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Summer of Frustration

Back to Truce Tent and Fighting Front

The Foundation of Freedom is the Courage of Ordinary People

History  Bert '53  On Line

At the outset Admiral Joy and his fellow delegates paid little attention to the kidnapping of General Dodd. They were preoccupied with the difficult task of convincing the Communists that the package proposal of 28 April was a firm and final offer and not just an interim UNC position. Moreover, there were no indications at the start that the abduction represented more than another incident in the prisoner of war camps. Not until the contents of the Colson letter were revealed did the full impact of the Communist coup affect them.

For the enemy the riots at Koje-do and the Colson letter provided a custommade weapon to discredit the basic stand of the United Nations Command on the only issue that remained-repatriation. The Communists eagerly seized the opportunity to weaken the UNC position in the eyes of the world and in the process to strengthen their own case of the repatriation of all prisoners of war.

Aftermath of the Package Proposal

The relentless attack on the UNC concept of no forced repatriation was scarcely interrupted by the presentation of the package proposal. Actually there had been little hope that the Communists would concede on two issues while the U.N. Command gave in on only one, so that the enemy's rejection had not been unexpected. The net result of the proposal was to eliminate the question of the rehabilitation of airfields and the USSR as a member of the supervisory commission as issues and to focus the spotlight of attention unswervingly upon the disposition of prisoners.

Although the prospects of enemy acceptance of the UNC proposal were remote, General Ridgway felt that they could be materially improved by resolute backing of his position at the highest level in the United States and among the other United Nations participating in Korea. He recommended a strong statement that would bluntly inform the Communists that this was the final offer.1 But neither the military services, the State Department, nor the United States' allies wished to go so far. They were perfectly willing to issue communiques demonstrating their support of the UNC stand and implying that this was the last and best offer, but not to put it so baldly that it could be interpreted as an ultimatum. If a break in the negotiations were to occur, they still desired to let the Communists bear the onus.2

The President, however, did not wantto prevent Joy from using the terms "final" and irrevocable" in the statements on the package deal, but his own official statement on 7 May reflected a more moderate approach. It contained no flat assertion that this was the end of bargaining and left the door open to future maneuvering.3

With the Communist delegation holding firm on their counterproposal for the exchange of the 12,000 prisoners of war in their custody for the 132,000 held by the U.N. Command, both Ridgway and Joy became convinced that there no longer existed any reason for meeting in executive session. On 6 May Joy told General Nam that the UNC desired to return to open meetings and the Communists give their consent.4

The reversion to open sessions the following day had no effect upon the proceedings. The Communists would have nothing to do with the UNC's offer to permit rescreening of all the nonrepatriates by Red Cross or neutral agencies, and charged the UNC with intent to prevent 100,000 prisoners from returning homes.5

At this juncture the Dodd incident and the Colson letter supplied the enemy with fresh ammunition for its assault on the UNC screening procedure. On 16 May, Nam launched the following broadside:

As long as your side does not change this peremptory attitude and give up your unreasonable proposal, our side will continue to expose at these conferences the absurdity of your proposal. Since you are insisting upon your absurd proposition, you will not be able to escape the inevitable consequences of your such [sic] insistence. The so-called screening is totally absurd and impermissible. The so-called result of your so-called screening is doubly absurd and wholly concocted by your side. The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp has already declared to the whole world the utter bankruptcy of your proposition.6

Four days later he lodged this accusation with the UNC delegates:

The unshakable fact is that our captured personnel would rather die than yield to your design of retaining them as your cannon fodder. The unshakable fact is that public confessions of the commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp have killed and buried the myth that our captured personnel refused to be repatriated. In spite of all your threats and violence, our captured personnel rose in heroic and just resistance against your forced screening. The commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp could not but confess before the whole world your inhuman treatment and murderous violence against our captured personnel, and the criminal and unlawful acts committed by your side in screening and re-arming war prisoners by force.7

These samples of the continuous attack sustained by the Communists during May were difficult to refute and, internationally, the damage to the UNC position on repatriation and screening was considerable. Although the situation on Koje-do provided the bulk of the grist for the Communist mill, the enemy produced a steady stream of additional charges. On 11 May, Nam stated, UNC planes bombed a Communist prisoner of war camp and injured a number of UNC personnel. The next day, Nam informed Joy, supply trucks en route to Panmunjom were strafed, and on 14 May parachute flares were dropped on the neutral conference area and strafing carried out.8 While the UNC representatives denied responsibility for some of these accusations, there were enough infractions to place the UNC delegation constantly on the defensive.

In the midst of the Communist barrage, Admiral Joy's tour as chief spokesman at Panmunjom came to an end. In his farewell speech on 22 May, Joy managed to strike back at the enemy. Recalling that on 10 July 1951 he had stressed that "the success or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends directly upon the good faith of the delegations present," he pointed out that that hope had proved to be forlorn. The Communists had caviled over procedural matters, manufactured spurious issues, denied agreements, and indulged in abuse and invective, when all else failed, the admiral charged. Comparing the records of the two sides, he noted that "they are as different as night and day. No amount of propaganda, however oft repeated, can hide your ignoble record." Joy urged the acceptance of the package proposal, then concluded: "After ten months and 12 days I feel there is nothing more for me to do. There is nothing left to negotiate. I now turn over the unenviable job of further dealings with you to Major General William K. Harrison, who succeeds me as Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command Delegation. May God be with him."9

Joy had done well in a difficult situation. Despite frequent harassment he had restrained himself and maintained the dignity of his office under trying circumstances. Yet whenever weak points in the Communist arguments had appeared, he had hit hard. During the ten months that he had led the delega. tion, all of the issues under discussion had been settled with the exception of repatriation of prisoners. And even on this thorny problem, the debate was over. One side or the other would have to give in before an armistice agreement could be reached. As Joy left the Far East, he could contemplate his accomplishments with some satisfaction. The deadlock on repatriation was not his responsibility and all other matters had been successfully negotiated. In many instances he had attained more than expected and if, in some cases, the United States also had had to surrender more than it had bargained for, this was a normal part of negotiating and certainly no vital objectives had been given up.

There was little doubt that Joy had often grown restive at the caution exercised by his superiors in their dealings with the Communists and wished to adopt a firmer position. Yet despite his personal conviction that continued haggling with the enemy would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and indecision by the Communists, he had suppressed his own feelings and carried on the negotiations with patience and forbearance.

The composition of the UNC delegation underwent several other changes during the latter part of May. As General Harrison moved up to assume the duties of chief delegate, Brig. Gen. Frank C. McConnell took over his position as Army representative.10 On 28 May, Brig. Gen. Lee Han Lim replaced Maj. Gen. Yu Chae Heung as ROK Army delegate. The replacements in both instances were of lower rank than their predecessors, possibly because there remained little to be done and major generals could be better utilized elsewhere. At any rate, the rotation of personnel had little effect upon the UNC policies and attitudes in the truce tents.

Variations on a Theme

While the Communist delegates probed for weak spots in the UNC defenses, the internal conflict over a stiffer approach to the enemy continued. General Harrison staunchly supported Joy's pleas for avoiding any signs of weakness. In their opinion daily sessions with the enemy could only lead the Communists to believe that the UNC was still ready to bargain. Actually both Joy and Harrison would have preferred an immediate indefinite suspension of the negotiations until the Communists indicated that they were prepared to accept the UNC proposals.11

General Clark soon came to agree with his negotiators at Panmunjom. He granted the argument that regular meetings with the enemy did provide the UNC with ample opportunity to remind the Communists and, of course, the rest of the world of the fairness of its 28 April proposal. Obversely, however, he pointed out, they also afforded the enemy an excellent means of exploiting the deterioration of the UNC position after the Koje-do incident. The Communist attack was constantly being refueled by fresh charges and thus was more dramatic and newsworthy. Constant repetition of the UNC formula- no matter how attractive the original concept might be- had only resulted in diminishing returns in press coverage and had allowed the enemy to retain the initiative.12

To counter the present Communist advantage and convince the enemy that the U.N. Command would not alter its stand, Clark suggested at the end of May several possibilities that might be adopted as alternatives to indefinite suspension of the truce talks. These included: turning over the problem of rescreening to the liaison officers; one week recesses; delaying tactics by postponing meetings shortly before they were scheduled to convene; and launching a strong propaganda counterattack against the enemy. But Clark did not recommend them. Instead he felt that the UNC should meet as infrequently as possible with the Communists until it had completed its final rosters of all those who were willing to return to the control of the enemy. When the lists were ready, the new firm figures should be presented and if the Communists did not accept them, the UNC would recess unilaterally until they did.13

The use of the expanded repatriation lists led to another point of debate during May between U.S. leaders in Washington and the U.N. Command. As rescreening proceeded during late April and early May, it became apparent that not 70,000 but over 80,000 prisoners and civilian internees wished to be sent back. The obvious disadvantage in revealing the increase to the enemy immediately lay in the fact that the Communists would probably assume that this was another interim figure and adopt a policy of delay anticipating further augmentation of the repatriate totals. On the other hand, knowledge of a 2-percent boost might well spur Communist acceptance of the UNC offer. Admiral Joy and General Harrison wanted to submit the revised estimate to the enemy through the liaison officers, but their superiors were less inclined to act in haste. They pointed out that since many of the prisoners included in the new figures were members of compounds that were completely unscreened because of the threat of violence, a considerable number might refuse to be repatriated at the time of exchange and the Communist would deem this a breach of faith.14

After the Koje-do affair, the Washington leaders felt even more strongly about informing the enemy of the 80,000-plus figure. In their opinion, it could only strengthen the Communist allegation that the initial screening had been conducted improperly and had no validity. This, in turn, could weaken the support that the United States was receiving from its allies and the neutral nations.15

The refusal of the Washington leaders to release the new figure limited the UNC negotiators to a defense of the 28 April proposal. On 23 May-the second day of Harrison's assumption of the role of chief delegate-the Communists presented him with an opportunity to call a three-day recess to the talks. Despite the expressed Washington desire that daily sessions be held as long as the Communists wished them, Harrison postponed the next meeting until 27 May. This contrary action brought a query from the U.S. leaders, but Clark held it was perfectly proper under the circumstances since the enemy had agreed to the recess. Technically, the U.N. Command had a point and soon won permission to ask for additional recesses on this basis in the future provided that none was longer than four days.16

Although the approach of the Washington political and military chiefs to the Communists might have seemed overcautious or perhaps oversolicitous under other conditions, there were several factors on the international scene that strongly influenced their actions during the hectic month of May 1952. As they informed Clark in early June, the strong support that the UNC had won for the principle of nonforcible repatriation had been undermined by the incidents on Koje-do. Many of the United States' principal allies were urging that some type of rescreening take place now rather than prior to the armistice. If the United States invoked a unilateral indefinite suspension of the talks at this juncture, the Soviet Union might take advantage of the opportunity and bring the matter before the U.N. Security Council. In the opinion of the Washington chiefs, the question of the number of prisoners to be returned appeared to be all-important. They felt that a total of 100,000 if it included all of the Chinese, might be acceptable to the Communists, but a figure in the eighty thousands would only cast further doubts on the original screening process.

To restore confidence in the UNC's position, they suggested a step that might alleviate the situation. A group of countries not participating in the conflict might be requested to send representatives to interrogate the nonrepatriates prior to the armistice. This could be accomplished with Communist observers on hand and with both sides agreeing to abide by the results. If the enemy refused to participate, the U.N. Command could proceed unilaterally and present the corrected figures to the Communists. If they did not accept these, the UNC would recess indefinitely.17

On the same day- 6 June- that the Washington leaders forwarded this explanation of the difficulties facing them at home and their suggestions for possible solution of the impasse, they also informed Clark that they were going to inaugurate an intensified campaign to counteract the increased flow of Communist propaganda. The enemy was engaged in a world-wide "Hate America" attack, they maintained, using biological warfare and prisoner of war charges as the chief ingredients. If Clark agreed, they were prepared to set up an Interdepartmental Watch Committee with representatives of Defense, State, and Central Intelligence Agency to work on quick exchange of information and the development of countermeasures to the enemy's sowing of doubt and suspicion.18

General Clark was quite willing to have the committee established, but he felt that the strongest weapon that the U.N. Command could employ against the enemy was truth. The removal of the "shroud of secrecy" from all matters, save those vital to military security, and the prompt release of full and factual information to the press would be the best method to insure domestic and world support in the long run, he believed. He pointed out that although many of the stories emanating from Koje-do had not reflected credit on the UNC, the situation was improving and the freedom accorded to the press was producing increasingly favorable results.19

The Communist propaganda campaign produced one side effect that the enemy probably did not anticipate. While there appeared to be a chance that an armistice might be concluded during March and April, Ridgway had decided to hold all civilian internees until a final settlement was reached. He did not wish to endanger a quick agreement by releasing prematurely the civilian internees desiring to remain in the Republic of Korea. But as the prospects for agreement receded in May, the reasons for delaying action on the civilian internees became less important. The primary deterrent to immediate release- the adverse effect upon the negotiations- was no longer considered valid in view of the depressed state of affairs at Panmunjom.

As Harrison informed Clark in early June, the Communists had already accorded the civilian internees special status when they accepted the prisoner lists of 18 December. He felt there was little risk that the enemy would break off the negotiations over the freeing of these people nor would the Communists retaliate by holding on to UNC prisoners since this would violate the principle they had been defending so staunchly. Doubtlessly, Harrison continued, the Communist propaganda machine would attempt to make full use of this unilateral action as delaying or preventing an armistice, but at this stage the propaganda was being issued at such a rapid rate that a little more or less would make no difference. Clark, in informing the JCS of his intention to make the release, agreed with Harrison's analysis and went on to add that the continued detention of the internees had been a constant source of irritation to Rhee and the ROK people. He did not think that letting the internees go free would have any impact upon the internal crisis in the ROK Government at this time and it would materially reduce the logistical burden imposed upon the Far East Command and result in a savings of vitally needed administrative personnel.20

With the Army supporting Clark's argument, the JCS, the State Department, and the President consented on 10 June to the release of the civilian internees.21 Two days later Clark forwarded his schedule and his plans to coordinate the discharge of some 27,000 internees with the ROK Government. The rate of release, he noted, would depend upon the ability of the Republic of Korea to receive the internees, but a minimum of sixty days would be necessary to do the job in an orderly fashion. Responsibility would rest with the 2d Logistical Command for drawing up lists and providing transport and subsistence en route with the UNC Civil Assistance Command furnishing liaison with the ROK Government, insuring that no interference with military operations resulted, issuing thirty-day rations to each internee as he was freed, and assisting the ROK Government in the task of distributing the civilians to their areas of residence. Clark thought that the unscreened internees should and could be screened before the 27,000 were discharged lest the release influence the choice of those left unscreened. On 13 June the Clark plan was approved.22

Screening the recalcitrant civilian internees was but one aspect of the problem facing Clark during June. On Koje-do General Boatner was still engaged in wresting control of several of the compounds from the enemy prisoners. Clark wanted this task to be completed as quickly as possible and the remainder of the unscreened prisoners of war to be polled. Once this was finished, the U.N. Command would be in possession of more accurate figures on the number of repatriates. If the United States desired eventually to have the nonrepatriates rescreened by neutral nations before the armistice, Clark declared, the job would be much simpler since all the hard-core Communists would be in the repatriate compounds and would not have to be rescreened.23

The U.S. leaders agreed and Clark informed them of the Eighth Army plan for concluding the segregation of prisoners. In general, the procedure paralleled that followed in April. Prisoners would be rostered and fingerprinted first, then taken to the interview tent. If a prisoner refused to answer the questions or indicated he would not resist repatriation violently, he was placed on the list to be repatriated and assigned to a repatriate compound.24

By the end of June the last compound had been screened and a new total of slightly over 83,000 repatriates segregated.25 The question of whether to disclose the revised figures to the enemy immediately came under discussion again. General Bradley evidently felt as Clark and Harrison did on the subject. The danger that the Communists would learn of the corrected total through a leak or via their quite competent intelligence system argued for a quick presentation of the figures at Panmunjom, but the Department of the Army was still reluctant. The possibility of further discrediting of the original screening process at this time and the lack of decision over a later rescreening by neutral nations prompted G-3 to urge that the U.N. Command confirm the 83,000 figure only in the event that it were discovered by the Communists.26

On 3 July the Washington leaders effected a compromise between the two positions. Clark was authorized to divulge the revised numbers to the enemy, but only if the Communists insisted upon discussing them.27


In the meantime, Clark and his staff completed their preparations for the return of the internees to civilian life. On 23 June Harrison quietly announced at Panmunjom that the UNC intended to release 2'7,000 internees in the near future. As expected, the Communists bitterly protested this action as unilateral and designed to delay the fashioning of an armistice. But Harrison made no effort to explain or defend his statement. As far as the UNC was concerned, he told Nam, this was an internal matter and passed on to the enemy as a point of information and not as a subject for debate.28 One week later the first group of 1,800 internees were moved from Yongch'on to their homes throughout South Korea and by mid-July about 10,000 had been set free.29

On the whole, June was an uneventful month at Panmunjom. Harrison resorted several times to three-day recesses despite Nam Il's remonstrations but there was little change in the course of negotiations.30 The recess from 8 to 10 June drew a letter of protest from Kim and Peng and a brief, firm response from Clark affirming the right of either side to request recesses in the event there were no new proposals to discuss. Whether the enemy was worried and feared that the U.N. Command might be preparing to break off relations, as Clark and Harrison asserted, or simply did not want to lose the daily forum for its complaints and charges, was difficult to assess, but in either case the recess could do little harm to the UNC cause.31

There were two changes in the composition of the UNC delegation in late June and early July. On 22 June fiery, capable Admiral Libby attended his last meeting at Panmunjom and was replaced the following day by Rear Adm. John C. Daniel.32 At the beginning of July another veteran member of the team finished his service as a negotiator. General Turner, who had so often clashed with Hsieh Fang on airfields and other Item 3 matters, was rotated and replaced by Brig. Gen. Joseph T. Morris, USAF.33 With the departure of Turner, Harrison became senior in length of service on the delegation as well as chief delegate.

The lack of progress and prospects at Panmunjom was reflected in a plan that Harrison presented at the end of June to Clark. He recommended that the revised figures be given to the Communists. If they refused to accept a settlement on the basis of these totals, then an attempt to secure rescreening by neutral nations should be carried out. Were the enemy still reluctant to conclude an armistice after rescreening was finished and firm and final figures furnished, then the U.N. Command would simply release and parole all prisoners except those desiring repatriation. The negotiations would remain at recess until the Communists conceded the fait accompli and signed an armistice.34 The resuscitation of the concept of unilateral release of nonrepatriates met with little encouragement from Harrison's superiors but the possibilities were intriguing. Although the Communists would have protested vociferously, it might well have permitted them to save face and eventually to give in more gracefully on repatriation.

As July began there was a brief flurry of excitement at Panmunjom. Both sides had agreed on every article of the draft armistice except Article 51. At the meeting on 1 July Harrison discussed this article and urged the enemy to accept it as written: "All prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be released and repatriated as soon as possible. The release and repatriation of such prisoners of war shall be effected in conformity with lists which have been exchanged and have been checked by the respective sides prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement." The interest of the Communist delegation was immediately stirred, for they evidently considered that the U.N. Command, in bringing this matter up, was about to alter its basic position. Harrison, on the other hand, became very optimistic that the more conciliatory attitude evidenced by Nam Il meant that the enemy really wanted an armistice. Since the enemy desired more than 100,000 repatriated, Harrison proposed to juggle the figures and permit the Communists to save face. 83,000 would be repatriated directly, 26,000 internees were then being released, and there were 11,000 South Koreans that would be released. This would give a total of 121,000, but only 83,000 actual repatriations to the Communists need be made.35

Neither Clark nor his superiors in Washington shared Harrison's feeling that the Communists were ready to change their stand and advised him to secure further elaboration from the enemy delegation. As the Washington leaders noted, there was as yet no solution to the question of the disposition of the Chinese prisoners and this was basic to any final agreement.36

One effect of the discussion of Article 51 was immediately noticeable; the propaganda attack on the UNC faded to a whisper. On 3 July the Communists asked for executive sessions the next day so that the article could be thoroughly considered and the UNC consented. But the inception of the closed meetings soon revealed how far apart the two delegations were on Article 51. Both agreed to the article as it was written, but the interpretations accorded were widely divergent. The phrase "held in custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective" was the crux of the matter. The U.N. Command contemplated changing the nomenclature or categories of the prisoners who did not desire repatriation and removing them from prisoner status prior to the effective date of the armistice. To the Communists, the phrase included all prisoners on the 18 December lists. They were willing to except the prisoners living below the 38th Parallel, but all others must be returned. As soon as they discovered that the UNC envisioned submitting new lists based upon the screening results, the Communists quickly became disenchanted. Nam told Harrison frankly on 6 July that if the UNC could come up with a figure approximating 110,000 and including fall the Chinese prisoners, an armistice could easily be concluded.37

Although the sparring continued for several days, neither side gave ground. The Communists were waiting for a UNC concession and had no interest in juggling figures-they wanted 110,000 bodies returned to them.38 After another week of stalemate, Clark and Harrison concluded that presentation of the 83,000 figure offered the only hope to break the impasse. The leaders in Washington finally agreed provided that the UNC did not express the number in such a way as to preclude later expansion in case of rescreening by an impartial agency.39


On 13 July Harrison informed Nam that revised tallies showed that 76,600 Koreans and 6,400 Chinese desired repatriation and suggested that new, up-to-date lists be prepared. After a five-day recess to study the figures, Nam completely rejected them. He was perfectly willing to have the lists rechecked as long as the final total approximated 110,000, he added.40

The Communists refusal to accept the UNC figures evidently occasioned some second thoughts in Washington. G-3, forwarded a suggestion that the release of civilian internees be suspended so that the final list of persons to be repatriated might be increased. In his reply Clark could find little to recommend in this concept. To the enemy the important prisoners were the Chinese and not the Koreans, he noted, and the Communists did not appear to be too concerned over the fate of the internees. On the other hand, Clark went on, interruption of the release program would cause the ROK Government to become upset, the internees to turn restless, and the Communists to have a propaganda holiday.41 The Army did not pursue the subject further.

From Washington also came a proposal that the U.N. Command free all Chinese prisoners and permit the enemy to send representatives to persuade them to return home. No force would be allowed, of course, and neutral observers would be invited to watch the operation. When Harrison learned of this scheme, he protested strongly. To his way of thinking, the enemy agents would swarm over the prisoners and it would be extremely difficult to rid the camps of them. If the Communist agents were successful in getting a large number of prisoners to return, Harrison argued, it would reflect very badly upon the UNC defense of screening and nonforcible repatriation.42

While Clark also had serious doubts about the feasibility of this plan, he was willing to try it in the event that the alternatives previously advanced failed. To cut down on some of the dangers inherent in the proposal, he advocated that reindoctrination of the nonrepatriates by enemy representatives be attempted after an armistice was effective with a specific time limit and a ceiling upon the number of Communist representatives to be sent. Recalling his World War II experience, he reminded the JCS that the Russians had carried out a similar operation in Austria when the war ended. Their teams had invested displaced person camps and used every subversive means available, including espionage. In their wake violence and a wave of suicides had followed and Clark feared that this might well be repeated.43

The incidence of fresh suggestions reflected the realization that the Communists were less than happy over the revised figures submitted. With the end of the brief era of good feeling on 18 July, the Communist attack on the UNC at Panmunjom and via press and radio recommenced. One week later, Nam Il asked that the executive meetings of the delegates be ended on the 26th and that the staff officers resume their conferences on the details of the armistice.44

Since there seemed to be little point in holding executive sessions while the enemy remained in an uncompromising frame of mind, Clark's superiors consented to a return of open meetings. They then inaugurated a new stage in the UNC handling of the repatriations by giving Clark and Harrison permission to propose and carry out immediately, if necessary, a seven-day recess in the plenary meetings as soon as they saw fit.45

Harrison wasted little time. On 26 July he advised the enemy delegates that the staff officers' meetings could begin again, but that the plenary session should take a seven-day recess in the meantime. When Nam opposed a break in the highlevel discussions, Harrison made a few brief, but cutting remarks:

In these meetings we have been restrained in our statements and have tried to be accurately factual. Your statements, on the other hand, have demonstrated utter hypocrisy. You have said we want to retain your personnel. What we know and what the world knows as a fact is that those prisoners are afraid to be returned as slaves to the tender mercies of Communist control.

You have said we violate the Geneva Convention- a covenant intended to protect the rights of individual human beings, not the tyranny of totalitarian rulers. Probably no government or armies have more consistently ignored or violated the Geneva Convention than you have. You, have no moral right to raise the issue or the question of the Geneva Convention. You have made utterly false statements about our actions. Such lies are recognized by everybody as typical of Communist propaganda.

Finishing his speech, Harrison added that the UNC delegation would return on 3 August. Then he and his staff rose and walked out of the tent without giving Nam a chance to reply.46

As the era of the one-week recesses began, three months of frustrating bargaining ended. The 28 April proposal had resulted in narrowing the three outstanding issues to one, but settlement of the prisoner of war problem was no closer in July than it had been in April. A year of negotiation had produced an estimated 2,000,000 words of discussion and nearly 800 hours of meetings.47

Many troublesome questions had been dealt with through compromise, but now both sides had maneuvered themselves into positions that severely limited negotiations. Yet the search for a solution continued, for the pressures to conclude the Korean conflict increased as the war dragged on indecisively and the casualties continued to grow.

Narrowing the Choices

Although many plans were proffered and alternate approaches were advanced during the summer by individuals and nations for ending the Korean War, none of the proposals presented an answer that would satisfy both sides and none could as long as they remained diametrically opposed in their principles. What then remained to be done? In Munsan-ni, Tokyo, and Washington this question was accorded mounting attention during the waning weeks of the summer.

At the truce site there were four plenary meetings during August- one every eight days starting on the 2d. Aside from name-calling indulged in by the Communists and the unsuccessful attempt by Harrison to drive a wedge between the Chinese and the North Koreans by stressing the inequity in the importance granted the Chinese prisoners and the casual way in which the fate of the North Koreans was being handled, the sessions contained little of note.48

The U.N. Command deliberately spaced the meetings at these intervals and made no effort to introduce anything new. And while the U.N. Command sought to convince the Communists through this procedure that their stand was firm, Clark did his best to apply maximum air pressure against enemy targets.49 Only routine publicity was given to the air strikes and they were justified on military grounds alone. The U.S. leaders did not wish to engage Communist prestige so seriously that agreement to an armistice might be further delayed.50

In line with the build-up of pressure upon the enemy, Clark investigated the possibility of releasing the 11,000 South Koreans who were still in the custody of the UNC. His judge advocate informed him in early August that the only legal basis for taking such action lay in Article 5 of the Geneva Convention which covered doubtful cases. The holding power, in this instance the UNC, could convene a "competent tribunal" according to Article 5 to determine the status of these doubtful cases. If the tribunal found that these prisoners should not be classified as POW's, then they might be freed. Under the circumstances, Clark told Harrison, there were three simple criteria for recommending release of a prisoner: 1. residence south of 38th Parallel prior to 25 June 1950; 2. after screening, election not to return to Communist control; and 3. profession of allegiance to the Republic of Korea.

The tribunals, Clark went on, could be composed of U.S. and ROK personnel or include other U.N. representatives if this could be arranged. As for telling the Communists, the UNC delegation could either make a perfunctory announcement, explaining the legal basis for the action or not raise the matter at all. If the enemy protested under the latter plan, Harrison could use the argument employed in the case of the civilian internees, that this was a purely internal affair. Harrison preferred this approach.51

On 25 August Clark embarked upon the more difficult task of securing approval of his plan in Washington. As it happened, his request arrived while the State and Defense Departments were considering the significance of the Sino-Soviet talks at Moscow and the issuance of a Presidential statement. The State Department was reluctant to consent to anything that might prejudice such a statement.52

After the decision to discard the project for a Presidential release in early September, the State Department dropped its objections. A State-JCS meeting on 8 September concluded that the South Koreans should be let go before the U.N. Command presented new suggestions on prisoner exchange to the Communists. One week later Clark was instructed to go ahead, but not on the basis of the tribunal system. Instead, in the interest of speed, he should follow the policy set up during the release of the civilian internees. As the Army G-3 had pointed out, if Clark reclassified the 11,000 immediately as civilian internees, then he could quickly screen and release them without bothering with the cumbersome tribunals.53

Clark waited until after the plenary session of 20 September was over before he announced that 11,000 South Koreans who had been improperly classified primarily because of the great dislocation of population in late 1950 and early 1951 were now in the civilian internee category. Their release would begin about 1 October and take about six weeks to complete.54 As planned, the delay in publicizing this action prevented the Communists from using the 20 September meeting for their protests, but Nam sent a strong letter decrying this unilateral disposition of prisoners of war to Harrison on 24 September.55 The UNC ignored Nam's warnings against carrying out the plan.

While the U.N. Command was applying military and political pressure upon the enemy through the air campaign and the release of civilian internees, Clark and his staff began to sift through the various solutions put forward for resolving the POW question. These ranged from rescreening the prisoners by neutral nations teams to the outright discharge of all the nonrepatriates, as suggested by Harrison in June. As Clark saw the situation in August, it was time to assemble all the alternatives acceptable in the UNC and present them to the Communists in a final package proposal. If the Communists turned them all down, then the UNC could either recess indefinitely or terminate the negotiations.56

When Clark consulted him, Harrison had a number of reservations on the type of proposal that should be made to the enemy. He did not want to include any plan that might leave the nonrepatriates to the mercy of a nation on which the Communists might apply pressure. Neither did he desire a postarmistice political conference to determine a prisoner's fate-all issues should be worked out before a truce was signed. If the Communists persisted in refusing to swallow nonrepatriation in its various guises, Harrison still felt that the UNC should let all the nonrepatriates go free.57

Although Clark was not ready to accept Harrison's last suggestion, he evidently did come to agree that the prisoner problem should not be handed over to a later political conference. On I September he forwarded his recommendations for a final approach to the Communists. The keynote remained UNC firmness backed by public and international opinion. Pointing out that most of the proposals made since 28 April were similar to or modifications of the plans already rejected by the enemy, troducing new variations could only make the Communists think that the Clark maintained that to continue inU.N. Command had as yet not reached its final position.

Therefore, at one plenary session, he went on, Harrison would preface his presentation of the last UNC offer with some .carefully chosen remarks on the differences between the UNC and Communist attitudes and performances on POW matters and note that most of the controversy had hinged on the disposition of 14,000 Chinese, presumably volunteers. After his opening remarks, Harrison would review the choices previously offered and turned down by the enemy and then set forth the other alternatives acceptable to the UNC. All of the latter were contingent upon the signing of the armistice first and, of course, the acceptance of the principle of nonrepatriation.

In Clark's opinion, five merited consideration: (1) All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and released from military control. There would be no screening or interview and the ex-prisoner would then go to the side of his choice. Observers could be military or civilian, participants or neutrals, as the Communists wished. (2) All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and turned over to representatives of impartial nations for disposition with both sides agreeing to abide by the decisions of this body. (3) Both sides would agree that the supervision, control, and responsibility for the determination of the ultimate disposition of all nonrepatriates would pass to a group of impartial nations once the armistice was signed. (4) Both sides would maintain custody of their nonrepatriates until a group of mutually acceptable impartial nations decided on their disposition. (5) Nonrepatriates would be delivered to custody of impartial nations either in or outside of Korea and disposed of by this group. The last four proposals, Clark went on, would require time limits to insure that disposition was concluded before a political conference was convened. Harrison, after finishing his presentation, would recess unilaterally to give the Communists time to study the alternatives thoroughly. In the meantime wide publicity and strong U.S. and U.N. support should be accorded to the UNC proposals. Were the enemy to refuse this offering, then the UNC would recess indefinitely until the enemy either accepted or submitted new solutions in writing.

As far as Clark was concerned, Communist rejection would signify the end of military negotiations since further discussion would be pointless. If the UNC plan were carried out in this manner, he concluded, the Communists would have to demonstrate whether they really wanted an armistice or not.58

It was evident that neither Clark nor Harrison believed that the enemy would accept any of the alternatives. But both were convinced that it would be very unwise to permit the matter of the prisoners to be handed over to a postarmistice political conference. While the fate of the prisoners was decided on the political level, the Communists could improve their military position substantially and the U.N. Command would be unable to employ its air and naval power to induce a quicker settlement.59

Thus, when the JCS informed Clark on 9 September that a proposed Department of State plan involving the exchange of 12,000 UNC prisoners for 83,000 Communists with the nonrepatriates to be left for subsequent repatriation was again under ,consideration, Clark was not enthusiastic. If such a plan were to be used, Clark told the JCS two days later, then it should be brought forward as a last resort only after the other alternatives had been rejected. Although the State Department had not accepted four of Clark's five alternatives for turning over nonrepatriates to impartial nations for disposition, it was more receptive to his suggestion for bringing the nonrepatriates to the demilitarized zone, releasing them from military control, and then letting them choose their own side without interview or screening.60

Clark's objections to "subsequent negotiations" after an armistice were supported by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense in mid-September. During meetings between State and Defense Department officials, Secretary Lovett and Admirals Fechteler and Libby opposed the suggestion of State that the President issue a proclamation based upon the Mexican recommendation urging the exchange of those desiring repatriation and the deferral of further consideration of the nonrepatriates problem until a later date. Fechteler and Libby felt that once an armistice was signed, the U.S. public would increase pressure upon the government to bring the boys back home and the U.S. military position in Korea would deteriorate while the Communists improved their capabilities. By the time subsequent negotiations got under way, the enemy would have attained a decided advantage militarily and could use this as a club to gain its objectives.61

Since efforts to reconcile the StateDefense differences were unsuccessful, President Truman had to make the decision on 24 September and he approved the Defense view, ruling out the possibility of postponing the nonrepatriate question to the postarmistice period. The following day G-3 prepared new instructions for Clark and the President accepted them.62

The general procedure set forth in the message approved by the President followed closely that recommended by Clark on I September. But the discard of the proposals to handle the nonrepatriates either by handing them over to a group of impartial nations or to a subsequent conference for disposition narrowed the number of new choices to three.63 In presenting them to the enemy, Clark told Harrison, he should exercise care not to make a commitment that the Chinese prisoners would not be permitted to go to Taiwan.64

Mr. Truman sent a personal word of encouragement to Clark the day before the meeting at Panmunjom. He expressed his hope that the UNC proposal would be made "with utmost firmness and without subsequent debate." If the Communists failed to accept the UNC offer and indefinite recess was invoked by the UNC delegates, it would be essential that "the military pressure should not be lessened" during the period ahead, the President concluded.65

On 28 September, just five months after the package proposal of April had been delivered, Harrison opened the session with a brief restatement of the previous plans brought forward by the U.N. Command breaking the POW deadlock. He then proceeded to the alternatives, all of which were dependent upon the prior formal acceptance of an armistice: (a) All prisoners would be brought to the demilitarized zone, identified, and checked off by one or a combination of Red Cross and joint military teams. They would then be considered as fully repatriated. If a prisoner stated at this time that he desired to return to the side that had detained him, he would be free to so do. In that case, he would assume civilian status and would not be employed again in acts of war in the Korean conflict. (b) All prisoners desiring repatriation would be exchanged expeditiously. All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone in small groups, released from military control, and then interviewed by representatives of countries not participating in the Korean hostilities. This could be done with or without military representation and under the observation of the ICRC, joint Red Cross teams, or joint military teams, as the Communists desired. (c) All prisoners wishing repatriation would be exchanged as quickly as possible. All nonrepatriates would be delivered to the demilitarized zone and freed from military control. Then, without questioning, interview, or screening, each individual so released would be free to go to the side of his choice. This plan also could be carried out under military or civilian observers if the Communists so wished.

To give the enemy delegates time to consider the new choices, Harrison proposed a ten-day recess, but Nam asked that the meeting reconvene that afternoon. At that time he expressed his disappointment in the UNC proposals. "You have only used different forms and ways to decorate the unreasonable demand upon which your side has persistently insisted," he charged. The Communists would continue to demand full repatriation, he concluded, but were agreeable to a recess of ten days so that the U.N. Command might reconsider its basic stand.66

The meeting on 8 October repeated the Communist rejection of the UNC offering. After Nam finished, Harrison began a thirty-four minute speech in which he covered the Communist responsibility for starting the war in Korea and the UNC's many efforts to reach a reasonable settlement. The UNC had now reached the end of the trail; it had no further proposals to make. Furthermore, the UNC did not intend to come to Panmunjom merely to listen to the abuse and false propaganda issued by the Communist delegation. Therefore, Harrison continued, the UNC was declaring a recess until the Communists were willing to accept one of the UNC plans or submit in writing a constructive proposal of its own. With that, Harrison and the rest of the UNC delegation rose and left the conference tent.67

The talking stage was over; it was now a matter of "fish or cut bait." But the prospects for an armistice appeared no closer than they had been after the April proposal. As long as the UNC persistently opposed no forcible repatriation and the Communists stubbornly insisted upon full repatriation, compromise appeared impossible without one side conceding political defeat. Neither the United States nor the Communists seemed willing to apply sufficient force to insure a military victory that might have produced conditions amenable to a political defeat. At the front the defense tines grew stronger each month and although the air assault was a constant thorn in the side of the enemy, there was considerable doubt whether it alone could provide sufficient pressure to make the Communists desire an armistice. Without a powerful stimulus, the enemy had no special incentive to seek peace other than on its own terms. Operating within a fairly rigid set of restrictions, the U.N. Command had a complex task- just how much military pressure could and should be applied against the enemy to induce him to make concessions and yet not provoke a resumption of large-scale war.


1 (1) Msg, CX 67235, Ridgway to JCS, 20 Apr 52, DA-IN 129944. (2) Msg, C 67655, Ridgway to JCS, 28 Apr 52, DA-IN 132680.

2 Msg, JCS 907676, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Apr 52.

3 (Msg, JCS 907937, JCS to CINCFE, 2 May 52. (2) Truman, Memoirs, vol. II, pp. 460-61.

4 (1) Msg, HNC 1211, Joy to CINCUNC, 2 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS sec., incl go. (2) Msg, C 67976, Ridgway to CINCUNC (Adv), 4 May 52, in same place, incl 31. (3) Transcript of Proceedings, Forty-ninth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 6 May 52, in FEC Transcript of Proceedings, Mtgs on Mil Armistice, 28 Apr-3 Jun 52, vol. 41 (hereafter cited as FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, Vol. 4.

5 Transcript of Proceedings, Fifteenth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 7 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

6 Ibid, Fifty-ninth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 16 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

7 Ibid, Sixty-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 20 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

8 Ibid., Fifty-eighth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 15 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

9 Ibid., Sixty-fifth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 22 May 52, in FEC Transcripts, Plenary Conf, vol. 4.

10 General McConnell had spent a great part of his career in organizing and training troops. During World War II he had devoted himself to the preparation of antiaircraft units for combat and after the war he assisted in training Philippine ground forces.

11 (1) Msg, HNC 1236, Joy to CINCUNC, 12 May 52, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS sec., incl 35. (2) Msg, HNC 1277, Harrison to CINCUNC, 30 May 52, in same place, incl 50.

12 (1) Msg, JCS 908988, JCS to CINCFE, 16 May 52. (2) Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DA-IN 145230.

13 Msg, C 69351, Clark to JCS, 31 May 52, DA-IN 145230.

14 (1) Msg, HNC 1214, Joy to CINCUNC, 5 May 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, May 52, CinC and CofS sec., incl 38. (2) Msg, CX 67989, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 5 May 52, in same place, incl 39.

15 Msg, JCS 909104, JCS to CINCFE, 18 May 52. Eighth Army tallies as of 16 May had produced the following results on those to be repatriated:

Category Screened Unscreened
North Korean
South Korean
Civilian internees

In addition there were 3,500 unscreened personnel at Pusan. See Msg, CX 68567, Clark to JCS, 16 May 52, DA-IN 139602.

16 (1) Msg, CX 68975, Clark to DA, 23 May 52, DA-IN 142347. (2) Msg, JCS 909747, JCS to CINCFE, 26 May 52.

17 Msg, JCS 910484, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.

18 Msg, JCS 910473, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Jun 52.

19 Msg, C 69888, Clark to JCS, g Jun 52, DA-IN 148276.

20 Msg, CX 69687, Clark to JCS, 5 Jun 52, DA-IN 146933. For the ROK internal crisis, see Chapter XIV, below.

21 (1) Memo Jenkins for CofS, 6 Jun 52, sub: Proposal by CINCFE to Release Civilian Internees, in G-3 383.6, 24. (2) Msg, JCS 910811, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52.

22 (1) Msg, CX 50051, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA-IN 149495. (2) Msg, JCS 911250, JCS to CINCUNC, 13 Jun 52.

23 Msg, CX 50050, Clark to JCS, 12 Jun 52, DA-IN 149501.

24 Msg, CX 50636, CINCUNC to JCS, 22 Jun 52, DA-IN 153229.

25 UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jun 52, p. 69. The complete breakdown was as follows:

Category Total Repatriates Nonrepatriates
North Koreans
South Koreans
Civilian internees

26 (1) Msg, CX 51050, CINCUNC to JCS, 28 Jun 52, DA-IN 155625. (2) Memo, Jenkins for CofS, 30 Jun and 1 Jul 52, sub: Proposal to Submit to the Communists a New Final Figure .... in G-3 091 Korea, 8/37.

27 Msg, JCS 912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

28 Transcript of Proceedings, Eighty-eighth Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 23 Jun 52, in FEC Main Delegate's Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52.

29 Msg, G 74961, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 2 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 63.

30 The meetings recessed from 8 to to June, from 18 to 20 June, and from 28 to 30 June.

31 (1) Msg, CX 69901, Clark to JCS, 10 Jun 52, DA-IN 148567. (2) Msg, JCS 910892, JCS to CINCFE, 10 Jun 52.

32 Admiral Daniel had seen extensive service as a destroyer commander during World War II and had organized and commanded the Navy's first underwater demolition team for the Sicily invasion of 1943.

33 General Morris was an engineer who had commanded the VIII and later the XII Air Force Service Commands during World War II and more recently had served as commanding general of the Spokane Air Depot.

34 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52-Jul 53), vol. 3, pt. 1, pp. 54-55.

35 (1) Transcript of Proceedings, Ninety-third Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 1 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52. (2) Msg, HNC 1364, Harrison to CINCUNC, 3 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 32.

36 (1) Msg, C 51299, Clark to CINCUNC (Adv), g Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 33. (2) Msg, JCS 912791, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 52.

37 Transcripts of Proceedings, Ninety-fourth through Ninety-seventh Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 3-6 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52.

38 Msg, HNC 1371, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS sec., Supporting Docs, tab 38.

39 (1) Msg, C 51780, Clark to JCS, 11 Jul 52, DA-IN 159939. (2) Msg, JCS 913383, JCS to CINCFE, 11 Jul 52.

40 Transcripts of Proceedings, 104th and 105th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 13 and 18 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. V, 4 Jun-23 Jul 52.

41 (1) Msg, DA 913958, G-g to CINCFE, 18 Jul 52. (2) Msg, C 52204, Clark to G-g, 19 Jul 52, DA-IN 162816.

42 Msg, JCS 913758, JCS to CINCFE, 18 Jul 52. (2) Msg, HNC 1410, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 18 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 52.

43 Msg, CX 52284, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 52, in UNC/FEC Comd Rpt, Jul 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 53.

44 Transcript of Proceedings, 112th Session of Mil Armistice Conf, 25 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.

45 Msg, JCS 914523, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Jul 52.

46 Transcript of Proceedings, 113th Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 26 Jul 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtg, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.

47 Hq UNC/FEC, Korean Armistice Negotiations (May 52-Jul 53) , vol. 5, pt. 1, p. 67.

48 Transcripts of Proceedings, 114th-117th Sessions of Mil Armistice Conf, 3, 11, 19, 27 Aug 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, Vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.

49 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 7 Aug 52, sub: Re Armistice Negotiations in Korea, in G3 091 Korea, 8/44. For air pressure, see Chapter XIV, below.

50 Msg, JCS 915579 JCS to CINCFE, 8 Aug 52.

51 (1) Msg, CX 53436, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 10 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 29. Msg, HNC 1472, Harrison to CINCUNC, 10 Aug 52, in same place, tab 30.

52 (1) Msg, CX 54177, Clark to JCS, 25 Aug 52, DA-IN 176419. (2) Msg, DA 917089, G-3 to CINCFE, 27 Aug 52.

53 (1) Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 11 Sep 52, sub: Release of 11,000 AntiCommunist South Korean POW's, in G-3, 383.6, 28/5. (2) Msg, JCS 918515, JCS to CINCFE, 15 Sep 52. This message was approved by the JCS, Defense and State Departments, and the President.

54 Msg, CX 55410, CINCFE to JCS, 19 Sep g2, .in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 25.

55 Ltr, Nam to Harrison, 24 Sep 52, no sub, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 27.

56 Msg, C 53390, CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 9 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 35.

57 Msg, HNC 1473, CINCUNC (Adv) to CINCUNC, 20 Aug 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Aug 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 36.

58 Msg, C 54499, Clark to JCS, 1 Sep 52, DA-IN 179066.

59 Msg, HNC 1503, Harrison to CINCUNC, 6 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep gQ, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 10.

60 (1) Msg, JCS 917910, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Sep 52. (2) Msg, CX 55003, Clark to JCS, 11 Sep 52, DA-IN 182579.

61 Memo of Conv, 17 Sep 52, sub: State-Defense Conf on Korean Armistice Negotiations.

62 Memo, Eddleman for CofS, 6 Oct 52, sub: Summary of Actions with Respect to the Armistice Negotiations, in G-3 091 Korea, 70.

63 Msg, JCS 919368, JCS to CINCFE, 25 Sep 52.

64 Msg, CX 55856. CINCUNC to CINCUNC (Adv), 26 Sep 52, in UNC/FEC, Comd Rpt, Sep 52, CinC and CofS, Supporting Docs, tab 18.

65 Msg, Truman to Clark, 27 Sep 52, in FEC Gen Admin Files, CofS, Personal Msg File, 1949-52.

66 Transcript of Proceedings, 121st Session, Mil Armistice Conf, 28 Sep 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.

67 Transcript of Proceedings, 122d Session, Military Armistice Conf, 8 Oct 52, in FEC Main Delegates Mtgs, vol. VI, 24 Jul 52-15 May 53.

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