Preface
B. L.
Kortegaard
This site brings together in one place
a small picture of the history and infantry weapons of
the Korean War. But, over 60 years removed from when I
manned an SCR-300
while bouncing around in an LCVP at Inchon, preparing the
site has left me numbed at our generally abysmal
performance.
Given the huge disparity in artillery,
armor, air and naval support, the United States should
have crushed North Korea's offensive within the
first month of our entry into the war.
China's veteran guerilla armies,
victors in one of the most decisive battles in history
the previous year against the Nationalists, were a
different problem entirely, but we should only have
crossed the 38th parallel far enough to establish
effective defensive positions for the South.
As representatives of the UN, this was
our only valid objective.
No need to consider resorting to
nuclear weapons. No need to start WWIII.
But our nation's main concern was
self-indulgence. Our political leaders' main
concern was staying in office. Our military
leaders' main concern was not upsetting higher
levels of command. As one consequence, our nation
could not easily provide adequately armed and trained
fighting forces psychologically prepared to fight a
brutal and resolute enemy.
In the end, we were saved national
humiliation by small cadres of cynical professionals, and an uneven sprinkling of resolute units
and proud individuals. Our capable few who are always
prepared.
Against all odds.
Upon reflection, history shows this
pattern is one we repeat over and over. Possibly an
inevitable result of the arrogance necessary for
success in those who seek leadership positions, but
certainly a repeating cycle in our history.
The thing is, I had forgotten all
that.
To me, Truman, his Joint Chiefs, and
the US Army higher command levels all failed
profoundly in Korea.
Today's Media, using
"McCarthyism" as synonymous with hysterical
Red Bashing, seldom mention that the Truman
administration ignored McCarthy's insistance that
they indict Alger Hiss for treason and instead
attempted to crucify Whitaker Chambers, who exposed
Hiss as a communist. The Media probably dosn't
even know it. But, after their collapse fifty years
later, USSR records showed that Hiss had led one of
the most powerful groups of subversives in our
history. The reasons for this blindness were assumed
to be the Truman cabinet beliefs that Communists were
peace-loving idealists, and that nuclear weapons had
ended ground warfare forever. The facts were
otherwise.
Acting on their
misperception, Truman's cabinet failed to prepare
our ground forces psychologically for the savage
realities of infantry combat. Our combat units were
conditioned for friendly peacetime Occupation
duty.
They had not adequately
armed our fighting forces with the 3.5 inch
superbazooka and HEAT rounds, to effectively cope
with modern armor, even though these had been made
standard shortly after WWII.
They initially failed to
issue smokeless small-arms ammunition even though
both North Korea and the Chinese consistently used it
with deadly effect, just as the Spanish Krag rifles
had in Cuba over fifty years
earlier!
They failed to supply
reliable small-unit communications equipment, and
special weapons such as infrared night-vision
carbines, even though these would have given us a
decisive edge in small-unit combat at
night.
These blunders are
consistent with Truman's belated recognition that
nuclear weapons didn't make conventional combat
impractical, but rather made it the only practical
form of combat. He, and his High Command, had
essentially no understanding of the tactics and
strengths of the North Koreans, or of the CCF itself.
Together, these blunders of command were primarily
responsible for our initial
defeats by the North Koreans, and for our later
crushing defeats by the
CCF.
These deficiencies were
largely corrected over time, and we did force the
Chinese and NK to the truce table, but the
politicians and higher command levels responsible for
these blunders did not pay for them. The men who paid
were those who fought, as well as we could, with what
we had.
