No speech of admonition can be so fine that it will at once make those
who hear it good men if they are not good already; it would surely not
make archers good if they had not had previous practice in shooting; neither
could it make lancers good, nor horsemen, it cannot even make men able
to endure bodily labour, unless they have been trained to it before.|
Attributed to Cyrus the Great, in XENOPHON, Cyropaedia
Elements of the 34th Infantry began arriving at Pusan by ship late in
the afternoon of 2 July. The next afternoon two LST's arrived with equipment.
All that night loading went on at the railroad station. Just after daylight
of 4 July the 1st Battalion started north by rail; by evening the last
of the regiment was following. Col. Jay B. Lovless commanded the regiment,
which had a strength of 1,981 men. 
When Colonel Lovless saw General Dean at Taejon early on 5 July the
General told him that Lt. Col. Harold B. Ayres (an experienced battalion
combat officer of the Italian campaign in World War II), whom Lovless had
never seen and who had just flown to Korea from Japan, had been placed
in command of his 1st Battalion at P'yongt'aek. Colonel Ayres had arrived
at P'yongt'aek that morning about 0500 with the 1st Battalion. Dean told
Lovless that he would like the 3d Battalion to go to Ansong, if possible,
and that the 34th Regimental command post should be at Songhwan-ni. As
requested by General Dean, the 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. David
H. Smith, went to Ansong, twelve miles east of P'yongt'aek to cover the
highway there. Colonel Lovless set up his regimental headquarters that
day, 5 July, at Songhwan-ni, six miles south of P'yongt'aek, on the main
highway and rail line. (Map 3)
General Dean placed great importance on holding the P'yongt'aek-Ansong
line. On the west, an estuary of the Yellow Sea came up almost to P'yongt'aek
and offered the best barrier south of Seoul to an enemy that might try
to pass around the west (or left) flank of a force defending the main highway
and rail line.
Once south of P'yongt'aek, the Korean peninsula broadens out westward
forty-five miles and a road net spreads south and west there permitting
the outflanking of the Seoul-Taegu highway positions. East of Ansong, mountains
come down close to that town, affording some protection there to a right
(east) flank anchored on it. P'yongt'aek and Ansong were key points on
the two principal highways running south between the Yellow Sea and the
west central mountains. If enemy troops succeeded in penetrating south
of P'yongt'aek, delaying and blocking action against them would become
infinitely more difficult in the western part of Korea.  General Dean
was expecting too much, however, to anticipate that one battalion in the
poor state of training that characterized the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
and without artillery, tank, or antitank weapon support, could hold the
P'yongt'aek position more than momentarily against the vastly superior
enemy force that was known to be advancing on it.
The Retreat From P'yongt'aek
When General Barth reached P'yongt'aek from the Osan position the morning
of 5 July he found there, as he had expected, Colonel Ayres and the 1st
Battalion, 34th Infantry. He told Ayres of the situation at Osan and said
that probably enemy tanks would break through there and come on down the
road. He asked Ayres to send some bazooka teams on ahead to intercept the
Lt. Charles E. Payne with some infantrymen started north. Approaching
the village of Sojong they discovered tank tracks in the muddy road where
an enemy tank had turned around. Payne stopped the trucks and dismounted
his men. A South Korean soldier on horseback, wearing foliage camouflage
on his helmet, rode up to them and yelled, "Tanks, tanks, go back!"
Payne eventually located the enemy tank on the railroad track about a mile
ahead at the edge of Sojong-ni, five miles south of Osan. In an exchange
of fire about 1600 between his bazooka teams and the tank at long range,
enemy machine gun fire killed Pvt. Kenneth Shadrick. The bazooka teams
withdrew, bringing Shadrick's body with them. The group returned to P'yongt'aek
and reported the futile effort to Barth and Ayres. 
That evening after dark General Dean and his aide, 1st Lt. Arthur M.
Clarke, drove to P'yongt'aek. There was still no word from Smith and his
men, but the presence of enemy tanks south of Osan raised all sorts of
conjectures in Dean's mind. After midnight, he started back to Taejon full
of forebodings about Task Force Smith. 
Four survivors of the Osan fight arrived at Ayres' command post at P'yongt'aek
shortly after General Dean had left it and told an exaggerated story of
the destruction of Task Force Smith. A few minutes later, Colonel Perry
arrived from Ansong and made his report of
what had happened to Task Force Smith. Barth and Ayres then decided
to keep the 1st Battalion in its blocking position but to destroy the highway
bridge just north of the town now that enemy tanks must be expected momentarily.
Members of the 1st Battalion blew the bridge at 0300, 6 July. General Barth
instructed Colonel Ayres to hold as long as he could but to withdraw if
his battalion was in danger of being outflanked and cut off. He was "not
to end up like Brad Smith."
General Barth left the 1st Battalion command post at P'yongt'aek about
0130, 6 July, and started south. He arrived at Colonel Lovless' regimental
command post at Songhwan-ni about an hour later. Already Colonel Smith
with the remnant (about eighty-six men) of his task force had passed through
there from Ansong on the way to Ch'onan, leaving four badly wounded men
with Lovless. Colonel Lovless had not received any instructions from General
Dean about General Barth, yet now he learned from the latter that he was
giving orders to the regiment, and also independently to its battalions.
General Barth told Lovless about the position of his 1st Battalion at P'yongt'aek.
According to Colonel Lovless, Barth then told him to consolidate the regiment
in the vicinity of Ch'onan. Barth directed that the 3d Battalion, less
L Company (the regimental reserve) which was near P'yongt'aek, should move
from Ansong to Ch'onan. Colonel Lovless thereupon directed L Company to
act as a rear guard and delay on successive positions when the 1st Battalion
should withdraw from P'yongt'aek. As events later proved, the company did
not carry out that order but closed directly on Ch'onan when the withdrawal
began. Barth left the 34th Infantry command post for Ch'onan before daylight.
The men of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, in their positions at the
river line two miles north of P'yongt'aek had an uncomfortable time of
it as dawn broke on 6 July in fog and rain. With water in their foxholes,
the men huddled in small groups beside them as they broke open C ration
cans for an early breakfast. Colonel Ayres came down the road and stopped
where a group of them manned a roadblock, and then he climbed the hill
west of the highway to the A Company command post.
On the hill, Platoon Sgt. Roy F. Collins was eating his C ration breakfast
when the sound of running motors caused him suddenly to look up. He saw
in the fog the outline of tanks on the far side of the blown bridge. From
the company command post, Colonel Ayres and Capt. Leroy Osburn, A Company
commander, saw the tanks about the same time. Beyond the first tanks, a
faint outline of soldiers marching in a column of twos on the left side
of the road and a line of more tanks and trucks on the right side, came
into view. Some of those watching speculated that it might be part of the
21st Infantry Task Force Smith coming back from Osan. But others immediately
said that Task Force Smith had no tanks. It required only a minute or two
for everyone to realize that the force moving up to the blown bridge was North Korean. It was, in fact, elements of the North Korean 4th Division.
The lead tank stopped at the edge of the blown bridge and its crew members
got out to examine the damage. Other tanks pulled up behind it, bumper
to bumper, until Sergeant Collins counted thirteen of their blurred shapes.
The North Korean infantry came up and, without halting, moved around the
tanks to the stream, passing the blown bridge on both sides. Colonel Ayres
by this time had ordered the 4.2-inch mortars to fire on the bridge area.
Their shells destroyed at least one enemy truck. The enemy tanks opened
fire with their tank guns on A Company's position. American return fire
was scattered and ineffective.
After watching the first few minutes of action and seeing the enemy
infantry begin fanning out on either flank, Colonel Ayres told Captain
Osburn to withdraw A Company, leaving one platoon behind briefly as a screening
force. Ayres then started back to his command post, and upon reaching it
telephoned withdrawal orders to B Company on the other (east) side of the
The 4.2-inch mortar fire which had started off well soon lapsed when
an early round of enemy tank fire stunned the mortar observer and no one
else took over direction of fire. Within half an hour after the enemy column
had loomed up out of the fog and rain at the blown bridge, North Korean
infantrymen had crossed the stream and worked sufficiently close to the
American positions for the men in A Company to see them load their rifles.
When he returned to his command post, Colonel Ayres talked with Maj.
John J. Dunn, S-3 of the 34th Infantry, who had arrived there during his
absence. About 0300 that morning, Dunn had awakened at the regimental command
post to find everyone in a state of great excitement. News had just arrived
that the enemy had overrun Task Force Smith. The regiment had no communication
with its 1st Battalion at P'yongt'aek. The distances between Ansong, P'yongt'aek,
and Songhwan-ni were so great the command radios could not net. Land lines
were laid from Songhwan-ni to P'yongt'aek but it was impossible to keep
them intact. Retreating South Korean soldiers and civilian refugees repeatedly
cut out sections of the telephone wire to improvise harness to carry packs
and possessions. The only communication was liaison officers or messengers.
Accordingly, orders and reports often were late and outdated by events
when received. Dunn asked Colonel Lovless for, and got, permission to go
forward and determine the situation. Before he started, Dunn asked for
any instructions to be delivered to Colonel Ayres. Lovless spread a map
on a table and repeated General Barth's instructions to hold as long as
possible without endangering the battalion and then to withdraw to a position
near Ch'onan, which he pointed out on the map. Dunn set out in a jeep,
traveling northward through the dark night along a road jammed with retreating
ROK soldiers and refugees. In his conversation with Ayres at the 1st Battalion command post, Major Dunn delivered the instructions
passed on to him. The decision as to when to withdraw the 1st Battalion
was Ayres'; the decision as to where it would go to take up its next defensive
position apparently was General Barth's as relayed by Lovless. 
Colonel Ayres started withdrawing his battalion soon after his conversation
with Major Dunn. By midmorning it was on the road back to Ch'onan. That
afternoon it began arriving there. Last to arrive in the early evening
was A Company. Most of the units were disorganized. Discarded equipment
and clothing littered the P'yongt'aek-Ch'onan road.
Night Battle at Ch'onan
When General Barth arrived at Ch'onan that morning he found there two
troop trams carrying A and D Companies and a part of Headquarters Company,
1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. They were the parts of the battalion not
airlifted to Korea on 1 July with Task Force Smith. Barth put them in a
defensive position two miles south of Ch'onan. When General Barth returned
to Ch'onan in the early afternoon the advance elements of the 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, were already there. He ordered the 1st Battalion to join
elements of the 21st Infantry in the defensive position he had just established
two miles south of the town. Lovless had already telephoned from Ch'onan
to Dean at Taejon giving him the P'yongt'aek news.  Familiar aspects
of war were present all day in Ch'onan. Trains going south through the
town were loaded with ROK soldiers or civilians. Everyone was trying to
Dean that evening started for Ch'onan. There he presided over an uncomfortable
meeting in Colonel Lovless' command post. Dean was angry. He asked who
had authorized the withdrawal from P'yongt'aek. Colonel Ayres finally broke
the silence, saying he would accept the responsibility. Dean considered
ordering the regiment back north at once, but the danger of a night ambuscade
caused him to decide against it. Instead, he ordered a company to go north
the next morning after daylight. General Barth remained at Ch'onan overnight
and then started for Taejon. He remained in command of the 24th Division
artillery until 14 July when he assumed command of his regular unit, the
25th Division artillery. 
As ordered, the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, had arrived at Ch'onan
from Ansong the afternoon of 6 July and during that night. Colonel Lovless
gave its L Company the mission of advancing north of Ch'onan to meet the
North Koreans the morning of the 7th. With the regimental Intelligence
and Reconnaissance Platoon in the lead, the little force started out at
0810. Only some South Korean police were in the silent town. The civilian
population had fled. At this point Lovless received a message from General Dean. It read, "Time
filed 1025, date 7 July 50. To CO 34th Inf. Move one Bn fwd with minimum
transportation. Gain contact and be prepared to fight delaying action back
to recent position. PD air reports no enemy armor south of river. CG 24
D."  Pursuant to these instructions, the 3d Battalion moved up
behind L Company.
Col. Robert R. Martin had now arrived at Ch'onan from Taejon. He was
wearing low-cut shoes, overseas cap, and had neither helmet, weapons, nor
equipment. General Dean and Colonel Martin had been good friends since
they served together in the 44th Division in Europe in World War II. Dean
had the highest opinion of Martin as a regimental commander and knew him
to be a determined, brave soldier. As soon as he was ordered to Korea,
General Dean requested the Far East Command to assign Martin to him. Arriving
by air from Japan, Colonel Martin had been at Taejon approximately one
day when on the morning of 7 July Dean sent him northward to the combat
As the 3d Battalion moved north out of Ch'onan it passed multitudes
of South Koreans going south on foot and on horseback. Lovless and others
could see numerous armed troops moving south on the hills to the west.
Lovless asked the interpreter to determine if they were North or South
Koreans. The latter said they were South Koreans. Some distance beyond
the town, men in the point saw enemy soldiers on high ground where the
road dipped out of sight. The time was approximately 1300. These enemy
troops withdrew several times as the point advanced cautiously. Finally,
about four or five miles north of Ch'onan enemy small arms fire and some
mortar shells came in on the I & R Platoon. The advance halted. It
was past mid-afternoon. An artillery officer reported to Lovless and Martin
(the latter accompanied Lovless during the day) that he had one gun. Lovless
had him emplace it in a gap in the hills about three miles north of Ch'onan;
from there he could place direct fire in front of L Company.
A liaison plane now came over and dropped a message for Lovless which
read, "To CO 34th Infantry, 1600 7 July. Proceed with greatest caution.
Large number of troops on your east and west flanks. Near Ansong lots of
tanks (40-50) and trucks. Myang-Myon large concentration of troops. Songhwan-ni
large concentration of troops trying to flank your unit. [Sgd] Dean."
Lovless and Martin now drove to the command post of the 1st Battalion,
34th Infantry, to acquaint Colonel Ayres with this intelligence and the
situation north of Ch'onan. When they arrived there they found Brig. Gen.
Pearson Menoher, Assistant Division Commander, 34th Division, and General
Church. General Menoher gave Colonel Lovless an order signed by General
Dean relieving him of command of the 34th Infantry and directing that he
turn over command to Colonel Martin. Martin likewise received an order to assume command. The change of command
took place at 1800. Lovless had been in command of the regiment only a
month or two before the Korean War started. He had replaced an officer
who had failed to bring the regiment to a desired state of training. It
appears that Lovless inherited a chaotic situation in the regiment; the
state of training was unsatisfactory and some of the officers wholly unfitted
for troop command. Before the regiment's initial commitment in Korea, Lovless
had not had time to change its condition appreciably.
While the change of command scene was taking place at the 1st Battalion
command post, Major Dunn had gone forward from the regimental command post
to find the 3d Battalion moving into a good defensive position north of
Ch'onan with excellent fields of fire. While he talked with Colonel Smith,
the battalion commander, the I&R Platoon leader drove up in a jeep.
There were bullet holes in his canteen and clothing. He reported that an
estimated forty enemy soldiers had ambushed his platoon in a small village
a mile ahead. The platoon had withdrawn, he said, but three of his men
were still in the village.
Dunn started forward with the leading rifle company, intending to attack
into the village to rescue the men. As he was making preparations for this
action, Maj. Boone Seegars, the battalion S-3, came from the direction
of the village with several soldiers and reported that he had found the
missing men. Dunn then canceled the planned attack and directed the company
to take up a blocking position. As the company started back to do this
a small group of North Koreans fired on it from the west. The company returned
the fire at long range. Dunn kept the company moving and got it into the
position he had selected, but he had trouble preventing it from engaging
in wild and indiscriminate firing. Friendly mortar fire from the rear soon
fell near his position and Dunn went back to find Colonel Smith and stop
it. Upon arriving at the 3d Battalion defensive position he found the battalion
evacuating it and falling back south along the road. He could find neither
the battalion commander nor the executive officer. 
Dunn went to the command post and explained to the group that the 3d
Battalion was abandoning its position. One of the colonels (apparently
Colonel Martin) asked Dunn if the regiment would take orders from him.
Dunn replied, "Yes." The colonel then ordered, "Put them
back in that position."
Dunn headed the retreating 3d Battalion back north. Then with Major
Seegars, two company commanders, and a few men in a second jeep, Dunn went
on ahead. Half a mile short of the position that Dunn wanted the battalion
to reoccupy, the two jeeps were fired on from close range. Majors Dunn
and Seegars were badly wounded; others were also hit. Dunn crawled to some
roadside bushes where he worked to stop blood flowing from an artery in
a head wound. An enlisted man pulled Seegars to the roadside. Dunn estimates
there were about thirty or forty enemy advance scouts in the group that
ambushed his party. An unharmed officer ran to the rear, saying he was
going for help.
From his position on a little knoll, Dunn could see the leading rifle
company behind him deploy when the firing began, drop to the ground, and
return the enemy fire. The men were close enough that he could recognize
them as they moved into line. But they did not advance, and their officers
apparently made no attempt to have them rescue the wounded men. After a
few minutes, Dunn heard an officer shout, "Fall back! Fall back!"
and he saw the men leave the skirmish line and move to the rear. This exhibition
of a superior force abandoning wounded men without making an effort to
rescue them was, to Dunn, "nauseating." Dunn, who was captured
and held thirty-eight months a prisoner in North Korea, said the main enemy
body did not arrive for two hours. Major Seegars apparently died that night.
The battalion, in withdrawing to Ch'onan, abandoned some of its mortars.
By the time the battalion reached the town its units were mixed up and
in considerable disorder. South of the town, Colonel Smith received an
order to return to Ch'onan and defend it. Colonel Martin led a Headquarters
Company patrol north of Ch'onan and recovered jeeps and other abandoned
3d Battalion equipment.
By 1700, 7 July, the 3d Battalion was in a defensive position along
the railroad tracks west of Ch'onan and along the northern edge of the town. Some of the troops organized the concrete
platform of the railroad station as a strongpoint. Others mined a secondary
road running from the northwest into the town to prevent a surprise tank
attack from that direction.
In the early part of the evening some enemy pressure developed from
the west. At 2000 a battery of the 63d Field Artillery Battalion, newly
arrived in Korea, emplaced south of Ch'onan to support the 34th Infantry.
Soon thereafter it fired its first fire mission, employing high explosive
and white phosphorus shells, against a column of tanks and infantry approaching
the town from the east, and reportedly destroyed two tanks. This enemy
force appears to have made the first infiltration into Ch'onan shortly
before midnight. 
After midnight, reports to the regimental command post stated that approximately
eighty men and Colonel Martin, who had gone into the town, were cut off
by enemy soldiers. Lt. Col. Robert L. Wadlington, the regimental executive
officer, reported this to General Dean at Taejon, and, at the same time,
said the regimental ammunition supply was low and asked for instructions.
Dean instructed Wadlington to fight a delaying action and to get word to
Martin in Ch'onan to bring his force out under cover of darkness. Dean
learned with great relief from a message sent him at 0220 8 July that Colonel
Martin had returned from the town and that the supply road into Ch'onan
was open. 
Sometime before daylight Colonel Martin went back into Ch'onan. About
daylight a 2 1/2-ton truck came from the town to get ammunition. Returning,
the driver saw an enemy tank approaching on the dirt road running into
Ch'onan from the northwest. Others were following it. They came right through
the mine field laid the day before. Enemy soldiers either had removed the
mines under cover of darkness or the mines had been improperly armed; none
exploded. The driver of the truck turned the vehicle around short of the
road intersection and escaped. 
This group of five or six tanks entered Ch'onan and opened fire on the
railroad station, the church, several buildings suspected of harboring
American soldiers, and all vehicles in sight. In the street fighting that
followed, members of the 3d Battalion reportedly destroyed two tanks with
bazookas and grenades. Pvt. Leotis E. Heater threw five grenades onto one
tank and set it burning. Enemy infantry penetrated into the city about
0600 and cut off two rifle companies.
In this street fighting, Colonel Martin met his death about 0800. Martin
had obtained a 2.36-inch rocket launcher when the tanks entered Ch'onan
and posted himself in a hut on the east side of the main street. He acted
as gunner and Sgt. Jerry C. Christenson of the regimental S-3 Section served
as his loader. Sergeant Christenson told Major Dunn a month later when
both were prisoners at the North Korean prison camp at P'yongyang that
an enemy tank came up and pointed its gun at their building. Colonel Martin
aimed the rocket launcher but the tank fired its cannon first, or at the
same time that Martin fired the rocket launcher. Its 85-mm. shell cut Martin
in two. Concussion from the explosion caused one of Christenson's eyes
to pop from its socket but he succeeded in getting it back in place. On
11 July, the Far East Command awarded Martin posthumously the first Distinguished
Service Cross of the Korean War. 
After Martin's death, the enemy tanks and increasing numbers of infiltrating
enemy soldiers quickly caused confusion in the thinning ranks of the 3d
Battalion. It soon became a question whether any appreciable number of
the men would escape from the town. Artillery laid down a continuous white
phosphorus screen and under its cloak some of the 3d Battalion escaped
from Ch'onan between 0800 and 1000. The battalion commander, Colonel Smith, was completely
exhausted physically and was evacuated a day or two later. Colonel Wadlington
placed Maj. Newton W. Lantron, the senior officer left in the battalion,
in charge of the men at the collecting point. At 1000 the artillery began
to displace southward. The 1st Battalion still held its blocking position
south of the town.
Back at Taejon, Dean had spent a sleepless night as the messages came
in from the 34th Regiment. In the morning, General Walker flew in from
Japan and told Dean that the 24th Division would soon have help-that the
Eighth Army was coming to Korea. Walker and Dean drove north to the last
hill south of Ch'onan. They arrived in time to watch the remnants of the
3d Battalion escape from the town. There they learned the news of Martin's
Dean ordered Wadlington to assume command of the regiment and to withdraw
it toward the Kum River. Just south of Ch'onan the highway splits: the
main road follows the rail line southeast to Choch'iwon; the other fork
runs almost due south to the Kum River at Kongju. Dean ordered the 21st
Infantry to fight a delaying action down the Choch'iwon road; the 34th
Infantry was to follow the Kongju road. The two roads converged on Taejon.
Both had to be defended. 
In the afternoon, a count at the collecting point showed that 175 men
had escaped from Ch'onan-all that were left of the 3d Battalion. The 34th
Regimental Headquarters also had lost many officers trapped in the town.
Survivors were in very poor condition physically and mentally. The North
Korean radio at P'yongyang claimed sixty prisoners at Ch'onan. The 3d Battalion
lost nearly all its mortars and machine guns and many individual weapons.
When the 34th Infantry began its retreat south toward the Kum in the late
afternoon, enemy troops also moving south were visible on the ridge lines
paralleling its course. 
The enemy units that fought the battle of Ch'onan were the 16th and
18th Regiments of the N.K. 4th Division, supported by tank
elements of the 105th Armored Division. The third regiment, called
up from Suwon, did not arrive until after the town had fallen. Elements
of the 3d Division arrived at Ch'onan near the end of the battle
and deployed east of the town. 
The 21st Infantry Moves Up
The 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division had now crossed from
Japan to Korea. Colonel Stephens, commanding officer of the regiment, arrived
at Taejon with a trainload of his troops before noon on 7 July. Stephens,
a bluff, rugged soldier, reported to General Dean for instructions. Within
the hour Dean sent him northward to take up a delaying position at Choch'iwon,
support the 34th Infantry, and keep open the main supply road to that regiment.
At Choch'iwon all was confusion. There were no train schedules or train
manifests. Supplies for the 24th Division and for the ROK I Corps troops
eastward at Ch'ongju arrived all mixed together. The South Korean locomotive
engineers were hard to manage. At the least alarm they were apt to bolt
south with trains still unloaded, carrying away the supplies and ammunition
they had just brought up to the front. American officers had to place guards
aboard each locomotive. 
Colonel Stephens placed his 3d Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Carl
C. Jensen, in position along the highway six miles north of Choch'iwon.
A little more than a mile farther north, after they withdrew from their
Ch'onan positions, he placed A and D Companies of the 1st Battalion in
an advanced blocking position on a ridge just east of the town of Chonui.
Chonui is approximately twelve miles south of Ch'onan and three miles below
the point where the Kongju road forks off from the main highway. (Map 4)
Late in the day on 8 July, General Dean issued an operational order
confirming and supplementing previous verbal and radio instructions. It
indicated that the 24th Division would withdraw to a main battle position
along the south bank of the Kum River, ten miles south of Choch'iwon, fighting
delaying actions at successive defensive positions along the way. The order
stated, "Hold Kum River line at all costs. Maximum repeat maximum
delay will be effected." The 34th Infantry was to delay the enemy
along the Kongju road to the river; the 21st Infantry was to block in front
of Choch'iwon. Dean ordered one battery of 155-mm. howitzers of the 11th
Field Artillery Battalion to Choch'iwon for direct support of the 21st
Infantry. Also in support of the regiment were A Company, 78th Heavy Tank
Battalion (M24 light tanks), less one platoon of four tanks, replacing
the 24th Reconnaissance Company tanks, and B Company of the 3d Engineer
Combat Battalion. The 3d itself was to prepare roadblocks north of Kongju
along the withdrawal route of the 34th Infantry and to prepare all bridges
over the Kum River for demolition. 
Messages from General Dean to Colonel Stephens emphasized that the 21st
Infantry must hold at Choch'iwon, that the regiment must cover the left
flank of the ROK forces eastward in the vicinity of Ch'ongju until the
latter could fall back, and that he could expect no help for four days.
General Dean's intent was clear. The 34th and 21st Infantry Regiments were
to delay the enemy's approach to the Kum River as much as possible, and
then from positions on the south side of the river make a final stand.
The fate of Taejon would be decided at the Kum River line.
The Fight at Chonui
On the morning of 9 July, the 3d Battalion, 1st Infantry, completed
moving into the positions north of Choch'iwon, and Colonel Jensen began
registering his 81-mm. and 4.2-inch mortars. Engineers blew bridges in
front of Chonui.  By noon the 21st Regimental Headquarters received
a report that enemy tanks were moving south from Ch'onan.
In mid-afternoon, Capt. Charles R. Alkire, in command at the forward
blocking position at Chonui, saw eleven tanks and an estimated 200-300
enemy infantry move into view to his front. He called for an air strike
which came in a few minutes later. Artillery also took the tanks under
observed fire. Five of the eleven tanks reportedly were burning at 1650.
Enemy infantry in Chonui came under 4.2-inch mortar and artillery fire.
Observers could see them running from house to house. The men on the low
ridge east of Chonui saw columns of black smoke rise beyond the hills to
the northwest and assumed that the planes and artillery fire had hit targets
there. Aerial observers later reported that twelve vehicles, including
tanks, were burning just north of Chonui. At dusk another air report stated
that of about 200 vehicles on the road from P'yongt'aek to Chonui approximately
100 were destroyed or burning. The third and fourth tactical air control
parties to operate in the Korean War (Air Force personnel) directed the strikes at Chonui.
While this heavy bombardment of the enemy column was still in progress,
Colonel Stephens arrived at the forward position about dusk and announced
he was going to stay overnight.  In their front, burning Chonui relieved the blackness of the night. Enemy patrols probed
their position. Unless all signs failed there would be action on the morrow.
About 500 men of A and D Companies and fillers for B and C Companies
who had arrived at Pusan too late to join Task Force Smith for the Osan
action comprised the composite battalion of the 21st Infantry at the Chonui
position. They occupied a three-quarter mile front on a low ridge 500 yards
east of Chonui and on a higher hill 800 yards south of the town. Rice paddy
land lay between this high ground and Chonui. The railroad and highway
passed between the ridge and the hill. Still another hill westward dominated
the left flank but there were too few troops to occupy it. 
From the low ridge east of Chonui one normally could see the road for
a mile beyond the town, but not on the morning of 10 July. The day dawned
with a ground fog billowing up from the rice paddies. With it came the
North Koreans. At 0555 the American soldiers could hear enemy voices on
their left. Fifteen minutes later those on the ridge at the center of the
position heard an enemy whistle at the left; then firing began in that
direction. Soon, some of the men near Colonel Stephens began shooting blindly
into the fog. He promptly stopped them. At 0700, enemy mortar fire began
falling on the ridge.
Lt. Ray Bixler with a platoon of A Company held the hill on the left.
The rate of small arms fire increased and those in the center could hear
shouting from Bixler's platoon. It was apparent that the main enemy attack
centered there, coming from the higher hill beyond it. A concentration
of friendly registered mortar fire covered the little valley between the
two hills and in the early part of the morning prevented the enemy from
closing effectively with Bixler's platoon. But an enemy force passed to
the rear around the right flank of the battalion and now attacked the heavy
mortar positions. At the same time, enemy tanks came through Chonui on
the highway and passed through the infantry position. The men on the ridge
could hear the tanks but could not see them because of fog. 
At 0800 the fog lifted. Chonui was still burning. Four tanks came into
view from the north and entered the village. Stephens radioed for an air
strike. Then the men heard tank fire to their rear. The enemy tanks that
had passed through the lines earlier were joining their flanking infantry
force in an attack on the American heavy mortar position. Stephens had
already lost wire communication with the mortarmen; now he lost radio communication
with them. The mortars fell silent, and it seemed certain that the enemy
had overrun and destroyed them. Although artillery still gave support,
loss of the valuable close-in support of the 4.2-inch mortars proved costly.
North Korean infantry came from Chonui at 0900 and began climbing the
ridge in a frontal attack against the center of the position. The artillery forward observers adjusted artillery
fire on them and turned them back. Men watching anxiously on the ridge
saw many enemy fall to the ground as they ran. The T34's in Chonui now
moved out of the town and began spraying the American-held ridge with machine
Shortly after 1100, intense small arms fire erupted again at Lieutenant
Bixler's position on the left. The absence of the former heavy mortar fire
protecting screen enabled the enemy to close with him. The fog had lifted
and men in the center could see these enemy soldiers on the left. Bixler
radioed to Stephens at 1125 that he needed more men, that he had many casualties,
and asked permission to withdraw. Stephens replied that he was to stay-"Relief
is on the way." Five minutes later it came in the form o an air strike.
Two American jet planes streaked in, rocketed the tanks without any visible
hits, and then strafed the enemy infantry on the left. The strafing helped
Bixler; as long as the planes were present the enemy kept under cover.
Soon, their ammunition expended, the planes departed. Then the enemy infantry
resumed the attack.
While the air strike was in progress, survivors from the overrun recoilless
rifle and mortar positions in the rear climbed the ridge and joined the
infantry in the center of the position. At 1132, according to Bigart's
watch, friendly artillery fire began falling on the ridge. Apparently the
artillerymen thought that enemy troops had overrun the forward infantry
position and they were firing on them. Enemy fire and tanks had destroyed
wire communication from the battle position to the rear, and the artillery
forward observer's radio had ceased working. There was no communication.
Stephens ran to his radio jeep, 100 yards to the rear of the foxholes,
and from there was able to send a message to the regiment to stop the artillery
fire; but it kept falling nevertheless. 
As the men on the ridge crouched in their foxholes under the shower
of dirt and rocks thrown into the air by the exploding artillery shells,
Stephens at 11 35 received another report from Bixler that enemy soldiers
surrounded him and that most of his men were casualties. That was his last
report. The enemy overran Bixler's position and most of the men there died
in their foxholes.
Even before the friendly artillery fire began falling, some of the men
on the north (right) end of the ridge had run off. About the time of Bixler's
last radio message, someone yelled, "Everybody on the right flank
is taking off!" Stephens, looking in that direction, saw groups running
to the rear. He yelled out, "Get those high priced soldiers back into
position! That's what they are paid for." A young Nisei from Hawaii,
Cpl. Richard Okada, tried to halt the panic on the right but was able to
get only a few men together. With them he formed a small perimeter.
At 1205 Colonel Stephens decided that those still on the ridge would
have to fall back if they were to escape with their lives. On a signal
from him, the small group leaped from their foxholes and ran across open
ground to an orchard and rice paddies beyond. There they learned, as thousands
of other American soldiers were to learn, that crossing flooded rice paddies in a hurry
on the narrow, slippery dikes was like walking a tightrope. While they
were crossing the paddies, two American jet planes strafed them, thinking
them enemy soldiers. There were no casualties from the strafing but some
of the men slipped knee-deep into mud and acquired a "lifelong aversion
to rice." Stephens and his small group escaped to American lines.
In this action at Chonui, A Company had 27 wounded and 30 missing for
a total of 57 casualties out of 181 men; D Company's loss was much less,
3 killed and 8 wounded. The Heavy Mortar Company suffered 14 casualties.
Of the total troops engaged the loss was about 20 percent. 
Upon reaching friendly positions, Stephens ordered Colonel Jensen to
counterattack with the 3d Battalion and regain the Chonui positions. Jensen
pressed the counterattack and regained the ridge in front of the town,
but was unable to retake Bixler's hill south of the railroad. His men rescued
about ten men of A and D Companies who had not tried to withdraw under
the shell fire.
Jensen's counterattack in the afternoon uncovered the first known North
Korean mass atrocity perpetrated on captured American soldiers. The bodies
of six Americans, jeep drivers and mortar-men of the Heavy Mortar Company,
were found with hands tied in back and shot through the back of the head.
Infiltrating enemy soldiers had captured them in the morning when they
were on their way to the mortar position with a resupply of ammunition.
An American officer farther back witnessed the capture. One of the jeep
drivers managed to escape when the others surrendered. 
American tanks on the morning of 10 July near Chonui engaged in their
first fight of the Korean War. They performed poorly. In the afternoon,
tanks participated in the 3d Battalion counterattack and did better. One
of them got in a first shot on an enemy tank and disabled it. Two American
light tanks were lost during the day. 
Elements of the N.K. 4th Division had pressed on south after
the capture of Ch'onan and they had fought the battle of Chonui. Leading
elements of the N.K. 3d Division, following the 4th by one
day, apparently came up to Chonui late on the 10th. They found the town
such a mass of rubble that the reserve regiment bypassed it. 
On the afternoon of 10 July American air power had one of its great moments in the Korean War. Late in the
afternoon, a flight of jet F-80 planes dropped down through the overcast
at P'yongt'aek, twenty-five air miles north of Chonui, and found a large
convoy of tanks and vehicles stopped bumper to bumper on the north side
of a destroyed bridge. Upon receiving a report of this discovery, the Fifth
Air Force rushed every available plane to the scene-B-26's, F-80's, and
F-82's-in a massive air strike. Observers of the strike reported that it
destroyed 38 tanks, 7 half-track vehicles, 117 trucks, and a large number
of enemy soldiers. This report undoubtedly exaggerated unintentionally
the amount of enemy equipment actually destroyed. But this strike, and
that of the previous afternoon near Chonui, probably resulted in the greatest
destruction of enemy armor of any single action in the war. 
Perhaps a word should be said about the close air support that aided
the ground troops in their hard-pressed first weeks in Korea. This support
was carried out by United States Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Australian
fighter planes and some U.S. fighter-bombers. Beginning early in the war,
it built up as quickly as resources would permit. On 3 July the Far East
Air Forces established a Joint Operations Center at Itazuke Air Base, on
Kyushu in Japan, for control of the fighter planes operating over the Korean
battlefield. This center moved to Taejon in Korea on 5 July, and on 14
July to Taegu, where it established itself near Eighth Army headquarters.
By 19 July, heavy communications equipment arrived and a complete tactical
air control center was established in Korea, except for radar and direction-finding
facilities. Advance Headquarters, Fifth Air Force, opened at Taegu on 20
The forward element in the control system of the close air support was
the tactical air control party, consisting of a forward air controller
(usually an officer and an experienced pilot), a radio operator, and a
radio repair man who also served as jeep driver. Six of these parties operated
with the 24th Division in Korea in the early days of the war. As soon as
others could be formed, one joined each ROK corps and division, and an
Air Liaison Officer joined each ROK corps to act as adviser on air capabilities
for close support.
The Fifth Air Force began using T-6 trainer aircraft to locate targets
on and behind enemy lines. The controllers in these planes, using the call
sign "Mosquito," remained over enemy positions and directed fighter
planes to the targets. Because of the call sign the T-6's soon became known
in Army and Air Force parlance as Mosquitoes. The Mosquito normally carried
an Air Force pilot and a ground force observer. The plane was equipped
with a Very High Frequency radio for contact with tactical air control
parties and fighter aircraft in the air. It also had an SCR-300 radio for
contact with front-line ground troops. The ground force observer and the
pilot in the Mosquito, the control party, and the forward infantry elements
co-ordinated their information to bring fighter aircraft to targets where
they delivered their strikes, and also to direct ground fire on enemy targets in front of
the infantry. 
In the early part of the war the F-51 (Mustang), a propeller-driven
fighter, predominated in the Air Force's close support effort. This plane
had shown to good advantage in World War II in low-level close support
missions. It had greater range than the jet F-80 and could use the rough,
short fields in Korea. Most important of all, it was available. For close
support of Marine troops when they were committed later, a tried and tested
plane, the Marine F4U Corsair, was used. The F-51 was capable of carrying
6 5-inch rockets and 2 110-gallon napalm tanks, and it mounted 6 .50-caliber
machine guns. The F-80 could carry 2 110-gallon napalm tanks, and mounted
6 .50-caliber machine guns with about the same ammunition load as the F-51.
It could also carry 2 5-inch rockets if the target distance was short.
Both the F-51 and the F-80 could carry 2,000 pounds of bombs if the mission
required it. The F4U could carry 8 5-inch rockets, 2 110-gallon napalm
tanks, and it mounted 4 20-mm. cannon with 800 rounds of ammunition. If
desired it could carry a 5,200-pound bomb load. The F-51 had a 400-mile
operating radius, which could be increased to 760 miles by using external
gas tanks. The F-80's normal radius was 125 miles, but it could be increased
to 550 miles with external tanks. The F4U had a shorter operating range.
With external tanks it reached about 335 miles. 
Just before midnight of 10 July Colonel Jensen began to withdraw the
3d Battalion from the recaptured ridge east of Chonui, bringing along most
of the equipment lost earlier in the day. When the battalion arrived at
its former position it received a surprise: enemy soldiers occupied some
of its foxholes. Only after an hour's battle did K Company clear the North
Koreans from its old position. 
In a message to Colonel Stephens at 2045 General Dean suggested withdrawing
the 3d Battalion from this position. But he left the decision to Stephens,
saying, "If you consider it necessary, withdraw to your next delaying
position prior to dawn. I am reminding you of the importance of the town
of Choch'iwon. If it is lost, it means that the SKA [South Korean Army]
will have lost its MSR [Main Supply Route]." An hour later, in talking
to a regimental staff officer, Dean authorized falling back four miles
to the next delaying position two miles north of Choch'iwon, but ordered,
"Hold in your new position and fight like hell. I expect you to hold
it all day tomorrow." 
Meanwhile, Task Force Smith, re-equipping at Taejon, had received 205 replacements and on 10 July it
received orders to rejoin the 21st Regiment at Choch'iwon. Smith arrived
there with B and C Companies before dawn of 11 July. A and D Companies
had re-equipped at Choch'iwon and they joined with B and C Companies to
reunite the 1st Battalion. Colonel Smith now had his battalion together
in Korea for the first time. At 0730, 11 July, the 1st Battalion was in
position along the highway two miles north of Choch'iwon.  Four miles
north of it Colonel Jensen's 3d Battalion was already engaged with the
North Koreans in the next battle.
At 0630 that morning, men in the 3d Battalion position heard tanks to
their front on the other side of a mine field, but could not see them because
of fog. Within a few minutes four enemy tanks crossed the mine field and
loomed up in the battalion area. Simultaneously, enemy mortar fire fell
on the battalion command post, blowing up the communications center, the
ammunition supply point, and causing heavy casualties among headquarters
troops. Approximately 1,000 enemy infantry enveloped both flanks of the
position. Some forward observers had fine targets but their radios did not function. In
certain platoons there apparently was no wire communication. Consequently
these forward observers were unable to call in and direct mortar and artillery
fire on the North Koreans.
This attack on the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was one of the most
perfectly co-ordinated assaults ever launched by North Koreans against
American troops. The North Koreans who had been driven from the 3d Battalion's
position shortly after midnight, together no doubt with other infiltrators,
apparently had provided detailed and accurate information of the 3d Battalion's
defenses and the location of its command post. The attack disorganized
the battalion and destroyed its communications before it had a chance to
fight back. Enemy roadblocks behind the battalion prevented evacuation
of the wounded or re-supplying the battalion with ammunition. For several
hours units of the battalion fought as best they could. Many desperate
encounters took place. In one of these, when an enemy machine gun placed
a band of fire on K Company's command post, Pvt. Paul R. Spear, armed with
only a pistol, charged the machine gun emplacement alone, entered it with
his pistol empty and, using it as a club, routed the enemy gunners. Enemy
fire seriously wounded him. 
The North Koreans overran the 3d Battalion. Before noon, survivors in
small groups made their way back toward Choch'iwon. Enemy fire killed Colonel
Jensen, the battalion commander, and Lt. Leon J. Jacques, Jr., his S-2,
when they tried to cross a stream in the rear of their observation post.
The battalion S-1 and S-3, Lieutenants Cashe and Lester, and Capt. O'Dean
T. Cox, commanding officer of L Company, were reported missing in action.
The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, lost altogether nearly 60 percent of its
strength in this action. Of those who escaped, 90 percent had neither weapons,
ammunition, nor canteens, and, in many instances, the men had neither helmets
nor shoes. One officer of L Company who came out with some men said that
after he and others had removed an enemy machine gun blocking their escape
route many uninjured men by the side of the road simply refused to try
to go on. One noncom said, "Lieutenant, you will have to go on. I'm
too beat up. They'll just have to take me." A remnant of 8 officers
and 142 men able for duty was organized into a provisional company of three
rifle platoons and a heavy weapons company. But by 15 July a total of 322
out of 667 men had returned to the battalion. Four tanks of A Company,
78th Heavy Tank Battalion, were lost to enemy action north of Choch'iwon
on 10 and 11 July.  The 21st Infantry on 10 and 11 July north of Choch'iwon
lost materiel and weapons sufficient to equip two rifle battalions and individual
and organic clothing for 975 men.
At Chonui the 3d Division had passed the 4th on the main
highway. It struck the blow against the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry. The
4th Division turned back from Chonui and took the right fork toward
Kongju, following the retreating 34th Infantry. 
Toward evening of the 11th, after he had full information of the fate
of the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, General Dean ordered A Company, 3d
Engineer Combat Battalion, to prepare every possible obstacle for the defense
of the Choch'iwon area and to cover, if necessary, the withdrawal of the
regiment. Dean also started the 18th Infantry Regiment and the 13th Field
Artillery Battalion from Taegu and P'ohang-dong for Taejon during the day.
That night the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, rested uneasily in its
positions two miles north of Choch'iwon. It had to expect that the North
Koreans would strike within hours. At dawn an enemy patrol approached C
Company's position, and members of the battalion saw hostile movement on
both flanks. At 0930 an estimated enemy battalion, supported by artillery
fire, attacked Smith's left flank. Very quickly a general attack developed
by an estimated 2,000 enemy soldiers. Colonel Stephens decided that the
under-strength 1st Battalion, with its large percentage of replacement
and untried troops, would have to withdraw. At noon, 12 July, he sent the
following message to General Dean: "Am surrounded. 1st Bn left giving
way. Situation bad on right. Having nothing left to establish intermediate
delaying position am forced to withdraw to river line. I have issued instructions
to withdraw." 
Colonel Smith disengaged the 1st Battalion by moving one company at
a time Regimental trucks loaded the troops near Choch'iwon. While the infantry
were displacing southward, enemy artillery began shelling the regimental
command post in Choch'iwon. The retreat was orderly and there was no close
pursuit. By 1530 the 1st Battalion occupied new defensive positions on
the south bank of the Kum River where the highway crossed it at Taep'yong-ni.
The 21st Infantry Regiment completed its withdrawal across the Kum at 1600,
but stragglers were still crossing the river five hours later. A thin line
of approximately 325 men held the new blocking position at the river-64
men from the 3d Battalion, the rest from the 1st Battalion. 
In the series of battles between Chonui and Choch'iwon the under-strength
two-battalion 21st Infantry Regiment had delayed two of the best North
Korean divisions for three days. It was the most impressive performance
yet of American troops in Korea, but the regiment paid heavily for it in
loss of personnel and equipment.
The 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, meanwhile, had covered the retreat
on the Kongju road and fought a series of minor delaying actions against
the leading elements of the N.K. 4th Division which had taken
up the pursuit there. Four light M24 tanks of the 78th Tank Battalion joined
the battalion, and D Company of the 3d Engineer Combat Battalion prepared
demolitions along the road. In the afternoon of 11 July, enemy action destroyed
three of the four tanks, two of them by artillery fire and the third by
infantry close attack when the tank tried to rescue personnel from a litter
jeep ambushed by enemy infiltrators. Remnants of the 3d Battalion had led
the retreat. Reorganized as a composite company and re-equipped at Taejon,
it returned to Kongju on the 11th. The next day the 63d Field Artillery
Battalion and the 34th Infantry crossed the Kum. The last of the infantry
and Colonel Ayres, the 1st Battalion commander, crossed at dusk. General
Dean's instructions were to "leave a small outpost across the river.
Blow the main bridge only when enemy starts to cross." To implement
this order Colonel Wadlington had L Company hold the bridge and outpost
the north bank for 600 yards. 
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, Msg 10, 030930 Jul 50; 34th Inf WD, Summ, 28
Jun-22 Jul 50; Col Jay B. Lovless, MS review comments, 7 Aug 58.
 34th Div WD, 5 Jul 50; 34th Inf WD, Summ, 28 Jun-22 Jul 50; Dean and
Worden, General Dean's Story, pp. 19-21.
 34th Inf WD, 5 Jul 50; Barth MS, pp. 2-3; Higgins, War in Korea, pp.
58-65; New York Times, July 6, 1950, p. 3; Time Magazine, July 17,
1950, p. 12. Miss Higgins erroneously publicized Shadrick as being the
first American infantryman killed in the Korean War.
 Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, pp. 21-23; Barth MS. p. 3.
 Interv, author with Col Harold B. Ayres, 13 Jul 54; Barth, MS review
comments, 24 Feb 57; Bart, MS, pp. 2-3 (a part of this MS was published
in Combat Forces Journal, March, 1952, as "The First Days in Korea");
Lovless, MS review comments, 7 Aug 58.
 Interv, author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54; Capt Russell A. Gugeler,
Combat Actions in Korea: Infantry, Artillery, Armor (Washington: Combat
Forces Press, 1954), "Withdrawal Action," pp. 5-8. Gugeler's book,
notable for its detail of incident and action, is based largely on
interviews with soldiers engaged in the actions described. ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 45.
 Ltr, Dunn to author, 17 Jun 54; Intervs, author with Ayres, 13 Jul
54 and 16 Sep 55; Lovless, MS review comments, 7 Aug 58; Gugeler, Combat
Actions in Korea, pp. 10-12; New York Herald Tribune, July 12, 1950;
ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 45,
 Barth MS, pp. 3-4; Lovless, MS review comments, 7 Aug 58.
 Barth MS, p. 4; Interv, author with Ayres, 13 Jul 54; Ltr, Dunn to
author, 17 Jun 54; Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, p. 23.
 Lovless, MS review comments, 7 Aug 58, quoting order, original in
 Lovless, MS review comments, 7 Aug 58. This order is in Lovless'
possession. It and the message dated at 1025 were the only two orders
Lovless received from Dean during the action at Ch'onan before his
relief. 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 55, 071045 Jul 50; Ibid., WD, 7 Jul
50; New York Times, July 7, 1950.
 Ltr, Dunn to author, 17 Jun 54; Interv, 1st Lt Fred Mitchell with
SFC Charles W. Menninger, 31 Jul 50 (Menninger was Opns Sgt, 3d Bn, 34th
Inf), copy in OCMH.
 Ltr, Dunn to author, 17 Jun 54.
 Interv, Mitchell with Menninger, 31 Jul 50; 34th Inf WD, 7 Jul 50;
Interv, Mitchell with SFC Leonard J. Smith (Ch Comp, Fire Direction
Center, Hq Btry, 63d FA Bn), 29 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 175,
091125 Jul 50; New York Herald Tribune, July 9, 1950, Bigart dispatch
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entries 93, 080220, and 97, 080200 Jul 50.
 Interv, author with Col Stephens, 8 Oct 51; Interv, Mitchell with
Smith, 29 Jul 50; Interv, Mitchell with Lt Col Robert H. Dawson (CO 63d
FA Bn), 27 Jul 50; Interv, Mitchell with Menninger, 31 Jul 50.
 Ltr. Dunn to author. 17 Jun 54; Ltr and Comments. Col Wadlington to
author, 1 Apr 53; Interv, author with Col Green (G-3 of ADCOM staff in
Korea and temporarily on Dean's staff), 28 Sep 51: 34th Inf WD, 8 Jul
5o; 24th Div WD, 8 Jul 50; FEC GO 12, 11 Jul 50. According to Dunn,
Sergeant Christenson died in a North Korean prison camp in December
 Dean and Worden, General Dean's Story, pp. 25-26: Comments,
Wadlington to author, 1 Apr 53.
 Comments, Wadlington to author, 1 Apr 53; Ltr, Wadlington to
author, 25 Jun 53; 34th Inf WD, 8 Jul 50; Interv, author with Ayres, 5
Apr 55; New York Herald Tribune, July 9, 1950, Bigart dispatch; New York
Times, July 9, 1950.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 45; Ibid.,
Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 31.
 21st Inf WD. 6-7 Jul 50; Ibid., Summ, 29 Jun-22 Jul 50; 24th Div
WD 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, msgs 73, 74, 86, 7 Jul 50.
 24th Div WD, 7 Jul 50.
 21st Inf WD, 7-8 Jul 50; Ltr, with sketch map showing positions of
A and D Companies at Chonui, Brig Gen Richard W. Stephens to author, 24
 24th Div Opn Order 3, 082145 Jul 50; 78th Tk Bn WD, 8 Jul 50; 24th
Div WD, 8 Jul 50.
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 169, 090935 Jul 50.
 21st Inf WD, 9 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entries 315, 091900
and 317, 091950 Jul 50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, entries 211, 091820, and 217,
091945 Jul 50; Ltr, Stephens to author, 17 Apr 52; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 4 (Enemy Forces), p. 39. Captured North Koreans
said later this aerial and artillery action destroyed twenty of their
tanks north of Chonui. New York Herald Tribune, July 12, 1950, Bigart
dispatch; USAF Hist Study 71, p. 25.
 New York Herald Tribune, July 12, 1950, article by H. Bigart, "From
a Foxhole in Korea." This account is a delayed dispatch written by
Bigart on 10 July. He occupied a foxhole with Stephens, Alkire, and 1st
Lt. Earl Babb, commanding officer of A Company, on the ridge east of
Chonui. Bigart kept a log of events as they occurred, describing what he
saw and heard from his foxhole and consulting his watch for each
 Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 52.
 Ltrs, Stephens to author, 24 Mar, 17 Apr 52.
 Bigart, "From a Foxhole in Korea," op. cit.; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl,
entry 239, 101000 Jul 50.
 Bigart. "From a Foxhole in Korea," op. cit.; 24th Div WD, G-3, Jnl,
entry 255, 101530 Jul 50; Ltr, Stephens to author, 17 Apr 52.
 Bigart, "From a Foxhole in Korea," op. cit.; ,4th Div WD, G-3 Jnl,
entry 255 gives Stephens' message to Dean immediately after his return
to American lines.
 Dr. J. O'Sullivan, the Rand Corp., Casualties of United States
Eighth Army in Korea, Battle of Chochiwon, 10-11 July 1950.
 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 420, 101445 and entry 424, 101505 Jul
50; Ltr, Stephens to author, 17 Apr 52; Bernard, MS review comments, 24
Feb 57; New York Herald Tribune, July 11, 12, 1950, Bigart dispatches.
 21st Inf WD, 10 Jul 50; Interv, author with Stephens, 8 Oct 51;
Ltr, Stephens to author, 17 Apr 52; TAS, Employment of Armor in Korea-
the First Year (Ft. Knox, 1952), p. 49. Signal Corps Photo 50-3965,
taken 10 July 1950, shows a tank named "Rebels Roost," captioned as the
first American tank to see action in Korea.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 46; Ibid.,
Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 31; ORO-R-I (FEC), The Employment of Armor in
Korea, vol. I, p. 138.
 USAF Hist Study 71, p. 40
 Air War in Korea," Air University Quarterly Review, IV, No. 3
(Spring, 1951), 56: Hq X Corps, Analysis of the Air-Ground Operations
System. 28 Jun-8 Sep 50, Staff Study, 25 Dec 50; Maj Louis H. Aten,
Debriefing Rpt 75, Arty School, Ft. Sill, Okla, 5 Mar 52.
 X Corps Study, p. 14; Operations Research Office, Close Air Support
Operations in Korea, ORO-R-3 (FEC), pp. 13-14.
 21st Inf WD, 11 Jul 50.
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entries 275 at 102045, 277 at 102040, and 278
at 102130 Jul 50.
 21st Inf WD, 9 and , 1 Jul 50.
 21st Inf WD, 11 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 292, 110650 Jul
50; Bernard (1st Plat Ldr L Co at time), MS review comments, 24 Feb 57.
General Order 55, awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Private
Spear. EUSAK WD, 7 Sep 50.
 Ltr, Stephens to author, 24 Mar 5R; Bernard, MS review comments, 24
Feb 57; 21st Inf WD, 11 Jul 50; Ibid., 12 Jul 50, Incl III, Activities
Rpt, 3d Bn; 24th Div WD, 11 Jul 50. When it regained this ground on 29
September 1950, the 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, found
many American dead. See Hist, 5th Cav Regt, 1st Cav Div, Msg 49, 291825
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 46; Ibid.,
Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 31.
 24th Div WD, 11 Jul 50.
 21st Inf WD, 12 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 353, 121200 Jul
50; Interv, author with Col Charles B. Smith, 7 Oct 51; Interv, author
with Stephens, 8 Oct 51.
 21st Inf WD, 12 Jul 50; 24th Div WD, G-2 Jnl, entry 703, 11-13 Jul
50; Ibid., G-3 Jnl, entries 361, 121545, and 372, 122120 Jul 50.
 Comments, Wadlington to author, 1 Apr 55; 24th Div WD, 9-12 Jul 50,
and G-3, Jnl, entries 158, 032300, 292, 110650, and 356, 121818 Jul 50;
G-2 Jnl, entries 555, 111520, and 572, 111630 Jul 50: 34th Inf WD, 12
Jul 50, and Summ, 28 Jun-22 Jul 50; Interv, Mitchell with Sgt Justin B.
Fleming, I Co, 34th Inf, 1 Aug 50; Interv, Mitchell with 2d Lt James B.
Bryant, B Co, 34th Inf, 30 Jul 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 9
(N.K. 4th Div), p. 46. The 34th Infantry War Diary for this period, made
up at a later date, is poor and unreliable. It rarely agrees with the
24th Division War Diary on the time for the same event.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation