History 
On Line
The dramatic development of the prisoner of
war issue during the winter months tended to obscure the questions of a more
technical nature confronting the two delegations at Panmunjom. Human emotions
were involved in the fate of the men confined behind the barbed wire, while the
matter of airfield construction and rehabilitation appeared dull and prosaic in
comparison. Yet the struggle in the conference tent over Item 3 was every bit as
spirited as the dispute over the prisoners; for the delegates of both sides were
also military technicians. They understood only too well that the disposition of
the prisoners of war was a transient problem which would be shortlived no matter
which way it was finally decided. The keeping of the truce, on the other hand,
seemed likely to become a long-term affair that might plague the Korean scene
for years to come. Under these conditions it seemed essential to assure that
adequate safeguards and guarantees were written into the armistice agreement.
Narrowing the Issues
By mid-December the discussion on Item 3
had disclosed the main areas of disagreement. First and foremost among these was
the knotty question of airfields which had engendered the bulk of the arguments.
And close behind lay the matter of rotation, the
composition of the neutral nations observer teams, and the number of ports that
were to be permitted to handle rotation and replenishment of men and supplies.
These promised to be the most difficult to settle, since the positions taken by
the two sides were so far apart.
It was at this juncture that the UNC
delegation lost another of its capable spokesmen. General Hodes was given
another assignment just a few days after Admiral Burke had been transferred.
Able and tough, the two men had worked well together and proved themselves
competent to match the best that the enemy had to offer in the negotiations.
Instead of Hodes, General Ferenbaugh, who had been serving his apprenticeship
for several weeks, joined General Turner on 17 December as a full-fledged
delegate.1 It was a difficult task that faced the new Army
representative for he not only had to replace General Hodes but also had to
contend with the best man on the Communist team- the sometimes profane but
always efficient General Hsieh.
In the skirmishes that had taken place so
far the U.N. Command had adopted an adamant position against the construction or
rehabilitation of airfields and the Communists had refused to listen to any
argument imposing restrictions on their freedom to do as they pleased in this
matter. Several times during the debates in the latter half of December, Hsieh
had intimated that his side would be willing to forget its objections to
rotation and replenishment if the U.N. Command would reciprocate on the airfield
issue, but his hints fell upon barren ground.2
In an attempt to break the impasse, the
negotiators briefly turned the problem over to their staff officers for several
days to see if they could narrow the differences in a less formal atmosphere,
but this proved to be a futile hope.3 The arrival of the thirty-day
limit on the line of demarcation on 27 December was marked by no significant
change in the negotiations or on the battlefield. It appeared that the
forebodings that the line might become a permanent one until an armistice was
signed were well founded.
Toward the end of December the United
Nations Command offered a concession. If the Communists would accept the
restrictions on airfields, the UNC would forego aerial observation and
photoreconnaissance flights. The enemy reaction seemed to sustain the
oft-repeated complaints of Ridgway and Joy over the unwisdom of giving the
Communists an opportunity to get something for nothing. Hsieh accepted the
concession most willingly, but would not budge in his
stand on the airfields. Furthermore, he told Turner frankly: "you want to sit on
top of other people's heads, and when you come down from that position you say
that is a concession on your part."4
The implication that the U.N. Command had
simply receded from an unreasonable and untenable position rather than offered
something of value was plain. In Admiral Joy's opinion, the weakening of the UNC
position merely hardened the enemy's determination to secure further concession
on the airfield issue.5
The Communists were well advised on this
score, for during the latter part of December, there had been a steady
deterioration in the United Nations resolution to insist upon a strict
limitation of airfield construction and rehabilitation. This could be traced to
the growing reliance on the part of the United States upon a "broader sanction"
declaration to be issued as soon as an armistice was signed.6 As the
emphasis shifted from dependence upon control of local conditions in Korea to
the threat of a larger war if the armistice were violated, the airfield question
became less important, especially since it was recognized that it would be
difficult if not impossible to prevent the enemy from rehabilitating and
building airfields once the armistice went into effect.
To General Ridgway this trend was
disturbing. He failed to see how the U.N. Command could pose a deterrent threat
to a later outbreak of hostilities if the enemy were permitted to strengthen
its air capabilities at will while the UNC
air power remained static or decreased. He felt that the Communists sensed the
lack of a firm and final UNC position on airfields and that newspaper reports
from the United States intimating that the U.N. Command was considering further
concessions did not help the situation.7
Ridgway's brief for a hard and fast stand
was too late. On 10 January the U.S. military and political leaders informed him
that his final position would be the omission of any prohibition on airfield
construction or rehabilitation if the issue became the
sole obstacle to an armistice. But until the Communists showed that this would
be their breaking point, there should be no open concession. As a suggestion
they urged that the delegations settle all the other matters outstanding under
Items 3, 4, and 5 and defer further discussion of airfields until then. At that
time, the U.N. Command could drop the airfields requirements if the Communists
would sign the armistice. In this way, they argued, the concession could soon be
followed by the U.N. declaration including the "broader sanction" of an expanded
war. The issuance of the declaration should
counteract the propaganda value that the enemy might attempt to gain from the
UNC retreat on airfields.8
With considerable misgivings, Ridgway
agreed. He did not have the confidence that his superiors possessed in the
possible effectiveness of the U.N. declaration, but he proposed to shunt the
airfield question aside if the enemy would consent. Under the present
conditions, he was extremely dubious that the Communists would neglect to press
their, advantage. Anticipating further concessions, he believed that they would
refuse to take up new topics until the matter was settled.9
There were no immediate effects of the
Washington instructions in the tent at Panmunjom, for an opportune moment had to
be selected for the presentation of the UNC proposal. In the meantime, the
arguments between Turner and Ferenbaugh on the one hand and the wily Hsieh on
the other continued. The latter stood foursquare behind the slogan "no
interference in internal affairs" whenever the UNC delegates brought up
airfields. Hsieh's concern over the invasion of North Korea's sovereign rights
led Turner to question his sincerity. Since the North Korean air force was
depleted, whose sovereign rights was Hsieh interested in- North Korea's or
China's, Turner asked. The Chinese general ignored the question.10
On 9 January the Communist delegation
introduced a new version of Item 3 that was closer to the objectives that the
U.N. Command sought. But as a matter of tactics Turner attacked the weak points
and omissions in the enemy's proposal. He could not understand, he told Hsieh,
why the Communists were willing to allow the neutral nations observation teams
to inspect behind the lines- a clear case of internal interference in his
opinion- and yet balked at airfield restrictions. But Hsieh could see no
inconsistency in the two matters. The neutral nations were acceptable as a
measure to stave off foreign interference, he maintained.
There was no provision for restrictions
upon airfields in the Communist version, but it did permit replenishment of
military personnel, aircraft, weapons, and ammunition as long as there were no
increases. Since this had been the UNC contention from the beginning, Turner
quickly took a leaf from Hsieh's book and termed this provision no concession at
all, but merely recognition of the justness and reasonableness of the UNC stand.
Although Turner turned down the Communist offering because it ignored the
airfield issue, the area of dispute was growing smaller.11 The
enemy's withdrawal from a firm antireplenishment position served to compensate
for the UNC surrender of aerial inspection and photoreconnaissance and indicated
that there was still room to bargain on Item 3 as long as the discussion avoided
airfields.
In any event there was a gradual shift in
the UNC drive to secure modification of the enemy attitude during mid-January.
The UNC delegates directed their fire
at the Communist motives in insisting upon freedom to rebuild their airfields,
but the attempts to pin down General Hsieh were unsuccessful. He insisted that
an agreement not to introduce any reinforcing aircraft into Korea covered the
UNC objections yet refused to state categorically that the Communists would not
increase their military air capability during an armistice. This placed the
matter in the realm of good faith and since the U.N. Command was unwilling to
lean on so slim a reed, little progress was made.12
Hsieh was not content to remain on the
defensive, however, for he vigorously attacked the UNC concept that the balance
of military capabilities in Korea should be maintained after the armistice. It
was a familiar argument urging that the state of war should be eliminated
entirely and all foreign forces withdrawn from Korea; still, on the surface at
least, it sounded reasonable. The Chinese general asserted that it would be
impossible to retain the status quo during a truce since the U.N. Command was already
engaged in increasing its postarmistice strength by expanding the ROK
Army.13 Hsieh did not mention that the Communists were engaged in the
same task with the North Korean forces, but he had a point.
In late January, the U.N. Command decided
that the time was propitious to turn the problem of working out the details on
Item 3 over to the staff officers. This would permit
further discussion of airfields to be postponed as the Washington leaders had
suggested and allow the negotiation of some of the minor differences to be given
more attention. Hsieh agreed on 27 January that the subdelegation should recess
until the staff officers finished their efforts.14 If the latter could
eliminate all issues except the question of airfields, the U.N. Command would
then be in a better position to offer a final trade.
Settlement of Item 5
As the staff officers began their meetings,
General Ridgway and Admiral Joy determined to suggest simultaneous discussion of
Item 5 of the agenda. It will be remembered that this had been simply stated in
July as "Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both
sides." The was intentionally vague, since the United States had no desire to
commit itself in advance on political matters beyond the purview of the military
armistice.
In early December General Ridgway and his
staff had drawn up an initial position that hewed closely to the July formula.
Each side would recommend to the governments concerned a political conference to
discuss appropriate matters left unsolved by the armistice agreement. This was a
nice indefinite proposal that would bind no one.15
Two weeks later, the President and his
advisors decided that mention should be made of the
unification of Korea under an independent, democratic government, and they
instructed Ridgway to include this in his first approach to the Communists. If
the enemy insisted upon a reference to the withdrawal of foreign troops, they
authorized the Far East commander to put it in.16 They cautioned him
a few days later, however, not to make any commitment on the countries that
would participate in the political conference nor on the form or forum of the
discussions.17 These details would be left
open to settlement on a political level after the armistice was signed.
Ridgway initially did not question these
instructions, but by the end of January he had some second thoughts. Suppose the
Communists tried to insert the names of the countries that would take part in
the political talks, he asked his superiors, should he reject all names or
accept only the North Korean and Chinese Communist Governments? And since the
enemy probably would press for the inclusion of a ninety-day time limit for
calling a conference, the U.N. commander felt that he could make the U.N. proposal
more palatable to the Communists by anticipating this move."' The Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs had no objection to the latter suggestion, but they
were still reluctant to have names of countries mentioned in the agreement. If
it became necessary, on the other hand, they conceded that the recommendation to
take steps at a political level to deal with matters unresolved by the military
armistice might be addressed to the specific states concerned. The Soviet Union
would be addressed only as a member of the United Nations and not as an
individual government.19
Thus, on the eve of the reconvening of the
plenary conference in early February, the United States position on Item 5 was
extremely cautious. Since the outlook for an early and satisfactory solution of
the political situation in Korea did not appear to be encouraging, the American
political and military leaders preferred to go very slowly and to operate on an
opportunistic basis. Foreseeing a long and involved struggle with the Communists
over Korea's future, they favored a flexible approach with few or no advance
commitments. Under these conditions, if no final arrangement could be reached,
the chances for working out a modus vivendi would be improved.
The Communists had insisted that the
principles involved in Item 5 be taken up in a plenary session, and on 6
February the full delegation met once again. Joy presented two new members of
the UNC group, Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., and Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung,
to General Nam. Harrison replaced General Ferenbaugh and Yu took the place of
Gen. Lee Hyung Koon.20
As soon as the amenities were disposed of,
Nam introduced the Communist solution to Item 5. He proposed that within three
months after the armistice was signed, each side should appoint five
representatives to hold a political conference. As for the topics to be
discussed, Nam listed three: 1. withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea;
2. specific recommendations for a
peaceful settlement of the Korean question; and 3. other problems related to
peace in Korea.21
After a three-day recess the U.N. Command
made its counterproposal. Since Ridgway felt that the differences between the
two sides were not large, he recommended that the UNC version adopt as much of
the Communist wording as possible and the JCS agreed. Nevertheless, reference to
five representatives was eliminated and the withdrawal of "foreign troops"
became "non-Korean troops." Under the third topic the Communists had listed for
discussion, the U.N. Command had changed the wording so that it now read, "Other
Korean questions related to peace." The Republic of Korea was named along with
the United Nations as an addressee for the recommendation of the military
commanders and the portion pertaining to the political conference was made more
vague.22
Most of these changes were minor but the
Communists preferred their own proposal and a week's debate ensued. The U.N.
Command made it clear that it did not intend to recommend that the political
authorities discuss any matter not directly related to Korea since this lay
outside the UNC province. When the Communists complained that the U.N. Command
did not represent all the United Nations and that use of this term would be
incorrect, Joy countered that the Chinese Volunteers did not represent the
People's Republic of China either. He told Nam that the UNC was willing to drop
all references to specific governments in the recommendations if the enemy so
desired.23
Finally on 16 February, the
Communists brought forth a revised proposal:
In order to insure the peaceful settlement
of the Korean question, the military commanders of both sides hereby recommend
to the government of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three
(3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a
political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives
appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the
Korean question, etc.
With the understanding that "foreign" meant
non-Korean forces and that "etc." did not pertain to matters outside of Korea,
the U.N. Command accepted the Communist version in toto on 17
February.24
As Joy informed General Ridgway,
the Communist statement afforded the wide latitude
desired by the joint Chiefs of Staff and could be interpreted in almost any
fashion since at best it was only a recommendation.25
It had only taken eleven days to reach an
agreement on Item 5- by far the best record of all. Even the agenda had taken
longer. Perhaps because of its very vagueness, both sides could easily accept
such a noncommittal statement since in essence it settled nothing and promised
little. If it later became inconvenient or unnecessary, it could be ignored. On
the other hand, if both sides found it worth pursuing, a conference could be
called. Regardless of the meaninglessness of Item 5, three items were now out of
the way. But the discussion on Items 3 and 4 showed no signs of a imminent
meeting of the minds and they were the most important of all.
The Horse Traders
Since the perplexing problem of airfields
had been temporarily shelved, the staff officers on Item 3 were able to
concentrate on the less troublesome details in late January. Cols. Don O. Darrow
and Kinney of the Air Force and Lt. Col. Howard S. Levie of the Army had to cope
with Colonel Chang of the North Korean Army and Col. Pu Shan of the Chinese
Communist forces- all in all a very competent group of officers.
To get these informal talks under way, the
UNC delegation had prepared a draft armistice covering all the topics to be
considered under Item 3. Actually there were four main areas that the UNC
staff officers hoped to settle: rotation;
the number of ports to handle rotation and replenishment; the composition of the
neutral nations' supervisory organ and inspection teams; and the control of
coastal islands still in dispute. The draft armistice submitted by the U.N.
Command provided a convenient point of departure for the staff conferences.
There was a refreshing atmosphere in the
truce tent during the first meetings that followed. On the Communist side there
was less haranguing and speechmaking; their staff officers had an air of serious
intent to make progress. They were inclined to accept as much of the UNC wording
as possible and their suggested changes were frequently regarded as improvements
by the U.N. Command.26
Nevertheless, the Communists were not ready
to surrender, despite their more businesslike approach. They opened the
discussion of rotation by expressing great astonishment at the "enormous" figure
of 75,000 per month
proposed by the U.N. Command. It may be remembered that earlier they had offered
to permit a monthly rotation of 5,000 and the U.N. Command had declared this would be totally
insufficient. In the bargaining that followed, rotation and the number of ports
that would be permitted to handle the flow of personnel and equipment were
closely linked together. The Communist staff officers were disposed to place the
UNC suggestion that twelve ports be used in North Korea and ten in South Korea
in the same category as the 75,000 rotation figure.27
Gradually the differences between the two
sides shrank. The enemy offered 25,000 for rotation and the U.N. Command lowered its figure to
40,000, provided that the
Communists accepted eight ports of entry on each side. In a counterproposal,
Colonel Chang put forward a total of 25,000,
excluding personnel leaving or entering on rest and
rehabilitation passes and those on temporary duty, but he insisted on limiting
the number of ports to three for each side.28
At this point General Ridgway and his staff
wanted to take a final position, holding fast to the 40,000 figure and reducing the number
of ports to six. They believed that the enemy would give in if confronted with a
firm offer. In Washington, however, the Department of Defense and State did not
wish the negotiations to break down over such relatively minor issues, but they
agreed to a stand at 40,000 and six ports per side provided there were no implied
ultimatum.29
By mid-February the UNC requirements had
decreased to seven ports and 40,000 men, while the enemy had expanded its proposals
to four ports and 30,000 men. The dickering
went on for another week and then the U.N. Command went down to 35,000 men and six
ports and the Communists came up to 35,000 men and five ports per side.30
With only one port separating the two sides
from agreement, General Ridgway gave Joy permission on 7 March to settle for
five ports if and when he felt that it would encourage settlement of other
problems. Ridgway was worried at that time about the growing indication that the
Communists intended to use the neutral nation's inspection teams to examine
classified equipment closely for the collection of technical intelligence. He
felt that the wording of the armistice agreement must insure that this would not
happen.31
This was a rather odd turnabout, since
traditionally the Communists had opposed inspection and argued that good faith
was enough. As Colonel Kinney pointed out to Chang in the staff officer
meetings, the Communists had originally tried to apply restrictions on all
activities of the inspection teams, but now were insisting upon the full rights
of the teams to examine all equipment carefully.32 The aftermath to
this switch on inspection laid the Communists' sincerity on the subject open to
question, however, for when Kinney offered to settle for five ports if the enemy
would give up detailed inspection, Chang quickly accepted on 15 March.33 Regardless of
whether the Communists were using inspection solely
for bargaining purposes or not, the matter of rotation and ports of entry were
now agreed upon at 35,000 men per month and five ports of entry per
side.34
Insofar as the question of coastal islands
was concerned, the Communists proved to be particularly amenable. On 3 February
they agreed to let the U.N. Command retain control over the five island groups
under dispute on the west coast of Korea.35 The U.N. Command had
expected a fight on this provision of the draft armistice, but the enemy had
surprisingly decided not to contest it.36
There was some discussion on the topic of
coastal waters which the U.N. Command had defined as comprising a distance of
three miles from shore at mean low tide. The Communists were reluctant to go
into the subject, since they felt that it did not matter what the distance might
be, provided each side ceased naval blockade and patrol in its opponent's
waters. When the UNC officers pressed for a 3-mile limit to prevent
unintentional violations, the Communists came out in support of a 12-mile zone.
This slowed the UNC eagerness to have a precise figure written into the
armistice, for the United States preferred not to set a precedent by accepting a
12-mile definition of coastal waters in Korea. The upshot was that both sides took
the matter under further consideration.37
Three of the four issues that the staff
officers wished to settle had proved open to negotiation and bargaining, but the
fourth- the composition of the neutral nations supervisory organ and inspection
teams- soon developed into a bottleneck second only to the airfields dispute. It
may be recalled that the original Communist suggestion that neutral nations
serve on the supervisory organ had been general and vague. As General Lee had
defined "neutral nation," the term meant a nation that had not participated in
the fighting in Korea. He had indicated that Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Switzerland, and Sweden would qualify under this description.38
When Ridgway had asked for guidance, his
superiors responded quickly that as UNC choices, Sweden, Switzerland, and Norway
would be acceptable if they would consent to serve. As for the possible
Communist selections, there was no real difference among the satellites and any
three would be agreed to. Under no circumstances, however, would the USSR be
considered acceptable as a neutral nation, they warned.39 Here was
the crux of the matter, for despite the fact that the Soviet Union had not
formally intervened in the Korean War, the United States did not doubt that she
was delivering both moral and physical sustenance to
the Chinese and North Korean Communists. By no stretch of the imagination could
the Russians be considered neutral in the estimation of the American military
and political leaders, and they showed an early and fixed determination to deny
them a neutral status. The trump card in the U.S. hand was the agreement with
the Communists that the neutral nations must be acceptable to both sides. The
power of the veto- long a favorite Russian weapon- might now be turned against
the USSR.
Diplomatic approaches to Sweden,
Switzerland, and Norway during December drew affirmative responses and Ridgway
was authorized to nominate them as the UNC selections at an appropriate
moment.40 The opportunity did not arise until 1 February when the U.N. Command
submitted its choices in the staff officer meeting, but the Communists were in
no hurry. Despite frequent reminders and proddings, it was not until the 16th
that they named Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. The U.N. Command
immediately accepted the first two and rejected the Soviet Union.41
Since Ridgway's superiors hoped that the
Communists would not insist upon the inclusion of the USSR, they preferred to
de-emphasize Russian participation in the war as the reason for the UNC
rejection. Unless the enemy persisted, they favored giving no reason at all. If
the enemy pressed for an explanation, the U.N. Command could fall back upon
the proximity of the Soviet Union and its record of past participation in Korea
as disqualifying factors.42
Ridgway and Joy agreed with the appraisal
so far as it went, but warned that the staff officers suspected that the enemy
might be trying to lay the groundwork for a trade of concessions on rotation and
ports in return for acceptance of the Soviet Union. If this were true, then the
U.N. Command would be better off telling the Communists unequivocally that the
USSR would never be acceptable before the enemy involved its
prestige.43 Not prepared to take this step until other possibilities
had been exhausted, the Washington leaders told Ridgway that the U.N. Command
might offer to drop Norway if the Communists would reciprocate on the Soviet
Union.44
On 25 February the UNC staff officers
followed through on these instructions, but Colonel Chang and his assistants
refused to bargain. Their continued insistence upon the USSR convinced Ridgway
that the U.N. Command must make a final stand on the issue. The JCS consulted
with their colleagues at the Defense and State Department level and received
Presidential approval to inform Ridgway that the United States was willing to
have the UNC refusal to accept the USSR made "firm and irrevocable." Ridgway
might proffer an alternative solution of the problem concomitantly with the
rejection, if he thought agreement could be gained.
They suggested that both sides select nations, regardless of their status in the
Korean War, to man the supervisory organ and inspection teams. This would
include the United States for the UNC side and the Communists could appoint the
Soviet Union if they wished.46 Since this would divorce the Russians
from a neutral designation, there was no objection to the Russians serving on
frankly partisan organs.
When the Communists showed no interest in
forming nonneutral groups to conduct supervision and inspection, the staff
officers were forced to put the matter aside. Their earnest efforts had resulted
in the solution of the rotation, port, and coastal island controversies, as well
as the settlement of a number of lesser details on Item 3. By mid-March only
differences over airfields and the Soviet Union remained outstanding.
As the negotiations ground to a standstill
in both Item 3 and Item 4, Admiral Joy and staff took stock of the over-all
truce situation and concluded that there were two promising methods of obtaining
a satisfactory armistice from the enemy. The more drastic solution entailed the
presentation of a complete armistice document incorporating some concessions to
the enemy along with an ultimatum. Either the Communists would have to accept
within a stated time limit or the negotiations would be terminated and
hostilities resumed. Such a course would require a high-level decision and
willingness to open up on the battlefield if the ultimatum were turned down, but
Joy believed that it offered the best hope for a quick and favorable
settlement.
The second choice would be the submission
of a complete armistice document without the open ultimatum. The enemy delegates
would be informed that this was the final UNC effort and only minor changes in
wording would be considered. The plenary sessions would recess and the United
Nations Command would decline to enter into further substantive discussions.
Although there would be no breaking off of the negotiations, since the liaison
officers would be available for consultation, the UNC position would not be altered nor any further concessions
made.46
In brief, Joy and his associates advocated
the threat of force or the combined use of the recess and an inflexible front on
the major issues to produce an armistice. As Ridgway pointed out, both of the
suggested courses were ultimatums; the chief difference was that the alternative
course had no time limit. Either one would bring censure to the U.N. Command if
the negotiations were
165broken off and
this would be contrary to the JCS instructions. Despite the advantages in the
Joy suggestions, Ridgway did not think that the time was ripe for the open or
the implied ultimatum as yet.47
This was Ridgway vis-a-vis the UNC
delegation, acting as a moderating influence and tempering the bolder and
riskier proposals emanating from Panmunjom. On the other side of the coin was
Ridgway, the theater commander, versus the Washington policy makers. Here was
the more aggressive leader urging the adoption of a determined plan of action
that would make the enemy realize that the U.N. Command would grant no more
concessions. Just one day after he told Joy that he should continue the "present
course of action" in the truce negotiations, he sent off a frank appraisal of
the situation to the JCS.
Neither he nor his staff knew whether the
Communists wanted an armistice or not, he told the joint Chiefs on 11 March, or
how they really felt on the current issues. On the other hand, it was clear that
the enemy attitude was becoming more arrogant and obdurate and that the position
of the UNC delegates was deteriorating daily. To arrest this trend, the U.N.
Command either had to take a public, hard and fast stand backed by official
support from Washington and as many of the U.N. participants in Korea as
possible or apply the one influence that the Communists evidently
respected-force. Since the latter seemed to be out of the question, he strongly
pressed for an open and flat rejection of the Soviet
Union's membership on the neutral nations supervisory commission as a first step
in attaining a final position.48
Army staff members in Washington supported
the U.N. commander's argument for stiffening the Panmunjom front. However, G-3
questioned the advisability of approaching the issues on a piecemeal basis. Maj.
Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, the Deputy G-3, told the Chief of Staff that the impact
would be far greater if the major unsolved problems were presented in a single
package. Then if the Communists would not accept and the negotiations ended, the
U.N. Command would be in a stronger position for having made an effort to break
the deadlock. Secretary of State Acheson favored the idea of an over-all
proposal, Eddleman added.49 So, too, did General Collins, his fellow joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. But before a
single package could be fashioned, they wanted the issues reduced to an absolute
minimum. Then, when an impasse developed at the subdelegation level and Ridgway
was prepared to segregate and reclassify the nonrepatriate prisoners, the U.N.
commander would have the plenary conference assemble. Joy would deliver a letter
from Ridgway to Kim and Peng urging a personal meeting of the commanders. If the
Communists agreed, Ridgway would present the package on an all-ornothing basis.
The U.N. Command would concede on airfields and the Communists would be expected to give in
on forcible repatriation and the Soviet Union. Although there would be no
substantive debate, the Washington proposal went on, the liaison officers would
remain available and the UNC delegates would be willing to meet to explain their
proposal.50
Ridgway must have been taken aback by the
new proposal. He had just turned down a similar method of approach by Joy and
then within a week to receive from his superiors a counterpart which he liked
even less must have astonished him. In any event he recovered quickly and
protested vigorously. A meeting of the field commanders would imply authority
which he did not believe existed on the Communist side and would cause untold
administrative delays. Moreover, the U.N. Command would be asking the enemy to
concede on two issues while it yielded on a single one. As for the segregation
and reclassification of POW's, he opposed any such action since it might
jeopardize the lives of the prisoners in Communist hands. The Soviet Union he
was extremely reluctant to accept on any terms, even on a frankly partisan
commission. If a package were to be offered to the enemy, the U.N. Command
should be given authority to indicate that refusal would mean termination of the
negotiations in the UNC eyes. His own recommendations, he concluded, had not
changed. First eliminate the Soviet Union controversy- then a package deal could
be presented.51
The U.S. political and military leaders
were willing to meet some of the objections Ridgway raised. If he did not want
to confer with the Communist commanders, a plenary
session of the delegates would serve. They had believed that Ridgway's presence
would help underline the seriousness of the final proposal and the importance
that the U.N. Command attached to it. Although they had seen no indication of an
early solution to the USSR issue, they would be happy to have this solved before
the package was offered. The essential factor here, they reminded Ridgway, was
not Russian participation on the supervisory commission, but designation of the
Soviet Union as a neutral nation. A compromise that avoided the latter would be
perfectly acceptable.
With this out of the way, the Washington
leaders got down to some cold facts. They did not want an ultimatum delivered
openly or implied with the package proposal. Since the United States and its
allies had little inclination to undertake increased military action to back an
ultimatum, it could only be an empty gesture. If there were to be a break over
the package offer, the blame must still fall upon the enemy.52
This was a frank admission by the JCS that
neither the United States nor its fellow nations in Korea wanted a resumption of
full-scale hostilities and had no intention of posing an idle threat that the
Communists might challenge. Few actions could do more danger to the UNC cause
politically than a bluff that the enemy called. After this message, talk of
ultimatums dwindled. Ridgway continued to oppose the USSR's participation in any
capacity, but, from this time on, he tended to support the concept of a package proposal as the best hope
for an armistice.53
By the first of April, the staff officers
had been in conference for over nine weeks. Despite the real progress they had
made on the lesser problems and on many details of Item 3, the question of
airfields and the Soviet Union still remained unsolved. So, on 3 April, the
subdelegation reconvened, with General Harrison replacing Ferenbaugh as the Army
member. The U.N. Command accepted Hsieh's suggestion that the agreements reached
by the staff officers be confirmed, but this was the last accord. The arguments
took up where they had left off and the meetings became shorter and shorter. At
the 14 April session, a
record time of fifteen seconds elapsed between the opening and closing of the
meeting.54 With both sides refusing to budge an inch, the staff took
over again on 20 April. In
the meantime the discussions on prisoners of war had reached a new climax.
Screening the POW's
During February the staff officers had met
twenty-two times to discuss Item 4. Despite their earnest efforts, the chief
bone of contention- forced repatriation- still remained. Some of the details
were cleared up, but the Communists were reluctant to settle subsidiary matters
until the controlling principle was determined. In the face of the unwillingness
of both sides to retreat further until all
possibilities had been tried and exhausted, agreement was no nearer at the end
of February than it had been a month earlier.
The subdelegations reconvened for a series
of meetings during the first half of March with a similar lack of success.
Admiral Libby pressed for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, for the
delivery of POW packages, and for formation of joint Red Cross teams to visit
the camps, but Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho would not consider a piecemeal approach to
a settlement.55
Instead, Lee attacked the U.S. stand on "no
forced repatriation," which he characterized as a verbal trick rather than a
concession by the U.N. Command. He again charged that the United Nations Command
intended to hand over the Chinese prisoners to the enemy of the Chinese
people-Chiang Kai-shek. And in between his jousts with Libby on the main topic,
Lee found the subject of the recent riots of prisoners on Koje-do rewarding. The
outbreak of violence on 18 February at the UNC prisoner camps made good propaganda for the
Communist delegate.56
In fact Lee became so enthusiastic in his
work that Libby had to ask him not to scream at him. He was not deaf, the
Admiral declared, and, besides, he did not understand Korean and much of the
effect of the emotional delivery was lost in the translation.57
After two fruitless weeks of debate, the staff officers took up the task again.
The shifting of problems back and forth between the subdelegation and staff
officers during the January to April period was reminiscent of a caf? that had
two orchestras so that there would be no interruption to the dancing. In this
case, however, both combinations featured the same kind of music- discordant and
cacophonous- making it impossible to dance.
In an effort to introduce a new note to the
proceedings, General Ridgway decided to explore another line at the staff
officer level in mid-March. It will be recalled that he had been given
permission to remove prisoners who might forcibly resist repatriation because of
their fear of the consequences from POW status. With this object in mind Ridgway
now wanted to find out whether revised lists eliminating all in this category by
overt screening might be acceptable to the Communists. The nonrepatriates could
then be called special refugees or some such name and all the other prisoners
would be exchanged. To screen the prisoners unilaterally and covertly, Ridgway
and his staff felt, might gravely imperil the safe return or even the lives of
the UNC prisoners in enemy custody, but the Communists might consent to an overt
screening.58
His superiors were a little dubious, since
they feared that the enemy might try to revise the lists of UNC prisoners
downward if Ridgway attempted openly to prune the Communist
rosters.59 On the contrary, Ridgway rebutted, the enemy would never
accept a fait accompli brought about by secret and unilateral
action. Only by allaying Communist suspicion of UNC
double-dealing could the United Nations Command protect itself against
retaliatory measures. He and his staff thought that the enemy might agree to a
trial screening.60
In the staff officer meetings there were
increasing signs that the Communists were shifting their ground. They hinted on
22 March that there might
be cases among the prisoners that could be given special consideration before
the present lists were checked. And they also intimated that the initiation of
closed, executive sessions might promote freer conversation. The UNC officers
quickly followed up by proposing executive meetings until one side or the other
desired to revert to the open conference again and the Communists agreed.61
This marked a definite turn for the better,
but the enemy soon demonstrated that they would give "special consideration"
only to the prisoners who had been former residents of the Republic of Korea. In
no case would North Koreans or Chinese be placed in special categories, they
insisted. Their hatred of Chiang and fear that the Chinese would be sent to
Taiwan if they were not repatriated came through again and again during the
staff sessions in late March.62
One of the major weaknesses of the UNC
proposals on revising the POW lists was the fact that the UNC staff had
no idea as to just how many prisoners would
refuse repatriation. Based on guesswork, General Hickey, UNC chief of staff,
estimated that of the 132,000 military prisoners, about 28,000
would prefer not to go home, but probably only 16,000
would resist repatriation. And of the 37,000
civilian internees, 30,000
would elect not to return and 2,000 would put up a fight to prevent
going back. He thought that over half of the 20,000
Chinese prisoners would use every means at their
disposal to present a solid block of opposition since they were well organized,
disciplined, and controlled by strong leaders with Nationalist
sympathies.63
Early in April, Colonel Hickman, UNC staff
officer, told his counterpart, Colonel Tsai, that the U.N. Command was reluctant
to take a poll to form a rough estimate of the number of military repatriates,
but about 116,000 might be involved in an exchange.64 The figure of
116,000 tallied with the estimate of General Hickey which was admittedly a
guess, but it evidently intrigued the Communists. It also may have been a
tactical error on the part of the U.N. Command, for it misled the enemy into
thinking that they would recover approximately that number of prisoners. At any
rate, Colonel Tsai suggested on 2 April that both sides immediately check their lists and defer the
debate on principles until this was completed. The Communists showed a desire to
get a round figure of those who would forcibly resist
repatriation in the obvious hope that the number would be no more than around
16,000. Two days later Hickman agreed and asked if the Communists would issue an
amnesty statement before the screening to reassure the prisoners that they would
not be punished when they returned. Although the enemy officers protested that
such a statement would be unnecessary since the Communists desired nothing more
than to return the prisoners to a peaceful life, they lost little time in
providing the U.N. Command with a florid amnesty declaration on 6 April. This
statement was given wide publicity throughout all the prisoner camps before the
screening to encourage as many prisoners as possible to go home.65
The insistence of the Communists upon a
round figure implied their tacit assent to the screening process and removed
most of the previous objections to revising the prisoner lists. After Ridgway
had conferred with Joy at Munsan-ni, he submitted his plan to carry out the
interviewing and segregating of the POW's. The screening and separation of
repatriates from nonrepatriates would be a one-shot operation, he told the JCS,
and no one would be allowed to change his mind once he had made his choice. The
Communists would expect to receive whatever number was announced by the U.N.
Command, he went on, so no downward revisions could be made after the enemy was
informed. In his opinion, screening was inevitable sooner or later and the
quicker it was done the better. He frankly admitted that an explosive
situation existed in the POW camps
and the U.N. Command did not have the capability on hand to break up the camps
into small dispersed units to reduce the danger.
Once the screening was finished, Ridgway
intended to give the totals to the enemy, reclassifying the nonrepatriates and
ROK residents who did not want to go to North Korea into a status other than
POW. If the Communists accepted these figures, he would follow up by an effort
to trade airfield restrictions for the dropping of USSR, thus completing the
armistice. If the enemy did not accept the figures, Ridgway would present a
package proposal with the same objectives on which the U.N. Command would stand
firm.66
Permission was received on 3 April to start
the screening at once and two days later Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to initiate
Plan SCATTER.67 This plan was openly designed to make the maximum number of POW's
available for repatriation. All were cautioned beforehand not to discuss the
choice they had made with other prisoners prior to the interview lest they be
subjected to violence and injury to force a change of mind. The final nature of
the decision was strongly stressed to make each man think it over carefully. As
each prisoner approached the interview area, he carried his clothing and
equipment with him, so that there would be no need to return to his former
enclosure if he chose not to return. In the interview that followed the unarmed
interrogating officer or clerk related the
disadvantages of refusal and the uncertainties that would face the
nonrepatriates. He also warned the prisoner of the fate that might befall his
family if he did not return. Then the prisoner was told again of the Communist
amnesty that had been offered and asked a series of seven questions:
1. Will you voluntarily be
repatriated to North Korea (China)? 2. Would you forcibly resist repatriation? 3. Have you carefully
considered the impact of such action on your family? 4. Do you realize that you
may remain here at Koje-do long after those electing repatriation have been
returned home? 5. Do you realize that the UNC cannot promise that you will be
sent to any certain place? 6. Are you still determined that you would violently
resist repatriation? 7. What would you do if you were repatriated in spite of
this decision? If at any point the POW indicated that he would accept
repatriation, the questions ceased. On the other hand, if he mentioned suicide,
fight to the death, escape, etc., the POW was segregated and put in a new
compound.68
On 8 April Van Fleet began the screening.
For the most part it proceeded smoothly and the separation of the nonrepatriates
from those who wanted to return was accomplished without serious incident. But
there were seven compounds containing over 37,000 determined North Korean
Communists who would not permit the UNC teams to screen them. In one of these
compounds, an altercation between the prisoners and ROK guards erupted into
stone throwing and then to the use of machine gun fire. Before the fighting could be stopped,
there were seven dead and sixtyfive other casualties.69
Despite the opposition of the ardent
Communist elements, the results of the first three days of screening were
amazing even to the U.N. Command. With approximately half of the 132,000 interviews completed, over
40,000 prisoners had
declared that they would forcibly resist repatriation.70 It was a
surprising demonstration of the strength of feeling among the POW's that must
have been heartening to the psychological warfare experts, but it immediately
cast a pall over the prospects for an armistice. Even were all the unscreened
prisoners to return, the total would bear little resemblance to the 116,000 the Communists anticipated.
In the days that
followed the U.N. Command made no attempt to screen the seven recalcitrant
compounds and automatically put the prisoners in these enclosures among the
repatriates. The remainder of the POW's and civilian internees were sent through
the interviews, and by 15 April Ridgway was able to provide the JCS with the "round" figure
the Communists desired. Of the over 170,000
military and civilian prisoners in UNC hands, only
about 70,000 would return
to the Communists without the use of force, he told the joint Chiefs. Since he
realized that the enemy was not going to be happy about these figures, Ridgway proposed to permit
either an international neutral body or joint Red Cross teams to rescreen all of
the nonrepatriates if the Communists so desired. If they turned this suggestion
down, then the UNC delegation would move back into plenary sessions and would
present the package proposal.71 Although the 70,000 figure was by no means final,
the JCS agreed that the U.N. Command should convey it to the enemy right away
rather than risk a leak to the press. At the meeting of the staff officers on
19 April Colonel Hickman
calmly informed Tsai that 7,200 civilian internees, 3,800 ROK prisoners, 53,900 North Koreans, and 5,100 Chinese- a total of 70,000 men- would be available for repatriation. The effect was dramatic!
For once Tsai was speechless, overcome with emotion. When he finally recovered
himself enough to talk, he quickly requested a recess ostensibly to study the
figures.72 The evident shock to Tsai intimated that the Communists
were completely unprepared for such a low estimate and the immediate recess was
probably necessary not only for him to regain his composure but also to get new
instructions from his superiors.
The tenor of these instructions was crystal
clear the following day. The Communists felt that they had been deliberately
deceived by the UNC's earlier estimate of 116,000
and Tsai mounted a full-scale assault upon the
70,000 figure. It was
"completely impossible for us to consider," he cried, and "you flagrantly
repudiated what you said before." In a counterblast,
Hickman charged that the U.N. Command had felt the same sort of dismay when they
had been given the 11,559-prisoner figure by the Communists in December. The UNC
had conducted the screening in the fairest way possible and the percentage of
prisoners that the Communists would get back was far greater than the 20 percent
that the 12,000 UNC prisoners represented.73
Through the wrangling that ensued during
the next few days, one fact stood out. The Communists had been stung once by the
screening procedure and they would have nothing more to do with it. They
repulsed the offers to permit rescreening by neutral or Red Cross teams
summarily and insisted that the U.N. Command come up with a more favorable
figure.74 The screening process which momentarily seemed to be a way
to break the deadlock had merely resulted in increasing it. In justice to the
U.N. Command, they had acted in good faith. Regrettably they had given the enemy
a rough initial estimate based on what turned out to be incomplete and
inaccurate information. During the interviews the UNC teams had sought to
discourage the nonrepatriates as much as possible and encourage the POW's to go
home. On the other side, it is not difficult to understand the attitude of the
Communists and their feeling that they had been duped
and led into a propaganda trap. Their natural suspicion of the motives of the
U.N. Command needed little impetus to assume the worst.
The Package Is Delivered
The violent Communist opposition to the
results of the UNC screening delimited the course of events at Panmunjom. If the
POW issue could have been settled, Ridgway could probably have exchanged the
airfield rehabilitation concession for the exclusion of Soviet Union and
completed the armistice. Rejection of the no forced repatriation concept meant
that a package proposal would have to include three issues and that one side
would have to give way on two points. This complicated the matter since it
introduced a sense of imbalance allowing an apparent advantage to the side that
secured the two concessions. Under the circumstances it might well have been
better to have had a fourth issue, real or manufactured, which the U.N. Command
could have used to sweeten the pill that they now wanted the enemy to swallow.
While the enemy was launching its
broadsides at the screening procedure, Ridgway made his final arrangements for
presenting the package deal. He planned to support the UNC offer with a strong
statement that might convince the Communists that this was the final position
for the United Nations Command. Either the enemy must accept the whole package
without debate or the responsibility for continued hostilities would rest on its
shoulders. To bolster his stand, Ridgway asked that public statements along this
line be made by the U.S. Government and other U.N.
participants.75
Ridgway's superiors, however, were not
willing to go quite so far. As long as the truce meetings remained in executive
session, public statements were not possible, they pointed out. In the second
place, they did not want Ridgway or the U.S. Government to make statements that
could be interpreted as ultimatums. Uncompromising declarations might decrease
the probability of Communist acceptance of the package and raise domestic and
international expectations of quick military action if the enemy did not accept
the proposal. In any case they moderated Ridgway's approach to eliminate the
implication of an ultimatum.76 At the same time, the JCS and its
staff worked diligently with the political advisors to fashion a statement that
President Truman could release to support the UNC
position.77
Judging from the actions of the Communists
at the staff officer level, the executive meetings were about to end. On 24
April Colonel Tsai threatened to return to open meetings and the following day
he carried out the threat. The Communists immediately issued a long resume of
the April developments and the U.N. Command countered with a release setting
forth its own version. As the debate moved out into the open again, Colonel
Hickman requested a recess so that the UNC could make the last-minute
arrangements for the formal delivery of its
offer.78
General Ridgway and Admiral Joy were not
concerned at this point whether the sessions were secret or open. In their
opinion there was little need for secrecy since the separate elements of the
package deal had been fully publicized in the press.79 But the
military and political leaders in Washington disagreed. The open sessions
generated more heat than light, they maintained, and they therefore preferred an
executive meeting of the plenary conference. Then if the Communists disregarded
the understanding to gain the propaganda initiative or if they turned down the
suggestion for the executive meetings, the onus for failure to reach agreement
in the negotiations would fall upon the enemy.80
Through the liaison officers the plenary
conference was set up for April 28. When the delegates met, Admiral Joy
requested an executive session and after a recess, the Communists
agreed.81 Joy then went over the outstanding issues carefully and set
forth the UNC solution which had been incorporated into a complete draft of the
armistice. All mention of the rehabilitation of airfields, had been deleted and
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission was to be formed of Switzerland,
Sweden, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The paragraph referring to the disposition
of POW's read as follows:
All prisoners of war held in the custody of
each side at the time this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The
release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected in
conformity with lists which have been exchanged and have been checked by the
respective sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.82
In effect this meant that the U.N. Command
would swap the 70,000 repatriates that it held for the 12,000
in enemy custody, since it intended to reclassify the
nonrepatriates into a status other than POW in the meantime.
The package proposal created as much stir
as a pebble dropped into the ocean. Nam simply stated that "our side fails to
see how your proposal of this morning can really be of help to the overall
settlement of the remaining issues" and then called for an indefinite
recess.83 Under the circumstances the Communists reaction was not
surprising. The UNC offer had revealed nothing that the enemy had not
anticipated as a result of discussions in the U.S. and U.N. press before the
presentation. If it accomplished anything, it did
reduce the number of issues to one- the number of POW's who would be
repatriated. The other two soon canceled each other out, but as long as there
remained such a wide discrepancy between the 70,000
figure that the U.N. Command had offered and the
116,000 the Communists
expected, hopes for an early armistice would be small.
Yet despite the indifferent reception that
the enemy had given the package proposal, this was a key moment in the
negotiations. The UNC had officially fallen back upon its "final and
irrevocable" position and the period of debate was over. There had been no
ultimatum or threat of increased activity at the front, but the U.N. Command had
passed the crossroads and embarked upon a firm course. Patience and firmness-
the old standbys- were to be the chief weapons in the battles that lay ahead
rather than force. In the meantime the battle at the front would go on as it had
all winter, essentially a defensive war on both sides. Fought within carefully
defined boundaries and under tacit rules, the war of the active defense
nonetheless continued and took its daily toll of casualties.
Notes
1 Ferenbaugh had served with
the Operations Division of the General Staff and as an assistant division
commander of the 83d Division in World War II. In January 1951 he had taken over
as commander of the 7th Division in Korea. Ferenbaugh's experience with
political affairs during his tenure on the General Staff provided him with a
good background for handling the negotiations.
2 Transcripts of Proceedings, Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 19-20
Dec 51, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol.
II.
3 Ibid., Seventeenth and Eighteenth Sessions, 20
and 22 Dec 51.
4 Ibid., Twenty-fifth
and Twenty-ninth Sessions, 29 Dec 51 and
2 Jan 52.
5 Joy, How Communists Negotiate, pp. 123-24.
6 See Chapter VI, above.
7 Msg, C 60961 Ridgway to DA, 7 Jan 52, DA-IN
17600.
8 Msgs, JCS 91600, and JCS
91606 to CINCFE, 10 Jan 52.
9 Msg, C 61348, Ridgway to JCS, 13 Jan 52, DA-IN
19740.
10 Transcript of Proceedings, Thirty-fifth Session,
Subdelegation Mtg on item 5, 8 Jan 52, in FEC Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 8
Jan-19 Apr 52, Vol. III
(hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. III).
11 Ibid., Thirty-sixth Session, 9 Jan 52.
12 Ibid., Thirty-seventh through Forty-fifth Sessions, 10 Jan-18 Jan 52.
During the 18 January meeting, Hsieh became quite profane again, but the U.N.C
delegates had come to realize that his bark was worse than his bite and paid
little heed.
13 Ibid., Forty-sixth and Fifty-first Sessions, 14 Jan and 24 Jan 52
14 (1) Msg,
C 62064, Ridgway to Collins, 23 Jan 52, DA-IN 3851. (2) Transcripts of
Proceedings, Fifty-second and Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation Mtgs on item
3, 25 and 27 Jan 52, in FEC Transcripts, item 3, vol. III.
15 Msg, CINCUNC
to CINCUNC (Adv), 5 Dec 51, DA-IN 8008.
16 Msg, JCS 90083, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec 51.
17 Msg, JCS 90388, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51.
18 Msg, CX 62465, Ridgway to
JCS, 30 Jan 52, DA-IN 6207.
19 Msg, JCS
900075, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Feb 52.
20 General Harrison was the
deputy commander of the Eighth Army. He had served in the Operations Division of
the General Staff and as assistant division commander of the 30th Division
during World War II and on the staff of the Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, in
the postwar period. General Yu was Vice Chief of Staff of the ROK Army.
21 Transcript of
Proceedings, Thirty-sixth Session, Mtgs on the Mil Armistice Conf, 6 Feb 52, in
FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. III.
22 Ibid.,
Thirty-seventh Session, 9 Feb 52.
23 Ibid., Thirty-eighth through Fortieth Session, 9-12 Feb
52.
24 Ibid., Forty-first and Forty-second Sessions, 16-17 Feb 52.
25 Msg, HNC 924,
Joy to CINCUNC, 16 Feb 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 52, an. 1, case
58.
26 Hq UNC/FEC,
Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, p. 58.
27 The North
Korean ports included: Sinuiju, Manp'ojin, Hyesanjin,
Hoeryong, Ch'ongjin, Sinanju, Hamhung, P'yongyang, Wonsan, Pyoktong, Songjin,
and Haeju. The ports in South Korea were: Seoul, Yangyang, Ch'ungju, Taejon,
Andong, Chonju, Taegu, Wonju, Sunch'on, and Pusan. See First Mtg of Staff
Officers on Details of Agreement of Agenda item 3, 27 Jan 52, in G-3 Mtgs of
Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. I.
28 Seventh through Eleventh Mtgs of Staff
Officers . . . on item 3, 3-7 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. I.
29 (1) Msg, CX 63438, Ridgway
to JCS, 12 Feb 52, DA-IN 104463. (2) Msg, JCS 901022, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Feb 52.
30 Fourteenth
through Twenty-seventh Mtg of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 10-23 Feb 52, in
G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. II.
31 Memo, Ridgway for Joy, 7 Mar 52,
sub: Armistice Negotiations, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan-31 Dec 52.
32 Forty-sixth Mtg of Staff Officers . . .
on item 3, 13 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. III.
33 Forty-eighth and
Forty-ninth Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, 15-16 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of
Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. III.
34 The final
list of ports included: Sinuiju, Ch'ongjin, Hungnam (for Hamhung), Manp'ojin and
Sinanju in North Korea and Inch'on (for Seoul), Taegu, Pusan, Kangnung (instead
of Yangyang) and Kunsan (for Chonju) in South Korea.
35 These were Paengnyong-do,
Paechong-do, Soch'ong-do, K'unyonp'yong-do, and U-do-all located below the 38th
Parallel.
36 Seventh Mtg of Staff Officers . . . on
item 3, 3 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk.
I.
37 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean
Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51-May 52), vol. 2, ch. II, pp. 64-65.
38 Transcript of Proceedings, Second Session,
Subdelegation Mtgs on item 3, 5 Dec 51, in FEC
Transcripts, item 3, vol. I.
39 (1) Msg, C 59130, CINCFE to
JCS, 11 Dec 51, DA-IN
8556. (2) Msg, JCS 89473, JCS to CINCFE, 12 Dec 51.
This message was approved by the JCS,
State and
Defense Departments, and the President.
40 Msg, JCS 90381, JCS to CINCFE, 24 Dec 51, DA-OUT
90381. Army and State Departments approved this message.
41 Twentieth Mtg of the Staff Officers . . . on item 5,
16 Feb 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 3, bk. II.
42 Msg, DA 901353, G-3 to
CINCFE, 17 Feb 52.
43 (1) Msg, C 68918, Ridgway to JCS, 19 Feb 52,
DA-IN 107012. (2) Msg, C 63918, Ridgway to JCS, 19
Feb 52, DA-IN 107018.
44 (1) Msg, JCS 901451, JCS to
CINCFE, 19 Feb 52. (2)
Msg, DA 901845, CofS to CINCFE, 28 Feb 52. Norway was selected since it had
supported the U.N. action in Korea.
45 (1) Msg, CX 64842, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52, DA-IN 109768. (2)
Msg, JCS 902160, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52.
46 Msg, HNC 1027, Joy to CINCUNC, 9 Mar 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52,
an. 1, CofS, incl 27.
47 Msg, C 65020, CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), to Mar 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 52, an. 1, incl 28.
48 Msg, HNC 1033, Ridgway to
JCS, 11 Mar 52, DA-IN 114495.
49 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11
Mar 52, sub: Courses of Action in the Korean
Armistice Negotiations, in G-3 091 Korea, 3/7.
50 Msg, JCS 903687, JCS to
CINCFE, 15 Mar 52.
51 Msg, C 65430, CINCFE to
JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA-IN 116955.
52 Msg, JCS 904101, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Mar
52.
53 Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to
JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA-IN 118696.
54 Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-fifth through
Sixty-sixth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 3, 3-14 Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts
of Proceedings, Subdelegation on item 3, vol. III, 8 Jan-19 Apr 52.
55 Ibid., Fifty-sixth
through Fifty-eighth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 29 Feb-2 Mar 52, in FEC
Subdelegates Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV, 28 Jan-7 Mar 52.
56 For more detail on this
riot, see Chapter XI, below.
57 Ibid., Fifty-ninth and Sixtieth Sessions, 3-4
Mar 52.
58 Msg, CX 65424, Ridgway to JCS, 17 Mar 52, DA-IN 116952.
59 Msg, JCS 904101 JCS to
CINCFE, 19 Mar 52.
60 Msg, C 65650, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Mar 52, DA-IN 118696.
61 Twenty-ninth and
Thirtieth Mtgs of Staff Officers on Details of Agreements on item 4, 22-23 Mar
52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.
62 Thirty-sixth
Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . . on item 4, 29 Mar 52, in G-3 Mtgs of
Staff Officers . . . on item 4.
63 Memo, Hickey for Hull, no
date, no sub, in G-3 383.6, 5/1. This memo dates approximately in mid-February 1952.
64 Thirty-ninth Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . . on
item 4, 1 Apr 52, in G-3
Mtgs of Staff Officers . . . on item 4.
65 (1) Fortieth, Forty-first
Mtgs of Staff Officers on Details . . . on item 4, 2
and 4 Apr 52. (2)
Msg, Tsai to Hickman, 6 Apr 52. Both in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers
. . . on item 4.
66 Msg, HNC 1118, Ridgway to
JCS, 3 Apr 52, DA-IN 123736.
67 (1) Msg, JCS 905426, JCS to
CINCFE, 3 Apr 52. (2) Mg, CX 66469, Ridgway to JCS, 5
Apr 52, DA-IN 124553.
68 (1) Msg, C 66649, Ridgway to G-3, 10
Apr 52, DA-IN 126222. (2) Msg, C 67178, Ridgway to
G-3, 19 Apr 52, DA-IN
129608.
69 (1) Msg, C 66761, Ridgway to G-3, 11
Apr 52, DA-IN 126801. (2) Msg, C 66838, Ridgway to
G-3, 12 Apr 52, DA-IN 127294. Casualties included: 4 ROK dead, 4 wounded, 1 U.S. lieutenant wounded; 3 North Korean dead, 60 wounded. See
below, Chapter XI, for further details on prisoners' refusal to be screened.
70 Msg, CX 66754, CINCUNC to
G-3, 11 Apr 52, DA-IN
126732.
71 Msg, CX 66953, Ridgway to
JCS, 15 Apr 52, DA-IN 128107.
72 Forty-second Mtg of Staff Officers on Details . . . on
item 4, 19 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers on . . . item 4.
73 Forty-third Mtg of the Staff Officers .
. . on item 4, 20 Apr
52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff
Officers . . . item 4. Hickman later said that his counterattack actually caused
Tsai to blush for the first and only time during the meetings. Interv, author
with Maj Gen George W. Hickman, Jr., 7 Mar 58.
In OCMH.
74 Forty-fourth through
Forty-sixth Mtgs of the Staff Officers . . . on item 4, 21-23 Apr 52, in G-3 Mtgs of Staff Officers . . .
on item 4.
75 Msg, CX
67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA-IN 129944.
76 Msg, JCS
906923, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Apr 52. This message was drafted by State and approved
by the services, Defense Department, and the President.
77 Msg, JCS 907375, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Apr
52.
78 Hq UNC/FEC,
Korean Armistice Negotiations (Jul 51-May 52), vol.
2, ch. III, pp. 97-98.
79 Msg, C 67640, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Apr 52,
DA-IN 132562.
80 Msg, JCS
907378, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Apr 52.
81 Besides Admiral Joy, the
UNC delegation now consisted of Harrison, Turner, Libby, and Yu. The Communists
were represented by Nam, Hsieh, Lee, General Pien Chang-wu, and Rear Adm. Kim
Won Mu, who had replaced Maj. Gen. Chung Tu Hwan.
82 Transcript of Proceedings,
Forty-fourth Session, 28 Apr 52, in FEC Transcripts of Proceedings, Msgs on the
Mil Armistice Conf, vol. IV, 28 Apr-3 Jun 52.
83 Ibid.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
