History 
On Line
When General Harrison and his associates walked out of
the tent at Panmunjom on 8 October, they neither knew when they would return nor
if they would come back at all. The possibility that the Communists would alter
their attitude toward repatriation appeared extremely unlikely at that time and
the military pressure that the U.N. Command could hope to muster gave no promise
of producing a change in the enemy's stand. Since the UNC had fallen back upon
its final negotiating position, the discussion phase and the period of
maneuvering were at an end. Until a break occurred in the adamant fronts
presented by both sides, the prospects for a settlement remained remote.
The liaison officers meanwhile continued to
meet at Panmunjom and furnished one point of contact for reflecting a shift in
the situation. The activity on the battlefield, especially during the
October-November operations, provided another. And in the air over North Korea,
the Far East Air Forces did its best to help speed up the enemy's desire to
reach an agreement. To counter the application of military pressure, the
Communists reverted to their old standbys-political and psychological warfare.
But the efficacy of either the UNC or the enemy method was doubtful, since both
had been tried before and found wanting.
The Long Recess: First Phase
The first nonmilitary attack by the
Communists in October was aimed at the UNC tactics at Panmunjom. As soon as the
Harrison team left the tent, the enemy began to charge that the UNC had broken
off the negotiations. Since the onus for ,a collapse in the talks had always
been a sensitive point to the political and military leaders in Washington, they
quickly instructed Clark not to use the term "indefinite recess" in the UNC
statements. They informed him that there was no desire to have the armistice
negotiations debated in any forum other than that of Panmunjom and that all the
efforts of the United States in the U.N. General Assembly were directed towards
facilitating an agreement at the meetings in the
tents.1
As the letters flew back and forth between
the liaison officers in October, the courses adopted by the opponents became
clear. The UNC stand rested upon the conclusion that the Communists had neither
accepted any of the plans offered by the U.N. Command nor proffered any of their
own that were new or reasonable; therefore, the UNC delegation would wait until
the enemy satisfied one of the two conditions listed above before it would
reconvene. Harrison and Clark denied repeatedly that the
UNC had ended the negotiations.2
The Communists, on the other hand, pursued
two tactics. While they pressed their accusations that the UNC had ended the
truce talks, they missed no opportunity to cite UNC violations, real and
alleged, of the neutral zone around Panmunjom. And as the incidence of violence
in the prisoner of war camps started to increase again, the enemy negotiators
strongly censured the UNC for its treatment of the Communist
prisoners.3
To lessen the impact of the enemy's charges
and to explain the UNC position in the negotiations to the rest of the world,
Secretary of State Acheson addressed the U.N. Political Committee on 24 October.
Tracing the beginnings of the talks and the development of the issues, he
admitted that the growth of the conflict over repatriation had been "wholly
unexpected" and "surprising" to the U.N. Command.' He pointed out the
inconsistencies of the position adopted by the USSR in opposing the concept of
no forced repatriation in Korea when it had on various occasions previously
upheld the right of the prisoner of war to choose or refuse repatriation. In
closing he stressed that the UNC was ready to
reconvene the meetings at Panmunjom at any time that the Communists were willing
to accept the "fundamental principle of nonforcible return." 6
While the debates in the General Assembly
over the U.S. resolution against forcible repatriation were going on, other
suggestions and resolutions were brought forth. One of these was an informal
Canadian proposal that the UNC seek a cease-fire in Korea and leave the
nonrepatriate problem to later negotiations. Both Army and State Department
staffs objected to this procedure. To remove the threat of military compulsion
would amount to a surrender of the UNC's most potent weapon, they maintained,
while, at the same time, the Communists would keep their trump card-the UNC
prisoners. The enemy could protract the discussions on the disposition of
prisoners and in the meantime rebuild its airfields, roads, bridges and restock
its supply dumps. If the talks proved fruitless and hostilities again broke out,
the Communist military position could be greatly improved and UNC morale would
be sadly depressed.6
Several weeks later when the joint Chiefs
forwarded their views on the matter to the Secretary of Defense, they endorsed
the ArmyState staff arguments. There could be no justification for giving up the
UNC air superiority in Korea, they told Mr. Lovett, unless the
Communists accepted the concept of no forced repatriation.7
On 17 November the Indian delegation
presented its plan to end the Korean War to the United Nations. The Indian
resolution recognized the U.S. contention that no force should be used to
prevent or effect the return of prisoners to their homeland. Yet in deference to
the Communist stand, it suggested that a repatriation commission, composed of
two Communist and two UNC nations, be set up to receive all the prisoners in the
demilitarized zone. There they would be classified according to nationality and
domicile, as the Communists had wished, and be free to go home. Each side would
have the freedom of explaining to the prisoners their rights, and all prisoners
who still had not chosen repatriation after ninety days would be referred to the
political conference recommended in the armistice agreement. In case the four
members of the repatriation commission could not agree on the interpretation of
the details of handling the prisoners and their disposition, an umpire would be
named by the members or the General Assembly to break any deadlock.8
Although many of the United States allies
favored the Indian proposal, at least in principle, the U.S. official reaction
was quick and adverse. Most of the objections voiced by the United States
concerned the vagueness of the duties and responsibilities that the repatriation
commission would carry out and the indefinite procedure for handling
nonrepatriates. Not only was the time limit of ninety
days too long for the interrogation period, but the U.S. still opposed turning
over the nonrepatriates to a political conference.9
But the Communist response proved to be
even stronger. Soviet Foreign Minister Vishinsky roundly denounced the Indian
plan in the United Nations, and Chou En-lai rejected it by stating on 28
November that the Russiansponsored proposal calling for forcible repatriation
was the only reasonable one. When it came to a vote on 3 December, the U.N.
voted down the USSR's resolution, 40 to 5, and adopted the Indian plan, 54 to 5.
Only the Communist bloc supported the Russian and opposed the Indian proposal.
The latter provided that if the peace conference did not settle the
nonrepatriates' fate in thirty days, the prisoners would be turned over to the
United Nations for disposition.10
There was small chance that the Communists
would pay much heed to the action of the General Assembly in the matter beyond
attacking it vigorously. But the bitter assault that they launched on the Indian
suggestion served two purposes: it alienated public opinion in some of the
neutral countries that had supported this solution; and it helped obscure the
milder disapproval evidenced by the United States.
The unfavorable publicity garnered by the
Communists on this score, however, was soon to be matched by the gathering storm
of unfortunate events taking place in UNC prison camps.
Although the Communist prisoners had been relocated in smaller, more manageable
groups and scattered on a number of islands to lessen the threat of concerted
action, the hard-core leaders and their followers had shown no disposition
toward ending their fight in the compounds.
As already indicated, the problem of
maintaining order and discipline in the Communist enclosures was fraught with
pitfalls. A policy of leniency and laxness would allow the zealous partisans
full opportunity to control and administer the compounds as they saw fit. On the
other hand, a ruthless, hard policy with tight control and discipline meant
continual clashes and bloodshed. The Communists seemed to welcome violence
and-even more-to encourage it. For every man that the UNC was inveigled into
wounding or killing meant another propaganda advantage to the enemy. The
Communist prisoners acted therefore as a double weapon since they forced the UNC
to maintain strong guard forces in the rear and since their agitation placed the
UNC constantly on the defensive to justify its repressive measures.
When the Joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group suggested in early October that the UNC Armistice Delegation
should seek to forestall Communist propaganda gains by charging the enemy with
instigation of the disturbances in the camps each time one occurred, the
delegation agreed that this approach had merit. But it pointed out that seizing
the initiative would probably neither deter the Communists from causing the
disorders nor from magnifying them to suit their purpose. The delegation felt
that if the UNC intended to accuse the enemy of
fomenting trouble, concrete evidence of such activity would have to be presented
to substantiate the charges. This would mean that intercepted orders,
confessions, plans that were uncovered, and other proof of enemy direction would
have to be produced and publicized.11 The concern of the Far East
Command with the enemy's techniques in exploiting the situation in the prison
camps was to produce results later on, but for the time being nothing was done.
Meanwhile the enemy seldom attended a
meeting of the liaison officers without citing a violation of the Geneva
Convention in regard to the treatment of prisoners or an infringement of the
neutral zone around Panmunjom by UNC aircraft or ground troops. On 30 November the Communists alleged that
the UNC had wounded thirty-two prisoners at Koje-do five days earlier and then
went on to claim that during October and November a total of 542 Communist
prisoners had been killed or wounded.12 By the end of the year,
General Nam charged that the UNC had caused 3,059 casualties among the Communist
internees since July 1951 and noted that the Communists had lodged 45 protests
on this score since February 1952.13
The growing toll
in the prison camps caused UNC leaders a great deal of uneasiness as December
began. Direct disobedience of orders was a common occurrence and was usually
countered by direct application of force. Indications from the UNC Prisoner of
War Command pointed to considerable planning among the prisoners for a mass
breakout from the camps in early December and one of the worst trouble spots was
at the civilian internee compounds on Pongam-do, a tiny island not far from
Koje-do.14
It was difficult to understand why Pongam-do had been chosen for a prison
camp site. The island was small and compounds had to be located on the side of a
steeply terraced hill. Since the prisoners were placed on the upper terraces and
access could only be gained by proceeding level by level up the hill, the
Communist internees were given all the advantages of terrain. For some time, the
prisoners at Pongam-do had been getting bolder and bolder. They organized and
conducted military drill in defiance of UNC orders and mounted demonstrations at
will. Among the 9,000 inmates on the island were many of the prisoners who had
been participants in the February 1952 outbreak on Koje-do. They were guarded by
one ROK security. On 14 December matters came to a head. Around 3,600
internees in six compounds were ordered to disband their drilling and to cease
causing a commotion. Instead they formed three ranks on the upper terrace and
locked arms. Others gathered behind this protective screen and began to hurl
rocks and debris on the ROK troops as they ascended the hill to enforce the
order. Ordinarily concussion grenades and nontoxic gas would have been used,
but, in this instance, the prisoners could throw the grenades back down the hill
and a strong crosswind ruled out the employment of gas. Thus, when orders and
warning shots were disregarded, the ROK soldiers began to take aim at the solid,
defiant ranks above them. At close range the bullets opened gaps in the human
chain and resistance collapsed. But when the melee was over, 85 prisoners lay
dead, 113 were hospitalized, and there were over 100 minor injuries. Only four
ROK personnel received major wounds.15
The affair at Pongam-do again led to a
flurry of activity on POW matters. Clark told Van Fleet to have available one
U.S. infantry battalion that could be shifted to the Korean Communications Zone
on twenty-four hours' notice and authorized General Herren to utilize one
battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division on the prisoner of war mission. When
Herren asked that helicopters be furnished so that tear gas grenades could be
dropped on rioters to disperse them without casualties, Clark approved
his request.16
These measures would help to cope with the results of the prisoner agitation if
not with the causes.
To strengthen his hand against further
outbreaks in the prison camps, Clark pressed anew for authority to establish a
U.N. military commission to try prisoners charged with postcapture offenses. His
urgings in July and August had elicited no positive action, despite the support
of General Collins, but with the example of Pongam-do fresh in the news, Clark
reminded his superiors that the lack of appropriate judicial machinery weakened
the disciplinary powers of the camp commanders.17 In view of the
legal and political complications involved in conducting trials of prisoners of
war, the U.S. political and military leaders had been reluctant to use this
weapon in the past, but Clark's plea reopened the matter. Speedy action
approving such authority, however, appeared to be out of the question, since the
JCS intended to have the entire POW problem reviewed at the highest
level.18 This
meant consideration by the new President and his advisors and would take time.
Pongam-do produced protests from the
Communists and criticism by the International Committee of the Red Cross of the
methods used by the U.N. Command. The latter complaint was more difficult to
cope with, for the ICRC was highly regarded throughout the non-Communist world.
In answer to the Red Cross
allegation that the UNC control of prisoners had been overly strict and the
members of the security forces had been unnecessarily harassing the prisoners,
Clark issued a statement defending the UNC actions and attacking the Communist
prisoners' behavior. He reminded the ICRC representatives that the UNC had
voluntarily observed the Geneva Convention while the Communists had ignored it.
When it came to deliberate disobedience, marked by mutiny, riots, or refusal to
carry out orders, on the one hand, and terrorism in the camps, on the other, the
UNC had used force, but only after all other methods had been tried. Clark
pointed out that the UNC had constantly sought to improve the physical
facilities and supply procedures for the camps and that only the pro-Communist
enclosures, whose inmates had never accepted their nonbelligerent status as
prisoners, had turned to organized violence.19
Despite the voluminousness of the enemy's
protests during the latter part of 1952, Clark did not believe that the
Communists had any intention of terminating the negotiations. The continuous
barrage of enemy grievances seemed designed, in his opinion, to play upon the
fears of the United States' allies and to create sympathy for the Communist
position on prisoners of war.20
Nevertheless, the Far East commander took
steps to lessen the opportunities of the prisoners to
incite unrest. To eliminate the necessity for visiting the latrines at night,
the prison command installed facilities in each barracks. In the corridors
between the compounds guards were armed with shotguns so that prisoners moving
around in disobedience to the camp curfew could be identified by the buckshot
they absorbed, but not killed or seriously injured.21
In early January, the Department of the
Army and the Far East Command decided that the time had come to expose the
Communist methods and techniques of stirring up trouble in the prison camps. The
Military Intelligence Section, G-2, of the FEC was assigned the task of
compiling a report on the organization, control, and methods used by the enemy
to exploit their faithful followers and to demonstrate the problems facing the
U.N. Command as it attempted to deal with the matter. The end result was the
study entitled The Communist War at POW Camps,
published in late January.22 The press reaction in the United States
to the release of this report was highly favorable, but complete copies were not
available there and full advantage of the study could not be
attained.23
The enemy seemed to hold the upper hand in
the battle of indirect pressures as 1953 began. However, the UNC still retained
several weapons that it had not used. In
mid-December, Col. Charles W. McCarthy, senior UNC liaison officer, had urged
that the UNC strike back. In a letter to the joint Strategic Plans and
Operations Group he pointed out that the UNC pilots were allowing the Communists
to utilize the PyongyangKaesong road for convoys to the truce area every day. In
effect, what this meant, McCarthy continued, was that the enemy had a main
supply route open all day despite the fact that the negotiations were in recess.
He proposed that the UNC cut back the number of convoys permitted the enemy to
three or less a week and require the Communists to adhere to a tight timetable
for each trip allowed. Such action would strike a blow at the enemy and perhaps
let the people back home know that the UNC was not adopting a passive approach
to the Communists' behind-the-scenes tactics.24
Thus, when the liaison officers met on 15
January, Colonel McCarthy's successor, Col. William B. Carlock, informed Col. Ju
Yon, who had recently taken Colonel Chang's place, of the new UNC policy.
Starting on 25 January, the Communists would be allowed to run only two convoys
a week as long as the negotiations were in recess. One would leave P'yongyang
and the other Kaesong every Sunday morning; both would be required to finish
their journeys by 2000. To the protest by the Communists that the UNC could not
unilaterally break the agreement of November 1951, Colonel Carlock informed Ju
that there was no "agreement" on the immunity granted the Communists,
since the enemy had not extended any like
consideration to the UNC.25
The Republicans Take Over
When Dwight D. Eisenhower became President
of the United States on 20 January, John Foster Dulles succeeded Dean Acheson as Secretary of
State and Charles E. Wilson became Secretary of Defense. Yet, as noted above,
there was no basic change in U.S. policy insofar as the Korean War was
concerned. The new administration had no panacea for ending the conflict
expeditiously and no intention of expanding the military pressure to force a
settlement upon the Communists. On the whole the Republicans adopted the policy
of watchful waiting pursued by the Truman administration.
The new President quickly changed one of
the procedures followed by Mr. Truman during his term of office. No longer were
all the important messages concerning the Korean War routed across his desk for
final approval. This task now fell largely to the Secretaries of State and
Defense and Mr. Dulles' role in the making of Korean policy increased during the
early months of 1953.
In one substantive respect, too, President
Eisenhower swiftly divorced himself from the course followed by his predecessor.
In his State of the Union message to Congress on 2
February, Mr. Eisenhower revealed that he had decided
to end the U.S. naval blockade of Taiwan.
No longer would the U.S. Seventh Fleet
serve as a screen for the Chinese Communists and prevent Chiang Kai-shek from
attacking the mainland, the President affirmed. As might be expected, reaction
to this shift was loud and varied. General MacArthur, Senator Robert A. Taft of
Ohio, Chiang Kai-shek, and President Rhee all supported the rescinding of the
restriction, while leading Democrats and prominent newspapermen in Great Britain
and India immediately voiced their concern lest the act provoke an extension of
the war into the Taiwan area. Backers of the President hailed the "unleashing"
of Chiang's forces and praised Eisenhower for having seized the initiative in
the battle with communism. But if it were true that the enemy might be confused
and forced to guess at the next move that the United States might make, it was
also fair to state that the sword was two-edged. It was also conceivable that
the Communist Chinese might attack Taiwan.
British Foreign Secretary Eden was quite
cool to the "unilateral" decision taken by the new government without
consultation with its allies and warned that the move might "have very
unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages."
In India, one newspaper accused the President of "hunting peace with a gun."
26
Despite the excitement generated by this
announcement, there was no sudden outbreak of operations in the Taiwan sector.
The Nationalist Chinese forces had but few landing craft and only a small number
of their troops were amphibiously trained. Without greater support in equipment
from the United States and the preparation of more divisions for assault
landings, the Nationalist threat could become little more than a threat. The
principal result of the "unleashing" was to stir up the political and diplomatic
waters of the world, while those about Taiwan remained militarily serene. As the
historian of the Far East Naval Forces remarked: "Despite internal uneasiness
over the decision, it did not have the immediate strategic significance
expected, and, tactically, had no effect on the operation of the Formosa
Patrol." 27
Gradually the Eisenhower administration
became more familiar with the problems in Korea and began to consider what
positive steps could be taken within the accepted political framework to break
the impasse. Once again the concept of unilateral release of the nonrepatriates
and the presentation to the Communists of a fait accompli was revived and Clark
was asked to comment on this approach. Because of the sensitivity of the matter,
Clark sent a member of his staff, Lt. Col. Arthur W. Kogstad, to Washington to
present his views. Meeting with Washington officials in early March, Kogstad
informed the group that Clark was fully in favor of releasing the Korean
nonrepatriates and did not think that such a move would have an appreciable
effect upon the UNC's prospects for an armistice in Korea. As for the Chinese
nonrepatriates, their disposition would require careful attention, since it
would have political implications. Kogstad later reported that the tenor of
opinion among the conferees attending the meeting had been
favorable to Clark's recommendation, but other factors were at work. Mr. Dulles,
who had a major hand in making policy in Mr. Eisenhower's administration, was
busy with the U.N. General Assembly and unable to devote his time to the POW
question in early March. Then, too, the sudden demise of Joseph Stalin of a
cerebral hemorrhage on 5 March had injected any number of new elements into the
world political picture, and time was required to assess them before bold
ventures were embarked upon.28 At any rate time overtook the concept
of unilateral release insofar as the U.N. Command was concerned and the next
time it reared its head, it bore the visage of Syngman Rhee.29
The rash of incidents in the prison camps
meanwhile continued unabated. Clark decided in February to sound out the new
political chiefs on the old question of trial of prisoners for their postcapture
offenses. Pointing out that the publication of the study of the Communist
prisoners had raised questions among the press and his own troops as to why no
disciplinary action had been taken against the prison leaders, Clark requested
immediate consideration for this pressing problem.30
The Far East commander received some solace
in late February. In cases of flagrant attack against UNC security personnel,
the JCS told him, Clark might bring the offenders to justice, but no undue publicity would be given to the trials. This was only a
halfway measure. Clark immediately protested, since most of the violence had
been directed at fellow prisoners rather than at the U.N. Command. In the face
of this reclama, the JCS secured authority for the UNC to try prisoners charged
with offenses committed after June 1952 against other prisoners.31
Despite this apparent victory, events
conspired to delay the trial and punishment of the Communist troublemakers in
the prison camps. Before the Far East Command brought the first cases to court,
the State Department wanted to line up judicial support and participation in the
trials from the United States' allies in Korea. By the end of March, however,
only four nations had agreed to serve on military commissions.32 This
reluctance to share the responsibility for trying prisoners of war for
postcapture offenses and the swift flow of developments on the negotiating front
in late March seemed to offer small hope that the ringleaders of violence would
ever come to trial.
The Communist threat to Seoul in February,
discussed in the preceding chapter, produced several exchanges between Tokyo and
Washington concerning the neutral city of Kaesong. Under the October 1951
agreement, Kaesong was protected from UNC attack. Yet, Clark told the JCS in
early February, the enemy was using the town for restaging
troops, for resupply, and as an espionage headquarters. If and when he became
convinced that a major Communist offensive was in the offing, Clark wanted
authority to abrogate the 1951 agreement and attack Kaesong. On 9 February, just two days
after his initial request, the United Nations commander asked for permission to
open up Kaesong to assault.33
When Clark's recommendation came up for
discussion in Washington, Mr. Dulles urged that the U.N. Command should
unilaterally abrogate the security agreement of 1951 as of a specific date and
remove Kaesong and Munsan, but not Panmunjom, from a neutral status, if an enemy
offensive of division size or larger seemed imminent. The JCS, in passing the
decision on to Clark, pointed out that such an action would help alleviate an
adverse military situation, while lessening the political implications that the
negotiations were being completely broken off.34 As it turned out,
the large-scale Communist offensive failed to materialize and Clark did not have
to retract Kaesong's immunity.
The Big Break
Amidst the search for ways and means to
apply pressure upon the enemy and to strengthen General Clark's hand in the
conflict, the UNC made a rather perfunctory gesture that, at the time, seemed to
offer little chance of a favorable response. Back in December, Clark had read a
news despatch from Geneva which reported that the Executive Committee of the
League of Red Cross Societies had passed a resolution on 13 December calling for the
immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Clark suggested that, although
he did not think the Communists would agree to such an exchange in the light of
their previous reaction to similar proposals, he felt that the UNC should
support the resolution for its psychological and publicity value.35
No action was taken on his suggestion until
February. Then the State Department learned that the question of an exchange of
sick and wounded would probably be raised when the U.N. General Assembly met on
24 February. The political
advantage in having the United States propose and support a resolution of this
nature was obvious and the State Department had little difficulty in securing
the approval of the JCS and of Clark.36
On 22
February the Far East commander thus sent a letter to
Kim and Peng requesting an immediate exchange of sick and injured prisoners. He
believed they would turn it down, as they had earlier efforts along this
line.37
The matter lay fallow during the remainder
of the month and most of March. In the meantime, the enemy sustained the flow of complaints on
prisoner of war incidents, infringements of the vital area by UNC aircraft, and
even resurrected the charge that the UNC was resorting to germ warfare. On
24 February Clark issued a
statement refuting the Chinese claim that captured American personnel had
admitted the employment of germ warfare. He pointed out that Communists
evidently expected new outbreaks of disease during the spring and were trying to
cover up the inadequacy of their own health service to cope with epidemics. In
conclusion, he reaffirmed that the U.N. command had never engaged in germ
warfare in Korea.38
As March opened, events began to change the
world situation dramatically. Stalin's successor, Georgi M. Malenkov, assumed
the reins of government on 5 March and another transition period for world
communism was inaugurated. Whether the policies of the new controlling group
surrounding Malenkov would differ radically from those of Stalin was unknown,
but that there would have to be a period of consolidation to establish Malenkov
and his associates in power seemed self-evident. Under the circumstances, the
United States and its allies cautiously awaited indications of the direction
that the Malenkov regime intended to take.
Although the Communist prisoners of war
seemed little affected by Stalin's death and mounted an attack on the prison
commandant on the island of Yoncho-do on 7 March, which resulted in the death of
twenty-three prisoners and the wounding of sixty more, there were signs that a
shift in Soviet strategy might be
approaching.39 On 21 March Moscow radio, for the first time since the close of World
War II, admitted that the United States and Great Britain had played a role in
the defeat of the Axis Powers. The Russians also agreed to intervene to obtain
the release of nine British diplomats and missionaries held captive in North
Korea since the outbreak of the Korean War. In Germany, the Soviet reaction to
the West German ratification of the European Defense Community treaty was fairly
mild.40 The possibility that a new Communist peace offensive was in the making
evoked a spirit of hope in diplomatic circles throughout the non-Communist world.
The big break came on 28 March. Replying to Clark's request
for the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, Kim and Peng said that they were
perfectly willing to carry out the provisions of the Geneva Convention in this
respect and then went on to state: "At the same time, we consider that the
reasonable settlement of the question of exchanging sick and injured prisoners
of both sides during the period of hostilities should be made to lead to the
smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving
an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing."
41
What the Communist leaders meant by their
vague reference to a "smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of
war" was a matter of conjecture, but their acceptance of the sick and wounded
exchange promoted optimism.
Clark immediately told the JCS that he
would go ahead with the arrangements for the sick and wounded through the
liaison officers, but would decline to resume plenary sessions until the enemy
either came forward with a constructive proposal or demonstrated willingness to
accept one of the offers that the UNC had made.42 In their reply, his
superiors suggested that Clark's letter imply that the Communists intended to
meet in substance the UNC position on prisoners if the negotiations were
reconvened. In this way the burden would be placed upon the enemy to
either agree to that assumption or admit publicly that there was no change in
their stand on repatriation. In no case, the Washington leaders concluded, would
the resumption of negotiations be tied in as a condition for the exchange of the
sick and wounded.43 Clark followed the instructions and dispatched
his response to Kim and Peng on 31 March.44
While Tokyo and Washington pondered
the significance of the Communist move, Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister of
Communist China, provided a measure of clarification. On 30 March he issued a
statement covering the course of the negotiations and the agreements already
reached. Chou then went on to the prisoner of war problem and offered what
apparently was the key concession, as he urged that both sides "should undertake
to repatriate immediately after the cessation of hostilities all those prisoners
of war in their custody who insist upon repatriation and to hand over the
remaining prisoners of war to a neutral state so as
to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation." Lest the U.N.
Command assume that the enemy had surrendered its views on repatriation, Chou
strongly affirmed that the Communists believed that the
prisoners of war had been filled with apprehensions and were afraid to return
home "under the intimidation and with oppression of the opposite side." He was
confident that once explanations could be tendered to the prisoners, they would
quickly decide to be repatriated.45 At any rate, the Chou
proposal, which was quickly seconded by Kim Il Sung the following day, presented
the brightest hope of settling the Korean War since screening in April 1952.
The initial reaction to Chou's
communication in Washington was continued caution. While not denying that it
held promise, the U.S. leaders maintained that the Communists still had to come
forward with a detailed plan for implementing their proposal. They could
foresee a number of questions that would have to be answered
such as: What did Chou mean by a "neutral" state? Where would the neutral state
take over control of the prisoners- in or outside of Korea? Who would make the
explanations? Who would determine the final disposition of the nonrepatriates?
If the Communists went forward with the exchange of sick and wounded and
produced a detailed statement indicating their good faith in desiring a
settlement of the over-all problem, the American leaders were willing to permit
concurrent discussion of Chou's proposal during the exchange.46
Clark agreed fully that the enemy must
produce a concrete plan for discussion before the plenary sessions could
reconvene and that the Communist performance in following through on the sick
and wounded trade would provide a demonstration of their good faith. In a letter
to the enemy leaders on 5 April, he proposed that the liaison officers meet the
following day and requested that Kim and Peng furnish the UNC with more
particulars on the Communist method for disposition of the nonrepatriation
question.47
In preparation for the first meeting of the
liaison officers on the arrangements for the transfer of the sick and wounded,
Clark and his staff formulated a UNC plan. It contemplated that each prisoner to
be exchanged would be brought to Panmunjom, furnished with a medical tag on his
condition and treatment and given unmarked, serviceable clothing. No
incapacitated prisoner accused of postcapture war crimes would be held back for
this reason, since it did not appear probable now that war crimes trials would
ever be held. To insure that the enemy return the maximum number of UNC
personnel, Clark told Harrison to avoid the use of the term "seriously" sick and
wounded. As for the treatment of the prisoners turned back to the UNC through
the exchange, Clark wanted to permit the members of the press and other news media to observe the whole process, but to restrict
their numbers to fifty at Panmunjom and to allow interviews only with the
prisoners selected by medical personnel as physically and mentally up to being
questioned.48
Operation LITTLE SWITCH
Admiral Daniel and General Lee Sang Cho led
the liaison officers groups when they gathered at Panmunjom on 6 April. Relieved
of the task of lodging and refuting charges and complaints, the representatives
quickly got down to business and Admiral Daniel launched into an account of the
UNC proposal. The United Nations Command was ready to start immediate
construction of the facilities necessary for the delivery and receipt of the
sick and wounded at Panmunjom and to begin delivery of 500 prisoners a day
within seven days of the agreement on procedures. To expedite matters Daniel
suggested that each side turn over its lists of names and nationalities of the
prisoners to be exchanged and that officers be appointed to discuss
administrative details. Lee pointed out that the Communists wanted to repatriate
all sick and wounded eligibles under Articles
109 and 110 of the Geneva
Convention.49
After some
hesitation, while the UNC checked the Geneva Convention carefully, Daniel
informed the Communists on 7 April that his side was prepared to repatriate all
prisoners eligible under the two articles, subject to the proviso that no
individual would be repatriated against his will. Daniel stressed that the UNC
would give the broadest interpretation possible to the term "sick and
wounded."50
The effort of the United Nations Command to
encourage the enemy to return as many prisoners as possible met with a
disappointing response. When Lee announced the total on 8 April of 450 Korean and 150 non-Korean sick and wounded, Daniel
called the figure "incredibly small." Actually, considering that the enemy was
returning 600 of the 12,000 prisoners under its control, or 5
percent, the figure compared favorably with that
presented by the UNC. For the latter intended to transfer 800 Chinese and
5,100 Koreans over to the
enemy out of the 132,000 prisoners in its custody and this averaged out to only about
4.5 percent. Nevertheless,
Daniel again asked the Communists to be more liberal in their classification of
the sick and wounded.51 As he told Clark after the meeting, the enemy
liaison officers relaxed their strained attitudes visibly after the UNC
disclosed its figures and he felt that he should press strongly for an increase
in the totals the UNC would receive.52
In the succeeding days the details were
gradually worked out. Security guards at Panmunjom
were increased to thirty for each side during the exchange period and the UNC
agreed to let the Communists move the prisoners up to the conference area in
convoys of five vehicles over routes that were clearly marked out.53
The agreement that was signed on
t t April completed the
general arrangements. Within ten days the exchange at Panmunjom would begin,
with the enemy delivering 100 and the UNC 500
a day in groups of 25
at a time. Rosters prepared by nationality, including
name, rank, and serial number would accompany each group and receipts would be
signed for a group as it was turned over to the other side.54
April 20
was established as the date for initiating
LITTLE SWITCH, as the U.N.
Command dubbed the operation, and in the interim trucks and trains began to
transport the Communist prisoners north from Koje-do and the other offshore
islands. On 14 April,
twenty-three vehicles left the North Korean prison camps with the first
contingent of UNC sick and wounded. Five days later the first trainload of enemy
prisoners set out from Pusan to Munsan. But even as the Communist invalids
prepared to go home, they sought to embarrass the UNC. Some refused a new issue
of clothing because the letter "P" for prisoner had not been stenciled on the
shirts. Others would not permit UNC personnel to dust them with DDT powder.
Demonstrations broke out, with chanting and singing, until camp authorities
warned the leaders that failure to obey orders would result in loss of their
opportunity for repatriation. As the prisoners rode to
the waiting LST for shipment to the mainland, they threw away their rations of
tooth powder, soap, and cigarettes with hand-printed propaganda messages cached
inside, charging the United States with "starvation, oppression and barbarous
acts against the Korean people." At Pusan they demanded the right of inspection
of hospital facilities before they debarked and had to be told they would be
forcibly removed unless they complied with instructions. Some of the Chinese
went on a hunger strike for several meals because they claimed that the food had
been poisoned. When the time came for the final train ride from Pusan to Munsan,
many of the prisoners cut off buttons, severed
the half-belts of their overcoats, and removed their shoelaces in an attempt to
create the impression that they had been poorly treated.55
As the U.N. Command gathered all of the
Communist prisoners eligible for return, it discovered that there were more than
5,800 who could be repatriated. The question immediately arose whether to
include the additional 550 Communists in the exchange or to adhere to the
original tally. General Clark felt that the advantages of demonstrating the good faith of the UNC and of possibly
spurring the enemy to increase its total of returnees outweighed the
disadvantages of introducing a new figure and his superiors agreed.56
A new element was injected into the
situation after LITTLE SWITCH got under way on 20 April. When the UNC sick and wounded
were delivered to Panmunjom
they were rushed back to Munsan for initial processing. Some were then flown to
Japan for rest and treatment preparatory to shipment home, while the ROK
patients were transferred to base hospitals in South
Korea. As the press descended upon the prisoners for accounts of their
experiences while in Communist hands, stories arose of other ill and injured
prisoners still remaining in the enemy camps. Harrison quickly suggested that
the UNC use the 550 extra Communist prisoners as a lever to pry more UNC
personnel away from the enemy. But Clark preferred that Harrison simply ask the
Communists to reexamine the matter, since many prisoners might not be in a fit
condition to be moved.57
Whether the enemy was influenced by the UNC
revelation that it was going to turn over 550 more patients than originally
estimated, or by the uproar that the press stories of the UNC sick and wounded
reportedly still in Communist custody occasioned in the United States, was
difficult to ascertain. On 23 April, however, the Communists did announce that
they would also exceed the 600 figure that they had submitted.58
Hoping to encourage further
relaxation of the Communists' standards, the
UNC added more enemy prisoners to its list, but on 26
April General Lee abruptly stated that his side had completed its share of the
exchange. When Admiral Daniel protested that evidence in UNC possession showed
that there were still about 375 UNC sick and wounded who could be repatriated,
Lee termed it a groundless accusation and refused to consider the matter. Faced
with an unyielding stand, the U.N. Command on 3 May finished delivering the last
group of Communists that it intended to turn over.59
The final tally of deliveries
disclosed that the UNC had relieved itself of 5,194 North Korean and
1,030 Chinese soldiers and
446 civilian internees, for a total of 6,670. Of these patients 357 were litter
cases. In return the enemy had brought 684 assorted sick and wounded, including
94 litter cases, to Panmunjom.60
Perhaps the Communists had not been as
liberal as many had hoped, but at least they had carried out their part of the
bargain and thrown in a small bonus. In the light of this performance and the
apparent disposition of the enemy to put an end to the shooting war in Korea,
the resumption of plenary negotiations seemed to be in order.
Preparations for the Return to Plenary Sessions
While the Communists were evidencing their
sincerity in following through with the LITTLE SWITCH exchange, General
Clark and his advisors sought to find out more about the intent and extent of
the concession that Chou had offered on 30 March. As already pointed out, the
Chinese statement had produced a mixed atmosphere of hope and caution throughout
the non-Communist world, but it had been couched in such vague terms that it
generated more questions than it answered. Clark's letter to Kim and Peng on 5
April had asked for further details and clarification.
The response came from Nam Il rather
than his superiors on 9 April. Repeating in essence the same line that Chou had used about the
Communist desires to find a peaceful solution to the conflict and to permit the
prisoners to return home quickly, Nam went on:
It is precisely on the basis
of this principle of repatriation of all prisoners of war that our side firmly
maintain that the detaining side should ensure that no coercive means whatsoever
be employed against all the prisoners of war in its custody to obstruct their
returning home . . . . The Korean and Chinese side does not acknowledge that
there are prisoners of war who are allegedly unwilling to be repatriated.
Therefore the question of the so-called 'forced repatriation' or 'repatriation
by force' does not exist at all, and we have always opposed this assertion.
Based on this stand of ours, our side maintains that those captured personnel of
our side who are filled with apprehensions and are afraid to return home as a
result of having been subjected to intimidation and oppression, should be handed
over to a neutral state, and through explanations given by our side, gradually
freed from apprehensions . . . .61
Based on Nam's reply, the problem was quite
simple-if the U.N. Command would stop trying to detain the prisoners forcibly
and would hand them over to a neutral nation, the Communists would soon convince
the so-called nonrepatriates of the needlessness of their fears and all would be
glad to go home. It was a glib attempt to save face and dismiss their concession
as only procedural and not substantive.
Although Nam's letter failed to answer the
questions that the Washington leaders had raised earlier on the identity of the
neutral nation or on the treatment of the nonrepatriates once they were
surrendered to the neutral nation, these were details that the plenary
conference would have to settle. But to maintain the initiative, the UNC
notified Nam on 16 April that since his letter had not offered concrete
proposals, it assumed that the Communists were either ready to accept one of the
UNC's earlier plans or to offer a constructive one of their own. To prepare the
enemy with some idea of what the UNC considered constructive, Harrison cited
Switzerland as a neutral state in view of its long tradition in this respect and
urged that the neutral state take custody of the nonrepatriates in Korea itself.
As for the time limit for persuading the nonrepatriates to come back home, sixty
days appeared sufficient. In closing Harrison warned that if the plenary
meetings did not give promise of an acceptable agreement within a reasonable
time, the UNC would recess them again.62
On the eve of the LITTLE SWITCH Operation, Admiral Daniel proposed 23
April as a date for the resumption of plenary conferences, but the Communist
representative preferred 25 April. Later on they postponed the opening date to
26 April.63
The few days before the first meeting
proved a busy period of last-minute preparations and instructions. Clark told
Harrison to reject the Soviet Union or any of its satellites as candidates for
the neutral state role and to insist upon the retention of the nonrepatriates in
Korea. In response to the Far East commander's request for acceptable nominations for the neutral state, his
superiors advanced Switzerland and Sweden in that order. They felt that he could
agree to a go-day limit for the custody of the nonrepatriates by neutral
nations. As a talking point, General Collins told Clark that the U.N. Command
should emphasize the fact that it had the absolute legal right to grant asylum
and was making a major concession in permitting a neutral nation to assume
control of the nonrepatriate prisoners.64
To acquaint Clark with current policy on a
Korean settlement, the JCS forwarded some basic instructions on 23 April for his
guidance. The first two items were direct inheritances from the previous
administration and reaffirmed that it was to the interest of the United States
to obtain an acceptable armistice, yet not at the expense of a compromise on the
principle of no forced repatriation. Until proved to the contrary, the
instructions stated, the Communist proposal would be taken at its face value;
however, the United States would not countenance long and inconclusive haggling.
Since the UNC had seized the initiative through the Harrison suggestions of 16
April, it should strive to retain this favorable position to keep the enemy on
the defensive. Any of the former plans submitted by the UNC would be
satisfactory as a basis for agreement, but it might be desirable to confine the
task of processing nonrepatriates to the Chinese and to release the
North Koreans without further processing, the instructions concluded.65
Thus, in the six months of recess, the top
political personnel in the United States had been replaced, but the politics
lingered on. The new leaders had tried several minor expedients to induce the
Communists to halt the fighting in Korea and the enemy had reciprocated with its
own brand of pressure. Under ordinary circumstances, this game could have been
played indefinitely, without reaching a decision. But, with the death of Stalin,
the balance shifted to the advantage of the U.N. Command. It would appear from
Soviet actions in March and April that the removal of external distractions such
as the Korean affair with its drain on Russian resources acquired a new sense of
urgency during the period of consolidation of power. As part of the new peace
offensive, or as Secretary Dulles termed it, peace
"defensive," launched after Stalin's demise, the Communists' concession on the
nonrepatriate question dangled the hope of a settlement before the eyes of the
United States and its allies.66 Based on past experience, however,
the UNC was properly cautious as it prepared to discover just what the
Communists had in mind. The brightening prospect for an armistice was tempered
by the rising tide of opposition in South Korea to any agreement that accepted a
disunited Korea. In the critical days that lay ahead the UNC might well find it
more difficult to deal with the dissension behind its lines than with the enemy.
Notes
1 Msg, JCS 920838, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Oct 52.
2 (1) Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 15 Oct 52, no sub. (2) Ltr,
Clark to Kim and Peng, 19 Oct 52. Both in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held
at Pan Mun Jom, 1952, bk. II.
3 Ltrs, Nam to Harrison, 16 and 29
Oct 52, no sub, in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, 1952,
bk. II.
4 From the context it is
evident that Secretary Acheson used the term "UNC" loosely, encompassing the
political and military leadership in the U.S. and other allied U.N. countries.
As already noted, General Ridgway had had misgivings about the UNC position on
voluntary repatriation before it became the official stand. See Chapter VII,
above.
5 Department of State Publication 4771, The Problem of
Peace in Korea, a report by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, October 24,
1952 (Washington, 1952).
6 G-3 and State Dept Staff
Paper, no title, no date (ca. 28 Oct 52) , in G-3 091 Korea, 3/22.
7 Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 17 Nov 52, sub: U.S. Position on Korea . . . .
8 Msg, DA 924505, G-3 to
CINCFE, 22 Nov 52.
9 (1) Msg, DA 924551,
G-S to CINCFE, 23
Nov 52. (2) U.S. Reaction to India's Proposal on Prisoners of War, Statement
made by Secretary Acheson, in Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVII, No. 702 (December 8, 1952) , pp . 910ff.
10 Text of Resolution on Prisoners of War, 3 Dec 52, in Dept of State Bulletin, vol XXVII, No.
702 (December 8,
1952) , pp . 916-17.
11 Ltr, Col S.
D. Somerville, Exec to UNC Delegation, to Chief JSPOG, 14 Oct 52, sub: Letter on
POW Incidents, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan-31 Dec 52.
12 Memo for
Rcd, sub: Liaison Officers' Mtgs, 30 Nov 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Nov 52, incls
1-89, incl 1.
13 Ltr, Nam to
Harrison, 30 Dec 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incls 1
and 2.
14 Msg, CX 59869, CINCUNC to DA, 8 Dec 52,
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 6.
15 Msg, CX 60206
and CX 60301, CINCUNC to DA, 15 and 18 Dec 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 8.
16 (1) Msg, CX 60234, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 16 Dec 52. (2)
Msg, CX 60303, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 18 Dec 52. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt,
Dec 52, incls 1-78, incls 9 and 10.
17 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 19 Dec 52, sub: Trial of POW's for Post-Captive
Offenses, in G-3 383.6, 64.
18 Msg, JCS 928298, JCS to CINCFE, to Jan 53.
19 (1) Msg, C 60412, CINCFE to DA, 21 Dec
52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Dec 52, incls 1-78, incl 19. (2) Msg, CX 60820,
CINCUNC to CSUSA, 5 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67, incl 16.
20 Msg, CX 60789, CINCFE to
JCS, 2 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls
1-67, incl 15.
21 (1) Msg, CX 60811, CINCUNC to Herren, 3 Jan 53. (2) Msg, AX 72028,
Herren to Clark, 8 Jan 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls i-67, incls
17 and 18.
22 Msg, DA 928223, DA to
CINCFE, 9 Jan 53.
23 (1) Msg, ZX
35682, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jan 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jan 53, incls 1-67, incl
23. (2) Msg, DA 930068, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jan
53.
24 Ltr, McCarthy to Col Donald
H. Galloway, Deputy Chief JSPOG, 16 Dec 52, no sub, in FEC SGS Corresp File, 1 Jan-31 Dec 52.
25 Ltr, Carlock to Ju, 15 Jan 53, no sub. (2) Ltr, Ju to
Carlock, 21 Jan 53, no sub. (3) Liaison Officers Mtgs, 21 Jan 53. All in G-3 File, Liaison
Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
26 The reaction to the 2
February speech may be found in the New York
Times, February 3, 4 1953.
27 COMNAVFE, Comd and Hist Rpt, Jan, Feb 53, p. 4.
28 A good
account of the Kogstad mission will be found in Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice
Negotiations (May 52-Jul 53), vol. g, pt. 1,
pp. 271ff. See also Clark, From
the Danube to the Yalu, p. 262.
29 See Chapter XX,
below.
30 Msg, CX
61135, CINCUNC to DA, 4 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls 1-88, incl
15.
31 (1) Msg, DA 931969, JCS to CINCFE, 21
Feb 53. (2) Msg, CX 61323, CINCUNC to DA, 24 Feb 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb
53, incls 1-88, incl 17. (3) Msg, JCS 932476, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Feb 53.
32 (1) Msg, JCS 933135, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Mar 53. (2) Msgs, CX 61627 and
CX 61647, CINCUNC to G-3, 25 and 27 Mar 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 53,
incls 1-72, incls 13 and 14.
33 Msgs, CX 61160 and CX 61173, CINCUNC to JCS, 7 and 9
Feb 53, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 495, in JSPOG Files.
34 (1) Memo,
Eddleman for CofS, 12 Feb 53, sub: Abrogation of Security Agreement Re
Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan, in G-3 091 Korea, 12/4. (2) Msg, JCS 931311, JCS to
CINCFE, 14 Feb 53.
35 Msg, CX 6008, CINCUNC to G-3, 21 Dec 52,
DA-IN 220029.
36 (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 16 Feb 53,
sub: Proposal to Exchange Sick and Wounded POW's, in G-3 3836, 13/4. (2) Msg,
JCS 931724, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Feb 53. (3) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to DA, 19 Feb 53,
DA-IN 239084.
37 (1) Msg, CX 61281, Clark to DA, 19 Feb
53, DA-IN 239084. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 22 Feb 53, no sub, in G-3
file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
38 Msg, Z 35882, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb 53,
in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Feb 53, incls1-88, incl
7.
39 Msg, EX
13188, CG AFFE to DA, g Mar 58, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Mar 58, incls 1-72, incl
16.
40 New York Tines, March 20, 21, 25,
1958.
41 Ltr, Kim and Peng to Clark, 28 Mar 58,
no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk.
III.
42 Msg, CX
61673, Clark to JCS, 29 Mar 53, DA-IN 252152.
43 Msg, JCS 935136, JCS to CINCUNC, 30 Mar
53.
44 Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 31 Mar 53,
no sub, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk.
III.
45 Statement
of Chou En-lai, 30 Mar 53, in G-3 file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun
Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
46 Msg, JCS 935344, JCS to CINCUNC,
1 Apr 53. The message was
drafted by the State Department and approved by the Services, General Bradley,
and the Department of Defense.
47 (1) Msg, C 61723, Clark to JCS, 3
April 53, DA-IN 253841. (2) Ltr, Clark to Kim and Peng, 5 Apr 53, no sub, in G-3
file, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun 53, bk. III.
48 (1) Msgs, CX 6174, and 61743, Clark to
JCS, 4 Apr 53, DA-IN's 254454 and 254434 (2) Msg, CX 61751, CINCUNC to CINCUNC
(Adv), 4 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 7. (3) Msg, CX 61767, Clark to DA, 6
Apr 53, in same place, incl 48.
49 First Meeting of Liaison Group for discussing arrangement for
repatriation of sick and wounded captured personnel, 6 April 53, in G-3 file,
Transcript of Proceedings, Meetings of Liaison Group, 6 April-2 May 1953. All
the meetings of the group are in the above file and will be henceforth referred
to only by number and date.
50 Second Mtg, Liaison Group, 7 Apr 53.
51 Third Mtg, Liaison Group, 8
Apr 53.
52 Msg, HNC 1611, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 8 Apr 53, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 20.
53 Fourth and Fifth Mtgs,
Liaison Group, 9-10 Apr 53.
54 Sixth Mtg, Liaison Group, 11 Apr 53.
55 Msg, PWCG
4-386, POW Comd to AFFE, 19 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls
1-256, incl 106.
56 Msg, HNC 1684, CINCUNC to
DA, 20 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-296, incl 111. (2) Msg, JCS
986998, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Apr 53.
57 (1) Msg, HNC 1687, CINCUNC
(Adv) to CINCUNC, 21 Apr 53. (2) Msg, C 62028, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 22 Apr
53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, incls 114 and
117.
58 (1) Msg, C 62042, Clark to DA, 23 Apr 53. (2) Msg, HNC
1639, Harrison to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53. Both in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls
1-256, incls 121 and 122.
59 Tenth and Eleventh Mtgs, Liaison Group, 1 and 2
May.
60 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, app. I, p. 51. A breakdown of the UNC
and Communist repatriates and nonrepatriates involved in the prisoner of war
exchanges in 1953-54 will be found in Appendixes B-1 and B-2.
61 Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 9 Apr
53, no sub, in G-3 file, Transcripts of Proceedings, Mtgs of Liaison Group at
Pan Mun Jom, 6 Apr-2 May 53.
62 Ltr, Harrison to Nam, 16
Apr 53, no sub, in G-3 File, Liaison Officers Mtgs Held at Pan Mun Jom, Jan-Jun
53, bk. III.
63 Seventh Mtg, Liaison Group,
19 Apr 53.
64 (1) Msg, C 62022, CINCUNC
to DA, 22 Apr 53, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Apr 53, incls 1-256, incl 182. (2) Msg,
JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53. (3) Msg, DA 937371, CSUSA to CINCUNC, 24
Apr 53.
65 Msg, JCS 937205, JCS to CINCUNC, 23 Apr 53.
66 For Dulles' views on the Soviet shift in tactics, see
his address of 18 April 53, reprinted in the Dept of State Bulletin, vol. XXVIII, No. 722
(April 27, 1953), pp. 603-08.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
