The Soviet
View
"On Guard For Peace and Labor"
Mir Aviatsii 2-97 pp. 29-39
- Vladislav Morozov, Sergey Uskov, Ufa
A Short Observation on the DPRK Air
Forces from 1948 to 1996
At 1500 hours Central Korean Time on 25
June 1950, a pair of Yak-9P fighters sporting the
markings of the North Korean Air Forces arrived over
Kimpo Airfield near Seoul where they found the Amerians
evacuating the place at a high rate of operations,
feeling that the South Korean capital would soon fall
to the advancing ground forces of the DPRK. The Yaks
shot up the control tower, destroyed a fuel tank, and
then strafed a C-54 transport belonging to the USAF
which was sitting on the ground. At the same time, a
flight of Yaks shot up seven ROK Air Force aircraft at
the Seoul International Airport. At 1900, the Yaks
returned to Kimpo and finished off the C-54. This was
the first such episode in the war in Korea.
The formation of the DPRK Air Forces
began considerably earlier than the events which were
described above. Not even three months after the end of
the Second World War had passed when the Great Leader
of the Korean People, Kim Il Song, made the decision to
"Create an Air Force for the New Korea" (29
November 1945). Training the cadres for the air forces
of "New Korea" began (with the experience of
the "Great Northern Neighbor") during mid
1946 with the organization of aviation clubs in
Pyongyang, Sinuiju, Hamhung, Chonjin, and Huer Ne -
there where the units of the Soviet occupation forces
were located. The Soviets became the instructors, of
course, and taught programs on the Po-2, UT-2, Yak-18
(and, perhaps the Yak-9UTI as well as the La-7UTI and
Yak-11).
The search for candidates caused
serious problems. Those Koreans who had served with the
Japanese Air Force during the war years were labeled
"enemies of the People" - they were
unacceptable and not asked. The intelligentsia, the
bourgeois, and other more literate members of Korean
society had, after the arrival of Soviet troops,
largely fled to the American zone of occupation, since
they felt, and with some truth, that staying behind
would result in them falling under "the true light
of Korean Socialism". On the other hand, the
majority of the Korean population remained relatively
illiterate peasantry, which had only the barest
knowledge of aviation. The simple "ricepaddy
workhorse" could be taught how to fire a PPSh
submachine gun with relative ease, or even a Mosin
rifle, by filling his head with some of the theses of
"The Program of the Temporary Peoples'
Committee of North Korea", but turning him into a
pilot would be a very difficult task.
In order to break this problem into its
constituent parts for solution, it was decided to send
Kim Il Song military specialists from the Soviet Army
(including those which could approach the people most
directly - those who were Soviets of Chinese, Korean,
Mongolian, or other extraction). This was the standard
method used to "strengthen" the armies of
other brother countries in those days, including the
Peoples' Liberation Army of China led by Comrade
Mao. The most literate young people were selected for
the aviation clubs and the Communist military aviation
schools, who had not only boys but girls in the first
groups selected.
The "First Swallows" to fly
from the new Air Forces in North Korea began at the end
of 1947; these were Li-2 and C-47 military transports
making regular flights from Pyongyang to the Soviet
Primorye area (Vladivostok and Khabarovsk) and China
(Harbing). The flights were manned by mixed
Soviet-Korean crews. The main task of these flights was
to establish regular liaison between the
"Temporary Committee", later the government
of the DPRK, and its "brother partners" via
the delivery of diplomatic mail and various types of
specialists.
In 1948 the Soviet and American forces
abandoned the Korean Peninsula. Nearly immediately
afterwards the "Temporary Peoples' Committee
of North Korea" turned to the creation of the
Korean Peoples' Army - KPA - (Decree dated 8
February 1948) and just over six months later (9
September 1948) declared themselves the Democratic
Peoples' Republic of Korea or DPRK. Using this
non-traditional approach meant that by the end of 1948
Pyongyang had assembled a reasonably powerful army of
several divisions and equipped with Soviet arms
(the
T-34 tank, the SU-76M and SU-100 SP
guns, the Katyusha rocket launcher, and heavy
artillery).(1) Consider this in the light of the fact
that at every echelon there were Soviet (or on
occasion, Chinese) military advisors. The Korean Air
Forces were under the command of General Van Len and
his Soviet advisor Colonel Petrachev. His command
officially consisted of one mixed aviation division in
mid 1950, but numerically it was significantly larger
than a Soviet air division. American calculation showed
that the Koreans had 132 combat aircraft including 70
Yak-3, Yak-7B, Yak-9, and La-7 fighters, as well as 62
Il-10 ground attack aircraft. The precise numbers
tallied by Soviet advisors were: 1st Aviation Division
(1st Assault Aviation Regiment - 93 x Il-10 aircraft;
1st Fighter Aviation Regiment - 79 x Yak-9 fighters;
1st Training Aviation Regiment - 67 trainers,
transports, and liaison aircraft) and two aviation
technical battalions. Total number of men was 2,829
[10]. The framework of the armed forces consisted of
former Soviet aviation specialists and flying personel
who had received their training between 1946 and 1950
in the USSR, China, and immediately upon the territory
of the DPRK.(2)
In general, and in regard to the DPRK
Air Forces in specific during the Korean War, a number
of legends have been created. For example, Western
experts stoutly support the existence of a DPRK Air
Forces Yak-3 regiment manned by women, but at the same
time, the only womens' regiment or even flight
singled out was a part of the North Korean 56th Fighter
Aviation Regiment. Precise information is given as to
participation by a number of DPRK Air Forces women
pilots. Their literature recalls, in particular, Tua
Sen Hi(3),who was commanding a MiG-15 squadron at the
end of the war. There is no verified data on any combat
operations by any women available in regard to North
Korean pilots.
Beside that, the achievements of
American pilots during the first weeks of the war have
recollections of encountering North Korean jet fighters
using the "stepped" configuration (either the
Yak-17, Yak-23,or Yak-15), which led American
historians to conclude that the KPAFAC had begun the
war initially equipped with jet fighters. No Soviet
historian supports this claim, since they knew at that
time the Chinese (e.g. who were training on the MiG-15,
as there was no MiG-15UTI at the time) were training on
the Yak-17UTI. These aircraft were located, for the
most part, in Mukden, Anshang, and Laoyang.
Furthermore, the Americans also reported encounters
over North Korea with La-5, Pe-2, Yak-7, Il-2, and even
((P-39)) Airacobras, ((A-20)) Bostons, and Spitfires!
As the Russians say in those situations, "Check
the material units..."(4)
The KPAFAC was "opposed" by
the air forces of the South Korean ROKAF, which in mid
1950 consisted of eight L-4 Piper Cub liaison aircraft
and three T-6 Texan trainers. One other Piper had been
lost in May 1949 when the pilot defected to the north.
The rest of the aircraft were destroyed on the ground
during the first days of the war. The war caught the
ROKAF in its very earliest stages of formation - the
Kimpo airfield was virtually all it had: of five
airfields which had been laid out and were under
construction, not one of them was ready by the
beginning of the war. South Korea had only organized a
flying school in January 1949 and had not succeeded in
training an adequate number of aviation
specialists.
The South Korean air force numbered a
total of 1,899 soldiers and officers as of 2 June 1950;
of this number, less than 100 were pilots, and since
all their aircraft "died" in the first days
of the war, they either fled or were captured by the
North Koreans. Therefore, when it came to bringing them
in on operations, as the South needed some sort of
visible presence in the air, the Americans carried out
an original initiative which was called Project BOUT
ONE, which was called for just prior to the start of
the war: ten USAF Reserve F-51D Mustangs were
reassigned and repainted with South Korean markings.
They were piloted by Americans led by Major D. Hess,
and serviced by American technicians. During the summer
and fall battles of 1950, these Mustangs actively
participated in combat operations, which were described
as "...the South Korean Air Force is flying wing
to wing with the UN air forces to protect their
country." The Americans had simply no other
approach that they could make at that time, since there
were not a sufficient number of real South Korean
pilots available.
Discussing the reasons that led to the
Korean War is outside the scope of this article, and
therefore we will only provide a short overview of the
factual events. Our interest in the war only concerns
this or that event which directly related to the North
Korean air forces. Initially, combat operations went
successfully for Pyongyang: tank columns moved forward
nearly without opposition, and the Yaks and Ils
provided them good support from the air. For their
participation in the "battles" near Seoul and
Taejong several Korean Peoples' Army units were
given Guards honorifics. Among them were four infantry
and one tank brigade, four infantry and two
antiaircraft artillery regiments, and a torpedo boat
detachment. The KPAFAC 56th Fighter Aviation Regiment
was given the honorific of "Guards Taejong"
for its achievements. To this day, this is the only
Guards unit among the units of the KPAFAC.
Thus, in the initial stages of the war,
success was on the North Korean side. This continued up
to the point where the US forces interfered in the war.
As a result, even by the end of August 1950 the
North's aviation had been destroyed, and what was
left could only put up token resistance to UN forces;
the rest of the KPAFAC fled to Chinese territory.(5)
Continuous attacks by American aviation had forced the
DPRK ground units to switch over to night combat
operations. But after the landing by UN forces on 15
September 1950 in the Inchon area in the rear of the
DPRK forces, and the simultaneous commencement of a
counterattack by US forces in the Pusan beachhead, the
forces of the DPRK began a "temporary strategic
withdrawal" (translated into plain Russian, they
ran to the north). As a result, by the end of October
1950 the North Koreans had lost over 90% of their own
territory and their army was nearly completely
crushed.
This position changed dramatically with
the entry into Korea of the "Chinese Peoples'
Volunteer Corps" under Marshal Pen Dehuan, under
the cover of the Soviet 64th PVO Fighter Aviation Corps
(IAK), which was equipped with the MiG-15 fighter. The
Chinese pushed the Americans and their allies back to
the 38th Parallel, but were stopped at that line. As
for the KPAFAC, the only element which they had that
conducted widespread operations and is listed in their
writings was the night bomber regiment (commanded by
Pak Den Sik), which began flying the Po-2 and later
also used the Yak-11 and Yak-18. And, as is not
strange, there was a real value to their combat
operations. The Yankees never did successfully solve
the "Po-2 Problem", while they were seriously
concerned about it. Beside that, the "Chinese
alarm clocks" as the Americans dubbed the Po-2s,
always played on the psyche of the enemy, as they
caused much alarm on the other side. For example, on 28
November 1950 the 8th Fighter Bomber Wing suffered
damage to 11 F-51D Mustangs, three of which had to be
left behind when they withdrew. On 17 June 1951, their
attacks destroyed one F-86 Sabre and damaged eight more
(four seriously and four with only light damage). One
can recall that it was a raid by a Po-2 on 16 June 1953
in the Inchon area which caused the destruction of
98,000 barrels of petroleum products. And the list goes
on. Ultimately, two squadrons from the 56th Fighter
Aviation Regiment and some Chinese aviation units also
joined in the night attacks - but they were flying La-9
and La-11 aircraft.
In November-December 1950, the Chinese
and Koreans began forming the "Unified Air
Forces" (OVA). Dominated by the Chinese, command
of the OVA was therefore given to Chinese General Lu
Chien. On 10 June 1951, the Korean Air Forces numbered
136 aircraft and 60 well-trained pilots. In December of
that year, they commenced combat operations in MiG-15
equipped fighter divisions (those of commanders Fan
Tsuan and Si Buan). A bit later on, at the end of
December, they were unified with a PLA aviation
division (only one) as part of the Soviet 324th IAD,
with whom they flew into combat. Then, when the Koreans
felt they could operate independently, without support
from their "Big Friends", they were not very
eager to join in battle with the enemy. By the end of
1952, the number of divisions had been increased to
three, of which two belonged to the OVA. At that time,
a order from Kim Il Sung dated 30 December 1952
"On Strengthening Our Defensive Position"
read as follows: "...Aviation units are to
forcefully complete their flight training and in three
months be ready to participate in combat operations in
squadron size formations, continue to conduct
reconnaissance and maneuvering raids, and improve the
tactics of the Air Forces..."
As a fully function combat force, even
by the middle of 1953 the KPAFAC was still not
completely ready. The main workload for the air battles
in the skies over Korea lay upon the Russians and the
Chinese pilots. As one can understand after reading the
memoirs of the Soviet participants in that war, there
were few North Korean pilots, and teaching them was
difficult, particularly since they spoke neither
Russian or Chinese. In their own recollections, the
Koreans (and not without some shouting) simply claimed
that they stayed out of combat in order to ensure that
they retained their "nationalist
cadres".(6)
Not being in a great hurry, the
"Great Peoples' Combat Leader", Kim Il
Sung, organized an air defense system. In mid 1951, he
held an interview with the leadership of the PLA
"On Strengthening Air Defense", but at the
same time, further negotiations did not move forward.
The fact of the matter is that the brunt of the air
defense of the DPRK fell to the Soviet units, as the
Koreans and Chinese only played an auxiliary role in
supporting the effort up until the end of the war. And
they did want and get an air defense, but only one
corresponding to their input.
Apparently the only air defense
subunits created by order of Kim Il Song on 2 December
1950 were the "aircraft hunter riflemen". The
idea put forward by the "Great Leader" was
based on each infantry regiment creating a platoon
designated to combat enemy aircraft via their organic
weapons - using either tripod mounted machine guns or
light machine guns to cables strung across valleys and
vertical supports to trap the closing aircraft.As
assured in Northern propaganda, several of these groups
(for example, that led by Hero of the DPRK Yu Gi Ho)
used these methods to destroy between three and five
enemy aircraft! No matter whether the reader feels
these are viable means or not, the fact remains that
the "hunter-riflemen" remained massed at the
front and did cause the UN pilots to shed more than a
little blood.(7)
The summary results of the air war in
Korea were as follows: the fighters of the 64th IAK
shot down 1,097 aircraft; the antiaircraft units of the
64th IAK claimed another 212;(8) OVA fighters claimed
271; and PLA ground forces, another 1,284 aircraft.(9)
For that reason, UN aviation lost 2,864 aircraft. Our
own losses: 64th IAK, 120 pilots and 335 aircraft; 64th
IAK antiaircraft units, 68 killed,165 wounded, and one
gun and one searchlight destroyed; and the OVA, 135
pilots and 231 aircraft shot down. Overall losses for
the "Communist Forces" were 556 aircraft. The
North Koreans, in their own assessment, assure us that
"The Indomitable and Heroic Korean Peoples'
Army" destroyed 5,729 aircraft in the course of
the war, damaged 6,484, and captured 11 as trophies;
but as to their own losses, they have been as silent
with us as well as with the Chinese. (10)
There is information which identifies
DPRK aces (e.g. those pilots who shot down four or five
of the enemy's aircraft). For example, Hero of the
DPRK Kim Gi Ok was recorded to have racked up six
victories even in the first months of the war. But, as
can be seen, when one enters the "Gallery of
Heroes" in Pyongyang's "Museum of the
National-Liberation Fatherland War 1950-53" nearly
all of the portraits which hang there are of
infantrymen and artillerists; there are a few tanks,
but next to zero sailors or pilots. And this is in the
DPRK - a country where the number of awards to inspire
the spirit of the population are the highest in the
world!
On the day that the ceasefire was
signed - 27 July 1953 - the North Korean aviation still
had low combat skills, but their size had been greatly
increased.(11) Various experts have estimated their
numbers at 350-400 aircraft, which included at least
200 MiG-15s. All of these were based on Chinese
territory, since prewar airfields in North Korea had
been destroyed and during the course of the war had not
been reestablished. The Chinese Volunteer Corps was
withdrawn from the DPRK and control of the 38th
Parallel turned over to the units of the KPA. A deep
reorganization of all of the arms of service of the
North Korean Army was begun, which was accompanied by a
wider fielding of new military equipment provided by
the USSR.
For the Air Forces, there was a driving
speed to build tens of airfields which were connected
as a single air defense network along the 38th Parallel
by radar stations, VNOS (ground air observer) posts,
and communications lines. The "Front Line"
(as the demarcation line between the forces has been
referred to by the DPRK up until the present time) and
major cities were completely covered by air defense
artillery. In 1953, there was a complete conversion of
the KPAFAC to jet aircraft: over the next three years,
the USSR and China transferred a large number of
MiG-15s to them. Even by the end of the war, the first
Il-28 bombers had been given to them, in time for the
first ten aircraft to take part in the "Victory
Parade" over Pyongyang on 27 July 1953.
Military aviation continued to undergo
major organizational changes - the Air Defense Forces
(PVO) were separated from the Air Forces, as were Army
and Naval Aviation.
The Air Defense Forces included
subordinate staffs for aerial target acquisition,
antiaircraft artillery, and fighter aviation.
Naval Aviation included several fighter
squadrons, which were tasked with covering the primary
ports, and a small number of Il-28 bombers which could
be used for naval reconnaissance and maritime strike
efforts.
Since 1953, Army Aviation has included
all civil aviation in the DPRK, which was particularly
voluminous during the immediate postwar years, when the
road network and railroads had not been restored.
Beside the old Po-2 and Li-2 aircraft, Army Aviation
included the An-2, Il-12, and Yak-12. According to
unsubstantiated data, the North Koreans used these
aircraft in 1953-54 to drop its agents into the South.
These Army Aviation aircraft did not drop them by
parachute, but made secret landings in South Korea
itself. One of these An-2 aircraft, completely painted
black, was captured during one of these operations by
the South Korean security service and is on display at
the present time in their military museum
exposition.
Likewise, the South Korean Air Forces
were actively involved in inserting their spies into
the DPRK. In one of their successful operations, which
received a great deal of cooperation from the
Americans, was "MiG Hunt". On 21 September
1953, North Korean Senior Lieutenant Kim Sok No
received a medal and the award of $100,000 US for
turning his MiG-15bis over to the South. This was
greatly appreciated by the Americans, who until that
time had only had pieces of destroyed MiGs to examine,
and the aircraft received thorough testing on Okinawa
and then in the US.
In general, the lines of demarcation,
whether on the ground or in the air, still saw a nearly
continuous firing across them; nearly a hundred such
incidents have occurred since the early 1950s. The most
frequently quoted episode in literature took place on 2
February 1955 over the Sea of Japan. At that time,
eight North Korean MiG-15 aircraft unsuccessfully
attempted to intercept an American RB-45 Tornado
reconnaissance aircraft which was photographing the
coastal areas of the DPRK while under the protection of
16 USAF F-86 Sabres As a result of the engagement, the
North Koreans lost two aircraft, and the American
losses were nil. Another scandalous incident took place
on 7 November 1955, when an officially authorized UN
flight of an An-2 carrying Polish observers along the
DMZ was shot down by the South Koreans. The official
answer was that it was mistakenly shot down by the
Southerners.
At the XXth Congress of the CPSU in
1956, the international lexicon was expanded by the
introduction of the term "The cult of
personality". In the world Communist movement,
there was a deep division between the pro- and
anti-Stalinist supporters. In the DPRK, at the IIIrd
Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, it was with
disapproval that they noted "The cumulative
searches for anti-party counter-revolutionary factions
and revisionists" began with a grandiose purge
that thinned out the Party ranks. At that time, the
term Chu Che (self reliance) was heard for the first
time (the idea of building a separate brand of
Socialism in Korea without any support from external
forces). In North Korea, the Soviets, as well as the
Chinese, see that the idea for this plan is
insufficiently supported. Nevertheless, while there was
no interruption in the receipt of new armaments for
their Armed Forces from either the USSR or the PRC, but
there was a simultaneous questioning of the repression
of the most literate military and technical specialists
from the educated members of the population in
socialist countries.
The strengthening of the armed forces
had gone to full speed in 1956: a complete navy was
formed, the organizational structure of the Air Forces
was completed, and the Army began modernization. For
armament, they received the first tens of MiG-17F
fighters and Mi-4 and Mi-4PL helicopters. In 1958, the
Koreans received the MiG-17PF fighter interceptor from
the USSR. On 6 March 1958, a pair of American T-6A
training aircraft flying along the "Front
Lines" were shot at by antiaircraft artillery, and
then attacked by MiGs. One of the Texans was shot down
and its crew killed. The North Koreans asserted that
the Americans were "preparing to make an
intelligence flight..."
In 1959, Kim Il Sung solemnly
proclaimed the "Victory of Chu Che Socialism"
and named himself as the leader who would bring
Communism to the Korean people! But in South Korea, at
that time local "leftists", supported by the
agents of the North, had fought with the former Singman
Ree government, which hadcompletely lost their
influence over the situation. This set up things so
that in 1960 South Korean generals saved the country,
espousing the "ideals of democracy" and
called upon the USA to assist them in a complete
military turnaround, sharply suppressed organized
opposition in the country, and set up the conditions
which would lead to the "economic
juggernaut". American forces in South Korea
received tactical nuclear weapons and the means to
deliver them - the Sergeant, Honest John, and Lance
missiles, and somewhat later, the Pershing. The South
Korean Army, together with the US 7th Infantry Division
which was deployed in the South, began to train for
combat operations under the conditions of the use of
weapons of mass destruction. In the early 1960s, the
South Koreans began building what they termed
"reinforced concrete positions" along the
37th Parallel (reinforced firing steps, reinforced by
not just conventional mine fields, but in some
instances, nuclear munitions), which could rapidly be
occupied and made operational in any instance of a
sharp crisis with the DRPK. Nevertheless, the North
Koreans, under the covering noise of resurveying their
lines, turned themselves to building more powerful and
more carefully concealed fortifications.
In 1961, a treaty on mutual aid and
defense was signed by the USSR and the DPRK with a
massive number of additional secret protocols, which
have not been revealed even now. Under this treaty, in
1962 the KPAFAC began to receive the supersonic MiG-19S
and the S-25 Berkut surface to air missile system; the
KPA also received chemical aviation and artillery
delivered munitions, and soldiers began receiving
training in fighting battles under conditions of
chemical and radiological contamination. After 1965,
the North Korean aviation was rearmed again, this time
with MiG-21F fighters and S-75 Dvina surface-to-air
missile complexes.
At the Vth Plenum of the Central
Committee of the KWP in December 1962, Kim Il Sung
declared a new course for conducting "parallel
economic and defensive construction". This was
predicated on measures which undertook the complete
militarization of the economy, converted the entire
country into a fortress, armed the entire nation (e.g.
the entire population became military cadres), and
modernized the army. This "new course"
captured and held the entire life and policy of the
DPRK until the present time: North Korea puts 25% of
its gross national product into its armed forces.
In the 1960s and 1970s the KPAFAC
became embroiled in an number of border conflicts and
actions:
- On 17 May 1963 KPAFAC air defense
ground elements fired on an American OH-23 helicopter,
forcing it down on the territory of the DPRK; - On 19
January 1967, South Korean patrol boat Number 56 was
attacked by North Korean ships, and then sunk by MiG-21
fighters; - On 23 January 1968, North Korean planes and
ships attacked the US Navy auxiliary ship Pueblo, and
then assaulted it with their own ships and landing
craft; the ship was captured and taken to one of the
naval bases in the DPRK; - On 15 April 1969, the air
defense missile forces of the DPRK attacked and shot
down a USAF EC-121 four-engined reconnaissance
aircraft; - On 17 June 1977, North Korean MiG-21
fighters shot down an American CH-47 Chinook
helicopter; - On 17 December 1994, North Korean air
defense ground elements shot down an American OH-58D
helicopter, killing one pilot and capturing a second.
In all cases, the North Koreans assert that their
attacks on aircraft, helicopters and ships were
substantiated due to violations of North Korean air and
sea space on spying missions, but the South Koreans and
Americans flatly deny this. If they are correct, and
remembering that in those years South Korean aircraft
more than once violated the borders of the USSR (recall
the Boeings which was shot down near Arkhangel'sk
and over Sakahlin Island) then the position of the DPRK
in these matters is more or less legally justified.
On their side, during this same period
of time the South Koreans sank a pair of North Korean
ships (which the North Koreans call "an act of
vandalism" to this day, assuring that they were
"unarmed trawlers") and more than once North
Korean aircraft and helicopters have been caught
violating South Korean airspace.
In the 1980s, the hopes by Pyongyang
that a large-scale military conflict would break out
between NATO and the countries of the Warsaw Pact in
western Europe, thus permitting them a diversion so
that they could assure its victory over South Korea,
did not come to fruition. On the contrary, at the end
of the 20th Century there was a mass crackup of the
Communist regimes and the countries enjoying the
"Friendship of the USSR". Nevertheless, there
was no longer a USSR itself, and even "apologists
for Communism" in Albania and Rumania, who had
once avowed loyalty to their "big brothers".
In the Far East, China and Vietnam also slowed down,
but in truth have veered away from Marxist ideology.
Not counting Cuba and several African countries, among
whom are those negotiating with the West, there is no
other country now in the early 1990s which remains as
purely Communist other than the singular DPRK. Ignoring
the loss of nearly all of their allies and increasing
pressure on the part of the "free world"
which nearly totally surround it, North Korea is still
convinced of the ultimate victory of Communism which
separates it from other countries.
They have supported their assurance up
until now with what has to be one of the strongest
armies in the world -- the KPA. True, the complete
isolation of North Korea prevents foreign analysts to
determine approximate assessments of the general
condition of the country, and in paticular -- the
technical level of the equipping of its armed forces.
In this area, the DPRK and the KPA write a great deal,
but very one sided assessments: one could say that the
North Koreans are superior to their Soviet and Chinese
friends in the areas of demonstrations and secrecy.
Consider that the state propaganda is constantly
reinforced -- the KPA is unbeatable, and that its
invincible warriors and commanders are prepared to
fight "one against a hundred". In this
departure, one has to agree with American experts that
"the North Koreans have obsolete weapons and
technology, but exclusive of that they have a high
fighting spirit; this is good training which induces
iron discipline into their soldiers."
Nevertheless, no one would disagree with the
"Great Leader" Kim Il Sung at all of the
party congresses when he would regularly give his
marshals beratings for "loss of their vigilance,
lack of combat spirit, and inducing peaceful thoughts
into the forces."
The basic combat power of the Korean
Peoples' Army remains its tens of thousands of
artillery tubs and nearly 7,000 combat vehicles,
running from obsolete T-55 and T-62 Soviet tanks and
Chinese Type 59s to T-72M tanks, BMP-2s, and BTR-70s
received in the 1980s. Part of the western experts are
exceedingly optimistic as they feel that the antitank
weapons of the South Koreans and the US troops deployed
in Korea can "overcome the North Korean tank
armada and turn it into the largest scrap heap in the
world."
Nevertheless, regarding North Korean
military aviation, American writers cheerfully assure
all that "the KPAFAC is in even worse technical
condition than the Iraqi air forces. All of their
aircraft are elderly, and were first flown by their
grandfathers. Today's pilots are poorly trained and
they only average around seven flying hours per year.
If they do succeed in making it into the air from their
revetments, then they will soon be heading south where,
in the tradition of the kamikaze, they will dive their
aircraft into the first ground target that they
encounter."
Even if you agree that the above
pronouncement is 100% wrong, it is absolutely clear
that the Soviet and Chinese produced technology which
is in the arsenal of the KPAFAC is in the main formed
of obsolete models and is of little value under the
conditions of modern war, and the pilots, who have only
been taught older methods and are limited by a terrible
lack of fuel, do not have a great deal of experience.
But note that the North Korean aircraft are secure in
underground hangars, and they have a plethora of
runways to choose from. With a complete lack of unit
level light aviation transport and a small number of
cargo aircraft, the DPRK built a great number of roads
with reinforced concrete protection and steel
reinforced concrete tunnels (for example, the
Pyongyang-Wonsan highway) which in the case of war can
also be used as military airfields. Drawing from that,
one could assume that there would be an
"exception" of those aircraft which succeed
in avoiding a first strike, and anyone studying the
mighty air defense system would have to think that
there would be, considering that no less an authority
than American intelligence assesses as "the most
complete system of anti-missile and anti-aircraft
defenses in the world."
The air defenses of the DPRK, in the
opinion of western analysts, have deployed over 9,000
weapons into firing positions, ranging from light
antiaircraft machine gun mounts to the most powerful
guns in the world -- 100mm weapons -- as well as mobile
ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4 Shilka mounts. Beside that, there
are more than 10.000 launchers for surface-to-air
missiles - from the fixed S-25, S-75, and S-125
complexes and mobile Kub and Strela-10 systems to
hand-held launchers, the "numbers of which cannot
be put into words."
In regard to the KPAFAC, these by no
means influence the fact that the once mighty forces
have become eroded. True, even in the early 1990s more
than 150 MiG-17 and 100 MiG-19 fighters remained in
service (including Chinese Shengyang F-4 and F-6
corresponding models) as well as 50 Harbin H-5 bombers
(the Chinese version of the Il-28 bomber) and 10
Su-7BMK fighter-bombers. But even as early as the 1980s
their military aviation had begun to reequip with 150
MiG-21s from the USSR and received a lot of 60 MiG-23P
interceptors and MiG-23ML frontal fighters, and 150
Chinese Q-5 "Fantan" fighter-bombers. Army
aviation, which had only consisted of a score of Mi-4
helicopters, now received 10 Mi-2s and 50 Mi-24
helicopters. In May and June 1988, the DPRK received
its first six MiG-29 fighters, and by the end of that
year the rest of a lot of 30 of these aircraft had been
delivered, along with 20 Su-25 assault aircraft. The
continuous upgrade to their air forces even saw the
addition of a score of American Hughes 500 helicopters,
which were purchased via a third party country: they
came without armament and were used for liaison and
aerial observation.
Obsolete aviation technology (MiG-15,
MiG-17, MiG-19) were given away in those years to
"brother countries who are fighting the battle
against world imperialism" - in the first order,
Albania, and then Guinea, Zaire, Somalia, Uganda, and
Ethiopia. In 1983 30 MiG-19s were sent to Iraq, which
were used in the course of the Iran-Iraq War. These
aircraft were deployed at Iraqi airfields as dummy
targets and were used to attract enemy air strikes by
the Multinational Forces during Operation "Desert
Storm".
It must be stressed that civil
aviaiton, as we know the term, still does not exist in
the DPRK. Every flight made in that country, even if it
delivers foodstuffs and medicine to outlying regions,
as well as internal passenger flights or crop dusting,
is carried out by aircraft which bear the markings of
the military air forces. The basic park of these
aircraft at the present time includes 200 An-2 biplanes
and their Chinese analogues, the Y-5. Until the early
1980s, flights to "brother countries" were
carried out by five Il-14 and four Il-18 transports,
and then the aviation park of the DPRK received 12
An-24 (per other data, part of these aircraft were
actually An-32 types), three
Tu-154B, and one
"presidential" Il-62 transports; the latter
was used by Kim Il Sung to make a number of official
foreign visits. After the breakup of the USSR, the air
fleet of North Korea received a number of civil
aircraft, purchased for the SNG "Independent
Aviation Company" - the largest of these were
several Il-76 transports. In early 1995, the DPRK
signed an international agreement for "Open
Skies" which opened up its air space for passenger
flights of foreign aviation companies. In concert with
this, North Korean aircraft which were selected to make
cross-border flights received civil aviation markings
for the Choson Min Hang Aviation Company, but they were
still manned and flown by military crews.
For training flyers, in the early 1990s
they had 100 CJ-5 and CJ-6 propeller driven aircraft
(Chinese modfications of the Yak-18), 12 L-39 jet
trainers made in Czechoslovakia, and several tens of
training models of the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29, and
Su-25. It is completely natural to expect that training
pilots on more modern types of aircraft requires a
significantly higher average training time than
"seven flight hours per year". These hours
go, in the first rank, to those pilots from the elite
56th Guards and 57th Fighter Aviation Regiments, who
are equipped with the MiG-23 and MiG-29 aircraft: these
units are based close to Pyongyang and are tasked with
providing air cover to the capital of the DPRK. A
wealth of experience has been garnered by their
instructors who have provided training to many
countries of the "Third World".
One cannot forget the fact that the
DPRK also has missiles of the "surface to
surface" class of various types, many of which are
produced in their own factories. As soon as he got
North Korean built SCUD missiles, Saddam Hussein fired
them at the Israelis and the Americans during the
Persian Gulf Conflict. At that time the Americans shot
down some with their new Patriot surface-to-air missile
system, but they only succeeded in about 10% of
missiles fired by the Iraqis, and that is ignoring the
fact that Iraqi launches became fewer and fewer as the
war progressed.
One could ponder how great the depth of
American air defense means would be if the North
Koreans somehow fired a massive missile strike across
the 38th Parallel, followed by no less a massive
aviation strike! And what would the difference be if
they only shot down half of the obsolete North Korean
aircraft, which have been placed in hiding for so long,
if the second half of that aviation managed to strike
their firing positions, command posts, and lines of
communication - dropping those obsolete but still fully
functional bombs and assaulting them with
"cheap" unguided missiles and cannon
fire?
A special danger to the US and South
Korea arises from the DPRK nuclear program. This gives
Pyongyang the capability to conduct negotiations from a
position of which contemporary Russia can only dream.
On the one hand, it gives the North Korean leadership a
chance to take positions on a more incremental level,
and gives the the international policies of the DPRK
more reality.
Even a few years back American analysts
predicted that "in the case of a new war,
Pyongyang would be the victor, but only after a
bloodbath which would destroy the entire
peninsula." For that reason, the positions have
stayed the same for over 40 years, which is pathetic.
But at the same time, it is entirely clear that the
Korean problem which was part of the "Cold
War" will be solved by peaceful means. There are
no other alternatives.
The author would like to thank Ten In
Bom (Pyongyang) and Yu. Popov (Irkutsk) for their
assistance in preparing this article.
The editors would like to thank Leonid
Krylov and Yuriy Tepsurkayev for their help in working
with these materials.
All photos personally provided by V.
Morozov.
Bibliography
1. Kim Il Sung; "Writings"
Volumes 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 11. Foreign Language Publishing,
DPRK, Pyongyang 1980 2. "The Indomitable Armed
Forces - Heroes of the KPA" (Photo album) Korean
Peoples' Army Publishing, DPRK, Pyongyang 1982 3.
Mi En Rok, "Honoring the Leaders of the Blessed
Victory", Korean Publishing, DPRK, Pyongyang, 1993
4. Ho Chong Ho, Kan Sok Hi, Pak The Ho; "The
Imperialism of the USA Broke During the War in
Korea", Foreign Language Publishing, DPRK,
Pyongyang, 1993 5. "Museum of the Victory in the
National Liberation Fatherland War 1950-53" (photo
album), Korean Peoples' Army Publishing, Pyongyang
1979 6. Li Ching Gien, Li Ben Rer, "Military
Demarcation Line In Korea", Foreign Language
Publishing, DPRK, Pyongyang, 1991 7. Larry Davis,
"Mig Alley (Air to Air Combat in Korea)",
Squadron/Signal Publications 1978 8. Olaf Groener,
"Der Korean Krieg (1950 bis 1953)",
Militaerverlag der DDR, Berlin, 1980 9. David
Hackworth, "The Second Korean War", Soldier
of Fortune magazine (Russian edition), 5-1995 pp. 19-23
10. "War in Korea 1950-53", edited by A,P.
Pokrovskiy, Moscow 1959 11. RGVA, F. 64th IAK, work
565836s, d. 1, "Historical notes on the 64th
IAK", F. 64th IAK, work 174045ss, d. 186, "A
Brief Analysis of Combat Operations of the 64th IAK in
the Korean TMO" 12. RGVA, F. 16, work 3139, d. 15,
"Writeup of the Combat Opeations of the 64th IAK
and UAF"
Paint Schemes for Aircraft and
Helicopters of the KPAFAC
As is correct, the North Korean air
forces put their aircraft in their own color schemes,
which were used for all aircraft and helicopters
prepared for use in that country, and which were
delineated by their own national insignia and side
numbers.
Thus, the first aircraft used by the
KPAFAC were delivered from the USSR in the standard
colors of the Soviet VVS, with the fighters being an
overall light grey and the ground attack aircraft,
bombers, and transport aircraft in camouflage green
over their upper parts and light blue on their
undersides.
The MiG-15 jet aircraft delivered
during the period of the Korean war were painted
overall with a clear lacquer over its aluminum
surfaces. The standard lacquer gave a gloss finish to
the surfaces, but aircraft in some series were
delivered with a matte lacquer (which reduced
visibility in the air).The MiG-15bis aircraft were
delivered with a semimatte "silver" lacquer
paint coating.
These all receive new identification
markings: a red five-pointed star on a white disk,
surrounded by a red-white-blue ring; frequently, the
background color was used instead of white (thus using
only the red and blue parts of the insignia),
particularly if the color was light grey, light blue,
or silver; the white was used against a dark background
(camouflage green). The markings were applied to the
fuselage sides and undersides of the wings.
As part of the elements used for rapid
identification, many MiGs had their noses and upper of
the fin and rudder painted red. From 1952 on the
majority of MiG-15 aircraft (both UAF and 64th IAK)
were camouflaged. The very large number of variations
in the application of these schemes were due in part to
the particular terrain where the aircraft were based.
The majority of these schemes consisted of irregular
earth brown stripes applied over a green camouflage
base color. Several La-11 and MiG-15 aircraft were
painted with dark green bands which wrapped all the way
around the aircraft's surfaces, and had bands of
either unpainted silver or light grey in between them.
Some MiGs were seen painted a sandy orange color. The
fuselage in all these schemes was completely
camouflaged, but the lower surfaces of the wings and
tail were left either unpainted silver or light grey,
based on the aircraft's original paint scheme.
Fighters of the 64th IAK flew with North Korean
markings, but the Chinese ones flew with Chinese
markings.
From the moment that the war ended, and
until the 1970s, practically all combat and transport
aircraft of the DPRK have been painted a silver color,
but the An-2s, trainers and helicopters were painted in
camouflage green upper surfaces and light blue lower
surfaces. The Chinese- produced aircraft came in a dark
green camouflage color - a bit darker and a bit greener
than the Soviet color (think about World War II
Japanese camouflage colors). The exception to the rule
were those An-2 aircraft designated for special secret
missions over South Korea - they were completely
painted a flat black color to include the white field
on the national markings.
If at the beginning of the Korean War
the side numbers of the aircraft were very carefully
applied by hand, then since the mid 1950s they have
been applied by stencil. These have fixed proportions:
the colored ring around began with an even width, but
now the proportion of red/white/blue is 2:1:3. The
radius of the white background on the stencil is equal
to the height of the star, and the width of the star is
equal to the width of the white background.
Ultimately, the KPAFAC painted their
aircraft in the same colors as the USSR, China, and the
CSSR. Thus the MiG-21s of the last series and the
MiG-23 aircraft were light grey, and the MiG-29, Su-25,
Chinese Q-5, and the Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters used
variated camouflage bands.
The An-24, Tu-154, Il-62 and Il-76
transports had silver-grey wings, which were separated
from the fuselage, and the upper fuselage was white;
the dividing strip between the two was a contrasting
color - red or gloss blue split the top from the
bottom, and the tail was marked with the national flag
of the DPRK. Aircraft which were transferred to the
state aviation company wore the silhouette of a crane
inside a ring on their tails in dark red paint; on
their fuselages they carried the name of the company
(AIR KORYO) in Latin letters and Korean letters in blue
paint, and the flag was moved to just behind the
cockpit. - S. Uskov
1. Ten infantry divisions (1-6, 10, 12,
13,.15) of which four were just forming (4, 10, 13,
15); the 105th Tank Brigade:, the 603rd Motorized
Regiment; an independent artillery regiment (12 x 122mm
howitzers, 24 x 122mm guns); an independent
antiaircraft regiment (24 x 37mm guns, 12 x 85mm guns,
30 x 12.7mm machine guns); an independent
engineer-sapper regiment; and signal troops, all
amounting to a total strength of 175,000 men [10]
2. By May 1950, 22 assault aircraft and
10 fighter pilots were ready for combat; another 151
were undergoing training, along with 17 aviation
technicians. 120 pilots were trained, along with 60
aviation technicians and 67 armament specialists
[10].
3. DPRK propaganda asserts, for
example, that Tua Sen Hi followed a group of F-84s back
to their airfield and severely damaged it. Since the
F-84s were based at Taegu and Kunsan during that period
of time, it would have been possible to get to their
bases from Machuria - but not to return [Editors'
comments]
4. In our observations, it is
understandable to for the Americans to mistake a Yak-7
for a Yak-9, and in one case they may have correctly
identified a Yak-15 (2/3 November 1952, at night), but
as for the La-7, MBR-2, and F-86(!) claims, the Yankees
should have known the material units better
(Editors)
5. By the last ten days of August 1950,
the KPAFAC consisted of 21 serviceable aircraft: 20
ground attack aircraft and only one fighter. They
numbered 6 fighter pilots and 17 ground attack pilots
available for duty. [10]
6. The 64th IAK had these statistics:
total combat missions flown - 63,229; group day
missions - 1,683, individual night missions - 107. The
OVA: total combat missions flown - 22,300; group day
missions - 366. During this, the maximum number of
missions flown by the Koreans was 376. But the average
was: 64th IAK - around 2500; OVA - 1520, and Koreans,
12. What happened to their material units?
[Editors]
7. These "riflemen" and
"cable layers" should not be made light of.
They were reasonably effective. We have heard stories
of how the cables were able to bring down ground attack
aircraft when they were well laid above trafficability
routes. As a point of fact, by admission of the
Americans themselves, most of their aircraft losses in
the immediate frontal area were from small arms fired
from the ground. And our statistics support this as
well. [Editors]
8. Amended by the editors [11]
9. Amended by the editors [12]
10. Per American data, the UN shot down
844 MiG-15 aircraft and 69 other machines for a total
of 924 enemy aircraft. [Editors]
11. By our observation, at the end of
the war the OVA had 892 aircraft: the PRC had 480, and
the KPA 412, of which total 635 were MiG-15 fighters.
These were divided up into seven aviation divisions.
[Editors]
