The conduct of war resembles the workings of an intricate machine with
tremendous friction, so that combinations which are easily planned on paper
can be executed only with great effort. |
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, Principles of War
By 6 July it was known that General MacArthur planned to have Eighth
Army, with General Walker in command, assume operational control of the
campaign in Korea. General Walker, a native of Belton, Texas, already had
achieved a distinguished record in the United States Army. In World War
I he had commanded a machine gun company and won a battlefield promotion.
Subsequently, in the early 1930's he commanded a battalion of the 15 Infantry
Regiment in China. Before Korea he was best known, perhaps, for his command
of the XX Corps of General Patton's Third Army in World War II. General
Walker assumed command of Eighth Army in Japan in 148. Under General MacArthur
he commanded United Nations ground forces in Korea until his death in December
During the evening of 6 July General Walker telephoned Col. William
A. Collier at Kobe and asked him to report to him the next morning at Yokohama.
When Collier arrived at Eighth Army headquarters the next morning General
Walker told him that Eighth Army was taking over command of the military
operations in Korea, and that he, Walker, was flying to Korea that afternoon
but was returning the following day. Walker told Collier he wanted him
to go to Korea as soon as possible and set up an Eighth Army headquarters,
that for the present Col. Eugene M. Landrum, his Chief of Staff, would
remain in Japan, and that he, Collier, would be the Eighth Army combat
Chief of Staff in Korea until Landrum could come over later.
General Walker and Colonel Collier had long been friends and associated
in various commands going back to early days together at the Infantry School
at Fort Benning. They had seen service together in China in the 15th Infantry
and in World War II when Collier was a member of Walker's IV Armored Corps
and XX Corps staffs. After that Collier had served Walker as Chief of Staff
in command assignments in the United States. Colonel Collier had served
in Korea in 1948 and 1949 as Deputy Chief of Staff and then as Chief of
Staff of United States Army forces there. During that time he had come to know the country well.
On the morning of 8 July Colonel Collier flew from Ashiya Air Base to
Pusan and then by light plane to Taejon. After some difficulty he found
General Dean with General Church between Taejon and the front. The day
before, General Walker had told Dean that Collier would be arriving in
a day or two to set up the army headquarters. General Dean urged Collier
not to establish the headquarters in Taejon, adding, "You can see
for yourself the condition." Collier agreed with Dean. He knew Taejon
was already crowded and that communication facilities there would be taxed.
He also realized that the tactical situation denied the use of it for an
army headquarters. Yet Colonel Collier knew that Walker wanted the headquarters
as close to the front as possible. But if it could not be at Taejon, then
there was a problem. Collier was acquainted with all the places south of
Taejon and he knew that short of Taegu they were too small and had inadequate
communications, both radio and road, to other parts of South Korea, to
serve as a headquarters. He also remembered that at Taegu there was a cable
relay station of the old Tokyo-Mukden cable in operation. So Collier drove
to Taegu and checked the cable station. Across the street from it was a
large compound with school buildings. He decided to establish the Eighth
Army headquarters there. Within two hours arrangements had been made with
the Provincial Governor and the school buildings were being evacuated.
Collier telephoned Colonel Landrum in Yokohama to start the Eighth Army
staff to Korea. The next day, 9 July at 1300, General Walker's advance
party opened its command post at Taegu. 
General Walker Assumes Command in Korea
As it chanced, the retreat of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division across
the Kum River on 12 July coincided with the assumption by Eighth United
States Army in Korea (EUSAK) of command of ground operations. General Walker
upon verbal instructions from General MacArthur assumed command of all
United States Army forces in Korea effective 0001 13 July.  That evening,
General Church and his small ADCOM staff received orders to return to Tokyo,
except for communications and intelligence personnel who were to remain
temporarily with EUSAK. A total American and ROK military force of approximately
75,000 men, divided between 18,000 Americans and 58,000 ROK's, was then
in Korea. 
General Walker arrived in Korea on the afternoon of 13 July to assume
personal control of Eighth Army operations. That same day the ROK Army
headquarters moved from Taejon to Taegu to be near Eighth Army headquarters.
General Walker at once established tactical objectives and unit responsibility.
 Eighth Army was to delay the enemy advance, secure the current defensive
line, stabilize the military situation, and build up for future offensive
operations. The 24th Division, deployed along the south bank of the Kum
River in the Kongju-Taejon area on the army's left (west) was to "prevent
enemy advance south of that line." To the east, in the mountainous
central corridor, elements of the 25th Division were to take up blocking
positions astride the main routes south and help the ROK troops stop the
North Koreans in that sector. Elements of the 25th Division not to exceed
one reinforced infantry battalion were to secure the port of P'ohang-dong
and Yonil Airfield on the east coast.
On 17 July, four days after he assumed command of Korean operations,
General Walker received word from General MacArthur that he was to assume
command of all Republic of Korea ground forces, pursuant to President Syngman
Rhee's expressed desire. During the day, as a symbol of United Nations
command, General Walker accepted from Col. Alfred G. Katzin, representing
the United Nations, the United Nations flag and hung it in his Eighth Army
headquarters in Taegu. 
A word should be said about General MacArthur's and General Walker's
command relationship over ROK forces. President Syngman Rhee's approval
of ROK forces coming under United Nations command was never formalized
in a document and was at times tenuous. This situation grew out of the
relationship of the United Nations to the war in Korea.
On 7 July the Security Council of the United Nations took the third
of its important actions with respect to the invasion of South Korea. By
a vote of seven to zero, with three abstentions and one absence, it passed
a resolution recommending a unified command in Korea and asked the United
States to name the commander. The resolution also requested the United
States to provide the Security Council with "appropriate" reports
on the action taken under a unified command and authorized the use of the
United Nations flag. 
The next day, 8 July, President Truman issued a statement saying he
had designated General Douglas MacArthur as the "Commanding General
of the Military Forces," under the unified command. He said he also
had directed General MacArthur "to use the United Nations flag in
the course of operations against the North Korean forces concurrently with
the flags of the various nations participating." 
The last important act in establishing unified command in Korea took
place on 14 July when President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea placed
the security forces of the Republic under General MacArthur, the United
Nations commander. 
Although there appears to be no written authority from President Rhee
on the subject, he verbally directed General Chung Il Kwon, the ROK Army
Chief of Staff, to place himself under the U.N. Command. Under his authority
stemming from General MacArthur, the U.N. commander, General Walker directed
the ROK Army through its own Chief of Staff. The usual procedure was for
General Walker or his Chief of Staff to request the ROK Army Chief of Staff
to take certain actions regarding ROK forces. That officer or his authorized
deputies then issued the necessary orders to the ROK units. This arrangement
was changed only when a ROK unit was attached to a United States organization.
The first such major action took place in September 1950 when the ROK 1st
Division was attached to the U.S. I Corps. About the same time the ROK
17th Regiment was attached to the U.S. X Corps for the Inch'on landing.
Over such attached units the ROK Army Chief of Staff made no attempt to
exercise control. Actually the ROK Army authorities were anxious to do
with the units remaining nominally under their control whatever the commanding
general of Eighth Army wanted. From a military point of view there was
no conflict on this score. 
When political issues were at stake during certain critical phases of
the war it may be questioned whether this command relationship would have
continued had certain actions been taken by the U.N. command which President
Syngman Rhee considered inimical to the political future of his country.
One such instance occurred in early October when U.N. forces approached
the 38th Parallel and it was uncertain whether they would continue military
action into North Korea. There is good reason to believe that Syngman Rhee
gave secret orders that the ROK Army would continue northward even if ordered
to halt by the U.N. command, or that he was prepared to do so if it became
necessary. The issue was not brought to a test in this instance as the
U.N. command did carry the operations into North Korea.
Troop Training and Logistics
General Walker had instituted a training program beginning in the summer
of 1949 which continued on through the spring of 1950 to the beginning
of the Korean War. It was designed to give Eighth Army troops some degree
of combat readiness after their long period of occupation duties in Japan.
When the Korean War started most units had progressed through battalion
training, although some battalions had failed their tests.  Regimental,
division, and army levels of training and maneuvers had not been carried
out. The lack of suitable training areas in crowded Japan constituted one
of the difficulties.
If the state of training and combat readiness of the Eighth Army units
left much to be desired on as June 1950, so also did the condition of their
equipment. Old and worn would describe the condition of the equipment of
the occupation divisions in Japan. All of it dated from World War II. Some
vehicles would not start and had to be towed on to LST's when units loaded
out for Korea. Radiators were clogged, and over-heating of motors was frequent.
The poor condition of Korean roads soon destroyed already well-worn tires
and tubes. 
The condition of weapons was equally bad. A few examples will reflect
the general condition. The 3d Battalion of the 35th Infantry Regiment reported
that only the SCR-300 radio in the battalion command net was operable when
the battalion was committed in Korea. The 24th Regiment at the same time
reported that it had only 60 percent of its Table of Equipment allowance
of radios and that four-fifths of them were inoperable. The 1st Battalion
of the 35th Infantry had only one recoilless rifle; none of its companies
had spare barrels for machine guns, and most of the M1 rifles and M2 carbines
were reported as not combat serviceable. Many of its 60-mm. mortars were
unserviceable because the bipods and the tubes were worn out. Cleaning
rods and cleaning and preserving supplies often were not available to the
first troops in Korea. And there were shortages in certain types of ammunition
that became critical in July. Trip flares, 60-mm. mortar illuminating shells,
and grenades were very scarce. Even the 60-mm. illuminating shells that
were available were old and on use proved to be 50 to 60 percent duds. 
General Walker was too good a soldier not to know the deficiencies of
his troops and their equipment. He went to Korea well aware of the limitations
of his troops in training, equipment, and in numerical strength. He did
not complain about the handicaps under which he labored. He tried to carry
out his orders. He expected others to do the same.
On 1 July the Far East Command directed Eighth Army to assume responsibility
for all logistical support of the United States and Allied forces in Korea.
 This included the ROK Army. When Eighth Army became operational in
Korea, this logistical function was assumed by Eighth Army Rear which remained
behind in Yokohama. This dual function of Eighth Army-that of combat in
Korea and of logistical support for all troops fighting in Korea-led to
the designation of that part of the army in Korea as Eighth United States
Army in Korea. This situation existed until 25 August. On that date the
Far East Command activated the Japan Logistical Command with Maj. Gen.
Walter L. Weible in command. It assumed the logistical duties previously
held by Eighth Army Rear.
The support of American troops in Korea, and indeed of the ROK Army
as well, would have to come from the United States or Japan. Whatever could
be obtained from stocks in Japan or procured from Japanese manufacturers
was so obtained. Japanese manufacturers in July began making antitank mines
and on 18 July a shipment of 3,000 of them arrived by boat at Pusan.
That equipment and ordnance supplies were available to the United States
forces in Korea in the first months of the war was largely due to the "roll-up"
plan of the Far East Command. It called for the reclamation of ordnance
items from World War II in the Pacific island outposts and their repair
or reconstruction in Japan. This plan had been conceived and started in
1948 by Brig. Gen. Urban Niblo, Ordnance Officer of the Far East Command.
 During July and August 1950 an average of 4,000 automotive vehicles
a month cleared through the ordnance repair shops; in the year after the
outbreak of the Korean War more than 46,000 automotive vehicles were repaired
or rebuilt in Japan.
The Tokyo Ordnance Depot, in addition to repairing and renovating World
War II equipment for use in Korea, instituted a program of modifying certain
weapons and vehicles to make them more effective in combat. For instance,
M4A3 tanks were modified for the replacement of the 75-mm. gun with the
high velocity 76-mm. gun, and the motor carriage of the 105-mm. gun was
modified so that it could reach a maximum elevation of 67 degrees to permit
high-angle fire over the steep Korean mountains. Another change was in
the half-track M15A1, which was converted to a T19 mounting a 40-mm. gun
instead of the old model 37-mm. weapon. 
Of necessity, an airlift of critically needed items began almost at
once from the United States to the Far East. The Military Air Transport
Service (MATS), Pacific Division, expanded immediately upon the outbreak
of the war. The Pacific airlift was further expanded by charter of civil
airlines planes. The Canadian Government lent the United Nations a Royal
Canadian Air Force squadron of 6 transports, while the Belgian Government
added several DC-4's.  Altogether, the fleet of about 60 four-engine
transport planes operating across the Pacific before 25 June 1950 was quickly
expanded to approximately 250. In addition to these, there were MATS C-74
and C-97 planes operating between the United States and Hawaii.
The Pacific airlift to Korea operated from the United States over three
routes. These were the Great Circle, with flight from McChord Air Force
Base, Tacoma, Washington, via Anchorage, Alaska and Shemya in the Aleutians
to Tokyo, distance 5,688 miles and flying time 30 to 33 hours; a second
route was the Mid-Pacific from Travis (Fairfield-Suisun) Air Force Base
near San Francisco, Calif., via Honolulu and Wake Island to Tokyo, distance
6,718 miles and flying time 34 hours; a third route was the Southern, from
California via Honolulu, and Johnston, Kwajalein, and Guam Islands to Tokyo,
distance about 8,000 miles and flying time 40 hours. The airlift moved
about 106 tons a day in July 1950. 
From Japan most of the air shipments to Korea were staged at Ashiya
or at the nearby secondary airfields of Itazuke and Brady.
Subsistence for the troops in Korea was not the least of the problems
to be solved in the early days of the war. There were no C rations in Korea
and only a small reserve in Japan. The Quartermaster General of the United
States Army began the movement at once from the United States to the Far
East of all C and 5-in-1 B rations. Field rations at first were largely
World War II K rations.
Subsistence of the ROK troops was an equally important and vexing problem.
The regular issue ration to ROK troops was rice or barley and fish. It
consisted of about twenty-nine ounces of rice or barley, one half pound
of biscuit, and one half pound of canned fish with certain spices. Often
the cooked rice, made into balls and wrapped in cabbage leaves, was sour
when it reached the combat troops on the line, and frequently it did not
arrive at all. Occasionally, local purchase of foods on a basis of 200
won a day per man supplemented the issue ration (200 won ROK money equaled
5 cents U.S. in value). 
An improved ROK ration consisting of three menus, one for each daily
meal, was ready in September 1950. It provided 3,210 calories, weighed
2.3 pounds, and consisted of rice starch, biscuits, rice cake, peas, kelp,
fish, chewing gum, and condiments, and was packed in a waterproofed bag.
With slight changes, this ration was found acceptable to the ROK troops
and quickly put into production. It became the standard ration for them during the first year of the war. 
On 30 June, Lt. Col. Lewis A. Hunt led the vanguard of American officers
arriving in Korea to organize the logistical effort there in support of
United States troops. Less than a week later, on 4 July, Brig. Gen. Crump
Garvin and members of his staff arrived at Pusan to organize the Pusan
Base Command, activated that day by orders of the Far East Command. This
command was reorganized on 13 July by Eighth Army as the Pusan Logistical
Command, and further reorganized a week later. The Pusan Logistical Command
served as the principal logistical support organization in Korea until
19 September 1950 when it was redesignated the 2d Logistical Command. 
The Port of Pusan and Its Communications
It was a matter of the greatest good fortune to the U.N. cause that
the best port in Korea, Pusan, lay at the southeastern tip of the peninsula.
Pusan alone of all ports in South Korea had dock facilities sufficiently
ample to handle a sizable amount of cargo. Its four piers and intervening
quays could berth twenty-four or more deepwater ships, and its beaches
provided space for the unloading of fourteen LST's, giving the port a potential
capacity of 45,000 measurement tons daily. Seldom, however, did the daily
discharge of cargo exceed 14,000 tons because of limitations such as the
unavailability of skilled labor, large cranes, cars, and trucks. 
The distance in nautical miles to the all-important port of Pusan from
the principal Japanese ports varied greatly. From Fukuoka it was 110 miles;
from Moji, 123; from Sasebo, 130; from Kobe, 361; and from Yokohama (via
the Bungo-Suido strait, 665 miles), 900 miles. The sea trip from the west
coast of the United States to Pusan for personnel movement required about
16 days; that for heavy equipment and supplies on slower shipping schedules
From Pusan a good road system built by the Japanese and well ballasted
with crushed rock and river gravel extended northward. Subordinate
lines ran westward along the south coast through Masan and Chinju and northeast
near the east coast to P'ohang-dong. There the eastern line turned inland
through the east-central mountain area. The roads were the backbone
of the U.N. transportation system in Korea.
The approximately 20,000 miles of Korean vehicular roads were all of
a secondary nature as measured by American or European standards. Even
the best of them were narrow, poorly drained, and surfaced only with gravel
or rocks broken laboriously by hand, and worked into the dirt roadbed by
the traffic passing over it. The highest classification placed on any appreciable
length of road in Korea by Eighth Army engineers was for a gravel or crushed
rock road with gentle grades and curves and one and a half to two lanes wide. According to engineer specifications there were
no two-lane roads, 22 feet wide, in Korea. The average width of the best
roads was 18 feet with numerous bottlenecks at narrow bridges and bypasses
where the width narrowed to 11-13 feet. Often on these best roads there
were short stretches having sharp curves and grades up to 15 percent. The
Korean road traffic was predominately by oxcart. The road net, like the
net, was principally north-south, with a few lateral east-west connecting
American Command Estimate
Almost from the outset of American intervention, General MacArthur had
formulated in his mind the strategical principles on which he would seek
victory. Once he had stopped the North Koreans, MacArthur proposed to use
naval and air superiority to support an amphibious operation in their rear.
By the end of the first week of July he realized that the North Korean
Army was a formidable force. His first task was to estimate with reasonable
accuracy the forces he would need to place in Korea to stop the enemy and
fix it in place, and then the strength of the force he would need in reserve to land behind the enemy's line. That the answer
to these problems was not easy and clearly discernible at first will become
evident when one sees how the unfolding tactical situation in the first
two months of the war compelled repeated changes in these estimates.
By the time American ground troops first engaged North Koreans in combat
north of Osan, General MacArthur had sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Washington by a liaison officer his requests for heavy reinforcements,
most of them already covered by radio messages and teletype conferences.
His requests included the 2d Infantry Division, a regimental combat team
from the 82d Airborne Division, a regimental combat team and headquarters
from the Fleet Marine Force, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, a Marine
beach group, a Marine antiaircraft battalion, 700 aircraft, 2 air squadrons
of the Fleet Marine Force, a Marine air group echelon, 18 tanks and crew
personnel, trained personnel to operate LST's, LSM's, and LCVP's, and 3
medium tank battalions, plus authorization to expand existing heavy tank
units in the Far East Command to battalion strength. 
On 6 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested General MacArthur to
furnish them his estimate of the total requirements he would need to clear
South Korea of North Korean troops. He replied on 7 July that to halt and
hurl back the North Koreans would require, in his opinion, from four to
four and a half full-strength infantry divisions, an airborne regimental
combat team complete with lift, and an armored group of three medium tank
battalions, together with reinforcing artillery and service elements. He
said 30,000 reinforcements would enable him to put such a force in Korea
without jeopardizing the safety of Japan. The first and overriding essential,
he said, was to halt the enemy advance. He evaluated the North Korean effort
as follows: "He is utilizing all major avenues of approach and has
shown himself both skillful and resourceful in forcing or enveloping such
road blocks as he has encountered. Once he is fixed, it will be my purpose
fully to exploit our air and sea control, and, by amphibious maneuver,
strike him behind his mass of ground force." 
By this time General MacArthur had received word from Washington that
bomber planes, including two groups of B-29's and twenty-two B-26's, were
expected to be ready to fly to the Far East before the middle of the month.
The carrier Boxer would load to capacity with F-51 planes and sail
under forced draft for the Far East. But on 7 July Far East hopes for a
speedy build-up of fighter plane strength to tactical support of the ground
combat were dampened by a message from Maj. Gen. Frank F. Everest, U.S.
Air Force Director of Operations. He informed General Stratemeyer that
forty-four of the 164 F-80's requested were on their way, but that the rest could not be sent because the Air Force did not have them. 
To accomplish part of the build-up he needed to carry out his plan of
campaign in Korea, MacArthur on 8 July requested of the Department of the
Army authority to expand the infantry divisions then in the Far East Command
to full war strength in personnel and equipment. He received this authority
on 19 July. 
Meanwhile, from Korea General Dean on 8 July had sent to General MacArthur
an urgent request for speedy delivery of 105-mm. howitzer high-explosive
antitank shells for direct fire against tanks. Dean said that those of
his troops who had used the 2.36-inch rocket launcher against enemy tanks
had lost confidence in the weapon, and urged immediate air shipment from
the United States of the 3.5-inch rocket launcher. He gave his opinion
of the enemy in these words, "I am convinced that the North Korean
Army, the North Korean soldier, and his status of training and quality
of equipment have been under-estimated." 
The next day, 9 July, General MacArthur considered the situation sufficiently
critical in Korea to justify using part of his B-29 medium bomber force
on battle area targets. He also sent another message to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, saying in part:
The situation in Korea is critical...
His [N.K.] armored equip[ment] is of the best and the service thereof,
as reported by qualified veteran observers, as good as any seen at any
time in the last war. They further state that the enemy's inf[antry] is
of thoroughly first class quality.
This force more and more assumes the aspect of a combination of Soviet
leadership and technical guidance with Chinese Communist ground elements.
While it serves under the flag of North Korea, it can no longer be considered
as an indigenous N.K. mil[itary] effort.
I strongly urge that in add[ition] to those forces already requisitioned
an army of at least four divisions, with all its component services, be
dispatched to this area without delay and by every means of transportation
The situation has developed into a major operation. 
Upon receiving word the next day that the 2d Infantry Division and certain
armor and antiaircraft artillery units were under orders to proceed to
the Far East, General MacArthur replied that same day, 10 July, requesting
that the 2d Division be brought to full war strength, if possible, without
delaying its departure. He also reiterated his need of the units required
to bring the 4 infantry divisions already in the Far East to full war strength.
He detailed these as 4 heavy tank battalions, 12 heavy tank companies,
11 infantry battalions, 11 field artillery battalions (105-mm. howitzers),
and 4 antiaircraft automatic weapons battalions (AAA AW), less four batteries.
After the defeat of the 24th Division on 11 and 12 July north of Choch'iwon, General Walker decided to request immediate shipment to Korea of the
ground troops nearest Korea other than those in Japan. These were the two
battalions on Okinawa. Walker's chief of staff, Colonel Landrum, called
General Almond in Tokyo on 12 July and relayed the request. The next day,
General MacArthur ordered the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, to prepare
the two battalions for water shipment to Japan.  The worsening tactical
situation in Korea caused General MacArthur on 13 July to order General
Stratemeyer to direct the Far East Air Forces to employ maximum B-26 and
B-29 bomber effort against the enemy divisions driving down the center
of the Korean peninsula. Two days later he advised General Walker that
he would direct emergency use of the medium bombers against battle-front
targets whenever Eighth Army requested it. 
It is clear that by the time the 24th Division retreated across the
Kum River and prepared to make a stand in front of Taejon there was no
complacency over the military situation in Korea in either Eighth Army
or the Far East Command. Both were thoroughly alarmed.
 Brig Gen William A. Collier, MS review comments, 10 Mar 58: EUSAK
WD. 25 Jun-12 Jul 50, Prologue, p. xiv.
 EUSAK GO 1, 13 Jul 50; EUSAK WD, G-3, Sec, 13 Jul 50; Church MS.
 ADCOM reached Tokyo the afternoon of 15 July. See EUSAK WD, 13 Jul
50, for American organizations' strength ashore. ROK strength is
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 13 Jul 50, Opn Ord 100.
 EUSAK GO 3, 17 Jul 50; EUSAK WD and G-3 Sec, 17 Jul 50.
 Dept of State Pub 4263, United States Policy in the Korean Conflict,
July 1950-February 1951, p. 8. Abstentions in the vote: Egypt, India,
Yugoslavia. Absent: Soviet Union. For text of the Security Council
resolution of 7 July see Document 99, pages 60-67.
 Ibid., Doc. 100, p. 67, gives text of the President's statement. The
JCS sent a message to General MacArthur on 10 July informing him of his
new United Nations command.
 Ibid., p. 47.
 Ltr. Lt Gen Francis W. Farrell to author, 11 Jun 58. General Farrell
was Chief of KMAG and served as ranking liaison man for Generals Walker,
Ridgway, and Van Fleet with the ROK Army for most of the first year of
the war. He confirms the author's understanding of this matter.
 Schnabel, Theater Command, treats this subject in some detail.
 24th Div WD, G-4 Daily Summ, 7-8 Jul 50.
 24th Inf WD, 6-31 Jul 50; 1st Bn, 35th Inf (25th Div) Unit Rpt, 12-
31 Jul, and 1-6 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, G-4 Sec, Daily Summ, 3-4 Aug 50, p.
113, and Hist Rpt, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50.
 GHQ FEC, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, p. 43.
 GHQ FEC, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, p. 50; Brig. Gen.
Gerson K. Heiss, "Operation Rollup," Ordnance (September-October, 1951),
 Heiss, "Operation Rollup," op. cit., pp. 242-45.
 Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Kuter, "The Pacific Airlift," Aviation Age,
XV, No. 3 (March, 1951) 16-17.
 Maj. James A. Huston. Time and Space, pt. VI, pp. 93-94, MS in
 Interv, author with Capt Darrigo, 5 Aug 53. (Darrigo lived with ROK
troops for several months in 1950.)
 Capt. Billy C. Mossman and 1st Lt. Harry J. Middleton, Logistical
Problems and Their Solutions, pp. 50-51, MS in OCMH.
 Pusan Logistical Command Monthly Activities Rpt, Jul 50, Introd and
p. 1; Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch.
III, pp. 3, 6, and ch. 4, pp. 8-9.
 Pusan Log Comd Rpt, Jul 50.
 EUSAK WD, 10 Sep 50, Annex to G-3 Hist Rpt.
 FEC, C-3 Opns, Memo for Record, 5 Jul 50, sub: CINCFE Immediate
Requirements, cited in Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in
the Korean War, ch. 111, p. 17.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch.
III, p. 16, citing Msg JCS 85058 to CINCFE, 6 Jul and Msg C 57379,
CINCFE to DA, 7 Jul 50.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. V,
pp. 18-39, citing Msg JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50; USAF Hist
Study 71, p. 16.
 GHQ FEC, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, p. 11.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch.
III, p. 8, citing Ltr, Dean to CINCFE, 080800 Jul 50, sub:
Recommendations Relative to the Employment of U.S. Army Troops in Korea.
 Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Jul 50; Hq X Corps, Staff Study, Development
of Tactical Air Support in Korea, 25 Dec 50, p. 8.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch.
III, pp. 19-20, citing Msg CX57573, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War. ch.
III, p. 21; Digest of fonecon, Landrum and Almond, FEC G-3, 12 Jul 50.
 USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 22-23.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation