PART IX
Short Bits
1. Unification
Michael Slauta, Special Observer for The Quartermaster General. (From a
speech, 16 November 1950.)
On the working level in the combat zone there are no unification problems. If
two units from different services are together in an area for a time, you soon
find they are wearing the same uniform -- the uniform that was available in
quantity sufficient to supply all. That goes for food and all other supplies.
Eventually there will be standardization for all items and all forces in Korea,
with perhaps the exception of the rum ration which the British demand.
2. How to Get Lit Up
Lt.Col. Olin T. Hinkey, Finance Officer, 3d Infantry Division
I consider that light and power were my major problem in Korea. It was solved
by the Army custom of swapping some beer and whiskey to an engineer unit for a
surplus generator. Repairs were made on the same basis. Without that generator
normal operations could not have been maintained.
3. Speedy Refueling
Capt. Douglas O. Kennedy, 425th Traffic Regulating Group. (Interview by Capt.
B. C. Mossman, 6th Historical Detach meet.)
On 22 March 1951 the 425th Traffic Regulating Group was directed to handle a
refueling and regulating point for elements of the
187th Airborne RCT moving north by land. To handle the refueling, we placed
signs to indicate the interval between trucks when they halted. Five-gallon gas
cans were stored at intervals alongside the road and an entire serial of fifteen
trucks could be refueled at once. Each serial was under way within five minutes.
In thirteen hours five hundred trucks were refueled.
4. What's the Score?
Capt. George R. Spreng, Korean Military Advisory Group
Korean engineers were the finest of the ROK troops. They had higher
educational standards than the Army in general, and the selection was careful.
Almost all of the enlisted and NCO personnel had some formal education. Like the
American soldier, they asked many questions and worked best when they were told
the exact situation. They needed a great deal of supervision, but they did well
when given good leadership.
5. Loading in Flight
Capt. Homer W. Johnston, 8192d Helicopter Unit. (Interview by Lt. John Mewha,
8th Historical Detachment.)
On 14 August 1951 Capt. Homer W. Johnston, 8192d Helicopter Unit, received a
message to evacuate two wounded men from the high ground east of the Punchbowl.
It took him twenty minutes to fly from the 8224th Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
to the French sector. As he circled the designated landing area, Captain
Johnston noted that the area was small and slanted. He hovered down to test
it.
The landing area was a pronounced slope that would cause the helicopter
either to slip down the hill or topple over. To keep the copter upright, Captain
Johnson kept the power on and tipped the craft slightly toward the crest. He was
actually semi-flying while the patients were strapped on the carrying
platforms.
As soon as the wounded men were ready, Johnston raised the helicopter
vertically, scraping the right bunker as he did so. He dropped
down the reverse slope until his craft reached the necessary climbing speed.
Then he returned to the hospital.
6. VHF Ship to Shore
Lt. Robert T. O'Brien, 7th Signal Company
When the 7th Infantry Division's turn came to be evacuated from the Hungnam
area, we began to set up special communications to expedite the movement. From
others we learned that we could use AN/TRC-3 (very high frequency) radio sets
for ship-to-shore communication. On the ship that was to carry the division's CP
we set up an AN/TRC-3, but instead of using the directional antenna we
substituted a whip antenna. This was necessary to keep our antennas aligned as
the ship shifted with wind and tide. The expedient could only have worked over
short distances, but it was satisfactory here.
7. Rescuing Wounded by Tank
Army Field Forces Training Bulletin No. 8, 16 November 1951
An instance has been reported of an infantryman being wounded and
subsequently killed because he was unaware he could be pulled to safety through
the escape hatch of a tank. He was lying wounded in the road, and efforts of the
medics to get to him were ineffective. A tank commander moved his tank forward
to straddle the man and get him into the tank. The wounded man misunderstood the
intent of the commander, fearing he was to be run over, and kept crawling ahead
of the tank. The enemy finally noticed the movement of the wounded man, and
killed him. A set of signals or prearranged plans worked out between infantry
and tank-platoon leaders and passed down to all troops may save lives in the
future.
8. Time for Reflection
Lt.Col. John E. Harbert, 314th Ordnance Ammunition Group
The ordnance officer charged with getting ammunition forward has great
problems of time, space, communication, and transportation.
As commander of the 314th Ordnance Ammunition Group, I had over ten
thousand square miles of Korea to cover in inspecting operations and troops. My
units worked both laterally and vertically along the entire front of Eighth
Army.
One must realize that army ammunition troops provide the only ammunition
supply services to the combat trains of the using units. Unlike any other type
of supply service, there is no counterpart organic to a corps or a division.
This led to many problems involving command control and operational
proficiency.
I tried many times to have a light plane assigned to me, but this was never
allowed by higher headquarters. I spent well over half my time traveling from
ammunition supply point to ammunition supply point over Korea's rough roads.
Traveling like this had one value, however. I had plenty of time in which to
contemplate my problems and to make decisions.
9. 5-in-1 Mule Ration
Sgt. David J. Fox, Radio and Message Center Company, l0lst Signal Operation
Battalion. (Interview by Capt. Pierce W. Briscoe, 2d Historical Detachment.)
The Chinese Communists used pack mules in their 1951 spring offensive. When
the United Nations forces counterattacked, many of these mules were abandoned or
escaped. Left to forage on the rice paddies and mountain slopes, they soon
became thin and sickly.
The Radio Relay Platoon, 101st Signal Operation Battalion, gathered six of
these mules for use in packing equipment up the mountains. The mules were fed
candy, sugar, and cereal from 5-in-1 rations. After a short time the mules were
fattened and resumed their burdensome life.
10. You've Got to Follow Through
Major Richard I. Crawford, Korean Military Advisory Group
The average ROK officer and soldier had received demolitions
training -- including how to calculate, prepare, and place charges. But they had
had very little of the theory of defensive demolitions.
Before the Communist invasion, ROK engineers had packaged charges for the
demolition of key bridges and roads in a zone forty miles south of the 38th
parallel. We had held practice alerts, moved the
demolitions to their sites, and prepared each site for demolition with
gratifying success. However, we had not impressed the Koreans sufficiently with
the importance of timely detonation and defense of their newly created
obstacles. When combat came, trigger-happy individuals ordered key bridges blown
before our vehicles had been cleared; on a few occasions the enemy made a
flanking movement with small bands and killed the demolitions squad before the
fuze was lighted. In at least six cases the tactical commander ordered that the
bridge not be blown because he wanted to "counterattack over that route." In no
case did such a counterattack ensue. Few, if any, of the obstacles created were
defended. There was a great tendency for combat troops to fall well behind a
blown but undefended obstacle to eat their rice, to sleep, or to regroup. That
was fatal.
11. Recaptured American Wire
Capt. Rudolph A. Fallon, 5th Cavalry
In October 1950, the 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry (for which I was
communications officer), overran a North Korean signal dump. In it we found
about thirty miles of single-conductor (strand) wire. We were particularly
interested in this wire because obviously it was American-made W-110. We deduced
this from the fact that it was the familiar four-copper, three-steel strands.
Though the twisted pair had been separated and each strand individually rolled,
the spiral marks where another strand had gone around and around were still
plainly visible. Each roll of wire was wrapped in burlap and marked in what
appeared to be Russian.
We were short of wire at this time, so we picked up the abandoned rolls on
DR-4s and -5s. We often used the captured wire by rolling out two lines.
However, ground return was used successfully by our artillery liaison officer.
In one instance north of Kunu-ri, we laid about four hundred yards of
single-strand wire along a railroad, using the rail for the return.
12. Intrenching Tools
Lt.Col. Arnold C. Gilliam, Quartermaster, Id Infantry Division
During the winter of 1950-S1, intrenching tools were discarded by combat
units while they were actually engaged with the enemy. The
reason was that the ground was frozen and the tools could not be used. The
quartermaster of the Id Infantry Division did not become aware that these tools
had been abandoned until the spring of 1951, when the ground began to thaw.
Commanders then wanted replacement intrenching tools as rapidly as possible. But
the number of replacement requests on this item was too great for the depot at
Pusan to fill. It was necessary to airlift them from Japan. Unfortunately, this
used air space vitally needed for gasoline and ammunition.
13. Bridge Assembly on land
Major Carl A. Pollock, Liaison Officer to the Turkish Brigade
On the day before an assault crossing, we supplied the Turks with 340 feet of
M38 infantry foot-bridging and instructions for its assembly. The crossing site
was under heavy artillery and mortar fire. The Turkish engineer commander
decided it would cost many lives to have his men work in the open, so he had the
bridge assembled behind a small crest -- 150 yards from the river's edge. Once the
bridge was assembled, several hundred troops picked it up and hand-carried it to
the water's edge. During the carry, the bridge broke several times, whereupon
everyone lowered it. When it was put back together, all lifted and moved on.
The bridge was put into the river at a 35- to 45-degree angle in the same
direction as the current. At this angle it did not reach the opposite shore, but
the men walked its length and jumped into the water to pull on ropes and bring
the bridge astride the current. It was a smooth operation, quickly executed.
14. A Dilemma
Capt. George W. Spreng, Korean Military Advisory Group
During the offensive into North Korea the ROKs had few trucks with which to
supply their divisions. To solve this problem my division commander ordered me
to establish a railroad operating section in our engineer battalion. This put me
in a command dilemma, for the U.S. authorities had ordered all locomotives and
rolling stock returned to Hamhung. I was caught between the ROK decision to use
the trains and the U.S. decision to move them back.
All KMAG advisers were hampered by the U.S. decision "to advise only" and
stay away from command. This seemed impossible to me, and
by agreement with the South Koreans I actually ordered people to carry out
tasks.
But now I was faced with a direct order by the U.S. officials to countermand
the order of an ROK division commander. I took refuge in my advisory capacity
and suggested that these orders be sent through channels. I don't know that this
was done. We did release a few trains for appearances' sake, but we kept eight
complete trains for ourselves.
15. Integration
Lt.Col. Homer P. Harris, Quartermaster, 2d Infantry Division
I especially want to note that the 15th Quartermaster Company was integrated
and that at least a third of my men were Negroes. I believe these were my best
men. They held more than their share of the NCO ratings. They did skilled jobs.
They knew they were getting a break on rotation points and were not being
discriminated against in any way. They were good soldiers.
16. Broken Springs
Major John C. Bell, 13th Engineer Combat Battalion
There were times when we had as many as Is of our Sl trucks deadlined -- all for
broken front springs. The breakage was so far from the normal expectancy that
Ordnance was rarely able to supply these springs.
Most frequently the break occurred in one of the two bottom (long) leaves.
The mechanics soon became adept at rebuilding front springs by throwing out a
bad leaf and combining the rest of this spring with parts of another to make one
good spring. If the breakage had been evenly distributed among the leaves, there
would have been little trouble.
17. Language Problems
Capt. Robert F. Doolin, Korean Military Advisory Group
A frequent failing in ROK commanders was their refusal to use a common
language. All Korean officers could speak both Korean and Japanese.
But the use of Chinese was the sign of a good education. Consequently,
an officer who understood Chinese would write his messages in that language and
have them translated so they could be understood by the radio operators. At the
other end the message was again rendered into Chinese before it was
delivered.
18. Fire in the Hole!
Lt. William A. Champion, Lt. Charles H. Crossley, Lt. Weldon M. Gamel, and
Lt. James E. Hunter, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. (From interviews by Lt. John
Mewha, 8th Historical Detachment.)
Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, sent the remainder of its demolition
men to work on a pass in an access road. They progressed through the rocky
sections at about a hundred feet a day, using a daily average of two thousand
pounds of explosives. Every type of explosive charge available to the Corps of
Engineers was used. Each time the demolition men finished blasting, from six to
twenty rounds of enemy 82-mm mortar or 76-mm artillery fire hit the blasting
site. For several days the men were able to blast only twice daily. The charges
were placed in the morning with five- to ten-minute fuzes. As the men moved off
the pass for lunch, they detonated the explosives. During the afternoon they
cleared the debris and set more charges. As they withdrew for the night they
blasted again. In this way they were able to avoid the enemy fire and proceed
with their work.
19. Combat Boots
Lt.Col. Arnold C. Gilliam, Quartermaster, 2d Infantry Division
Some time before the Korean action, the new russet boot was adopted to
replace the combat boot. As stocks of the combat boot in any size became
exhausted, substitution of the new type boot was authorized.
News travels fast. Soon men requested sizes that did not fit so they would be
equipped with the russet boot. The quartermaster of Eighth Army (Col. James M.
Lamont) stated that, although he had exceeded the normal replacement factor by
269 per cent, the demand for boots continued high. It was apparent that many men
had thrown away their combat boots in order to get the new type.
At an inspection of one regiment it was found that more than half the men
equipped with the russet boot were wearing the wrong size. It was necessary to
airlift foot-measuring devices so that commanders could be sure their men were
wearing the proper footwear.
20. Need for Trained Personnel
Michael Slauta, Special Observer for The Quartermaster General. (From a
speech, 16 November 1950.)
Handling supplies at the Pusan port was quite difficult at the start. It
wasn't because we didn't know how to handle supplies; the personnel to handle
them in quantity were not there.
The quartermaster section operated with a staff of six officers and a platoon
of men. We had to depend on indigenous labor. The piers were soon piled high
with unsegregated cargo. Loose cans filled a large warehouse. The problem did
not diminish until service troops arrived.
21. Division Airdrop
Command Report, 23d Infantry, October 1951
Airdrops by liaison aircraft are successful only when the pilot knows where
the target is located and dares to take his plane close enough and low enough to
insure that most of the cargo will reach its destination. The airdrops in
support of the 23d RCT consisted mainly of rations, water, fruit juices, and
medical supplies (especially blood plasma). These drops were excellent, and
there was at least 75 per cent recovery.
22. Who Wants to Serve in the Rear?
WO John Kinnaman, Jr., Finance Section, 1st Cavalry Division
A major problem in Korea was the lack of trained replacements. During the
first six months we received only one trained finance man. Our main source of
replacements were re-profiled front-line men, sole surviving sons, and men in
similar categories. At the same time, a check
of the military pay records indicated that several finance school graduates
were serving in front-line units as riflemen. After much discussion with G1 and
unit personnel officers, we finally managed to get some of these men out of the
front line and into our section.
We often operated by candle light in bombed-out buildings that had little
heat. Our workday started immediately after breakfast and often extended to
midnight. Because of the continuous moving of the bulky equipment, our men had
to assume the triple role of finance clerks, stevedores, and guards. As a result
of these working conditions, we received many requests for transfers to combat
units. We had to deny them for the good of the service.
23. The Sagging Bridge
Lt. William A. Champion, Lt. Charles H. Crossley, Lt. Weldon M. Gamel, and
Lt. James E. Hunter, Id Engineer Combat Battalion. (From interviews by Lt. John
Mewha, 8th Historical Detachment.)
About 12 August 1951, Company C, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, began
constructing a Bailey bridge near the site of a washedout wooden bridge. The
need for the bridge was so great that it was begun before enough parts had been
assembled for it. It was necessary to launch the 80-foot span single-single (one
panel wide and one panel high on each side of the treadway) instead of a
double-single. After the single-single was across, the bridge sagged, and had to
be made double single. To compensate for the sag in the alignment of the pins of
the outside panels, a D7 bulldozer was driven into the middle of the stream and
jacks were placed on its A-frame. By jacking one side at a time, the bridge was
brought into alignment. It took three days and two nights to construct the
bridge.
24. Carelessness is Expensive
Lt.Col. Clifford E. Roberts, Signal Officer, 7th Infantry Division
Service detachments of the 7th Infantry Division moved together from Seoul to
Inchon in October 1950. A convoy moving along the mountainous route in central
South Korea was ambushed by the
enemy at 0200 one morning in a defile. The lead vehicle was hit and blocked
the road.
The signal detachment had an SCR-193 radio, mounted in a jeep, which could be
used to request assistance for the convoy. However, when an attempt was made to
put the set on the air, the antenna would not load properly. For hours, the men
made frantic attempts in the dark to get the transmitter into operation, but
with no success.
When daylight came, it was found that the antenna terminal on the set was
broken. Investigation revealed two important facts. First, the radio was a spare
set and had not been operated recently. Second, the faulty antenna condition had
existed before this operation.
Five hours and several lives were lost because of this carelessness.
25. Patrol Evacuation
Capt. Arne H. Eliasson, 8192d Helicopter Unit. (Interview by Lt. John Mewha,
8th Historical Detachment.)
On 18 August 1951 the 23d Infantry (2d Infantry Division) had a platoon-sized
patrol in the Punchbowl area. Mortar fire struck the patrol and a number of men
were killed and others wounded. The patrol immediately withdrew with its wounded
and dead and notified the battalion surgeon. He called for two helicopters to
aid in the evacuation.
The Punchbowl is a fairly level valley surrounded on all sides by mountains.
Without helicopters it would be necessary to carry the casualties up the hills
before they could be evacuated.
Twenty minutes after the call, Capt. Arne H. Eliasson was over the area. The
patrol was withdrawing in single file. The men didn't have time to place the
regular landing mark, but they had placed a panel in a nearby rice paddy.
Two wounded men had just been strapped to the stretcher platforms when
several 60-mm mortar rounds landed fifty yards away. The infantry immediately
scattered and Captain Eliasson flew the craft away. Later that day six calls
came from the same area, and twelve men from the patrol were evacuated.
26. Problems of Sizing
Michael Slauta, Special Observer for The Quartermaster General. (From a
speech, 16 November 1950.)
We had a considerable problem in issuing clothing and shoes to the South
Koreans integrated into our ranks. They are very small people, standing only 64
or 65 inches, and are quite slender. Fortunately, they don't pay as much
attention to size as we do. So long as an item was wearable, they would accept
it and then trim it down.
Footwear, however, was another problem. During the summer and fall of 1950 we
were issuing all our footwear smaller than 6-1/2 to ROK soldiers. There were
some complaints on the fitting, so we ran a survey to see where we were going
wrong. We found that 71 per cent of the ROKs have supplementary tariff size
feet. The mean size was 6 EE; the smallest ran down to 3-1/2 EEEE; and the
largest to 10-1/2 EEE.
27. Wire Recovery
Capt. Robert F. Doolin, Korean Military Advisory Group
The Koreans did not always understand our signal doctrine -- or agree with it.
Sometimes this made little difference. At other times the results were
ludicrous. One ROK peculiarity was the refusal to use drums in the recovery of
wire. Instead, a soldier would walk a wire accompanied by a cart. He would coil
the wire around his bent arm as one does a rope. After he had as much as he
could conveniently carry, he would cut the wire, carefully tie the coil, and
place it in the cart. He would then repeat this operation until the entire
length of wire was picked up. When he returned to his unit he would carefully
splice the wire and rewind it on a reel. We just couldn't stop that
practice.
28. Supply Guesstimates
Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7th Infantry Division
We didn't know what enemy resistance to expect at Inchon since this was to be
the first offensive against the enemy. I had to reach
into space for many of my estimates. I loaded rations enough for thirty days.
Anticipating that water might be short until we captured Inchon, I included
thirty gallons of water per man. On pure guess I included burial supplies for
five thousand, and three loads of insecticides.
The quantity of supplies we carried may sound excessive in some cases.
Actually, it wasn't. Although the division loaded them, the supplies were not to
be unloaded while the battle was in balance. Initially we would have no supply
base to turn to, but I anticipated that many nondivisional units would call on
us for supplies. In this I was correct, for an ROK marine regiment was attached
to us south of Seoul.
Our supplies, then, constituted the stock for the initial operation, and a
beginning stock for 2d Logistical Command which was to come. Actually, the 7th
Division did not meet an Eighth Army forward supply point until January
1951.
29. For Want of a Nail
Major Carl A. Pollock, Liaison Officer to the Turkish Brigade
The Turks are excellent in improvising when they lack a critical item. I
recall one instance where they were building a bridge and did not have enough
nails for the job. Their solution was to drill holes and insert wooden pegs. In
the United States, hand doweling is used only in cabinet work.
30. Infantry Division Port
Lt.Col. Arnold C. Gilliam, Quartermaster, 2d Infantry Division
After the 2d Infantry Division crossed the 38th parallel we established a
supply point at Sariwon. Trucks hauled supplies more than a hundred miles north
of Ascom City. The main supply road was a second-rate road used by several other
divisions. Because of the pressure, only class I and class III supplies could be
moved.
At this time I learned that we could receive shipments directly from the sea
if we could operate the port at Haeju. I moved to Haeju
with Capt. Fred J. Tennant and a small detachment. Using prisoner-of-war
labor, we unloaded one LST and several Japanese cargo vessels.
Supplies from Haeju were moved north to Sariwon over a narrow-gauge railroad.
The smallness of the cars slowed the operation. We could load only 50 drums of
gasoline in a car instead of the normal 150. As we were now in enemy territory,
we placed two guards in the cab of each locomotive to be sure the Communist
engineer moved his train to Sariwon. This operation relieved the pressure on the
truck route.
31. Roadbound
Lt.Col. Ernest W. Chapman, Engineer Section, X Corps
I would say that our over-all concept of operations makes us roadbound to
such an extent as to be dangerous. For example, we look at a road on a map and
decide we cannot move a force over it. Yet in the next breath we concern
ourselves with the possibility that the enemy will use the same road against
us -- which often happens.
32. Helmets for the 38th Infantry
Lt.Col. Arnold C. Gilliam, Quartermaster, 3d Infantry Division
In January 1951, I made a routine visit to the 38th Infantry (3d Infantry
Division) near Andong. I asked the regimental commander (Col. George B. Peploe)
if he had any quartermaster problem. He stated that there was one problem about
which he was greatly concerned. Less than two weeks had passed since he had been
assured that every man would be equipped with a steel helmet. Now his S4 advised
him that the regiment needed 350 helmets. During this period the 38th had been
engaged only in minor patrol actions.
I told Colonel Peploe I could take care of his requirements. He thanked me
and said that stern disciplinary action would be taken against any man who, in
the future, was caught without a helmet.
During the next month I again visited the 38th Infantry. The regiment had
been engaged in heavy combat and there had been heavy losses
of equipment in several companies. Nevertheless, the shortage of steel
helmets was so small that only a few replacements were needed.
33. Camera Patrol
Lt. Robert T. O'Brien, 7th Signal Company
The 7th Infantry Division was the only major unit to reach the Yalu River. We
realized that we were very much exposed that far north, so we paid particular
attention to combat intelligence. The civilians provided us with many rumors of
enemy units between us and Hagaru-ri. To ignore any of these might have been
dangerous, but to check them all by patrol would have been impossible.
Instead, the division G2 had our photo section make aerial photos of each
suspected area and areas where enemy strongpoints might logically develop. These
sorties were flown twice daily and the prints delivered to G2 within two hours.
Comparisons gave the division a good indication of what was going on.
34. Security Through a Swap
Capt. John M. McGuire, 1st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
Although medical personnel had not been armed before our entry into Korea, by
the time we left North Korea in late 1950 all our medics were armed with the
carbine or the M1 rifle. Some of us thought this was a violation of the Geneva
Convention, but we learned later that the Convention does not prohibit the
arming of medical troops for the protection of their patients and themselves.
Nurses were the only medical personnel who were not armed.
In February 1951, while four miles outside Andong, we felt that the
possibility of an ambush was strong because enemy guerrillas were very active in
the region. As our hospital was located within several hundred yards of two
potential military targets -- a main supply road and a railroad tunnel -- we figured
we were sitting ducks.
We felt that our individual weapons did not offer adequate fire power to
protect us in an attack. Therefore, we exchanged some medicinal
alcohol for ten automatic rifles from a division ordnance company.
Needless to say, both units felt each had received the better bargain.
35. Flame-Thrower Tanks
Lt.Col. William C. Hammond, Jr., Chemical Officer, I Corps
It has been a hard job to sell the flame thrower to the armor people, but
after they used it a while they became quite enthusiastic. The enemy fears fire.
Recently, a tank went into a valley and fired one burst of flame. For a distance
of a thousand yards all the enemy ducked down into their holes and stopped
firing -- including those way up on the sides of hills whom we could not possibly
have reached. The psychological factor was tremendous.
36. Pick Your Method
Major Carl A. Pollock, Liaison Officer to the Turkish Brigade
The Turks did not always use methods that are part of our doctrine. They had
with them American, German, and Soviet field and technical manuals in addition
to their own. I gathered that their manuals were pretty much a synthesis of all
of these. The Turks certainly were not doctrinaire in their methods.
37. Preparation for Action
Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7th Infantry Division
As soon as the 7th Infantry Division had closed in the Fuji area, the process
of requisitioning equipment and bringing the division to wartime allowances was
begun. Unfortunately, there just weren't enough supplies in Japan. The
occupation divisions had been maintained at reduced strength and only a minimum
of field training had been possible. Stock levels in the Far East Command had
been related to both strength and losses, so there was little theater reserve of
such items as mess kits, barber sets, and stove parts. The outfitting of the
first three divisions
for Korea had absorbed that reserve. The barrel was scraped clean before we
got to Fuji. When we requisitioned carpenter sets, we first got the box the set
comes in; then, from time to time, we received shipments of loose tools. Our
requests for mess kits brought us a shipment of mess trays as substitutes.
38. Borrowing a Bridge
Lt.Col. James E. Linden, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion
The Kumho River appears as a small stream on a map, but it was wide and
definitely unfordable in September 1950. As the attack progressed the 1st
Cavalry Division built a 13-ton infantry support bridge across it. For the
heavier traffic the division attempted a causeway of sandbags. This washed out
as fast as the sandbags were placed.
The 24th Infantry Division faced a better prospect for its crossing of the
Naktong River, as I Corps had attached to it a class 50 treadway bridge. A small
margin of time existed before it was necessary to erect the class 50 bridge over
the Naktong, and the 1st Cavalry Division borrowed the structure for its
crossing of the Kumho.
The bridge over the Kumho River was 300 feet long and took four hours to
erect. It carried critical supplies for twelve hours, then was dismantled and
returned. So vital was the bridge in the plans of the 24th Division that the
assistant division commander personally waited at the bridge to see that it was
dismantled in time to be returned to the 24th Division. The treadway bridge was
removed at 2300, and the next morning at 0600 the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion
opened a fixed-span M2 treadway bridge across the Kumho.
39. Why Pay the Combat Soldier?
WO John Kinnaman, Jr., Finance Section, 1st Cavalry Division
It was intended that unit personnel officers screen their units to determine
what portion of his pay each soldier desired. It soon became apparent that this
was not being done, however, for turnbacks often totaled 75 per cent. Many men
had no need or desire for their money.
I recommend that personnel in combat units not be paid until their departure
from Korea. I suggest a gratuitous issue of ten dollars a month
to cover cost of laundry and PX items. This program would cost about two
million dollars a month. Since soldiers in the combat zone are given free
cigarettes, beer, soft drinks, and candy, I feel that this expense is not out of
line with Army policy. Furthermore, the cost will be more than compensated by
the savings.
Savings and benefits will occur in many ways. Nonpayment would prevent
military pay certificates from falling into enemy hands. The increased use of
allotments would reduce the necessity for payment -- and finance personnel.
Limitation of money in the hands of troops would reduce the free spending that
has been so damaging to the economy of the Republic of Korea. It is to be noted
that the exchange rate on the ROK Zion rose from 1,800 to 6,000 to the U.S.
dollar in the eleven months I was in Korea. To a large extent this was due to
soldier spending.
40. Wire Cutters Caught
The army Combat Forces Journal? February 1952
A wire "trouble" team usually fixes broken telephone wires. This crew also
fixed some Communists.
When a recent trouble call was answered, wire men from the 25th Infantry
Division in Korea found a break in the line and repaired it. Calling back to the
switchboard was fine, but a call forward indicated another broken line.
As the men moved up the line and were about to advance over a ridge, they
discovered the cause of their broken lines -- eighteen Communists busily cutting
the wire.
A quick call for reinforcements resulted in the capture of the wire spoilers
and a return to trouble-free circuits.
41. What Do You Feed a Korean?
Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7th Infantry Division
Three weeks before the 7th Infantry Division shipped to Inchon, we received
an augmentation of 8,600 Koreans. Before they arrived our division commander
(Maj.Gen. David G. Barr) asked me, "What do you plan to feed these men?"
I countered, "How do you plan to use them?"
After some consideration he replied that the buddy system would probably work
best. On that basis I recommended that we feed the Koreans regular U.S. rations,
and make adjustments as we got complaints. I didn't believe it would be possible
to set up a dual ration system within the units.
42. Redesigning a Bridge
Capt. Francis S. Obradovich, 185th Engineer Combat Battalion, and Lt. George
W. Brazier, Jr., 8224th Engineer Construction Group. (Condensed from interviews
by Lt. Bevan R. Alexander, 5th Historical Detachment.)
The bridge over the Soyang River was well under way. The south abutment and
the north approach road were complete and forty-one piles had been driven. On 24
April 1951, however, the engineers learned that the enemy offensive would bring
a halt to their project. They began to evacuate the engineer equipment.
To hide as much of the progress on the bridge as possible, all the unused
piling was buried. The south abutment was completely camouflaged to make it
appear that the work on it had only just begun. The piling that had already been
driven into the river bed was left in place because nothing could be done with
it.
When the enemy offensive was halted, the UN forces counterattacked and
reached the Soyang River approximately a month after the engineers had pulled
out. The infantry reported that something had happened to the piles of the
bridge. The message was vague. A construction officer flew to the bridge site
and found that the Chinese had chopped the piles off at the water level.
The Chinese had used the chopped-off piles to build a low bridge about two
hundred yards from our bridge site. The camouflaged abutment and the buried pile
bents had escaped enemy observation, however, and had not been bothered. But the
cut-off piles forced a redesign of our bridge.
43. Infantry Replacements
Capt. Fred J. Tennant, 2d Quartermaster Company
The 2d Infantry Division entered Korea on 31 July 1950 and went into action
immediately. The infantry regiments had high casualty rates in their
fighting, and without replacements the infantry strength
became dangerously low.
Here we learned that every man has to be a soldier. Division ordered all
service units to transfer 10 per cent of their strength to the infantry. Some of
our men had previous infantry experience, most had not. Often the men we
transferred went into an attack two hours after joining the new unit. We gave
the infantry good men -- the enemy was too close to send out any 8-balls.
44. Eager Beaver
Col. Thomas A. Pitcher, Signal Officer, Eighth Army
One of the best cable splicers to work on the Mukden cable was Sergeant Van
Atta of the 532d Signal Construction Company. Not only was he thoroughly
proficient, but he was always anxious to get his job done. He carried his
enthusiasm so far that, so long as the cable ran there, it seemed to make little
difference to him whether or not we had captured an area.
Equal in zeal to Van Atta were the wire crews of the Republic of Korea's
Ministry of Communications. They seemed to give allegiance to neither side in
the struggle. Their interest and loyalty was to the cable. When it went bad they
fixed it -- regardless of whose territory it was in.
A strong bond developed between Van Atta and the Koreans. Once, north of
Seoul, Van Atta went ahead of the infantry into enemy territory to get started
on the cable. He was surrounded by Korean civilians and communications men.
Suddenly several North Korean soldiers came on the scene and, seeing an American
soldier, asked the civilians why an enemy soldier was here.
The communications men replied: "He's a prisoner. We're using him to repair
the cable."
The enemy soldiers moved on.
45. Icebreaker, M1
Condensed from "Expedient River Ice Removal Practice," by Major Vernon L.
Watkins and Lt. George W. Brazier, in Engineer Lessons Learned in Korea, June
1951.
Along with the rise in the Han River waters came floating ice. Combined,
these forces of Nature destroyed all the bridges over the
Han in the X Corps zone except for a 300-foot timber structure near
Chungju.
The floating ice varied from small bits to 40-foot sheets, and from 2 to 14
inches thick. It became apparent that the Chungju bridge would also fail if the
ice could not pass. Already, clogging ice had raised the upstream water level 42
inches.
Demolition crews were unable to dislodge the mounting ice, and men with steel
bars, tent poles, and native timbers were too slow. As the river continued to
rise, the bridge began to fail. In desperation the engineers turned to any
expedient, including one that had been discussed earlier and passed over.
Engineers fired M1 rifles directly at the jammed ice. Results were gratifying. A
single fracture often broke the ice mass and allowed the fragments to flow under
the bridge.
Throughout the night of 22 February 1951 and the next morning, squads of
riflemen protected the structure, but subsequent rises in the river allowed
water to flow over the treadway and forced the engineers from the bridge.
Unattended, the ice clogged all openings and some of the larger sheets extended
over the deck. The bridge failed.
Quick thinking and the use of an expedient had extended the life of the
structure twenty-four hours. This was sufficient to permit the repair of
alternate routes.
46. Curtailing the Money Black Market
Lt. Donald J. Horan, Finance Office, 2d Logistical Command
The main problem which arose in this rear area was the illegal trafficking in
military payment certificates between members of the United Nations forces and
Korean nationals. Within the means of the finance section~we could practically
wipe out this black market activity by making exchange readily available without
any waiting.
We found that two cashiers could adequately handle the sale of turn, which
amounted to approximately thirty thousand dollars a day, provided they did not
have to count the currency. Four Korean girls, money counters for the Bank of
Korea, were used to count out the Korean currency in five- and ten-dollar
stacks. Being more proficient than U.S. personnel at counting Korean money,
their employment speeded up the counting and they proved far more accurate.
47. Temperature Adjustment
Michael Slauta, Special Observer for The Quartermaster General. (From a
speech, 16 November 1950.)
The reaction of troops from tropical countries to wet-cold climate is
unfavorable. When the Filipinos arrived in Korea on a September night, the
temperature was a very comfortable 65 degrees. But the Filipinos felt cold. They
were actually "freezing" and, before they moved away from the train, they had
broken into their packs and had blankets draped over their shoulders. Before two
days passed we had to issue them winter clothing.
48. Shortage of Spare Parts
Lt.Col. William C Hammond, Jr., Chemical Officer, I Corps
We suffered all through the campaign from a lack of spare parts. I do not
mean that the Chemical Corps is remiss; I mean that all spare parts are short.
Korea is brutal on all types of mechanized equipment. It's because of rough
roads and dust. The dust over here is terrific. It is highly abrasive -- just like
the dust we encountered at Salerno. The World War II replacement factor should
be doubled, or even tripled.
49. Iead-in Wire
Sgt. Gene C. DeMont, 2d Medical Battalion
Around 15 September 1950 I was serving as advanced radio operator with the 2d
Medical Battalion (2d Infantry Division) at Yongsan. The infantry was having a
rough fight and we had a number of serious casualties in our clearing platoon in
need of immediate evacuation. We were rapidly running out of medical
supplies.
I was operating an old AN/GRC-9 radio with a whip antenna. I should have been
able to get a range of forty-five miles, even in this rough country. The medical
battalion was at Miryang -- only thirteen
miles away -- and I could not reach them. I tried for an hour without
success.
While I was trying to get the message through, a radio operator from the 2d
Quartermaster Company came along. He looked at the lead-in wire between the
radio and the antenna, and told me the wire was losing a great deal of power
from radiation. He suggested I make a lead-in of coaxial cable -- and even provided
a short piece of it.
I made the lead-in and tried calling Miryang. I got them on the first call.
Their signal was weak but readable. In turn, they read me strong.
I sent my message requesting supplies and asking for helicopter evacuation of
the serious cases. Fortunately, the radio crew was located at a mobile army
surgical hospital and a helicopter was available. The first flight reached us
within twenty minutes of my message.
50. Feeding Koreans
Michael Slauta, Special Observer for The Quartermaster General. (From a
speech, 16 November 1952.)
When Koreans first try the American diet they tend to overeat, and become
ill. You could see the Koreans going through a mess line for a well-liked cup of
coffee. They would fill the canteen cup quarter full of sugar and the remainder
with coffee.
We began to control the amounts of food the Koreans could have. After they
became accustomed to our rations they relished them.
51. Convoy Troubles
Lt.Col. Arnold C. Gilliam, Quartermaster, 2d Infantry Division
The haul from Masan to Chongju and back was 460 miles, and the turnaround
took approximately 36 hours. Ten bridges were out and several rivers had to be
forded. Guerrillas and bypassed enemy units attacked our convoys. One truck
returned with nine bullet holes in its windshield and an unscathed driver.
We noticed that the guerrillas picked on the rear vehicle in each convoy, so
we moved the convoy commander's jeep up from that position and placed a
2-1/2-ton truck in the rear. Then we rear-mounted
a caliber .50 machine gun and stationed a gunner to return the fire. We had
no more trouble with guerrillas.
52. Hot Food
Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7th Infantry Division
In the landings of the 7th Infantry Division at Inchon, I was particularly
impressed by the speed with which food was brought forward. Each soldier carried
a full C ration, but few used it. The kitchen trucks were among the first
vehicles unloaded. Within hours of our landing most of the kitchens ashore were
serving hot meals. Some of the messes even served hot rolls.
53. Never Put Off Till To-Morrow . . .
Major Edward Pooley, 25th Signal Company
The 24th Infantry (25th Infantry Division) was on field maneuvers in Japan in
June 1950. During the last few days of the maneuver it rained constantly, and
most of its signal equipment got thoroughly wet. At the close of the maneuver
this equipment was loaded on vehicles and returned to the home station without
being dried and cleaned. It was supposed this delay would not damage the
equipment.
When the regiment arrived at its home station it was sent directly to Korea
with no opportunity to service its equipment. Eight days later the regiment was
in combat, and found its signal equipment operating at approximately 50 per cent
efficiency, whereas during the maneuver it had been 95 per cent effective.
54. Supply by Cable
Lt. William A. Champion, Lt. Charles H. Crossley, Lt. Weldon M. Camel, and
Lt. James E. Hunter, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion. (From interviews by Lt. John
Mewha, 8th Historical Detachment.)
The rains washed away a temporary bridge, isolating the front-line troops and
our engineer company. Food and medical supplies were
brought in for a Manhour period by a cableway built by the 1st Platoon. Some
men from the 3d Platoon, which had been left south of the stream, helped in the
operation. A rock with telephone wire attached was thrown to the men, and to
this a half-inch rope was attached. A three-quarter cable was attached to the
rope. After the cable was pulled across, it was anchored on both sides of the
stream. A snatch block, placed on the cable, ran back and forth, hauling
supplies across the river.
55. Protecting Perishables
Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7th Infantry Division
We learned many tricks about shipping supplies while we were in Korea. One
allowed us to protect perishables against heat and cold. When we needed -- but
didn't have -- a refrigerated railroad car or truck, we used our standard vehicles
and applied the layer principle. Frozen foods were maintained in standard trucks
and boxcars for about three days during normal weather by placing cases of
nonperishables on the bottom, sides, and top of the car, then placing the frozen
product in the center. To insulate against cold we sandwiched loads of fresh
vegetables between protective layers of produce not likely to be damaged by the
cold.
56. Finance on the Alert
Major Stanley H. Hendricks, 106th Finance Disbursing Section
While in Wonsan, we were required to remain on the alert twenty-four hours a
day because of the limited number of troops available for perimeter defense. We
were on the western edge of town and the enemy often infiltrated our positions.
Several times I had to have my cash verified by two disinterested officers and
necessary certificates prepared. Thermite grenades were attached to my field
safes at all times so that the money, checks, and pay records could be quickly
destroyed.
I had been with the company only a few days, and had not moved the radios
into this site, but I anticipated that moving four VHF stations with one truck
would be difficult.
I was promised plenty of time to phase out my stations and pack the
equipment, however. At 1300 on the 30th I got our march order from the corps
signal officer. I was given lots of time -- "Be in the column by 1500!"
Scouring the area, I found a North Korean fire engine and a 1-1/2 ton truck.
Commandeering is the military term for what took place. I brought the vehicles
up to our equipment and loaded. Everything got on board except an old Korean
chair, but our appearance was none too military.
60. We Didn't Overlook Anything
Lt.Col. Kenneth O. Schellberg, Quartermaster, 7th Infaury Division
After the 7th Infantry Division landed at Iwon, its infantry regiments moved
out very rapidly. The infantry was well on its way to Kapsan while the supply
base was still being shifted from Iwon to Pukchong. We were able to supply the
infantry only by the continuous use of our truck company, airlifts from Japan,
use of the division's own light aircraft, and by operating a ten-mile
mine-conveyor system we found. We used this to transport 55-gallon drums from
the railhead at Honggun-ni over the very rough mountains to within twelve miles
of Pungsan. We hauled gasoline all day and fought off guerrillas from our
conveyor installations at night.
61. Seeing Is Believing
Lt.Col. Joseph Beaver, 2d Finance Disbursing Section
The sixty miles separating the finance section from the frontline troops
brought no problem. A pay team took payrolls and cash forward to advance CPs on
payday and remained until every service was completed. A battalion commander
would advise our office when we could visit his units, and we would take the pay
records for perusal or voicing of complaints by the men. Most complaints were without foundation;
the men were just curious to see their pay records.
62. Who's Afraid of a Tank?
Capt. George R. Spreng, Korean Military Advisory Group
The South Koreans had an extreme fear of tanks. This was not without cause,
considering how unprepared they were to cope with them. In time the ROKs came to
realize how restricted the tankers were, and how frightened were the
crewmen.
An incident occurred near Hamhung which pointed up the limitations of tanks.
The Chinese Communists attached with four tanks out ahead of their infantry. Two
of my ROK engineers each ran twice across the road dropping M6 mines in the path
of the tanks. All four enemy tanks were knocked out, and the attack was stopped.
The fear of tanks was much less thereafter.
63. Laying Telephone Wire by Air
Command Report, 23d Infantry (October 1951)
Liaison planes in three missions laid 11,000 yards of telephone wire. It was
found that 2 miles of wire will cross 1.4 miles of ground distance. That is not
excessive, for wire crews normally allow a 25 per cent slack.
Wire should be flown into position by 1530, as the wire crews must locate it
and connect the wires before dark. To aid the wire men, a panel is tied to each
end of the wire. It is suggested that smoke grenades be dropped from the plane
at each end of a run.
We used the planes to lay wire only when the terrain was too rough for crews
to do it on the ground. However, the wire crossed terrain where it could not be
repaired. Alternate means of communication must therefore be established.
64. Payroll by Helicopter
Major Wilford E. Vidlock, Finance Officer, 24th Infantry Division
One morning I was due at the division's forward CP at 0900 to deliver the
payroll to unit agents. I knew I could never make it by jeep, so I asked one of
the pilots of a helicopter to fly me and my assistant forward. He very
obligingly agreed. It took us an hour to make the trip that would have taken
eight by jeep. So I claim for the finance section of the 24th Infantry Division
the distinction of first having delivered a monthly payroll by helicopter.
We arrived on time, so everybody was happy. You should have seen the people
at forward when I got out of the "eggbeater"! No joke. They were running every
which way as we made our approach. When I stepped out it was really a picnic.
They thought the helicopter was bringing General Ridgway!
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
