The CCF entered the Korean War
with a short, violent probing offensive.
Although elements of three CCF Armies ... the
38th, 39th, and 40th, about 150,000 veterans of
guerilla warfare ... were in place, apparently
only about 30,000 CCF foot infantry were mainly
deployed. These veteran troops, directed by
skillful patrol actions and experienced
planning, wreaked devastation among our
unprepared and disorganized forces. They
destroyed the ROK 7th and 15th Infantry
Regiments and also inflicted about 800
casualties on our 8th Cavalry Regiment,
capturing over half our equipment while
smashing us back.
The CCF tactics were strange to
us, they being extremely effective by night and
by infiltration and highly effective
roadblocks. Even their methods of
communications, such as the whistles used in
small-unit assault above, seemed eerie and
helped demoralize many of our troops.
On November 5, the CCF broke
off contact to evaluate the results of their
attack and the capabilities of their enemies.
This was musunderstood by the UN High Command,
who were relying on China's intent by
faulty CIA Intelligence. Still,
they had ample information on the power and
guile of the forces facing them in the field,
and fatally underestimated both the strength
and the intent of the CCF forces. After
re-grouping, Eighth Army again formed on the
Chongchon River to launch a general assault on
November 25, risking possible world nuclear war
in an assault to get our forces "home for
Christmas."
In retrospect, this was an
incredible, almost incomprehensible
blunder.
But egomania
doesn't belong exclusively to American
leaders. Shortly, China was to make a similar
and equally fatal blunder.
Such is war.
