Reconnaissance in Force
Between 7 and 15 January, I and IX Corps
reconnaissance patrols ranging north of line D made little contact with enemy
forces. IX Corps patrols investigated Ich'on and Yoju several times but found
the towns empty. In the main I Corps attempt, the 27th Infantry came out of its
reserve assembly at Ch'onan to occupy outposts athwart Route 1 generally along
the Chinwi River eight miles north of P'yongt'aek and five miles south of Osan.
In extensive searches west and east of Route I and north of the Chinwi within
three miles of Osan, Colonel Michaelis' forces encountered few
Chinese.1
The patrols were numerous and far-ranging
enough to certify the absence of any strong enemy force immediately in front of
the two corps; yet civilians, agents, and air observers in the same week
reported a steady movement of Chinese south from Seoul. The heaviest enemy
concentrations appeared to be forming along Route 1 between Suwon and Osan and
around the junction of Routes 13 and 17 at Kyongan-ni, sixteen miles northeast
of Suwon. General Ridgway considered the nearer Suwon-Osan concentration to be a
suitable target for an infantry-armor strike that
also could serve as an example of the kind of reconnaissance in force he wanted
both General Milburn and General Coulter afterwards to initiate on their own. He
ordered the I Corps to investigate the Suwon-Osan area on the 15th with a force
that included at least one battalion of tanks. General Milburn was to punish any
enemy groupment located there with infantry, tank, and air assaults, then was to
withdraw, leaving part of his force in the objective area to maintain
contact.2
The Problem of Motivation
Although the I Corps reconnaissance was a
step in Ridgway's program of building up offensive operations, the continuing
lack of spirit within the Eighth Army worked against the prospects of launching
larger attacks. Some indications of recovery and Ridgway's confidence in the
Eighth Army's inherent ability notwithstanding, his forces and staff, in the
main, were still not "offensive-minded."3
In his constant attempt to reshape the mood of the Eighth
Army, Ridgway during the first days of January instituted a morale survey in
which his troops repeatedly raised two questions: "Why are we here?" and "What
are we fighting for?" These questions clearly reflected the lack of motivation,
and both, in Ridgway's judgment, required and deserved well-reasoned
replies.4
His answer to the first question was brief and
point-blank: "We are here because of the decisions of the properly constituted
authorities of our respective governments . . . .The answer is simple because
further comment is unnecessary. It is conclusive because the loyalty we give,
and expect, precludes the slightest questioning of these orders."
He considered the second question to have
greater significance, and he answered at length:
To me the issues are clear. It is not a
question of this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is here incidental.
It is not restricted to the issue of freedom for our South Korean allies . . .
though that freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, and included among them.
The real issues are whether the power of
Western civilization . . . shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of
men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of
man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual
rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead
us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.
If these be true, and to me they are,
beyond any possibility of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a
fight for freedom for our Korean allies alone and for their national survival.
It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent
national existence.
The sacrifices we have made, and those we
shall yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but in our own direct
defense.
In the final analysis, the issue now joined
right here in Korea is whether communism or individual freedom shall
prevail.5
Ridgway published these replies and
distributed them throughout the command in January. Whether they would help to
improve the attitude of the Eighth Army depended, he believed, on whether their
sincerity was recognized. In any case, the disciplinary tone of the first reply
was unmistakable, and the second was an eloquent statement of the war's
principal issue as Ridgway believed his command should understand it.
Allies From North Korea
A striking local example of the issue as
Ridgway summarized it was at the time being set on a string of islands hugging
enemy-held Hwanghae Province on the west coast. Giving up everything but
individual freedom, literally thousands of anti-Communist North Koreans were
taking refuge on the islands, mainly Ch'o-do and Paengnyong-do, the two largest.
Most came from western Hwanghae, the region between and west of Chinnamp'o in
the north and Haeju in the south, where an anti-Communist underground existed
even before the war. Some underground members had attacked retreating North
Korean troops in October 1950 when the Eighth Army moved above the 38th parallel, and after UNC
forces occupied the region a number of anti-Communists had joined UNC security
units formed to maintain civil order. Others had openly professed their
convictions and thus exposed themselves to retaliation when enemy forces
reentered the province on the heels of the Eighth Army's
withdrawal.6
The former UNC security groups reinforced
by volunteers engaged North Korean troops sent to reoccupy western Hwanghae in
December. ROK Navy ships of Task Force 95 in the Yellow Sea, with which the
anti-Communists established sporadic radio contact, provided gunfire and
arranged some air support. But this help could not compensate shortages in
weapons and ammunition among the anti-Communist groups which from the start gave
the enemy regulars the deciding edge. Some Hwanghae defenders hid out, hoping
that UNC forces would soon return to the province. Most decided to escape to the
coastal islands protected by Task Force 95. The exodus, aided by the ROK Navy,
which sea lifted many escapees, continued until late January when North Korean
troops closed the beach exits.
After reaching the islands the organized
groups of refugees, asking only for arms and supplies, offered to return to
their home area and resume the fight they had been forced to give up. At Eighth
Army headquarters the offer stimulated plans for developing these allies from
North Korea as the United Nations Partisan Force. The islands were to become
base camps, and the partisans were to be organized,
equipped, and trained for guerrilla warfare and intelligence missions behind
enemy lines on the mainland.
Regardless of what the partisans might
accomplish on the mainland, their occupation of the offshore islands would make
the Eighth Army's west flank more secure. Their alliance with the Eighth Army
also would be an ideological and psychological thorn in the enemy's side. The
partisans themselves, now without status as citizens of either North or South
Korea, faced an uncertain postwar future. But they meanwhile had gained personal
security for themselves and the many families who had come with them to the
islands, and they would receive logistical support for the fight they seemed
eager to rejoin.7
The Evacuation Issue Resolved
To the detriment of Ridgway's efforts to
restore confidence within the Eighth Army and to increase offensive action, the
question raised by the Chinese intervention of whether the United Nations
Command could or should stay in Korea had not been resolved by mid-January.
Ridgway personally believed the forces arrayed against him did not have the
strength to drive the Eighth Army out of Korea. But as long as the evacuation issue remained undecided at the higher
military and political levels, he was obliged to plan for the contingency of
further withdrawals, including a final one from the peninsula. The resulting
rumors of evacuation scarcely helped to rebuild the spirit of his command, and
the possibility of an eventual decision to leave Korea made general offensive
operations less practical.
At the higher levels, consideration of the question had
taken several new turns since 4 December, when the joint Chiefs of Staff.
advised General MacArthur that a major reinforcement was physically impossible
and that they concurred in the consolidation of UNC ground forces into
beachheads. The great concern in Washington was the possibility that China's
entry into Korea was only one step in a Soviet move toward global war. Out of
this concern, all major American commands received notices on 6 December to
increase their readiness, and on 16 December President Truman formally declared
a state of national emergency. No full mobilization was called, but action was
taken to increase U.S. military strength and to broaden mobilization and
production bases.8
Korea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
MacArthur on 30 December, was not considered the place to fight a major war.
Consequently, although they had concluded from MacArthur's gloomy reports that
the Chinese had committed sufficient strength in Korea to drive the U.N. Command
off the peninsula, both the current shortage of combat units in the United
States and the increased threat of general war now put a major buildup of MacArthur's forces out of the question. But the
Joint Chiefs wanted MacArthur to stay in Korea if he could. They directed him to
defend successive positions to the south, damaging enemy forces as much as
possible without jeopardizing his own. If his forces were driven back to a line
along and eastward from the Kum River, roughly halfway between Seoul and Pusan,
and the Chinese massed a clearly superior force before this line, the Joint
Chiefs would then order MacArthur to begin a withdrawal to Japan.
MacArthur already had directed his staff to
develop plans for an evacuation. But when the joint Chiefs asked for his ideas
on timing a withdrawal, he responded on 3 January that no such decision would be
necessary until his forces were actually pushed back to a beachhead line. He
meanwhile started a new round of discussion on how the war should be prosecuted
by proposing four retaliatory measures against the Chinese: blockade the China
coast, destroy China's war industries through naval gunfire and air bombardment,
reinforce the troops in Korea with part of the Chinese Nationalist Army on
Formosa, and allow diversionary operations by Chinese Nationalist troops against
the China mainland.
These proposals contradicted the
established policy of confining the fighting to Korea, a principle that largely
unified the nations allied with the United States in the war. After the measures
were considered in Washington, the benefit of each weighed against the certain
escalation of the war and the likelihood of alienating allied powers, the joint
Chiefs of Staff notified MacArthur on 9 January that there was little chance of
a change in policy. They repeated their 30 December instructions that MacArthur was
to defend successive positions and inflict the greatest possible damage to enemy
forces. As before, he was to guard against high losses lest he become unable to
carry out his mission of protecting Japan. He could withdraw to Japan whenever
in his judgment an evacuation was necessary to avoid severe losses in men and
materiel.9
These instructions elicited questions from MacArthur on
two points. Although a cautious delaying action in Korea could be an initial
mission, with a withdrawal to and defense of Japan its logical sequel, MacArthur
interpreted the directive to mean that he had to be prepared to carry out both
missions simultaneously. Since his command was not strong enough to do this, he
responded on 10 January with a question that, in effect, asked which mission he
was to consider more important.
His other question stemmed from the
authority given him to evacuate Korea whenever he judged it necessary to prevent
severe losses and hinged, in a sense, on the meaning of severe. The acceptable extent of
losses, thus the evacuation of Korea, should not be his decision, MacArthur
contended, until there had been a decision in Washington to maintain a position
in Korea indefinitely, to stay for a limited time, or to minimize losses by
leaving the peninsula as soon as possible. He was
asking Washington to pick one of these three courses.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to
explain their directive on 12 January. While they were not sure how long the
U.N. Command could stay in Korea, they emphasized that it was highly important
to U.S. prestige, to the future of the United Nations and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and to efforts to organize anti-Communist resistance in
Asia that UNC forces not withdraw unless militarily forced to do so. Again the
Joint Chiefs asked for MacArthur's estimate of the timing and conditions of a
withdrawal.
As of 15 January the evacuation issue
remained unresolved. General MacArthur wanted the question answered on the
Washington level, but officials there first wanted him to give them the military
guidelines. Aware of the repetitive interchange between Washington and Tokyo,
General Ridgway worried that deferring a decision would correspondingly reduce
chances that an evacuation could succeed. Some withdrawal actions, logistical
arrangements especially, would require sixty to ninety days' advance notice if
the Eighth Army was to remove the maximum of troops and equipment in minimum
time and with minimum loss.10
Having no clear answer also made it
difficult to dispel rumors of evacuation spreading through the ranks. South
Korean forces were especially fearful of being abandoned. Ridgway wrote and
radioed General MacArthur on 6 and 7 January to deplore any withdrawal that
would leave ROK forces to face the retaliation of the Chinese and North Koreans. He urged MacArthur to issue a
public statement assuring the South Koreans that they would not be deserted.
MacArthur passed Ridgway's request to the joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment
that he could not make such a statement until and unless a policy basis for one
was established at governmental level. Ridgway himself needed no such backing.
On 11 January he informed General Chung, the ROK Army chief of staff, that there
was only one military force fighting the enemy, "our combined Allied Army," and
that it would "fight together and stay together whatever the future
holds."11
Eighth Army plans and instructions issued
between 8 and 13 January however prudent, tended to support the current rumors.
On the 8th Ridgway traced two new defense lines, E and F, located some
twenty-five and sixty-five miles, respectively, behind line D. (The 2d
Division's engagement then in progress at Wonju, the fact that the X Corps
sector east of Wonju was then unmanned, and the improbability that the ROK III
Corps could occupy its sector of line D prompted Colonel Dabney, Ridgway's G-3,
to predict on the 8th that a withdrawal to line E would be called in the near
future.) Five days later Ridgway established priorities for completing the four
defense lines General Walker had ordered fortified in the southeastern corner of
the peninsula on 11 December. The Raider line arching around Pusan twenty miles
outside the city received first priority. The Peter line (formerly called
the Pusan line) just beyond the city limits and then
the Davidson and Naktong River lines farther out were next to be
completed.12
Between these actions Ridgway received
MacArthur's evacuation plan and instructions to prepare, as a matter of urgency,
his supporting plan. Ridgway's staff completed a broad outline on the 10th. In
concept, the Eighth Army would fight delaying actions to Pusan from the lettered
and named lines already delineated. No supplies or equipment would be abandoned,
all units would embark at Pusan with basic loads, and the entire ROK Army plus
prisoners of war would be evacuated. 13
There would be no mass evacuation of South Korean
civilians. Since features of the concept, such as the evacuation of the ROK
Army, were subject to revision, Ridgway insisted that knowledge of the outline
and of the operational and logistical details yet to be developed be limited to
those American commanders and staff members required to participate in the
planning.14 But from any planning map showing the lettered and named
lines previously established it was simple to project an Eighth Army withdrawal
through shorter and shorter lines and off the peninsula through the Pusan port.
This picture, available at several headquarters, partially nullified the special precaution Ridgway had applied.
Some light was shed on the evacuation issue
in Tokyo on 15 January when General Collins, accompanied by Air Force Chief of
Staff Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, arrived from Washington to confer with General
MacArthur. Collins informed MacArthur that just before he and General Vandenberg
left the United States it was agreed during a conference with President Truman
that an evacuation of Korea would be delayed as long as possible without
endangering the Eighth Army or the security of Japan. In this decision, Collins
added, the objective was to permit the longest time possible for political
action by the United Nations and the fullest opportunity to punish the Chinese.
Collins also settled the matter raised by Ridgway of the disposition of the ROK
Army. If an evacuation became necessary, President Truman wanted not only the
ROK Army but also the members of the ROK government and the ROK police force,
altogether more than a million people, taken out of Korea.15
Further clarification of the issue came
later on the 15th after Collins and Vandenberg flew to Korea for a meeting with
General Ridgway at Taegu. The main discussion centered on Ridgway's current
operations and plans and on their relationship to the Washington concept of
evacuation. Ridgway urged, lest his forces face a difficult withdrawal, that any
high level decision to leave Korea be kept a closely guarded secret until he
could get his forces below South Korea's main mountain ridges. Ridgway
estimated, and by so doing answered the joint Chiefs'
question on timing previously posed to MacArthur, that he could stay in Korea at
least two or three months. Collins also heard firsthand that the Chinese so far
had made no move to push south of the Han, that when counterattacked they
usually withdrew, that they seemed to be having supply and morale difficulties,
and that the North Korean infiltration in the east was being checked. This
information was encouraging, and quite in contrast to the dismal tone of
MacArthur's reports to Washington.16
On the negative side, Ridgway brought up
the need to improve the leadership of some corps and divisions. Except for
allowing General Almond to dismiss General McClure, Ridgway had relieved no one.
He had attempted instead to better the performance of his principal subordinates
by exhortation and example. But after observing more poor performances during
the withdrawals from line B to line D he was no longer hopeful that
encouragement and admonishment would produce the quality he considered
essential. Writing to General Collins on 8 January, Ridgway had urged the chief
of staff and, through him, commander of Army Field Forces General Mark W. Clark,
to insist that all general officers of combat commands "attain the highest
standards for our military traditions. Let's pour on the heat in our training,
and above all, let's be ruthless with our general officers if they fail to
measure up."17
General Collins With General MacArthur, Japan, Jan 15 '51
At Taegu on the 15th Ridgway told Collins
that he could not execute his future plans with his present leaders. But this
statement was hyperbole, not a move to sweep the command posts clean. Nor was
Ridgway recommending disciplinary action. Well aware that "not all battle
casualties are caused by bullets," he largely attributed the lack of
aggressiveness of some corps and division commanders to the wearing effect of
four to six months of hard fighting and discouraging experience. His most
pressing need, he told Collins, was for a corps commander. Ridgway recommended
Maj. Gen. Bryant E. Moore, who had served under him in Europe and whom he knew
to be a man who would "keep his feet on the ground and turn in a splendid performance at the same time." He planned to
give General Moore the IX Corps and to move General Coulter to Eighth Army
headquarters as deputy army commander responsible for maintaining liaison and
representing Ridgway in dealing with the ROK government. In evidence that this
change was no derogation of Coulter's professional competence, Ridgway
recommended that he receive his third star. Collins approved both
recommendations.18
Ridgway would soon lose two division commanders under a
recent Department of the Army decision to rotate senior commanders from Korea to
training posts in the United States, where their recent combat experience could
be put to good use. Later in January General Barr, commander of the 7th
Division, would leave Korea to become commandant of The Armor School at Fort
Knox, Kentucky, and General Church would relinquish command of the 24th Division
to become commandant of The Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. During his
conference with General Collins Ridgway requested that, in the future, any
senior commander returned to the United States simply because he was worn out be
protected under this rotation policy. Collins agreed.19
For all practical purposes, General Collins settled the
evacuation issue in an announcement to the press following his meeting with
Ridgway. Imbued with the Eighth Army commander's personal confidence and
encouraged by the report on the Chinese, Collins told correspondents that "as of
now, we are going to stay and fight."20 When he returned to Tokyo on
the 17th after a tour of the front that revealed considerable evidence of
Ridgway's strong leadership, he sent his views to Washington. The Eighth Army
was improving daily under Ridgway's command, he reported, and on the whole was
in position and prepared to punish severely any mass
enemy attack.21 Before returning to the United States, Collins, with Vandenberg,
met again with MacArthur and read this report. MacArthur, who as recently as 10
January had described his military position in Korea as "untenable," now agreed
that the situation had improved enough to permit his forces to hold a beachhead
in Korea indefinitely. But he reiterated his strong belief that the issue of
whether to evacuate Korea was a purely political matter and should not be
decided on military grounds.22 The issue, of course, really had been
resolved, and on a military basis.
Three days later MacArthur visited Eighty
Army headquarters for the first time since Ridgway had assumed command. At a
press conference there he confirmed the decision to stay. "There has been a lot
of loose talk about the Chinese driving us into the sea," he told reporters. "No
one is going to drive us into the sea."23 The report Collins filed
from Tokyo and briefings he and Vandenberg gave upon their return meanwhile
reassured officials in Washington, including President Truman. They "were no
longer pessimistic about our being driven out of Korea," Collins wrote later,
"and, though it was realized that rough times were still ahead of us, no longer was there much talk of
evacuation." In placing credit for resolving the evacuation issue, Collins
emphasized that "General Ridgway alone was responsible for this dramatic
change."24
Operation Wolfhound
For Ridgway, the decision to stay in Korea
underlined the challenge of the complete tactical control of ground forces given
him by MacArthur on 26 December. During World War II he had had the normal
experience of operating under higher commanders with greater troop resources to
whom he could turn for assistance. But in the present circumstances Ridgway had
to make tactical decisions in full realization that with the exception of ten
artillery battalions earmarked some time back for shipment to Korea after
training, "what I already had [in combat units] was all there was." Ridgway's
six Army divisions were still understrength in infantry and artillery troops;
indeed, the Department of the Army had not yet been able to send replacements to
the Far East at a rate that would raise the divisions to full strength by March,
as predicted earlier.25 (See Chapter II.) These limitations by no
means ruled out offensive operations, but they dictated deliberate, cautious
advances.
Accordingly, Ridgway warned General Milburn
against permitting any situation to develop during the I Corps' reconnaissance
in force on 15 January that would require additional forces to extricate those
initially committed. Neither was Milburn to attempt a
large scale exploitation, if that opportunity occurred, except on Ridgway's
order. If all went according to instructions, Ridgway estimated, the operation
would be concluded by dark on the 15th or, at the latest, on the
16th.26
Milburn assigned the main task to the 25th
Division, instructing General Kean to attack the Suwon-Osan area with an
infantry regiment and a battalion of tanks supported by artillery and engineers.
Kean selected as the central force the 27th Infantry, from whose nickname the
reconnaissance was tagged Operation WOLFHOUND.
To protect the main force on the east, Milburn
ordered the 3d Division to send a smaller force of infantry and tanks to cut the
Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni stretch of the lateral Route 20 and instructed the ROK 1st
Division to send a battalion as far as Ch'on-ni, on Route 17 three miles south
of Kumnyangjang-ni. Ridgway notified the IX Corps also to provide protection on
the east, for which General Coulter directed the ROK 6th Division to station a
battalion in blocking positions just east of Kumnyangjang-ni.27
On the 15th the South Korean battalions
reached Ch'on-ni and Kumnyangjang-ni over Route 17 without contact. But the 1st
Battalion, 15th Infantry, and two companies of tanks from the 3d Division which
followed the same axis to Kumnyangjang-ni received small arms and heavy mortar
fire after turning west for a mile on Route 20 toward Suwon. An exchange of fire with some six
hundred to eight hundred Chinese held the 3d Division force in place for the
remainder of the day.28
WOLFHOUND forces elsewhere met
no opposition but were delayed by damaged roads and bridges. The bulk of the
reinforced 27th Infantry moving over Route 1 in the main effort halted for the
night at the northern edge of Osan.29 The 1st Battalion of the
regiment and tanks following Route 39 near the coast stopped at Paranjang, ten
miles to the west.30
As Colonel Michaelis' two columns converged
on Suwon over Routes 1 and 39 on the morning of the 16th, General Milburn
ordered the WOLFHOUND forces to withdraw to the Chinwi River at 1400. Having so far met
only a few Chinese, who appeared to be stragglers, Michaelis ordered a motorized
company of infantry and a company of tanks from each column to sprint ahead and
inflict as much damage as possible on enemy forces discovered in Suwon before
withdrawing. On the left, after the tank-infantry team moving on Route 39 to
Route 20 and then turning east came to a destroyed bridge two miles southwest of
Suwon, dismounted infantry continued the advance and investigated the
southwestern edge of town without finding enemy forces. On Route 1 the tanks and
infantry received fire from a strong Chinese force
deployed five hundred yards south of Suwon and from machine gunners atop
buildings inside town. Michaelis' team deployed and returned the fire for a half
hour, then under the cover of air strikes withdrew out of range.31
The WOLFHOUND
forces developed a corps outpost line along the
Chinwi with a westward extension to the coast and pushed patrols back into enemy
territory. Ridgway commended them, more for the offensive spirit displayed than
for results achieved. But General Milburn estimated that the two-day operation
had inflicted 1,380 enemy casualties, 1,180 by air strikes, 5 captured and 195
killed by ground troops. His own losses were three killed and seven wounded. The
Chinese captives identified three armies, but since the 27th Infantry had taken
these prisoners before running into the Chinese position at Suwon, the identity
of the unit defending the town was obscure. Most pertinent, the reconnaissance
revealed that no large force was located south of the Suwon-Kumnyangjang-ni line
but that organized groups did hold positions along it.32
Having served up WOLFHOUND as an example, Ridgway on 20
January instructed his American corps commanders to devise similar operations.
General Milburn responded on the 22d with an infantry-armor strike built around
the 35th Infantry that in concept nearly duplicated Operation WOLFHOUND. Two small encounters
239
during the one-day operation resulted in three enemy
killed and one captured with no losses to the regiment. The strike confirmed the
absence of strong enemy forces within ten miles of the I Corps front. It also
raised the possibility that North Korean forces were now operating south of
Seoul when the captive identified his unit as the 8th Division, part of the I Corps.33
Task Force Johnson
During the week before Ridgway issued his
20 January directive he had prodded General Coulter to increase the strength,
continuity, and depth of the IX Corps' reconnaissance. He also had directed
Coulter to move the 1st Cavalry Division's 70th Tank Battalion from its deep
reserve location near Sangju in the Naktong River valley to Chinch'on, fifteen
miles behind the corps front. From Chinch'on the tankers were to back up the ROK
6th Division and also were to be employed in a reconnaissance in force wherever
Coulter saw an opportunity.34
Regardless of Ridgway's dissatisfaction,
Coulter was certain that his patrols had shown the IX Corps sector below the
Kumnyangjang-ni-Ich'onYoju road to be free of any large enemy force. Since 12
January the 24th Division had kept a battalion in Yoju, and on the 21st General
Church dispatched another battalion accompanied by tanks and a battery of
artillery to Ich'on with instructions to stay until
pushed out. At the corps left, the ROK 6th Division had not established outposts
that far forward but had placed a battalion at Paengam-ni on secondary Route 55,
six miles short of the Kumnyanjang-niIch'on stretch of Route
20.35
After receiving Ridgway's instructions on
the 20th, Coulter scheduled for the 22d a one-day operation built around the
70th Tank Battalion in which his force was to push north of Route 20 between
Kumnyangjang-ni and Ich'on. The 1st Cavalry Division was to mount the operation,
developing and punishing the enemy in the objective area without becoming
heavily engaged.36
General Gay organized a task force under
the 8th Cavalry's Col. Harold K. Johnson that added infantry, artillery, and
engineers to the tank battalion.37
Colonel Johnson was to move up Route 55 through the
South Korean outpost at Paengam-ni to Yangji-ri on Route 20, then investigate
east and west along the road and the high ground immediately above
it.38
Johnson's principal engagement was an
exchange of fire with an enemy company discovered on the reverse slopes of the
first heights above Yangji-ri. The task force suffered two killed and five
wounded, while enemy casualties were estimated at fifteen killed by ground
troops and fifty by air strikes. The lack of contact before reaching Yangji-ri
supported General Coulter's conviction that the area below Route 20 was
unoccupied, while the Yangjiri exchange supplied further evidence that organized
enemy groups were located along the road.39
Operation Thunderbolt
Ridgway, however, wanted a clearer picture
of enemy dispositions below the Han before committing forces to general
offensive operations. On 23 January his G2 reported the bulk of the XIII Army Group to be below
Seoul in the area bounded by Route 20 on the south and the Han River on the east
and north. Air reconnaissance had been reporting steady troop movements below
the Han but did not confirm the presence of such a large force in that region.
Nor had recent ground contacts developed any solid enemy defense at the area's
lower edge. Resolving the ambiguities, Ridgway judged, required a deeper and
stronger reconnaissance in force, which he scheduled for the morning of the 25th
under the name Operation THUNDERBOLT.40
In the THUNDERBOLT operation General Milburn
and General Coulter were to reconnoiter as far as the Han, each using not more
than one American division reinforced by armor and, at the discretion of each
corps commander, one South Korean regiment. Each
corps force was to establish a base of operations on the night of the 24th along
a line of departure ten miles ahead of line D, from the coast through Osan to
Yoju, then advance to the Han in multiple columns through five phase lines about
five miles apart. (Map 18) To insure a fully coordinated reconnaissance, Ridgway made Milburn
responsible for ordering the advance from each phase line in both corps zones;
to guarantee the security of the advance, he instructed Milburn to order each
successive move only after he had clearly determined that no enemy group strong
enough to endanger any column had been bypassed. Ridgway intended that his
ground troops would have ample air support. He planned to postpone the operation
if for any reason on the 25th General Partridge could not assure two successive
days of maximum close support. Ridgway also arranged for the I Corps to be able
to call down gunfire from a heavy cruiser and two destroyers of Task Force 95
stationed off Inch'on.41
The X Corps was to protect the right flank
of the THUNDERBOLT advance. On 23 January Ridgway had his deputy chief of staff,
Brig. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, deliver instructions to General Almond requiring the
X Corps to maintain contact with the IX Corps at Yoju and to prevent enemy
movements south of the Yoju-Wonju road. Almond, as he had been instructed three
days earlier, also was to send forces in diversionary forays north of this road.
Map 18.
Operation THUNDERBOLT, 25-31 January 1951
In a personal effort to develop the
disposition of enemy forces before Operation THUNDERBOLT began, Ridgway on the 24th
reconnoitered the objective area from the air with General Partridge as his
pilot. The two generals flew low over the territory twenty miles ahead of the I
and IX Corps fronts for two hours but saw no indications of large enemy
formations. Although this flight did not conclusively disprove the current G-2
estimate, Ridgway was more confident that his reconnaissance in force would reach the Han, and he also saw possibility of
holding the ground covered. That night, from a forward command post established
at I Corps headquarters in Ch'onan, he ordered Milburn and Coulter to prepare
plans for holding their gains once their forces achieved the fifth phase line
stretching eastward from Inch'on. The two corps commanders completed these plans
on the 25th. Thus the THUNDERBOLT reconnaissance tentatively assumed the nature of a general attack
within a few hours after it started.43
In the I Corps zone, the
first THUNDERBOLT phase line lay
four miles short of Suwon in territory already well examined. Milburn picked the
25th Division reinforced by the Turkish brigade to make the advance. According
to the scheme of moving in multiple columns, General Kean sent the 35th Infantry
up Routes 39 and 1 in the west, the Turks over a secondary road between Routes 1
and 17 and up 17 itself on the east. Out along the coast, a fifth column made up
of the reconnaissance companies of the 25th Division and the 3d Division
screened the west flank of the advance.44
The initial phase line in the IX Corps zone
traced the high ground just above Route 20 which included the area previously
reconnoitered by Task Force Johnson. Coulter again ordered the 1st Cavalry
Division to advance. Choosing to start in two columns, General Gay sent the 8th
Cavalry north on Route 55 toward Yangji-ri, where Colonel Johnson had met
resistance on the earlier mission, and the 7th Cavalry up Route 13 into the
territory above Ich'on.45
Close Air Support Given 7th Cavalry Near Inch'on, Jan 26 '51
Screening wide to the flanks of each axis
lest they bypass an enemy force, the THUNDERBOLT
columns on the 25th developed islands of opposition,
mostly light, along or just below the first phase line. Sharp counterattacks hit
the Turks on the secondary road east of Route 1 and the 8th Cavalry in the
Yangji-ri area, but in both instances the Chinese eventually broke contact.
Captives identified only two divisions of the 50th Army across the thirty-mile
front of the advance. This disclosure and the general pattern of light
resistance indicated that the XIII Army Group had set out a
counter-reconnaissance screen to shield defenses or assembly areas farther
north. According to the prisoners, some positions would be found between two and
five miles farther north. This location would place them generally along the
second THUNDERBOLT phase
line, which coincided with Suwon and a stretch of Route 20 in the west, then
tipped northeast to touch the Han ten miles above Yoju.46
On the 26th General Milburn allowed the I
Corps columns to move toward the second phase line while the IX Corps forces
continued to clear the area along the first. Again against light, scattered
opposition, the two columns of the 35th Infantry converged on Suwon and occupied
the town and airfield by 1300. Elsewhere in both corps zones the advance became
a plodding affair as the troop columns searched east and west of their axes
while driving north for short gains through tough spots of resistance. The
Chinese fought back hardest at Kumnyangjang-ni, which the Turks finally cleared
at 1930, and in the heights above Yangji-ri, where the 8th Cavalry lost 28
killed and 141 wounded while managing little more than to hold its position. The
inability of the 8th Cavalry to move forced the 7th Cavalry to the east to stand
fast alon the first phase line just above Ich'on.47
Gains on the 27th were short everywhere,
more because of the requirements for close coordination and a thorough ground
search than enemy resistance. The deepest I Corps advance was on the left,
where the 35th Infantry moved about two miles above Suwon, while the leading
Turk troops on the right got about a mile above Route 20 into the T'an-ch'on
River valley between Suwon and Kumnyangjang-ni. The heaviest fighting again
occurred near Yangji-ri when the 5th Cavalry passed through the 8th and attacked
west. Killing at least three hundred Chinese before reaching Kumnyangjang-ni,
the 5th Cavalry then turned up Route 17 to reach the first phase line a mile and
half to the north. The 7th Cavalry, in the meantime, continued to hold near
Ich'on.48
Captives taken during the day identified the third, and
last, division of the 50th Army. The full deployment of the 50th
and the absence of contact with any other army on
the THUNDERBOLT front
supported the previous conclusion that the 50th
had a screening mission. The intelligence
rationale now taking shape assumed the Chinese units originally moving south of
the Han to have started a gradual reduction of forward forces after determining
generally the extent of the Eighth Army withdrawal. Behind the 50th Army screen, the remaining
five armies of the XIII Army Group
and the North Korean I Corps apparently were now
grouped just above and below the Han to rest and refurbish those Chinese who had
been in combat longest.49
To meet the probability of stronger
resistance nearer the Han and to prepare for holding all ground gained,
Ridgway on the 27th authorized Milburn to add the 3d
Division to the I Corps advance. Milburn gave General Soule the Turkish brigade
zone east of Suwon and sent the Turks west to advance along the coast toward
Inch'on. On the 28th Soule's 65th and 15th Regiments moved north astride Route
55 in the T'an-ch'on valley while the Turks shifted westward and joined the
advance of the 35th Infantry. Against moderate, uneven resistance, the enlarged
I Corps force reached within two miles of the third phase line, which lay
roughly halfway between the line of departure and the Han.50
To the east, where resistance in the
Yangjiri-Kumnyangjang-ni area had kept the IX Corps THUNDERBOLT forces slightly behind the
others, the 1st Cavalry Division received clearance on the 28th to advance to
the second phase line. In the slow going imposed by careful screening and
moderate opposition, the 5th Cavalry, moving along Route 17, reached the new
objective while the 7th Cavalry, advancing above Ich'on in a wide zone astride
Route 13, stopped for the night about a mile short. The cavalrymen had
encountered two new regiments, one athwart each axis of advance. These, as
identified by Chinese captured later during sharp night assaults against the 7th
Cavalry, belonged to the 112th Division, 38th
Army. Previously assembled in a rest area about
seven miles above the front, the 112th
had received sudden orders to move south and
oppose the IX Corps advance.51
In anticipation of heavier opposition to the IX Corps
advance and to help hold the ground taken, Ridgway on the 28th instructed
General Coulter to commit the 24th Division. Coulter gave Maj. Gen. Blackshear
M. Bryan, who had replaced General Church on 26 January, until the morning of
the 30th to assemble the 24th behind the Ich'on-Yoju stretch of Route 20, whence
the division was to advance on the corps right.52
Also on the 28th Ridgway again instructed General Almond
to maintain contact with the IX Corps at Yoju, to block enemy moves below the
Yoju-Wonju road, and to create diversions north of the road.53 X
Corps forces, having only recently check the North Korean advance east of Route
29 and reoccupied Wonju, were then just beginning to carry out similar
instructions received on the 20th and 23d.
Enemy small arms, machine gun, mortar, and
artillery fire, as well as minefields (though neither extensively nor well laid)
kept gains short in both corps zones on the 29th. Information supplied by
prisoners taken during the day indicated that six divisions now opposed the
THUNDERBOLT advance. In
the area between the west coast and Route 1, the North Korean 8th Division stood before the
Turks and the left flank units of the 35th Infantry. West to east between Routes
1 and 17, the Chinese 148th, 149th,
and 150th Divisions
of the 50th Army
opposed the 25th and 3d Divisions and the left
flank forces of the 1st Cavalry Division. From Route
17 eastward to the Han, the Chinese 113th
and 112th Divisions
of the 38th Army
occupied positions in front of the remainder of
the cavalry division.54
Even though the opposition had tripled, the
dotted pattern of enemy positions, mostly company-size, made clear that the
THUNDERBOLT forces were
still battling a counter-reconnaissance screen. There was now some doubt that a
main enemy line would be developed below the Han. Prisoners made no mention of
one but spoke mainly of regroupment. Neither did air observers, although they
warned of prepared positions along Route 1 north to Yongdungp'o. Thus the
refurbishing needs of the XIII Army Group
might be great enough to keep it from
establishing solid defenses south of the Han, or the group commander might have
chosen not to stand with the river at his back.55
Exercising a prerogative given in Ridgway's
initial order, Milburn and Coulter on the 30th each added a South Korean
regiment to their THUNDERBOLT forces to help push through the enemy's tighter screen. With the
opening of the 24th Division's advance on the IX Corps right on that date, the
additions doubled the forces who had begun the reconnaissance five days earlier.
Ground gains against the six enemy divisions nevertheless were hard won and
measured in yards during the last two days of January. Milburn's forces barely
gained the third phase line on the 31st, and IX Corps forces reached little
farther than the second.56
Ridgway in the meantime converted his
reconnaissance in force to a fullfledged attack. On the 30th, although his
assault forces were some distance short of the fifth phase line, where he
originally had planned to establish the remainder of the I and IX Corps, he
authorized Milburn and Coulter to bring their remaining units forward from line
D to hold the ground that had been gained. He did not release these forces for
commitment in the advance, but he did take steps to ease the progress of the
attack by instructing Milburn to plan a strong armored thrust through the
coastal lowland on the west flank. Beyond this, he directed his G-3 to arrange a
maximum air effort to isolate the battlefield south of the
Han.57
He also began to widen the offensive. On
the 30th he asked General Almond and the ROK Army chief of staff, General Chung,
for recommendations on sending the X Corps and the ROK III Corps forward
in the fashion of Operation THUNDERBOLT. The purpose of the advance, he explained, would be to disrupt the
North Korean II and V Corps, which were still regrouping east of
Route 29. On 2 February he ordered the ROK I Corps to join the advance. The
South Koreans were to move as far north as the east coast town of
Kangnung.58
When executed, the instructions Ridgway
issued at the turn of the month would set the entire Eighth Army front in
forward motion. In terms of ground to be gained and held, however, Ridgway
intended that this motion carry his forces no farther than the lower bank of the
Han in the west and a general line extending eastward from the Han River town of
Yangp'yong through Hoengsong in the center of the peninsula to Kangnung on the
coast. Only if enemy forces elected to withdraw above the 38th parallel would he
consider occupying a defense line farther north, and in this context he asked
his staff near the end of January for recommendations on the most advantageous
terrain lines for the Eighth Army to occupy during the spring and summer months.
Otherwise, his current judgment was that the ground farther north, to and
including the 38th parallel, offered no defensible line worthy of the losses
risked in attempting to take it.59
In limiting the Eighth Army's defense line
in the west to the lower bank of the Han, Ridgway excluded Seoul as an
objective. Occupying the capital city, in his estimation, would provide no
military advantage but would, rather, produce the disadvantage of placing a
river immediately in rear of the occupying forces. He had in fact directed his
staff to prepare plans for crossing the Han and capturing the city. But, in line
with his views, these plans were not to be carried out unless there arose an
opportunity to destroy a major enemy force in
which the retaking of Seoul was an incidental possibility.60
In any event, Ridgway entertained no
thought of a prolonged effort to hold any line. Knowing that there would be no
major reinforcement of the Eighth Army and assuming that enemy forces would keep
trying to drive the Eighth Army out of Korea or destroy it in place, he saw no
wisdom in accepting the heavy attrition that a static defense seemed certain to
entail. In sum, he considered the permanent acquisition of real estate an
impractical, if not unachievable, objective. In his mind, inflicting maximum
losses on the Chinese and North Koreans, delaying them as long as possible if
and when they attempted to advance, preserving the strength of his own forces,
and maintaining his major units intact remained the only sound bases of
planning, both for current operations and at longer
range.61
Ridgway informed General MacArthur of these
tactical concepts by letter on 3 February. MacArthur agreed that occupying Seoul
would yield little military gain, although he believed that seizing the city
would produce decided diplomatic and psychological advantages. On the other
hand, he stressed to Ridgway the military worth of nearby Kimpo airfield and the port of Inch'on, both below the Han, and
urged their capture.62 These facilities already had become objectives
of Operation THUNDERBOLT.
To Ridgway's larger concept of holding
along the Han River-Yangp'yong-Hoengsong-Kangnung line unless enemy forces
voluntarily withdrew above the 38th parallel, MacArthur responded in terms of
developing the enemy's main line of resistance. If Ridgway developed the line
below the Han, he should not attempt to break through it, but if he reached the
Han without serious resistance, he should continue north until he had defined
the enemy line or discovered that no line existed.63
As a general concept, MacArthur had in mind
"to push on until we reached the line where a balance of strength was achieved
which was governed by the relativity of supply."64 Ridgway, on the
other hand, was primarily interested in holding whatever line best suited his
basic plan of punishing the enemy as severely as possible at the least cost to
his own forces. The difference in concept was perhaps subtle but was substantial
enough to prompt Ridgway to bring up the matter again when MacArthur next
visited Korea.
Notes
1 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps Comd Rpt,
Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51;
25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
2 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 13
and 14 Jan 51; Rad, GX-11066 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps,
14 Jan 51; Rad, G1-1081 KAR, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 14 Jan 51; 1 Corps G3
Jnl, Sum, 14 Jan 51.
3 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p.
382; Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, 2 Nov 51; Ltr, Ridgway to Collins, 8 Jan
51.
4 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 369.
5 MS, Ridgway, The
Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 370-71.
6 This section is based on Mono, "AFFE Military History Detachment,
U.N. Partisan Forces in the Korean Conflict," copy in CMH.
7 By war's end the United Nations Partisan Force reached a strength
of twenty thousand divided among six regiments, one of which had received
airborne training. Its members at that time included South Korean volunteers who
were allowed to join the partisans in lieu of conscription into the ROK Army.
Partisan units eventually occupied island strongholds off both coasts of North
Korea, although the major strength remained off Hwanghae Province. Beyond
harassing the enemy rear along the west coast, the value of partisan operations
is a matter of speculation.
8 For a detailed discussion of the evacuation
issue, see Schnabel, Policy and Direction,
chs. XVI and XVII.
9 On 18 December MacArthur had requested that four National Guard
divisions called into federal service the previous September be moved to Japan
to complete their training so as to be at hand to protect Japan against any
Soviet attack. Because no final government decision had yet been made as to the
future U.S. course of action in Korea, the Joint Chiefs on 23 December notified
MacArthur that no divisions would be deployed to the Far East for the time
being. Japan was left virtually without combat troops.
10 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp.
383-84.
11 Ibid.; Rad, G-1-1594 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 7 Jan 51;
Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 312; Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Maj Gen Chung
It Kwon, 11 Jan 51.
12 Eighth Army Opns Plan 21, 8
Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8 Jan 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Log
Comd, 13 Jan 51, sub: Defense Line Construction.
13 Prisoners of war then numbered
137,791, of whom 616 were Chinese and 137,175 were North Koreans.
14
DF, Eighth Army G3 to CofS, 10 Jan 51, sub:
Evacuation Plan; Eighth Army Opn Plan 2-25, Draft no. 1, 10 Jan 51; Ltr, CG
Eighth Army to CG 2d Log Comd, 10 Jan 51, sub: Operation Plan 2-25; Eighth Army
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
15 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p.
313.
16 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51;
Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for General J. Lawton Collins, CS, USA, 15 Jan 51,
sub: Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Rad, C-53613, Bradley from
Collins for JCS, 17 Jan 51.
17 Ltr, Ridgway
to Collins, 8 Jan 51.
18 Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, sub:
Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Ltr, Ridgway to Gen Mark W. Clark, 5 Mar
51; Rad, G-1-1299 KCG, CG EUSAK to CS USA, Personal for Haislip from Collins, 16
Jan 51; Interv, Mossman, Carroll, and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
19
Ridgway, Aide-Memoire for Collins, 15 Jan 51, sub:
Conference at EUSAK Main, 15 Jan 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Collins,
War in Peacetime, p. 257.
20
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
21 Later, after
Ridgway saw press reports of Collins' views, he radioed MacArthur: "May I
suggest for such use as you think it might merit, my firm conviction that
recently reported press statements that members of the JCS had announced `the
Eighth Army has plenty of fight left and if attacked will severely punish the
enemy' are great understatements. This command, I am convinced, will do far
more." See Rad, G-1-2148 KCG, CG EUSAK to CINCFE, Personal for General
MacArthur, 26 Jan 51.
22 Rad, C-53613, Bradley
from Collins for JCS, 17 Jan 51; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 327.
23 Statement
to the Press, General MacArthur, 20 Jan 51, copy in CMH.
24 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 255.
25
MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp.
388-89. See also Schnabel, Policy and
Direction, pp. 342-44.
26 Msg, Ridgway Personal for
Milburn, 150900 Jan 51, copy in I Corps G3 Jul file,
15 Jan 51.
27 I Corps Opns Dir 38, 14 Jan 51; 1
Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 14 Jan 51; Rad, CG-1-1066 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps
and CG IX Corps, 14 Jan 51; Rad, IXACT-697, CG IX Corps to CG 6th ROK Div, 14
Jan 51; 25th Div 01 46, 14 Jan 51.
28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1 Corps POR 375, 15 Jan 51, and 377, 16 Jan 51.
29 The 89th Tank
Battalion; 8th Field Artillery Battalion; Battery B, 90th Field Artillery
Battalion; Company A, 65th Engineer Battalion; 25th Reconnaissance Company; a
detachment of the 25th Signal Company; and two tactical air control parties were
attached.
30 25th Div 0146, 14 Jan 51; I Corps POR 375, 15 Jan 51; 27th Inf
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
31 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16
Jan 51; 1 Corps POR 378, 16 Jan 51; 27th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 27th Inf
Unit Rpt no. 16, 16 Jan 51.
32 I Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 and 17 Jan 51; Ltr, CG 25th Div for
general distribution, 19 Jan 51, sub: Commendation. See also various reports on
Operation WOLFHOUND in the
27th Inf Comd Rpt, Jan 51.
33 Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I,
IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; 1 Corps Opn Dir 39, 21 Jan 51; I Corps G3 Jul, Sum,
20 and 22 Jan 51; Ltr, CG 25th Div to CG I Corps, 26 Jan 51, sub: Evaluation of
the Limited Objective Attack, 22 Jan 51.
34
Rads, G-1-980 and CG1-1535 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG
IX Corps, 13 and 19 Jan 51.
35 Eighth Army G3 Jul,
Sum, 21 Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
36 IX Corps Opn Dir 23, 20 Jan 51.
37 Task Force Johnson included the
70th Tank Battalion, the 3d Battalion and a platoon of the heavy mortar company
of the 8th Cavalry, a battery of the 99th Field Artillery Battalion, and a
platoon of the 8th Engineer Combat Battalion.
38
1st Cav Div Opn Dir 1-51, 21 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div,
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; TF Johnson Opn O no. 1, 21 Jan 51.
39 TF Johnson Periodic Operations Report, 22 Jan 51; TF Johnson
Periodic Intelligence Report, 22 Jan 51.
40
MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p.
381; Eighth Army PIR 195, 23 Jan 51.
41 Rads,
CG-1-1895 KGOO, CG-1-1888 KGOO, and CG-1-1889 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps
and CG IX Corps, all 23 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-1929 KAR, CG Eighth Army to CG I
Corps, 24 Jan 51; Rad, CTF 95 to COMCRU DIV 1, 23 Jan 51; Rad, CTG 95.1 to CTE
95.12, 24 Jan 51.
42 Rad, GX-1-1645 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps, 20 Jan 51; Rad, GX-1-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth
Army to CC X Corps, 28 Jan 51 (confirms oral instructions delivered by Gen Hodes
on 23 Jan 51).
43 MS, Ridgway, The Korean War,
Issues and Policies, p. 381; Futrell, The United States Air Force in
Korea, p. 263; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; I Corps Opn Plan
"Exploitation," 25 Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Plan 11, 25 Jan 51.
44 I Corps Opn Dir 40, 23 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51.
45 IX Corps Opn O 11, 23 Jan 51; 1st Cav Div
Opn 0 1-51, 24 Jan 51.
46 Eighth Army Comd Rpt,
Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 197, 25 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st
Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
47 25th Div Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 198, 26 Jan
51.
48 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51.
49 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jul, Sum, 26 Jan 51; Eighth Army PIR 199, 27 Jan 51, and 200, 28 Jan
51.
50 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 27 Jan 51; I Corps
G3 Jut, Sum, 27 Jan 51; 1 Corps Opn Dir 41, 27 Jan 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar,
Jan 51; 1 Corps G3 Jnl, Sum, 28 Jan 51.
51 1st Cav
Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps PIR 125, 29 Jan 51.
52 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Opn Dir 25, 29 Jan 51;
24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
53 Rad, GX-1-2270 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 28 Jan
51.
54 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; Eighth
Army PIR 201, 29 Jan 51.
55 Ibid.; Eighth Army G3
SS Rpt, Jan 51.
56 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 25th Div Comd
Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 1st Cav Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; I Corps G3 Sit Overlay, 31 Jan 51; IX Corps G3 Sit Overlay, 31 Jan
51.
57 Eighth Army
Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan 51.
58 Rad, GX-1-2257 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 30 Jan 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 31 Jan
51; Rad, GX-2-118 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps and C/S ROKA, 2 Feb
51.
59 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Jan
51; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 386.
60 Ltr,
Ridgway, to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51; Rad, CICOS-14376, CG Eighth Army to C/S Eighth
Army, 26 Jan 51.
61 Ltr, Ridgway to MacArthur, 3 Feb 51.
62 Ibid.; Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG
Eighth Army Personal for Ridgway 4 Feb
51.
63 Rad, C-54811, CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army,
Personal for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51.
64 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 384.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation