History 
On Line
On the surface the problem of prisoners of
war seemed simple. The United States was a signatory to the Geneva Convention of
1949 although it had not ratified the convention when the war began. The North
Korean Foreign Minister had declared shortly after the outbreak of war in 1950
that his government would abide by its stipulations. Since the opening sentence
of Article 118 of the
convention clearly stated: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of hostilities," there seemed little reason
for dispute. Yet difficulties arose at the outset of the discussions on the
exchange of prisoners and steadily mounted as the issue became surcharged with
emotional elements. A series of conflicts broke out between the rights of the
individual and those of the majority, between human rights and legal rights, and
between humanitarianism and Communist Party pride. As the controversy became
very involved, a glance at the contributing factors would appear to be in order.
Voluntary Repatriation
Early in its history the United States had
come into contact with the principle of voluntary repatriation or the right of
each individual prisoner to choose whether he wanted to return home or
not. At the close of the Revolutionary War the Treaty
of Paris of 1783 had simply stated: "All prisoners on both sides shall be set at
liberty . . . ." Thousands of British and German soldiers decided to stay in the
new country and to live under the new form of government rather than go back to
Europe.1
But this experience had been the exception
to the rule. The common practice was to exchange all prisoners of war at the end
of a conflict. When the 1929 Geneva Convention was fashioned, compulsory
repatriation was taken for granted since it was generally accepted that the
great majority of prisoners would wish to return home as soon as a war was
finished. World War II added a new chapter to the handling of prisoners of war
when the Soviet Union retained large numbers of German and Japanese prisoners
for a long period after the war to assist in the rehabilitation of the USSR.
Perhaps to prevent a recurrence of this action, the delegates to the Geneva
Conference in 1949 strengthened the article dealing with repatriation, It became
a fiat statement prescribing quick and compulsory repatriation.2
But in their
zeal to protect the right of each prisoner to return home swiftly, the delegates
ignored the other side of the coin. They failed to incorporate escape provisions
to cover the possible exceptions- the prisoners who might be afraid to go back,
those who had fallen out of sympathy with their national regimes, and those who
preferred the ways of their captors.
The omission was soon revealed by the
Korean War. The Communists, however, did not allow a scrap of paper to deprive
them of an advantage. As soon as they began to accumulate prisoners in mid-1950,
they set about reeducating and incorporating as many as possible of the former
ROK soldiers into the Korean People's Army. When the United Nations Command
turned the tables after the Inch'on landing in September 1950, no such easy
solution was permissible. Respecting the provisions of the Geneva Convention,
the UNC sent its ever-increasing bag of prisoners, military and civilian, back
to the stockades and faithfully reported the names to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). It was inevitable that some of the ex-ROK
soldiers should fall into UNC hands and many of them now claimed that they had
been impressed into the Communist forces. This was the initial complication.
When the Chinese entered the war in late
1950, another element was added. For among the Chinese troops were many quondam
members of the Nationalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek. During the civil war there
lead been wholesale desertions and surrenders and the Communists had taken the
former Nationalists into their military organization en masse. Disaffection was
widespread in their ranks and once they had become
prisoners of the UNC, many soon demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for a return
to Communist control.3
As the number of enemy prisoners mounted
and their composition grew more complex, the problem of their ultimate
disposition came to the fore. On the eve of the opening of the truce
negotiations in July, Brig. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Army Chief of Psychological
Warfare, voiced his concern over the possible fate of the former Nationalist
soldiers in the event of an armistice. Many of these men, he told General
Collins, claimed that they were forced to join the Communist army. If they were
now compelled to return, they might well be faced with heavy punishment or even
execution because they had surrendered to the U.N. Command. To forestall this
McClure presented a clever, if somewhat debatable solution. Since the bulk of
the ex-Nationalist prisoners would probably elect to go to Taiwan if they were
given a choice and since it could be officially considered a part of China, he
urged the repatriation of the group to Taiwan. In this fashion the United States
would avoid the experience of World War II when it had consented to the forcible
repatriation of prisoners to the Soviet Union. At the same time, McClure went
on, future psychological warfare operations would be strengthened since if enemy
soldiers were confident that they would not be repatriated, they would be more
likely to surrender.4
The McClure approach deserved further
consideration, in Collins' opinion, and he submitted it in expanded form to the
JCS on 6 July. Although the United States had not ratified the Geneva
Convention, Collins and the Army Judge Advocate General felt that it was
committed to the principles expressed therein. On the other hand, the Chief of
Staff thought that provided adequate safeguards for the protection and safe
return of UNC prisoners were arranged, General Ridgway could repatriate all
Chinese prisoners claiming Nationalist sympathies to Taiwan on the technical
ground that it was still part of China. Collins was willing to go even further.
If it could be accomplished without prejudice to the rapid recovery of UNC
prisoners, he suggested that no Chinese or North Korean prisoners should be
forced to go back to Communist-controlled territory without their full
consent.5
While the Taiwan proposition complied with
the letter of the Geneva Convention and could be defended, the voluntary
repatriation concept advocated by the Chief of Staff was clearly at variance
with the provisions of the convention. General Ridgway, when asked for his
comments, was quick to point this out. The adoption of voluntary repatriation at
this time, Ridgway declared, might establish a precedent that would work to the
disadvantage of the United States in future wars. In addition, the Communists
might make use of this breach of the convention to formulate adverse propaganda
and influence the borderline countries not yet committed to communism. Despite
these disadvantages, Ridgway felt that the concept
had definite merit.6
Further support for voluntary repatriation
came from the joint Strategic Survey Committee, the senior advisory group to the
joint Chiefs of Staff, but the committee recommended that since the problem
transcended military considerations, it should be handled on a higher
governmental level. Final approval, the committee concluded, should come from
the General Assembly of the United Nations. General Jenkins, the Army G_3,
disagreed strongly, for he felt that giving the matter to the General Assembly
would result in no decision at all on the basic policy. His arguments won over
the JCS and General Collins was instructed to inform Ridgway that he could
develop a UNC position for planning purposes based on the principle of voluntary
repatriation.7
During the long recess over the incidents
at Kaesong, there was a gradual change within the Defense Department, Robert A.
Lovett, who succeeded General Marshall on 17 September as Secretary of Defense,
keynoted this shift. Referring to the instructions of 30 June to Ridgway on
prisoner of war exchange, he declared that the Communists might not consent to
negotiate on a one-for-one basis and might well insist upon an all-for-all
agreements This possibility immediately cast a pall over the doctrine of
voluntary repatriation, for the primary consideration was to secure the speedy
return of all UNC prisoners. In a one-for-one exchange, the UNC could easily have
held back the enemy prisoners who did not want to return to the Communists until
all the UNC prisoners were turned over. An all-for-all agreement would void this
plan completely.
General Jenkins reflected the new climate
of opinion in early October when he counseled the Chief of Staff to accept the
Lovett argument that the UNC should be ready to agree to an all-forall exchange
if the enemy refused to deal on any other basis. Since Ridgway's armistice
instructions were about to be revised in preparation for the resumption of the
truce talks and since voluntary repatriation was contrary to the Geneva
Convention anyway, the Army G-3 did not think that the principle should be
reaffirmed. Collins and his JCS colleagues agreed.9
This appeared to be the end of voluntary
repatriation. In Tokyo General Ridgway had also shifted his ground. Unless there
were a one-for-one exchange, he told the JCS, he did not see how he could hold
back the prisoners unwilling to be repatriated. The United Nations Command had
avoided the subject of nonrepatriation in its psychological warfare program and
had not offered asylum to the Communist soldiers. Instead it had promised food,
medical care, and good treatment to all, plus permission to the North Koreans to
return home as soon as practicable. And to the Chinese troops, it had proffered
the chance to save their lives.10
Although voluntary repatriation was now
deemphasized, some progress was made on the reclassification of prisoners held
in the UNC camps. Among the thousands of men captured by the United Nations
Command, there were many who claimed South Korean residence. These fell into
five general classes: 1. Volunteers from civilian status who joined the North Korean
forces; 2. Personnel
impressed into North Korean military units from civilian life; 3. ROKA personnel
captured and impressed into the enemy army; 4.
ROKA personnel mistakenly taken into custody while in
a straggler status; and 5. "Innocent bystanders" who joined prisoner of war
groups or broke into the stockades to get fed or were picked up on suspicion of
being North Korean soldiers in civilian clothes. Both the Far East Command
Provost Marshal General and Judge Advocate General felt that only classes
2 and 5 could be properly
reclassified as civilian internees; the others should be
held.11
There were then about 40,000 South Koreans in UNC custody who
had earlier been impressed into the North Korean Army, according to Ridgway's
estimates, and with JCS approval he began to reclassify members of this group as
civilian internees. He intended to parole individuals from this category
acceptable to the ROK Government to local officials gradually when the situation
seemed opportune.12
After discussion
of Item 3 began in late November, Ridgway submitted his proposed approach to the
prisoner of war problem to the JCS on the 28th. Before he would enter into
substantive matters, he intended to insist upon delivery of names, numbers, and
locations of all UNC prisoners held by tile enemy. Initially he would attempt to
secure a one-for-one exchange. If this were successful, the U.N. Command could
withhold the prisoners it desired. If, on the other hand, the enemy refused, he
would agree to an allfor-all exchange, even though it meant turning over
suspected war criminals, intelligence prospects, soldiers who had aided the U.N.
Command, and individuals who did not want to go back.13
Faced with the immediate problem of
deciding whether or not to sacrifice the unwilling repatriates, the JCS again
debated the question without reaching a solution. Torn between their natural
concern for the safety of the UNC prisoners and their humanitarian desire not to
force enemy prisoners to return to the Communists, they could see no sure method
of safeguarding both groups. As a suggestion they informed Ridgway that he might
try to secure an agreement providing for the screening of all prisoners by joint
teams prior to their release. If, during the screening, a prisoner did not wish
to be repatriated, he could remain under the jurisdiction of his captor. But
there were frank indications that the JCS did not put a great deal of faith in
the possible success of this maneuver since they told both the Secretary of
Defense and Ridgway that they would welcome any suggestion for resolving the
question. In the meantime they authorized the U.N.
Commander to go ahead on the basis of his 28 November
proposal.14
By the time the subdelegation on Item 4
opened its meetings on 11 December, the principle of voluntary repatriation was placed in a
strange position- neither in nor out of UNC planning. To the JCS and to Ridgway
it was a desirable objective that should be attained, but no one was sure if or
how it could be won. On the other hand, there seemed to be no overriding reason
for adhering to the concept in the event the Communists balked or showed a
disposition to withhold the UNC prisoners in retaliation. As the talks began,
the fate of voluntary repatriation appeared to depend mainly upon future
Communist actions and reactions in handling the prisoner of war problem.
The Period of Reconnaissance
The repeated efforts of the UNC delegation
to initiate discussions on Item 4 concurrently with those on Item 3 finally bore
fruit on 11 December when
the Communists agreed to hold a subdelegation meeting that afternoon. Across the
conference table the familiar faces of Maj. Gen. Lee Sang Cho and Col. Tsai
Cheng-wen indicated that the enemy had assigned two of its ablest negotiators to
the task. On the UNC side, Rear Adm. Ruthven B. Libby, who had just replaced
Admiral Burke officially, and Col. George W. Hickman, Jr., USA, were
chosen to match wits with the Communists.
Libby was a fiery sea dog with a salty tongue who had no difficulty in coping
with the best or the worst that the enemy had to offer. He combined quickness of
mind, common sense, and spirit in an admirable blend and made an ideal
negotiator for dealing with the Communists. Colonel Hickman was intelligent and
capable, experienced in staff work, and provided added balance to the UNC
team.15
After the credentials were presented,
General Lee made the opening move. The prisoner of war issue could be settled
very quickly, he declared, if all POW's were released and allowed to go home
after the armistice. Provided that the conferees could agree upon this
principle, Lee thought that everything else fell into the category of details
and could be straightened out without too much trouble. But since, the UNC
delegation was not authorized to start the substantive discussions until the
enemy furnished current lists of prisoners, Libby ignored the Communist gambit.
Instead he pressed for the exchange of POW information and for permission for
the International Committee of the Red Cross representatives to visit the
prisoner of war camps. In the preliminary sparring that followed, Libby hinted
that the UNC general position on POW's was fashioned around a fair and equitable
exchange of prisoners along with suitable supervision to insure that they
received humane treatment and comfort until they were repatriated. Naturally,
Libby told Lee, the U.N. Command desired to establish a priority for the transfer of sick and wounded prisoners.
Lee was interested in probing the
significance of some of the vague terms that Libby had used in setting forth the
UNC approach, but the admiral was not ready to get down to specifics at this
stage. All that Lee found out was that a "fair and equitable exchange" meant
that neither side should gain an undue military advantage over the other if
hostilities resumed before a final peace settlement was concluded.16
After the first session was over, Admiral
Joy informed Ridgway that it appeared that the Communists were going to support
an all-for-all exchange and would oppose a one-for-one trade no matter how it
might be modified.17 At the moment, however, Ridgway was interested
in supporting the visits of ICRC representatives to the camps and he was trying
to marshal strong backing from his superiors. The latter were quite willing to
have the U.N. Command secure such a concession from the enemy, but did not want
the visits to become an issue.18
The next few days were spent in exploring
and establishing the lines of battle. Libby concentrated his comments on the
failure of the Communists to observe the Geneva Convention. Although the North
Koreans had promised to comply with the Geneva rules in 1950, they had reported
only 110 names of
prisoners taken during the early fighting and then ceased. The
United Nations Command had been obliged to gather later POW information via
Communist news media and radio broadcasts. Before the general problem of
prisoners could be discussed intelligently, Libby maintained, the U.N. Command
would have to know the names, locations, and nationalities of all the prisoners
in enemy custody. He also reminded General Lee that the convention also provided
for the visits of ICRC teams.
Lee was nothing loath to use the convention
for his base of argument. The only difference was that he had his own favorite
articles. First and foremost was Article 118 supporting all-for-all repatriation
on a compulsory basis. There was no doubt of the Communist hostility to any
suggestion of a one-for-one exchange and Lee sought doggedly to determine
whether the U.N. Command intended to insist upon this. Despite Libby's
successful evasion of debate, the enemy's position was very clear. On
12 December Lee followed
up with a definite proposal featuring the acceptance by both sides of the
all-for-all principle. Once this was conceded, the Communists were willing to
provide POW lists and to carry out the actual transfer of prisoners at
Panmunjom. They remained adamantly opposed to any visits by ICRC
representatives, however, and Lee made it plain that these were "out of the
question."19
In the absence of substantive discussions,
the mid-December meetings were frequently devoted to assaults upon the
opponent's position, Occasionally there was a lighter moment. Since the
Communists admitted that the POW data were necessary
yet refused to release them, Libby accused the Communists of wanting to take a
bath without soap or water. Lee promptly retorted that they were ready with soap
and water, but the U.N. Command would not get into the tub. The most important
thing, Lee claimed, was to free the prisoners and not to worry too much about
giving each other lists.20 In any case both sides seemed eager to
take the other to the cleaners; the big problem was to settle which one would be
cleaned.
The Communists agreed to furnish POW data
on 18 December. A four-day recess followed to allow both sides to check the
information. For the U.N. Command the lists submitted by the enemy proved to be
a definite disappointment. During the first months of the war, the Communists
had reported via news releases and radio broadcasts the capture of over
65,000 prisoners. Yet their lists showed that they now held only 7,142
ROK soldiers and 4,417 U.N. personnel, or a total of 11,559 prisoners.21 Since
the ROK Army carried over 88,000 men missing in action and the United States
over 11,500 in the same category, the discrepancy was particularly large. The disparity was even more
striking when compared with the UNC record. Out of 188,000 men listed as missing by the Communists,
the U.N. Command held over 132,000 prisoners of war and in addition had
another 37,000 recently reclassified as civilian internees.
When the first shock over the small number of names listed by the Communists
wore off, Admiral Joy and Ridgway decided to send a cold and factual letter to
the enemy leaders requesting an explanation. Until they received an answer, the
UNC delegation would attack the all-for-all plan and probe the enemy position
fully. It would present no counterproposals.22
The Communists were not entirely satisfied with the United Nations lists either.
When the meetings resumed on 22 December, General Lee charged that
there were shortages of 44,259 names on one list and 1,456 on another.
Libby explained that the bulk of the missing persons
consisted of former residents of the Republic of Korea who had been taken
prisoner under suspicious or hostile circumstances. During the spring of
1951 the U.N. Command had thoroughly screened its prisoners
and discovered that a large number of them had been caught in the flow of war or
had been impressed into the North Korean armed forces. Prisoners in these
categories had been separated from those who had voluntarily joined the
Communists and 37,000 had
been reclassified as civilian internees. In addition, Libby went on, the U.N.
Command was in the process of screening another 16,000 prisoners who had proven to be ROK citizens and these would not be
repatriated either,
Branding Libby's arguments "cute and
strange," Lee quickly protested this unilateral action. It was not the place of
residence but the army in which a man served that determined whether he
should be repatriated or not, Lee maintained.
Libby declined to debate the point and
instead counterattacked in another quarter. Just how, he asked, did the
Communists propose to justify the exchange of some ten thousand prisoners held
by them for the hundred-odd thousand in UNC possession? Reminding Lee that
General Hsieh in the Item 3 discussions had clearly stated that there should be
no increase of military forces after the armistice, Libby charged that an
all-for-all swap would add the equivalent of ten divisions to the Communist
forces. Then, turning to the POW lists, he requested that Lee explain why only
7,142 ROK soldiers were included when the enemy had
claimed that they had captured tens of thousands.23
From intelligence reports and POW
interviews, the U.N. Command was well aware that the North Koreans had
incorporated a large number of former ROK Army personnel into the Communist
armed forces. Although the prospects for their return were not bright, Joy and
Ridgway agreed that the UNC negotiators would at least attempt to get them
back.24 At the same time the demand for the onetime ROK Army members
would serve as a counterweight to the enemy's request for the return of the
37,000 reclassified civilian internees.
Admiral Libby pressed the attack during the
holiday meetings. He told Lee that the Communists had not reported all the
prisoners that they held. This drew a hot denial from his opposite.
The lists were small, Lee declared, because
his side had re-educated and released thousands of prisoners at the front. If
this were true, Libby swiftly rejoined, why had only 177 returned to the UNC
lines. He believed that the lists were small because so many ROK soldiers had
been forced to join the Communist army. This was not so, Lee maintained, only
volunteers were allowed to become members of their forces.25
During this exploratory period much of the
wrangling centered about the apparent inability of either side to furnish the
other with accurate information. The discrepancies between the numbers missing
in action and those reported as prisoners by the Communists made the UNC
delegation question the sincerity of the enemy lists. But the UNC was not
blameless, since it had submitted more names of prisoners to the International
Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva than it now had on hand. As it turned out,
more than 2,000 POW's had been sent through the processing line twice and the
later lack of co-operation shown by many Communist soldiers in providing
identifying information had made it difficult to correct errors. Other enemy
prisoners had escaped or disappeared, increasing the inconsistencies in the UNC
figures. Recognizing the vulnerability of the UNC position as long as the
variances persisted, Joy requested a complete audit of all POW's so that he
could present an up-to-date, accurate, and complete list to the
enemy.26
While this census was going on, Joy hoped
to collect more information on the attitudes of the Chinese and North Korean
prisoners toward repatriation and to find out how strongly the ROK Government
felt about the recovery of ROK civilians in enemy custody.27 Behind
this search for knowledge lay the case for voluntary repatriation. Without an
estimate of the numbers of enemy POW's who would refuse repatriation or of the
reaction of the ROK officials toward the principle, the U.N. Command could place
itself in an awkward and exposed position.
As the New Year began, Admiral Libby
brought up the civilian internee question. Although this was a delicate matter,
more political than military, General Lee had demonstrated at an earlier meeting
that his side was not opposed to its inclusion. In the course of the discussion
that followed the sides agreed that after the armistice was signed displaced
civilians would be allowed to go to the area of their choice. Libby pressed his
advantage. Since the military commanders would have the task of supervising the
movement of the civilians, he argued successfully that the agreement should be
written into the armistice stipulations.
Once this matter was settled, Libby was
ready to present the first UNC substantive proposal. There were three major
areas of disagreement to be resolved, he began. Both parties wanted all of the
prisoners released, but the U.N. Command wished to do this under an equitable
formula. Secondly, there was the disposition of the ex-ROK soldiers who
had been impressed into the North Korean Army. The United Nations Command
desired all in this category returned to POW status. And lastly, there was the
question of what standards to use in determining to which side a prisoner
belonged: the UNC claimed that the place of residence should be the deciding
factor and the Communists maintained that the army in which a man served when
captured should establish his nationality.
The U.N. Command proposed to solve these
differences, Libby continued, by a fair compromise. It would accept the concept
advanced and advocated by the Communists that a soldier who becomes a prisoner
can, upon his "release," exercise his individual option as to whether he will
return to his own army or join the other side. The UNC wished to extend this
principle to all prisoners, military and civilian. To supervise the interviews
of the prisoners, Libby suggested the ICRC. All POW's in excess of the
one-for-one exchange would be paroled and could not fight against their captor
again. None of those who refused repatriation would be allowed to bear arms
against the other side, Libby concluded.28
It was neatly done. Since the Communists
had permitted the ROK troops captured in the early stages of the war to join the
North Korean forces or to choose release at the front, they had practiced
voluntary repatriation. At that time it had been to their advantage to swell
their ranks and to lighten the burden of guarding large numbers of prisoners.
Now this policy was being turned against them. They
had provided the United Nations Command with a propaganda lever and with only a
comparatively small bag of prisoners to bargain with, the Communists were placed
at a distinct disadvantage. If a large proportion of the prisoners in UNC hands
refused to return to communism, the adverse publicity would be hard to combat,
no matter how it was rationalized. Unusual as the doctrine of voluntary
repatriation might be, its humanitarian aspects were bound to appeal to a large
part of the world. Only on legal grounds could the principle be freely attacked
and whether this would be successful in the face of world opinion was a matter
for conjecture.
Obversely, the United States and its allies
were now officially linked with voluntary repatriation. Although it was in the
nature of trial marriage, the possibility existed that once public opinion had
been marshaled in its support divorce might prove to be out of the question.
The Communists Reject Voluntary Repatriation
The first reaction of the Communists to the
UNC proposal of 2 January was not unexpected. On the following morning Lee led
the assault. Calling the plan "absurd," he insisted that it was a one-for-one
exchange. In his complete rejection of the proposal, Lee waxed eloquent. "The
release and repatriation of prisoners of war is not a trade of slaves," he
charged, nor was the twentieth century "the barbarous age of slavery." He paid
no attention to Libby's explanations nor to the admiral's barbed references to
the inconsistencies of the Communist position in attacking a policy
that they themselves had introduced in the Korean War.29
But Libby was not easily put off. He
twitted Lee for his concern over the possible defection of the Chinese Communist
soldiers. After all, he reminded Lee, the Chinese troops were all volunteers
according to the enemy's own avowals and part of "an army composed entirely of
men eager to fight for the Korean People's Army." If this were true, Libby event
on, he could not understand why the Communists were worried about any of these
volunteers not wanting to go back home. When Lee refused to rise to this bait,
and persisted in branding the UNC proposal a slave trade, Libby became ironic.
"Your analysis is faulty, your arguments are specious, and your conclusions are
wrong," he told Lee, "outside of that it was a nice piece of work."30
Despite the spirited accusations of the
Communists, Admiral Joy detected a ray of hope behind the facade. He noted that
although they had termed the UNC proposal too unreasonable to discuss, they had
soon begun to argue its merits.31
In the subdelegation meetings, Admiral
Libby tried to dispel some of the hostility of General Lee by careful
explanation of the UNC proposal of 2 January. But the detailed statements had little effect upon the
Communist delegate. As January wore on, Lee became more abusive in his attacks
and Libby had to rebuke him several times for his slurring remarks about Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-shek, and the
United Nations Command.32
It did no good to point out the
incongruities of the Communist opposition to voluntary repatriation after they
had introduced and practiced the principle. Lee had no hesitation in accusing
the U.N. Command of educating the POW's politically to influence their choice
even though he had admitted at an earlier meeting that the Communists had
reeducated many UNC prisoners and then released them at the front. On the other
hand, even Lee could see the somewhat distorted humor in his own arguments at
times. At the meeting on 11 January as he defended the Communist system of prisoner education
and called it righteous and benevolent, he become so convulsed with laughter
that he could scarcely finish his remarks.33
When Libby charged that the North Koreans
had impressed thousands of ROK soldiers into their army, Lee denied it
vehemently. He asserted with a straight face that only volunteers could serve in
the Communist forces. And despite the fact that the enemy had violated the
Geneva Convention many times since the war began, the Communists extracted the
last measure of benefit in propaganda and argument from the provisions that
favored their own positions and blithely ignored the rest.34
There was little progress made on Item 4
during mid-January. The efforts of Admiral Libby
to indicate the advantages that would accrue to the Communists if they accepted
the UNC proposals were regarded with deep suspicion by General Lee. He reminded
Libby that the U.N. Command was not doing any favors for the Communists and
could not without betraying its own cause and interest.35 When Libby
confirmed the Communist apprehension that the Chinese POW's would be allowed to
choose between Communist China and Nationalist China, Colonel Tsai became very
agitated. The Chinese people, he declared, "will never tolerate it and will
fight to the end."36 Under questioning, Tsai refused to state whether
he was speaking for the Chinese Volunteers in Korea or all the Chinese people.
In view of the static condition of the
negotiations, General Ridgway requested that the JCS approve a final position
for the UNC delegation. But all that the JCS could provide was a quasi-final
position. On 15 January they authorized Ridgway to agree to an allfor-all
exchange provided that no forceful return of POW's would be required. However,
since this position would be taken only as a last resort and since public
pressure might influence the President to modify this stand in the interim,
there was in reality nothing conclusive to the JCS instructions. The UNC
delegation was to continue its attempts to secure an agreement on the return of
selected U.N. and ROK civilians held by the Communists. To convince the enemy
that the U.N. Command was not using voluntary repatriation as a pretext for
holding on to most of the prisoners the possibility
was suggested that Ridgway might conduct, under ICRC supervision, a poll of the
POW's to discover the approximate number desiring repatriation. It was also
proposed that at the proper moment Ridgway might transfer the POW problem back
to the plenary conference and present a trade to the enemy- the U.N. Command
conceding on the airfield issue while the Communists agreed to the UNC prisoner
proposal.37 This was the first indication of the package deal that
was to be drawn up in April.
In his reply on 19 January the U.N.
commander agreed that it might be possible to combine unresolved issues once
these could be reduced to a minimum. He did not favor a poll of the prisoners
since he believed that one of the strongest points of the UNC proposal was that
the POW choice would be expressed at the exchange point in the presence of
representatives of both sides and of neutral observers. As the UNC delegation
had denied the existence of any program to influence or coerce the decision of
the POW's, the Communists might very well seize upon the poll as a means of
prejudicing the prisoners' choice and refuse to accept the results, If the
International Committee of the Red Cross conducted the poll, the enemy would
have further cause to impugn its neutrality. There was little doubt that the
Communists already regarded the ICRC as a UNC agent and not as a neutral body
anyway. Besides, Ridgway concluded, he and his staff did not think that the
enemy had any real concern about the numbers of prisoners who might return to
them, "it is the principle which is anathema to them since the question of the
individual versus the state is the essential difference between
democracy and communism."38
To listen to General Lee as he denounced the UNC proposal in
the subdelegation meetings as immoral and inhumanitarian might have confused the
casual observer into believing that the Communists were the ones who were
concerned over the plight of the individual. But when Admiral Libby asked him to
cite an example, he dodged the question deftly and after a long speech wound up
asking a couple of questions of his own. The exchange that followed illustrated
the tenor of the conversations and the Communist technique.
Admiral Libby: "You are extremely adept at
refusing to give a direct answer to any question which our side asks; you are
also extremely adept at capping your refusal to answer a question with two or
three questions of your own, and then insisting that we must answer them. That
is typical of the whole spirit with which your side approaches these
negotiations, You have made blanket charges against our proposal: that it is
immoral, that it is inhumanitarian, that it is unfair, and that it is
unreasonable. When we attempt to pin you down, to get you to show how in the
simplest case- in any one particular- our proposal is any one of these things,
you wiggle out of it, you will not answer. You will not answer because you can
not answer....
General Lee: "One thing we have found
through the meeting is that when you try to delay the time of the meeting, you
say we did not give any
answer, although we really have given one; and when we shrewdly pursue any
question, you say we make a smoke screen ....
This seems to be your only weapon and this is a special stunt which you alone
have.... But we have a sound standpoint. We love truth and righteousness and
standing upon the truth, we do our work; and from righteousness and truth, we
speak and insist.39
Whether the Communists were standing on the truth or trampling
it was unimportant, for the key fact was that they would not recognize the
principle of voluntary repatriation. They argued steadfastly and with
considerable justice that it was in conflict with the Geneva Convention. To
provide Admiral Libby with some counterarguments, the State Department forwarded
its interpretation of the convention on 22 January. Under Article 6, it pointed
out, parties to a conflict could make special agreements covering prisoners of
war as long as the prisoners were not deprived of their rights under the rest of
the convention. Since the spirit of the convention was to protect individuals,
the State Department felt that voluntary repatriation was not inconsistent with
its provisions.40 Thus, there was some legal as well as abundant
humanitarian justification for the UNC position in the interpretation of the
State Department.
The Communists not only opposed voluntary repatriation, but
strongly challenged the parole features of the UNC proposal. Since all the
prisoners who would be paroled belonged to the Communists, the enemy delegates
claimed that it was a unilateral requirement upon their side. Admiral Joy was
inclined to agree with them and suggested that there were two possible
solutions. Either he could be given authority to extend the parole feature to
both sides to guarantee that repatriated POW's would not be permitted or
compelled to bear arms against the other side or he should be allowed to drop
the parole feature entirely from the UNC position. Since the ROK Government
opposed the paroling of prisoners and the Communists probably would not let the
detail stop them from reusing their recovered personnel, General Ridgway agreed
that Joy could delete the requirements at his own
discretion.41
Actually concession even on minor matters
was contrary to Admiral Joy's usual stand. Both he and Ridgway felt that the
enemy regarded concessions as signs of weakness. In a published interview in
late January 1952, Joy declared that patience and unmistakable firmness backed
by applied military power were the elements that influenced the Communists. In
the presence of a military stalemate, he was doing his best to negotiate an
effective and stable armistice. But unless the enemy had a change of heart
voluntarily, sufficient military force would have to be applied to induce such a
change, Joy maintained.42
One of the stumbling blocks in the path of
the UNC negotiators during January had been the inability to present the
Communists with a complete and accurate list of the prisoners in its hands. The
normal delays occasioned by the necessity to check over a hundred thousand men
and women were compounded by the technical failure of the mimeographing machines
which turned out illegible copies of the lists. With
the enemy delegates constantly reminding Admiral Libby of the UNC promise to
produce a corrected roster, the admiral in turn sought to apply the pressure
upon Eighth Army headquarters to supply the data. But it was not until January
28 that Libby was able to hand over the new lists. According to these, there
were 20,720 Chinese, and 111,360 Koreans, or a total of 132,080 prisoners in
U.N. custody. This was less than the 13 December roster, but the 394-man
differential was due to reclassifications to civilian internees, Libby
explained. He also told Lee that the U.N. Command had completed work on the
44,000 reclassified civilian internees and was ready to exchange this
information on 72-hour notice if and when the enemy would agree to supply
similar data on the 65,000 prisoners captured by them.43
Although Lee ignored the last offer, he did
begin to demonstrate some signs of resuming negotiations. On 3 February he
introduced a Communist counterproposal, designed to meet most of the UNC
requirements except on the voluntary repatriation issue. The enemy was willing
to promise that none of the POW's would again take part in acts of war and to
allow the ICRC representatives along with Chinese and North Korean Red Cross
members to attend the camps, but held steadfastly to an all-for-all
exchange.44
Recognizing a more co-operative attitude
across the table, Libby tried to settle some of the details. He told Lee that
the parole item should be made less ambiguous. First, it should apply solely to
soldiers and not civilians, and secondly the agreement should pertain only to
the Korean War since some of the soldiers were professionals and forbidding them
to engage in acts of war in the future would deprive them of their living. Libby
suggested that the staff officers get together and work out the particulars. On
5 February Lee consented. He also agreed that the parole feature should bind
only the soldiers and be valid just for the Korean War, but warned the UNC
delegation again that the Communists would not accept the ICRC as a neutral
agency.45
As the staff officers conferences began on
6 February, Admiral Joy submitted a candid report on Item 4. The delegation felt that the Communists
would not offer additional lists of prisoners, but thought that the U.N. Command
could assure that it received back all on the present rosters by giving itself
ninety days to dispose of its larger holdings of POW's while granting the enemy
only thirty days to return the smaller numbers in Communist custody. Provided
the U.N. Command was willing to accept the good faith of the enemy as sufficient
guarantee, the delegation thought that provision for the return of all ROK
civilians who lived south of the present line of demarcation and wanted to be
repatriated could be written into the armistice agreement. As for the ex-ROK
soldiers now serving in the North Korean Army, Joy and his staff field that this
was a hopeless cause and asked for permission to drop
the matter at an appropriate moment.46 Washington officials
concurred, but stipulated that agreements on the return of both Korean and U.N.
civilians be written into the armistice terms regardless of whether specific
safeguards were included.47
It was evident from Joy's report and from
staff conversations with the admiral that he had little confidence that the
Communists would conclude a satisfactory armistice in the near future. Not only
did he believe that the enemy would never concede on voluntary repatriation, but
he also felt that the U.N. was on unsound ground in insisting upon the
principle. Most prisoners in his opinion surrendered because they were hungry,
poorly equipped, or out of ammunition and not because they were promised
nonrepatriation. Joy thought that now that the Communists had stabilized
positions, good supplies, food, equipment, and ammunition, they would be content
to maintain the status quo and negotiate as long as time seemed to be operating
to their advantage. In the past the negotiations had been influenced by
considerations other than military even though they were basically a military
matter. Until the armistice effort concentrated upon a direct and simple
approach to resolve the remaining issues, Joy did not feel that it woud be
successful. And if the direct effort failed, he still was convinced that the
negotiations should be terminated.48
As voluntary repatriation threatened to stall progress at
Panmunjom, General McClure, one of the founding fathers of the doctrine,
suggested a new approach which would avoid the term completely. The U.N. Command
would agree to an all-for-all exchange but since there were many prisoners who
claimed they were impressed or did not live in an area controlled by the
Communists, and others who might claim political asylum, prisoners in these
categories would be held and the matter referred to the governments concerned
under Item 5 as essentially political rather than military. McClure thought that
this suggestion might allow the Communists to save face and should be broached
on the staff officer level.49
Another avenue was explored in Washington
during the early part of 1952 that offered a more daring solution to the
nonrepatriate problem. When Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson and
Vice Chief of Staff General John E. Hull were in Tokyo in mid-February, they
broached to General Ridgway the concept of unilateral release of all
nonrepatriates. Once the prisoners were freed, the U.N. Command could present
the Communists with a fait accompli and then attempt to ride
out the storm of protests that would follow. This plan also had the advantage of
allowing the enemy to save face. But Ridgway was not yet ready to abandon the
old approach. He looked with disfavor upon schemes to reclassify and release
certain categories unilaterally. Although he still was not enthusiastic about
screening the prisoners before they were about to be
exchanged, if it had to be done he preferred a quick, single-day screening that
would be done openly. Each prisoner would be informed that the choice would be
final and segregated as soon as he made it.50
Before he resorted to screening, Ridgway
wanted to try and trade off the rehabilitation of airfields for voluntary
repatriation. If this failed, he would go ahead and screen the prisoners and
then propose an all-for-all exchange of the remaining POW's. Were the Communists
to insist, he would grant the airfield rehabilitation as a final concession. In
his opinion, the linking of the issues would permit a breaking off of the
negotiations to occur over two points rather than one.51
Ridgway's chief objection to the ideas
advanced for the release of the prisoners who indicated that they would forcibly
resist repatriation stemmed from his belief that subterfuge at this time would
nullify the prestige that the UNC had won in supporting voluntary repatriation.
He feared that the UNC might be accused of treachery and deceit such as had
characterized the enemy's dealings and that the lives of the prisoners in
Communist hands might be endangered. Under the circumstances he recommended that
voluntary repatriation and airfields be presented in one package and then if the
enemy refused to accept the former, the UNC should be authorized to announce its
final position on no forced repatriation.52
Despite the arguments of Ridgway, the
President decided to go ahead with the plan to remove from POW status the
prisoners that might be expected to resist repatriation violently because of
their fear of the consequences if they returned to enemy control.53
If the Communists rejected a voluntary repatriation airfield trade, Ridgway would
remove the names of the violent resisters from the POW lists and indicate that
the UNC was willing to agree to an all-for-all exchange on the basis of the
revised list.53 This would be the final U.S. position and one full of
intriguing possibilities if it were used, for it would mean that the U.N.
Command would be utilizing the enemy's own tactics in
handling the prisoner of war problem unilaterally. How the Communists would
react to this turnabout was unknown, but one thing was certain - they would
protest loudly and at length.
By the first of March, the negotiations on
Item 4 had been narrowed to one issue - voluntary or forced repatriation. The
details of the exchange would be easily settled as soon as this principle was
decided. But the Communists gave no sign that their adamant opposition to any
form of voluntary repatriation- no matter how it was disguised- was weakening.
The UNC position, too, had hardened during January and February. Although the
ideal objective of full voluntary repatriation seemed unattainable, the UNC
delegation had finally received the support of the U.S. policy makers to hold
out firmly for no forced repatriation and had been further armed by authority to
effect a unilateral release of nonrepatriates. Now it appeared to be a question
of whether the irresistible force or the immovable object or perhaps both would
have to give way.
Notes
1 See Lt. Col, George G. Lewis and Capt,
John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army,
1776-1945, DA Pamphlet 20-213, June 1955, p. 200.
2 DA Pamphlet No. 20-150 October 1950
Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims. Article
118, p. 129.
3 Msg, C-67842,
CINCFE to CINCUNC (Adv), 28 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 44.
4 Memo, McClure for CofS, 5 Jul 51, sub:
Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K.
Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4.
5 Memo, CofS U.S. Army for JCS, 6 Jul 51,
sub: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners, in G-3 383. 6, 4.
6 Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 51, DA-IN
17240.
7 (1) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Aug 51,
sub: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners, in G-3 383.6, 4/4.
(2) Msg, DA-99024, G-3 to CINCFE, 15 Aug 51.
8 Memo, Lovett for JCS, 25 Sep
51, no sub, Ind to JCS
2095/5.
9 (1) Memo,
Jenkins for CofS, 9 Oct 51, sub: Policy on Repatriation . . . , in G-3 383.6?
4/9 (2) Decision On JCS
2095/7, 12 Oct 51.
10 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 27 Oct 51, DA-IN
12414. (2) Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 15 Nov 51, DA-IN 15530. (3) JCS 2095/8, 9 Nov
51, title: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K.
Prisoners.
11 Memo, Lt Col D. T. Hamersley, SGS, for
Asst CofS G-1 FEC, 8 Nov 51, sub: Investigation and Release of ROKA Personnel in UN POW
Enclosures, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jul-31 Dec 51.
12 (1) JCS
2095/8, 9 Nov 51, title: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and N.K. Prisoners.
(2) Memo, Collins for Secy Defense, 15 Nov
51, same sub, in G-3 383.6, 4/14.
13 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Nov 51, DA-IN
3785.
14 (1) Decision on JCS 2095/10, 4 Dec 51,
Policy on Repatriation of Chinese ant[ N.K. Prisoners. (2) Memo, Jenkins far
CofS, 7 Dec 51, sub: Proposed Dispatch to CINCFE in Regard to PW's, in C-3
383?6, 5? (3) Msg, JCS 89172. JCS to CINCFE, to Dec 51
15 Hickman later became the
Army Judge Advocate General.
16 Transcript of Proceedings, First Session,
Subdelegation on item 4, 11 Dec 51, in FEC Subdelegation Mtgs, item 4, 11-25 Dec
51 (hereafter cited as FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I) .
17 Msg, HNC 541, Joy to CINCUNC, 11 Dec
51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5.
1951, case 349.
18 (1) Msg, CX 59155, Ridgway
to JCS, 11 Dec 51. (2) Msg, JCS 89474. JCS to CINCFE, 12 Dec 51. Both in FEC
387.2, bk. 5, 1951. case 349.
19 Transcripts of Proceedings, Second and Fourth
Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 12 and 14 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on Item 4, vol. I.
20 Ibid., Fifth Session, 15 Dec 51.
21 The UNC POW list was broken
down as follows: 3,168 U.S.; 274 Turkish; 10 French; 10 Dutch; 40 Filipino; 1 Greek; 4 South African; 919 U.K.; 6
Australian; 1 Canadian; and 3 "Japanese." The Japanese later proved to be U.S.
citizens.
22 (1) Msgs, HNC 605 and 607, Joy to CINCUNC, 20
and 21 Dec 51, in FEC Messages, Dec 51. (2) Msg, C
59779, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 21 Dec 51, in FEC
387.2, bk. 5, 1951, case
385.
23 Transcript of Proceedings, Ninth Session,
Subdelegation on item 4, 22 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. I.
24 Msg, HNC 618, Joy to CINCUNC, 22 Dec 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 5,
1951, case 396.
25 Transcripts of Proceedings, Tenth through Seventeenth Sessions, Subdelegation on
item 4, 23-30 Dec 51, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. I
and II.
26 Msg, HNC 682, Joy
to CINCUNC., 30 Dec 51, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 51, G-3 Jnl, 30 Dec
51, tab J-8.
27 (1) Msg, HNC 619, CINCUNC (Adv) to CG EUSAK (Main), 22 Dec 51. (2) Msg, HNC
629 CINCUNC (Adv) to American Embassy Pusan, for
Muccio, 23 Dec
51. Both in FEC Msgs Dec 51.
28 Transcripts of Proceedings, Nineteenth and Twentieth
Sessions, subdelegation on item 4, 1-2 Jan 52, hr FEC Mtgs on item 4,
vol. II.
29 Ibid., Twenty-first Session, 3 Jan 52.
30 Ibid., Twenty-second and Twenty-third Sessions, 4-5 Jan 52.
31 Msgs, HNC 715
and 716, Joy to CINCUNC, 4 Jan 52, in FEC Msgs, Jan 52.
32 Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-fourth and
Twenty-fifth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 6-7 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. II.
33 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice
Negotiations (Jul 51-May 52), vol 2, ch. III, p. 50.
34 Transcripts of Proceedings, Twenty-sixth and Thirty-first Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 8 and
13 Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vols. II and III.
35 Ibid., Thirty-second
Session, 14 Jan
52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4,
vol. III.
36 Ibid., Thirty-fourth Session, 16 Jan
52.
37 Msg, JCS 92059, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Jan
52.
38 Msg, CX 61829. Ridgway to JCS, 19
Jan 52, DA-IN 2276.
39 Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-first Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 23
Jan 52, in FEC Mtgs
on item 4, vol. III.
40 Msg, JCS 92490, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jan 52.
41 (1) Msg, HNC 785, Joy to
CINCUNC, 22 Jan 52. (2)
Msg, CX 62010, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 23 Jan 52. Both in FEC Msgs, Jan 52.
42 An interview with
Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy, "Russia Calls the Turn in Korea- Chinese do the
Arguing," in U.S. News and World Report (January 25, 1952), pp. 24-25.
See also Msg C 62217, Ridgway to JCS, 25 Jan 5, DA-IN 4540.
43 Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-sixth
Session, Subdelegation on item 4, 28 Jan, 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4, vol. IV.
44 Communist Proposal of 3
Feb, incl to Transcript of Proceedings, Fifty-second Session, Subdelegation on
item 4. 3 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on item 4. vol. IV.
45 Transcripts of Proceedings, Fifty-third and
Fifty-fourth Sessions, Subdelegation on item 4, 4 and 5 Feb 52, in FEC Mtgs on
item 4, vol. IV.
46 Msg, CX 63013, CINCUNC to JCS, 6 Feb 52, DA-IN
102022.
47 Msg, JCS 900383, JCS to CINCUNC (Adv) for Ridgway, 6
Feb 52.
48 Msg, OT 577, Col James R. Davidson to DA, 12 Feb 52, DA-IN 104519.
49 Memo for Rcd, by Gen McClure, sub: POW Exchange, 16 Feb 52, in G-3 383.6, sec. I, 4
50 Suggestions that the nonrepatriate prisoners be
released unilaterally to break the deadlock were advanced several times during
the last year and a half of the war and were always disapproved. See below.
Chapters VIII, XII, and XVII; also Vatcher, Panmunjom pp. 157-58.
51 Memo for Rcd (sgd M. B. Ridgway),
19 Feb 52, no sub,
in G-3 383.6, 5/1.
52 Msg, C 64383,
Ridgway to JCS, 27 Feb 52, DA-IN 109858.
53 (1) Msg, JCS 902159, JCS
to CINCFE, 27 Feb 52. (2) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 5 Feb 52, sub: Armistice
Negotiations in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 15.
54 Memo, Maj Gen Clyde D. Eddleman for CofS, 4 Mar 52, sub: Status of Korean Armistice
Negotiations as of 4 March, in G-3 091, Korea, 23.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
