Redeployment South
The Chinese did not pursue the Eighth Army's
twenty-mile withdrawal from the Ch'ongch'on to the Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songch'on
line. Only light enemy patrolling occurred along the new line on 1 December,
mostly at its eastern end where there had been no deep withdrawal the day
before. General Walker nevertheless believed that the Chinese would soon close
the gap, resume their frontal assaults, and again send forces against his east
flank.1
Walker now estimated the Chinese opposing
him to number at least six armies with eighteen divisions and 165,000 men. Of
his own forward units, only the 1st Cavalry; 24th, 25th, and ROK 1st Divisions;
and the two British brigades were intact. The ROK 6th Division could be employed
as a division but its regiments were tattered; about half the ROK 7th and 8th
Divisions had reassembled but were far less able than their strengths indicated;
and both the 2d Division and Turkish brigade needed substantial refurbishing
before they could again function as units. Of his reserves, the four ROK
divisions operating against guerrillas in central and southern Korea were too
untrained to be trustworthy on the line. His only
other reserves were the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and
its attached Filipino and Thai battalions then guarding forward army supply
installations; the Netherlands battalion, which had just completed its
processing at the U.N. Reception Center; and an infantry battalion from France,
which had just debarked at Pusan.
2
By Walker's comparison of forces, the injured Eighth Army
could not now set a successful static defense. Considering delaying action to be
the only course open, a course in which he should not risk becoming heavily
engaged and in which he should anticipate moving out of Korea, Walker began to
select delaying lines behind him. He intended to move south from one to the next
well before his forces could be fixed, flanked, or enveloped.
3
Though the XIII Army Group remained out of contact
on 2 December, Walker received agent and aerial observer reports that Chinese
were moving into the region east of Songch'on and that either they or North
Korean guerrillas infesting that area had established blocking positions below
the Pyongyang-Wonsan road from Songch'on eastward twenty-five miles to Yangdok. They
could be trying to secure a portion of the lateral route in advance of a drive
toward either or both coasts, and should the drive go west into P'yongyang, they
could trap the Eighth Army above the city. In view of the latter possibility,
Walker elected to withdraw before the thrust materialized. Pyongyang was to be
abandoned.
4
Walker's use of relatively slight intelligence
information in deciding to withdraw below P'yongyang reflected the general
attitude of the Eighth Army. According to some accounts, Walker's forces had
become afflicted with "bugout fever," a term usually used to describe a tendency
to withdraw without fighting and even to disregard orders.
5
Because it implied
cowardice and dereliction of duty, the term was unwarranted. Yet the hard
attacks and high casualties of the past week and the apparent Chinese strength
had shaken the Eighth Army's confidence. This same doubt had some influence on
Walker's decision to give up P'yongyang and would manifest itself again in other
decisions to withdraw. But the principal reason for withdrawing had been, was,
and would continue to be the constant threat of envelopment from the east.
Pyongyang Abandoned
As Walker started his withdrawal from the
Sukch'on-Sunch'on-Songch'on line on 2 December, Maj. Gen. Doyle O. Hickey,
acting chief of staff of the Far East Command and United Nations Command,
arrived with word from General MacArthur that, in effect, allowed Walker to
leave behind any equipment and other materiel that he chose as long as they were
destroyed.6 Walker, however, planned not to drop behind P'yongyang
until the army and air force supply points in the city had been emptied and the
port of Chinnamp'o cleared. To provide time for the removal he ordered a half
step to the rear, sending his forces south toward a semicircular line still
twenty miles above P'yongyang.
(Map 13)
While service troops rushed to evacuate supplies
and equipment from the North Korean capital and port, line units reached the
temporary line late on the 3d with no enemy interference beyond being harassed
by North Korean guerrillas on the east flank.7
Walker meanwhile pushed reserves eastward onto Route 33,
the next P'yongyang-Seoul road inland from Route 1, to protect his east flank
and to guarantee an additional withdrawal route below the North Korean capital.
He deployed the 24th Division at Yul-li, twenty-five miles southeast of
Pyongyang, and the partially restored ROK II Corps at Sin'gye in the Yesong
River valley another thirty miles to the southeast. South and east of Sin'gye,
units of the ROK 2d and 5th Divisions previously had occupied Sibyon-ni and
Yonch'on on Route 33, P'och'on on Route 3, and Ch'unch'on on Route 17 in the Pukhan River valley during
antiguerrilla operations. Route 33 thus was protected at important road
junctions, and Walker at least had the semblance of an east flank screen all the
way from Pyongyang to Seoul.
8
8th Army Troops Retreating South From Sunch'on Toward P'yongyang
Walker moved the damaged 2d Division from Chunghwa into
army reserve at Munsan-ni on the Imjin River twenty-two miles north of Seoul,
where General Keiser, with priority on replacements, was to rebuild his unit.
But while Keiser's immediate and main task was to revive the 2d Division, Walker
wanted him also to reconnoiter as far
as Hwach'on,
more than fifty miles east of Munsan-ni, in case it became necessary to employ
2d Division troops in those areas guarded by South Korean units of doubtful
ability. Walker attached the Turkish brigade to the 2d Division. Hurt less by
casualties than by disorganization and equipment losses, the Turks had collected
bit by bit at several locations, mostly at Pyongyang. On 2 December, after
General Yasici had recovered some thirtyfive hundred of his original five
thousand men, Walker ordered the brigade to Kaesong, fifteen miles north of
Munsan-ni, to complete refurbishing under General Keiser's supervision
as more of its members were located and returned.9
Map 13. Eighth
Army Withdrawal, 1-23 December 1950
Walker held the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and
its attachments in the Pyongyang area to protect his supply routes and
installations. In preparation for the coming withdrawal south of the city, the
airborne troops also were to keep civilians from moving over four ponton bridges
spanning the Taedong River, two inside Pyongyang and another pair three miles
east of the city, and to take whatever other precautions were necessary to
insure an uninterrupted flow of military traffic over the crossings.
10
On 3 December, after receiving more reports of sizable
enemy movements and concentrations east and northeast of the Eighth Army
position, Walker anticipated not only a westward enemy push into P'yongyang but
also a deeper thrust southwest through the Yesong valley and across the army
withdrawal routes in the vicinity of Sin'gye. Induced to haste by this
possibility, he ordered his line units to drop fifteen miles behind Pyongyang
beginning on the morning of the 4th, to a line curving eastward from Kyomip'o on
the lower bank of the Taedong to a point short of Koksan in a subsidiary valley
of the upper Yesong River. Walker warned them to be ready to withdraw another
fifty miles on the west and twenty miles on the east to a line running from
Haeju on the coast north-
eastward through Sin'gye,
then eastward through Ich'on in the Imjin River valley. The latter withdrawal
would set Walker's rightmost units athwart the Yesong valley in fair position to
delay an enemy strike through it and would eliminate concern for the army left
flank, which, after the initial withdrawal below P'yongyang, would open on the
large Hwanghae peninsula southwest of Kyomip'o.
11
In withdrawing south of Pyongyang, the IX Corps, now with
the 24th Division attached, was to move on Route 33, occupy the right sector of
the new army front, and reinforce the weak ROK II Corps in protecting the army
east flank in the Yesong valley. The I Corps was to withdraw to the west sector
of the new line over Route 1 and, while passing through P'yongyang, destroy any
abandoned materiel found within the city.
12
General Milburn's demolition assignment was likely to be
sizable. Aside from organizational and individual equipment lost by the line
units, the only notable materiel losses since the Chinese opened their offensive
had been fourteen hundred tons of ammunition stored at Sinanju and five hundred
tons at Kunu-ri. But now Walker's forces were about to give up the locale of the
Eighth Army's main forward stockpiles, and although the smaller stores at
Chinnamp'o might be evacuated, it was less likely that the larger quantities
brought into Pyongyang over the past several weeks could be completely removed
on such short notice. The improbability of clearing the Pyongyang
stocks was increased by the necessity to give priority on locomotives to trains
carrying casualties and service units, by heavy demands on trucks for troop
movements as well as for hauling materiel from supply point to railroad yard,
and by the problems of loading and switching trains in congested yards that
earlier had been severer damaged by UNC air bombardment.
13
All Bridges Across The Taedong River at Pyongyang Were Destroyed After 8th Army Retreated South Of City
With almost no enemy contact, Walker's forces moved south
of P'yongyang
within twenty-four hours. Much of the
city was afire by 0730 on 5 December when the rear guards destroyed the last
bridges over the Taedong and set off final demolitions in the section of
P'yongyang below the river. Colonel Stebbins, Walker's G4 who supervised the
removal of materiel from Chinnamp'o and P'yongyang, would have preferred a
slower move by seventy-two or even forty-eight hours. Given that additional
time, Stebbins believed, the service troops could have removed most of the eight
to ten thousand tons of supplies and equipment that now lay abandoned and broken
up or burning inside Pyongyang. More time also could have prevented such oversights as leaving at least
fifteen operable M-46 tanks aboard flatcars in the railroad yards in the
southwestern part of the city. Fifth Air Force planes struck these overlooked
tanks on 6 December, but differing pilot claims left obscure the amount of
damage done.
14
Although Chinnamp'o was exposed after early morning of
the 5th, evacuation of the port continued until evening without harassment from
enemy forces. Pressed only by time and the wide range of the Yellow Sea tides,
the port troops from 2 through 5 December loaded LSTs, transports of the
Japanese merchant marine, a squadron of U.S. Navy troop and cargo transports,
and at least a hundred Korean sailboats. Aboard these craft went casualties,
prisoners, and materiel sent from P'yongyang; the supplies and equipment on the
ground around the port; the port service units themselves; and some thirty
thousand refugees (most of them on the sailboats). Four American destroyers took
station off Chinnamp'o, and aircraft from the British carrier
Theseus
appeared overhead on the
5th to protect the final outloading. That morning the port commander received
word from Colonel Stebbins to get the last ships under way on the favorable tide
at 1700. The last three ships pulled away from the docks near that hour.
Demolition crews set off their last explosives, and shortly afterward the last
men ashore drove an amphibious truck out to a waiting ship. Some two thousand
tons of supplies and a few items of port equipment, small amounts by comparison
with the losses
at P'yongyang, had had to be
destroyed for lack of time to remove them.
15
The men and materiel sea lifted from Chinnamp'o were
landed either at Inch'on (port personnel, rations, and petroleum products) or
Pusan (patients, prisoners, and remaining supplies). Most of the stock evacuated
from P'yongyang was shipped to depots at Kaesong and around Seoul. Some was kept
forward aboard the railcars on which it had been loaded to institute a mobile
system of meeting day-to-day requirements of the line units. These daily needs,
mostly rations and petroleum products, were to be issued from the cars at
railheads whose locations could be changed as rapidly as the line units
withdrew. This system would reduce the likelihood of further materiel
losses.
16
The trace of the new army position vaguely resembled a
question mark. I and IX Corps defenses between Kyomip'o and Yul-li formed the
upper arc, IX Corps positions on the east flank from Yul-li southeastward to
Sin'gye shaped the shank, and clumps of army reserves below Sin'gye supplied
several dots. The figure traced was appropriate since Walker now had been out of
meaningful contact with enemy forces for five days, had no clear idea of the
location or movement of the main Chinese body, and could only speculate on what
the XIII Army Group commander could or intended to do next.
17
In an attempt to fill the intelligence gap
deriving from the withdrawals and the Chinese slowness to follow, Walker on the
5th ordered General Milburn and General Coulter to send strong reconnaissance
patrols, including tanks, north as far as the Taedong River. But only the 1st
Cavalry Division reported any noteworthy deep patrolling, on 6 December when two
battalions sortied northeast up the Yesong valley and into Kokson, where they
fought a minor skirmish with North Korean troops, and on 7 December when two
companies made another, but uneventful, visit to the town.
18
Most of Walker's information continued to come from
agents and aerial observers. The latter reported on the 6th that enemy troops
were moving into Chinnamp'o and south across the Taedong estuary by ferry to the
Hwanghae peninsula. Agents on the same day verified the presence of Chinese
troops in Pyongyang and reported that North Korean regulars were joining North
Korean guerrillas, to the east and right rear of the Eighth Army. To escape the
trouble these reports portended, Walker instructed his forward units to withdraw
on 8 December to the HaejuSin'gye-Ich'on line and to extend that line east to
Kumhwa. The west flank would again be anchored on the sea, and Walker's forces
would be able to present a front instead of a flank to the North Korean units
reported gathering on the east.
19
But what now worried Walker
most were the whereabouts and intentions of the Chinese he previously had
suspected were maneuvering into attack position just beyond his east flank.
Because his forces at no time since 30 November had captured or even sighted a
Chinese soldier during the sporadic encounters along the army right, he was
beginning to believe that all enemy troops immediately east of him were North
Korean. Chinese forces, then, possibly were moving south, not into position for
a close-in envelopment but around the Eighth Army some distance to the east
through the X Corps' rear area. Since General Almond's forces were concentrating
at Hamhung and Hungnam far to the northeast, any such march by the Chinese would
be unopposed, and if the Chinese moved through the open area in strength, they
possibly could occupy all of South Korea with little or no difficulty. Walker
anyway granted the Chinese this capability and against the possibility of such a
sweep took steps on 6 December to deploy troops across the entire peninsula. He
planned no static defense. His concept of fighting a delaying action without
becoming heavily engaged remained unchanged except that he now would delay from
preselected lines stretching coast to coast.
20
As a preliminary, Walker obtained General MacArthur's
agreement to erase the southern segment of the Eighth Army-X Corps boundary so
that the Eighth Army's sector spanned the peninsula below the 39th parallel, more generally south of a line between
Pyongyang and Wonsan. He also arranged air and naval surveillance of the east
coast south of the X Corps' position to detect enemy coastal movements while he
was extending his line. He chose coast-to-coast positions running from the mouth
of the Yesong River, almost forty miles behind Haeju, northeastward through
Sibyon-ni, southeastward through Ch'orwon and Hwach'on, then eastward to
Yangyang on the Sea of Japan. This line, later designated line A, was roughly a
hundred fifty miles long and at its most northerly point reached just twenty
miles above the 38th parallel. Walker ordered five South Korean divisionsthe two
of the ROK II Corps and three others then in central and southern Korea-to
occupy the eastern half of the line and to start moving into position
immediately. The I and IX Corps, scheduled eventually to man the western portion
of line A, remained for the time being under orders to withdraw only as far as
the Haeju-Kumhwa line.
21
CINCUNC Order Number 5
The apprehensions evident in Walker's appraisals and
plans were apparent in Tokyo as well. General MacArthur, although his main
intention may have been to coax reinforcement, already had notified the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the United Nations Command was
too weak to make a successful stand when he informed them on 28 November that he
was passing to the defensive. The Joint Chiefs fully approved MacArthur's
adoption of defensive tactics but were not convinced that a successful static
defense was impossible. They suggested that MacArthur place the Eighth Army in a
continuous line across Korea between Pyongyang and Wonsan. MacArthur objected,
claiming such a line was too long for the forces available and that the
logistical problems posed by the high, road-poor mountains then separating the
Eighth Army and X Corps were too great. By concentrating the X Corps in the
Hamhung area, MacArthur countered, he was creating a "geographic threat" to
enemy lines of communication that made it tactically unsound for Chinese forces
to move south through the opening between Walker and Almond. In any event, he
predicted, the Chinese already arrayed against the Eighth Army would compel it
to take a series of steps to the rear.
22
The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed that the X Corps'
concentration at Hamhung would produce the effect MacArthur anticipated. In
their judgment, the Chinese already had demonstrated a proficiency for moving
strong forces through difficult mountains, and the concentration of the X Corps
on the east coast combined with the predicted further withdrawals of the Eighth
Army would only widen the opening through which the Chinese could move. They
again urged MacArthur to consolidate the Eighth Army and X Corps
sufficiently to prevent large enemy forces from passing between the two commands
or outflanking either of them. But MacArthur defended his view of a
P'yongyang-Wonsan line, pointing out that he and Walker already had agreed that
Pyongyang could not be held and that the Eighth Army probably would be forced
south at least as far as Seoul. Turning his reasoning in support of a request
for ground reinforcements "of the greatest magnitude," he emphasized on 3
December that his present strength would allow him at most to prolong his
resistance to the Chinese by making successive withdrawals or by taking up
"beachhead bastion positions" and that a failure to receive reinforcements
portended the eventual destruction of his command.
23
The response to MacArthur's estimate was as gloomy as his
predictions. Prompted by earlier dismal reports to visit the Far East for a
firsthand appraisal, Army Chief of Staff General Collins informed MacArthur on 4
December that no reinforcement in strength, at least in the near future, was
possible. The remaining joint Chiefs meanwhile replied from Washington that
preservation of the U.N. Command was now the guiding consideration and that they
concurred in the consolidation of MacArthur's forces into
beachheads.
24
Beachhead sites that in varying degrees could facilitate
a withdrawal from Korea were Hungnam and Wonsan for the X Corps, Inch'on and
Pusan for
the Eighth Army. General Collins, while
touring Korea between 4 and 6 December, heard General Walker and General Almond
on the best beachheads and on how best to handle their respective commands.
Almond believed that he could hold Hungnam indefinitely and wanted to stay there
out of certainty that by doing so he could divert substantial Chinese strength
from the Eighth Army front. Walker, on the other hand, believed the preservation
of the Eighth Army required a deep withdrawal. Walker attempted to forestall any
order to defend Seoul, insisting that tying his forces to the ROK capital would
only allow the Chinese to encircle the Eighth Army and force a slow, costly
evacuation through Inch'on. He favored pulling back to Pusan, where once before
he had broken an enemy offensive and where now, if reinforced by the X Corps,
the Eighth Army might hold out indefinitely.25
MacArthur's G-3, General Wright, meanwhile recommended
Pusan as the best beachhead for both the Eighth Army and X Corps on grounds that
should UNC forces be compelled to leave Korea, they should leave the distinct
impression of having delayed the enemy as long and as well as possible. Wright
also pointed out that defending successive lines into the southeastern tip of
the peninsula would afford UNC air forces the greatest opportunity to hurt the
Chinese; further, if a withdrawal from Korea became necessary during the
remaining winter months, MacArthur's command could escape extreme weather
conditions at Pusan; finally, an evacuation at any time could be effected faster through the Pusan facilities
than through any other port. To permit the longest delaying action possible and
to enable an evacuation from the best port, Wright recommended that the X Corps
be sea lifted from Hungnam as soon as possible and landed in southeastern Korea,
that the X Corps then join the Eighth Army and pass to Walker's command, and
thereafter that the U.N. Command withdraw through successive positions, if
necessary to the Pusan area.26
On 7 December in Tokyo, Generals MacArthur, Collins, and
Stratemeyer, Admirals Joy and Struble, and Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, the
commander of all Marine forces in the Pacific, considered the various views
generated during the week past and agreed on plans that embodied in largest part
the recommendations of General Wright. MacArthur set these plans in effect on
the 8th in CINCUNC (Commander in Chief, United Nations Command) Order Number 5.
He listed nine lines to be defended by the Eighth Army, the southernmost based
on the Naktong River in the general trace of the old Pusan Perimeter. But he
insisted that Walker not surrender Seoul until and unless an enemy maneuver
unquestionably was about to block the Eighth Army's further withdrawal to the
south. Related to this stipulation, four lines lay above Seoul, the last of
which, resting on the Imjin River in the west and extending eastward to the
coast, was MacArthur's first delineation of positions across the entire
peninsula. Here the peninsula was somewhat narrower than in the PyongyangWonsan
region and offered a road net that could
accommodate
supply movements.27 Earlier pessimistic reports to Washington
notwithstanding, MacArthur apparently believed that the Eighth Army and the X
Corps combined could man this line; indeed, he expected Walker to make an ardent
effort to hold it.
Through correspondence and interviews, MacArthur
meanwhile had responded publicly to charges appearing in a substantial segment
of the press that he was responsible for the reverse his forces were suffering
at the hands of the Chinese. In defense of his strategy and tactics, he insisted
that his command could not have fought more efficiently given the restrictions
placed upon it by the policy of limiting hostilities to Korea. This criticism of
administration policy rankled President Truman, particularly because MacArthur
voiced it publicly and frequently enough to lead "many people abroad to believe
that our government would change its policy."28 Truman issued
instructions on 5 December by which he intended to insure that information made
public by an executive branch official was "accurate and fully in accord with
the policies of the United States Government."29 Specifically
applicable to General MacArthur, "Officials overseas, including military
commanders, were to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and
to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with
newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United
States."30 The Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarded the president's
instructions to MacArthur on 6 December.
Withdrawal to Line B
On 7 December General MacArthur had radioed a warning to
both Walker and Almond of the next day's order for successive withdrawals, the
defense of Seoul short of becoming entrapped, and the assignment of the X Corps
to the Eighth Army. So guided, Walker on the 8th laid out line B, which
duplicated line A eastward from Hwach'on but in the opposite direction fell off
to the southwest to trace the lower bank of the lmjin and Han rivers, some
twenty miles behind the Yesong River. This line was at least twenty miles
shorter than line A, fairly coincided with the northernmost coast-to-coast line
designated by MacArthur, and now became the line toward which Walker began to
move his forces for the defense of Seoul.31
On 11 December MacArthur made his first
visit to Korea since he had watched the start of what was hoped would be the
Eighth Army's final advance. He was now on the peninsula for a firsthand view of
the Eighth Army and X Corps after their setbacks at the hands of the Chinese and
for personal conferences with Walker and Almond on the steps the two line
commanders had taken or planned to take in carrying out the maneuvers and
com
mand change he had ordered three days before.
When MacArthur reached Walker's
headquarters (having first stopped in northeastern Korea to confer with General
Almond), he was able to see not only the Eighth Army plan for withdrawing to
line B but also Walker's plans in case the Eighth Army again was squeezed into
the southeastern corner of the peninsula. Reviving an unused plan developed by
the Eighth Army staff in September, Walker reestablished not only the Naktong
River defenses but also three lines between the old perimeter and Pusan, each
arching between the south coast and east coast around the port. Nearer Pusan,
the Davidson line curved northeastward sixty-eight miles from a south coast
anchor at Masan; next southeast, the Raider line stretched fortyeight miles from
the south coast resort town of Chinhae; and just outside the port, the Pusan
line arched twenty-eight miles from the mouth of the Naktong. Walker instructed
General Garvin to fortify these lines using Korean labor and all other means and
manpower available within Garvin's 2d Logistical Command.32
On the day following MacArthur's visit Walker established
two more lettered lines. Line C followed the lower bank of the Han River just
below Seoul, curved northeast to Hongch'on, thirty miles below Hwach'on, then
reached almost due east to the coast at Wonpo-ri, fifteen miles behind Yangyang.
Line D, next south, ran from a west coast anchor
fortyfive miles below Seoul northeast through the towns of Py'ongt'aek, Ansong,
Changhowon-ni, and Wonju to Wonpo-ri, the same east coast anchor as for line C.
These lines were to be occupied if and when enemy pressure forced the Eighth
Army to give up Seoul but before any deep withdrawal as far as the Naktong was
required.
33
Amid this contingency planning and through 22 December
Walker gradually pulled his forward units south and pushed ROK forces north into
positions generally along line B. The I and IX Corps, withdrawing over Routes 1
and 33, bounded in three-day intervals through the Haeju-Kumhwa line and line A
toward sectors along the western third of line B. The withdrawal was uncontested
except for minor encounters with North Korean troops on the IX Corps' east
flank, but thousands of refugees moving with and trailing the two corps had to
be turned off the main roads lest they block the withdrawal routes. By 23
December both corps occupied stable positions in their new sectors. The I Corps,
with two divisions and a brigade, stood athwart Route I along the lower banks of
the Han and the lmjin; the IX Corps, with two divisions, blocked Routes 33 and 3
right at the 38th parallel.
34
Spreading ROK forces along the remainder of the line
proved more frustrating. Transportation requirements exceeded available trucks;
resistance
from North Korean troops in the central
region slowed the South Koreans; and general confusion among the sketchily
trained ROK units caused further delay. But by 23 December General Walker
managed to get the ROK III Corps up from southern Korea and, with three
divisions, emplaced in a central sector adjoining the IX Corps on the east. The
South Korean front lay below line B, almost exactly on the 38th parallel, with
its center located about eight miles north of Ch'unch'on. In more rugged ground
next east, the ROK II Corps occupied a narrow one-division front astride Route
24, which passed southwestward through the Hongch'on River valley. The corps
thus blocked what otherwise could provide enemy forces easy access south through
central Korea over Route 29 and to lateral routes leading west to the Seoul
area.35
By 20 December the ROK I Corps
had been sea lifted in increments out of northeastern Korea, landed at Pusan and
near Samch'ok close to the east coast anchor of line B, and transferred to
Eighth Army control. Walker immediately committed the additional corps to defend
the eastern end of the army line. By the 23d the ROK I Corps, with two
divisions, occupied scattered positions blocking several mountain tracks and the
east coast road.
36
Regardless of his success in stretching forces across the
peninsula, Walker lacked confidence in the line he had built. His defenses were
shallow and there were gaps. He mainly mistrusted the ROK forces along the eastern two-thirds of the
line. He doubted that they would hold longer than momentarily against a strong
enemy attack, and, should they give way, his forces above Seoul in the west
would be forced to follow suit. It was to meet this particular contingency that
he had established lines C and D on 12 December. On the 15th he extended his
effort by dispatching the 1st Cavalry Division out along the connected Routes
2-18-17 northeast of Seoul as added protection against any strike at the capital
city from the direction of Ch'unch'on.
37
Eighth Army Troops Dig In North Of Seoul
The same day, he started army head
quarters, less a small group to remain in Seoul, south to Taegu.
He already had directed the removal of major supply stores located in or above
Seoul to safer positions below the Han River and had ordered the reduction of
stocks held in the Inch'on port complex. On the 18th he assigned corps
boundaries along line C and described the deployment of army reserve units to
cover a withdrawal to this first line below Seoul. Two days later he ordered the
still-weak 2d Division, which by then had stepped back from Munsan-ni to
Yongdungp'o, a suburb of Seoul just below the Han, to move to the town of
Ch'ungju, some sixty miles southeast of Seoul. From there the division was to be
ready to move against any enemy force breaking through South Korean lines in
central or eastern Korea and was to protect
the flank of Walker's western forces in any withdrawal prompted by such an enemy
thrust. General Keiser in the meantime had been evacuated because of illness,
and Maj. Gen. Robert B. McClure now commanded the 2d Division.
38
Seoul: The Capitor Is At Center
To General MacArthur, the elaborate
preparations for a withdrawal below Seoul indicated that Walker had decided
against a determined defense of the city. When MacArthur raised the question,
Walker assured him that he would hold Seoul as long as he could. But, Walker
pointed out, sudden col
lapses of ROK forces twice
before had placed the Eighth Army in jeopardy. Nor had the ROK Army shown any
increased stability even after strenuous efforts to improve it. If, as he
suspected, the ROK units now along the eastern two-thirds of line B failed to
stand against an attack, his positions north of Seoul could not be held and the
then-necessary withdrawal would have to be made over an obstacle, the Han River.
In Walker's mind these two dangers, of another sudden ROK Army collapse and of
making a river crossing in a withdrawal, made his extensive preparations a
matter of "reasonable prudence."
39
Walker also was convinced that his
adversaries were now capable of opening an offensive at any time. He still had
no solid contact with enemy forces, but by pressing intelligence sources over
the previous two weeks he had obtained sufficient evidence to predict an
imminent attack and to forecast the strength, paths, objective, and even
possible date of the next blow.40
Between 8 and 14 December Walker caught a southeastward
shift of the North Korean II Corps, the bulk of which previously had been
concentrated in and operating as a guerrilla force out of the mountains between
Koksan and Inch'on. Apparently having retaken regular status, the corps
paralleled the Eighth Army's southeastern withdrawals below P'yongyang. As
Walker's forces spread out along line B, the North Korean unit followed suit,
occupying positions just above the 38th parallel in the central sector,
principally between Yonch'on in the Wonsan-Seoul corridor and Hwach'on, due
north of Ch'unch'on. It also seemed that earlier reports of reconstituted North
Korean units joining the II Corps were correct. Several renewed North
Korean divisions apparently had assembled immediately behind the II Corps
to make a total strength of sixty-five thousand plausible for the North Korean
troops directly opposite the Eighth Army's central sector as of 23
December.
41
As late as 17 December Walker was still completely out of
contact with Chinese forces and by the 23d had encountered only a few, these in
the I and
IX Corps sectors in the west. General
Partridge, who had shifted the emphasis of Fifth Air Force operations to armed
reconnaissance and interdiction about the time Walker had given up P'yongyang,
was able to verify that Chinese forces had moved south in strength from the
Ch'ongch'on battlefields, but not how far.42 Until mid-December his
fighter pilots and light bomber crews discovered and attacked large troop
columns moving openly in daylight over main and secondary roads between the
Ch'ongch'on and P'yongyang. But then, to escape Partridge's punishing attacks,
the Chinese reverted to their strict practices of concealment and camouflage and
halted virtually all daytime movement.
43
Walker, consequently, had no clear evidence that the main
body of the XIII Army Group had moved any farther south than P'yongyang.
But on the basis of repeated reports from agents and air observers that Chinese
troops and supplies were moving southeastward from the North Korean capital, by
the 23d he considered it possible that three or four Chinese armies with about a
hundred fifteen thousand troops were bunched within a day's march of the Eighth
Army's central front. This possibility brought the estimate of enemy strength
above Walker's central positions to a hundred eighty thousand. Furthermore,
Walker judged, these troops could be reinforced by any units of the XIII Army
Group remaining in the P'yongyang area within four to eight days and by the
Chinese and North Korean units currently operating in the X Corps
sector within six to ten days.
44
To Walker, the apparent concentration and disposition of
enemy forces opposite his central front clearly suggested offensive preparations
in which the North Korean II Corps was screening the assembly of assault
forces and supplies. Small North Korean attacks below Yonch'on and from Hwach'on
toward Ch'unch'on seemed designed to search out weaknesses in the Eighth Army
line in those areas and indicated the possibility of a converging attack on
Seoul south along Route 33 and southwest over the road from Ch'unch'on. A likely
date for opening such an attack, because of a possible psychological advantage
to the attackers, was Christmas Day.
45
Walker's largest hope of holding Seoul for any length of
time in these circumstances rested on the arrival of the remainder of the X
Corps from northeastern Korea. Once he had General Almond's forces in hand,
Walker planned to insert them in the Ch'unch'on sector now held by the untried
ROK III Corps. This move would place American units athwart the
Ch'unch'on-Seoul axis, one of the more likely enemy approaches in an attack to
seize the South Korean capital. Whether the X Corps would be available soon
enough depended first on how closely Walker had estimated the opening date of
the threatening enemy offensive and second on how long it would take General
Almond to get his forces out of northeastern Korea and
to refurbish them for employment under the Eighth
Army.
46
The X Corps
Evacuates Hungnam
By the time General Almond received General
MacArthur's 8 December order to evacuate the X Corps through Hungnam, two
sideshows to the coming main event were well under way. Out of the earlier
decision to concentrate X Corps forces at Hungnam, the evacuation of Wonsan had
begun on 3 December. In a week's time, without interference from enemy forces,
the 3d Division task force and a Marine shore party group totaling some 3,800
troops loaded themselves, 1,100 vehicles, 10,000 tons of other cargo, and 7,000
refugees aboard transport ships and LSTs provided by Admiral Doyle's Task Force
90. One LST sailed north on the 9th to Hungnam, where its Marine shore party
passengers were to take part in the forthcoming sea lift. The remaining ships
steamed for Pusan on the 9th and 10th.
47
The Task Force 90 ships dispatched to Songjin
on 5 December to pick up the tail-end troops of the ROK I Corps meanwhile had
reached their destination and by noon on 9 December had taken aboard the ROK 3d
Division (less the 26th Regiment, which withdrew to Hungnam as rear guard for
the 7th Division); the division headquarters, division artillery, and 18th Regiment of the
ROK Capital Division; and some forty-three hundred refugees. This sea lift
originally had been designed to assist the X Corps' concentration at Hungnam,
but the intervening order to evacuate Hungnam changed the destination for most
of the South Koreans to Pusan. On 10 and 11 December the convoy from Songjin
anchored at Hungnam only long enough to unload the Capital Division's
headquarters and artillery for employment in the perimeter and to take aboard an
advance party of the ROK I Corps headquarters before proceeding to its new
destination.
48
On the 11th, as the South Koreans from Songjin as well as
the Marine and Army troops from the Changjin Reservoir came into Hungnam, the
perimeter around the port was comprised of a series of battalion and regimental
strongpoints astride the likely avenues of enemy approach some twelve to fifteen
miles outside the city. The 3d Division still held the large sector assigned to
it when General Almond first shaped the perimeter, from positions below Yonp'o
airfield southwest of Hungnam to defenses astride the Changjin Reservoir road at
Oro-ri northwest of the port. Battalions of the 7th Division stood in breadth
and depth athwart the Pu'on Reservoir road north of Hungnam, and three regiments
of the ROK I Corps guarded approaches near and at the coast northeast of the
port.
49
Although Almond had begun to pull these units into
defenses around
Hungnam at the beginning of December,
enemy forces as of the 11th had not yet made any significant attempt to
establish contact with the perimeter units. But Almond expected his beachhead
defenses would be tested by enemy units approaching Hungnam along the coast from
the northeast, from the Wonsan area to the south, and especially from the
direction of the Changjin Reservoir.50
The likelihood that enemy forces pushing to the coast to
reoccupy Wonsan would block the routes south of Hungnam had prompted Almond to
discard any thought of an overland withdrawal to southern Korea. (Nor had
MacArthur ordered such a move.) Almond also considered the roads inadequate to
permit the timely movement of large forces. His warning order, issued 9
December, alerted his forces for a "withdrawal by water and air without delay
from Hungnam area to Pusan-Pohang-dong area."51 The larger exodus was
to be by sea, with the Hungnam defenses contracting as corps forces were
outloaded, but airlift was to be employed for as long as the airfield at Yonp'o
remained within the shrinking perimeter.52
Evacuation Planning
In deciding how to evacuate his forces and still
successfully defend his perimeter, Almond considered two alternatives. He could
place all divisions on the perimeter and then withdraw portions of each
simultaneously, or he could pull out one division at a time and spread his remaining forces to cover the vacated
sector on a shorter front. Since some units were more battle worn than others,
especially the 1st Marine Division, he elected the latter method and intended to
ship the marines first. They were to be followed by the 7th Division, then the
3d Division.53
Almond planned to phase out the ROK I Corps, corps
support units, bulk supplies, and heavy equipment simultaneously with the
American Army divisions. This was to be done carefully enough to keep a proper
balance between combat and support troops and to insure adequate logistical
support. To maintain this balance yet guarantee that the evacuation proceeded as
rapidly as possible, he established three points of control. From X Corps
headquarters, his G3 and G4 together guided the dispatch of units to the beach.
To supervise the actual loading of troops and materiel at water's edge, he
organized a control group under Col. Edward H. Forney, a Marine officer serving
as Almond's deputy chief of staff. Under Colonel Forney's direction, the 2d
Engineer Special Brigade was to operate dock facilities, a reinforced Marine
shore party company was to operate the LST and small craft beaches and control
the lighterage for ships to be loaded in the harbor anchorages, and some five
thousand Korean civilians were to work as stevedores. On the Navy's end of the
outloading procedure, Admiral Doyle, through a control unit aboard his flagship
Mount McKinley, was to coordinate all shipments, assign anchorages, and
issue docking and sailing instructions. Direct
liaison was established between Almond's control group ashore and Doyle's
control group at sea to match outgoing troops, supplies, and equipment with
available ships. Almond also dispatched a control group under Lt. Col. Arthur M.
Murray from corps headquarters to Pusan to receive troops, supplies, and
equipment arriving by sea and air and to move them as rapidly as possible to
assembly areas.
54
Including the troops and materiel outloaded at Wonsan and
Songjin, Almond needed shipping space for 105,000 troops, 18,422 vehicles, and
some 350,000 tons of bulk cargo. Although Admiral Doyle commanded a transport
group of over 125 ships, some would have to make more than one trip to meet
Almond's needs. The Far East Air Forces' Combat Cargo Command flying out of
Yonp'o airfield was to fulfill airlift requirements.55
Tactical air support during the evacuation would be a
Navy and Marine responsibility, the Fifth Air Force fighters previously located
in northeastern Korea having flown out to Pusan on 3 December. The 1st Marine
Air Wing, based at Yonp'o and aboard escort carriers, was to devote its full
effort to supporting the corps operation. In addition, Admiral Doyle was to
arrange both naval air and naval gunfire support. Reinforced by ships supplied
by Admiral Struble, the Seventh Fleet commander, Doyle eventually was able to employ seven carriers in throwing a canopy of aircraft
over the corps area and to deploy one battleship, two cruisers, seven
destroyers, and three rocket ships in a maneuver area reaching ten miles north
and ten miles south of Hungnam to answer Almond's requests for gunfire
support.56
To begin an orderly contraction of defenses as the X
Corps' strength ashore diminished, the units on the perimeter were to withdraw
deliberately as the 1st Marine Division embarked toward the first of three phase
lines that Almond drew around Hungnam. In the southwest this first line rested
generally along the Yowi-ch'on River, just below Yonp'o airfield, and elsewhere
traced an arc about three miles from the heart of Hungnam. (Map 14) The
second line differed from the first only in the southwest in the 3d Division
sector where it followed the upper bank of the Songch'on River close by Hungnam.
The 3d Division's withdrawal to this second line, which would mean the
abandonment of Yonp'o airfield, was scheduled to take place as the 7th Division
began its embarkation. The third and final line was a tight arc about a mile
outside the limits of Hungnam to be occupied by the 3d Division as that division
itself prepared to outload. During this final phase of the evacuation General
Soule's units were to use rearguard tactics to cover their own
embarkation.
57
Troops Outloading At Hungnam
General Almond published his formal evacuation order on
11 December, the date on which General MacArthur visited Korea and flew into
Yonp'o airfield for a conference with the X Corps
commander. After briefing MacArthur on corps dispositions and the
plan of evacuation, Almond predicted that the evacuation would be orderly, that
no supplies or equipment would be destroyed or abandoned, and that enemy forces
would not interfere seriously. The redeployment of the X Corps to southern
Korea, he estimated, would be complete by 27 December.
58
The Outloading
The 1st Marine Division, as it came into Hungnam from the
Changjin Reservoir on 11 December, assembled between the port and
Yonp'o airfield. The division outloaded over the following three days and sailed
for Pusan at midmorning on the 15th. General Almond the day before had
designated Masan, thirty miles west of Pusan, as the division's assembly area.
Following the voyage to Pusan and a motor march to Masan, the marines passed to
Eighth Army control on 18 December.
59
Barrels Of Aviation Fuel To Be Loaded On Ships At Hungnam
Some bulk cargo was shipped out during the Marine
outloading, but the heavier evacuation of materiel began after the marines
sailed. From 15 De
cember forward, service units
gradually moved depots and supply points into the port area proper, and the bulk
supplies and heavy equipment were either loaded aboard ships double-banked at
the docks or lightered to ships in the harbor. To save time, ammunition was
loaded at the docks instead of well out into open water according to usual
precautionary practice. This constant outward flow of materiel paralleled unit
embarkations through the final day of the evacuation.
60
While the marines outloaded by sea, the bulk of the 1st
Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had been attached to the 3d Division, moved to Yonp'o
for evacuation by air. General Soule had planned to compensate for the loss of
the South Korean marines by pulling his division to the shorter first phase line
on 16 December. But several sharp attacks against his positions between Chigyong
and Oro-ri during the morning of the 15th prompted him to make his withdrawal
that afternoons.61
By the 16th the attacks against the 3d Division on the
western and northwestern arcs of the perimeter, enemy patrol contact with the
ROK I Corps in the northeast, and other ground and air reports indicated that
enemy forces f were closing in around the X Corps perimeter but not in great
strength. Parts of the Chinese 81st Division, 27th Army, appeared to have
made the attacks on the 3d Division, and a North Korean brigade apparently was
moving toward Hungnam over the coastal road from the northeast. A greater
immediate problem than the approach of relatively few enemy forces was a mass
movement of civilians toward the corps perimeter. Although General Almond had
planned to evacuate government officials, their families, and as many others as
shipping space allowed, he had not anticipated that thousands of civilians would
try to reach Hungnam.62
Besides hampering evacuation operations by overcrowding
the port area, the large refugee movement posed a danger of enemy infiltration.
According to corps intelligence sources, the enemy was circulating a rumor in
Hamhung that the X Corps would provide transporation
for all civilians who wished to leave North Korea. The intention was to create a
mass move to cover the infiltration of enemy agents and saboteurs. To prevent
overcrowding and infiltration, military police, intelligence agents, and
perimeter troops attempted to block civilian entry, particularly over the
HamhungHungnam road, which carried the larger number of refugees. They were only
partially successful. Those civilians already in Hungnam and those who managed
to reach the city were screened, then moved to the southeastern suburb of
Sohojin, where corps civil affairs personnel distributed food and organized them
for evacuation as shipping space became available.
63
On the heels of the Marine division, the 7th Division
began to outload on 14 December, embarking first the worn troops of the 31st
Infantry, 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry, and 57th Field Artillery Battalion,
who had been with the marines in the reservoir area. Most of the division's
service units went aboard ship on the 15th and 16th. The 17th Infantry and
remainder of the 32d Infantry meanwhile relieved the ROK I Corps on the
perimeter and withdrew to the first phase line. Hence, the corps perimeter on
the 16th was divided into two nearly equal parts by the Songch'on River, the 7th
Division in position above it, the 3d Division holding the sector below. Patrols
and outposts deepened the defense as far out as the lower edge of
Hamhung.
64
After being relieved by the 7th Division,
the ROK I Corps outloaded and sailed at noon on 17 December. Although original
plans called for the South Koreans to go to Pusan, General MacArthur, apparently
as a result of his 11 December visit to Korea, had directed that the corps units
then on the Hungnam perimeter be sea lifted to Samch'ok. These units and those
being carried to Pusan from Songjin were to pass to Eighth Army control upon
debarkation. This transfer would permit General Walker to deploy the South
Korean corps immediately, and the landing at Samch'ok would put much of it close
at hand for deployment at the eastern end of line B. The landing, actually made
at a small port just north of Samch'ok, was completed on 20
December.
65
The ROK I Corps' departure on the 17th coincided with the
evacuation of most X Corps headquarters sections and troops. Their final
destination was Kyongju, fifty miles north of Pusan, where they were to
establish an advance corps command post. On the same day, operations at Yonp'o
airfield closed as the left flank units of the 3d Division prepared to withdraw
to the lower bank of the Songch'on River behind the field the next day. The
Marine squadrons that had used the field already had withdrawn to Pusan and
Itami, Japan. Last to leave was a Fifth Air Force base unit that had serviced
the Marine fighters and General Tunner's cargo aircraft. By the closing date
Tunner's
planes had lifted out 3,600 troops, 196
vehicles, 1,300 tons of cargo, and several hundred refugees.66
The 18 December withdrawal of
General Soule's left flank units to the lower bank of the Songch'on River was a
preliminary move in the 3d Division's relief of the two 7th Division regiments
still on the perimeter. Soule's forces stepped behind the Songch'on to the
second corps phase line on the 19th and on the 19th and 20th spread out to
relieve the 17th and 32d Regiments. General Almond closed his command post in
Hungnam on the 20th and reopened it aboard Admiral Doyle's
Mount McKinley
in the harbor,
leaving General Soule in command of ground troops ashore.67
Enemy probing attacks, which had slackened noticeably
after the 3d and 7th Divisions withdrew to the first corps phase line, picked up
again on the 18th and became still more intense on the following day. Three
Chinese divisions, the
79th, 80th,
and
81st,
all from the
27th
Army,
were believed to be in the nearby ground
west of Hungnam, although only the
79th
was currently in contact. North and northeast of
Hungnam, a North Korean brigade and the reconstituted North Korean 3d
Division
had
been contacted, as had another North Korean force, presumably a
regiment.
68
None of the enemy strikes on the perimeter did more than
penetrate some outposts, and counterattacks rapidly eliminated these
gains. So far, all action appeared to be only an attempt to reconnoiter the
perimeter. Several explanations for the enemy's failure to make a larger effort
were plausible. The bulk of the Chinese in the Changjin Reservoir area
apparently were taking time-probably forced to take time-to recuperate from
losses suffered in the cold weather and recent battles. All enemy forces
undoubtedly were aware that the X Corps was evacuating Hungnam and that they
would be able to enter the city soon without having to fight their way in. The
contraction of the corps perimeter probably forced the enemy to repeat his
reconnaissance. Artillery fire, naval gunfire, and ample close air support may
well have prevented the enemy from concentrating sufficient strength for strong
attacks. Whatever the reasons, enemy forces had not yet launched a large-scale
assault.
69
Although an additional unit, a regiment of the North
Korean 1st Division, was identified near the northeastern anchor of the
corps perimeter on 20 December, enemy attacks diminished on the 20th and 21st as
the last troops of the 7th Division embarked and sailed for Pusan. General
Barr's troops completed their redeployment on the 27th and moved into an
assembly around Yongch'on, west of the new X Corps headquarters at
Kyongju.
70
New but still small attacks
harassed the 3d Division on the 22d as General Soule's 7th, 65th, and 15th
Regiments from west to east stood at the second
corps
phase line to cover the outloading of the last corps artillery units and the
first of the division's service units. On the 23d, when Soule pulled his
regiments to the last corps phase line in preparation for the final withdrawal
from Hungnam, only a small amount of mortar and artillery fire struck the
perimeter troops. Whatever conditions so far had kept the Chinese and North
Koreans from opening a large assault obtained even after the X Corps' perimeter
strength dwindled to a single division.
71
The indirect fire received on the 23d proved to be the
last opposition offered. By morning of the 24th the perimeter was silent and
remained so as the last of the 3d Division's service units outloaded and as
General Soule started his rearguard action to take out his regiments and
artillery. A battalion from each regiment stayed on the perimeter while the
remaining infantry and the artillery outloaded and while the division's 10th
Engineer Combat Battalion and Navy underwater demolition teams prepared port
facilities for destruction. At the same time, the last corps supplies, the port
operating units, and as many of the remaining refugees as possible were put
aboard ship. After General Almond made a final inspection ashore, seven platoons
established strongpoints near the beaches to protect the embarkation of the
remainder of the covering battalions and the bulk of the 10th Engineer Combat
Battalion. In the final steps, Admiral Doyle's warships laid down a wide barrage
about a mile and a half inland as the last platoons of the covering force outloaded and
as the 10th Engineer Combat Battalion and Navy demolition teams blew up the port
before leaving the beaches aboard LVTs and LCMs shortly after 1430.
72
Rearguard Troops of 3rd Infantry Division leave Hungnam Beach - 24 December 1950
By Christmas Eve the ships carrying the last X Corps
troops and supplies were well out of Hungnam harbor en route to Pusan and to
Ulsan, a small port thirty miles north of Pusan. They left behind no serviceable
equipment or usable supplies. About 200 tons of ammunition, a like amount of
frozen dynamite, 500 thousand-pound aerial
bombs, and about 200 drums of oil and gasoline had not been taken out, but "all of this
[had] added to the loudness of the final blowup of the part of
Hungnam."73 A remarkable number of refugees, over 86,000, had been
lifted out of Hungnam since the 11th. Including those evacuated from Wonsan and
Songjin, the total number of civilians taken out of northeastern Korea reached
98,100. About the same number had been left behind for lack of shipping
space.74
In retrospect, the evacuation of the X
Corps from Hungnam had proved most spectacular as a logistical exercise. While
the move could be considered a withdrawal from a hostile shore, neither Chinese
nor North Korean forces had made any serious attempts to disrupt the operation
or even to test the shrinking perimeter that protected the outloading.
Logistical rather than tactical matters therefore had governed the rate of the
evacuation. Indeed, the X Corps' redeployment south had been a matter of how
rapidly Admiral Doyle's ships could be loaded.
75
Final Demolitions At Hungnam - USS Begor, APD 127
In announcing the completion of the X Corps' withdrawal
from Hungnam in a communique on 26 December, General MacArthur took occasion to
appraise UNC operations from the time his command had resumed its advance on 24
November and, once again, to remark on the restrictions that had been placed on
him. He blamed the incorrect assessment of Chinese strength, movements, and
intentions before the resumption on the failure of "political intelligence . . .
to penetrate the iron curtain" and on the limitations placed on field
intelligence activities, in particular his not being allowed to conduct aerial
reconnaissance beyond the boarders of Korea. So handicapped, his advance, which he later termed a
"reconnaissance-in-force," was the "proper, indeed the sole, expedient," and
"was the final test of Chinese intentions." In both the advance and the
redeployment south, he concluded, "no command ever fought more gallantly or
efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no
command could have acquitted itself to better advantage under prescribed
missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy.
76
But while MacArthur earlier had proclaimed that only by advancing could he determine enemy strength,
he had not designed or designated the UNC attack as a reconnaissance in force.
Nor was it such. It was, rather, a general offensive whose objective was the
northern border of Korea. On the other hand, except that the operations of his
command really had nothing to do with "conditions of restraint and handicap,"
MacArthur was correct in his assessment of the quality of UNC operations.
Indeed, in both advance and withdrawl his forces had conducted operations in far
largest part with efficiency and with many demonstrations of gallantry.
Notes
1 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS
Rpt, Dec 50.
2
Ibid.; Eighth Army PIR 142,
1 Dec 50; Sawyer, KMAG in Peace and War, p. 146; Appleman, South to
the Naktong, pp. 618, 667.
3
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50.
4 Ibid.; Eighth Army PIR 142, 1 Dec 50; Eighth Army PIR
143, 2 Dec 50.
5
For example, British
historian David Rees, in Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1964), on page 171 entitled a section covering the Eighth Army's
withdrawal "The Big Bug-Out" and on page 176 stated, "At the Front throughout
December the moral collapse of the Eighth Army was complete, as bug-out fever
raged everywhere."
6
General Almond officially
remained the chief of staff.
7
Interv, Appleman with
Hickey, 10 Oct 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rad, GX 30141 KGOO, CG Eighth
Army to CG I Corps et al., 2 Dec 50.
8 Ibid.; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50.
9
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Eighth Army G1 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; "Turkish
U.N. Brigade Advisory Group, 20 Nov-13 Dec 50"; Rad, GX 30139 KGOO, CG Eighth
Army to CG 2d Div, 2 Dec 50; Rad, GX 30142 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps
et al., 2 Dec 50.
10 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rad, GX 30146 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 2 Dec 50.
11 Eighth Army PIRs 143, 2 Dec 50, and 144, 3 Dec 50;
Rad, CG 30162 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 3 Dec 50.
12 Rad, GX 30162 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
al., 3 Dec 50.
13 Eighth Army G4 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army,
"Logistical Problems and Their Solutions."
14 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS
Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army, "Logistical Problems and Their Solutions."
15
Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec
50; Eighth Army G4 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army, "Logistical Problems and Their
Solutions"; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 272-74.
16 Eighth Army G4 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Mono, Eighth Army,
"Activities of the 3d Transportation Military Railway Service-The Withdrawal
From Pyongyang," cp in CMH.
17
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50.
18
Rad, GX 29613 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps and CG IX Corps, 5 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29660 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG IX Corps, 5 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 in], 6 and 7 Dec 50.
19
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 5 Dec 50; Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Eighth Army
G2 Brief, 6 Dec 50; Eighth Army
PIR 147, 6 Dec 50;
Rad, GX 29685 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29706
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 6 Dec 50.
20
Eighth Army G3 in], 5 and 6
Dec 50.
21
Rads, GX 29621 KGOO and GX
29661 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 5 Dec 50; Briefing for CG, in Eighth Army
G3 Jnl, 6 Dec 50; Rad, CTF 95 to CTG 95.7, 070206 Dec 50; Rad GX 29684 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to C/S ROKA, 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29685 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I
Corps et al., 6 Dec 50; Rad, GX 29706 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 6
Dec 50; Rad, GX 29733 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps et al., 7 Dec 50; Rad,
GX 29794 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 8 Dec 50.
22
Rad, C 69953, CINCFE to
JCS, 28 Nov 50; Rad, JCS 97592, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Nov 50; Rad, C 50095, CINCUNC
to DA for JCS, 30 Nov 50; Rad, C 50105, CINCFE to DA, 30 Nov 50.
23
Rad, JCS 97772, JCS to
CINCFE, I Dec 50; Rad, C 50332, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 3 Dec 50.
24
Chief of Staff, FEC, Memo
for Gen Collins, 4 Dec 50; Rad, JCS 97917, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50.
25
Schnabel, Policy
and Direction, p.
283; Ltr, Lt Gen Edward M. Almond (Ret) to Col C. H. Schilling, 21
May 1965, copy in CMH.
26
Memo, FEC G3 for FEC C/S, 6
Dec 50.
27
Field, United States
Naval Operations, Korea, p. 288; Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG Eighth
Army et al., 7 Dec 50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O No. 5), CINCUNC to CG Eighth
Army et al., 8 Dec 50. The JCS formally approved MacArthur's plan on 9 Dec 50
per Rad, JCS 98400, DEPTAR (JCS) to CINCFE, 9 Dec 50.
28
Truman, Years of Trial
and Hope, p. 383.
29
MacArthur Hearings,
p. 3536.
30
Ibid.
31 Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et al., 7 Dec
50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O no. 5), CINCUNC to CG Eighth Army et al., 8 Dec
50; Rad, GX 29794 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 8 Dec 50.
32
Rad, GX 29857 KGOP, CG
Eighth Army to CG 2d Log Comd and C/S ROKA, 9 Dec 50; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CG
2d Log Comd, 11 Dec 50, sub: Construction of the Naktong River Defense Line and
Completion of Construction of the Davidson and Raider Lines; Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Dec 50.
33
Rad, GX 35046 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 12 Dec 50.
34
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50; Rads, GX 29874 KGOO and GX 35071 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 9 Dec and 13 Dec 50, respectively.
35
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec 50.
36
Ibid.; Rad, AG IN BSF-1305,
CTF 90 to CG Eighth Army et al., 20 Dec 50.
37 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Dec 50; Rad, GX 35176 KGOO,
CG Eighth Army to CG IX Corps and CG 1st Cav Div, 15 Dec 50.
38
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Dec 50; Rad, GX 35255 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 18 Dec 50; Rad,
GX 35300 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 2d Div, 20 Dec 50; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 20
Dec 50.
39
Rad, CX 51694, CINCFE to CG
Eighth Army, 20 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35321 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 21 Dec 50.
40
Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, Dec
50; Eighth Army PIRs 149-156, 815 Dec 50; Rad, GX 35266 KGI, CG Eighth Army to
CINCFE, 18 Dec 50; Eighth Army PIRs 163, 22 Dec 50, and 164, 23 Dec
50.
41
Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec
50; Eighth Army PIRs 148-164, 823 Dec 50.
42
Bomber Command meanwhile
halted its attacks on the Yalu bridges and devoted its main effort to the
interdiction of rail lines.
43
Futrell,
The United States Air Force in Korea, pp.
243-45. The FEAF estimate of enemy troops killed in December was
39,694.
44
Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, Dec
50; Eighth Army PIRs 148-164, 823 Dec 50.
45
Ibid.
46
Rad, GX 35226 KGOP, CG
Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 17 Dec 50; Rad, CX 35321 KCG, CG Eighth Army to
CINCFE, 21 Dec 50; Eighth Army PIRs 160, 19 Dec 50, and 163, 22 Dec 50.
47
Rad, CX 50635, CINCFE to CG
Eighth Army et al., 7 Dec 50; Rad, CX 50801 (CINCUNC Opn O No. 5), CINCUNC to CG
Eighth Army et al., 8 Dec 50; Cagle and Manson, The Sea War in Korea, pp.
183-84; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 286-88.
48
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps POR 74, 9 Dec 50; X Corps G3 Jul, Entry J-31, 9 Dec 50; X Corps G3
Jul, Entry J-28, 11 Dec 50; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea,
pp. 286, 288-89.
49 X Corps POR 75, 11 Dec 50.
50
X Corps PIRs 74-76, 9-11
Dec50; X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50.
51 X Corps OI 27, 9 Dec 50.
52
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50.
53
Ibid.; X Corps Opn O 10, 11
Dec 50; X Corps POR 76, 11 Dec 50.
54
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; Field,
United States Naval Operations,
Korea, pp.
289-90.
55
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; Field,
United States Naval Operations,
Korea, p.
289; Cagle and Manson,
The Sea War in Korea, pp.
512-14; Futrell,
The United States
Air Force in Korea, pp.
241-42.
56
Cagle and Manson,
The Sea War in Korea, pp.
181-82, 186-87; Futrell,
The United
States Air Force in Korea, pp.
24819.
57
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps Opn O 10, 11 Dec 50.
58
Ibid.; X Corps Comd Rpt, 11
Dec 50; Memo, Gen Almond, 11 Dec 50, sub: Movement of X Corps to the Pusan Area;
Ltr, Gen Almond to CINCUNC, 11 Dec 50, sub: Redeployment of X Corps in
Pusan-Pohangdong Area.
59
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps 0130, 14 Dec 50; Montross and Canzona, The Chosin Reservoir
Campaign, pp. 338-41, 345; X Corps POR 83, 18 Dec 50.
60 X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50.
61
X Corps PORs 79, 14 Dec 50,
and 80, 15 Dec 50; Dolcater, 3d
Infantry Division
in Korea,
pp. 97-100.
62
X Corps PIRs 77-80,12-15
Dec 50; X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50.
63
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps PIRs 77, 12 Dec 50, and 78, 13 Dec 50.
64
X Corps PORs 79-81, 14-16
Dec 50; X Corps OI 31, 16 Dec 50.
65
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; Rad, CX 51019, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army et al., 11 Dec 50; Rad, CX 51102,
CINCFE to DEPTAR, 12 Dec 50; X Corps PORs 8083, 15-18 Dec 50; Field,
United States Naval Operations, Korea, p.
295; Rad, AG IN BSF-1305, CTF 90 to CG Eighth Army et
al., 20 Dec 50.
66
X Corps POR 79, 14 Dec 50;
X Corps Comd Rpt, 18 Dec 50; X Corps 01 36, 18 Dec 50; Futrell,
The United States Air Force in Korea, pp.
241, 248-49; X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec 50; Cagle and Manson,
The Sea War in Korea, p.
191.
67
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps PORs
83-85, 18-20 Dec 50; Dolcater,
3d Infantry Division in Korea, p.
102.
68 X Corps PIRs 81-85, 16-20 Dec 50.
69
Ibid.
70
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps PIRs 85, 20 Dec 50, and 86, 21 Dec 50; X Corps PORs 85, 20 Dec 50,
and 86, 21 Dec 50.
71
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps PORs 87, 22 Dec 50, and 88, 23 Dec 50; X Corps PIRs 87, 22 Dec 50,
and 88, 23 Dec 50; Dolcater, 3d
Infantry
Division in Korea,
p. 102.
72
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; X Corps PIR 89, 24 Dec 50; X Corps POR 89, 24 Dec 50; Dolcater,
3d Infantry Division in Korea, p.
102.
73
Col Edward H. Forney,
Special After Action Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 Aug-Dec 50, p.
14.
74
X Corps Comd Rpt, Sum, Dec
50; Field,
United States Naval Operations, Korea,
p.
304.
75
X Corps, Special Report on
Hungnam Evacuation, 9-24 Dec 50.
76
Quoted in MacArthur
Hearings, pp. 3536-539.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
