Withdrawal to Line D
Even as his forces were giving up Seoul,
General Ridgway wrote General Collins in Washington that although the Eighth
Army was in for some difficult days, he was certain of its intrinsic ability to
perform well against the Chinese. Also prompting his confidence was the manner
in which the Chinese had conducted operations since New Year's Day. "The Chinese
probe on a wide front," he told Collins. "When they strike resistance their
overwhelming numbers immediately flow around both flanks and join in the
rear."1 As the North Koreans had learned when they met close-knit
defenses for the first time at the Pusan Perimeter, this tactic could be
countered.
The armament employed by the Chinese had
been largely small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars. They had used some
artillery in breaching line B, but problems in moving the pieces and in
supplying ammunition combined with the Eighth Army's counterbattery fire and air
support had frustrated further use of the heavier
guns. Although pilots reported they had sighted and attacked tanks behind enemy
lines, the Chinese had used no armor in their recent assaults. Nor had they
employed air support.2
In Ridgway's appraisal, the Eighth Army was
"opposed by an enemy whose only advantage is sheer numbers, whose armament is
far inferior quantitatively and qualitatively, who has no air support whatever,
meager telecommunications and negligible armor." But while Ridgway believed the
Eighth Army to have the strength and means to handle the enemy, most of his
commanders and so most of his forces-did not share his confidence. He had "found
only one or two cases where a Division has shown any appreciable resourcefulness
in adapting its fighting tactics to the terrain, to the enemy, and to conditions
in this theater." His dominant problem was "to achieve the spiritual awakening
of the latent capabilities of this command." If he could manage this, he was
certain that the Eighth Army would "achieve more, far more, than our people
think possible-and perhaps inflict a bloody defeat on the Chinese which even
China will long remember."3
For the time being there was no escaping further withdrawal. While the last
steps in evacuating Seoul were being taken on the 4th, Chinese patrols were
observed investigating the Kimpo peninsula off the west flank of the I Corps and
were reported to be crossing the Han to the right rear of the IX Corps. This
reconnaissance and the concentration of Chinese forces above Seoul indicated
that the enemy would advance below the city with hardly a pause.4
It was the shambles farther east, however,
that. made a withdrawal to line D mandatory. This segment of the Eighth Army
line remained a largehole sieve through which an estimated seventy thousand
North Koreans grouped in the Ch'unch'on-Inje-Hong-ch'on area, and possibly
Chinese forces as well, could push attacks south on the Route 29 axis through
Wonju and through the undefended mountains east of Route 29. Or they could move
southwestward to envelop the I and IX Corps, or both. By pulling back to the
P'yongt'aek-Ansong-Changho-won-ni sector of line D, the I and IX Corps would no
longer be open to envelopment from the northeast, and the X Corps and the two
South Korean corps might be able to organize a satisfactory line in the
Wonju-Wonp'o-ri sector.5
Withdrawal From the Han
Congestion on Route 29 South of Hongch'on during retreat in the Central Sector, Jan 3 '51
Ridgway warned his forces around noon on
the 4th to expect orders to withdraw to line D, all corps abreast. The I and IX
Corps in the meantime were to pull back at 2000 to intermediate positions six to
eight miles south of the Han and hold until Air Force
and Army supplies stocked at Suwon, ten miles farther south and about midway
between Seoul and line D, had been removed. Ridgway expected the supplies to be
cleared within twenty-four to thirty-six hours.6
Ridgway intended that the starting hour of
the intermediate move provide time for the 3d Logistical Command to finish
evacuating Inch'on, ASCOM City, and Kimpo airfield.7 (The Seoul
airport already had been emptied.) On 3 January Ridgway had notified Col. John
G. Hill, commander of the 3d Logistical Command, to cease port operations at
Inch'on at noon the next day.8 The deadline seemed reasonable since
the gradual reductions of stocks at the port and airfield areas since early
December already had brought items on hand to modest quantities. But unforeseen
delays in getting some reserve stocks released from Eighth Army staff officers,
too few tankers, too little suitable shipping for such items as long lengths of
railroad track, and an overestimate of the ammunition that would be issued to
line troops had prevented Colonel Hill from removing all stocks by the
designated hour.9
Nor would Hill get everything out. After receiving
Ridgway's noontime orders, General Milburn, in whose sector the port and
airfield lay, instructed Hill to execute his demolition plans as soon as he had
removed all troops other than demolition crews. While back shipment at Inch'on
did continue through the favorable afternoon tide on the 4th, Hill's main
attention was diverted to rendering the airfield and port facilities useless to
enemy forces.10
The Port Of Inch'on, Tidal Basin upper right, Foreground Island of Wolmi-do
(BK note: This photo is composed of two other photos, poorly patched and missing the causeway)
All port units scheduled to travel south by
road had gone by the time Hill received Milburn's
instructions, and the last Fifth Air Force unit
except for Army aviation engineers had flown
from Kimpo to a new base in Japan. Through the afternoon these engineers burned the airfield buildings and the drums of aviation gasoline and napalm remaining at Kimpo while Eighth Army engineers from the 82d Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company destroyed
the four- and six-inch pipelines between Inch'on and
Kimpo and the booster pumps and storage tanks at the
airfield.11
Kimpo Airfield Jan 4 '51
Members of the 50th Engineer Port
Construction Company began demolishing the Inch'on port at 1800. All main
facilities except one pier and a causeway to the small offshore island,
Wolmi-do, were destroyed. Prime targets were the lock gates of the tidal basin,
which by compensating the Yellow Sea's wide tidal range had largely given
Inch'on the capacity of a principal port. The demolitions at Wolmi-do as well as
the city itself were completed by 0300 on the 5th. Colonel Hill and his
remaining troops left by water for Pusan within the hour.12
Supplies destroyed at Kimpo, ASCOM City,
and Inch'on included some 1.6 million gallons of petroleum products, 9,300 tons
of engineer materiel, and 12 rail cars loaded with ammunition. While time and
tide may have made the destruction of this materiel unavoidable, the extensive
damage to port facilities could not be fully justified. Denying the enemy the
use of a port was theoretically sound; on the other hand, the United Nations
Command's absolute control of Korean waters made Inch'on's destruction
purposeless.13
The I and IX Corps left the lower bank of
the Han while Hill's engineers were still blowing Inch'on, so Hill had been
obliged to put out his own security above the port. These outposts were not
engaged. Neither were Milburn's forces as they moved to positions centered on
Route 1 at the town of Anyang, nor were Coulter's as they extended the
intermediate line northeastward to the junction of
the Han and Pukhan rivers.14 (See Map 16)
Late on the 4th, while the I and IX Corps
were withdrawing to positions above Suwon, Ridgway ordered the withdrawal to
line D to begin at noon on the 5th, by which time he now expected the supplies
at Suwon to have been removed. All five corps were to withdraw abreast, meeting
in the process Ridgway's basic requirement of maximum delay and maximum
punishment of the enemy. Ridgway specifically instructed Milburn and Coulter to
include tanks in their covering forces and to counterattack the Chinese who
followed the withdrawal.15
Ridgway learned during the morning of the
5th that the supplies at Suwon and at the airfield south of town could not be
cleared by noon. Creating the delay was not only the sheer bulk of the materiel
but also about a hundred thousand desperate refugees from the Seoul area who
crowded the Suwon railroad yards and blocked the trains. At midmorning Ridgway
radioed Milburn to stand fast until the remaining Suwon stocks had been shipped
out, and he notified Coulter to leave forces to protect the east flank of the I
Corps' forward position.16
Milburn received Ridgway's instructions in
time to hold the bulk of the 25th Division and the ROK 1st Division at the
Anyang position, and Coulter ordered the ROK 6th Division to
protect Milburn's east flank. But Coulter did not dispatch his instructions
until an hour after the ROK 6th had started for line D, and General Chang did
not receive them until midafternoon. It took Chang another half hour to get his
division stopped. By that time his forces were almost due east of Suwon, where,
with Coulter's agreement, Chang deployed them astride Route
17.17
During the night of the 5th an enemy
regiment crossed the Han and assembled east of Yongdungp'o. Patrols from the
regiment moved south through the hills east of Route 1 and reconnoitered the ROK
1st Division front before midnight but somehow missed
finding the vulnerable east flank earlier left open by the IX Corps. By daylight
on the 6th the patrol contact in the center of General Paik's front developed
into a general engagement between an enemy battalion and the 3d Battalion, 11th
ROK Regiment, but the enemy attempt to dislodge the South Koreans eased by noon
and ended altogether at 1400. By then supplies had been cleared from Suwon and
Milburn and Coulter could continue south toward line D.18
The two corps completed their withdrawals
on the 7th. Since the 15th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, of the 3d
Division in the meantime had arrived from Kyongju and been attached to the I
Corps, Milburn was able to keep a substantial reserve and still organize a
fairly solid twenty-mile line D front from the west coast eastward through
P'yongt'aek and Ansong. The British 29th Brigade and the Thai battalion stood at
the far left astride Route 1 just below P'yongt'aek. The 3d Division held a
sector across the hills between Routes 1 and 17, which General Soule manned with
the 15th Infantry. Lending depth to this central position, the 3d Battalion,
65th Infantry, and the 35th Infantry of the 25th Division were assembled not far
behind it. Above Ansong, the ROK 1st Division lay across Route 17. The remainder
of the 25th Division and the Turkish brigade went into corps reserve at Ch'onan, thirteen miles
south of P'yongt'aek.19
Map 16.
Withdrawal to Line D, I and X Corps, 4-7 January 1951
Along a slightly longer front tipping to
the northeast and reaching beyond Changhowonni to the Han River Coulter deployed
the ROK 6th Division, British 27th Brigade, and 24th Division, west to east.
Hard against the right corps boundary twenty miles behind the front, the bulk of
the 1st Cavalry Division was in corps reserve at Ch'ungju on Route 13, now the
IX Corps' main supply route. To protect the route from attacks by guerrillas known to be located in the Tanyang area
twenty miles farther east, the 5th Cavalry had begun to patrol the road from
Ch'ungju south through a mountain pass at Mun'gyong.20
The way Milburn and Coulter had moved to
line D exasperated General Ridgway. "Reports so far reaching me," he told the
two corps commanders on the 7th, "indicate your
forces withdrew to `D' line without evidence of having inflicted any substantial
losses on enemy and without material delay. In fact, some major units are
reported as having broken contact. I desire prompt confirming reports and if
substantially correct, the reasons for non-compliance with my basic
directives."21 The reports reaching Ridgway were true. Except for the
clashes between the Chinese and the ROK 1st Division east of Anyang on the 6th,
the I Corps had withdrawn from the south bank of the Han without contact, and
the IX Corps had not engaged enemy forces since leaving the Seoul
bridgehead.22
Attempting once more to get the quality of
leadership he considered essential, Ridgway pointed out to Milburn and Coulter
that their opponents had but two alternatives: to make a time-consuming,
coordinated followup, or to conduct a rapid, uncoordinated pursuit. If the
Chinese chose the first, the Eighth Army could at least achieve maximum delay
even though there might be few opportunities for strong counterattacks. If they
elected the second, the Eighth Army would have unlimited opportunities not only
to delay but to inflict severe losses on them. In either case, Ridgway again
made clear, Milburn and Coulter were to exploit every opportunity to carry out
the basic concept of operations that he had repeatedly explained to
them.23
The immediate response was a flurry of
patrolling to regain contact. According to the I Corps intelligence officer, the
39th and 50th Armies were now advancing south of Seoul, and their
vanguards had reached the Suwon area. An ROK 1st Division patrol moving north
over Route 17 during the afternoon of the 7th supported this assessment when it
briefly engaged a small enemy group in Kumnyangjangni, eleven miles east of
Suwon. Farther west, patrols from the 15th Infantry and the British 29th Brigade moved north as far as Osan, eight
miles short of Suwon, without making contact. In the IX Corps sector, the 24th
Division at the far right sent patrols into Ich'on and Yoju, both on an
east-west line with Suwon. Both towns were empty. Shallower searches to the
north by the British 27th Brigade in the center of the corps sector also failed
to reestablish contact. (The ROK 6th Division, at the corps left, sent out no
patrols while it absorbed twenty-three hundred sorely needed
replacements.)24
General Ridgway considered the attempts by
patrols to regain contact at least to be moves in the right direction. What he
wanted and planned to see next in the west was more vigorous patrolling by
gradually enlarged forces. This patrolling would be the main mission of the
larger efforts to acquire better combat intelligence, which in his judgment had
been sadly neglected and which was a prime requisite for the still larger
offensive action that he intended would follow. His attention meanwhile was
drawn to the east, where the withdrawal to line D was still in progress and
where North Korean forces, as expected, had opened an attack to seize
Wonju.25
Wonju and Hill 247
To promote continuous defenses through the
mountains east of Wonju, Ridgway on the 5th had redrawn line D in the ROK III
and I Corps sectors, replacing the original line stretching northeastward from Wonju to Wonp'ori on the coast with a
new trace reaching almost due east of Wonju to the coastal town of Samch'ok.
(Map 17) This 45-degree change in alignment dropped the east coast position some
forty miles.26
Ridgway expected the shift south to give the two South
Korean corps additional time and space in which to set a defense and to get
behind some of the North Korean guerrillas and regulars who, if the original
line D were occupied, would be in the ROK rear areas. But as of the 7th his
expectation was nowhere near realization. In the ROK I Corps sector, the ROK
Capital Division on the coast was just beginning to move from the old to the new
line, and the ROK 3d Division, while on the move from Hongch'on in the X Corps
area, was only approaching the town of Yongwol at the left of the ROK III Corps
sector.27
The ROK III Corps had no line at
all. As could best be determined, the ROK 9th Division was fighting its way
south in the corps sector but was no farther than the trace of the old line D.
The corps' other division, the ROK 7th, was on the way out of the X Corps area,
but on entering a mountain road leading eastward toward Yongwol from Route 29 at
a point eleven miles below Wonju, the division had run into a large force of
North Koreans and was currently stalled about six miles east of its Route 29
departure point.28
The continuing lack of defense between
Wonju and the east coast left the mountains east of
Route 29 wide open to a southward enemy advance. In the X Corps area, as a
result, all of the 7th Division and part of the 2d had occupied or were
currently moving into positions along the fifty-five miles of Route 29 from
Chech'on south to Andong to protect the X Corps' supply route and to refuse the
east flank. General Barr's 17th Infantry and General McClure's 9th Infantry and
one battalion of his 23d Infantry were deployed in and around Chech'on. Farther
south, a battalion of the 32d Infantry of the 7th Division was assembled at
Tanyang, and the remainder of the regiment was moving up from the south to join
it. Barr's 31st Infantry was also moving north, two battalions headed for
Yongju, below Tanyang, the other battalion for Andong.29
2d Infantry Division Troops South of Wonju, Jan 10 '51
In the western half of the X Corps sector,
General Almond had manned a twenty-mile front from Wonju southwestward to the
east flank of the IX Corps at the Han. Having gradually gained control of the
ROK 2d, 5th, and 8th Divisions as they struggled piecemeal out of the mountains
north of line D, Almond placed the 5th along the western third of the front, the
8th in the center, and the bulk of General McClure's 2d Division at Wonju. Since
the ROK 2d Division numbered less than thirty-two hundred men, Almond assembled
it, nominally in corps reserve, on Route 13 just below Ch'ungju. As of the 7th,
the 35th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division occupied the west anchor of the X
Corps front. East of the 35th, beyond a three-mile gap scheduled to be filled by
the 5th's 27th Regiment, the 16th and 10th Regiments of the ROK 8th Division, then the 23d
and 38th Regiments of the 2d Division, carried the front a short distance beyond
Wonju.30
Map 17. NK II
Corps and V Corps Attacks, 7-22 January 1951
Prisoners taken earlier by the 2d
Division-while wedging aside the remainder of the North Korean force that had
blocked Route 29 six miles below Hongch'on and during later skirmishes farther
south at Hoengsong- had supplied a fairly clear picture of enemy intentions in
the east. A boundary between the North Korean V and II Corps
appeared to parallel Route 29 just to its east. On the east, the II
Corps, commanded by Lt. Gen. Choe Hyon and operating with the 2d, 9th,
10th, and 31st Divisions, was to seep south through the mountains
east of Route 29, avoiding engagements during this move, then was to attack
Wonju, Chech'on, Tanyang, and Taegu. Along and west of Route 29, Maj. Gen. Pang
Ho San, commander of the V Corps, was to employ his 6th, 7th, 12th,
27th, 28th, and 43d Divisions in frontal attacks to seize Wonju and
force a general withdrawal of the X Corps. Enemy guerrillas, numbering between
five thousand and seventy-five hundred and currently massed around Tanyang and
along the twenty miles of Route 29 cutting through a high mountain spur between
Tanyang and Yongju, were to displace south and southeast to disrupt the Eighth
Army's Pusan-Andong line of communication. The whole operation, according to the
captives, was to be conducted in conjunction with Chinese advances in the
west.31
To seize Wonju itself, the North Korean
plan called for a two-division frontal attack by the V Corps. The Wonju
attack was to be assisted by the enveloping effect of other V Corps
attacks farther west and by the II Corps advance on the east. Moving down
from Hoengsong during the night of the 6th, General Pang's 6th and
27th Divisions before dawn were poised just above Wonju for the frontal
attack. Ahead of these two forces, Pang's 12th Division, previously in
the Hongch'on-Hoengsong area, had crossed from the east to the west side of
Route 29 and had come south to a position northwest of Wonju, just north of the 10th Regiment
of the ROK 8th Division. On the opposite side of Route 29, General Choe's 2d
and 9th Divisions had marched from Hongch'on to the area northeast of
Wonju, and the 10th Division, coming from Ch'unch'on, was approaching
Wonju for the II Corps' thrust through the unoccupied
mountains.32
Wonju sits in the bottom of a bowl in the
valley of the Wonju River. Hills forming the rim of the bowl begin to rise about
a mile from town. To defend the town and an airstrip at its southeastern edge,
General McClure had established the 23d and 38th Regiments in an inverted U atop
the bowl rim. The 23d was deployed across Route 29 and in an arc to the west and
southwest, and the 38th was similarly aligned north, east, and southeast of
town. Bulging out as this position did at the northeastern corner of the X Corps
line, and, for the time being, the Eighth Army line, McClure's two regiments, in the words of the Eighth Army G-3, occupied an "unenviable salient."33
The leading forces of the North Korean 6th and 27th Divisions punctured the
salient before McClure's men realized it. About 0530 on the 7th, some four
hundred enemy troops disguised as and intermingled among civilians merely walked
down Route 29, by outposts in other areas, and even through some main positions.
Their identity was not discovered until they opened fire on two battalion
command posts in the rear. McClure's forces, once alerted, rapidly screened out
the infiltrators, captured 114, and broke up several assaults that followed
against their main defenses. But almost simultaneously with these assaults, the
North Korean 12th Division to the west attacked and pushed the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th
Division out of position, leaving the 2d Division's Wonju salient even more
unenviable.34
As the North Korean attack developed,
General McClure sought General Almond's approval of a withdrawal below town.
Almond, having himself foreseen a possible need to adjust the 2d Division's
line, agreed to a withdrawal provided McClure placed his forces on the hills
edging the town on the south so that they would still control the road hub.
McClure, however, assumed a latitude of decision Almond had not really given him
and allowed his two regiments to make a substantial withdrawal to the southwest
down the Wonju- Mokkye-dong road. By evening of the
7th the 23d Infantry held a line four and a half miles below Wonju, and the 38th
Infantry was aligned in depth near the village of Mich'on, another three miles
to the south. From these positions, McClure's only chance of controlling Wonju
was by artillery fire.35
Almond had no intention of depending on
artillery alone. Wonju, in his judgment, was so important and indeed so rare a
road junction that any force controlling it had gone far toward controlling
central Korea. After learning of the 2d Division's deep withdrawal he ordered
McClure to send at least one infantry battalion at first light on the 8th to
clear the town and airstrip, to occupy the high ground directly south of Wonju
with no fewer than four battalions, and not to withdraw from that position
unless Almond himself gave the order.36
McClure gave the Wonju assignment to the
23d Infantry, instructing Colonel Freeman to use one battalion in the attack.
Lt. Col. James W. Edwards' 2d Battalion started for Wonju at 0930 on the 8th,
moving over the road in a column of companies with Company E leading and with
four aircraft overhead in close support. Around noon, as Company E passed Hill
247 overlooking the road from the east two and a half miles below Wonju, the
leading riflemen spotted and fired on several North Koreans, who quickly
scattered. A half mile farther, they discovered North Koreans
asleep in buildings. Finding them was like bumping a beehive. Some of the first
to awaken gave an alarm that stirred a swarm of soldiers out of other buildings
and carried to troops located in nearby heights. The 2d Battalion killed two
hundred during the melee. But Colonel Edwards at the same time discovered that
he was being flanked on both the east and west by what he estimated to be a
regiment and pulled his battalion out of range to a position south of Hill 247.
To the west, in the meantime, the North Korean 12th Division again hit the 10th ROK Regiment
and forced it back almost on line with the 38th Infantry at Mich'on. Since this
left the west flank of the 23d Infantry, above Mich'on, wide open, General
McClure instructed Colonel Freeman to pull the 2d Battalion all the way back to
the regimental line and emplace it on the exposed flank.37
Convinced by reports of heavy enemy losses
and moderate enemy resistance that a successful attack on Wonju could be made,
General Almond ordered McClure to resume his effort to clear the town and
airstrip by noon on the 9th. Almond directed that two battalions with air and
artillery support make the renewed advance and repeated his previous instruction
that four battalions occupy positions just south of Wonju.38
McClure attached two battalions of the 38th
Infantry to the 23d to provide Colonel Freeman sufficient forces to hold a
defensive position as well as make a two-battalion
advance. For the Wonju mission Freeman organized a task force with the 2d
Battalion of the 23d Infantry and 2d Battalion of the 38th Infantry, placing Lt.
Col. James H. Skeldon, commander of the latter battalion, in charge. In snow
that canceled close air support, Task Force Skeldon started over the road toward
Wonju at 1000 on the 9th.39
As Skeldon's column approached Hill 247 at
noon, fire struck the task force from that peak and heights to the west. Skeldon
deployed a battalion on each side of the road and attacked, but by late
afternoon his forces bogged down part way up the near slopes of the enemy
position. Colonel Freeman considered Skeldon's position unsound, especially
after learning that North Korean 12th Division
forces to his west again had hit the ROK 8th
Division and advanced deep to his left rear before the South Koreans contained
them. But, under pressure to clear Wonju and occupy positions just below the
town, he held Skeldon where he was for the night, reinforced him with the bulk
of the French battalion, and planned to resume the attack on the
10th.40
Frequent snowstorms on the 10th again
eliminated close air support, and the ground troops suffered also from far lower
temperatures caused by a northerly wind shift. Freeman, personally taking charge
of the attack, pushed his forces another half mile into the 247 mass but met
increasing opposition and faced a repeated need to spread forces farther west
and east to meet North Korean counterattacks.
Around noon he notified General McClure of the growing
resistance and of the constant danger of being outflanked, and he advised
against continuing the attack. McClure agreed but instructed Freeman to hold his
position. Freeman could adjust the disposition of his troops, but he was to do
nothin that would appear to be a withdrawal.41
Freeman's change to a defensive stance was followed by
hard North Korean attacks that did not subside until well after dark and after
Freeman's forces had inflicted, in their estimate, two thousand enemy
casualties. Although control of Hill 247 vacillated through the afternoon,
Freeman still commanded a good defensive position at the close of the
engagement.42
Continuing North Korean attempts to shove
Freeman's forces out of the 247 mass on the 11th and 12th had similar results.
Reinforced by more of the French battalion and part of the Netherlands battalion
and helped by strong air support (including a B-29 attack on Wonju) after the
sky cleared around noon on the 11th, Freeman's forces broke up the assaults and
killed more than eleven hundred North Koreans. Two weak and failing attempts
against Freeman's position early on the 13th ended the V Corps' effort to
drive south of Wonju.43
Regardless of this stand at Hill 247,
General Almond was dissatisfied with the 2d Division's performance. Largely as a
result of the initial withdrawal so far south of Wonju and what Almond
considered to be inefficient staff work, poor employment of weapons (especially
artillery), improper organization of defenses, and an exhorbitant rate of
non-battle casualties (mostly from trench foot, frostbite, and respiratory
diseases), Almond on the 13th asked General Ridgway for authority to relieve
General McClure. Ridgway was not fully convinced that a relief was warranted.
His own impression of McClure, formed in part after a visit to Wonju on 2
January, was of a hardhitting, aggressive commander. He also considered
McClure's assignment at Wonju to be a "hot potato" that could burn a person no
matter how he handled it. But he felt more strongly that he had to back his
corps commander in this instance and gave Almond the authority he asked for. He
pointed out to Almond, however, that one of his own guidelines in a decision to
relieve an officer was that he had to have a better man available.44
Almond believed he had a better man in the
X Corps chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, and on 14 January sent him
to take command of the 2d Division. Ridgway returned General McClure to the
United States a few days later with the official status of relieved without
prejudice but was well aware that "the prejudice would be there anyway.
"45
East of Route 29
General Pang, the North Korean V Corps
commander, dropped his push against the ROK 8th Division at the same time he
canceled his attack south of Wonju. He had employed at least parts of all his
divisions against the Americans and South Koreans but had not won the advantage
before casualties and the near exhaustion of his ammunition and other supplies
eliminated his chances of gaining an edge. His divisions, to begin with, had
been understrength, and his troops were by no means of the same high caliber as
those that had driven to the Pusan Perimeter at the beginning of the war. His
weapons, too, were limited-mostly rifles, with some automatic weapons and
mortars. Judging it useless to continue until he had reorganized and
replenished, Pang on the 17th ordered his forces, except for the 27th
Division, to withdraw into defensive positions around
Hoengsong.46
Although the North Korean II Corps
began operations in no better shape than the V Corps, General Choe had
more success infiltrating through the mountains east of Route 29. Opening his
advance concurrently with Pang's attack on Wonju, Choe sent the 2d and
9th Divisions wide to the east out of the Wonju area, then south through
the higher Taebaek peaks toward Yongwol. Farther west, his first move was to
send the 10th Division south through the heights bordering Route
29.47
In passing Wonju on the east, part of the
10th Division accidently bumped into the 2d Division. Under Choe's order
to avoid engagement, the division commander, Maj. Gen. Lee Ban Nam, shifted his
forces farther east to prevent more such encounters but did not sidestep far
enough to avoid running almost head on into the ROK 7th Division then moving
eastward toward Yongwol eleven miles below Wonju. General Lee disentangled the
last of his forces from this engagement on the 8th. On the following day Lee's
leading 27th Regiment got past Chech'on but then ran into strong patrols
from the 7th Division operating east of Route 29 below the town. General Barr's
forces killed almost five hundred of Lee's men and took fourteen captives, who
identified their division and revealed its attack objectives to be Tanyang first
and then Taegu.48
Behind the 10th Division, the
opening through which General Choe could infiltrate forces meanwhile had begun
to narrow. On the 8th, the 10th's disengagement with the ROK 7th Division
allowed the latter to complete its move to Yongwol, and on the following day the
ROK 9th Division, finally free of its isolation to the north, came in at the
right of the ROK III Corps sector at the upper Han River town of Chongson. With
General Ridgway's approval, the ROK III Corps' new commander, Maj. Gen. Yu Jai
Heung, faced these two divisions to the northwest along the Han above Yongwol
rather than attempt to push them forward onto line D.49 General Yu
set the ROK 7th Division in the heights immediately northeast
of Yongwol and deployed the ROK 9th Division in the vicinity of its Chongson
assembly. To strengthen the ROK III Corps, Ridgway gave Yu the ROK 3d Division,
which also had assembled near Yongwol while moving toward the ROK I Corps
sector. Yu placed the additional division in reserve at Ch'unyang, thirty miles
souteast of Yongwol.50
Although there were openings in the line,
the ROK III Corps by the 10th finally had a position from which to oppose
North Korean II Corps movements through the steeper heights east of Route
29. A fifteen-mile gap in the X Corps sector between Chech'on and Yongwol was now the area through which General Choe could most
easily pass his units. Judging the movement of North Korean forces through this
gap to be the major threat to the X Corps, not the V Corps effort then in
progress at Wonju, Ridgway ordered Almond to close the gap and to eliminate all
enemy forces who had gotten behind Route 60 between Chech'on and
Yongwol.51
To assist Almond, Ridgway moved the 187th
Airborne Regimental Combat Team to Andong and attached it to the X Corps. To
hedge any deep enemy penetration below the lateral Andong-Yongdok road, Route
48, Ridgway also ordered the 1st Marine, Division to make the
move for which he earlier had alerted it, from Masan to the
P'ohang-dong-Kyongju-Yongch'on area.52
Almond initially ordered the ROK 5th Division, so far not
involved in the Wonju fight, to move east and fill the Chech'onYongwol gap,
leaving the ROK 8th Division to occupy the 5th's old sector. Since the shift of
the 5th from corps left to corps right would take time, Almond instructed
General Barr in the meantime to send a battalion of the 17th Infantry eastward
from Chech'on to make physical contact with the ROK III Corps at Yongwol and to
clear all enemy forces between the towns while en route.53
Almond already had ordered all corps units
up and down Route 29 to institute day and night patrolling to clear enemy troops
from the bordering mountains. Judging that an expansion of this patrolling in
the rear would prove more profitable than a linear defense between Chech'on and
Yongwol, he reassigned the bulk of the ROK 5th Division to clear the region
above Yongju at the corps right rear. Similar rear area assignments to other
units by 14 January spread a network of patrols and blocking positions over an
area forty miles square. The 7th Division continued to patrol from Chech'on
toward Yongwol and, with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, along both
sides of Route 29 from Chech'on south to Yongju. The remainder of the
ROK 5th Division and a regiment of the ROK 2d
Division covered the lateral road leading west from Tanyang to Ch'ungju, joining
hands with the 5th Cavalry patrolling Route 13 south from Ch'ungju through the
Mun'gyong pass. Almond concentrated the bulk of the ROK 2d Division at the lower
end of the Mun'gyong pass, where it could help bottle guerrillas massed in the
mountains to the northeast around Tanyang. Already operating against these
guerrillas was part of the X Corps special activities group, a small provisional
force recently formed by X Corps headquarters around its special operations
company for raids and other missions behind enemy lines. The group so far had
been fully committed to security missions in the X Corps' rear area.54
Deciding on the 14th that getting
additional troops into the Tanyang area was more immediately important than
clearing Wonju, Almond pulled the 2d and ROK 8th Divisions out of their
positions above Chech'on and instructed General Ruffner to occupy the entire
west corps sector, a front of some twenty-two miles, on a line extending almost
due west of Chech'on to the Han River. This move freed the ROK 8th Division,
which Almond dispatched to Tanyang.55
General Choe, aided by the wild terrain and
night movements, seemed to stay a half step ahead of Almond's attempt to blanket
the corps area. At the II Corps left, the 9th Division ran into the ROK 7th Division
near Yongwol and into infantry-tank patrols from the 17th Infantry along the Chech'on-Yongwol
road and got no farther south, but the 2d
Division, staying to the west of Yongwol, managed
to seep below the road and by 16 January placed its leading troops within sight
of Tanyang. Similarly, the 31st Division
threaded troops through the heights bordering
Route 29 as far as Tanyang, and the 27th Division
of the North Korean V Corps, coming south
behind the 31st, pushed forces as far as the Chech'on area. Still in the lead, the
10th Division meanwhile changed course after running into 7th Division patrols
below Chech'on on 9 January and by the 18th reached within a few miles of its
new objective, Andong.56
By appearances, the daily deepening of the
North Korean II Corps penetration steadily enlarged the danger of
envelopment of the X Corps' east flank. But the heavy patrolling by Almond's
forces kept the North Koreans moderately engaged, draining the groups
encountered of men and ammunition, and the corps' artillery fire and air support
also took a toll. The winter weather compounded these losses. To turn the snow
and temperatures that registered as low as twenty-one degrees below zero to an
advantage, Almond ordered the destruction of all buildings that might shelter
the North Koreans. As many structures as could be reached by patrols, artillery,
and air strikes were demolished. According to captives, diseases besides those
related to cold weather also struck hard among North Korean
ranks.57
The progressive weakening of the II Corps became particularly
noticeable around 22 January when X Corps patrols began to encounter only stray
soldiers and irregular bands instead of organized formations. Almond dismissed
the enemy corps as an effective force on the 25th. "By utilizing armor and
armored vehicles in our 'power' patrols where possible, and through systematic
search of the mountainous recesses by dismounted forces," he reported to General
Ridgway, "we have completely disrupted the cohesion and organization of four
North Korean divisions."58
These four, the 2d, 9th, 27th, and 31st, were indeed in bad shape.
General Choe recalled them on the 24th, instructing them to assemble above
P'yongch'ang, some fifteen miles north of Yongwol. Those surviving the
withdrawal, which amounted to an infiltration in reverse, reached their assembly
area by the end of January. By Eighth Army and X Corps estimates, the survivors
of an original four-division strength near sixteen thousand numbered, at most
eighty-six hundred.59
The North Korean 10th Division, too, had suffered
heavy losses en route to Andong. General Choe directed General Lee to withdraw
to P'yongch'ang on the 23d and informed him that if he could notify Choe of his
escape route, other II Corps forces would attempt to clear the way. Aware
that Lee's division was all but encircled by X Corps forces above and by the 1st
Marine Division below, Choe advised Lee that if he could not get his division
out, he was to stay in the X Corps rear and employ his troops as
guerrillas.60
Lee elected to stay where he was but made a less than
halfhearted attempt to conduct guerrilla operations. When General Smith's
marines opened a systematic screening operation in the
P'ohang-dong-Andong-Yongdok area on the 18th, they found it harder to locate
Lee's forces than to fight them. A 10th Division
officer captured some days later explained that
General Lee had fallen victim of acute melancholia, brooding constantly over his
predicament and directing his forces in no course of action other than one of
alternate hiding and flight. After nearly three weeks of combing, General Smith
notified General Ridgway that his forces had scattered the remnants of the
10th Division. In
Smith's judgment, Lee's forces were not then capable of any kind of major
effort, and the situation was sufficiently in hand to permit the assignment of a
new mission to the 1st Marine Division.61
As contact with enemy forces diminished,
General Almond meanwhile had begun to organize a solid forward line from the
right bank of the Han opposite Yoju eastward across Route 29 five miles below
Wonju to a point five miles above Yongwol. As of 30 January the 2d Division was
moving onto the line between the Han and Route 29 on the west, the ROK 8th
Division above Chech'on in the middle, and the 7th Division above Yongwol on the
east.62
The 2d Division in fact had instituted a
program of patrolling and in the process had reoccupied Wonju. Following the
North Korean V Corps' withdrawal above Hoengsong, a battalion of the 9th
Infantry on the 23d reentered and set up a patrol base in Wonju and on the next
day began sending infantry and armored patrols to the west, north, and
northeast. At the right, the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division (the division was
now commanded by Maj. Gen. Claude B. Ferenbaugh) had pursued the North Korean
II Corps' withdrawal above P'yongch'ang, sending a battalion of infantry
and artillery far enough forward to destroy the town with a heavy shelling on
the 27th.63
The patrolling north of the corps front
during the last week of January was largely a result of orders from General
Ridgway on the 20th and 23d calling for infantry-armor patrolling and for a
diversion to prevent enemy movement south of the Yoju-Wonju line. These instructions were part of an expanding reconnaissance in
force that Ridgway had instituted in the west on the 15th.64
Notes
1 Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 3 Jan 51, copy in CMH. Ridgway
at this time urged Collins to press for the addition of helicopter companies to
Army transportation facilities: "Such situations [as the Chinese method of
attack] could be more effectively met and many thousands more of the enemy
destroyed, if we had the capability of putting down small reconnaissance groups
on ridges and hilltops, and could withdraw them at will. We could also supply
temporarily isolated units in a more efficient and economical way than by
parachute."
2 Eighth Army PIRs 173-176,
1-4 Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51. 3 Ltr,
Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway to Haislip, 11 Jan 51, copy in CMH.
4 Eighth Army PIR 176, 4 Jan 51.
5 Ibid.; Eighth Army G3 SS
Rpt, Jan 51.
6 Msg, CG Eighth Army to CG I U.S. Corps et al., 041215
Jan 51, copy in IX Corps Comd Rpt, Jan 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nat, Jan 51.
7 A former Japanese arsenal area four miles east of
Inch'on had been christened ASCOM (Army Service Command) City by American
occupation forces in 1945 and occupied during recent operations by engineer,
quartermaster, ordnance and signal supply depots and by Headquarters, 3d
Logistical Command.
8 In December Hill had replaced General Stewart, who
became the assistant division commander of the 2d Division.
9 3d Log Comd Daily Opus Rpt 103, 4 Jan 51; Eighth Army
Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Hq, 3d Log Comd, Memo, Col Hill for CG Eighth Army, 9 Jan
51, sub: Major Items Destroyed at the Port of Inchon; 3d Log Comd G4 Hist Rpt,
Jan 51.
10 Msg, CG I Corps to CG 25th Div et al., 041300 Jan 51;
IX Corps Opn Dir 21, 041500 Jan 51 (confirms oral orders issued 041200 Jan
51).
11 3d Log Comd Engr Monthly Activ Rpt, Jan 51; Futrell,
The United States Air Force in Korea, p. 259; 3d Log Comd Daily
Opus Rpt 104, 5 Jan 51.
12 3d Log Comd Engr Monthly Activ Rpt, Jan 51; 3d Log
Comd Daily Opus Rpt 105, 6 Jan 51.
13 Hq, 2d Log Comd, Memo, Col
Hill for CG Eighth Army, 9 Jan 51, sub: Major Items Destroyed at the Port of
Inchon; 3d Log Comd G4 Hist Rpt, Jan 51; Field, United States Naval
Operations, Korea, p. 312.
14 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 4 and 5 Jan 51; IX Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 3d Log Comd Daily Opns Rpt 104, 5 Jan 51, and 105, 6 Jan 51.
15 Rad, GX-1-313 KGOO, Eighth
Army to C/S ROKA et al., 4 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-316 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S
ROKA et al., 4 Jan 51.
16 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-344 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 5 Jan
51.
17 I Corps G3 Jul, Sum, 5 Jan
51; IX Corps POR 306, 5 Jan 51.
18 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1 Corps G3 Jul, Sum, 6
Jan 51.
19 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 51; 1 Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 5, 6, and 7 Jan 51.
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 51.
21 Rad, GX-1-526 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and
CG IX Corps, 7 Jan 51.
22 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51.
23 Rad, GX-1-526 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 7 Jan 51.
24 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps POR 351, 7 Jan
51; IX Corps PIR 103, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps POR 312, 7 Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 104, 8
Jan 51.
25 Ms, Ridgway, The Korean
War, Issues and Policies, p. 380.
26 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-403 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA, 5 Jan 51.
27 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 6 and 7 Jan 51.
28 Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 7
Jan 51.
29 Ibid., 6 and 7 Jan
51.
30 Ibid.
31 Eighth Army PIR 176, Incl 2, 4 Jan 51, PIR 177, 5 Jan
51, PIR 178, Incl 2, 6 Jan 51, and PIR 179, 7 Jan 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52.
32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 180, Incl 2, 8 Jan 51.
33 2d Div G3 Jnl, 7 Jan 51;
Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 7 Jan 51.
34 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; 2d Div PIR 77, 7 Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf POR 118, 13
Jan 51 (covers period 4I1 Jan 51); 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 38th Inf PIR
5, 9 Jan 51 (covers period 5-9 Jan 51).
35 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; X Corps 01 61, 7 Jan
51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 Jan 51; 23d Inf
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf S3 Jul, 7 Jan 51;
23d Inf POR 118, 13 Jan 51.
36 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; Rad, X 17082, CG X Corps to CG 2d Div, 8 Jan 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51.
37 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; 23d Inf Opn O 19, 8 Jan 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 8 Jan 51; Rad, X 17092, X
Corps to Eighth Army, 8 Jan 51; Rad, X 17095. X Corps to Eighth Army, 8 Jan 51;
Eighth Army PIR 180, 8 Jan 51.
38 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51.
39 Ibid.; 2d Div LOI, 9 Jan
51: 2d Div G3 Jnl, Entry J-43, 9 Jan 51; 23d Inf Opn O 20, 9 Jan 51; 23d Inf
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
40 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51.
41 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 23d Inf S3 Jnl, 10 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR
182, 10 Jan 51; Technical Report, Weather Effect
on Army Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, vol. I (Department of Physics, Oregon State College, 1956), pp.
VII-12-VII-13, copy in CMH.
42 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 10 Jan
51.
43 Ibid.; 23d Inf S3 Jul, 11
and 12 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 21 Jan 51.
44 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and
Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
45 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
46 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51. North Koreans captured in January reported that many of their weapons
were those discarded by Americans and that they preferred these because it was
simpler to replenish ammunition from stores abandoned by Americans.
47 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
48 Eighth Army PIR 180, Incl
2, 8 Jan 51, and PIR 181, Ind 2, 9 Jan 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 7th
Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
49 General Yu replaced General Lee on 9
January.
50 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8 and 9 Jan 51.
51 Ibid., 9 and 10 Jan 51;
Rad, GX-1-751 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 10 Jan 51.
52 Rad, GX-1-637 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG 187th Abn RCT, 8 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-661 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to
CG 1st Marine Div, 9 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-860 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps et
al., 11 Jan 51.
53 X Corps OI 67, 10 Jan 51;
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 Jan 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
54 X Corps OI 64, 8 Jan 51,
and 69, 12 Jan 51; X Corps POR 110, Annex 1, 14 Jan 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51.
55 X Corps OI 70, 14 Jan 51, 71, 14 Jan 51, and 73, 15
Jan 51; Ltr, Almond to Ridgway, 15 Jan 51, copy in CMH; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51.
56 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51.
57 Ibid.; X Corps 0168, 12 Jan
51, and 72, 14 Jan 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
58 Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen
Ridgway, 25 Jan 51, copy in CMH.
59 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; Eighth Army PIR 176, Incl 2, 4 Jan 51, and PIR 188, Incl 2, 16 Jan
51.
60 Lynn Montross, Maj. Hubbard D. Kuokka, and Maj. Norman
W. Hicks, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea,
1950-1953 (Washington,
D.C., 1962), vol. IV, The East-Central Front,
p. 51.
61 Ibid., pp. 42-14, 48, 53,
56.
62 Rad, X 17435, CG X Corps to
CG Eighth Army, 25 Jan 15; X Corps 0184, 85, and 86,
28 Jan 51, and 87 and 88, 29 Jan 51; 7th Div Opn O 41, 28 Jan 51; 2d Div Opn O
21, 29 Jan 51.
63 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51.
64 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs 1, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan
51; Rad, GX-1-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms
Ridgway's instructions delivered orally by the Eighth Army chief of staff on 23
Jan 51); X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Rad, X 17405, CG X Corps to CG 2d Div,
23 Jan 51; X Corps 0179, 25 Jan 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 7th Div Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
