He, therefore, who desires peace, should prepare for war. He who aspires
to victory, should spare no pains to train his soldiers. And he who hopes
for success, should fight on principle, not chance. No one dares to offend
or insult a power of known superiority in action. |
VEGETIUS, Military Institutions of the Romans
On 8 June 1950 the P'yongyang newspapers published a manifesto which
the Central Committee of the United Democratic Patriotic Front had adopted
the day before proclaiming as an objective a parliament to be elected in
early August from North and South Korea and to meet in Seoul on 15 August,
the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule. 
It would appear from this manifesto that Premier Kim Il Sung and his Soviet
advisers expected that all of Korea would be overrun, occupied, and "elections"
held in time to establish a new government of a "united" Korea
in Seoul by mid-August.
During the period 15-24 June the North Korean Command moved all Regular
Army divisions to the close vicinity of the 38th Parallel, and deployed
them along their respective planned lines of departure for the attack on
South Korea. Some of these units came from the distant north. Altogether,
approximately 80,000 men with their equipment joined those already along
the Parallel. They succeeded in taking their positions for the assault
without being detected. The attack units included 7 infantry divisions,
1 armored brigade, 1 separate infantry regiment, 1 motorcycle regiment,
and 1 Border Constabulary brigade. This force numbered approximately 90,000
men supported by 150 T34 tanks. General Chai Ung Jun commanded it. All
the thrusts were to follow major roads. In an arc of forty miles stretching
from Kaesong on the west to Ch'orwon on the east the North Koreans concentrated
more than half their infantry and artillery and most of their tanks for
a converging attack on Seoul. The main attack was to follow the Uijongbu
Corridor, an ancient invasion route leading straight south to Seoul. 
In preparation for the attack the chief of the NKPA Intelligence Section on 18 June issued Reconnaissance Order
1, in the Russian language, to the chief of staff of the N.K. 4th Division,
requiring that information of enemy defensive positions guarding the
approach to the Uijongbu Corridor be obtained and substantiated before
the attack began.  Similar orders bearing the same date, modified only
to relate to the situation on their immediate front, were sent by the same
officer to the 1st, 2d, 3d, 6th, and 7th Divisions, the 12th
Motorcycle Regiment, and the BC 3d Brigade. No doubt such orders
also went to the 5th Division and possibly other units. 
On 22 Tune Maj. Gen. Lee Kwon Mu, commanding the N.K. 4th Division,
issued his operation order in the Korean language for the attack down
the Uijongbu Corridor. He stated that the 1st Division on his right
and the 3d Division on his left would join in the attack leading
to Seoul. Tanks and self-propelled artillery with engineer support were
to lead it. Preparations were to be completed by midnight 23 June. After
penetrating the South Korean defensive positions, the division was to advance
to the Uijongbu-Seoul area.  Other assault units apparently received
their attack orders about the same time.
The North Korean attack units had arrived at their concentration points
generally on 23 June and, by 24 June, were poised at their lines of departure
for attack. Officers told their men that they were on maneuvers but most
of the latter realized by 23-24 June that it was war. 
Destined to bear the brunt of this impending attack were elements of
four ROK divisions and a regiment stationed along the south side of the
Parallel in their accustomed defensive border positions. They had no knowledge
of the impending attack although they had made many predictions in the
past that there would be one. As recently as 12 June the U.N. Commission
in Korea had questioned officers of General Roberts' KMAG staff concerning
warnings the ROK Army had given of an imminent attack. A United States
intelligence agency on 19 June had information pointing to North Korean
preparation for an offensive, but it was not used for an estimate of the
situation. The American officers did not think an attack was imminent.
If one did come, they expected the South Koreans to repel it.  The South
Koreans themselves did not share this optimism, pointing to the fighter
planes, tanks, and superior artillery possessed by the North Koreans, and
their numerically superior Army. In June 1950, before and immediately after
the North Korean attack, several published articles based on interviews
with KMAG officers reflect the opinion held apparently by General Roberts
and most of his KMAG advisers that the ROK Army would be able to meet any
test the North Korean Army might impose on it. 
Scattered but heavy rains fell along the 38th Parallel in the pre-dawn
darkness of Sunday, 25 June 1950. Farther south, at Seoul, the day dawned
overcast but with only light occasional showers. The summer monsoon season
had just begun. Rain-heavy rain-might be expected to sweep over the variously
tinted green of the rice paddies and the barren gray-brown mountain slopes
of South Korea during the coming weeks.
Along the dark, rain-soaked Parallel, North Korean artillery and mortars
broke the early morning stillness. It was about 0400. The precise moment
of opening enemy fire varied perhaps as much as an hour at different points
across the width of the peninsula, but everywhere it signaled a co-ordinated
attack from coast to coast. The sequence of attack seemed to progress from
west to east, with the earliest attack striking the Ongjin Peninsula at
approximately 0400.  (Map 1)
The blow fell unexpectedly on the South Koreans. Many of the officers
and some men, as well as many of the KMAG advisers, were in Seoul and other
towns on weekend passes.  And even though four divisions and one regiment
were stationed near the border, only one regiment of each division and
one battalion of the separate regiment were actually in the defensive positions
at the Parallel. The remainder of these organizations were in reserve positions
ten to thirty miles below the Parallel. Accordingly, the onslaught of the
North Korea People's Army struck a surprised garrison in thinly held defensive
After the North Korean attack was well under way, the P'yongyang radio
broadcast at 1100 an announcement that the North Korean Government had
declared war against South Korea as a result of an invasion by South Korean
puppet forces ordered by "the bandit traitor Syngman Rhee." 
The broadcast said the North Korea People's Army had struck back in self-defense
and had begun a "righteous invasion." Syngman Rhee, it stated,
would be arrested and executed.  Shortly after noon, at 1335, Premier
Kim Il Sung, of North Korea, claimed in a radio broadcast that South Korea
had rejected every North Korean proposal for peaceful unification, had
attacked North Korea that morning in the area of Haeju above the Ongjin
Peninsula, and would have to take the consequences of the North Korean counterattacks. 
The North Korean attack against the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast,
northwest of Seoul, began about 0400 with a heavy artillery and mortar
barrage and small arms fire delivered by the 14th Regiment of the
N.K. 6th Division and the BC 3d Brigade. The ground
attack came half an hour later across the Parallel without armored support.
It struck the positions held by a battalion of the ROK 17th Regiment commanded
by Col. Paik In Yup. 
The first message from the vicinity of the Parallel received by the
American Advisory Group in Seoul came by radio about 0600 from five advisers
with the ROK 17th Regiment on the Ongjin Peninsula. They reported the regiment
was under heavy attack and about to be overrun.  Before 0900 another
message came from them requesting air evacuation. Two KMAG aviators, Maj.
Lloyd Swink and Lt. Frank Brown, volunteered to fly their L-5 planes from
Seoul. They succeeded in bringing the five Americans out in a single trip.
The Ongjin Peninsula, cut off by water from the rest of South Korea,
never had been considered defensible in case of a North Korean attack.
Before the day ended, plans previously made were executed to evacuate the
ROK 17th Regiment. Two LST's from Inch'on joined one already offshore,
and on Monday, 26 June, they evacuated Col. Paik In Yup and most of two
battalions-in all about 1,750 men. The other battalion was completely lost
in the early fighting. 
The 14th Regiment, 6th Division, turned over the Ongjin Peninsula
area to security forces of the BC 3d Brigade on the second day and
immediately departed by way of Haeju and Kaesong to rejoin its division.
East of the Ongjin Peninsula, Kaesong, the ancient capital of Korea,
lay two miles south of the Parallel on the main Seoul-P'yongyang highway
and railroad. Two battalions of the 12th Regiment, ROK 1st Division, held
positions just north of the town. The other battalion of the regiment was
at Yonan, the center of a rich rice-growing area some twenty miles westward.
The 13th Regiment held Korangp'o-ri, fifteen air miles east of Kaesong
above the Imjin River, and the river crossing below the city. The 11th
Regiment, in reserve, and division headquarters were at Suisak, a small
village and cantonment area a few miles north of Seoul. Lt. Col. Lloyd
H. Rockwell, senior adviser to the ROK 1st Division, and its youthful commander,
Col. Paik Sun Yup, had decided some time earlier that the only defense
line the division could hold in case of attack was south of the Imjin River.
Songak-san (Hill 475), a mountain shaped like a capital T with its stem
running east-west, dominated Kaesong which lay two miles to the south of it. The 38th Parallel ran almost
exactly along the crest of Songak-san, which the North Koreans had long
since seized and fortified. In Kaesong the northbound main rail line linking
Seoul-P'yongyang-Manchuria turned west for six miles and then, short of
the Yesong River, bent north again across the Parallel.
Capt. Joseph R. Darrigo, assistant adviser to the ROK 12th Regiment,
1st Division, was the only American officer on the 38th Parallel the morning
of 25 June. He occupied quarters in a house at the northeast edge of Kaesong,
just below Songak-san. At daybreak, approximately 0500, Captain Darrigo
awoke to the sound of artillery fire. Soon shell fragments and small arms
fire were hitting his house. He jumped from bed, pulled on a pair of trousers,
and, with shoes and shirt in hand, ran to the stairs where he was met by
his Korean houseboy running up to awaken him. The two ran out of the house,
jumped into Darrigo's jeep, and drove south into Kaesong. They encountered
no troops, but the volume of fire indicated an enemy attack. Darrigo decided
to continue south on the Munsan-ni Road to the Imjin River.
At the circle in the center of Kaesong small arms fire fell near Darrigo's
jeep. Looking off to the west, Darrigo saw a startling sight-half a mile
away, at the railroad station which was in plain view, North Korean soldiers
were unloading from a train of perhaps fifteen cars. Some of these soldiers
were already advancing toward the center of town. Darrigo estimated there
were from two to three battalions, perhaps a regiment, of enemy troops
on the train. The North Koreans obviously had relaid during the night previously
pulled up track on their side of the Parallel and had now brought this
force in behind the ROK's north of Kaesong while their artillery barrage
and other infantry attacked frontally from Songak-san. The 13th and
15th Regiments of the N.K. 6th Division delivered the attack
Most of the ROK 12th Regiment troops at Kaesong and Yonan were killed
or captured. Only two companies of the regiment escaped and reported to
the division headquarters the next day. Kaesong was entirely in enemy hands
by 0930. Darrigo, meanwhile, sped south out of Kaesong, reached the Imjin
River safely, and crossed over to Munsan-ni. 
Back in Seoul, Colonel Rockwell awakened shortly after daylight that
Sunday morning to the sound of pounding on the door of his home in the
American compound where he was spending the weekend. Colonel Paik and a
few of his staff officers were outside. They told Rockwell of the attack
at the Parallel. Paik phoned his headquarters and ordered the 11th Regiment
and other units to move immediately to Munsan-ni-Korangp'o-ri and occupy
prearranged defensive positions. Colonel Rockwell and Colonel Paik then
drove directly to Munsan-ni. The 11th Regiment moved rapidly and in good
order from Suisak and took position on the left of the 13th Regiment, both thereby protecting the approaches to the Imjin bridge.
There they engaged in bitter fighting, the 13th Regiment particularly distinguishing
Upon making a reconnaissance of the situation at Munsan-ni, Colonel
Rockwell and Colonel Paik agreed they should blow the bridge over the Imjin
River according to prearranged plans and Paik gave the order to destroy
it after the 12th Regiment had withdrawn across it. A large body of the
enemy so closely followed the regiment in its withdrawal, however, that
this order was not executed and the bridge fell intact to the enemy. 
The N.K. 1st Division and supporting tanks of the 105th Armored
Brigade made the attack in the Munsan-ni-Korangp'o-ri area. At first
some ROK soldiers of the 13th Regiment engaged in suicide tactics, hurling
themselves and the high explosives they carried under the tanks. Others
approached the tanks with satchel or pole charges. Still others mounted
tanks and tried desperately to open the hatches with hooks to drop grenades
inside. These men volunteered for this duty. They destroyed a few tanks
but most of them were killed, and volunteers for this duty soon became
The ROK 1st Division held its positions at Korangp'o-ri for nearly three
days and then, outflanked and threatened with being cut off by the enemy
divisions in the Uijongbu Corridor, it withdrew toward the Han River.
On 28 June, American fighter planes, under orders to attack any organized
body of troops north of the Han River, mistakenly strafed and rocketed
the ROK 1st Division, killing and wounding many soldiers. After the planes
left, Colonel Paik got some of his officers and men together and told them,
"You did not think the Americans would help us. Now you know better."
The main North Korean attack, meanwhile, had come down the Uijongbu
Corridor timed to coincide with the general attacks elsewhere. It got under
way about 0530 on 25 June and was delivered by the N.K. 4th and
3d Infantry Divisions and tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade.
 This attack developed along two roads which converged at Uijongbu
and from there led into Seoul. The N.K. 4th Division drove straight
south toward Tongduch'on-ni from the 38th Parallel near Yonch'on. The N.K.
3d Division came down the Kumhwa-Uijongbu-Seoul road, often called
the P'och'on Road, which angled into Uijongbu from the northeast. The 107th
Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Brigade with about forty
T34 tanks supported the 4th Division; the 109th Tank Regiment with another forty tanks supported the 3d Divisionon the P'och'on Road. 
The 1st Regiment of the ROK 7th Division, disposed along the Parallel,
received the initial blows of the N.K. 3d and 4th Divisions.
In the early fighting it lost very heavily to enemy tanks and self-propelled
guns. Behind it at P'och'on on the eastern road was the 9th Regiment; behind
it at Tongduch'on-ni on the western road was the 3d Regiment. At 0830 a
ROK officer at the front sent a radio message to the Minister of Defense
in Seoul saying that the North Koreans in the vicinity of the Parallel
were delivering a heavy artillery fire and a general attack, that they
already had seized the contested points, and that he must have immediate
reinforcements-that all ROK units were engaged.  The strong armored
columns made steady gains on both roads, and people in Uijongbu, twenty
miles north of Seoul, could hear the artillery fire of the two converging
columns before the day ended. At midmorning reports came in to Seoul that Kimpo Airfield was under air attack. A short time later,
two enemy Russian-built YAK fighter planes appeared over the city and strafed
its main street. In the afternoon, enemy planes again appeared over Kimpo
and Seoul. 
Eastward across the peninsula, Ch'unch'on, like Kaesong, lay almost
on the Parallel. Ch'unch'on was an important road center on the Pukhan
River and the gateway to the best communication and transport net leading
south through the mountains in the central part of Korea. The attacks thus
far described had been carried out by elements of the N.K. I Corps.
From Ch'unch'on east ward the N.K. II Corps, with headquarters
at H'wachon north of Ch'unch'on, controlled the attack formations. The
N.K. 2d Division at H'wachon moved down to the border, replacing
a Border Constabulary unit, and the N.K. 7th Division did likewise
some miles farther eastward at Inje. The plan of attack was for the 2d
Division to capture Ch'unch'on by the afternoon of the first day; the
7th Division was to drive directly for Hongch'on, some miles below
the Parallel.  The 7th Regiment of the ROK 6th Division guarded Ch'unch'on,
a beautiful town spread out below Peacock Mountain atop which stood a well-known
shrine with red lacquered pillars. An other regiment was disposed eastward
guarding the approaches to Hoengsong. The third regiment, in reserve, was
with division headquarters at Wonju, forty-five miles south of the Parallel.
The two assault regiments of the N.K. 2d Division attacked Ch'unch'on
early Sunday morning; the 6th Regiment advanced along the river
road, while the 4th Regiment climbed over the mountains north of
the city. From the outset, the ROK artillery was very effective and the
enemy 6th Regiment met fierce resistance. Before the day ended,
the 2d Division's reserve regiment, the 17th, joined in the
attack.  Lt. Col. Thomas D. McPhail, adviser to the ROK 6th Division,
proceeded to Ch'unch'on from Wonju in the morning after he received word
that the North Koreans had crossed the Parallel. Late in the day the ROK
reserve regiment arrived from Wonju. A factor of importance in Ch'unch'on's
defense was that no passes had been issued to ROK personnel and the positions
there were fully manned when the attack came.
The battle for Ch'unch'on was going against the North Koreans. From
dug-in concrete pillboxes on the high ridge just north of the town the
ROK 6th Division continued to repel the enemy attack. The failure of the
N.K. 2d Division to capture Ch'unch'on the first day, as ordered,
caused the N.K. II Corps to change the attack plans of the
N.K. 7th Division. This division had started from the Inje area,
30 miles farther east, for Hongch'on, an important town southeast of Ch'unch'on.
The II Corps now diverted it to Ch'unch'on, which it reached
on the evening of 26 June. There the 7th Division immediately joined its forces with the 2d
Division in the battle for the city. 
Apparently there were no enemy tanks in the Ch'unch'on battle until
the 7th Division arrived. The battle continued through the third
day, 27 June. The defending ROK 6th Division finally withdrew southward
on the 28th on orders after the front had collapsed on both sides of it.
The North Koreans then entered Ch'unch'on. Nine T34 tanks apparently led
the main body into the town on the morning of 28 June. 
The enemy 2d Division suffered heavily in the battle for
Ch'unch'on; its casualty rate reportedly was more than 40 percent, the
6th Regiment alone having incurred more than 50 percent casualties.
According to prisoners, ROK artillery fire caused most of the losses. ROK
counterbattery fire also inflicted heavy losses on enemy artillery and
supporting weapons, including destruction of 7 of the division's 16 self-propelled
SU-76-mm. guns, 2 45-mm. antitank guns, and several mortars of all types.
 The N.K. 7th Division likewise suffered considerable, but not
heavy, casualties in the Ch'unch'on battle. 
Immediately after the capture of Ch'unch'on the 7th Division pressed
on south toward Hongch'on, while the N.K. 2d Division turned west
On the east coast across the high Taebaek Range from Inje, the last
major concentration of North Korean troops awaited the attack hour. There
the N.K. 5th Division, the 766th Independent Unit, and some
guerrilla units were poised to cross the Parallel. On the south side of
the border the 10th Regiment of the ROK 8th Division held defensive positions.
The ROK division headquarters was at Kangnung, some fifteen miles down
the coast; the division's second regiment, the 21st, was stationed at Samch'ok,
about twenty-five miles farther south. Only a small part of the 21st Regiment
actually was at Samch'ok on 25 June, however, as two of its battalions
were engaged in antiguerrilla action southward in the Taeback Mountains.
About 0500 Sunday morning, 25 June, Koreans awakened Maj. George D.
Kessler, KMAG adviser to the 10th Regiment, at Samch'ok and told him a
heavy North Korean attack was in progress at the 38th Parallel. Within
a few minutes word came that enemy troops were landing at two points along
the coast nearby, above and below Samch'ok. The commander of the 10th Regiment
and Major Kessler got into a jeep and drove up the coast. From a hilltop
they saw junks and sampans lying offshore and what looked like a battalion
of troops milling about on the coastal road. They drove back south, and
below Samch'ok they saw much the same scene. By the time the two officers
returned to Samch'ok enemy craft were circling offshore there. ROK soldiers brought up their
antitank guns and opened fire on the craft. Kessler saw two boats sink.
A landing at Samch'ok itself did not take place. These landings in the
Samch'ok area were by guerrillas in the approximate strength of 400 above
and 600 below the town. Their mission was to spread inland into the mountainous
eastern part of Korea. 
Meanwhile, two battalions of the 766th Independent Unit had landed
near Kangnung. Correlating their action with this landing, the N.K. 5th
Division and remaining elements of the 766th Independent Unit crossed
the Parallel with the 766th Independent Unit leading the attack
southward down the coastal road. 
The American advisers to the ROK 8th Division assembled at Kangnung
on 26 June and helped the division commander prepare withdrawal plans.
The 10th Regiment was still delaying the enemy advance near the border.
The plan agreed upon called for the 8th Division to withdraw inland across
the Taebaek Range and establish contact with the ROK 6th Division, if possible,
in the central mountain corridor, and then to move south toward Pusan by
way of Tanyang Pass. The American advisers left Kangnung that night and
drove southwest to Wonju where they found the command post of the ROK 6th
On 28 June the commander of the 8th Division sent a radio message to
the ROK Army Chief of Staff saying that it was impossible to defend Kangnung
and giving the positions of the 10th and 21st Regiments. The ROK 8th Division
successfully executed its withdrawal, begun on 27-28 June, bringing along
its weapons and equipment. 
The ROK Counterattack at Uijongbu
By 0930 Sunday morning, 25 June, the ROK Army high command at Seoul
had decided the North Koreans were engaged in a general offensive and not
a repetition of many earlier "rice raids." 
Acting in accordance with plans previously prepared, it began moving
reserves to the north of Seoul for a counterattack in the vital Uijongbu
Corridor. The 2d Division at Taejon was the first of the divisions distant
from the Parallel to move toward the battle front. The first train with
division headquarters and elements of the 5th Regiment left Taejon for
Seoul at 1430, 25 June, accompanied by their American advisers. By dark,
parts of the 5th Division were on their way north from Kwangju in southwest
Korea. The 22d Regiment, the 3d Engineer Battalion, and the 57-mm. antitank
company of the ROK 3d Division also started north from Taegu that night.
During the 25th, Capt. James W. Hausman, KMAG adviser with General Chae,
ROK Army Chief of Staff, had accompanied the latter on two trips from Seoul
to the Uijongbu area. General Chae, popularly known as the "fat boy,"
weighed 245 pounds, and was about 5 feet 6 inches tall. General Chae's
plan, it developed, was to launch a counterattack in the Uijongbu Corridor
the next morning with the 7th Division attacking on the left along the
Tongduch'on-ni road out of Uijongbu, and with the 2d Division on the right
on the P'och'on road. In preparing for this, General Chae arranged to move
the elements of the 7th Division defending the P'och'on road west to the
Tongduch'on-ni road, concentrating that division there, and turn over to
the 2d Division the P'och'on road sector. But the 2d Division would only
begin to arrive in the Uijongbu area during the night. It would be impossible
to assemble and transport the main body of the division from Taejon, ninety
miles below Seoul, to the front above Uijongbu and deploy it there by the
Brig. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, commander of the 2d Division, objected to
Chae's plan. It meant that he would have to attack piecemeal with small
elements of his division. He wanted to defer the counterattack until he
could get all, or the major part, of his division forward. Captain Hausman
agreed with his view. But General Chae overruled these objections and ordered
the attack for the morning of 26 June. The Capital Division at Seoul was
not included in the counterattack plan because it was not considered tactical
and had no artillery. It had served chiefly as a "spit and polish"
organization, with its cavalry regiment acting as a "palace guard."
Elements of the 7th Division which had stopped the N.K. 3d Division
at P'och'on withdrew from there about midnight of 25 June. The next
morning only the 2d Division headquarters and the 1st and 2d Battalions
of the 5th Regiment had arrived at Uijongbu. 
During the first day, elements of the 7th Division near Tongduch'on-ni
on the left-hand road had fought well, considering the enemy superiority
in men, armor, and artillery, and had inflicted rather heavy casualties
on the 16th Regiment of the N.K. 4th Division. But despite
losses the enemy pressed forward and had captured and passed through Tongduch'on-ni
by evening.  On the morning of 26 June, therefore, the N.K. 4th
Division with two regiments abreast and the N.K. 3d Division also
with two regiments abreast were above Uijongbu with strong armor elements,
poised for the converging attack on it and the corridor to Seoul.
On the morning of 26 June Brig. Gen. Yu Jai Hyung, commanding the ROK
7th Division, launched his part of the counterattack against the N.K. 4th
Division north of Uijongbu. At first the counterattack made progress.
This early success apparently led the Seoul broadcast in the afternoon
to state that the 7th Division had counterattacked, killed 1,580 enemy soldiers, destroyed 58 tanks, and destroyed or captured
a miscellany of other weapons. 
Not only did this report grossly exaggerate the success of the 7th Division,
but it ignored the grave turn of events that already had taken place in
front of the 2d Division. The N.K. 3d Division had withdrawn from
the edge of P'och'on during the night, but on the morning of the 26th resumed
its advance and reentered P'och'on unopposed. Its tank-led column continued
southwest toward Uijongbu. General Lee of the ROK 2d Division apparently
believed a counterattack by his two battalions would be futile for he never
launched his part of the scheduled counterattack. Visitors during the morning
found him in his command post, doing nothing, surrounded by staff officers.
 His two battalions occupied defensive positions about two miles northeast
of Uijongbu covering the P'och'on road. There, these elements of the ROK
2d Division at 0800 opened fire with artillery and small arms on approaching
North Koreans. A long column of tanks led the enemy attack. ROK artillery
fired on the tanks, scoring some direct hits, but they were unharmed and,
after halting momentarily, rumbled forward. This tank column passed through
the ROK infantry positions and entered Uijongbu. Following behind the tanks,
the enemy 7th Regiment engaged the ROK infantry. Threatened with
encirclement, survivors of the ROK 2d Division's two battalions withdrew
into the hills. 
This failure of the 2d Division on the eastern, right-hand, road into
Uijongbu caused the 7th Division to abandon its own attack on the western
road and to fall back below the town. By evening both the N.K. 3d
and 4th Divisions and their supporting tanks of the 105th Armored
Brigade had entered Uijongbu. The failure of the 2d Division above
Uijongbu portended the gravest consequences. The ROK Army had at hand no
other organized force that could materially affect the battle above Seoul.
General Lee explained later to Col. William H. S. Wright that he did
not attack on the morning of the 26th because his division had not yet
closed and he was waiting for it to arrive. His orders had been to attack
with the troops he had available. Quite obviously this attack could not
have succeeded. The really fatal error had been General Chae's plan of
operation giving the 2d Division responsibility for the P'och'on road sector
when it was quite apparent that it could not arrive in strength to meet
that responsibility by the morning of 26 June.
The Fall of Seoul
The tactical situation for the ROK Army above Seoul was poor as evening fell on the second day, 26 June. Its 1st Division at Korangp'o-ri was
flanked by the enemy 1st Division immediately to the east and the
4th and 3d Divisions at Uijongbu. Its 7th Division and elements
of the 2d, 5th, and Capital Divisions were fighting un-co-ordinated delaying
actions in the vicinity of Uijongbu.
During the evening the Korean Government decided to move from Seoul
to Taejon. Members of the South Korean National Assembly, however, after
debate decided to remain in Seoul. That night the ROK Army headquarters
apparently decided to leave Seoul. On the morning of the 27th the ROK Army
headquarters left Seoul, going to Sihung-ni, about five miles south of
Yongdungp'o, without notifying Colonel Wright and the KMAG headquarters.
Ambassador Muccio and his staff left Seoul for Suwon just after 0900
on the 27th. Colonel Wright and KMAG then followed the ROK Army headquarters
to Sihung-ni. There Colonel Wright persuaded General Chae to return to
Seoul. Both the ROK Army headquarters and the KMAG headquarters were back
in Seoul by 1800 27 June. 
The generally calm atmosphere that had pervaded the Seoul area during
the first two days of the invasion disappeared on the third. The failure
of the much discussed counterattack of the ROK 7th and 2d Divisions and
the continued advance of the North Korean columns upon Seoul became known
to the populace of the city during 27 June, and refugees began crowding
the roads. During this and the preceding day North Korean planes dropped
leaflets on the city calling for surrender. Also, Marshal Choe Yong Gun,
field commander of the North Korean invaders, broadcast by radio an appeal
for surrender.  The populace generally expected the city to fall during
the night. By evening confusion took hold in Seoul.
A roadblock and demolition plan designed to slow an enemy advance had
been prepared and rehearsed several times, but so great was the terror
spread by the T34 tanks that "prepared demolitions were not blown,
roadblocks were erected but not manned, and obstacles were not covered
by fire." But in one instance, Lt. Col. Oum Hong Sup, Commandant of
the ROK Engineer School, led a hastily improvised group that destroyed
with demolitions and pole charges four North Korean tanks at a mined bridge
on the Uijongbu-Seoul road.  A serious handicap in trying to stop the
enemy tanks was the lack of antitank mines in South Korea at the time of
the invasion-only antipersonnel mines were available. 
Before midnight, 27 June, the defenses of Seoul had all but fallen. The 9th Regiment, N.K. 3d Division,
was the first enemy unit to reach the city. Its leading troops arrived
in the suburbs about 1930 but heavy fire forced them into temporary withdrawal.
 About 2300 one lone enemy tank and a platoon of infantry entered the
Secret Gardens at Chang-Duk Palace in the northeast section of the city.
Korean police managed to destroy the tank and kill or disperse the accompanying
Lt. Col. Peter W. Scott at midnight had taken over temporarily the G-3
adviser desk at the ROK Army headquarters. When reports came in of breaks
in the line at the edge of Seoul he saw members of the ROK Army G-3 Section
begin to fold their maps. Colonel Scott asked General Chae if he had ordered
the headquarters to leave; the latter replied that he had not. 
About midnight Colonel Wright ordered some of the KMAG officers to go
to their quarters and get a little rest. One of these was Lt. Col. Walter
Greenwood, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff, KMAG. Soon after he had gone to
bed, according to Colonel Greenwood, Maj. George R. Sedberry, Jr., the
G-3 adviser to the ROK Army, telephoned him that the South Koreans intended
to blow the Han River bridges. Sedberry said that he was trying to persuade
General Kim Paik Il, ROK Deputy Chief of Staff, to prevent the blowing
of the bridges until troops, supplies, and equipment clogging the streets
of Seoul could be removed to the south side of the river. There had been
an earlier agreement between KMAG and General Chae that the bridges would
not be blown until enemy tanks reached the street on which the ROK Army
headquarters was located. Greenwood hurried to the ROK Army headquarters.
There General Kim told him that the Vice Minister of Defense had ordered
the blowing of the bridges at 0130 and they must be blown at once. 
Maj. Gen. Chang Chang Kuk, ROK Army G-3 at the time, states that General
Lee, commander of the 2d Division, appeared at the ROK Army headquarters
after midnight and, upon learning that the bridges were to be blown, pleaded
with General Kim to delay it at least until his troops and their equipment,
then in the city, could cross to the south side of the Han. It appears
that earlier, General Chae, the Chief of Staff, over his protests had been
placed in a jeep and sent south across the river. According to General
Chang, General Chae wanted to stay in Seoul. But with Chae gone, General
Kim was at this climactic moment the highest ranking officer at the ROK
Army headquarters. After General Lee's pleas, General Kim turned to General
Chang and told him to drive to the river and stop the blowing of the bridge.
General Chang went outside, got into a jeep, and drove off toward the
highway bridge, but he found the streets so congested with traffic, both
wheeled and pedestrian, that he could make only slow progress. The nearest
point from which he might expect to communicate with the demolition party
on the south side of the river was a police box near the north end of the
bridge. He says he had reached a point about 150 yards from the bridge
when a great orange-colored light illumined the night sky. The accompanying
deafening roar announced the blowing of the highway and three railroad
The gigantic explosions, which dropped two spans of the Han highway
bridge into the water on the south side, were set off about 0215 with no
warning to the military personnel and the civilian population crowding
Two KMAG officers, Col. Robert T. Hazlett and Captain Hausman, on their
way to Suwon to establish communication with Tokyo, had just crossed the
bridge when it blew up-Hausman said seven minutes after they crossed. Hazlett
said five minutes. Hausman places the time of the explosion at 0215. Several
other sources fix it approximately at the same time. Pedestrian and solid
vehicular traffic, bumper to bumper, crowded all three lanes of the highway
bridge. In Seoul the broad avenue leading up to the bridge was packed in
all eight lanes with vehicles of all kinds, including army trucks and artillery
pieces, as well as with marching soldiers and civilian pedestrians. The
best informed American officers in Seoul at the time estimate that between
500 and 800 people were killed or drowned in the blowing of this bridge.
Double this number probably were on that part of the bridge over water
but which did not fall, and possibly as many as 4,000 people altogether
were on the bridge if one includes the long causeway on the Seoul side
of the river. Three American war correspondents-Burton Crane, Frank Gibney,
and Keyes Beech-were just short of the blown section of the bridge when
it went skyward. The blast shattered their jeep's windshield. Crane and
Gibney in the front seat received face and head cuts from the flying glass.
Just ahead of them a truckload of ROK soldiers were all killed. 
There was a great South Korean up roar later over the premature destruction
of the Han River bridges, and a court of inquiry sat to fix the blame for
the tragic event. A Korean army court martial fixed the responsibility
and blame on the ROK Army Chief Engineer for the "manner" in
which he had prepared the bridges for demolition, and he was summarily
executed. Some American advisers in Korea at the time believed that General
Chae ordered the bridges blown and that the Chief Engineer merely carried
out his orders. General Chae denied that he had given the order. Others
in a good position to ascertain all the facts available in the prevailing
confusion believed that the Vice Minister of Defense ordered the blowing of the bridges. The statements attributed
to General Kim support this view.
The utter disregard for the tactical situation, with the ROK Army still
holding the enemy at the outskirts of the city, and the certain loss of
thousands of soldiers and practically all the transport and heavy weapons
if the bridges were destroyed, lends strong support to the view that the
order was given by a ROK civilian official and not by a ROK Army officer.
Had the Han River bridges not been blown until the enemy actually approached
them there would have been from at least six to eight hours longer in which
to evacuate the bulk of the troops of three ROK divisions and at least
a part of their transport, equipment, and heavy weapons to the south side
of the Han. It is known that when the KMAG party crossed the Han River
at 0600 on 28 June the fighting was still some distance from the river,
and according to North Korean sources enemy troops did not occupy the center
of the city until about noon. Their arrival at the river line necessarily
must have been later.
The premature blowing of the bridges was a military catastrophe for
the ROK Army. The main part of the army, still north of the river, lost
nearly all its transport, most of its supplies, and many of its heavy weapons.
Most of the troops that arrived south of the Han waded the river or crossed
in small boats and rafts in disorganized groups. The disintegration of
the ROK Army now set in with alarming speed.
ROK troops held the North Koreans at the edge of Seoul throughout the
night of 27-28 June, and the North Koreans have given them credit for putting
up a stubborn resistance. During the morning of the 28th, the North Korean
attack forced the disorganized ROK defenders to withdraw, whereupon street
fighting started in the city. Only small ROK units were still there. These
delayed the entry of the N.K. 3d Division into the center of Seoul
until early afternoon.  The 16th Regiment of the N.K. 4th
Division entered the city about mid-afternoon.  One group of ROK
soldiers in company strength dug in on South Mountain within the city and
held out all day, but finally they reportedly were killed to the last man.
 At least a few North Korean tanks were destroyed or disabled in street
fighting in Seoul. One captured North Korean tanker later told of seeing
two knocked-out tanks in Seoul when he entered.  The two North Korean
divisions completed the occupation of Seoul during the afternoon. Within
the city an active fifth column met the North Korean troops and helped
them round up remaining ROK troops, police, and South Korean government
officials who had not escaped.
In the first four days of the invasion, during the drive on Seoul, the
N.K. 3d and 4th Divisions incurred about 1,500 casualties.
 Hardest hit was the 4th Division, which had fought the ROK 7th Division down to Uijongbu.
It lost 219 killed, 761 wounded, and 132 missing in action for a total
of 1,112 casualties. 
In an order issued on 10 July, Kim Il Sung honored the N.K. 3d and
4th Divisions for their capture of Seoul by conferring on them the
honorary title, "Seoul Division." The 105th Armored
Brigade was raised by the same order to division status and received
the same honorary title. 
Of the various factors contributing to the quick defeat of the ROK Army,
perhaps the most decisive was the shock of fighting tanks for the first
time. The North Koreans had never used tanks in any of the numerous border
incidents, although they had possessed them since late 1949. It was on
25 June, therefore, that the ROK soldier had his first experience with
tanks. The ROK soldier not only lacked experience with tanks, he also lacked
weapons that were effective against the T34 except his own handmade demolition
charge used in close attack. 
Seoul fell on the fourth day of the invasion. At the end of June, after
six days, everything north of the Han River had been lost. On the morning
of 29 June, General Yu Jai Hyung with about 1,200 men of the ROK 7th Division
and four machine guns, all that was left of his division, defended the
bridge sites from the south bank of the river. In the next day or two remnants
of four South Korean divisions assembled on the south bank or were still
infiltrating across the river.  Colonel Paik brought the ROK 1st Division,
now down to about 5,000 men, across the Han on 29 June in the vicinity
of Kimpo Airfield, twelve air miles northwest of Seoul. He had to leave
his artillery behind but his men brought out their small arms and most
of their crew-served weapons. 
Of 98,000 men in the ROK Army on 25 June the Army headquarters could
account for only 22,000 south of the Han at the end of the month. 
When information came in a few days later about the 6th and 8th Divisions
and more stragglers assembled south of the river, this figure increased
to 54,000. But even this left 44,000 completely gone in the first week
of war-killed, captured, or missing. Of all the divisions engaged in the
initial fighting, only the 6th and 8th escaped with their organization,
weapons, equipment, and transport relatively intact. Except for them, the
ROK Army came out of the initial disaster with little more than about 30
percent of its individual weapons. 
 New York Times, June 27, 1950. An enterprising Times employee found
this manifesto and accompanying Tass article in Izvestia, June 10, 1950,
datelined Pyong [P'yongyang], in the Library of Congress and had it
translated from the Russian.
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts for
the various North Korean divisions.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of N.K.
Aggression), pt. 2; The Conflict in Korea, pp. 26-28, 32-36.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2, pt. 2, pp. 12-23.
 Ibid., Opn Orders 4th Inf Div, 22 Jun 50, Transl 200045. This
document includes an annex giving a breakdown of regimental attack
plans. The Conflict in Korea, pages 28-32, gives part of the document.
 The Conflict in Korea, pp. 12-69; ATIS Enemy Documents, Korean Opns,
Issue 1, item 3, p. 37; Ibid., item 6, p. 43.
 Schnabel, Theater Command, ch. IV, p. 5; New York Times, Sept. 15,
 Norman Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian
War Memorial, 1954), p. 166; Time Magazine, June 5, 1950, pp. 26-27. The
New York Times, June 26, 1950, gives General Roberts' views as reported
by Lindsay Parrott in Tokyo.
 The time used is for the place where the event occurred unless
otherwise noted. Korean time is fourteen hours later than New York and
Washington EST and thirteen hours later than EDT. For example, 0400 25
June in Korea would be 1400 24 June in New York and Washington EST.
 Col Walter Greenwood, Jr., Statement of Events 0430, 25 June-1200,
28 June 1950, for Capt Robert K. Sawyer, with Ltr to Sawyer, 22 Feb 54.
Colonel Greenwood was Deputy Chief of Staff, KMAG, June 1950.
 GHQ FEC, Annual Narrative Historical Report, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, p. 8;
New York Times, June 25, 1950. That the North Korean Government actually
made a declaration of war has never been verified.
 Transcript of the radio broadcast in 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 25 Jun.
 Dept of State Pub 3922, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis,
Document 10 (U.N. Commission on Korea, Report to the Secretary-General),
pp. 18 - 20.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), p. 32;
Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 52; KMAG G-2 Unit Hist, 25 Jun 50.
 Sawyer, KMAG MS, pt. III.
 Ibid.; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer.
 Interv, Schnabel with Schwarze; DA Wkly Intel Rpt, 30 Jun 50, Nr
71, p. 10.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), p. 33.
 Ltr, Col Rockwell to author, 21 May 54; Gen Paik Sun Yup, MS review
comments, 11 Jul 58.
 Interv, author with Capt Joseph R. Darrigo, 5 Aug 53: Ltr, Maj
William E. Hamilton to author, 29 Jul 53. Major Hamilton on 25 June 1950
was adviser to the ROK 12th Regiment. He said several ROK officers of
the 12th Regiment who had escaped from Kaesong, including the regimental
commander with whom he had talked, confirmed Darrigo's story of the
North Korean entrance into Kaesong by train. See also, Ltr, Rockwell to
author, 21 May 54; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th
Div), p. 32: 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 50.
 Ltr, Rockwell to author, 21 May 54; Interv, author with Darrigo, 5
Aug 53; Ltr, Hamilton to author, 21 Aug 53; Gen Paik, MS review
comments, 11 Jul 58.
 Ltr, Rockwell to author, 21 May 54; Ltr, Hamilton to author, 21 Aug
53; Gen Paik, MS review comments, 1 Jul 58.
 Ltr, Rockwell to author, 21 May 54; Interv, author with Hausman, 12
Jan 52. Colonel Paik some days after the action gave Hausman an account
of the Imjin River battle. Paik estimated that about ninety ROK soldiers
gave their lives in attacks on enemy tanks.
 Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 52 (related by Paik to Hausman).
 DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr ·78, p. 34; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts,
Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of N.K. Aggression), pt. II, Opn Ord Nr 1,
4th Inf Div, 22 Jun 50; Ibid., Issue 3 (Enemy Documents), p. 65; G-2
Periodic Rpt, 30 Jun 50, Reserve CP (N.K.); The Conflict in Korea, p.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 4 (Enemy Forces), p. 37; Ibid.,
Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of N.K. Aggression), p. 45; Opn Plan, N.K.
4th Inf Div. Opn Ord Nr I. 221400 Jun 50; Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 4th
Div), Ibid., Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div).
 Interv, author with Gen Chang, 14 Oct 53; ATIS Res Supp Interrog
Rpts, Issue 3 (Enemy Documents), p. 5, file 25 Jun-9 Jul 50.
 Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer; Schwarze, Notes for author, 13 Oct
53; 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 25 Jun 50; New York Times, June 26, 1950.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 9 (N.K. Forces), pp. 158-74,
Interrog Nr 1468 (Sr Col Lee Hak Ku, N.K. II Corps Opns Off at time of
 Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 2d Div), p. 33; 24th Div. G-2 Jnl, 25 Jun 50;
Ltr, Lt Col Thomas D. McPhail to author, 28 Jun 54; New York Times, June
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), p. 43;
Ibid., Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of N.K. Aggression), p. 22; KMAG G-
2 Unit Hist, 25 Jun 50; DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, p. 34; Rpt, USMAG to ROK,
1 Jan-15 Jun 50, Annex IV, 15 Jun 50.
 Ltr, McPhail to author, 28 Jun 54; KMAG G-2 Unit Hist, 28 Jun 50;
24th Div G-3 Jnl, 30 Jun 50.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 2d Div), pp. 33-34;
Ibid., Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), p. 51.
 Ibid., Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), p. 43.
 Interv, Sawyer with Col George D. Kessler, 24 Feb 54; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 39; KMAG G-2 Unit Hist, 25
 Interv, Sawyer with Kessler 24 Feb 54; 24th Div G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 50;
DA Wkly Intel Rpt, Nr 72, 7 Jul 50, p. 18.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of N.K.
Aggression), pp. 46-50; Ibid., Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 39; 24th Div
G-3 Jnl, 25 Jun 50; DA Wkly Intel Rpt, Nr 72, 7 Jul 50, p. 18; KMAG G-2
Unit Hist, 25 Jun 50. According to North Korean Col. Lee Hak Ku, the
17th Motorcycle Regiment also moved to Kangnung but the terrain
prevented its employment in the attack. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts,
Issue 9 (N.K. Forces), pp. 158-74, Nr 1468.
Interv, Sawyer with Kessler, 24 Feb 54.
 Ibid.; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 3 (Enemy Documents), pp.
28, 45, file 25 Jun-9 Jul 50. On the 29th the 8th Division reported its
strength as 6,135.
 Interv, author with Gen Chang. 14 Oct 53.
 Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 52; ATIS Res Supp Interrog
Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 29; EUSAK WD, G-2 Sec, 20 Jul
50, ATIS Interrog Nr 89 (2d Lt Pak Mal Bang, escapee from North Korea, a member
of the ROK 5th Regt at Uijongbu on 26 Jun).
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p.
44; Ibid., Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of N.K. Aggression), Recon Ord Nr 1 to
 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 26 Jun 50. The New York Times, June 26, 1950,
carries an optimistic statement by the South Korean cabinet.
 Interv, Dr. Gordon W. Prange and Schnabel with Lt Col Nicholas J.
Abbott, 6 Mar 51; EUSAK WD G-2 Sec, 20 Jul 50, ATIS Interrog Nr 89 (Lt
Pak Mal Bang).
 EUSAK WD, G-2 Sec, 20 Jul 50, ATIS Interrog 89 (Lt Pak Mal Bang);
ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 29.
 Interv, author with Col Wright, 3 Jan 52; Interv, Prange and
Schnabel with Abbott, 6 Mar 51; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer, 22 Feb
54; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue I (Enemy Documents), item 6, p.
43; 24th Div G-2 Jnl, 26 Jun 50.
 Interv, author with Col Robert T. Hazlett, 14 Jun 51 (Hazlett was
adviser to the ROK Infantry School, June 1950); Statement, Greenwood for
Sawyer, 22 Feb 54; Sawyer, KMAG MS, pt. III; Col Wright, Notes for
author, 1952; Soon-Chun Pak, "What Happened to a Congress Woman," in
John W. Riley, Jr., and Wilbur Schram, The Reds Take a City (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1951), p. 193. Sihung-ni had
been a cantonment area of the ROK Infantry School before the invasion.
 Sawyer, KMAG MS; Wright, Notes for author, 1952.
 The New York Times, June 17, 1950; DA Intel Rev, Aug 50, Nr 171, p. 18
 Wright, Notes for author, 1952.
 Maj. Richard I. Crawford, Notes on Korea, 25 June-5 December 1950,
typescript of talk given by Crawford at Ft. Belvoir, Va., 17 Feb 51.
(Crawford was senior engineer adviser to the ROK Army in June 1950.)
 Diary found on dead North Korean, entry 27 Jun 50, in 25th Div G-2
PW Interrog File, 2-22 Jul 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96
(N.K. 3d Div), p. 30.
 Intervs, author with Gen Chang, 14 Oct 53, Schwarze, 3 Feb 54, and
Hausman, 12 Jan 54. Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer, 22 Feb 54. The
rusting hulk of this tank was still in the palace grounds when American
troops recaptured the city in September.
 Copy of Ltr, Col Scott to unnamed friend, n.d. (ca. 6-7 Jul 50).
Colonel Scott was the G-1 adviser to ROK Army.
 Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer, 22 Feb 54; Ltr, Greenwood to
author, 1 Jul 54; Interv, author with Col Lewis D. Vieman (KMAG G-4
adviser), 15 Jun 54. Sedberry said he did not remember this conversation
relating to blowing the Han River bridge. Ltr, Sedberry to author, 10 Jun 54.
 Interv, author with Gen Chang, 14 Oct 53.
 Wright, Notes for author, 1952; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer, 22
Feb 54; Lt Col Lewis D. Vieman, Notes on Korea, typescript, 15 Feb 51;
Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 52; Interv, author with Keyes Beech,
1 Oct 51; Interv, author with Hazlett, 11 Jun 54. The New York Times,
June 29, 1950, carries Burton Crane's personal account of the Han bridge
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 30. The
time given for the entry into Seoul is 1300.
 Ibid., Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 44. GHQ FEC, History of the N.K.
Army, p. 44, claims that the 18th Regiment, N.K. 4th Division, entered
Seoul at 1130, 28 June. The P'yongyang radio broadcast that the North
Korea People's Army occupied Seoul at 0300, 28 June. See 24th Div G-2
Msg File, 28 Jun 50.
 Interv, author with Schwarze, 3 Feb 54; KMAG G-s Unit Hist, 28 Jun
 ORO-R-I (FEC), 8 Apr 51, The Employment of Armor in Korea, vol. I,
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 44; Ibid.,
Issue 96 (N.K. 3d Div), p. 30; Ibid., Issue I (Enemy Documents), p. 37.
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army (4th Div), p. 58. Theses
figures are based on a captured enemy casualty report.
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 56.
 On Friday, 30 June, the sixth day of the invasion, the first
antitank mines arrived in Korea. Eight hundred of them were flown in
from Japan. Crawford, Notes on Korea.
 Ltr, Greenwood to author, 1 Jul 54.
 Interv, author with Hazlett, 11 Jun 54. Hazlett was at Sihung-ni,
reconnoitering a crossing, when Colonel Paik arrived there the evening
of 28 June, and talked with him later about the division's crossing.
 Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 54.
 Ibid.; Vieman, Notes on Korea, 15 Feb 51; Interv, author
with Gen Chang, 14 Oct 53. General Chang estimated there were 40,000
soldiers under organized ROK Army command 1 July. General MacArthur on
29 June placed the number of ROK Army effectives at 25,000.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation