Army). For
example, the 13th Army Group consisted of 38th,
39th, 40th, 42d armies.
Notice that a CCF
division is less than half the authorized
strength of a US Army division. A CCF division
has three 3000-men regiments. A US Army division
consisted of three regiments of infantry, three
battalions of 105mm artillery, 1 battalion of
155mm artillery, an anti-aircraft battalion, a
tank battalion and other supporting units,
totalling 20,000 men.
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CCF
Equipment
The CCF was basically a
rifle infantry with almost no heavy weapons
beyond mortars. Their rifles were mostly captured
from Japanese and KMT armies in the anti-Japanese
war and the civil war, and they lacked
ammunition. When the Korean war started, PRC was
less than one year old, and it was focusing on
reconstruction of a nation which suffered 8 years
of Japanese aggression and plundering.
China's steel production was a meager 0.6
million tons (in comparison, US figure was 87
million tons). China had almost no industry, it
could not make weapons in large quantity,
especially heavy weapons and their ammunitions. A
CCF army then had less than 10% of the fire power
of a US Corps, it had only 36 artillery pieces of
76mm or larger, while a US Corps had over 300
guns of 105mm or larger. The CCF army had no
tanks. The CCF also lacked transport; a CCF
division had only scores of
After CCF 's first successful campaigns in
Korea, China bought Soviet weapons enough to
equip 20 divisions, thus improving its fire
power. At the final stage of the war, the CCF was
able to mass enough heavy artillery to break an
ROK/US defense line by brute
force.
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CCF Tactics and
Strategy
PVA's tactics were
designed to negate the UN advantage of air power
and artillery.
The CCF used night
fighting tactics. It would start an attack when
night fell, withdraw and go to cover at dawn, so
US airplanes could not harass them. It also used
close combat, threw its units into enemy line, so
the enemy artillery could not operate. Another
CCF tactic was to infiltrate deep into enemy
positions, attack their command posts and
artillery positions directly from
inside.
During the truce talks,
the CCF went to bunker war. They dug very long
and deep bunkers in the hills and stocked
supplies there. When the enemy shelled the hills,
they would withdraw into the bunkers, when the
shelling stopped, they came out to fire on the
attackers. If the surface positions were taken by
enemy, the CCF would withdraw back into the
bunkers, then CCF artillery would shell the enemy
on the surface and the CCF infantry would then
come back out the bunkers again to assist the
retaking of the positions.
The CCF main strategy
at the beginning was the so-called "movement
war", the main objective being to divide the
enemy into isolated pieces and then use superior
strength of force to annihilate the encircled
enemy piecemeal before enemy reinforcement could
be brought in. To do this, the CCF used frontal
attacks and simultaneous penetrations to cut
directly into enemy rear, cuting off his MSR
(main supply route) and withdrawal routes, thus
trapping them when they tried to
redeploy.
To better understand
CCF strategies, one must study the grand
campaigns in which the CCF wiped out 8 million
KMT troops in 2 years, with few casualties of its
own.
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Comparative
strength of the CCF and UN
At the start of the
Second Phase Campaign the CCF had 13th Army Group
and 9th Army Group, a total of 30 divisions. In
the west, the 13th Army Group had about 150,000
men and in the east the 9th had about 120,000
men. The UN combat forces consisted of Eighth
Army, numbering 118,000 men, and X Corps,
numbering about 120,000 men. Thus the opposing
forces were about equal in
manpower.
In the west,
Walker's Eighth Army combat forces were: I
Corps consisting of the 24th division, ROK 1st
division and the Commonwealth Brigade(about 5000
men); IX Corps consisting of 25th Division, 1st
Cavalry Division, 2d Division and Turkish brigade
(about 5000); ROK II Corps consisting of ROK 7th
Division, ROK 8th Division and the battered ROK
6th Division.
In the east,
Almond's X Corps had about 240,000 men,
consisting of O.P. Smith's 1st Marine
Division, 7th Infantry Division, 3d Infantry
Division and ROK I Corps.
Based on Chinese
sources, from end of Oct. 1950 to June 1951, the
CCF participated in 5 major campaigns, inflicted
230,000 UN casualties, taking 36835 prisoners.
The CCF also captured a lot of equipment,
including 187 tanks, 4954 trucks, 5 amored
vehicles, 10 aircraft, 3133 artillery pieces,
45,000 rifles and machine guns.
At maximum, total CCF
and NKPA strength reached 1.2
million.
In June 1951, right
after the 5th campaign, UN total strength was
695,110, with 520,850 ground force (US 253100,
ROK 229600, other 38150), 80340 navy (US 66700,
ROK 6000, other 7640) and 94520 air force (US
90000, ROK 4000, other 520). At the same time,
CCF strength was about 240,000, much lower than
total UN strength.
At the end of war, from
CCF statistics, UN total strength was 1,111,340
(1.11134 million), ground force 904,550 (US
373,500, ROK 491,000, other 40050), navy 101,180
(US 73000, ROK 20000, other 8180), air force
105,610 (US 95000, ROK 10000, other 610). From
western source (Korean Almanac), UN ground forces
strength was slightly higher with a total of
932,539 (US 302483, ROK 590911, other 39145). CCF
counted 70000 more US troops, this was probably
because many ROKs (KATUSAs) were serving in US
forces and counted as US strength by
PVA.
In the war, the CCF
rotated about 2 million troops. The US used 86%
of its infantry and 14% of its Marine Corps,
rotating over 1.319 million
troops.
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The CCF 180th
Division
In the 5th campaign,
CCF had its biggest embarrassment ever: the 180th
Division of the 60th army was totally lost.
Except for the 3,000 men who withdrew earlier,
the majority of the division were captured by UN
forces. The division commander and other high
ranking officers escaped, but they were
investigated and demoted back home. In the eyes
of many Chinese, this was a shame in CCF
history.
During the withdraw
phase of the 5th campaign, the main force of
180th Division was encircled by UN forces, after
6 days of hard fighting, most of its men were
either wounded or sick, the division commanders
panicked, and ordered the troops to disperse and
escape by disguising as Koreans. Consequently,
most of the soldiers (about 5000) were captured.
Many of the wounded were killed immediately by UN
troops, those who were sent to the POW camps
suffered torture and even death during the POW
repatriation.
Other units of CCF
encountered similar situations but most of them
successfully returned. For example, the 194th
Division was encircled, but the commanders stayed
cool and brought the men out through a gap in the
encirclement . The 27th army was also cutoff, but
it retreated successfully with all the wounded
ones. Till today, many are still debating on the
reason of the collapse of the 180th Division.
There are books published researching on this
question. There were many
misjudgments/misunderstanding and incorrect
orders (in hindsight) issued by the 3rd Army
Group and 60th Army. A series of delays and
misunderstandings resulted the 180th being
trapped by enemy forces 5 times their own
strength, and the division commander did not
improvise and carry out a working break-out CCF
n. 180th division fought heroically, faithfully
carried out its orders. Its division commander
Zheng Qigui failed to act differently based on
the situation, in author's opinion, the
defeat was not his fault, but more of the 60th
Army commander, who misunderstand an order from
the 3rd Amry Group and ordered 180th Division go
back and forth alone to move wounded soldiers of
the Army Group, when all other units had
withdrawn.
BTW, the US did not
know that CCF lost a full division (less the
3000) in the Korean war until the 1980s, when US
military officials visited China.
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"Human
Wave" Tactics
During battles, western
forces were usually incapable of correctly
estimating the strength of CCF forces. Often they
greatly exaggerated the number of attacking CCF,
such as taking a CCF regiment as a CCF division.
The CCF mostly attacked at night, blowing bugles
and wistles, shouting thrills, even playing
"sweet music" to cause psychological
stress. these CCF tactics made western forces
feel that the enemy was everywhere coming from
every direction. Moreover, PVAs were masters of
infiltration, they often sneaked in and attacked
directly on command posts, generating shock and
chaos.
Western combat history
often referred to CCF attacks as "swarms of
Chinese", "human waves",
"Chinese hordes", as if the CCF simply
threw its men into the fire and let itself be
slaughtered. Such a description indicated a great
misunderstanding of the CCF tactics. As some
military analysts pointed out, the CCF rarely
used dense formations in their attacks, it sought
to inflict maximum damage with mnimum casualties.
During the Korean war, CCF never had a commanding
numerical superioty against UN forces, in fact,
during the 4th campaign, it was greatly
outnumbered by UN (it was always outgunned), yet
it could still outmaneuver UN forces and even
managed to counter attack at X Corps. CCF could
achieve all these with inferior firepower because
it had smarter tactics and
strategy.
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CCF
Casualties
Western sources gave
assertions such as "it seems reasonable to
assume that China cannot have lost less than half
a million men" , "China suffered at
least 900,000 casualties", etc. However,
such numbers were based on arbitrary estimates
which were greatly inflated.
From official Chinese
sources, CCF casualties during the Korean war
were 390,000. It breaks down as
follows:
KIA: 110,400
DIED OF WOUNDS: 21,600
DIED OF SICKNESS: 13,000
CAPTURED & MISSING:
25,600
WOUNDED: 260,000
From reports published by CCF on
August 15 1953, the UN suffered total casualties
of 1,093,839, in which 397,543 were Americans,
667293 were ROKs, and 29,003 were others.
From western sources, UN combat
casualties totalled 1 million. It breaks as
follows: US 144,173, ROK 844,000 (415,000 killed,
429,000 wounded), Commonwealth 6000, others 8,800
(Hastings). The US suffered another 20,000 or so
fatality. From military history authored by ROK
Defense Department, ROK total casualty was
actually 984,400.
Detailed US casualties were: KIA
33,629, accidental death 20,600 wounded 103,248,
captured and repatriated 3,746, MIA 8,142.
The total count from both sources
matched very well, some historians acknowledged
that CCF was very honest in their statistics.
However, CCF counted 220,000 more US casualties,
and about 200,000 less ROK. This discrepancy was
partly due to the fact that many ROKs were
serving as attachments to US armies and they were
counted as US force by PVA.
Why did ROK suffer such greater
casualties? One of the reasons was that they were
placed on the first line of defense in a lot of
the cases, and they suffered the initial blows by
PVA. Moreover, the ROK had different fighting
style: from CCF battle accounts, Americans
usually withdraw all the way down to the foot of
the hills after suffering a failed attack, but
the ROK only retreated out of range to regroup
and attack again immediately, which caused great
difficulty for PVA, and of course greater ROK
casualties. However, western historians seldom
mention the ROK's positive contribution to
the UN side.
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Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
The Foundations of Freedom are the Courage of Ordinary People and Quality of our Arms
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