The US Carbine, Caliber .30in,
M3, or T3, was an M2
with suitable mountings prepared on the receiver
to take various models of infra-red
night-sighting devices. No open or conventional
sights were provided. The M3, (its development
title was T3), was produced in limited numbers as
a semi-prototype. Only about 2100 were
manufactured compared to 5,510,000 M1 carbines, 150,000 M1A1
carbines and 570,000 M2 carbines.
These infrared weapons were
developed in 1943 by the Army, precisely to
defeat the infiltration tactics of the Japanese.
Although fewer than 500 units were actually used,
the Sniperscope accounted for about 30% of total
Japanese casualties suffered by small-arms fire
during the first week of the Okinawa
campaign.
Few combat personnel in the
Korean War were aware that the US possessed
infrared night-vision capability. Those who did
know, didn't welcome them. Objections were
mostly focused on their bulk and susceptibility
to damage.
In part, the poor reception by
combat units of night vision weapons was because
the Sniperscope M1 did indeed have significant
flaws. However, the vastly improved Sniperscope M3, with almost
double the effective range of the M1, with a less
vulnerably located IR light source, and with the
T23 flash hider was available at about the start
of the Korean War. Supplying only the M3, and in
quantity, would have made the value of the weapon
much more obvious, particularly if done before we
faced the CCF.
In actuality, all these infrared
devices would have been of tremendous value, if
provided in sufficient quantities and with
personnel trained in their use distributed along
perimeter defenses and listening posts. The main
strengths of the Chinese forces were their
ability to move swiftly at night, locate
automatic weapons and unit defensive weak points,
move grenade and submachine gun platoons into
striking range by stealth, and then attack
violently without warning. Clearly, night-vision
weapons distributed among rifle squads in
perimeter defenses would have been decisive
weapons. Their weakest feature was their active
source, that is they illuminated the search
areas, albeit with IR. Once an enemy had reason
to anticipate their use, they could have used IR
detectors and located the source from much
further distance than the range of Sniperscope
itself, enabling very effective counter measures
!
To me, the US Army higher command
levels failed abysmally in Korea.
First, they failed to prepare our
ground forces psychologically for the savage
realities of infantry combat. Instead, they
prepared our combat units basically for nothing
but garrison duty. Secondly, they initially
failed to equip all our infantry with the 3.5
inch superbazooka and HEAT rounds, to effectively
cope with modern armor, even though these had
been made standard shortly after WWII. Finally,
they failed to introduce reliable small-unit
communications equipment, and special weapons
such as infrared night-vision carbines, even
though these would have given us a decisive edge
in small-unit combat at night.
These blunders are consistent
with High Command's lack of understanding of
the tactics and strengths of the North Koreans,
and of the CCF itself. Together, these blunders
of command were primarily responsible for our
initial defeats by the
North Koreans, and for our later crushing
defeats by the CCF.
These deficiencies were largely corrected over
time, and we did force the Chinese and NK to the
truce table, but the men who paid were those who
were killed, wounded or imprisoned, not the
higher command levels actually responsible for
the blunders.
