History 
On Line
On the eve of the opening of the
substantive discussions at Kaesong, the Soviet Union launched a new peace
offensive. The Russians suggested a fivepower peace pact to include Communist
China and the banning of atomic weapons as steps that would lead to an easing of
world tensions.1 As the United States was in the midst of
preparations for the Japanese peace treaty conference and also currently
negotiating defensive pacts with the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand,
the vague Russian proposals aroused little enthusiasm among the American
leaders.2 The confluence of circumstances intimated that the Soviet
peace drive was mainly inspired by a desire for favorable propaganda that might
disrupt the American undertakings.
The dovetailing of the Communist peace
movement with the armistice discussions did not cause any important alterations
in the U.S. plans for concluding the treaty with Japan or the defensive pacts.
Nor did it have any great effect upon the Korean negotiations. For the
uncompromising position concerning the 38th Parallel adopted by the enemy
delegates at Kaesong soon dispelled any illusion that they
were eager for a truce except on their own terms.
The 38th Parallel
The search for a satisfactory formula for
attaining a truce was hindered by the strong positions taken by both sides at
the outset. As soon as the agenda was settled, General Nam quickly turned back
to the 38th Parallel. Since the boundary had been recognized by all nations as
the dividing line before the war, Nam urged that it be restored. Each side held
territory north and south of the Parallel and neither would incur any great
disadvantage by re-establishing the status quo. To create a demilitarized
zone, Nam proposed that a 2o-kilometer strip along the parallel be cleared of
troops. Such a realignment of forces and readjustment of territory would be fair
and just, Nam maintained.3 The UNC rebuttal followed on 27 July. Admiral Joy ended the
preliminary skirmishing and came out strongly in favor of a truce line based on
battle realities rather than the 38th Parallel. Pointing out, that the Communist
and U.N. forces had crossed the parallel no less than four times during the last
thirteen months, he
argued that this fact alone proved the unsuitability of the parallel as a
demarcation line. An effective delineation of a demilitarized zone must be made
on practical military grounds, Joy continued, and should not be influenced by
consideration of ultimate political objectives; for a military armistice an
imaginary geographical line such as the 38th Parallel had no validity
whatsoever.
Ruling out the parallel as a line of
demarcation, Joy advanced the UNC proposal. There were three battle zones to be
considered, he maintained, the ground zone, the sea zone, and the air zone.
Although the UNC forces occupied definite positions on the ground, they had
superiority in the air over all Korea and controlled the entire Korean seacoast.
Since the Communists would gain freedom of movement and be able to rebuild
within their sector of Korea when the air and sea power of the U.N. Command were
confined by a cease-fire and therefore would gain more than the U.N. Command
through a truce, Joy suggested that the Communists should compensate the UNC by
making concessions on the ground. On the map that he presented to the enemy
delegates, UNC staff officers had drawn a demilitarized zone twenty miles wide
considerably to the north of the ground positions then occupied by the UNC
forces.4 This initial offer sought, of course, far more then the UNC
delegates expected to secure, but even so, it was a novel approach- an attempt
to break total military power into its component parts and give them separate
values for bargaining purposes.
The Communist reaction was a swift and rude
rejection. "Ridiculous," was Nam's comment on the 28th as he asserted that
military power was the sum total of the power of all arms of the forces. The UNC
battle lines, he went on, were the concentrated expression of the military
effectiveness of its land, air, and sea forces. Although the present battle
lines were variable, Nam felt that the 38th Parallel approximately reflected the
current situation and should be accepted as the line of demarcation.
After rebuking Nam for his rudeness and
bluster, Joy proceeded to defend the UNC proposal. Ground progress did not
always indicate the status of a war, he contended, for Japan was defeated
without a single soldier setting foot on the Japanese home islands.5
Nam refused to accept this statement. He
derided the American claim that the United States had defeated Japan. Anyone
knew, Nam said, that it was the Korean people's struggle, the Chinese people's
war, and the Soviet Union's resistance that brought Japan to her knees. Had not
the United States fought Japan for three years without victory until the Soviet
Army entered the war and dealt Japan a crushing blow? "Can these historical
facts be negated lightly?" he concluded.6
Since each side obviously was using a
different history book, Admiral Joy did not pursue this subject. Instead he
continued to point out the additional advantages that would accrue to the
Communists if a truce was signed. They could repair their roads, bridges, and
railroads, bring up supplies needed for the health and well-being of their
troops, and restore and rehabilitate their
towns and facilities.7
The Communists were not interested in the
admiral's arguments. They clung steadfastly to the 38th Parallel as July passed
by and the dog days of August began. The daily sessions became routine as each
side presented the same arguments and refused to concede or compromise. Since
apparently the support of Marshall and Acheson had helped convince the
Communists that the United States would remain firm on the troop withdrawal
issue, Joy suggested to Ridgway that high-level backing for the UNC position on
Item 2 might also have a beneficial
effect.8 He felt that the conference could break up over this matter
for Nam would not even discuss a proposal not hinged on the 38th
Parallel.9
In the midst of this impasse, a strange
incident occurred. During the lunch hour on 4 August a fully armed company of
Chinese troops marched past the UNC delegation house in clear violation of the
neutrality of the conference zone. This was a double violation, in fact, for not
only were there supposed to be no armed troops within a half mile of the
conference site but also all troops within a 5-mile radius of Kaesong were to be
equipped with sidearms only. When the conference resumed that afternoon, Joy
immediately entered a strong protest and Nam promised to
investigate.10
Whether the Communists wished to
demonstrate their control of the conference site for
propaganda purposes or simply made a mistake proved immaterial. General Ridgway
decided to adopt a strong position and informed Kim Il Sung and Peng Teh-huai
that the UNC delegation would not hold any further conversations with the
Communists until a satisfactory explanation of the violation and assurances that
it would not happen again were received.
The first reply from the Communists stated
that the troops were guards responsible for police functions and that they had
passed through the area by error. Instructions had been issued to prevent a
recurrence. But although Admiral Joy recommended that the U.N. Command accept
this response, Ridgway determined to press for an inspection team of equal
representation to be organized and to carry out a full inspection of the entire
neutral zone before the next meeting. Ridgway felt that the violation was either
a deliberate attempt to intimidate or was due to gross carelessness or lack of
discipline.11
On the morning of the 6th, a second message
was broadcast in Korean, English, and Japanese by the Communists. Although the
Korean and English versions were courteous and asked that the U.N. delegation
return to Kaesong, the Japanese broadcast had an insolent and peremptory ending.
Ridgway asked for permission to turn down the Communist explanation, but his
superiors considered that the enemy had in effect accepted the UNC conditions.
They instructed Ridgway to broadcast his acceptance and at the same time to warn
the Communists that the resumption of the talks was conditional upon their
complete compliance with the guarantees of the
neutralization of the Kaesong area.12
Perforce Ridgway agreed, but he vented some of
his indignation at the Communists in a message to Joy. Blasting the enemy as men
who considered courtesy a concession and concession a weakness, he enjoined Joy
to "govern your utterances accordingly and you will employ such language and
methods as these treacherous Communists cannot fail to understand, and
understanding respect."13
After a 5-day hiatus, the conference
resumed on 10 August. Joy
quickly informed General Nam that the UNC delegation was through discussing or
considering the 38th Parallel as a military demarcation line. Immediately the
Communists protested against this attempt to limit the discussion, but Joy soon
pointed out that his stand governed only the UNC response and in no way
prevented the Communists from talking about the 38th Parallel. A very curious
interlude ensued. For two hours and ten minutes the two delegations faced each
other in frozen silence punctuated only by the occasional nervous tapping of
Nam's cigarette lighter on the table. Finally Admiral Joy broke the sound
barrier and suggested that the conferees turn to Item 3, since no agreement
could be reached on the line of demarcation. The Communists
refused.14
Again General Ridgway urged his superiors
to support a strong course of action. He proposed to give the Communists
seventy-two hours to modify their adamant position.
If they still would not budge, then they would be told that by their own
deliberate act they had terminated the negotiations. But the Washington leaders
disapproved. They had no intention of presenting an ultimatum at this stage of
the discussions. If and when the conferences were broken off, the onus should
fall squarely upon the Communists. After all, they pointed out, the 38th
Parallel might not be the breaking point and it would take time for Moscow and
Peiping to amend their stand. Past experience in dealing with the Communists had
shown that long and protracted discussions were standard procedure. Calmness,
patience, perseverance, and firmness should characterize the U.N. delegation
attitude. This approach, they concluded, would subject the enemy to the greatest
strain while sustaining the unity and strength of the UNC position.15
On 12
August the Communist representatives returned to the
attack. "You should know that truth is not afraid of repetition, and needs
repetition," admonished General Nam as he argued the case for the 38th Parallel.
Unfortunately there was no common agreement on what "truth" was or whose "truth"
was more "truthful" than the other's. Nam termed the U.N. proposal for ground
compensation "absurd and arrogant" and his own as "reasonable," while Joy
attacked the Communists' "inflexible and unreal stand" and defended his own
"reasonable" procedure.16 Since neither side
wished to show any sign of weakness nor to
make concessions without a quid pro quo,
the sparring in the battle of words continued for
several days with no progress.
The Communists fought hard against a land
advance of the UNC forces as compensation. As Pravda put it, "The Korean
people have not agreed to the negotiations in Kaesong in order to make a deal
with the American usurpers over their own territory."17 But although the UNC delegation
admitted that its proposed demarcation line was entirely within the
Communist-controlled area and offered to make some territorial adjustments based
on the current battle line and over-all military situation, it held firmly to
the concept of compensation.18
Finally in an effort to break the deadlock,
Admiral Joy made an important suggestion that was to have a considerable effect
upon the conduct of the negotiations. On 15 August he proposed that a
subcommittee of one delegate and two assistants from each side be formed. He
believed that a less formal round-the-table exchange might be conducive to freer
discussion and might produce a feasible plan for solving Item 2. On the following day the Communists
accepted, but not without raising the number of delegates to two instead of one.
They nominated Generals Lee and Hsieh, and Joy named General Hodes and later
Admiral Burke, as his representatives. While the subcommittee attempted to
work out its recommendations, the plenary meetings
would stand in recess.19
The first subdelegate discussion took place
on 17 August, and although no concrete progress resulted, the atmosphere was
more relaxed. General Hsieh seemed to like this type of exchange. He spoke
frequently and acted as a moderator when the comments became sharp. As the talk
flowed back and forth around the small table, there was even a tendency on the
part of the Communists to consider the demarcation line on the map.
At the second session the UNC delegates
managed to shock the Communists by offering to toss a coin to decide which side
should make the first new proposal. The Communists could not imagine having an
important point turn on the flipping of a coin. Nevertheless they did bring
forth a map that slightly modified their stand on the 38th Parallel. On the east
they gave the U.N. Command about four kilometers and they took about the same
amount in western Korea. Later they went further. They proposed to do away with
all previous maps and to start afresh. Although they refused to answer several
pointed questions on the 38th Parallel, General Hodes and Admiral Burke felt
that the Communists might be ready to discuss other solutions, provided that the
U.N. Command made the opening gambit.20
When the third session convened on the
19th, Hodes suggested
that, for discussion purposes, the conferees assume that all air and naval
effectiveness was reflected in the battle line. The Communists were willing to talk on this basis,
but warily waited for the U.N. Command to make a definite new proposition. After
two days of fruitless fencing, the Communists retreated further from their
position on the 38th Parallel. They indicated that if the U.N. Command would
give up the concept of compensation, they would present a proposal based upon
adjustments along the battle line. Since this was a definite step forward, the
UNC delegates agreed to the principle of adjustment. The meeting of the 22d
adjourned with the possibility of agreement much closer at
hand.21
General Ridgway was encouraged.
Anticipating that the Communists might be willing to discuss the "line of
contact" as opposed to the "general area of the battle line," he asked and
secured approval for his plan to settle on a demilitarized zone not less than
four miles wide with the line of contact as the
median.22
Unfortunately the promise of progress in
the subdelegation meetings was shortlived. A succession of incidents stemming
from alleged violations of the neutral zone around Kaesong led the Communists to
call off the meetings on the night of the 22d.
The Incidents
Charges and countercharges of violations of
the conference area and of the neutrality arrangements had been rampant from the
outset of the negotiations. Following the Communist refusal to admit the UNC
newsmen, the UNC delegation had insisted upon an
agreement on rules and regulations governing the conference area. In brief this
established a neutral zone with a 5-mile radius centered on the traffic circle
in Kaesong. Each side agreed to refrain from hostile acts in this zone and all
military forces except those performing and equipped for military police
functions would be withdrawn. No armed personnel would be stationed within a
half mile of the conference house. During daylight hours the U.N. delegation was
given unrestricted use of the road between Panmunjom and Kaesong without prior
notification of the Communists. The U.N. liaison officers had already informed
their counterparts at the first meeting on 8 July that Communist convoys to and
from Kaesong, if marked with white crosses and if the U.N. Command was alerted
as to their time and route, would not be attacked. These arrangements seemed
fairly clear and simple, yet alleged infractions were charged almost at once.
On 16 July the Communists claimed that UNC
soldiers had fired in the direction of Panmunjom. Although no one was injured or
any damage committed, the Communists stated that this was an act of armed force
within the neutral zone. Investigation by the U.N. Command showed that some
firing in the general area of Panmunjom had taken place, but no evidence
indicated either that the fire had entered the neutral zone or that the UNC
forces had done the firing.23 In any event, the Communists did not
pursue the matter.
Five days later Col. Chang Chun San, the
North Korean liaison officer, informed Colonel Kinney that UNC planes had
strafed the Communist delegation's supply trucks marked with white flags at
Hwangju and Sariwon. But since the Communists had not notified the UNC of the
movement of this convoy, the U.N. Command refused to assume any responsibility
for damages incurred under such circumstances. With the enemy using the roads
between P'yongyang and Kaesong to build up his strength, Ridgway did not intend
to extend blanket immunity to all vehicles bearing white markings, for the UNC
suspected that the Communists might well use this device to slip through men and
materiel for the front. Furthermore, the U.N. Command had to take the word of
the Communists that a strafing had actually occurred, for no investigations were
carried on outside the conference area. Ridgway told Admiral Joy to inform the
enemy that unless advance warning was given, vehicles would be attacked wherever
found.24
The first two incidents were relatively
minor and the Communists did not raise too much fuss over them. It may have come
as quite a shock or revelation to them when the U.N. Command strongly protested
against the already mentioned violation of the conference area by a company of
fully armed Chinese Communist troops on 4 August and suspended the meetings for
five days until satisfactory assurances against recurrence were received from
Generals Kim and Peng. With the U.N. Command garnering favorable publicity from the incident and putting the Communists on
the defensive, the enemy may have decided to launch a counteroffensive.
On 8 August, while the recess continued,
the Communists reported that two UNC violations of the neutrality arrangements
had been committed the previous day. First, UNC planes had assaulted a supply
truck marked with a white flag at Sibyon-ni, and, second, about forty UNC troops
had closed on the bridge at Panmunjom and several had fired at unarmed Communist
personnel. Again, but without much success, the UNC liaison officers patiently
tried to convince their opposites that prior notification of convoy movements
was the only guarantee of immunity. The Communists insisted that the white
markings were sufficient. After a thorough investigation of the second charge,
Admiral Joy found that no UNC units had been in the Panmunjom area at that time
and therefore could not have been responsible for the shooting. Because of a
delay of twenty-eight hours by the Communists in laying this claim, Joy
questioned its validity.25
Less than a week later, on 13 August, another strafing attack on
three Communist supply vehicles took place in the vicinity of Sibyon-ni and
again the enemy protested. Admiral Joy's acknowledgement was brief and stated in
part: "In view of the fact that no notification of this movement was received,
no action on the part of the United Nations Command is neccessary and none is
contemplated."26
The spate of incidents led the Communists
to request that the liaison officers meet and work out more satisfactory
arrangements. In mid-August Colonel Kinney and Col. James C. Murray (a Marine
Corps officer) held a series of conferences with Colonel Chang and reached
agreement on a number of items. But even as they sought to attain final accord,
several new incidents occurred.
One was another truck strafing, but the
second was of a more serious nature. On 19 August a Chinese military police
platoon, patrolling near the village of Songgong-ni in the neutral zone, was
ambushed and the platoon leader was killed and another soldier wounded. The
Communists immediately protested and accused the U.N. Command of breaching the
old agreement. While the UNC officers investigated the charge, the enemy made
the most of the incident. In the subdelegation meeting on the 20th, the
Communist representatives recessed the session early so as to attend the funeral
of the platoon leader and invited General Hodes and Admiral Burke to go along
with them. This placed the UNC delegates in an embarrassing position, for if
they accepted, the Communists would be sure to take pictures and publicize and
probably distort the reasons for their presence. Hodes and Burke decided to
decline and hastened to their helicopter at the close of the meeting. Somewhat
apprehensive lest the Communists stop them en route and escort them to the last
rites, they made it safely to the plane and took off
as quickly as possible for Munsan-ni.27
Despite conflicting testimony,
investigation showed that the patrol had been ambushed, but that no U.N. or ROK
units had been close to Songgong-ni at that time. Since some witnesses stated
that several members of the attacking force had worn civilian clothes and had
been seen in the area before, the UNC officers surmised that they were partisans
friendly to the ROK but acting independently.28 Needless to say, the
Communists were not satisfied with this explanation and made full use of the
incident for propaganda purposes.
Before the furore caused by this episode
had died away, the Communists summoned Colonel Kinney from his bed in the early
morning hours of the 23d to lodge another protest. Upon his arrival at Kaesong,
Colonel Chang and his Chinese colleague, Lt. Col. Tsai Cheng-wen, informed him
excitedly that a UNC plane had bombed the conference site. Despite the darkness
and a driving rain, Kinney and his associates inspected the evidence. Although
there were several small holes, the so-called bomb fragments appeared to be
parts of an aircraft oil tank and an engine nacelle. The Communists claimed that
one of the bombs had been napalm, but nowhere was there any badly scorched earth
area that a napalm explosion would have caused. After viewing the evidence,
Kinney termed the whole affair "nonsense."
Whereupon Chang retorted that "all meetings from this time" were
called off.
As the UNC party drove to Panmunjom, the
Communist liaison officers overtook them and urged them to return and complete
the investigation. Kinney preferred to wait until daylight but Chang and Tsai
insisted that new evidence had been uncovered. Reluctantly Kinney returned and
was shown two more small holes, several small burned patches, and some pieces of
aircraft metal. There was an odor of gasoline and a substance in one of the
holes might have been a low-grade napalm that had not been ignited. When the
U.N. investigators requested that all the evidence remain in place until it
could be inspected by daylight, the Communists refused. They intended to gather
it all for analysis and considered the investigation over.29
There were many elements in this affair
that pointed to a deliberate attempt on the part of the Communists to arrange an
incident to suspend the negotiations. In the first place, the Fifth Air Force
maintained that it had no planes up in the area. Secondly, the plane that
supposedly dropped the bombs had its headlights on, a procedure contrary to all
UNC practice. Thirdly, the bomb pattern of the craters was such that, in the
opinion of the UNC investigators, no single plane could have made them. In
addition to these technical objections and the flimsiness of the evidence, the
haste of the Communists and their eagerness to gather
in the fragments for analysis and the quickness with which the low-echelon
liaison officer was able to call off the meetings made the Communist motives
suspect. As Ridgway informed the JCS, this decision must have been made in
advance and at the highest level. As he saw it, there were three possible
reasons for the Communists action: 1. They wanted an excuse to break off the
negotiations, with the blame falling on the UNC. 2.
They wanted to stall to mesh the timing of the
conference talks with the Japanese peace treaty and the Russian peace offensive.
3. They desired a suspension to strengthen their propaganda position and to
regain the initiative in the negotiations.30
Ridgway's suggestions did not exhaust the
list. There were several other interesting variations. Disappointment in the
failure of the United States to invite Communist China to the San Francisco
peace conference on Japan was one suggestion at the time. Another theory
reasoned that the Communists had thought the UNC proposal for subdelegation
meetings meant that the U.N. Command was ready to compromise on the 38th
Parallel and when this hope proved false, decided to play for time while they
worked out their next move.31
Whatever the motivations might be, the
truce talks entered a long period of suspension. The UNC rejection of
responsibility for the bombing of Kaesong elicited many angry Communist responses
but the UNC held firm. In the meantime the Communists entered several new
charges of UNC violations. They claimed that a UNC plane had dropped a flare in
the Kaesong area on 29 August; that UNC forces had attacked a patrol and fired
shots across the bridge at Panmunjom on 30 August; and that UNC planes had
bombed Kaesong a second time on 1 September. Investigation of these charges by UNC officers revealed
that no UNC planes could have committed the air incidents and that
partisan forces were probably responsibile for the
ground action.32
Both Ridgway and Joy felt strongly that the
best way to lessen the possibility of further incidents was to change the
negotiation site. The former had recommended that a new location be proposed in
early August and after the avalanche of incidents during that month, Joy
reinforced him stoutly. The U.S. leaders
were willing to
have the U.N. Command put forward a suggestion, but at this point they did not
wish to make a change in site a mandatory prerequisite to a resumption of
negotiations.33
The one encouraging factor lay in the
Communists' willingness to continue the battle of words over the violations. If
they seriously intended to break off the negotiations completely, they had
created a situation in which they could have withdrawn and blamed the U.N.
Command. Despite the lack of substance in most of their accusations, they had
seized the propaganda initiative and forced the UNC on to the defensive. The
U.N. Command could calmly refute the Communist claims again and again, but the
flood of incidents tended to obscure the denials. However as September wore on,
there were indications that the Communists had attained their objective, whether
it was time or the initiative, and were prepared to reopen negotiations.34
Strangely enough, the occasion was another
incident, only this time it was a real violation of the neutral zone. On 10
September a plane from the 3d Bomb Group strafed Kaesong through a navigational
error by the pilot. Fortunately no damage was incurred, but the Communists
entered a formal protest. As soon as the investigation disclosed that a UNC
plane had committed the attack, Admiral Joy wrote and
apologized for the infraction. This drew what could be considered almost a
friendly response from the Communists on 19 September. In view of the UNC
willingness to assume responsibility for this violation, Kim and Peng suggested
to Ridgway that the delegates resume the negotiations at Kaesong
immediately.35
But Ridgway was unwilling to reopen the
negotiations until there was a definite improvement in the physical setup. The
Communists had previously brushed aside his suggestion that the site be changed,
but he determined that the conditions for a resumption must be settled at the
liaison officer level and not by the delegates. At the same time he intended to
press for a new location36
Communist opposition to any change in the
site and to the liaison officers working out the details of neutralizing the
truce zone threatened to lengthen the recess. The Communists were reluctant to
give their liaison officers the authority necessary for coming to an agreement
on either point. Nevertheless, Kinney reported after the first meeting of the
liaison officers on 25 September that they seemed anxious to get the delegation
together. He felt that patience and firmness would finally gain the
establishment of satisfactory conditions.37
In Washington, intelligence sources were reluctant
to attach any special significance to the signs of Communist anxiety. Since the
Communist position in Korea had not deteriorated, they held that no new line of
action seemed imminent and that the Russians may have directed a resumption for
their own military or political purposes.38
In any event Ridgway and his staff drew up
a plan of action. Since Chairman of the JCS General of the Army Omar N. Bradley
and State Department Counselor Charles E. Bohlen were in the Far East, Ridgway
submitted his proposed policy to them and secured their approval. The plan posed
three alternatives based on Communist reactions. If they accepted a change of
site, the UNC delegation would offer a 4-kilometer demilitarized zone based
generally along the line of contact. As long as the Communists clung to Kaesong
but no break seemed imminent, the U.N. Command would push for a new site without
categorically excluding Kaesong. The third alternative would rise if a break
seemed likely: the U.N. commander would send a message with a map to the
Communists indicating the proposed demilitarized zone and subdelegations would
be suggested to discuss this at a place acceptable to both sides.39
Bohlen later reported that Ridgway and his staff felt that the U.N. Command had
made steady concessions to the Communists on procedural matters and had possibly
created an appearance of weakness that the military situation did not justify.
Bohlen recommended that Ridgway be firmly supported on the matter of a new site
even though it seemed to him to be an artificial
issue.40
While Ridgway pursued his pressure
campaign, exchanging letters with Kim and Peng on the higher level and backing a
staunch stand at the liaison officers meetings, several new incidents took
place. On 19 September a South Korean invasion of the neutral zone occurred.
Four unarmed ROK soldiers with full Red Cross insignia lost their way and
crossed the bridge at Panmunjom on a truck loaded with DDT. The bewildered
health team and the truck were immediately taken into custody, no doubt on
suspicion of conducting biological warfare, and were only released upon the
signing of a receipt by the UNC liaison officers.41
On 7 October a UNC B-26 crossed the neutral
zone, but no attack was made. The crew was officially reprimanded for the
overflight. Five days later a more serious violation drew a strong protest from
the Communists. On 12 October a flight of UNC F-80's passed over the neutral
area en route home. One of them cleared its machine guns and accidentally killed
a 12-year-old Korean boy and wounded his 2-year-old brother. Although the U.N.
Command accepted the responsibility for this unfortunate affair and tendered its
deep regrets, the atmosphere at the liaison officers meeting underwent a sudden
change.42
Until this latest episode progress had been encouraging. The
patience and firmness of the U.N. Command had won several concessions from the
Communists. Under steady pressure the latter had at last consented on 7 October
to a transfer of the site from Kaesong to Panmunjom, where both sides would
assume responsibility for protecting the conference area.43 Ridgway
immediately instructed Van Fleet to be ready to take over the high ground east
of Panmunjom as soon as final arrangements for the reopening of negotiations
were concluded.44
When the liaison officers met on 10
October, the Communists refused initially to discuss anything but the time and
date of the next meeting of the delegates. Colonel Chang was rather abrupt in
his treatment of the UNC officers, but the Chinese liaison officer, Colonel
Tsai, intervened and smoothed over the situation. He accepted the documents and
map of the neutral area offered by Colonel Murray and later escorted Murray to
the door of the tent while his senior, Chang, stood silently by.45 Such an overt action
by the junior officer provided a good example of where the real power lay.
As soon as the Communists realized that the
U.N. Command was not going to hold a meeting on higher level until the liaison
officers established the rules and regulations, they reluctantly agreed to work
out the details at the staff conferences. Relations between the lower
echelons had become comparatively cordial and
prospects for quick agreement on the conditions for resumption appeared bright
when the 12 October
incident cast its shadow. Overnight the Communists reverted to the old frigid
formality and tempers grew short. The following exchange between Kinney and
Chang during a long and trying session on the 16th was symptomatic of the new
climate of opinion:
Kinney: I find that is is becoming a habit
of Colonel Chang to read me a lesson on how to conduct my portion of this
particular discussion.
Chang: It seems to me that Colonel Kinney
is worrying about things about which he should not worry. Inasmuch as I am not
in a position of being an instructor of Colonel Kinney, I have no responsibility
for educating him.
Kinney: I am glad that you realize
that.46
Despite this turn in the personal
relationships, the points of official differences narrowed. Since the site was
moving to Panmunjom, the U.N. Command wished to limit the neutral area around
Kaesong to 3,000 yards
rather than five miles. Such a contraction would lessen the area in which
incidents could occur. But the Communists fought this proposal strongly and
would not agree to delimitation below three miles. The UNC representatives
finally compromised and accepted this figure both for Kaesong and the U.N. base
camp at Munsanni.47
Map 2. The
Armistice Conference Area, 22 October 1951
A second important item that blocked final agreement
concerned the violations of the air space over the neutral zone. After the many
instances of UNC planes flying over the area through navigational error or
because of the weather conditions, the UNC negotiators wished to eliminate
accidental invasion of the air space as a violation. The Communists insisted for
some time that this was a hostile act of armed force, but at last agreed to
compromise and recognized that there might be weather and technical conditions
beyond human control under which aircraft might fly over the conference area but
without any intent to attack or damage it.48
On 22
October the liaison officers signed the new security
agreement which embodied most of the features desired by the U.N. Command.
Besides the restriction of the Kaesong area to three miles and the provision on
accidental overflight of the neutral zone, the UNC was also able to except
itself from responsibility for the acts committed by irregulars or partisans not
under its control. This had been another troublesome matter and the cause of
several Communist complaints in the past. A 1,000-yard circle around Panmunjom
was neutralized as was a 200-meter area on each side of the road from Kaesong to
Panmunjom to Munsan. (Map 2) In
the Panmunjom area each side agreed to station 2
military police officers and 15 men armed with small
arms while the conference was in session and 1
officer and 5 men during other periods. The
Communists offered to supply the delegation
conference tent and the U.N. Command to provide flooring, space heating, and
lights for the tent. Other wise each side would take care of its own needs in
the conference area. To help prevent violations of the air space, the U.N.
Command agreed to set up a searchlight and barrage balloons at
Panmunjom.49
Having secured the agreement, the UNC
delegates hoped to steal a march upon the Communists. Admiral Joy anticipated
that the Communists intended to discuss the security arrangments all over again
at the delegate level, so he dispatched a letter to Nam ratifying the liaison
officers' accord and told Nam that he would await the Communist concurrence
before resuming negotiations. Colonel Kinney also informed Chang that UNC
security troops were moving in to the high ground east of Panmunjom to eliminate
the possibility of incidents from this quarter.50
General Nam signed the Communist
ratification on 24 October
and the first meeting of the delegates was scheduled for the following day. Thus
after two months the truce conference resumed, but what had happened in the
meantime? There seemed little doubt that the Communists had regained the
propaganda initiative. Despite the staged incidents and the question of validity
of others, there had been enough actual violations to provide the leaven for the
Communist case. If this were the Communist objective in suspending the
meetings, the mission had been successfully
accomplished. But if the Communists had hoped to alter the UNC position on the
38th Parallel and secure substantial concessions by this propaganda campaign,
they had failed. Their action had only strengthened the UNC determination not to
concede.
On the other hand the
Communist tactics had several by-products. The delay
in the negotiations led to increased UNC pressure on the battlefield and in the
air. It provided time for additional training of the South Korean forces and for
the National Police Reserve in Japan. And it also allowed the United States
ample opportunity to consider the shortand long-range situations in the Far
East.
Notes
1 Other members of the pact would be the
United States, United Kingdom, USSR, and France.
2 See article of
the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Warren R. Austin, "International
Unity Against Shifting Soviet Tactics," in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXV, No. 637 (September 10, 1951),
pp. 425ff. See also New York Times, August 7, 1951.
3 Transcript of Proceedings, Tenth Session, Conf at Kaesong, 26 Jul
51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
4 Ibid., Eleventh Session, 27 Jul 51.
5 Ibid., Twelfth Session, 28 Jul 51.
6 Ibid., Thirteenth Session, 29 Jul 51.
7 Ibid.
8 Msg, HNC 148,
Joy to Ridgway, 28 Jul 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 45-D.
9 Msg, HNC 175,
Joy to Ridgway, 4 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. 1, 60-C.
10 Transcript of Proceedings, Nineteenth
Session, Conf at Kaesong, 4 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min
of Conf Mtgs.
11 Msg, C 68881, Ridgway to Joy, 6 Aug 51, in FEC 587.2, bk. 1,
65.
12 Msg, JCS 98216, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Aug
51.
13 Msg, C 68554, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv),
8 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 68-A-1.
14 Transcript of Proceedings, Twentieth
Session, Conf at Kaesong, 10 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min
of Conf Mtgs.
15 (1) Msg, C
68672, CINCFE to JCS, to Aug 51. (2) Msg, JCS 98637, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Aug 51. Msg, JCS 98713, JCS to
CINCFE, 11 Aug 51. All in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 72.
16 Transcript of Proceedings, Twenty-second
Session, Conf at Kacsong, 12 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2,
Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
17 Quoted in
Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military-Political
History (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1957), p. 144.
18 Transcript of
Proceedings, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Sessions, Conf at Kaesong, 13, 14
Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Min of Conf Mtgs.
19 Ibid., Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Sessions, 15, 16 Aug 51.
20 Summary of Proceedings, First and Second Sessions,
Subdelegation Mtgs on item z, 17, 18 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice
Papers, Subdelegation Mtgs.
21 Ibid., Third and
Sixth Sessions, 19, 22 Aug 51.
22 (1) Msg, C 69346, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 109
(2) Msg, JCS 99477, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Aug 51.
23 Rpt of Investigation, Col James C. Murray for CINCUNC, sub: Rpt of
Investigation Alleged Violation of Neutral Zone, 18 Jul 51, in FEC 887.2, Korean
Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
24 (1) Msg, HNC 133, CINCUNC (Adv) to FEAF, 25 Jul 51. (2) Msg, CX 67744, CINCFE to CINCFE
(Adv), 26 Jul 51. Both in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 35.
25 (1) Rpts of Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest and
Replies Concerning Alleged Violation of 7 Aug 51, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean
Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation. (2) Msg, CX 68595, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Aug
51, in FEC 387.2, bk. I, 71.
26 Ltr, Joy to Nam, 14
Aug 51, no sub, Tab 7 in Rpt of Investigation, sub:
Summary of Protest . . . Strafing at Sib Yon Ni, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean
Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
27 Interv, author with Col
Howard S. Levie, Staff Officer for Subcommittee on item 2, 7 Mar 58. In OCMH.
28 Rpt of
Investigation, sub: Summary of Protest . . . 19
Aug 51, Communist Patrol Ambushed, Communist Truck
Attacked, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
29 Rpt of Investigation, sub: Summary of
Protest and Replies . . . Bombing of Kaesong, no date, in FEC 387.2, Korean
Armistice Papers, Rpts of Investigation.
30 Msg, CX 69566, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 116.
31 William H. Vatcher, Jr., Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice
Negotiations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Inc., 1958) , pp. 66-67.
32 Rpts of
Investigation, sub: Summaries of Protest and Replies . . . Flare Dropped Over
Kaesong, etc., no dates, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts of
Investigation.
33 (1) Msgs, HNC 264 and HNC 272, CINCUNC
(Adv) to CINCFE, 24, 28 Aug 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 118-B and 121-B (2) Msg, C
50115, CINCFE to JCS, 3 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 131-B. (3) Msg, JCS 80658,
JCS to CINCFE, 5 Sep 51, in FEC 587.2, bk. II, 135.
34 On 8 September, 48 of the 51 nations
which had been at war with Japan signed the peace treaty at San Francisco. Only
the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia failed to sign. The successful conclusion
of the treaty may also have influenced the Communists to resume negotiations.
35 (1) Msg, CX 50634,
CINCFE to JCS, 11 Sep 51.
(2) Ltr, Joy to Nam, no sub, 11 Sep 51. (S) Ltr, Kim 11 Sung and Peng Teh-huai
to Ridgway, no sub, 19 Sep 51. All in FEC 887.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Rpts
of Investigation.
36 Msg, C 51315,
CINCUNC to JCS, 21 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 147-A.
37 (1) Msg, HNC 815, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 24 Sep 51, in FEC 887.2,
bk. II, 150. (2) Msg, HNC 323, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 25 Sep 51, in FEC
387.2, bk. II, 159.
38 JCS 1776/253, 25 Sep 51, title: Evolution of Recent
Developments Pertaining to Cease-Fire Talks in Korea.
39 Msg, Ridgway to JCS, 1 Oct 51, DA-IN 2201.
40 Memo, Bohlen for Secy State, 4 Oct 51, sub: Rpt on
Trip to Japan and Korea with General Bradley, in G-3 333 Pacific, 12.
41 Msg, HNC 309,
CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 19 Sep 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. II, 146-B.
42 (1) Msg, A 4757 CG FEAF to CINCFE, 12
Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 184. (2) Msg, HNC 353,
CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 12 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 199. (3) Msg, HNC
359, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 14 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 203.
43 Msg, CX 52498, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2,
bk. III, 179.
44 Msg, CX 52506, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 8 Oct 51, in
FEC 587.2, bk. III, 188.
45 Msg, HNC 849, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 10 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III,
189.
46 Memo for Rcd, 16 Oct 51, sub: Liaison Officers' Mtg
Held at Panmunjom, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Liaison Officers Mtgs.
47 (1) Msg, C 53096, CINCFE to JCS, 16 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III,
206. (2) Msg, HNC 374, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC 887.2, bk.
III, 213.
48 (1) Msg, HNC
374, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCFE, 20 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 213. (2) Msg, HNC 376, CINCUNC
(Adv) to CINCFE, 21 Oct gi, in FEC 387.2, bk.
III, 215.
49 Memo for Rcd, Liaison Offcers' Mtg Held
at Panmunjom, 21, 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, Korean Armistice Papers, Liaison
Officers Mtgs.
50 Msg, HNC 381,
CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 22 Oct 51, in FEC 387.2, bk. III, 220.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
