Extracted from
AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY
ARMY HISTORICAL SERIES
CHAPTER 25
The Korean War, 1950-1953
After the USSR installed a Communist
government in North Korea in September 1948, that
government promoted and supported an insurgency in
South Korea in an attempt to bring down the recognized
government and gain jurisdiction over the entire Korean
peninsula. Not quite two years later, after the
insurgency showed signs of failing, the northern
government undertook a direct attack, sending the North
Korea People's Army south across the 38th parallel
before daylight on Sunday, June 25, 1950. The invasion,
in a narrow sense, marked the beginning of a civil war
between peoples of a divided country. In a larger
sense, the cold war between the Great Power blocs had
erupted in open hostilities.
The Decision for
War
The western bloc, especially the United
States, was surprised by the North Korean decision.
Although intelligence information of a possible June
invasion had reached Washington, the reporting agencies
judged an early summer attack unlikely. The North
Koreans, they estimated, had not yet exhausted the
possibilities of the insurgency and would continue that
strategy only.
The North Koreans, however, seem to
have taken encouragement from the U.S. policy which
left Korea outside the U.S. "defense line" in
Asia and from relatively public discussions of the
economies placed on U.S. armed forces. They evidently
accepted these as reasons to discount American
counteraction, or their sponsor, the USSR, may have
made that calculation for them. The Soviets also appear
to have been certain the United Nations would not
intervene, for in protest against Nationalist
China's membership in the U.N. Security Council and
against the U.N.'s refusal to seat Communist China,
the USSR member had boycotted council meetings since
January 1950 and did not return in June to veto any
council move against North Korea.
Moreover, Kim Il Sung, the North Korean
Premier, could be confident that his army, a modest
force of 135,000, was superior to that of South Korea.
Koreans who had served in Chinese and Soviet World War
II armies made up a large part of his force. He had 8
full divisions, each including a regiment of artillery;
2 divisions at half strength; 2 separate regiments; an
armored brigade with 120 Soviet T34 medium tanks; and 5
border constabulary brigades. He also had 180 Soviet
aircraft, mostly fighters and attack bombers, and a few
naval patrol craft.
The Republic of Korea (ROK) Army had
just 95,000 men and was far less fit. Raised as a
constabulary during occupation, it had not in its later
combat training under a U.S. Military Advisor Group
progressed much beyond company-level exercises. Of its
eight divisions, only four approached full strength. It
had no tanks and its artillery totaled eighty-nine
105-mm. howitzers. The ROK Navy matched its North
Korean counterpart, but the ROK Air Force had only a
few trainers and liaison aircraft. U.S. equipment,
war-worn when furnished to South Korean forces, had
deteriorated further, and supplies on hand could
sustain combat operations no longer than fifteen days.
Whereas almost $11 million in materiel assistance had
been allocated to South Korea in fiscal year 1950 under
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, Congressional
review of the allocation so delayed the measure that
only a trickle of supplies had reached the country by
June 25, 1950.
The North Koreans quickly crushed South
Korean defenses at the 38th parallel. The main North
Korean attack force next moved down the west side of
the peninsula toward Seoul, the South Korean capital,
thirty-five miles below the parallel, and entered the
city on June 28. (Map 45) Secondary thrusts down
the peninsula's center and down the east coast kept
pace with the main drive. The South Koreans withdrew in
disorder, those troops driven out of Seoul forced to
abandon most of their equipment because the bridges
over the Han River at the south edge of the city were
prematurely demolished. The North Koreans halted after
capturing Seoul, but only briefly to regroup before
crossing the Han.
In Washington, where a 14-hour time
difference made it June 24 when the North Koreans
crossed the parallel, the first report of the invasion
arrived that night. Early on the pith, the United
States requested a meeting of the U.N. Security
Council. The council adopted a resolution that
afternoon demanding an immediate cessation of
hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean forces to
the 38th parallel.
Map 45
In independent actions on the night of
the 25th, President Truman relayed orders to General of
the Army Douglas MacArthur at MacArthur's Far East
Command headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, to supply ROK
forces with ammunition and equipment, evacuate American
dependents from Korea, and survey conditions on the
peninsula to determine how best to assist the republic
further. The President also ordered the U.S. Seventh
Fleet from its current location in Philippine and
Ryukyu waters to Japan. On the 26th, in a broad
interpretation of a U.N. Security Council request for
"every assistance" in supporting the June 25
resolution, President Truman authorized General
MacArthur to use air and naval strength against North
Korean targets below the 38th parallel. The President
also redirected the bulk of the Seventh Fleet to
Taiwan, where by standing between the Chinese
Communists on the mainland and the Nationalists on the
island it could discourage either one from attacking
the other and thus prevent a widening of
hostilities.
When it became clear on June 27 that
North Korea would ignore the U.N. demands, the U.N.
Security Council, again at the urging of the United
States, asked U.N. members to furnish military
assistance to help South Korea repel the invasion.
President Truman immediately broadened the range of
U.S. air and naval operations to include North Korea
and authorized the use of U.S. Army troops to protect
Pusan, Korea's major port at the southeastern tip
of the peninsula. MacArthur meanwhile had flown to
Korea and, after witnessing failing ROK Army efforts in
defenses south of the Han River, recommended to
Washington that a U.S. Army regiment be committed in
the Seoul area at once and that this force be built up
to two divisions. President Truman's answer on June
30 authorized MacArthur to use all forces available to
him.
Thus the United Nations for the first
time since its founding reacted to aggression with a
decision to use armed force. The United States would
accept the largest share of the obligation in Korea
but, still deeply tired of war, would do so
reluctantly. President Truman later described his
decision to enter the war as the hardest of his days in
office. But he believed that if South Korea was left to
its own defense and fell, no other small nation would
have the will to resist aggression, and Communist
leaders would be encouraged to override nations closer
to U.S. shores. The American people, conditioned by
World War II to battle on a grand scale and to complete
victory, would experience a deepening frustration over
the Korean conflict, brought on in the beginning by
embarrassing reversals on the battlefield.
South to the
Naktong
Ground forces available to MacArthur
included the 1st Cavalry Division and the 7th, 24th,
and 25th Infantry Divisions, all under the Eighth U.S.
Army in Japan, and the 28th Regimental Combat Team on
Okinawa. All the postwar depreciations had affected
them. Their maneuverability and firepower were sharply
reduced by a shortage of organic units and by a general
understrength among existing units. Some weapons,
medium tanks in particular, could scarcely be found in
the Far East, and ammunition reserves amounted to only
a 4s-day supply. By any measurement, MacArthur's
ground forces were unprepared for battle. His air arm,
Far East Air Forces (FEAF), moreover, was organized for
air defense, not tactical air support. Most FEAF planes
were short-range jet interceptors not meant to be flown
at low altitudes in support of ground operations. Some
F-51's in storage in Japan and more of these World
War II planes in the United States would prove
instrumental in meeting close air support needs. Naval
Forces, Far East, MacArthur's sea arm, controlled
only five combat ships and a skeleton amphibious force,
although reinforcement was near in the Seventh
Fleet.
When MacArthur received word to commit
ground units, the main North Korean force already had
crossed the Han River. By July 3, a westward enemy
attack had captured a major airfield at Kimpo and the
Yellow Sea port of Inch'on. Troops attacking south
repaired a bridge so that tanks could cross the Han and
moved into the town of Suwon, twenty-five miles below
Seoul, on the 4th.
The speed of the North Korean drive
coupled with the unreadiness of American forces
compelled MacArthur to disregard the principle of mass
and commit units piecemeal to trade space for time.
Where to open a delaying action was clear, for there
were few good roads in the profusion of mountains
making up the Korean peninsula, and the best of these
below Seoul, running on a gentle diagonal through
Suwon, Osan, Taejon, and Taegu to the port of Pusan in
the southeast, was the obvious main axis of North
Korean advance. At MacArthur's order, two rifle
companies, an artillery battery, and a few other
supporting units of the 24th Division moved into a
defensive position astride the main road near Osan, ten
miles below Suwon, by dawn on July 5. MacArthur later
referred to this 540-man force, called Task Force
Smith, as an "arrogant display of strength."
Another kind of arrogance to be found at Osan was a
belief that the North Koreans might ". . . turn
around and go back when they found out who was
fighting."
Coming out of Suwon in a heavy rain, a
North Korean division supported by thirty-three tanks
reached and with barely a pause attacked the Americans
around 8:00 a.m. on the 5th. The North Koreans lost 4
tanks, 42 men killed, and 85 wounded. But the American
force lacked antitank mines, the fire of its recoilless
rifles and 2.36-inch rocket launchers failed to
penetrate the T34 armor, and its artillery quickly
expended the little antitank ammunition that did prove
effective. The rain canceled air support,
communications broke down, and the task force was,
under any circumstances, too small to prevent North
Korean infantry from flowing around both its flanks. By
midafternoon, Task Force Smith was pushed into a
disorganized retreat with over 150 casualties and the
loss of all equipment save small arms. Another casualty
was American morale as word of the defeat reached other
units of the 24th Division then moving into delaying
positions below Osan.
The next three delaying actions, though
fought by larger forces, had similar results. In each
case, North Korean armor or infantry assaults against
the front of the American position were accompanied by
an infantry double envelopment. By July 15, the 24th
Division was forced back on Taejon, sixty miles below
Osan, where it initially took position along the Kum
River above the town. Clumps of South Korean troops by
then were strung out west and east of the division to
help delay the North Koreans.
Fifty-three U.N. members meanwhile
signified support of the Security Council's June 27
action and twenty-nine of these made specific offers of
assistance. Ground, air, and naval forces eventually
sent to assist South Korea would represent twenty U.N.
members and one nonmember nation. The United States,
Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey,
Greece, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Thailand, the Philippines, Colombia and Ethiopia would
furnish ground combat troops. India, Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, and Italy (the non-United Nations country)
would furnish medical units. Air forces would arrive
from the United States, Australia, Canada, and the
Union of South Africa; naval forces would come from the
United States, Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand.
The wide response to the council's
call pointed out the need for a unified command.
Acknowledging the United States as the major
contributor, the U.N. Security Council on July 7 asked
it to form a command into which all forces would be
integrated and to appoint a commander. In the evolving
command structure, President Truman became executive
agent for the U.N. Security Council. The National
Security Council, Department of State, and Joint Chiefs
of Staff participated in developing the grand concepts
of operations in Korea. In the strictly military
channel, the Joint Chiefs issued instructions through
the Army member to the unified command in the field,
designated the United Nations Command (UNC) and
established under General MacArthur.
MacArthur superimposed the headquarters
of his new command over that of his existing Far East
Command. Air and naval units from other countries
joined the Far East Air Forces and Naval Forces, Far
East, respectively. MacArthur assigned command of
ground troops in Korea to the Eighth Army under Lt.
Gen. Walton H. Walker, who established headquarters at
Taegu on July 15, assuming command of all American
ground troops on the peninsula and, at the request of
South Korean President Syngman Rhee, of the ROK Army.
When ground forces from other nations reached Korea,
they too passed to Walker's command.
Between July 14 and 18; MacArthur moved
the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Korea after
cannibalizing the 7th Division to strengthen those two
units. By then, the battle for Taejon had opened. New
3.5-inch rocket launchers hurriedly airlifted from the
United States proved effective against the T34 tanks,
but the 24th Division lost Taejon on July 20 after two
North Korean divisions established bridgeheads over the
Kum River and encircled the town. In running enemy
roadblocks during the final withdrawal from town, Maj.
Gen. William F. Dean, the division commander, took a
wrong turn and was captured some days later in the
mountains to the south. When repatriated some three
years later, he would learn that for his exploits at
Taejon he was one of 131 servicemen awarded the Medal
of Honor during the war (Army 78, Marine Corps 42, Navy
7, and Air Force 4).
While pushing the 24th Division below
Taejon, the main North Korean force split, one division
moving south to the coast, then turning east along the
lower coast line. The remainder of the force continued
southeast beyond Taejon toward Taegu. Southward
advances by the secondary attack forces in the central
and eastern sectors matched the main thrust, all
clearly aimed to converge on Pusan. North Korean supply
lines grew long in the advance, and less and less
tenable under heavy UNC air attacks. FEAF meanwhile
achieved air superiority, indeed air supremacy, and UNC
warships wiped out North Korean naval opposition and
clamped a tight blockade on the Korean coast. These
achievements and the arrival of the 28th Regimental
Combat Team from Okinawa on July 26 notwithstanding,
American and South Korean troops steadily gave way.
American casualties rose above 6,000 and South Korean
losses reached 70,000. By the beginning of August,
General Walker's forces held only a small portion
of southeastern Korea.
Alarmed by the rapid loss of ground,
Walker ordered a stand along a 140-mile line arching
from the Korea Strait to the Sea of Japan west and
north of Pusan. His U.S. divisions occupied the western
arc, basing their position on the Naktong River. South
Korean forces, reorganized by American military
advisers into two corps headquarters and five
divisions, defended the northern segment. A long line
and few troops kept positions thin in this "Pusan
Perimeter " But replacements and additional units
now entering or on the way to Korea would help relieve
the problem, and fair interior lines of communications
radiating from Pusan allowed Walker to move troops and
supplies with facility.
Raising brigades to division status and
conscripting large numbers of recruits, many from
overrun regions of South Korea, the North Koreans over
the next month and a half committed thirteen infantry
divisions and an armored division against Walker's
perimeter. But the additional strength failed to
compensate for the loss of some 58,000 trained men and
much armor suffered in the advance to the Naktong. Nor
in meeting the connected defenses of the perimeter did
enemy commanders recognize the value of massing forces
for decisive penetration at one point. They dissipated
their strength instead in piecemeal attacks at various
points along the Eighth Army line.
Close air support played a large role
in the defense of the perimeter. But the Eighth
Army's defense really hinged on a shuttling of
scarce reserves to block a gap, reinforce a position,
or counterattack wherever the threat appeared greatest
at a given moment. Timing was the key, and General
Walker proved a master of it. His brilliant responses
prevented serious enemy penetrations and inflicted
telling losses that steadily drew off North Korean
offensive power. His own strength meanwhile was on the
rise. By mid-September, he had over 500 medium tanks.
Replacements arrived in a steady flow and additional
units came in: the 5th Regimental Combat Team from
Hawaii, the 2d Infantry Division and 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade from the United States, and a British
infantry brigade from Hong Kong. Thus, as the North
Koreans lost irreplaceable men and equipment, UNC
forces acquired an offensive capability.
North to the
Parallel
Against the gloomy prospect of trading
space for time, General MacArthur, at the entry of U.S.
forces into Korea, had perceived that the deeper the
North Koreans drove, the more vulnerable they would
become to an amphibious envelopment. He began work on
plans for such a blow almost at the start of
hostilities, favoring Inch'on, the Yellow Sea port
halfway up the west coast, as the landing site. Just
twenty-five miles east lay Seoul where Korea's main
roads and rail lines converged. A force landing at
Inch'on would have to move inland only a short
distance to cut North Ko rean supply routes, and the
recapture of the capital city also could have a helpful
psychological impact. Combined with a general northward
advance by the Eighth Army, a landing at Inch'on
could produce decisive results. Enemy troops retiring
before the Eighth Army would be cut off by the
amphibious force behind them or be forced to make a
slow and difficult withdrawal through the mountains
farther east.
Though pressed in meeting Eighth Army
troop requirements, MacArthur was able to shape a
two-division landing force. He formed the headquarters
of the X Corps from members of his own staff, naming
his chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, as
corps commander. He rebuilt the 7th Division by giving
it high priority on replacements from the United States
and by assigning it 8,600 South Korean recruits. The
latter measure was part of a larger program, called the
Korean Augmentation to the United Stat es Army, in
which South Korean troops were placed among almost all
American units. At the same time, he acquired from the
United States the greater part of the 1st Marine
Division, which he planned to fill out with the Marine
brigade currently in the Pusan Perimeter. The X Corps,
with these two divisions, was to make its landing as a
separate force, not as part of the Eighth Army.
MacArthur's superiors and the Navy
judged the Inch'on plan dangerous. Naval officers
considered the extreme Yellow Sea tides, which range as
much as thirty feet, and narrow channel approaches to
Inch'on as big risks to shipping. Marine officers
saw danger in landing in the middle of a built-up area
and in having to scale high sea walls to get ashore.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipated serious
consequences if Inch'on were strongly defended
since MacArthur would be committing his last major
reserves at a time when no more General Reserve units
in the United States were available for shipment to the
Far East. Four National Guard divisions had been
federalized on September 1, but none of these was yet
ready for combat duty; and, while the draft and
call-ups of members of the Organized Reserve Corps were
substantially increasing the size of the Army, they
offered MacArthur no prospect of immediate
reinforcement. But MacArthur was willing to accept the
risks.
In light of the uncertainties
MacArthur's decision was a remarkable gamble, but
if results are what count his action was one of
exemplary boldness. The X Corps swept into Inch'on
on September 15 against light resistance and, though
opposition stiffened, steadily pushed inland over the
next two weeks. One arm struck south and seized Suwon
while the remainder of the corps cleared Kimpo
Airfield, crossed the Han, and fought through Seoul.
MacArthur, with dramatic ceremony, returned the capital
city to President Rhee on September 29.
General Walker meanwhile attacked out
of the Pusan Perimeter on September 16. His forces
gained slowly at first; but on September 23, after the
portent of Almond's envelopment and Walker's
frontal attack became clear, the North Korean forces
broke. The Eighth Army, by then organized as four
corps, two U.S. and two ROK, rolled forward in pursuit,
linking with the X Corps on September 26. About 30,000
North Korean troops escaped above the 38th parallel
through the eastern mountains. Several thousand more
bypassed in the pursuit hid in the mountains of South
Korea to fight as guerrillas. But by the end of
September the North Korea People's Army ceased to
exist as an organized force anywhere in the southern
republic.
North to the
Yalu
President Truman, to this point,
frequently had described the American-led effort in
Korea as a "police action," a euphemism for
war that produced both criticism and amusement. But the
President's term was an honest reach for
perspective. Determined to halt the aggression, he was
equally determined to limit hostilities to the
peninsula and to avoid taking steps that would prompt
Soviet or Chinese participation. By western estimates,
Europe with its highly developed industrial resources,
not Asia, held the high place on the Communist schedule
of expansion; hence, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) alliance needed the deterrent
strength that otherwise would be drawn off by a heavier
involvement in the Far East.
On this and other bases, a case could
be made for halting MacArthur's forces at the 38th
parallel. In re-establishing the old border, the UNC
had met the U.N. call for assistance in repelling the
attack on South Korea. In an early statement, Secretary
of State Acheson had said the United Nations was
intervening ". . . solely for the purpose of
restoring the Republic of Korea to its status prior to
the invasion from the north." A halt, furthermore,
would be consistent with the U.S. policy of
containment.
There was, on the other hand,
substantial military reason to carry the war into North
Korea. Failure to destroy the 30,000 North Korean
troops who had escaped above the parallel and an
estimated 30,000 more in northern training camps, all
told the equivalent of six divisions, could leave South
Korea in little better position than before the start
of hostilities. Complete military victory, by all
appearances within easy grasp, also would achieve the
longstanding U.S. and U.N. objective of reunifying
Korea. Against these incentives had to be balanced
warnings of sorts against a UNC entry into North Korea
from both Communist China and the USSR in August and
September. But these were counted as attempts to
discourage the UNC, not as genuine threats to enter the
war, and on September 27 President Truman authorized
MacArthur to send his forces north, provided that by
the scheduled time there had been no major Chinese or
Soviet entry into North Korea and no announcement of
intended entry. As a further safeguard, MacArthur was
to use only Korean forces in extreme northern territory
abutting the Yalu River boundary with Manchuria and
that in the far northeast along the Tumen River
boundary with the USSR. Ten days later, the U.N.
General Assembly voted for the restoration of peace and
security throughout Korea, thereby giving tacit
approval to the UNC's entry into North Korea.
On the east coast, Walker's ROK I
Corps crossed the parallel on October 1 and rushed far
north to capture Wonsan, North Korea's major
seaport, on the 10th. The ROK II Corps at nearly the
same time opened an advance through central North
Korea; and on October 9, after the United Nations
sanctioned crossing the parallel, Walker's U.S. I
Corps moved north in the west. Against slight
resistance, the U.S. I Corps cleared P'yongyang,
the North Korean capital city, on October 19 and in
five days advanced to the Ch'ongch'on River
within fifty miles of the Manchurian border. The ROK II
Corps veered northwest to come alongside. To the east,
past the unoccupied spine of the axial Tachaek
Mountains, the ROK I Corps by October 24 moved above
Wonsan, entering Iwon on the coast and approaching the
huge Changjin Reservoir in the Taebaeks.
The outlook for the UNC in the last
week of October was distinctly optimistic, despite
further warnings emanating from Communist China.
Convinced by all reports, including one from MacArthur
during a personal conference at Wake Island on October
15, that the latest Chinese warnings were more
saber-rattling bluffs, President Truman revised his
instructions to MacArthur only to the extent that if
Chinese forces should appear in Korea MacArthur should
continue his advance if he believed his forces had a
reasonable chance of success.
In hopes of ending operations before
the onset of winter, MacArthur on October 24 ordered
his ground commanders to advance to the northern border
as rapidly as possible and with all forces available.
In the west, the Eighth Army sent several columns
toward the Yalu, each free to advance as fast and as Or
as possible without regard for the progress of the
others. The separate X Corps earlier had prepared a
second amphibious assault at Wonsan but needed only to
walk ashore since the ROK I Corps had captured the
landing area. General Almond, adding the ROK I Corps to
his command upon landing, proceeded to clear
northeastern Korea, sending columns up the coast and
through the mountains toward the Yalu and the Changjin
Reservoir. In the United States, a leading newspaper
expressed the prevailing optimism with the editorial
comment that "Except for unexpected developments
... we can now be easy in our minds as to the military
outcome."
UNC forces moved steadily along both
coasts, and one interior ROK regiment in the Eighth
Army zone sent reconnaissance troops to the Yalu at the
town of Ch'osan on October 26. But almost
everywhere else the UNC columns encountered stout
resistance and, on October 25, discovered they were
being opposed by Chinese. "Unexpected
developments" had occurred.
In the X Corps zone, Chinese stopped a
ROK column on the mountain road leading to the Changjin
Reservoir. American marines relieved the South Koreans
and by November 6 pushed through the resistance within
a few miles of the reservoir, whereupon the Chinese
broke contact. In the Eighth Army zone, the first
Chinese soldier was discovered among captives taken on
October 25 by South Koreans near Unsan northwest of the
Ch'ongch'on River. In the next eight days,
Chinese forces dispersed the ROK regiment whose troops
had reached the Yalu, severely punished a regiment of
the 1st Cavalry Division when it came forward near
Unsan, and forced the ROK II Corps into retreat on the
Eighth Army right. As General Walker fell back to
regroup along the Ch'ongch'on, Chinese forces
continued to attack until November 6, then, as in the X
Corps sector, abruptly broke contact.
At first it appeared that individual
Chinese soldiers, possibly volunteers, had reinforced
the North Koreans. By November 6, three divisions
(10,000 men each) were believed to be in the Eighth
Army sector and two divisions in the X Corps area. The
estimate rose higher by November 24, but not to a point
denying UNC forces a numerical superiority nor to a
figure indicating full-scale Chinese intervention.
Some apprehension over a massive
Chinese intervention grew out of knowledge that a huge
Chinese force was assembled in Manchuria. The
interrogation of captives, however, did not convince
the UNC that there had been a large Chinese commitment;
neither did aerial observation of the Yalu and the
ground below the river; and the voluntary withdrawal
from contact on 6 November seemed no logical part of a
full Chinese effort. General MacArthur felt that the
auspicious time for intervention in force had long
passed; the Chinese would hardly enter when North
Korean forces were ineffective rather than earlier when
only a little help might have enabled the North Koreans
to conquer all of South Korea. He appeared convinced,
furthermore, that the United States would respond with
all power available to a massive intervention and that
this certainty would deter Chinese leaders who could
not help but be aware of it. In an early November
report to Washington, he acknowledged the possibility
of full intervention, but pointed out that ". . .
there are many fundamental logical reasons against it
and sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to
warrant its immediate acceptance." His reports by
the last week of the month indicated no change of
mind.
Intelligence evaluations from other
sources were similar. As of November 24, the general
view in Washington was that ". . . the Chinese
objective was to obtain U.N. withdrawal by intimidation
and diplomatic means, but in case of failure of these
means there would be increasing intervention. Available
evidence was not considered conclusive as to whether
the Chinese Communists were committed to a full-scale
offensive effort." In the theater, the general
belief was that future Chinese operations would be
defensive only, that the Chinese units in Korea were
not strong enough to block a UNC advance, and that UNC
airpower could prevent any substantial Chinese
reinforcement from crossing the Yalu. UNC forces hence
resumed their offensive. There was, in any event
MacArthur said, no other way to obtain ". . . an
accurate measure of enemy strength...."
In northeastern Korea, the X Corps, now
strengthened by the arrival of the 3d Infantry Division
from the United States, resumed its advance on November
II. In the west, General Walker waited until the with
to move the Eighth Army forward from the
Ch'ongch'on while he strengthened his attack
force and improved his logistical support. Both
commands made gains. Part of the U.S. 7th Division, in
the X Corps zone, actually reached the Yalu at the town
of Hyesanjin. But during the night of November 25
strong Chinese attacks hit the Eighth Army's center
and right; on the 27th the attacks engulfed the
leftmost forces of the X Corps at the Changjin
Reservoir; and by the 28th UNC positions began to
crumble.
MacArthur now had a measure of Chinese
strength. Around 200,000 Chinese of the XIII Army Group
stood opposite the Eighth Army. With unexcelled march
and bivouac discipline, this group, with eighteen
divisions plus artillery and cavalry units, had entered
Korea undetected during the last half of October. The
IX Army Group with twelve divisions next entered Korea,
moving into the area north of the Changjin Reservoir
opposite the X Corps. Hence, by November 24 more than
300,000 Chinese combat troops were in Korea.
"We face an entirely new
war," MacArthur notified Washington on November
28. On the following day he instructed General Walker
to make whatever withdrawals were necessary to escape
being enveloped by Chinese pushing hard and deep
through the Eighth Army's eastern sector, and
ordered the X Corps to pull into a beachhead around the
east coast port of Hungnam, north of Wonsan.
The New
War
In the Eighth Army's withdrawal
from the Ch'ongch'on, a strong roadblock set
below the town of Kunu-ri by Chinese attempting to
envelop Walker's forces from the east caught and
severely punished the U.S. 2d Division, last away from
the river. Thereafter, at each reported approach of
enemy forces, General Walker ordered another withdrawal
before any solid contact could be made. He abandoned
P'yongyang on December 5, leaving 8,000 to 10,000
tons of supplies and equipment broken up or burning
inside the city. By December 15, he was completely out
of contact with the Chinese and was back at the 38th
parallel where he began to develop a coast-to-coast
defense line.
In the X Corps' withdrawal to
Hungnam, the center and rightmost units experienced
little difficulty. But the 1st Marine Division and two
battalions of the 7th Division retiring from the
Changjin Reservoir encountered Chinese positions
overlooking the mountain road leading to the sea. After
General Almond sent Army troops inland to help open the
road, the Marine-Army force completed its move to the
coast on December 11. General MacArthur briefly
visualized the X Corps beachhead at Hungnam as a
"geographic threat" that could deter Chinese
to the west from deepening their advance. Later, with
prompting from the Joint Chiefs, he ordered the X Corps
to withdraw by sea and proceed to Pusan, where it would
become part of the Eighth Army. Almond started the
evacuation on the 11th, contracting his Hungnam
perimeter as he loaded troops and materiel aboard ships
in the harbor. With little interference from enemy
forces, he completed the evacuation and set sail for
Pusan on Christmas Eve.
On the day before, General Walker was
killed in a motor vehicle accident while traveling
north from Seoul toward the front. Lt. Gen. Matthew B.
Ridgway hurriedly flew from Washington to assume
command of the Eighth Army. After conferring in Tokyo
with MacArthur, who instructed General Ridgway to hold
a position as far north as possible but in any case to
maintain the Eighth Army intact, the new army commander
reached Korea on the 26th.
Ridgway himself wanted at least to hold
the Eighth Army in its position along the 38th parallel
and if possible to attack. But his initial inspection
of the front raised serious doubts. The Eighth Army, he
learned, was clearly a dispirited command, a result of
the hard Chinese attacks and the successive withdrawals
of the past month. He also discovered much of the
defense line to be thin and weak. The Chinese XIII Army
Group meanwhile appeared to be massing in the west for
a push on Seoul, and twelve reconstituted North Korean
divisions seemed to be concentrating for an attack in
the central region. From all evidence available, the
New Year holiday seemed a logical date on which to
expect the enemy's opening assault.
Holding the current line, Ridgway
judged, rested both on the early commitment of reserves
and on restoring the Eighth Army's confidence. The
latter, he believed, depended mainly on improving
leadership throughout the command. But it was not his
intention to start "lopping off heads."
Before he would relieve any commander, he wanted
personally to see the man in action, to know that the
relief would not adversely affect the unit involved,
and indeed to be sure he had a better commander
available. For the time being, he intended to correct
deficiencies in leadership by working "on and
through" the incumbent corps and division
commanders.
To strengthen the line, he committed
the 2d Division to the central sector where positions
were weakest, even though that unit had not fully
recovered from losses in the Kunu-ri roadblock, and
pressed General Almond to quicken the preparation of
the X Corps whose forces needed refurbishing before
moving to the front. Realizing that time probably was
against him, he also ordered his western units to
organize a bridgehead above Seoul, one deep enough to
protect the Han River bridges, from which to cover a
withdrawal below the city should an enemy offensive
compel a general retirement.
Enemy forces opened attacks on New
Year's Eve, directing their major effort toward
Seoul. When the offensive gained momentum, Ridgway
ordered his western forces back to the Seoul bridgehead
and pulled the rest of the Eighth Army to positions
roughly on line to the east. After strong Chinese units
assaulted the bridgehead, he withdrew to a line forty
miles below Seoul. In the west, the last troops pulled
out of Seoul on January 4, 1951, demolishing the Han
bridges on the way out, as Chinese entered the city
from the north.
Only light Chinese forces pushed south
of the city and enemy attacks in the west diminished.
In central and eastern Korea, North Korean forces
pushed an attack until mid-January. When pressure
finally ended ale along the front, reconnaissance
patrols ordered north by Ridgway to maintain contact
encountered only light screening forces, and
intelligence sources reported that most enemy units had
withdrawn to refit. It became clear to Ridgway that a
primitive logistical system permitted enemy forces to
undertake offensive operations for no more than a week
or two before they had to pause for replacements and
new supplies, a pattern he exploited when he assigned
his troops their next objective. Land gains, he pointed
out, would have only incidental importance. Primarily,
Eighth Army forces were to inflict maximum casualties
on the enemy with minimum casualties to themselves.
"To do this," Ridgway instructed, "we
must wage a war of maneuver—slashing at the enemy
when he withdraws and fighting delaying actions when he
attacks."
Whereas Ridgway was now certain his
forces could achieve that objective, General MacArthur
was far less optimistic. Earlier, in acknowledging the
Chinese intervention, he had notified Washington that
the Chinese could drive the UNC out of Korea unless he
received major reinforcement. At the time, however,
there was still only a slim reserve of combat units in
the United States. Four more National Guard divisions
were being brought into federal service to build up the
General Reserve, but not with commitment in Korea in
mind. The main concern in Washington was the
possibility that the Chinese entry into Korea was only
one part of a USSR move toward global war, a concern
great enough to lead President Truman to declare a
state of national emergency on December 16. Washington
officials, in any event, considered Korea no place to
become involved in a major war. For all of these
reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff notified MacArthur
that a major build-up of UNC forces was out of the
question. MacArthur was to stay in Korea if he could,
but should the Chinese drive UNC forces back on Pusan,
the Joint Chiefs would order a withdrawal to Japan.
Contrary to the reasoning in
Washington, MacArthur meanwhile proposed four
retaliatory measures against the Chinese: blockade the
China coast, destroy China's war industries through
naval and air attacks, reinforce the troops in Korea
with Chinese Nationalist forces, and allow diversionary
operations by Nationalist troops against the China
mainland. These proposals for escalation received
serious study in Washington but were eventually
discarded in favor of sustaining the policy of
confining the fighting to Korea.
Interchanges between Washington and
Tokyo next centered on the timing of a withdrawal from
Korea. MacArthur believed Washington should establish
all the criteria of an evacuation, whereas Washington
wanted MacArthur first to provide the military
guidelines on timing. The whole issue was finally
settled after General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of
Staff, visited Korea, saw that the Eighth Army was
improving under Ridgway's leadership, and became as
confident as Ridgway that the Chinese would be unable
to drive the Eighth Army off the peninsula. "As of
now," General Collins announced on January 15,
"we are going to stay and fight."
Ten days later, Ridgway opened a
cautious offensive, beginning with attacks in the west
and gradually widening them to the east. The Eighth
Army advanced slowly and methodically, ridge by ridge,
phase line by phase line, wiping out each pocket of
resistance before moving farther north. Enemy forces
fought back vigorously and in February struck back in
the central region. During that counterattack, the 23d
Regiment of the 2d Division successfully defended the
town of Chipyong-ni against a much larger Chinese
force, a victory that to Ridgway symbolized the Eighth
Army's complete recovery of its fighting spirit.
After defeating the enemy's February effort, the
Eighth Army again advanced steadily, recaptured Seoul
by mid-March, and by the first day of spring stood just
below the 38th parallel.
Intelligence agencies meanwhile
uncovered evidence of rear area offensive preparations
by the enemy. In an attempt to spoil those
preparations, Ridgway opened an attack on April 5
toward an objective line, designated Kansas, roughly
ten miles above the 38th parallel. After the Eighth
Army reached Line Kansas, he sent a force toward an
enemy supply area just above Kansas in the west-central
zone known as the Iron Triangle. Evidence of an
imminent enemy offensive continued to mount as these
troops advanced. As a precaution, Ridgway on April 12
published a plan for orderly delaying actions to be
fought when and if the enemy attacked, an act, events
proved, that was one of his last as commander of the
Eighth Army.
Plans being written in Washington in
March, had they been carried out, well might have kept
the Eighth Army from moving above the 38th parallel
toward Line Kansas. For as a gradual development since
the Chinese intervention, the United States and other
members of the UNC coalition by that time were willing,
as they had not been the past autumn, to accept the
clearance of enemy troops from South Korea as a
suitable final result of their effort. On March 20, the
Joint Chiefs notified MacArthur that a Presidential
announcement was being drafted which would indicate a
willingness to negotiate with the Chinese and North
Koreans to make "satisfactory arrangements for
concluding the fighting," and which would be
issued "before any advance with major forces north
of 38th Parallel." Before the President's
announcement could be made, however, MacArthur issued
his own offer to enemy commanders to discuss an end to
the fighting, but it was an offer that placed the UNC
in the role of victor and which indeed sounded like an
ultimatum. "The enemy . . . must by now be
painfully aware," MacArthur said in part,
"that a decision of the United Nations to depart
from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area
of Korea, through an expansion of our military
operations to its coastal areas and interior bases,
would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military
collapse." President Truman considered the
statement at cross-purposes with the one he was to have
issued and so canceled his own. Hoping the enemy might
sue for an armistice if kept under pressure, he
permitted the question of crossing the 38th parallel to
be settled on the basis of tactical considerations.
Thus it became Ridgway's decision; and the parallel
would not again assume political significance.
President Truman had in mind, after the
March episode, to relieve MacArthur but had yet to make
a final decision when the next incident occurred. On
April 5, Joseph W. Martin, Republican leader in the
House of Representatives, rose and read MacArthur's
response to a request for comment on an address Martin
had made suggesting the use of Nationalist Chinese
forces to open a second front. In that response,
MacArthur said he believed in "meeting force with
maximum counterforce," and that the use of
Nationalist Chinese forces fitted that belief.
Convinced, also, that ". . . if we lose this war
to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable,
win it and Europe most probably would avoid war . . .
," he added that there could be " . . . no
substitute for victory . . ." in Korea.
President Truman could not accept
MacArthur's open disagreement with and challenge of
national policy. There were also grounds for a charge
of insubordination, since MacArthur had not cleared his
March 24 statement or his response to Representative
Martin with Washington, contrary to a Presidential
directive issued in December requiring prior clearance
of all releases touching on national policy. Concluding
that MacArthur was ". . . unable to give his
wholehearted support to the policies of the United
States government and of the United Nations in matters
pertaining to his official duties," President
Truman recalled MacArthur on April 11 and named General
Ridgway as successor. MacArthur returned to the United
States to receive the plaudits of a nation shocked by
the relief of one of its greatest military heroes.
Before the Congress and the public he defended his own
views against those of the Truman Administration. The
controversy stirred up was to endure for many months,
but in the end the nation accepted the fact that,
whatever the merit of MacArthur's arguments, the
President as Commander in Chief had a right to relieve
him.
Before transferring from Korea to
Tokyo, General Ridgway on April 14 turned over the
Eighth Army to Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet. Eight days
later twenty-one Chinese and nine North Korean
divisions launched strong attacks in western Korea and
lighter attacks in the east, with the major effort
aimed at Seoul. General Van Fleet withdrew through
successive delaying positions to previously established
defenses a few miles north of Seoul where he finally
contained the enemy advance. When enemy forces withdrew
to refurbish, Van Fleet laid plans for a return to Line
Kansas but then postponed the countermove when his
intelligence sources indicated he had stopped only the
first effort of the enemy offensive.
Enemy forces renewed their attack after
darkness on May 15. Whereas Van Fleet had expected the
major assault again to be directed against Seoul, enemy
forces this time drove hardest in the east central
region. Adjusting units to place more troops in the
path of the enemy advance and laying down tremendous
amounts of artillery fire, Van Fleet halted the attack
by May 20 after the enemy had penetrated thirty miles.
Determined to prevent the enemy from assembling
strength for another attack, he immediately ordered the
Eighth Army forward. The Chinese and North Koreans,
disorganized after their own attacks, resisted only
where their supply installations were threatened.
Elsewhere, the Eighth Army advanced with almost
surprising ease and by May 31 was just short of Line
Kansas. The next day Van Fleet sent part of his force
toward Line Wyoming whose seizure would give him
control of the lower portion of the Iron Triangle. The
Eighth Army occupied both Line Kansas and the Wyoming
bulge by mid-June.
Since the Kansas-Wyoming line traced
ground suitable for a strong defense, it was the
decision in Washington to hold that line and wait for a
bid for armistice negotiations from the Chinese and
North Koreans, to whom it should be clear by this time
that their committed forces lacked the ability to
conquer South Korea. In line with this decision, Van
Fleet began to fortify his positions. Enemy forces
meanwhile used the respite from attack to recoup heavy
losses and to develop defenses opposite the Eighth
Army. The fighting lapsed into patrolling and small
local clashes.