The Korean War, described by many,
including then President Harry S. Truman, as a police
action, marked the first time that the United States
and the fledgling United Nations organization entered
into a partnership to halt the advance of the Cold War
into the Far East.
A total of 22 nations agreed to send
either troops or medical units. Sixteen countries
responded to the U.N. resolution by sending troops to
halt the invasion of South Korea by the North Koreans.
One of the first of the major participants to send a
brigade was Turkey. The first Turkish contingent
arrived on October 19, 1950, and in varying strengths
remained until midsummer 1954.
Initially, Turkey sent the 1st Turkish
Brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Tahsin Yazici. The
brigade consisted of three battalions commanded by
Major Imadettin Kuranel, Major Mithat Ulunu, and Major
Lutfu Bilgon. The Turkish Armed Forces Command (TAFC)
was a regimental combat team with three infantry
battalions, along with supporting artillery and
engineers. It was the only brigade-sized UN unit
attached permanently to a U.S. division throughout the
Korean War.
More than 5,000 men of the 1st Turkish
Brigade, including liaison and the advance party,
arrived in Pusan, South Korea, on October 17 from the
eastern Mediterranean port of Iskenderun, Turkey. The
brigade unloaded from their ship and proceeded to the
newly opened U.N. reception center located just outside
of Taegu. The bulk of the enlisted men were from small
towns and villages in the mountains of eastern Turkey.
For these volunteer officers and volunteer enlisted men
who were just completing their compulsory two year
service, it was not only the first time that they had
left their native country--it was the first time they
had been out of the villages of their birth. It was, at
least for the enlisted men, the first time that they
had encountered non-Muslims. Vast cultural and
religious differences existed between the Turks and the
Americans.
Their commander, General Yazici, was an
aging brigadier who had been a division commander
fighting the British at Gallipoli in 1916. He was
highly regarded in the Turkish military establishment
and willingly stepped down a rank in order to command
the first contingent of Turks in Korea. He had only one
drawback--no real command of English--yet he was
attached to an American division. Later, that lack of
language proficiency would prove to be a major
hindrance to his understanding of orders and troop
deployments.
The U.S. Army command was unaware of
the difficulties in coordination, logistics and, above
all, basic communication in a common language that
would complicate orders and troop movements, especially
in the crucial early months of their joint exercises.
Unfamiliar food, clothing requirements and
transportation would come to create more problems than
the American high command had counted on. The dietary
requirements of the Turks forbade pork products, and
the American rations definitely contained pork products
forbidden to all Muslims. A Japanese food processor was
hired to provide rations that met the Turkish
requirements. Bread and coffee presented other
problems. The Turks favored a heavy, substantial bread
containing nonbleached flour along with thick, strong,
heavily sweetened coffee. The U.S. Army found a way to
satisfy these needs along with those of the other
Allied forces.
Few American liaison officers were
attached to the Turkish companies, thereby adding to
the problems the Turks faced in their initial combat
operations. Misinterpretation of orders resulted from
the lack of communication between Allies. The problem,
at first overlooked and judged to be only minor, only
became exacerbated in the heat of battle.
The Turks' arrival in Korea
garnered a considerable amount of publicity. The
Turkish soldiers' fierce appearance, flowing
mustaches and great knives were a war
correspondent's dream come true. Although they had
not fought in a major conflict since World War I, the
Turkish soldiers had the reputation of being rough,
hard fighters who preferred the offensive position and
gave no quarter in battle. Most of the enlisted men
were young and carried a sidearm sword that, to
Americans and the other U.N. troops, appeared to be a
long knife. No other U.N. troops were armed with that
kind of knife, or indeed any other weapon out of the
ordinary. The Turks had a dangerous proficiency in
close combat with their long knives that made all other
Allied forces want to stay clear of them.
Turkish Brigade's Baptism of Fire
Part 2: Flawed Offensives
Most of the enlisted men were from the
eastern steppe region of Turkey near the Russian border
and had little more than three or four years of basic
schooling. In the conscription process, they were given
uniforms, plus some training by the Turkish military
and their U.S. military advisers. Life in their native
villages had been largely unchanged for hundreds of
years. A central village well still provided water, and
news of the outside world seldom penetrated village
daily life.
It was to that patchwork U.N. army,
composed mainly of Americans but having diverse units
from 16 other countries, that the orders suddenly came
to General Walton "Johnnie" Walker's
Eighth Army headquarters to mount a massive offensive
and push for an early end to the war. General Douglas
MacArthur's promise to relieve two divisions and
have "the boys home for Christmas" gave the
impetus to an ill-conceived move to the Yalu River.
There were some expressed misgivings, especially by the
Eighth Army commander, General Walker. Those
objections, however, were quickly pushed aside by the
clique that surrounded MacArthur. Pressure to conclude
the war in one massive offensive became too difficult
to contain. The generals and commanders in the field
who would actually commit their men to one of the
bloodiest campaigns of the war were protesting voices
that were either never acknowledged or ignored.
Intelligence reports given to MacArthur
indicated the presence and capture of Chinese troops in
late October and early November. Major General
Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, kept
him abreast of all incoming reports of larger numbers
of Chinese troop movements. Nonetheless, the die was
cast for Walker's Eighth Army. Walker tried several
times to delay the inevitable by protesting the lack of
logistical support and supplies that were en route from
Japan and the United States, but all he accomplished
was to increase MacArthur's ire toward him and
impatience at the delay.
Bitter winds from Manchuria churned
over the steep, granitic mountains and treacherous
valleys of North Korea. The coldest weather in at least
40 years gripped the land. Numbed and miserable
soldiers tried to keep warm around makeshift fires made
in empty 50-gallon drums. Medical units began treating
their first cases of frostbite. More and more, Korea
became the proverbial "Hell froze over." It
was necessary to mix alcohol with the gasoline to
prevent gas lines from freezing in the vehicles and
equipment. Blood plasma had to be heated for 90 minutes
before it could be used. Medicines that were
water-soluble froze, and sweat that accumulated in the
soldiers' boots froze during the night. The terrain
of northern Korea, with its long v-shaped valleys, high
craggy mountain ridges and the lack of any real
discernible roads, along with the incredible numbing
cold sweeping across the forward-moving army,
contributed the elements of tragedy that shaped the
battle to come.
The U.S. Army's 7th Division and
other units were not prepared for arctic warfare. Few
of the fighting units had arctic parkas. Yet they were
ordered forward. On November 21, they were ordered to
move across a riverbed containing what they had been
told would be only ankle-deep water that would present
no problem. The night before, however, upstream dams
had been opened and the water released. The soldiers
waded into frigid, waist-deep water with chunks of ice
floating in it. After several unsuccessful attempts,
the crossing was called off. Eighteen men suffered
severe frostbite and had to have their frozen uniforms
cut off.
During the dogged advance, Walker's
army became more thinly stretched as the Korean
Peninsula widened and forced the army to cover more
territory as it moved steadily northward. His order of
battle was comprised of the U.S. I Corps, consisting of
the U.S. 24th Division, the British 27th Brigade, and
the Republic of Korea (ROK) 1st Division; the U.S. IX
Corps including the U.S. 2nd and 25th Divisions and the
1st Turkish Brigade; the ROK 6th, 7th, and 8th
divisions; and the 1st Cavalry Division in Army
reserve.
Walker was cautious about committing
his troops. Intelligence tried to get some realistic
estimates about the Chinese troop strength and their
movements. Daily briefings in early November indicated
a dramatic increase in Chinese and North Korean troop
strength from 40,100 to 98,400 men. These estimates
still were woefully inadequate.
Part 3: Under Pressure
Assembled in front of Walker's IX
Corps in the west was the XIII Army Group of the
Chinese Fourth Field Army, consisting of 18 infantry
divisions totaling at least 180,000 men. Opposing the
U.S. I Corps in the east was the IX Army Group of the
Chinese Third Field Army with 12 infantry divisions of
about 120,000 men. The total Chinese strength was about
300,000 men; 12 divisions of the North Korean Peoples
Army added approximately 65,000 men to the enemy
strength. The North Korean soldiers had recovered
sufficiently from their earlier reverses at the hands
of the Americans to be judged by their commanders to be
battle worthy. Added to that array were about 40,000
guerrillas operating behind the U.N. lines. Enemy
strength was more than slightly underestimated.
The Chinese army had managed to move a
vast number of troops by the most primitive means.
Using animals and their own backs to transport
supplies, they were not restricted to the primitive
roads. They moved overland without the benefit of
trucks or other mechanized equipment and therefore had
the advantage of greater mobility. The United Nations,
on the other hand, stuck with basic roads and improving
existing roads to move men and equipment. Engineering
companies moved ahead, trying to make roads passable
for tanks and trucks.
Another difference that was to count
very highly against the United Nations and the United
States was adherence to routine, World War II thinking
and tactics. Chinese used soldiers were expected to
carry on their backs all the food each soldier required
for at least six days. The food was cooked rice and
soybean curds in concentrated form as well as similar
items that required no cooking or heating in order to
be eaten. Recovered diaries of the Chinese soldiers
recount their pangs of hunger from these severely
restricted rations, but they achieved their objective
in the same bitter cold and biting winds and over the
same terrain that handicapped their U.N. opponents.
The Chinese generally marched at night
and averaged at least 18 miles per day for
approximately 18 days. In the daylight hours, they
concealed themselves in the rough, mountainous terrain.
The only daylight movement allowed was by scouting
parties. Restrictions were so onerous that officers
were authorized to shoot to kill any soldier who
violated the order for concealment. Many of the Chinese
movement tactics were similar to those used by Napoleon
Bonaparte a century and a half earlier.
On November 19, the U.S. 25th Division
left Kaesong at 6 a.m. and bedded down at the mining
town of Kunu-ri around 2 o'clock that night. The
next day, the Turkish Brigade, which was largely an
infantry unit without trucks for troop transport, was
detached and reassigned to the IX Corps reserve at
Kunu-ri. Walker's Eighth Army command was split
down the middle by the Chongchon River.
As part of the IX Corps' general
northward advance, the Turks were ordered on November
21 to move north with the 25th Division. By November
22, 1950, the Turks had completed their assignment of
neutralizing North Korean patrols in their assigned
area. The steady movement to Kunu-ri had begun in
earnest. Kunu-ri, much like all the other small
villages in the northern sector, was mainly
mud-and-stick houses. It was a totally unremarkable
place, little different from any of the other villages
perched on the mountainsides and in the deep valleys
cut by swift-moving mountain rivers and streams.
Advancing along with their American
counterparts, the Turks were ordered to establish
contact with the U.S. 2nd Division on the right flank
of the IX Corps and also to cover the right flank and
rear of their division. The brigade had received
information concerning a Chinese regiment known to be
northwest of Tokchon. General Yazici described the
situation that confronted him in these words:
"This was what the order was.
Further intelligence was asked about the enemy and the
ROK Corps, but none was available or more information
was not supplied lest it lower the morale of the
Turkish Brigade....The situation was serious, and
demanded prompt action."
On November 26, the Chinese Communist
Forces (CCF) launched strong counterattacks against the
U.S. I Corps and IX Corps. The main Chinese force moved
down the central mountain ranges against the ROK II
Corps at Tokchon. The South Koreans could not withstand
the attack and their defenses collapsed.
Part 4: Mixed Fortunes
The Chinese onslaught assumed alarming
proportions, and the Turks were ordered to protect the
U.N. right flank. Trucks were assigned to transport the
Turks' 1st Battalion to Wawon, 15 miles east of
Kunu-ri, about halfway to Takchon, unload and return
for the 2nd Battalion. After insufficient trucks
arrived, some of the brigade set out on foot. Orders,
counterorders and garbled transmissions made the
situation an unintelligible mess. The Turks were
ordered to close the road and secure Unsong-ni. Trying
later to explain the confusion of that time, General
Yazici wrote:
"There was no time to move the
brigade to Unsong-ni and deploy it there before dark.
Besides, the enemy, which was supposed to be at
Chongsong-ni, was in fact too close to the line which
the Corps wanted us to hold. That the Brigade might be
subjected to a surprise attack before reaching its
position was highly probable. Even more important was
the fact that the civilian population had not been
moved out of the area. If the peasants and the
guerrillas that might have been infiltrated among them
attempted to block the mountain crossing or the Wawon
Pass in the rear, the Brigade might suffer heavily. As
a matter of fact, the 2nd Division, of which we were
supposed to defend the right flank, was withdrawing. It
was impossible to fulfill the task from Karil
L'yong, where the Brigade was, because the terrain
was very rugged and thickly wooded. In order to protect
the Kunu-ri-Tokchon road and the other roads to the
north and the south, a 12-mile-wide front had to be
held. This was impossible against a numerically
superior enemy who knew the region well. Further, the
terrain restricted the effective use of artillery and
heavy infantry weapons."
As Yazici clearly outlined, the Turks
were in an unenviable situation. They had to withdraw
to the southeast. That withdrawal compounded the
exposure of the Turks' own east flank as well as
the 2nd Division's east flank. Yazici ordered his
men to move in the direction of Wawon northeast of
Kunu-ri. The brigade had lost contact with corps.
Therefore, Yazici assumed responsibility and ordered
his men to position themselves at Wawon. When they
reached Wawon, they attacked toward Tokchon, on foot
and without tank support. The terrain was upstream
along the Tongjukkyo River into the mountain divide
that separated the Chongchon River from the Taedong
drainage. Here, the headwaters of the Tongjukkyo River
fan out into numerous small streams.
When he received intelligence that air
observers had seen hundreds of Chinese moving toward
Tokchon, Maj. Gen. Laurence Kaiser, commanding the U.S.
2nd Division, remarked, "That's where they are
going to hit." The Chinese counteroffensive
actually struck all along the front. Two platoons of
the Turkish Brigade assigned reconnaissance duty were
now given rear-guard duty. The Chinese followed the
brigade closely. The reconnaissance unit engaged the
oncoming Chinese at the Karil L'yong Pass, was
unable to break contact. Only a few men survived.
The Turks had achieved one
objective--they had tied down the enemy. The Chinese
suffered heavy casualties trying repeatedly to take the
Turkish position, and all their attacks were repelled.
Finally, Yazici, understanding that the brigade was
being encircled by the numerically superior Chinese,
ordered withdrawal.
The Turks were isolated in the subzero
temperatures, their orders not fully understood. And
during the night, the Chinese kept up a steady barrage
of sudden noises using drums, bugles, whistles, flutes,
shepherds' pipes and cymbals, along with the
shouting, laughing and chattering of human voices.
The offensive had changed and now
became a rout of the U.N. forces. The engulfing enemy
constantly changed tactics and directions..
Communications resumed with the Turkish Brigade. Some
orders were understood, but most were not. The brigade
was ordered to merge with the U.S. 38th Regiment, cover
the 38th's flank and secure a retreat route
westward. In the confusion of the retreat and the
garbled, misdirected and delayed messages, that crucial
directive was two hours late in delivery. The column
got turned about in the mass confusion and congestion
of the road.
Once again, as the Turks approached
Wawon, they encountered heavy enemy fire. The CCF had
arrived before the Turks were able to reassemble and
assume defensive positions. The Chinese ripped into the
ragged column and the soldiers were ordered to turn
about once again. The Turkish 9th Company took the
brunt of the attack as it covered for the retreating
main body. The 10th Company of the brigade's 3rd
Battalion received orders to form the brigade's
general outpost line.
Major Lutfu Bilgin, commander of the
3rd Battalion, sent his 9th Company to defend the 10th
and 11th companies' flank. The Chinese eased off on
the 10th but continued to besiege the 9th and the 11th.
Midmorning on November 28, the Chinese broke through
and attacked the 9th's position in force. The
company was overrun, and Major Bilgin and many of his
men were killed.
Enemy reinforcements tried to encircle
the entire brigade. General Yazici, however, assessed
the situation and took steps to protect his flank and
avoid encirclement. The CCF poured forward, and the
Turks were caught in the trap that the Chinese were
laying. Suddenly, the Chinese broke off after
encountering strong resistance of the 3rd
Battalion.
During the withdrawal, the Chinese had
attacked the Turks with overwhelming force and the
brigade took such high casualties that by November 30
it was destroyed as a battleworthy unit. The only
support the Turks received from IX Corps was a tank
platoon and truck transportation. That was added to the
brigade's artillery and enabled some of the brigade
to survive.
Part 5: Aftermath
The flow of messages and changed orders
to the Turks on the road to Tokchon on November 27
reflected the lack of precise information and the high
level of uncertainty that IX Corps and the Eighth Army
experienced as they struggled to interpret the rapidly
enfolding events. One certainty was that, during the
day, the Chinese attacked the leading 1st Battalion at
Wawon and this ambush inflicted the devastating blow to
the Turks. The battalion was surrounded, and a
hand-to-hand battle between Chinese bayonets and
Turkish long knives took place. It was reported that
the two companies of Turks were still fighting east of
Wawaon and had about 400 men wounded. General Yazici
was at his headquarters in Taechon, a larger village
southeast of Kunu-ri. The Turks held out at Wawon until
the afternoon and then withdrew to another position
southwest of Wawon. Again, the Chinese outflanked those
Turks, who then withdrew toward Kunu-ri. The Turkish
battalion lost most of its vehicles. The survivors
scrambled into the hills when all other means of escape
was denied them. By that time, the Chinese held all the
roads. The Turks continued to fight delaying actions to
gain time for the rest of their troops to re-form and
establish some semblance of an orderly defense, but
they were not successful in any of those efforts.
At the 2nd Division Headquarters,
information about the Turks and their actual movements
was more and more difficult to obtain. The tanks sent
toward the Turks' position were repeatedly turned
back. Confusion led to startling events, such as
American soldiers simply abandoning their positions and
equipment, including their weapons. The Chinese
appeared to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time.
Confirmation of Chinese movements was sparse and often
erroneous. The Chinese, reported to be just ahead,
turned out to be advancing on the soldiers from behind.
The Turks decided to evacuate the command post. A new
and yet ancient style of warfare had begun.
The Chinese and North Koreans used a
multiple of tactics in a mountainous terrain that left
little, if any, mobility. The weather had become an
enemy as cruel as the terrain. The Turks and Americans,
unable to communicate and coordinate, fought valiantly,
but without much direction and without knowing what
their fellow soldiers and units were doing.
The U.N. response to the Chinese
offensive in November 1950 has been described as a
"bugout," a massive retreat that should not
have happened. Very little has been written about the
conditions that contributed to the failure of
MacArthur's November offensive, an offensive that
began with high expectations of bringing the soldiers
home for Christmas. Afterward, the words "home for
Christmas" rang hollow in the ears of both the
military and the politicians. The terrain, the weather,
the lack of adequate language skills by the Americans
and the Turks, and the lack of options for that massive
an operation preordained the bloody, tragic
outcome.
In the course of the U.N. offensive and
the Chinese counteroffensive, the 1st Turkish Brigade
suffered 3,514 casualties, of which 741 were killed in
action, 2,068 wounded, 163 missing and 244 taken
prisoner, as well as 298 noncombatant casualties.
The Turks, armed and trained by
American military advisers, did better than even they
had hoped or expected in this, their first real combat
since World War I. The American units to which they
were attached respected their skills and tenacity in
combat. Some comments by American officers give insight
into the Turks and their abilities. "They really
prefer to be on the offensive and handle it quite
well," went one appraisal. "They are not as
good at defensive positions, and certainly never
retreat." Another report told of their patrol
skills: "Certain Turkish patrols always reported
high body counts when they returned from patrols.
Headquarters always scoffed at the high numbers, much
higher in fact than any other unit, until the Turks
decided to bring the enemy bodies back and dump them at
headquarters for the body count."
The Turks acquitted themselves in a
brave and noble fashion in some of the worst conditions
experienced in the Korean War. Very little else could
have been required or expected of them. Their heavy
casualties speak of their honor and commitment. Their
bravery requires no embellishment. It stands on its
own.
This article was written by A.K.
Dawson and originally published in Military History
Magazine December 1997. A.K. Dawson teaches history in
Darwin, Australia.