History 
On Line
Strategic and Tactical Air Operations
On the ground the Communist advantage in manpower was
substantial, but the U.N. Command still had control of the air space over North
Korea. Despite the build-up of the enemy air strength in Manchuria, the
Communists made no serious effort to challenge the UNC dominance aloft during
the spring of 1952. Fighters and bombers roamed at will with only occasional
brushes with the enemy.
But a significant change in UNC aircombat operations policy
came about in May. The rail interdiction program had reached the same status as
the truce negotiations. As fast as the UNC pilots disrupted the rail system,
Communist repair crews put them back in operation again. It was apparent that
"to continue the rail attacks would be, in effect, to pit skilled pilots,
equipped with modern, expensive aircraft, against unskilled oriental coolie
laborers, armed with pick and shovel."1 If military pressure was to
be maintained upon the enemy to influence the Communists to agree to a truce,
then a shift from the diminishing returns of rail interdiction seemed in order.
Accordingly, in early May the scope of interdiction operations
was broadened. Along the front, the Fifth Air Force's fighter-bombers
concentrated their attacks upon enemy supplies, equipment, and personnel massed
within striking distance of the battlefield, while medium bombers began to
devote their attention to airfields, railway systems, and supply and
communications centers, in that order. One of the first endeavors of the change
came on 8 May when 485 fighter-bombers descended on Suan, about forty miles
southeast of P'yongyang, and over a 13-hour period caused widespread damage to
buildings, supplies, trucks, and gun positions in the biggest single attack of
the war up to that time.2
The North Korean Power
ComplexAs interest in rail interdiction lessened, the search for
profitable targets soon led the air planners back to the important, undamaged
hydroelectric complex in North Korea. The location of certain dams and plants,
such as that at Suiho on the Yalu, made them sensitive targets, since they
furnished power to the Chinese as well as to the North Koreans. To avoid giving
the Chinese an excuse to intervene, U.S. leaders had placed a ban upon the
bombing of dams and plants along the Yalu on 6 November 1950 and it had never been rescinded.3 Later,
when the truce negotiations began, the restrictions on Yalu power plant bombing
had been repeated, but no mention had been made of the remainder of the power
complex.4
Fearing that an effort to destroy the power installations might
have an adverse effect upon the armistice proceedings, Ridgway had been
reluctant to permit the Air Force to bomb them. In March 1952, he informed
General Weyland that if the Communists appeared to be deliberately delaying an
agreement and strengthening their offensive capabilities, he might change his
mind, but in the meantime, he would not recommend an attack.5 It
seemed to him that as long as the primary use of the power facilities was for
the civilian economy, their destruction was not justified.6
General Weyland did not agree. In response to a request for his
views on the matter from the Air Force planners in Washington, he stated that
the disruption of electric power would complement other air attacks. By cutting
off this power, the U.N. Command could make it difficult for the enemy to carry
out repair work that was done in small establishments and in railway tunnels.
Through reduction of small-scale production, Weyland went on, added pressure
might be put on the Communists and spur them to speed up the negotiations. As
for the means, Weyland estimated that 500 fighter-bomber and 80 medium bomber
sorties could do the job over a period of several good flying days.7
It was not very surprising that Weyland's views should be
communicated swiftly to the JCS by the Air Force or that Ridgway showed a little
annoyance when the JCS questioned him on the divergence between Weyland and
himself on the subject. The U.N. commander informed his superiors that there had
been no unusual circumstances that would necessitate them to direct an attack
upon the hydroelectric installations rather than follow the normal procedure of
waiting for a recommendation from him. He was keeping a close watch on the
situation, Ridgway concluded, and he did not want an attack unless he decided
that it was warranted and opportune.8
On 12 May, Clark took over as Ridgway's successor. Shortly
thereafter, he surveyed the situation and decided to intensify the air pressure
campaign as much as possible. One of the most lucrative targets, he discovered,
was the untouched hydroelectric complex. Although he did not have the authority
to bomb the Yalu installations, he instructed Weyland to prepare plans for
destroying all other major hydroelectric facilities. The Air Force would be the
co-ordinating agent and the Navy would participate in the initial attack which
was to be staged as soon as possible.9
When the Joint Chiefs learned of Clark's desire to strike the
hydroelectric targets, they approached the Secretary of
Defense to secure Presidential approval that would remove the
restrictions on the Suiho plant, since this was the largest and most important
installation in North Korea. President Truman's consent opened the entire
complex to air destruction and the JCS told Clark to go ahead at his own
discretion. The JCS warned that the ban on operations within twelve miles of the
Soviet border still applied and care should be exercised not to bomb Manchurian
territory inadvertently.10
Vice Adm. Joseph J. Clark, who had assumed command of the
Seventh Fleet on 20 May, was anxious to have naval air units take part in the
Suiho attack as well as those against other power targets.11 He flew
to Seoul and easily convinced Maj. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus that he should allow
Navy dive bombers and fighters to join the Fifth Air Force assault force.12
Thus, on 23 June, 35 Navy attack bombers (ADSkyraiders) and 35 Panther jet fighters (F9F's) from the carriers Princeton,
Boxer, and Philippine Sea hit the Suiho plant while squadrons of Air
Force Sabrejets (F-86's) provided overhead cover. The Navy dive bombers dropped
their bombs while the Panthers provided antiaircraft suppression. As soon as the
Navy planes completed their mission, 79 Thunderjets (F-84's) and 45 Shooting
Stars (F-80's) followed and dropped their loads. Over 200 Communist fighters,
perched on airfields across the Yalu, made no attempt to halt the attack; many
of them took off in haste and flew inland.
During the next three days the Fifth Air Force mounted over 800
fighter-bomber sorties and over 200 counterair sorties while the Navy launched
well over 500 sorties against the power system. Suiho was badly damaged,
according to the pilot reports, and ten other plants were made unserviceable.
Two installations suffered less vital hits. For two weeks a power blackout
existed in North Korea with only gradual restoration thereafter.13
The bombing of the hydroelectric installations drew immediate
fire in Great Britain from the Labour Party and from the press. Since the
British Defence Minister, Lord Alexander, had but recently visited Clark, the
British were upset that he had not been informed of the proposed strikes.
Actually the Clark request had not been approved by the JCS until after
Alexander had left Korea on 18 June, but it was difficult to convince the
British on this score. The Churchill government narrowly survived a Laborite
motion of censure after Secretary of State Acheson admitted in London that the
United States had been at fault and should have consulted the Brtish beforehand.
Although there was no compulsion for the United States to keep the British
informed, Acheson said that they should have been told about the power plant
operations as a matter of courtesy.14
Most of the British concern seemed to rest in the fears that
the power plant destruction might lead the Chinese to break off the truce
negotiations or to attempt retaliation. Clark later stated that he was somewhat
surprised by the furor the attacks had caused in Britain, but was determined to
repeat them, wherever profitable, until an armistice was concluded.15
It should be noted that although the Communist negotiators complained that the
bombings were wanton, they neither ended the meetings nor sought revenge.
In the United States, the reaction was quite the reverse of
that in the United Kingdom. The question of why the power complex had not been
bombed earlier was raised in Congressional and other quarters. Clark could do
little to help the JCS answer this query since he saw no reason why they should
have been spared so long. On 19 July, Mr. Lovett told a congressman that seven
factors had forestalled prior efforts to strike the
power targets: 1. the postwar reconstruction problem; 2. the
knowledge that some of the plants had been dismantled and only recently
reconstructed; 3. the status of excess capacity in the plants; 4. possible
losses of UNC air forces; 5. use of North Korean power in Manchuria and in the
USSR and possibility that destruction of the plants might invite a Communist
offensive; 6. estimated effect upon the armistice talks; and other priority
targets.16 As it turned out, some of these factors had obviously been
overrated or had become obsolescent.
One by-product of this flurry was the appointment of a British
representative on the UNC staff. This had been discussed previously and
rejected, since Ridgway had felt that making an exception in favor of the United
Kingdom would lead to similar requests for representation from other U.N.
countries participating in Korea. When Alexander visited Korea, Clark told the
JCS that he was willing to accept a British staff officer despite the possible
disadvantages. To counteract opposition criticism that had led to the censure
motion, Churchill announced on 1 July that a representative would be named
shortly. Actually, it was not until the end of the month that Maj. Gen. Stephen
N. Shoosmith was designated as a deputy chief of staff of the U.N. Command. His
directive, however, made it clear that his appointment was solely as a normal
staff officer and that liaison between the United States and the United Kingdom
would be carried on through normal political and military channels as it had
been in the past, both in Korea and in Washington.17
At any rate, the bombing of the hydroelectric system became an
accepted part of the air campaign. Suiho was subjected to a B-29 raid on 11-12
September and other plants were hit whenever they seemed to be getting back into
operation.
P'yongyang
During May the Far East Air Forces also proposed to mount
another attack upon the North Korean capital of P'yongyang. New military targets
near the city had been uncovered and could be destroyed, Weyland told Clark. The
latter was not averse to a strike on Pyongyang, but he was worried about
Prisoner of War Camp No. 9 which the Communists had placed close to the city.
Since air reconnaissance had not located this camp, Clark wanted the Far East
Air Forces to conduct the attack by visual means or with the assistance of
shortrange navigational beacons so that the prisoner camp would not be
bombed.18
On 5 July, subject to these conditions, Clark approved the
operations against P'yongyang. In the course of eleven hours on 11 July, 1,254
sorties were flown. Fifth Air Force Sabrejets and Thunderjets, ROK and
Australian fighters, British Meteors, and Navy Panthers and Corsairs from the
Seventh Fleet vectored in three waves to hit the forty-odd targets in and around
the city. When night fell, B-29's arrived to bomb targets specially reserved for
them. Supply depots, factories, billeting areas, railway centers, and gun
positions were destroyed and damaged and the Communist radio claimed that 1,500
buildings had been leveled and 900 others had suffered harm from the 1,400 tons
of bombs and 23,000 gallons of napalm dropped on the capital. Despite heavy and
accurate antiaircraft fire, only one air force and two naval fighters were lost.
Eight air force planes, however, were seriously damaged.19
On 4 August the Fifth Air Force fighter-bombers hit P'yongyang
again with 273 sorties, bombing buildings, a fuel dump, gun positions, and
military personnel. A third huge effort against the city came on 29 August.
Clark and Weyland decided that a psychological air blow should be struck while
the Soviet and Chinese representatives were conferring in Moscow. In another
three-wave assault, 1,403 Air Force and Navy sorties blanketed the capital and
inflicted additional damage. After this pounding P'yongyang possessed too few
worthwhile targets to warrant major strikes for a time.20
Air Pressure and Air-Ground Support
General Clark realized that although there was little he could
do to increase the ground pressure against the Communists in Korea, he could
give the Air Force and Navy full encouragement to step up the pace of the air
campaign.21 The attacks on the power plants and on P'yongyang were
the most spectacular during the summer of 1952, but by no means the only ones
that were launched.
In late July 63 B-29's mounted their greatest single-target
effort thus far against the Oriental Light Metals Company, an aluminum alloy
plant within five miles of the Yalu River. Enemy jet and propeller-driven night
fighters provided but slight and ineffective opposition to this raid, which
inflicted heavy damage on the plant.22
On 27 July naval aircraft from the Bon Homme Richard
attacked a lead and zinc mine and mill at Sindok and others from the
Princeton bombed a magnesite plant at Kilchu the next day. On 1
September, carrier aircraft from the Essex, Princeton, and Boxer
struck the oil refinery at Aoji, just eight miles from the Soviet border.
Special permission from the JCS, enabled the Navy to send over 100 fighters and
fighterbombers against the previously undisturbed oil supply center and reports
indicated that the destruction was extensive.23
Despite the nearness of many of the Air Force and Navy
operations to the Chinese border during the summer and the impressive fighter
strength of the Chinese Air Force located just across the Yalu, enemy air
activity was conspicuous by its absence. The MIG-15's generally avoided combat
and the majority of the aircraft losses was due to antiaircraft fire. As the
bombing of industrial targets increased in July and August, enemy aircraft began
to be sighted more frequently, but they showed little disposition to fight. When
they did, the Sabrejets usually took a heavy toll of Communist planes.24
The reluctance of the Communist fighters to defend their
troops, cities, and plants offered a contrast to the efforts of the UNC air
forces to afford their ground forces support during the summer of 1952. However,
there had been complaints from ground force commanders regarding the Van
Fleet-Everest agreement which had specified that 96 close air support sorties a
day would meet Eighth Army requirements under conditions of limited ground
activity.25 In December 1951, Van Fleet himself had sought in vain to
have one squadron of fighter-bombers assigned to each of his corps, maintaining
that this would improve close air support operations. The parceling out of air
combat units ran counter to Air Force doctrine and had been firmly rejected
on the grounds that such a system would be inflexible and wasteful inasmuch as
the squadrons could not be shifted to the more active fronts as necessity arose.
But Van Fleet was not easily dissuaded. After Clark became commander in chief,
he tried again. Early in June he suggested that the 1st Marine Wing be placed
under the operational control of the Eighth Army.26
Van Fleet's plan was essentially the same as it had been six
months earlier. He would put one squadron under each corps commander and
establish a joint operations center to control the use of the Marine units at
each corps headquarters. To counteract the Air Force argument that this system
would be inflexible, he intended to retain sufficient control at Eighth Army
level to divert aircraft not being used adequately to other corps or back to the
Fifth Air Force. The chief benefits, the Eighth Army commander maintained, would
be to reduce the time lag between the request for support and its arrival; to
allow the pilots to become familiar with the terrain that they would be called
upon to attack and the ground personnel they would be working with; to increase
the number of sorties per day by having the aircraft stationed close to the
corps front lines; and to insure better control of air strikes by eliminating
the spotter aircraft that now directed them.27
Although Clark sympathized with Van Fleet's approach, he had no
desire to stir up the old feud between air and ground forces on the role of
tactical aviation. On 1 July he turned down the Eighth Army commander's proposal
and directed his staff to improve procedures for carrying out air-ground
operations doctrine.28
Six weeks later Clark issued his plan for improving conditions. He did not
find anything basically wrong with the present system. One of the difficulties,
he maintained, was a lack of understanding at subordinate levels of the
limitations of the air arm and of the fact that air policies were only arrived
at after consultation between the Air Force and Army commanders. Clark felt that
ground commanders frequently called for air strikes when their organic artillery
could do the job better. After all, he went on, the air forces in the FEC had
only limited forces and had many tasks to perform. The Army could not afford to
adopt the Marine air-ground team system because it was not designed for the same
kind of operations and had entirely different allocations of artillery to carry
out its missions.29 Actually, Clark suggested, the tactical air
forces were engaged in three types of action- antiair, antimateriel and
installations, and antipersonnel. Ground support was not the least of these,
although it seemed always to be mentioned last. He thought that cooperative training between the
air and ground forces would do much toward eliminating many of the
misconceptions that existed and proposed that steps be taken to allow more
understanding of mutual problems.30
In the meantime, Van Fleet had consulted with General Barcus,
Fifth Air Force commander, in June about applying the maximum air effort to
destroy the enemy air offensive potential close to the battle front. He feared
that the build-up of Communist strength close to the front might portend a
possible offensive before the rainy season, so he urged de-emphasis of the rail
interdiction program and increase in close air support. In addition, Van Fleet
asked Clark to let the B-29's, which were running into mounting enemy night
fighter opposition on their raids close to the Manchurian border, hit Communist
personnel, supplies, and material close to the front lines by employing night
radar-controlled bombing techniques.31
Barcus was willing. He informed Van Fleet that the air effort
from the main line of resistance to areas forty miles behind the enemy front was
growing substantially. But there were difficulties, he continued. Personnel and
supply bunkers were extremely hard targets to destroy since the enemy was so
well dug in.32 Admiral Clark, Seventh Fleet commander, was also eager
to help. After a tour of the Eighth Army front in May and talks with Van Fleet,
he came to the conclusion that naval aircraft were particularly well suited for
the type of pinpoint attacks that would be necessary to hit enemy personnel and
supply bunkers. Van Fleet and his ground commanders were all in favor of naval
air aid and the Seventh Fleet staff began to lay plans for joining in the close
combat support program.33
As the number of air support missions increased,
fighter-bombers and medium bombers (B-29's) began to unload their bombs and guns
on targets in the enemy's immediate rear. Van Fleet was encouraged. During the
rainy season in July, he was successful in securing light bomber and medium
bomber support from Barcus and Weyland, who were eager to co-operate if suitable
targets could be uncovered for the heavier aircraft.34
There is little doubt that the end of the rail interdiction
campaign opened a new and- to the ground forces- more satisfactory phase of the
air war. The growing numbers of aircraft overhead meting out punishment to the
enemy across the lines could not help but boost front-line morale. During the
bitter battles of October, the U.N. Command air force flew almost 4,500
close support sorties against enemy personnel, equipment, supplies, and
strongpoints, and of these over 2,20o were in support of Operation SHOWDOWN
alone. General Jenkins, the IX Corps commander, sent his "grateful thanks" for
the Fifth Air Force's outstanding assistance.35
As the ground and air force officers began to swap visits to
the front and to the air control centers, some of the misunderstanding between
the two groups started to fade. The ground troops learned that they could help
the pilots by using proximity fuzes before air strikes to suppress antiaircraft
fire. Since losses of friendly planes had mounted during the close support
campaign because of heavy flak, the efforts of the artillery to reduce the
hazard were appreciated by the air force. Another symptom of the change for the
better, according to the official Air Force historian, came from Van Fleet
himself. By fall he no longer was urging that air squadrons be assigned to his
corps.36 This in itself seemed to denote an overall improvement.
The Kojo Demonstration
Naval surface operations during the summer of 1952 consisted
mainly of routine patrol and blockade of the Korean coast, mine sweeping
operations, and the shelling of targets along the coast to harass and interdict
the enemy's lines of communication. For the ROK I Corps the naval surface guns
provided splendid artillery support whether on offense or defense.
But the biggest naval operation was the demonstration at Kojo
on the east coast of Korea. In July Clark had asked Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe,
the naval commander, whether it might not be wise in the interest of economy to
hold a landing exercise in connection with the movement of the 1st Cavalry
Division's 8th Regimental Combat Team to Korea. Owing to housing difficulties in
Japan, Clark had decided to rotate the three RCT's of the 1st Cavalry to Korea,
one at a time. Since the first team was scheduled to be transferred from Japan
in October, Clark felt that the opportunity for alarming the Communists should
not be missed.
Admiral Briscoe was heartily in favor of some action and
suggested that an amphibious demonstration be mounted. This could conceivably
lure enemy reinforcements out on the roads and expose them to attack by air and
surface craft. In addition, the training would be excellent for all the UNC
forces involved, Briscoe concluded. Encouraged by this reception, Clark told his
naval commander to go ahead with the planning and to co-ordinate with Eighth
Army and XVI Corps staffs on the role of the 1st Cavalry Division
units.37
Under Admiral Clark, the Seventh Fleet commander, joint
Amphibious Task Force Seven was set up and 15 October established as the target
date. The demonstration was scheduled for the area near Kojo and planning for
the land, sea, and air phases proceeded at a swift pace. For purposes of
deception, only the highest echelon of command knew that the maneuver was to be only a
demonstration.38
Although the 187th Airborne Regiment was to be withdrawn and
prepared for an airdrop and Eighth Army was to prepare for an offensive to link
up with the amphibious forces, Clark told Van Fleet this was simply to confuse
enemy intelligence and no more than limited land objectives would be
attacked.39
On 12 October rehearsal operations held at Kangnung ran into
high surf conditions and had to be broken off. For the next three days, FEAF and
naval planes hit the enemy positions around Kojo and naval surface craft, led by
the battleship Iowa, shelled the beach area. The assault troops climbed down to
the assault landing craft in the early afternoon of 15 October and made a pass
at the shore. Sudden high winds made recovery of the boats a difficult task, but
there were no serious casualties.
The enemy response to the elaborate scheme was disappointing.
Little evidence of significant troop transfers came to light and the Communist
shore batteries threw only a few answering shells at the assault force. Whether
this denoted a lack of mobility to respond quickly or perhaps a preference to
wait until the UNC troops had landed and then to launch a counterattack was
impossible to surmise. Evidently the discovery that the operation was only a
feint added to the frustration of all the UNC personnel who had not been in on
the secret. The realism of the planning and mounting of the operation had built
up UNC expectations and although the training was adjudged valuable, the damage
to morale served to balance this off.40
As operations tapered off in the fall, the results of the
fighting during the May-October period remained open to speculation. Although
the air pressure campaign had evoked some protests from the Communists at
Panmunjom, it had in no way softened their attitude toward an early armistice on
the UNC terms. On the ground the hill battles had caused the enemy more
casualties than the UNC had suffered, but gains on both sides had been minor.
and neither could claim a victory. Communist attrition in men, supplies,
materiel, and installations was considerable during the six-month span, but they
showed no sign of cracking or of submitting to a truce. From every aspect it was
still a stalemate and no end was in sight.
Notes
1 USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul
53, p. 26.
2 Ibid., p. 27.
3 Ibid., pp. 27-30.
4 Msg, JCS 95977, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jul 51.
5 Memo, EKW [Wright] for CofS, x Apr 52, sub: N.K. Hydroelectric Power
Installations, in FEC G-3 091 Korea, folder 1, Jan-Feb 52.
6 Memo, MBR [Ridgway] for CofS FEC, 26 Apr 52, no sub, in FEC G-3 091 Korea,
folder 1, Jan-Feb 52.
7 Msg, VCO 118, CG FEAF to Hq USAF, 29 Apr 52, 5285.
8 Msg, CX 67909, CINCFE to JCS, a May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May
52, an. 4, incl 2.
9 Msg, CX 50528, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and CG FEAF, 17 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd
Rpt, Jun 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 15.
10 (1) Memo, Bradley for Secy Defense, 19 Jun 52, sub: Removal of Restriction
on Attacks Against Yalu River Hydroelectric Installations. (2) Msg, JCS 911683,
JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jun 52.
11 Clark succeeded Vice Adm. Robert P. Briscoe, who was appointed Commander,
Naval Forces, Far East, on 4 June when Admiral Joy was rotated.
12 General Barcus took over command of the Fifth Air Force on 30 May from
General Everest.
13 Msg, CX 50733, CINCFE to JCS, 24 Jun 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52,
CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 18. For more complete accounts of these
raids, see: (1) R. Frank Futrell, The United States Air Forces in Korea,
1950-1953, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961 ) , pp. 451-52: (2)
James A. Field, Jr., History of the United States Naval Operations,
Korea (Washington, 1962), pp. 436-39; (3) Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A.
Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957)
1957), pp. 441ff.
14 Dept of State, Press Release No . 516, 30 Jun 52, in Dept of State
Bulletin, vol. XXVII, No. 681 (July 14, 1952), p. 60
15 Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 72-74.
16 (1) Msg, JCS 912750, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52. (2) Msg, C 51395,
Clark to JCS, 5 Jul 52, DA-IN 157923.(3) Msg, JCS 914021 to CINCFE, 21
Jul 52.
17 (1) Msg, C 50318, Clark to JCS, 17 Jun 52, DA 151297. (2) Msg, DA 914543,
Jenkins to CINCFE, 26 Jul 52.
18 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, an. 4, pt. 1, p. 20.
19 (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1
July 1952-27 July 1953, pp. 88-99. (2) Futrell, United States Air Force in
Korea, 1950-53, pp. 481-82. (3) Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea,
pp, 450-53.
20 (1) USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean
Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 99. (2) Futrell, United States Air Force in
Korea, 1950-53, pp. 483, 489.
21 Msg, CX 53391 CINCFE to CG FEAF and
COMNAVFE, 8 Aug 52, in JSPOG Staff Study No. 410.
22 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, p. 28.
23 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 454-59.
24 Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-53, pp.
477-78.
25 (1) USAF Hist Study No, 72, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Nov 50-30
Jun 52, pp. 206ff. (2) USAF Historical Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean
Conflict, 1 Jul 52-27 Jul 53, pp. 184ff.
26 Msg, G 6262 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 6 Jun 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files,
CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949-52.
27 Ibid.
28 (1) Memo, for CofS, 1 Jul 52, no sub, in UDC/ FEC, Comd Rpt, G-3 Jnl, J-g,
12 Aug 52. (2) Clark, Front the Danube to the Yalu, pp. 91-92.
29 The 1st Marine Division had the 11th Marine Regiment as its artillery regiment. The
regiment had basically the same armament as the four separate battalions
employed by the Army to support divisions-three battalions of 105-mm. howitzers
and one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers. In Korea, it was part of a corps and
received corps artillery support. Ordinarily, however, Marine divisions did not
have corps artillery at their disposal to take care of the longrange, heavy-duty
artillery tasks, and Marine air support was often used as a substitute.
30 Ltr, Hq FEC to CG Eighth Army et al., 11 Aug 52, sub: Air
Ground Opus, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, G-3, Jnl, J-3, 12 Aug 52. See discussion in
Chapter XVII, below, of the results of the experiments ensuing from this plan.
See also USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1 Jul-27 Jul
53, pp. 197ff.
31 (1) Msg, G 6267 TAC, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 7 Jun 52, (2) Msg,
G 6390, Van Fleet to CINCFE, 12 Jun 52. (g) Msg, GX 6490, Van Fleet to Barcus,
17 Jun 52. All in Hq Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Papers 20, 28, and
38.
32 Msg, CG 117, CG Fifth AF to CG EUSAK, 19 Jun 52, in Hq Eighth Army
Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, p.43.
33 Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp. 461ff. The naval
support program did not get under way until October. See Chapter XVII, below.
34 (1) Msg, G 6644 TAC, Van Fleet to Clark, 25 Jun 52, in Hq
Eighth Army, Gen Admin Files, Jun 52, Paper 82. (2) Msg, GX 7229 KCG, Van Fleet
to CINCFE, 31 Jul 52, in FEC G-3 Completed Actions. (3) Msg, CX 52915, Clark to
Van Fleet, 1 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting
Docs, tab 17.
35 USAF Hist Study No. 127, USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 1
Jul 52-27 Jul 53, p. 188.
36 Futrell, United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-53.
pp. 505-07.
37 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, p. 5.
38 Ltr, Clark to Collins, ? Sep 52, no sub, in FEC Gen Admin
Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
39 Ltr, Clark to Van Fleet, 13 Sep 52, no sub, in FEC
Gen Admin Files, CofS, 1952 Corresp.
40 See Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.
391-96.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
