| | |
|
CHAPTER VIII In the Central Mountains and on the East Coast |
The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary PeopleHistory |
| He supposes all men to be brave at all times and does not realize thatthe courage of the troops must be reborn daily, that nothing is so variable,and that the true skill of a general consists in knowing how to guaranteeit by his dispositions, his positions, and those traits of genius thatcharacterize great captains. |
| MAURICE DE SAXE. Reveries on the Art of War |
Eastward, In the central mountains of Korea, aerial observation on 8July, the day Ch'onan fell, showed that enemy armor, truck, and infantrycolumns were moving south and were already below Wonju. This led to speculationat the Far East Command that the North Koreans were engaged in a wide envelopmentdesigned to cut the main north-south line of communications in the Taejonarea. [1] South of the Han River only one enemy division, the 6th, initiallywas west of the Seoul-Pusan highway.
The area defended by the ROK Army after American troops of the U.S.24th Division entered action on 5 July was everything east of the mainSeoul-Taegu railroad and highway. In the mountainous central part of Koreathere are two main north-south axes of travel and communication. The firs,from the west, is the Wonju-Ch'ungju-Mun'gyong-Kumch'on corridor runningalmost due south from Wonju. The second, farther east, is the Wonju-Chech'on-Tanyang-Yongju-Andong-Uisong-Yongch'oncorridor slanting southeast from Wonju.
The critical military terrain of both corridors is the high watershedof a spur range which runs southwest from the east coastal range and separatesthe upper Han River on the north from the upper Naktong on the south. Bothrivers have their sources in the western slope of the Taeback Range, abouttwenty miles from the Sea of Japan. The Han River flows south for fortymiles, then turns generally northwest to empty into the Yellow Sea; theNaktong flows first south, then west, then again south to empty into theKorea Strait. Mun'gyong is at the pass on the first corridor over the highplateau of this dividing watershed. Tanyang is on the south side of theupper Han and at the head of the long, narrow pass through the watershed on the second corridor.
On the south side of this watershed, and situated generally at its base,from southwest to northeast are the towns of Sangju, Hamch'ang, Yech'on,and Yongju in the valley of the Naktong. Once these points were reached,enemy units could turn down that valley for a converging attack on Taegu.Or, the more eastern units could cross the relatively wide valley of theNaktong to enter another east-west spur range of the southern Taebaeksat a number of points-the most important being Andong-and cut across tothe east-west corridor between Taegu and P'ohang-dong and the Kyongju corridorleading south to Pusan.
After the initial success of the North Korean Army in driving ROK forcesfrom their 38th Parallel positions, the South Koreans east of the U.S.24th Division were badly disorganized and fighting separate regimentaland division actions. In the first part of July the ROK Army was generallydisposed from west to east as follows: 17th Regiment, 2d, Capital, 6th,and 8th Divisions, and the 23d Regiment of the 3d Division.
The North Korean Army advanced southward on a wide front. (Map5) The N.K. 1st Division followed the 4th andthe 3d south out of Seoul, but then turned off on the next majorroad east of the Seoul-Pusan highway. This led through Ich'on and Umsong.Ahead of it was the N.K. 2d Division which had moved westwardto this road after the fall of Ch'unch'on. At Ich'on, ROK forces cut offan enemy regiment and destroyed or captured many mortars and several piecesof artillery. Farther west on the Yongin road another enemy regiment sufferedheavy casualties at the same time, on or about 5 July, the day of TaskForce Smith's fight at Osan. After these actions, the N.K. 1st Divisionleft the path of the 2d and slanted southeast toward Ch'ungju. Thisleft the 2d the first division east of U.S. 24th Division troopson the Seoul-Taejon highway and in a position to join with the N.K. 4thand 3d Divisions in a converging attack on Taejon.
Despite losses and low morale among its troops, officers drove the 2dDivision southward toward Chinch'on, twenty miles east of Ch'onan.There on 9 July, one day after Ch'onan had fallen, the ROK Capital Divisionand South Korean police ambushed one of its battalions capturing four piecesof artillery and twenty-seven vehicles. This began a three-day battle betweenthe enemy division and the ROK Capital Division. The ROK's withdrew on11 July after other enemy divisions had outflanked them on the west bythe capture of Ch'onan and Chonui. The N.K. 2d Division,exhausted and depleted by heavy casualties, then entered Chinch'on. Despiteits condition, its commander allowed it no rest and drove it on towardCh'ongju, headquarters of the ROK I Corps. At the edge of the town, ROKartillery took it under fire and inflicted another estimated 800 casualties.Only when the ROK troops at Ch'ongju were forced to fall back after theU.S. 24th Division, on 12 July, lost Choch'iwon, twelve miles westward,did the enemy division enter the town. [2]
Eastward, the N.K. 7th Division advanced down the mountainouscentral corridor of Korea after it had helped the 2d Divisioncapture Ch'unch'on in the opening days of the invasion. Retiring slowlyin front of it and fighting effectively was the ROK 6th Division. BetweenCh'unch'on and Hongch'on, the 6th Division inflicted approximately 400casualties on the enemy division and knocked out a number of its T34 tanks.From Hongch'on the battle continued on down the road toward Wonju, theaction reaching the edge of that rail and road center on or about 2 July.There, the North Korean High Command relieved Maj. Gen. Chon U, commanderof the 7th Division, because his division was behind schedulein its advance. At the same time, the North Korean high command redesignatedthe 7th Division the 12th, and activated a new 7thDivision. After the fall of Wonju on or about 5 July, the newlydesignated 12th Division split its forces-part going southeast toward Chech'on, theremainder south toward Ch'ungju. [3]
These enemy operations in the mountainous central part of the peninsulawere conducted by Lt. Gen. Kim Kwang Hyop, commanding general of the NorthKorean II Corps, with headquarters at Hwach'on. On or about 10 July,the North Korean high command relieved him for inefficiency because hiscorps was several days behind its schedule, replacing him with Lt. Gen.Kim Mu Chong. [4]
Below Wonju, while the ROK 6th Division tried to defend the Ch'ungjucorridor, the ROK 8th Division upon arriving from the east coast triedto establish a line to defend the Tanyang corridor, the next one eastward.After seizing Ch'ungju and Chech'on, the N.K. 12th Divisionconverged on Tanyang and on July encountered the ROK 8th Division justnorth of that village. The N.K. 1st Division, having enteredthe central sector from the northwest, turned south at Ch'ungju and onthe 12th approached positions of the ROK 6th Division just above Mun'gyong.The N.K. 15th Division, meantime, joined the attack afterfollowing the 7th Division from Ch'unch'on to Wonju. At Wonju, the15th veered westward, passed through Yoju, then turned south, clearingthe town of Changhowon-ni after a stiff battle with ROK forces. By 12 July,the 15th occupied Koesan, eighteen miles northwest of Mun'gyong.
The ROK 8th Division in its withdrawal from the east coast was supposedto concentrate in the vicinity of Wonju-Chech'on. For several days theROK Army headquarters had only vague and fragmentary information concerningits location. Eventually, in moving from Tanyang toward Ch'ungju on Armyorder the division found the enemy blocking its way. Instead of tryingto fight through to Ch'ungju or to make a detour, the ROK 8th Divisioncommander decided, in view of the exhaustion of his troops and the timeinvolved in attempting a detour over mountain trails, that he would transferthe division to Ch'ungju by rail on a long haul southward to Yongch'on,thence to and through Taegu. A KMAG adviser found part of the divisionat Yongch'on, between P'ohang-dong and Taegu; other parts appear to havereached Taegu. The ROK Army issued new orders to the 8th Division whichsent it back by rail to the upper Han River area. There on the south sideof the upper Han River in the Tanyang area the 8th Division had concentratedby 10 July to defend the Yongju-Andong corridor. [5]
American and ROK strategy and tactics in this part of Korea now centeredon holding the Mun'gyong and Tanyang passes of the Han-Naktong watershed.Both offered excellent defensive terrain.
The major part of the North Korean Army was striking in a great attackon a wide front against the southern tip of the peninsula. Five divisionsmoved south over the two mountain corridors; while a sixth followed a westernbranch of the first corridor, the road from Ch'ongju through Poun to Hwangganwhere it entered the Seoul-Taegu highway.
Over the first mountain corridor and across the Mun'gyong plateau camethree North Korean divisions, the 1st, 13th, and 15th,supported by the 109th Tank Regiment of the 105thArmored Division. [6] Over the second, or eastern, corridorcame two North Korean divisions, the 12th and 8th. In theeastern mountains there were also 2,000-3,000 partisan guerrillas who hadlanded in the Ulchin area at the beginning of the war with the missionof operating as an advance element to prepare for the easy conquest ofthat part of South Korea. This group functioned poorly and was a big disappointmentto the North Korean Army.
The battles in the mountains between the North and South Koreans inJuly were often bitter and bloody with losses high on both sides. One ofthe most critical and protracted of these began about the middle of themonth near Mun'gyong between the N.K. 1st Division and theROK 6th Division for control of the Mun'gyong pass and plateau.
On the next corridor eastward, the N.K. 12th Divisioncarried the main burden of the attack all the way south from the Parallelto the upper Han River. Some of its advanced troops crossed the river on1e July and the division captured the river crossing at Tanyang on the14th. The 12th then fought the ROK 8th Division for control of theTanyang Pass near the village of P'unggi, northwest of Yongju. It outflankedthe ROK positions astride the road at Tanyang Pass and forced the 8th Divisionto withdraw southward. By the middle of July the North Koreans were forcingthe Taebaek Mountain passes leading into the valley of the upper NaktongRiver. [7]
On the east coast along the Sea of Japan the N.K. 5th Divisionand the 766th Independent Infantry Unit aftercrossing the 38th Parallel moved south with virtually no opposition. Thehigh and all but trackless Taebaek Range, with almost no lateral routesof communication through it, effectively cut off the east coast of Koreabelow the 38th Parallel from the rest of the country westward. Geographythus made it an isolated field of operations.
At Kangnung, on the coastal road, twenty miles below the Parallel, the11th Regiment of the 5th Division swung inlandon an 8-day 175-mile march through some of the wildest and roughest countryin Korea. It passed through P'yong-ch'ang, Yongwol, and Ch'unyang. At thelast place the regiment met and fought a hard battle with elements of theROK
8th Division which were withdrawing inland to the Tanyang area. [8]The regiment then turned east and joined the rest of the division at Ulchinon the coast on or about 10 July. In this arduous march through and alongthe mountains bordering the east coast, the N.K. 5th Divisionlost from all causes about 1,800 men.
Meanwhile, the North Koreans succeeded in landing amphibiously a largeparty of civilians at Ulchin. They had been specially trained at P'yongyangto take charge of the civil government in this eastern province. When itreached Ulchin, the 766th Independent Infantry Unitseparated from the 5th Division and started westward intothe mountains with the mission, as reported by prisoners, of infiltratingsouthward in small units and cutting communications between Pusan and Taegu.
One of the enemy's major tactical mistakes of the Korean War was failureto press rapidly south on the east coastal road after crossing the Parallel.By sending strong reconnaissance parties out into the wild and rugged mountainsinland from the coast to make sure its rear would not be threatened, theN.K. 5th Division dissipated some of its strength and lostvaluable time. There seems little doubt that had it pressed south withall possible speed and effort the division could have been in P'ohang-dongwithin two weeks after the war began and thus have turned, on this flank,the entire ROK and American line across the peninsula. Once in P'ohang-dongit would have been in a position to advance directly on Pusan.
After the ROK 8th Division withdrew inland the only troops on the eastcoast to oppose the enemy were the ROK 23d Regiment of the 3d Division.Col. Kim Chong Won, better known as "Tiger Kim," an unusuallybig and strong man for a Korean, commanded this regiment. The regimentwent into action against Communist guerrillas in the vicinity of Ulchinand P'yonghae-ri in early July. Beginning on 10 July it engaged the N.K.5th Division in battle on the coastal road in the vicinityof P'yonghae-ri. From this time on through July there was hard fightingon the coastal road for control of Yongdok and the northern approachesto P'ohang-dong. [9]
General MacArthur was aware of the enemy division advancing down thecoastal road, and he knew that unless halted it would constitute, a gravemenace. On 7 July, he ordered General Dean to halt hostile troops movingsouth along the east coast near Yongdok, and instructed him to providesecurity for Col. Robert Witty and his 35th Fighter Group at the air basebeing established at Yonil, five miles south of P'ohang-dong. Pursuantto these instructions, General Dean ordered the 3d Battalion, 19th InfantryRegiment, then assembling at Taegu, to proceed to P'ohang-dong, where itarrived on 8 July. By 9 July an antiaircraft company also was at P'ohang-dongand heavy engineering equipment was en route by LST to improve and extend the Yonil air strip by 3,000 feet. [10]
Reports of strong unidentified enemy or guerrilla forces moving southalong the Taebaek Range now reached the ROK Army and 24th Division headquarters.They assumed that these forces intended to attack P'ohang-dong in conjunctionwith the main enemy force moving down the coastal road.
Colonel "Tiger Kim," feeling the force of the N.K. 5thDivision for the first time, requested that he be sent reinforcements.Colonel Emmerich, senior KMAG adviser with the ROK 3d Division, in turnrequested that the ROK Army release immediately the ROK 1st Separate Battalionand the Yongdungp'o Separate Battalion from their antiguerrilla operationsin the Chiri Mountains of southwest Korea. This was granted and the twobattalions, numbering about 1,500 men armed with Japanese rifles and carbines,moved by rail and motor transport to the east coast. [11]
Meanwhile, Capt. Harold Slater, KMAG adviser with the ROK 23d Regiment,sent to Colonel Emmerich at Taegu a radio message that the ROK situationnear P'yonghae-ri had grown critical. Emmerich started for that place accompaniedby the G-3 of the ROK 3d Division. Some fifty miles below the front, atP'ohang-dong, they found retreating ROK soldiers. They also found therethe regimental executive officer in the act of setting up a rear commandpost. Emmerich, through the ROK G-3, ordered them all back north to Yongdokand followed them himself.
Already U.S. naval and air forces had joined in the fight along thecoastal road. Ships came close in-shore on the enemy flank to bombard withnaval gunfire the North Korean troop concentrations and supply points onthe coastal corridor. The newly arrived 35th Fighter Group at Yonil Airfieldjoined in the fight. Weather permitting, aircraft bombed and strafed theN.K. 5th Division daily. Capt. Gerald D. Putnam, a KMAG adviserwith the ROK 23d Regiment, served as an observer with the fighter groupin identifying targets and in adjusting naval gunfire. Heavy monsoon rainscreated landslides on the mountain-flanked coastal road and helped to slowthe North Korean advance. [12]
Late in the afternoon of 11 July the command post of the ROK 23d Regimentwithdrew south into Yongdok. When the 3d Division commander arrived atP'ohang-dong, pursuant to Colonel Emmerich's request that he take personalcommand of his troops, he ordered the military police to shoot any ROKtroops found in the town. That proved effective for the moment. The nextday, young Brig. Gen. Lee Chu Sik arrived on the east coast to assume commandof the division.
On or about 13 July, the N.K. 5th Division entered P'yonghae-ri,twenty-two miles above Yongdok and fifty miles from P'ohang-dong. Therethe 10th Regiment turned westward into the mountains andheaded for Chinbo, back of Yongdok. The enemy advances down the mountain backbone of central Koreaand on the east coast had assumed alarming proportions. The attack on Yongdok,the first critical and major action on the east coast, was at hand.
General Dean tried to give this front additional strength by assemblingthere the advanced units of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj.Gen. William B. Kean. It was the second United States division to be committedin the war and arrived in Korea between 10 and 15 July. On the 8th, GeneralKean and an advance party flew from Osaka, Japan, to Taejon for a conferencewith General Dean. Two days later the 27th Infantry Regiment (Wolfhound)landed at Pusan. There the regiment learned that its new commander wasLt. Col. John H. "Mike" Michaelis. On the 12th, a second regiment,the 24th Infantry, an all-Negro regiment and the only regiment in the EighthArmy having three battalions, arrived in Korea. Col. Horton V. White commandedit. Lastly, the 35th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Henry G. Fisher,arrived at Pusan between 13 and 15 July. [13]
The 27th Infantry at first went to the Uisong area, thirty-five milesnorth of Taegu. General Kean opened his first 25th Division command postin Korea at Yongch'on, midway between Taegu and P'ohang-dong. On 12, JulyGeneral Dean ordered him to dispose the 25th Division, less one battalionwhich was to secure Yonil Airfield, so as to block enemy movement southfrom Ch'ungju. One regiment was to be in reserve at Kumch'on ready to moveeither to the Taejon or the Ch'ongju area. [14] The next day, 13 July,the 27th Infantry moved from Uisong to Andong on Eighth Army orders totake up blocking positions north of the town behind ROK troops.
On 13 July, with the U.S. 24th Division in defensive positions alongthe south bank of the Kum River, the front extended along that river toa point above Taejon, eighty miles south of Seoul, where it bent slightlynorth of east to pass through Ch'ongju and across the high Taebaek passessouth of Ch'ungju and Tanyang, and then curved slightly south to the eastcoast at P'yonghae-ri, 110 air miles north of Pusan at the southern tipof the peninsula. On all the principal corridors leading south from thisline heavy battles were immediately in prospect.
[1] Telecon TT3486, FEC with Washington, 8 Jul 50.
[2] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), p. 60 Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 2d Div), pp. 34-36; 24th Div WD, C-2 Jnl, entry 281, 091230 Jul 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, entry 153, 081605 Jul 50; 24th Div Opns Rpt 4, 9 Jul 50; FEC Telecons TT3487, 9 Jul, and TT3489, 10 Jul 50.
[3] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), p. 43; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 112, 080912 Jul 50; FEC Telecon TT3486, 8 Jul 50;ATIS Supp, Enemy Documents, Issue 3, p. 62; KMAG G-2 Unit Hist, p. 3, copy in OCMH; New York Times, July 9, 1950.
[4] GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army, p.43
[5] FEC Telecons TT3489, 10 Jul, TT3499, 11 Jul, TT3510, 12 Jul, and TT3515, 13 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 340, 092400 and G-3 Jnl, entry 113, 081615 Jul 50; Interv, Sawyer with Col Kessler (KMAG adviser with ROK 8th Div May-Dec 50), 24 Feb 54, copy in OCMH; Gen Paik Sun Yup, MS review comments, 8 Jul 58.
[6] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 104 (N.K. 13th Div), pp. 60-61; Ibid., Issue 3 (N.K. 1st and 15th Divs), pp. 32-33, 42; Ibid., Issue 4 (105th Armored Div), p. 38; Ibid., Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), pp. 44-45; ATIS Supp, Enemy Documents, Issue 38, pp. 31-33, notebook of Maj Kim Hak Son, 12th Div.
[7] FEC Telecons TT3489, 10 Jul, TT3499, 11 Jul, TT3510, 13 Jul, TT3514, 13 Jul, TT3518, 14 Jul, and TT3526, 15 Jul 50; ATIS Supp, Enemy Documents, Issue 3, p. 72; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 3 (N.K. 1st Div.), pp. 32-33.
[8] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), pp. 39-41; 25th Div WD. G-2 Jnl, entry 125, 081025 Jul 50; DA Wkly Intel Rpt 72, 7 Jul 50, p. 19; ADCOM G-3 Log, 4 Jul 50; Interv, author with Emmerich, 5 Dec 51.
[9] ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 46 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 41.
[10] Interv, author with Emmerich, 5 Dec 51; Interv, author with Maj Gen Chang Chang Kuk, 14 Oct 53; ATIS Supp, Enemy Documents, issue 3, pp. 57-58; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entries 182, 071714; 124, 072051; 153, 081245; 153, 081605; 336, 092335; 355, 092125; and entry at 102055 Jul 50.
[11] Col Emmerich, MS review comments, 30 Nov 57.
[12] GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army, p. 60; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 41: 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl entry 336, 092335 Jul 50; New York Times, July 29, 1950.
[13] 25th Div WD, Summ, Jul 50; 27th Inf WD, 6-31 Jul 50; 35th Inf WD, 6-31 Jul 50.
[14] USAFIK Ltr of Instr 4, 120900 Jul 50.
|
|
- A VETERAN's Blog - |
