History 
On Line
The frustrating conditions at Panmunjom and
on the battlefield in Korea could not fail to affect domestic affairs in the
United States during mid-1952. As long as the objective in Korea had been
military victory, opposition to the expenditures of American lives, funds, and
resources had not been difficult to cope with. But a slow process of reaction
had set in, once the decision to end the war through negotiation was taken. The
political and military leaders of the United States had to deal with a
phenomenon new to them-limited war-and all its ramifications. With the passage
of time and the failure to reach an agreement on a truce, criticism of the
conduct of the war, set off by the Congressional investigation of the dismissal
of General MacArthur in 1951, mounted.
To many people it seemed that the conflict
in Korea had served its purpose. The North Koreans had been pushed back of the
38th Parallel and the Communists now knew that the United States would fight in
the event of outright aggression. On the other hand, the United States and its
allies had learned not to underestimate Chinese military strength. From all
indications, both sides desired peace since little further gain could be
expected from the stalemate. Only the principle of repatriation lay between the
increasing casualty lists and the signing of an armistice.
How this obstacle was to be surmounted
remained unclear, but it was inevitable that the settlement of the Korean
problem should become the outstanding issue of the Presidential campaign of
1952. The debates, personalities, and political maneuvers of the race for the
White House had but little effect upon the war itself, yet it was against this
backdrop that events of the period unfolded. Both General of the Army Dwight D.
Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, and Adlai E. Stevenson, his Democratic
opponent, made peace the keynote of their platforms. The slackening of interest
in military victory and the avowed intentions of both political parties to make
an end of the Korean commitment meant that requests for additional manpower,
expenditures, and resources would be closely scanned by both the executive and
the legislative branch. In view of the election year atmosphere that fostered
criticism of the administration's policies and the possibility-of which the Army
was well aware-that there might be a change in the direction of the war if the
Republicans proved victorious, mid-1952 was characterized by caution.
Reviewing the Alternatives
A radical change in the course of action
being pursued in Korea was impossible under the circumstances. Although the
military leaders in the field might chafe under the restrictions imposed upon
them, there was little prospect that these would be altered except in detail.
They could not be, in fact, without augmenting the military forces at the
disposal of General Clark. It had been patent since July 1951 that, as presently
constituted, the Eighth Army could hold the line and punish the enemy, but that
was all. Limited war meant limited forces. One of the assumptions that military
planners in Washington and the Far East had to contend with constantly in
plotting courses of action was the dictum that the military strength of the Far
East Command would remain substantially as it was.1 Only a return to
fullscale warfare by the Communists or a breaking off of the negotiations could
have caused a shift from this policy and, as noted earlier, the enemy seemed
content to maintain the status quo.
Thus, the studies produced by the joint
Chiefs in Washington reflected the static conditions in Korea and the political
atmosphere in the United States. The Joint Staff Planners frankly admitted that
the war in Korea could not be brought to a successful conclusion with the
currently authorized force levels in the three services. If increased forces
were sent to Korea, the strategic reserve in the United States would be depleted
and allocations for Europe would have to be cut back. The alternative was an
accelerated mobilization effort and this appeared to be out of the question. To
maintain successfully the military pressure then
being exerted upon the Communists seemed to warrant increases in ground, sea,
and naval forces in the estimation of the joint Planners, but, until decisions
on a national level established the long- and short-range objectives of the
United States in Korea clearly, even this limited support was impossible. As
they stated in May 1952: "At the present time we are faced with a set of
conditions in Korea which preclude, from a military point of view, a conclusion
which can be termed satisfactory. Under these unfavorable conditions, it is
necessary to determine what immediate objectives and lines of action can be
taken which will be least damaging to our national security, international
prestige, and longrange objectives."2
The Washington planners seemed doomed to
the same kind of frustration that hobbled their counterparts in the Far East
Command. Unless the Communists erupted militarily in Korea or cut themselves off
completely from the negotiations, intensification or broadening of the war,
except in its air phase, was not likely to be considered. In the event the
Eighth Army could not contain an enemy offensive, the conflict would probably no
longer be limited to Korea, but might well become global in nature. If the
Communists refused to continue the truce talks, however, the question of
increased military pressure might again become vital and herein lay the weakness
of the U.S. military position, for it did not have the strength in being to
insure Communist acceptance of an armistice on UNC terms without leaving the
United States and Europe unacceptably exposed. And any attempt to secure the
additional personnel and means would have taken at least a year and required
some additional industrial and manpower mobilization as well as a change in the
global concept of placing the defense of Europe first.3
To be sure, the United States retained its
atomic superiority, but the question of use of nuclear weapons in a mountainous
area like North Korea which offered few worthwhile targets was still moot. In
addition, the moral issue of whether the United States should employ atomic
bombs again unless it were attacked had not been settled. It was doubtful that
the United States would have initiated atomic warfare against a stubborn, but
static enemy in Korea. This, then, reduced the U.S. position in Korea to a
gamble that the Chinese did want peace and that the limited military pressure
that the FEC forces could apply would secure that peace. In the meantime, the
ROK and Japanese defense forces would be built up in the hope that they
eventually would be capable of handling the Communist threat by themselves. This
was the insurance policy that the United States took out against an interminable
prolongation of the Korean affair. Eventually, whether an armistice was
concluded or not, the nonKorean forces would be gradually withdrawn from the
peninsula.4
Under these circumstances, planning for
military victory appeared to be an academic exercise. The Joint Staff worked up
plans and consulted with Clark's headquarters. In Tokyo the Far East Command examined ambitious outlines of operations that would
increase the military pressure on the enemy or carry the Eighth Army through to
victory. But the hard fact remained that none of these plans could be carried
out by the forces then at Clark's disposal. To a JCS query on 23 September for
his comments on possible courses of action if the negotiations failed, Clark
said that he could do little more on the ground front.
We confront undemoralized enemy forces, far
superior in strength, who occupy excellent, extremely well-organized defensive
positions in depth and who continue to provide themselves with sufficient
logistic support. Under these conditions, it appears evident that positive
aggressive action, designed to obtain military victory and achieve an armistice
on our terms, is not feasible by this command with current forces operating
under current restrictions. Only with increased forces and the removal of
certain restrictions could the FEC mount intensified operations with some hope
of winning success without "highly unpalatable personnel costs."
Clark did not think that the United Nations
Command should take the losses inherent in decisive offensive operations unless
it intended to carry the fight to the Yalu. Intermediate objectives would be
costly and undecisive, he felt.5
Although Clark did not believe that the
USSR would enter the Korean War if the UNC drove to he Yalu, his concept of
military victory had no chance for acceptance on the eve of the elections or
thereafter. It ran squarely against the trend that favored the quick liquidation
of the Korean commitment by political action. It was well for Clark to be ready
in the event of an unexpected change of conditions, but the possibilities for
such a shift were remote. The alternatives to a continuation of the policy of
seeking a political settlement backed by limited military pressure in the field
meant more men, more casualties, more expenditures, and more resources. By 1952
it was obvious that the era following the outbreak of the war when men, money,
and materiel had been supplied on a comparatively liberal basis was over and the
time for retrenchment was at hand. In this climate of opinion, broadening or
intensifying the war to any great degree would appeal to but few.
Budget, Manpower, and Resources
The Presidential budget message in January
1952 had foreshadowed the time of austerity. In previous estimates the JCS had
hoped to build up military forces to what might be considered acceptable defense
levels by 1954. Presidential budget restrictions now made this impossible for
the Chief Executive cut back the funds requested by the services. By lowering
the allocations he stretched the period of preparedness from 1954 to 1956. This
meant that, in the opinion of the JCS, if the Soviet Union attacked in full
force before 1956, the United States capacity to resist successfully would be
reduced. Although the cuts would affect the Air Force's attainment of 126 modern
combat wings primarily, the Army would also have to draw in its belt.6
In some respects, the lower budget
request for the armed services was deceptive, for it
was predicated upon the hope that the Korean War would be over by the end of the
fiscal year. Extension of the war beyond 30 June 1952 meant that supplementary
appropriations would have to be requested later on to take care of deficiencies.
General Collins and his staff had found it difficult to plan their fiscal
estimates on this restricted basis and in May he asked the JCS to press the
Secretary of Defense again for consideration of the assumption that hostilities
would continue through the next fiscal year, subject to review at the beginning
of each fiscal quarter. In late June, Secretary Lovett agreed that the JCS could
assume that the war would last until 30 June 1953 insofar as planning for fiscal
year 1954 estimates was concerned.7
Nevertheless the original Army estimate of
22.2 billion dollars for fiscal year 1953 had been tapered down by the President
and his budget advisors to 14.2 billion dollars and Congress had lopped off
nearly two billion dollars more in July. This would mean that the combat
readiness date for the Army would be postponed until fiscal year 1956 and the
expanded production base for items such as trucks, tanks, and artillery would be
reduced. In addition, Army personnel requirements would have to be
lowered.8
In Secretary Lovett's opinion, the Army had
only itself to blame for the budget cuts. He told Secretary of the Army Pace
that Congressional committees invariably asked Army witnesses why
they had not obligated the funds already advanced if the need for materiel were
so great. Evidently the witnesses had not answered these questions
satisfactorily, he went on, and could not as long as undelegated funds continued
to pile up and production was not accelerated to turn the money into usable
goods. He found the excuse of "no funds" offered by the Army "tiresomely
threadbare."9
The failure of the Army to obligate all the
funds previously voted by Congress was due in part to the administrative delays
inherent in arranging and concluding large contracts with hundreds of firms. In
this case the care and caution exercised by the Army in negotiating contracts
redounded to its disadvantage. Instead of having all the moneys deemed necessary
on hand at the beginning of the fiscal year, it seemed that the Army would again
have to depend upon supplemental appropriations to cover future deficiencies in
carrying on the war.
This piecemeal approach to financing the
war on a contingent basis made it difficult for the Army planners to formulate
firm programs, for frequently it took eighteen months to two years to secure
production of many items and few could guess how long the war would drag on. But
the knowledge that money could be gotten if the need could be demonstrated was
at least comforting. In the field of manpower, the situation was more serious
and the prospects were less encouraging.
During the remainder of 1952, most
of the men called into service during 1950 would have
completed their two years of duty and would be eligible for discharge. Almost
three-quarters of a million trained troops were scheduled to be released and an
estimated 650,000 raw
recruits would replace them. To train this tremendous number of men, the Army
would have to devote about 25 percent of its total manpower to this task alone.
If hostilities did not end shortly, the effective strength of Army forces in the
United States would be limited to one airborne division because of the influx of
the untrained troops. Other divisions would be undermanned and would have to be
utilized as replacement and training divisions. To cope with the problem,
General Collins urged the JCS in June to support his request for an increase of
92,000 men for overhead for the Army.10 Although Mr. Lovett tried to
secure this augmentation, he ran into opposition from the Bureau of the Budget
and the National Security Resources Board and was unsuccessful. From a total of
almost 1.7 million in April 1952, Army personnel steadily shrank to about 1.58
million at the end of October.11
Cuts in personnel required reduction of
officer strength as well. In the Far East Command the Army officer strength was
to be cut by almost six hundred officers because of the budget limitations.
Clark protested vigorously but G-3 informed him in June that the reduction on a
world-wide basis had amounted to 5 percent. In the case of the FEC, Korea
had been excluded and the actual cut had
been made on the officer strength in Japan and the Ryukyus; otherwise it would
have been more.12
At the end of July, G-3 suggested to Clark
that he might be able to decrease the number of officers training the Japanese
defense forces and give additional responsibility to Japanese instructors at
battalion level and below. If U.S. officers could be confined to the higher
echelons, the saving would help meet the anticipated over-all shortage of
officers. Clark, in his reply, asserted that the Japanese forces would
experience a large turnover in trained personnel in late 1952 as two-year
enlistments expired and were also about to undergo training in heavy armaments
that would preclude a reduction of U.S. officers for the present.13
In a frank letter to Clark on 1 August, General Collins discussed
Army personnel prospects for the year ahead. The loss of half of the strength of
the Army and the huge problem of training all the new replacements would sharply
affect the status and quality of the reserve forces in the United States. Each
month, Collins continued, the Army had to send 40,000
replacements overseas and this demand could be met
until November. After that, FEC would receive its full quota, but other areas
would go understrength. Collins felt that this would be a difficult period and
much would depend upon the character of leadership at all echelons, if the Army were going to weather it
successfully.14
The tone of Collins' letter left no doubt
but that the Army manpower situation would deteriorate further. As ROK forces
became trained and demonstrated their ability to take on further responsibility,
they would replace the U.S. troops in the line. If the status quo in Korea
continued, the U.S. contribution would be gradually diminished.15
The changing attitudes to U.S. funds and
manpower were also reflected in the distribution of resources during the
mid-1952 era. When General Clark in May voiced his concern over a possible
Communist air build-up in North Korea once an armistice was concluded, and asked
that his fighter force be increased by four F-86 fighter-interceptor wings and
eight automatic weapons battalions to counter this threat, the joint Chiefs were
sympathetic. But after carefully surveying F-86 production and the availability
of antiaircraft units, they could only offer limited support. By October, the
JCS informed Clark in early July, the F-86 Sabres that had been promised him in
February would be delivered. In addition, 65 Sabrejets and 175 F-84's would be
diverted to the FEC from other commitments to bring all FEAF fighter wings up to
full strength and provide a 50-percent reserve. To help out on the defense of
Japan, the JCS continued, one Strategic Air Command fighter wing of 60 F-84's
would be deployed to Japan on a rotational basis. As for the antiaircraft
battalions, one 90-mm. gun and two automatic weapons battalions could be
provided by taking them from the continental United States defense
forces.16 Although the provision of these air and antiaircraft units and
equipment involved some risk in spreading out very thinly the forces not
involved in the Korean War, the JCS attempted to scrape together at least part
of what the FEC requested.
Ammunition Again
One of the problems that continued to
plague the Army during the summer and fall of 1952 was the supply of ammunition.
As noted earlier, there was little expectation that conditions would improve
noticeably before the end of the year.17 And if the war waxed hot in
Korea once more, even an increase in production would do little more than
replace the rounds expended.
At a briefing in late April, the Army
chiefs in Washington were informed that in the five major deficient categories-
60-mm., 81-mm., and 4.2-inch mortars, 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzers- the
situation was especially serious. If war broke out in Europe on 1 January 1953,
the United States would only be able to supply six divisions with these five
types of rounds and a year later the total that could be kept in action would be
fifteen divisions. Current U.S. ammunition production facilities by early 1953
would have reached their maximum capacity and it would take another year and a
half before new ones could be brought into production. When Secretary of the
Army Pace heard about this, he directed that the
entire question of expanding the ammunition production base be
re-examined.18
Early in May another discordant note
sounded from. Korea. A newspaper story claimed that the American soldiers were
fighting with secondhand equipment and a shortage of ammunition. When the Army
asked the Far East commander to comment, he replied that ammunition was
plentiful and rationing was a normal military precaution. Since this information
seemed diametrically opposed to the stand then being taken by General Collins
before Congress to secure addtional funds for ammunition, G-3 asked FEC to
explain further. As it turned out, the theater staff had based its estimates
upon action on the battlefield continuing at the limited pace of the April-May
period. If the action should quicken, the ammunition situation might alter
radically. The one round whose supply did appear to be in a precarious position
considering proposed production schedules in the United States was the 155-mm
howitzer shell, the theater staff concluded.19
The dependence upon restricted operations
at the front to maintain ammunition levels came to the fore again in early June.
When Van Fleet toured his corps headquarters, he discovered that it had been
necessary to limit deliveries of 105-mm. and 155-mm. howitzer shells to the
other corps in order to provide the U.S. I Corps with adequate quantities for
its missions. The corps commanders were aware
that the situation would become even more complicated as additional ROK
battalions were activated and supplied.20
By the end of June Clark had become gravely
concerned over supplies of the 155-mm. howitzer shell. The Communists had almost
doubled their artillery and mortar fire during the month and the Eighth Army had
to increase its expenditures in self-defense. As mentioned earlier, the 105-mm.
howitzer was not effective against enemy bunkers and lacked the range for
counterbattery fire. Clark pointed out that when the 6 ROK 155mm. battalions
became active, the FEC would have to supply 486 pieces instead of 378. Although
the authorized day of supply was 40 rounds per tube, Clark had had to restrict
the expenditures to a bit over 15 rounds a day. If the scheduled delivery of
155-mm. ammunition during the summer were maintained, only 140,000 rounds would
arrive in the FEC and this would require further limitations. By 1 September, Clark concluded, theater
stocks would be reduced to about 350,000 rounds or only 62 days supply instead
of 90.21
General Collins recognized that the
situation in the Far East Command was far from ideal, but he relayed several
hard production facts to Clark in early July. At the present, only about 100,000
rounds of 155-mm. ammunition were coming off the lines each month and this would
gradually climb to 650,000 rounds a month in approximately a year. To
provide Clark with the full 40 rounds a day for 486
pieces would require about 583,000 rounds a month, a rate that would not be
reached until March 1953,
Collins continued. The most the Army could provide, without leaving Europe
critically short and eliminating firing in training, would be on the order of
400,000 to 500,000 rounds during the 1 July-31
October 1952 period. Of course, Collins went on, in the event of a major attack,
the Eighth Army could fire whatever was necessary to halt it, but it would take
time to replace ammunition expended at a higher daily rate than 15 rounds. If
the steel strike, which had begun on 2 June, lasted for a considerable length of
time, Collins felt that improvement in the situation would be delayed
further.22
Actually the Christie Park plant at
Pittsburgh which produced over 60 percent of the 155-mm. shell forgings had
already lost production of 60,000 forgings during the first month of the strike.
Secretary Pace urged Mr. Lovett on 5 July to bring this loss to the attention of
both labor and management in the hope that further damage might be
averted.23
The urgency of the 155-mm. shell situation
was reflected at the army and corps level in Korea several days later. Van Fleet
informed his subordinates that the resupply rate through October would amount to
about six to eight rounds per day and therefore the Eighth Army would employ its
155's only on the most remunerative targets, using other caliber
weapons and tactical air wherever possible
as substitutes.24
On 13-14 July, Collins and his deputy
assistant chief of staff, G-4, General Reeder, visited Eighth Army and assured
Van Fleet that he would get a minimum of five rounds of 155-mm. ammunition per
day per tube including the tubes in the new ROK battalions. To help out during
the emergency, Reeder suggested to Van Fleet that he might convert some of his
105-mm. to 8-inch howitzer battalions since tubes were available and ammunition
was plentiful.25
Clark was not willing to let the daily rate
rest at such a low figure and he authorized Van Fleet in early August to expend
fifteen rounds of 155-mm. howitzer shells a day per tube. General Collins was
able to secure approval of this rate later in the month by curtailing other
allocations severely.26
To help alleviate the shortage, Clark had asked for
permission to procure 600,000 rounds of 155-mm. ammunition (less explosives) in
Japan. But when the Army discovered that the cost would be more than 60 percent
over the U.S. rate, it turned down the request.27
However, the Army did agree in mid-August
to replace ammunition expended in Korea. This would mean that a ninety-day level
for the Korean area at the full rate of forty rounds
per day per tube would be sought. When this was attained, Clark would only
requisition ammunition on the basis of the number of rounds actually
fired.28
As the action on the front mounted in
September and October, ammunition expenditures on both sides climbed. In one
week in September the UNC artillery and mortar units hurled over 370,000 rounds
at the enemy and received over 185,000 in return. During the fierce battles of
October, the Eighth Army sent 423,000 rounds of 105-mm. howitzer and 108,000
rounds of 155-mm. howitzer shells at the Communists in a six-day
period.28
The sharply accelerated rate of fire per
tube per day from less than 8 rounds of 155-mm. in September to 18 in October
posed a new worry for General Clark. If the rate should continue, theater stocks
would be reduced to 26 days of supply instead of 6o by the end of November."'
The prospect led him to urge the Army to review its efforts to expedite
deliveries and rebuild the theater stocks. Clark also pointed out that the
155mm. howitzer shells were not the only cause for concern. 81-mm. high
explosive light shells for mortars and 155-mm. high explosive gun shells had
been slow in arriving and what was more serious, only 355 fragmentation hand
grenades had been shipped to the FEC between 15 August and 7
October.31
In its reply the Army assured Clark that it
was doing all it could to improve the situation and that the supply picture was
steadily becoming better.32 Some production was lost in the 155-mm.
howitzer shell because of the steel strike and this had held down the delivery
rate of this critical round. Yet in this and in the other rounds that were in
short supply, the FEC got the lion's share. The real danger, General Reeder
commented later on, lay in the precarious position of theater stocks in Europe.
If hostilities had broken out there, the situation
would have been disastrous.33
There were two points that should be kept
in mind in considering the ammunition situation during the last two years of the
war. First, there were no shortages of more than a temporary nature in the hands
of the troops. Whenever it was necessary, the Eighth Army could use whatever
ammunition it needed to protect itself. Secondly, despite the restrictions on
the rounds per day during the more quiescent periods, the
Eighth Army consistently fired far more ammunition than it received from the
Communists. And this did not include the bombs, gun, and rocket fire launched by
the UNC air forces. The troops could not fire as much as they desired all the
time, it was true, but the picture was not all black. The bleakest spot was in
the U.S. global ammunition situation rather than in Korea. Provided that Korean
demands remained fairly stable, this condition would not be alleviated until
production facilities reached their peak in 1953. In the meantime, restrictions
would remain in effect and the dispute over shortages would continue.
The Expansion of the ROK Army
Discussion of the domestic problems of
budget, manpower, and availability of resources for the Korean War could hardly
avoid the closely related subject of the role of indigenous forces in the
conflict. Since the United States wished to decrease gradually its commitments
in the Far East, the contributions of the ROK, Japanese, Chinese Nationalist,
and the armed forces of the other free nations in the area became more
important. U.S. funds invested in native troops produced multiple returns, for
the same amount of money would train, equip, and maintain more Far East
nationals than Americans and by the same token should permit the United States
eventually to reduce its responsibilities and its manpower in the theater.
Whether the additional quantities of indigenous soldiers would also succeed in
attaining a high degree of quality was as yet undetermined, but the
improvement in the performance of some ROK units
during the mid-1952 period was definitely encouraging.
With the replacement of General Ridgway by
General Clark in May, there had been a change of attitude toward the enlargement
of the ROK Army. Both MacArthur and Ridgway, it will be remembered, had favored
a ten-division force Of 250,000 men as a desirable size and strength. But Clark
was inclined from the start toward an expanded ROK Army. Several times during
the first two weeks of his assumption of command, he remarked that the bigger
the ROK Army was, the better he would like it.34
In reality the ROK Army had grown steadily
above the 250,000-man level and had long been overstrength. Just before Ridgway
had left the theater, he had submitted a new troop list totaling over 360,000
spaces, covering the additional artillery, tank, and security forces being
organized and providing for ten additional infantry regiments.35 The
tendivision ceiling had been retained, but the independent regiments could be
used as cadres for new divisions if and when this became desirable.
Clark was thoroughly in accord with the
expansion of the troop list. As he pointed out in June to the Washington staff,
the ROK Army had supplanted the National Police in the corps areas and had taken
on increased security duties in guarding prisoners of war and in suppressing
guerrillas in the rear. In addition, the replacement and training system which produced seven hundred ROK
soldiers a day had begun to pile up surpluses because of the low attrition rate
at the front. To disrupt this smoothly functioning process, Clark reasoned,
would not be wise, since it formed insurance against a period of heavy action.
It should not be forgotten, Clark concluded, that there were 30,000 patients
carried on the rolls because the ROK had no veteran's organization to care for
them. Under these conditions, he felt that the Army should grant him
authorization for 92,100 bulk personnel and 19,458 to form six separate
regiments.36
Four days later, Clark followed up with
another request. He wanted to add two more ROK divisions to the troop list and
increase the total for logistical support from 363,000 to about 415,000. With
the creation of the new divisions, Clark maintained, the number of Asians
fighting communism would rise and the number of American casualties would
decline. The ROKA replacement system would sustain the extra divisions and the
six separate regiments, and help make the best use of South Korean
manpower.37
As it turned out, the movement for
expanding ROKA ground forces was not opportune. The Korean Ambassador to the
United States, You Chan Yang, was at the time urging the State Department, the
Air Force, and Congress to adopt a three-year plan for building up the ROK Air
Force tactically.38 As already indicated,
Ridgway had opposed the existence of a small, ineffective ROK air force which he
thought would be annihilated at the outset by superior Communist air
power.39 The objections to an augmentation of the ground forces
stemmed from altogether different reasons. Owing to the shortages in artillery
equipment and ammunition, ROK Army increases in these categories could be
supported only by equivalent reductions in U.S. or U.N. forces that were being
currently maintained. If there were to be an expansion in the ROK Army, both G-3
and G-4 preferred the increase to be in separate regiments that would not
require additional artillery support rather than in
divisions.40
The JCS, however, were not yet prepared to
approve an augmentation of the ROK armed forces. At the end of June they decided
to hold to the ten-division, 250,000-man Army and the existing Navy and Air
Force.41
When General Collins visited Korea in
mid-July, he approved raising the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA)
to 2,500 men per division, but this was as much as he could do at the time.
Clark had to inform Van Fleet not to activate further separate light infantry
regiments and that ROK Army strength could not exceed 362,945 men. To insure
that the replacement and training system did not cause the total strength to go
over this figure, Clark told the Eighth Army commander to take action to
separate the physically disabled and other nonuseful members of the
ROK Army from the service.42
The Collins tour and his discussions with
Clark and Van Fleet bore fruit in early August. The Chief of Staff overrode his
staff by approving the requested bulk allotment of 92,100 men and directing Army
support for a two-division augmentation for the ROK Army. As Collins envisioned
the divisional expansion, it would be progressive and fitted within current
budget guidelines and availability of logistical resources. He felt it would be
desirable to capitalize on the ROK capability to supply trained manpower
economically and to pave the way for the eventual withdrawal and redeployment of
U.S. Army forces.43
While the JCS studied the implications of
adding two divisions to the ROK Army, the strength of this army grew to over
350,000 men in August.44 Since KATUSA was not included in the ROKA
totals, Van Fleet asked Clark to seek a further increment in KATUSA strength to
a ceiling of 27,000.45 Clark agreed and urged the Army to permit up
to 28,000 KATUSA soldiers to be distributed among the
UNC units. Not only would the South Koreans bolster the fighting strength of the
UNC organizations, 11e argued, but they would also receive the training that
would make them the finest cadres.46
The FEC requests for augmenting the ROK
Army and KATUSA were passed along to the JCS together with a third Clark
recommendation covering the enlargement of the ROK Marine forces from 12,376 to
19,800.47 The Joint Chiefs also were reconsidering whether to allow
the ROK Air Force to grow as Ambassador You had suggested in June. In
mid-September, they determined to hold firm to their earlier position and
maintain the ROK Air Force as it was.48
The following week the JCS approved Clark's
plan for increasing the ROK Army, Marine forces, and KATUSA, lifting the troop
ceiling for the ROK Army and marines to 463,000. In their memorandum to
Secretary Lovett, the JCS admitted that to supply and equip the ROK increments
would mean that the continental U.S. forces would have to go on operating under
a 5o-percent ceiling on critical items, that 105-min. howitzers would have to be
diverted from NATO programs, and that other critical items would have to be
withdrawn from mobilization reserve stocks. Despite these
disadvantages, the JCS felt that the opportunity to add more Asians to the fight
against communism made the program worthwhile.49
On 1 October, on the heels of the JCS memo,
Clark sent an urgent request for decision on the expansion of the ROK armed
forces. The efficient replacement and training machine that was feeding the ROK
Army seven hundred recruits a day was working all too well. In July the Eighth
Army had tried a subterfuge to hold down the flow of recruits by carrying all
the new trainees as civilians until they had completed basic training; otherwise
the ceiling would have been exceeded in August. Rather than disrupt the steady
input into the induction stations, the Eighth Army decided to gamble that the
requests for ROKA increases would be approved ultimately and resorted to
civilian trainees. If and when the augmentation were granted, the men would be
trained and ready to go into the new units as they were organized.50
There were certain advantages to this
procedure since it permitted the physically unfit and undesirables to be weeded
out before they were sworn into the Army. But the delay in the decision at
Washington had led to a crisis. The training cycle was only eight weeks long and
by September the first civilian trainees were finishing the course and beginning
to funnel into the Army officially. With casualties still at a moderate level,
the new influx would soon send the ROKA total above
the present ceiling. If the ROK Army were not going to be enlarged, Clark told
the JCS, he would have to cut back the number of replacements to the current
attrition level.51
Before the Secretary of Defense gave his
support to ROK expansion, however, he wanted to know more about the impact of
the program upon NATO, the Japanese defense forces, the Chinese Nationalist
Army, and military assistance to the countries of Southeast Asia. General
Bradley quickly informed him that deliveries of critical items like 105-mm. and
155mm. howitzers and 75-mm. recoilless rifles to other nations would be delayed
by two months and that the necessity to supply ammunition for these weapons, if
they were assigned to the ROK Army, would further limit the capability of the
United States to provide ammunition for Europe and the zone of interior. As for
other items that would be required, these could be furnished from Army
mobilization and depot stocks.52
On 25 October, Mr. Lovett forwarded to the
President his recommendation that the ROK forces be expanded with a new ceiling
of 463,000 men and five days later Mr. Truman approved the
proposal.53 In the meantime, the Republican candidate, General Eisenhower, had made his famous announcement
that he would go to Korea if he were elected and had urged that the ROK forces
be increased. On 29 October, at a political speech, he had read excerpts of a
letter from Van Fleet to his former chief of staff, General Mood, in which the
Eighth Army commander expressed his familiar theme that the ROK Army should be
doubled from ten to twenty divisions so that U.S. forces could be
released.54 Whether the political pressure of the campaign had an
appreciable effect upon President Truman's decision would be difficult to
ascertain, but it was possible that it might have speeded up favorable action.
At any rate, the first big step toward
building a more formidable ROKA force had been taken and Eisenhower's victory at
the polls in early November indicated that this move was only the forerunner of
further developments along the same line.
The drive for expansion had garnered the
major share of the attention during the summer and fall of 1952 and tended to
throw into the shadows the other developments in the ROK Army. During April the
ROK 1st Field Artillery Group of two 105-mm. howitzer battalions completed its
training and in May moved into the line in support of the ROK 6th Division. By
October eight of the ROKA artillery groups were available for duty and the
remaining two would be ready before the end of the year. In the field of armor,
four ROKA and one Korean Marine tank companies were operational by the close of
October and three others were awaiting the arrival of tanks from the United
States.55 The cadres of the six ROKA
155-mm. howitzer battalions authorized were sent out in June- one to each U.S.
division. By November they were ready to take their battalion firing
tests.56
The assignment of ROKA artillery battalions
to U.S. artillery units in the combat zone complicated the problems of the
latter considerably. In addition to surmounting the language barrier, the U.S.
artillery commanders had to devote a great deal of time to the training of the
ROKA outfits and to the finding of suitable firing positions for the ROKA pieces
in their often crowded sectors.
To improve the caliber of the ROKA officer
corps, Clark requested the Army in June to raise the allocations of student
spaces in U.S. service schools to 581 for fiscal year 1953. Three months later,
he asked that 100 spaces in the Artillery School and 150 spaces in the Infantry
School be made available for ROKA officers in the session that was to begin in
March 1953.57
Under Brig. Gen. Cornelius E. Ryan the
Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) had almost 2,000 U.S. personnel assisting
in ROK training by October, but the lifting of the troop ceiling to 463,000
betokened additional duties. Van Fleet levied twenty-four officers from his
corps and divisions and channeled sixty-eight more from his pipeline into KMAG.
Unfortunately, losses to rotation deprived KMAG of many officers and enlisted
men during the last half of 1952 and imposed a heavy burden upon
the KMAG staff.58
In mid-September, Van Fleet asked the ROK
Army to increase the Korean Service Corps (KSC) from 75,000 to 100,000. He planned to form six new
regiments and bring the existing units up to strength. Since members of the KSC
served sixmonth terms, the ROK Army would have to bring in 4,000 personnel each week to keep the
program at full strength.59
Crisis in the Rear
|
In addition to the support and training
functions behind the lines, the ROK Army had to cope with security problems as
well. Prisoners of war and the safeguarding of the lines of communication were
two facets of this function. ROKA units joined other UNC forces in providing
personnel to watch over the prisoner camps as they were dispersed in May and
June. In the rural areas, guerrillas or bandits-it was difficult to distinguish
one from the otherformed a constant threat to the lines of communication. In
some sections the roads were unsafe during the hours of darkness and many
farmers were afraid to cultivate their land even under the protection of guards
during the day-time.60
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Although guerrilla activity was mainly of
nuisance value only, the bands operating in the important Pusan port sector
assumed an important role in the development of the internal crisis in the
ROK Government during the spring of 1952. The basic cause for the rise of
domestic dissension lay in the conflict between President Rhee and the members
of the National Assembly who opposed him. With the national elections destined
to be held in the summer, Rhee determined to have the constitution changed so
that the President could be elected by popular vote rather than chosen by the
Assembly. His foes were equally resolved to keep this function in the
legislative branch.61
On 24
May matters came to a head. Rhee placed Pusan under
martial law and had some of his opponents in the Assembly arrested. Evidently he
intended to dissolve the Assembly and have a new one elected to amend the
constitution so that there would be a bicameral legislature and popular election
of the President. At any rate, he charged the arrested
assemblymen with complicity in treason in a Communist conspiracy and justified
the continuation of martial law as a measure to counteract guerrilla operations
in the Pusan area.62
The consternation caused by Rhee's actions
was immediate both within and outside Korea. Political and military
representatives of the U.N. and the United Nations Command sought to dissuade
him from further steps that might result in weakening Korean democratic
institutions and might endanger military operations at the front. Since the
problem was primarily political, Clark and Van Fleet preferred to let the State
Department handle the affair, although Van Fleet did go to see Rhee on 28 May,
together with General Lee Chong Chan, the ROKA Chief of Staff, in an effort to
persuade the President to lift the martial law edict.63 Rhee promised
to consider this, but took no action.
In the meantime, Van Fleet took
precautionary steps to safeguard the UNC personnel and installations. Security
guards were reinforced and plans prepared to protect UNC troops, vehicles, and
property from mob violence. Since the 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry
Regiment was engaged in prisoner of war duties at Pusan, Van Fleet ordered the
unit pulled back to the United Nations Reception Center at Taegu to act as a
mobile reserve. He warned General Yount of the 2d Logistical Command that
extreme care should be taken to avoid participation in civil disturbances where
no danger to the U.N. Command existed.64
As an added safety measure the JCS authorized Clark to divert up to a regimental
combat team from Japan if the political situation deteriorated.65
The chief concern of the UNC rested in the
uninterrupted flow of supplies to the front, since Pusan was the major port of
South Korea and handled the bulk of shipments for the Eighth Army.66
But the State Department requested full support from the UNC in its efforts to
alter Rhee's stubborn stand on martial law and the National Assembly and Collins
instructed Clark to back the U.S. political representatives
firmly.67
On 2 June President Truman sent a note to
Rhee deprecating the loss of confidence in Korean leadership that was taking
place and asking him to defer further action until Ambassador Muccio returned
from the United States. e8 Truman's request may have given Rhee pause, for
although he did not lift martial law, he evidently decided not to dissolve the
National Assembly.
The impasse between Rhee and his
legislature eased as they began to negotiate a compromise during June. It took
the form of a constitutional amendment on 3 July that among other things
provided for the popular election of the President and Vice President and the
establishment of a second legislative chamber. Despite the clear-cut victory
over his opponents, Rhee did not end martial law until 28 July.69
During the tense moments in late May and
early June, the U.N. Command carefully watched the effects of the crisis upon
the military supply lines and on the ROK Army. Since the political parties had
abstained from interference in military logistics and Van Fleet had taken a firm
stand against political tampering with the leadership of the ROK Army, Clark and
Van Fleet were inclined to remain aloof and let the Koreans work out their own
internal problems.70 They had supported the U.S. political
representatives faithfully, if without great enthusiasm, in the efforts to end
the Korean political war.71
While the guerrilla threat that Rhee had
used as a reason for imposing martial law had not posed a significant challenge
to either the ROK Government or the UNC, small-scale action of a bandit nature
mounted during June. On 24 June guerrillas or bandits blew up a train in southwest Korea,
destroyed eleven coaches, and killed over forty passengers.72
ROK Army and police units waged a constant
skirmish with these predators- whose chief objectives seemed to be food and
clothing. But despite the toll that the ROK forces exacted, the guerrilla bands
managed to gain new recruits and to carry out harassing raids. In July the ROK
1st Division was pulled out of the line and sent to
southwestern Korea to help eliminate the nuisance. This had been tried before
with only moderate success and the ROK 1st Division had to undergo a similar
experience. As the division moved through the mountainous Chiri-san region with
National Police units attached, it met no organized resistance. The guerrillas
followed the same pattern of dispersion and evasion that they used before.
Breaking up into small groups until the ROK forces passed them by, they came
together again afterwards and resumed their depredations. After a campaign of
more than three weeks chasing the elusive bandits, the ROK 1st Division returned
to the front and the National Police again resumed responsibility for the rear
areas. From August to October, about three to four hundred guerrillas were
reported killed and a hundred or so were captured each month, yet the over-all
guerrilla strength declined very slightly.73
It was evident that the problem did not
admit of an early solution and would probably continue. In Clark's opinion,
however, hunting of guerrillas, like the settlement of political squabbles, was
an internal ROK affair and in September he told Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren,
commander of the newly formed Korean Communications Zone, that American soldiers
could be used to guard prisoners, safeguard property, and protect supply routes
and U.N. nationals, but not to chase bandits.74
Although the United Nations commander was able to remain neutral in the
ROK domestic situation, he found it difficult to avoid participation in the
republic's embroilment with Japan. Relations between the two countries,
embittered by the controversy over Japanese claims to vested properties in
Korea, were aggravated by the Japanese practice of fishing off the Korean coast.
In September the ROK Navy seized several Japanese fishing vessels that had
violated ROK territorial waters and tension mounted. Clark was forced to
establish a sea defense zone on 22 September off the Korean coast, ostensibly to secure the UNC lines of communication and to prevent enemy agents from
being landed, but in reality designed to form a buffer area between the ROK and
Japanese vessels.75
Hardly had this uneasy moment passed when
Rhee decided to put an end to the UNC practice of employing about 2,000 Japanese in Korea.
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Most of the
Japanese were working in port areas, installing equipment and training Korean
replacements. But ROK resentment at the presence of its former overlords in
positions of responsibility led Rhee to direct the arrest of all Japanese who
came ashore without the permission of the ROK Government. Clark countered by
instructing all Japanese employees to remain on shipboard except in case of
absolute necessity. Since the Department of the Army did not wish Clark to make
an issue of the matter, Collins told him to intensify his efforts to replace the
Japanese with Koreans and to work out a program for doing this that Rhee might
approve.76 In early October Clark passed these instructions on to
General Herren, advising him that the emphasis should be put upon training
Koreans quickly as replacements and upon an amicable solution of the
altercation.77
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Notes
1 See Memo, Col John T. Hall, G-3, for Chief Training Br
G-3, 13 May 52, sub: The Effect on the Army of Possible Resumption of
Hostilities in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 77.
2 JSPC 853/106, 9 May 52,
title: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea.
3 Ibid.
4 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 12 May 52, sub: Courses of
Action in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 29/11.
5 (1) Msg, JCS 919187, JCS to
CINCFE, 23 Sep 52. (2) Msg, CX 56022, CINCUNC to JCS,
29 Sep 52, in Transcript of Briefings G-3 091 Korea,
78.
6 JCS 1725/175, 20
May 52, title: Information for the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.
7 (1) Memo, CofS for JCS, 21
May 52, sub: Assumption of Termination of Hostilities in Korea, in G-3 091
Korea, 1/15. (2) Memo,
Lovett for JCS, 24 Jun
52, no sub, incl to JCS
1800/195.
8 Draft
Statement of Secy Army before the Senate Appropriations Committee . . , ca. 10
Jun 52, in G-3 110, 10.
9 Memo, Secy
Defense for Secy Army, 15 Aug 52, incl to Summary Sheet, Eddleman for CofS, 15
Oct 52, in G-3 091 Korea, 36/3.
10 Memo, CofS for JCS, 14 Jun 52, sub: Assumption of
Termination of Hostilities in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 1/28.
11 (1) Memo, Jenkins for Taylor, 11 Jul 52,
sub: Implication of Continued Hostilities in Korea, in G-3 091 Korea, 1/32. (2)
STM30, Strength of the Army, 30 Apr and 31 Oct 52.
12(1) Ltr, TAG
to CINCFE, 14 May 52, sub: Military and Civilian Personnel Authorization, in G-3
091, 46. (2) Msg, CINCFE to DA, 22 May 52, DA 141852. (3) Msg, DA 9?831, G-3 to
CINCFE, 22 Jun 52.
13 (1) Msg, DA
914690, G-3 to CINCFE, 30 Jul 52. (2) Msg, C 53302, CINCFE to DA, 8 Aug 52, in
UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, and CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 47
14 Ltr, Collins
to Clark, 1 Aug 52, no
sub, in FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No.1.
15 Memo, Pace for Secy Defense, 16 Oct 52,
sub: Reduction of U.S. Manpower in Korea, in G-3
320.2 Pacific, 13.
16 (1) Msg, CX 68196, CINCFE to JCS, g May
52, DA-IN 136993. (2) Msg, JCS 913020, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Jul 52.
17 See Chapter X, above.
18 (1) G-3 Memo
for Rcd, 22 Apr 52, sub: Ammunition Supply Situation, in G-3 470, 4. (2) Memo,
Col H. C. Hine, Jr., for Jenkins, 29 Apr 52, sub: Ammunition Supply Situation in
FY 1958, in G-3 337, 23.
19 UNC/FEC, Comd
Rpt, May 52, pp. 129-30.
20 Hq Eighth
Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 139-41.
21 Msg, CX
51020, Clark to Collins, 28 Jun 52, in Hq Eighth
Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Paper 53.
22 Msg, DA 912775, Collins to Clark, 3 Jul
52. The strike was not settled until 25 July 1952 and endured fifty-four days in
all.
23 Memo, Pace
for Secy Defense, 5 Jul 52, sub: Opening of Christie
Park Plant . . . , in G-3 470, 7.
24 Msg, GX 6904, CG EUSAK to CG I U.S.
Corps et al., to Jul 52, in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jul 52, p. 15.
25 Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52, sub: Items of Personal
Interest to CINCFE . . . , in UNC/ FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS,
Supporting Docs, tab 16.
26 (1) Msg, CX 53249, Clark to CofS, 7 Aug
52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 62. (2)
Memo, Ralph J. Watkins for Bendetsen, 28 Aug 52, no sub, in FEC Geri Admin
Files.
27 Msg, DA 915309, G-4 to CINCFE, 7 Aug 52.
28 Msg, DA 915951, G-4 to CINCFE, 14 Aug 52.
29 Memo, Eddleman for DCofS
Opns and Admin, 29 Sep 52, sub: Statistical Data, in G-3 091 Korea, 93/3. (2) UNC/FEC,
Comd Rpt, Oct 52, p. 32.
30 Msg, CX 57223, Clark to DA,
18 Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 51.
31 Ibid.
32 Msg, DA 922080, G-4 to CINCFE, 25 Oct 52.
33 Reeder, The Korean
Ammunition Shortage, ch. VI, p. 9.
34 Memo, Moorman for CofS, 26
May 52, sub: Expansion of the ROK Forces, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952
Corresp.
35 Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experiences, pt. IV, pp. 43-44.
36 Msg, C 50459, Clark to DA,
19 Jun 52, DA-IN 152025. The bulk allotment included patients, trainees,
interpreters, general prisoners, etc.
37 Msg,
CX 50698, Clark to JCS, 23 Jun 52, DA-IN 153560.
38 Ltr, You Chan Yang to Bradley, 18 Jun 52, no sub, in
G-3 091 Korea, 82.
39 See Chapter X, above.
40 Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 7 Jul 52, sub: Strength,
Organizational and Logistical Support of Wartime ROK Army, in G-3 091 Korea,
74.
41 Decision on JCS 1776/281, 30 Jun 52.
42 (1) Memo, Mudgett for Clark, 15 Jul 52, sub: Items of
Personal Interest to CINCFE . . . , in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
(2) Msg, C 52744 CINCFE to Van Fleet, 29 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52,
an. 4, pt. III, incl 3.
43 Memo, Brig Gen John C. Oakes, SGS, for ACofS G-g, 8 Aug 52, sub:
Additional Logistical Support of War Time ROK Army, in G-3 091 Korea, 71/5.
44 The strength figures broke down as
follows: 10 divisions, 144,420; corps troops, 16,004; Army troops, 101,113; bulk
allotment, 92,100; total, 353,637. See Msg, CX 54184, CINCFE to DA, 25 Aug 52,
DA-IN 176440.
45 At
2,500 men per division, KATUSA strength could reach 20,000 since there were 8
divisions- 6 U.S. Army, 1 Marine, and 1 Commonwealth. The other 7,000 would be
placed in combat support units. See, Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, sec. I,
Narrative, p. 90.
46 Msg, C 55066, Clark to DA, 12 Sep 52,
DA-IN 183011.
47 Msg, CX 54489, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Sep 52,
DA 179035.
48 Memo, Brig Gen Charles P.
Cabell for Secy Defense, 19 Sep 52, sub: A Three Year Plan for the ROK Air
Force, in G-3 091 Korea, 60/5. It should be noted that this decision was
somewhat deceptive, for the U.S. Air force had added twenty more fighter planes
to the ROK Air Force between the JCS decision of 30 June and the end of
September. See Ltr, Col C. C. B. Warden, TAG FEC, for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub:
Peacetime ROK Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy, in G-3 091 Korea, 74.
49 Memo, Bradley
for Secy Defense, 26 Sep 52, sub: Augmentation of the Wartime ROK Army and
Marine Corps, in G-3 091 Korea, 66.
50 Memo, GCM [Mudgett] for CINC, 20 Sep
52, sub: Strength of the ROK Army, in FEC G-3 320.2 Strength No. 1. (2) Msg, CX 56149, Clark for JCS, 1
Oct 52, DA-IN 190069.
51 Msg, CX
56149, Clark to JCS, 1 Oct 52, DA-IN 190069.
52 (1) Memo,
Deputy Secy Defense Foster for JCS 8 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation . . . , incl to
JCS 1776/322. (2) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 10 Oct 52, sub: Augmentation .
. . , in G-3 091 Korea, 66/8.
53 (1) Ltr, Lovett to the President, 25 Oct
52, no sub, in G-3 091 Korea, 66/17. (2) Memo, Lovett for JCS, 30 Oct 52, sub:
Augmentation . . , G-3, Korea, 66/16.
54 New York
Times, October 30, 1952.
55 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, May and Oct
52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 41-42 and pp. 62-64, respectively.
56 Hq Eighth
Army, Comd Rpts, June and Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 73 and 63,
respectively.
57 (1) Msg, CX
50924, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. II,
J-17, 27 Jun 52. (2) Msg, CX 55484, CINCFE to DA, 20 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd
Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.
58 Myers, KMAG's Wartime Experience, pt.
IV, pp. 8-10.
59 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, sec.
I, Narrative, pp. 105-06.
60 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec.
I, Narrative, p. 204.
61 UNC/FEC, Comd
Rpt, Jun 52, pp. 46-47.
62 Ibid., p. 48.
63 Msg, LC 893, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 28 May
52, in Hq Eighth Army, Opn Planning Files, May 52, item 106A.
64 Msg, GX 6155, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d
Logistical Comd, go May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS, incl
27.
65 Msg, JCS 910146, JCS to CINCFE, 30 May 52.
66 Msg, C 69322, Clark to DA,
go May 52, DA-IN 145040.
67 Msg, DA 910149, CSUSA to CINCFE, 31 May 52.
68 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 47.
69 Ibid., Jul 52, pp. 54-55.
70 (1) Msg, GX
74495 KCG, Van Fleet to Clark, 17 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal
Msg File, 1949-5z. (2) Memo, Col Walter R. Hensey, Jr., G-5, for SGS, 19 Jun 52,
no sub, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
71 (1) Msg, GX 6632, Van Fleet to
Clark, 24 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personel Msg File, 1949-52. (2)
Msg, GX 51399, CINCUNC to JCS, 5 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and
CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15.
72 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, sec.
1, Narrative, p. 204.
73 Hq Eighth Army, Comd Rpts, Jut 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 6; Aug
52, sec. I, Narrative, pp. 80-81; Sep 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 118; Oct 52, sec. I, Narrative, p. 66.
74 Msg, C 54962,
CINCFE to CG KCOMZ, to Sep
52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 6.
75 UNC/FEC, Comd
Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 44-46.
76 (1) Msg, DA 919564, DA to CINCFE, 27 Sep
52, (2) UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, pp. 46-49.
77 Msg, CX
56725, CINCUNC to CG KCOMZ, 9 Oct 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Oct 52, CinC and
CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 55.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
