Battle Below the Soyang
Intent on confronting enemy forces with the
most formidable defenses yet, General Van Fleet on 30 April ordered the length
of No Name line fortified like its line Golden segment around Seoul.
Fortifications were to include log and sandbag bunkers, multiple bands of barbed
wire with antipersonnel mines interspersed, and 55-gallon drums of napalm mixed
with gasoline set out in front of defensive positions and rigged for detonation
from the bunkers.1 Van Fleet also wanted provision made for
counterattacking quickly once the enemy had been turned back.
Van Fleet expected the enemy's next
principal effort to come either in the west, as had the main force of the April
attacks, or on his central front. Judging the Uijongbu-Seoul, Pukhan River, and
Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on corridors to be the most likely axes of enemy advance, he
shifted forces by 4 May to place most of his strength and all U.S. divisions in
the western and central sectors and aligned the I, IX, and X Corps so that each
was responsible for one of these avenues. Deployed around Seoul, the I Corps
blocked the Uijongbu approach with the ROK 1st, 1st Cavalry, and 25th Divisions
on line and the 3d Division and British 29th Brigade in reserve. The IX Corps,
its sector narrowed by a westward shift of its right
boundary, now had the British 28th Brigade, 24th Division, ROK 2d Division, ROK
6th Division, and 7th Division west to east on No Name line and the 187th
Airborne Regimental Combat Team in reserve for defense against an enemy strike
down or out of the Pukhan River valley.2 In the left portion of the X
Corps sector, the 1st Marine Division and the 2d Division, less the bulk of the
23d Infantry in corps reserve, covered the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis. Though the
concentration of strength in the western and central areas left the remainder of
the front comparatively thin, Van Fleet believed that the six ROK divisions in
the east- the 5th and 7th in the right portion of the X Corps sector, the 9th
and 3d in the ROK III Corps sector, and the Capital
and 11th in the ROK I Corps sector- could hold the line since opposing North
Korean forces were weak and since the terrain barriers of the
higher Taebaeks favored defense.3
The Search for the Enemy
Along with his 30 April instructions for
the defense of No Name line, Van Fleet ordered intensive patrolling to locate
and identify enemy formations as they continued to move out of contact. Patrols
searching three to five miles above the front during the first two days of May,
however, encountered no major enemy force except at the I Corps left where ROK
1st Division patrols found the North Korean 8th
Division deployed astride Route 1. To deepen the search in the west and
central areas, Van Fleet ordered patrol bases set up five to six miles out along
a line reaching east as far as Route 24 in the X Corps sector. Each division
fronted by this line was to establish a regimental combat team in a base
position organized for perimeter defense. Patrols operating from the bases could
work farther north with full fire support, and the forward positions would
deepen the defense in the sectors where Van Fleet expected to be most heavily
attacked. While the fortification of No Name line continued, the front east of
Route 24 was to be advanced six to fifteen miles to line Missouri, both to
restore contact and to clear a stretch of Route 24 and a connecting secondary
road angling east to the coast for use as a supply route by the ROK divisions
defending the sector. Van Fleet also directed a foray to destroy North Korean
forces in the I Corps' west sector after the 8th Division stopped short
the 12th Regiment of the ROK 1st Division's at tempt
to establish a patrol base up Route 1 on 4 May.4
The six ROK divisions in the east opened
the advance toward line Missouri on the 7th. Along the coast, ROK I Corps forces
met almost no opposition, and on the 9th the ROK 11th Division's tank destroyer
battalion scooted some sixteen miles beyond the Missouri line to occupy the town
of Kansong, where Route 24 ended in a junction with the coastal highway. Forces
of the ROK 5th Division on the left flank of the advance in the X Corps zone
reached line Missouri the same day. The other four divisions, though still as
much as ten miles short of the line on the 9th, had made long daily gains
against scattered delaying forces. In the west, the bulk of the ROK 1st Division
advancing up Route 1 between 7 and 9 May levered North Korean forces out of
successive positions and finally forced them into a general withdrawal. Setting
the 15th Regiment in a patrol base six miles up Route 1, General Kang pulled his
remaining forces back into his No Name fortifications.5
From other bases in the I, IX, and X Corps
sectors, patrols doubled the depth of their previous reconnaissance but had no
more success in making firm contact than had patrols working from No Name line.
Available intelligence information indicated that the 64th, 12th,
60th, and 20th Armies were completely off the west and west central
fronts for refurbishing and that each of the four armies still in those sectors-
the 65th, 63d, 15th, and 27th- had only one division forward as a
screen while remaining divisions prepared to resume the offensive. Since there
were no firm indications that the resumption was an immediate prospect, however,
General Van Fleet on 9 May issued plans for returning the Eighth Army to line
Kansas. In the first phase of the return the I, IX, and X Corps were to attack,
tentatively on the 12th, toward line Topeka running from Munsan-ni east through
Ch'unch'on, then northeast toward Inje. The ROK III
Corps and ROK I Corps in
the east meanwhile were to continue their attack to line Missouri, a step which
would carry them above the Kansas line.6
The Hwach'on Dam Under Attack By AD Skyraiders using torpedoes
Van Fleet decided against the Topeka
advance on the 11th after changes in the intelligence picture indicated that
enemy forces were within a few days of reopening their offensive. Air
observation of enemy troops where none previously had been seen suggested
forward movements under cover of darkness, reports told of large enemy
reconnaissance patrols, and both agents and prisoners alleged an early resumption of the offensive. Extensive
smoke screens rose north of the 38th parallel ahead of the IX Corps and above
the Hwach'on Reservoir in the X Corps sector. Drawing Van Fleet's particular
notice were reports that five armies- the 60th, 15th, 12th, 27th, and
20th- were massing west of the Pukhan for a major attack in the west
central sector. In further instructions for defense, Van Fleet ordered the No
Name fortifications improved and directed General Hoge to give special attention
to the Pukhan corridor, where the heaviest enemy buildup was reported. Hoge was
to place the bulk of the IX Corps artillery on that flank. "I want to
stop the Chinese here and hurt him," Van Fleet told
Hoge. "I welcome his attack and want to be strong enough in position and fire
power to defeat him."
Lavish artillery fire, in particular, was
to be used. If gun positions could be kept supplied with ammunition, Van Fleet
wanted five times the normal day of fire expended against enemy attacks. As
calculated by his G-4, Colonel Stebbins, the "Van Fleet day of fire" could be
supported for at least seven days, although transportation could become a
problem since Stebbins could not haul other supplies while handling that amount of ammunition.8
Rations and petroleum products already stocked in corps sectors, however, would
last for more than seven days.9
Immediate army reserves for the advance to
line Topeka were to have been the 3d Division, to be withdrawn from the I Corps,
and the Canadian 25th Infantry Brigade, which had reached Korea on 5
May.10 Having undergone extensive training at Fort Lewis, Washington,
the brigade would be ready to join operations after brief tune-up exercises in
the Pusan area. Though the Topeka advance was off, Van Fleet ordered the
Canadians to move north, beginning on 15 May, to Kumnyangjang-ni, twenty-five
miles southeast of Seoul, and prepare to counter any enemy penetration in the
Pukhan or Seoul-Suwon corridors. The 3d Division was
still to pass to army reserve and organize forces capable of reinforcing or
counterattacking in the I, IX, or X Corps sectors in at least regimental combat
team strength on six hours' notice. Beginning on the 11th the 15th Regimental
Combat Team assembled near Ich'on, at the intersection of Routes 13 and 20
thirty-five miles southeast of Seoul, ready to move on call into the X Corps
sector; for operations in support of the IX Corps, the 65th Regimental Combat
Team assembled near Kyongan-ni, twenty miles southeast of Seoul and directly
below the Pukhan River corridor; and the 7th Regimental Combat Team assembled in
Seoul for missions in the I Corps sector.11
The six ROK divisions on the eastern front
were to stay forward of No Name line but were not to make further attempts to
occupy line Missouri. In the X Corps sector, the ROK 5th and 7th Divisions,
whose forces had all but reached the Soyang River southwest of Inje, were to
fortify their present positions. The ROK III Corps
and ROK I Corps were to set their four divisions in fortified defenses between
the lower bank of the Soyang south of Inje and the town of Kangson-ni, five
miles north of Yangyang on the coast, after conducting spoiling attacks on 12
May in the two principal communications centers ahead of them, Inje and
Yongdae-ri, the latter located on Route 24 fifteen miles northeast of Inje. The reconnaissance company of the ROK 9th
Division already had entered Inje without a fight during the afternoon of the
11th and dispersed an enemy force about a mile beyond the town before retiring
on the 12th, but other forces of the two South Korean corps were prevented by
distance and moderate resistance from reaching the objectives of their attacks
in the one day allotted for them.12
Navy AD Skyraider
Light contact along the remainder of the
front revealed little about enemy dispositions, but the composite of reports
from air observers, agents, civilians, and prisoners made clear by 13 May that
major Chinese forces had begun to shift eastward from the west and west central
sectors. Steady rain and fog all but eliminated further air observation on 14
and 15 May; poor visibility also hampered ground patrols; and a IX Corps
reconnaissance-in-force by the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team up the
valley northeast of Kap'yong toward what was believed to be a large
concentration of enemy forces had to be canceled shortly after it started on the
15th because of the rain and poor road conditions. As much as could be
determined by 16 May was that the eastward shift probably extended to the
Ch'unch'on area.13
A few reports tracing the shift indicated
that some Chinese units would move beyond Ch'unch'on. According to a Chinese medical officer captured northeast of Seoul on 10
May, the 12th Army and two other armies were
scheduled to leave the west central area late on the 10th, march east for four
days, then attack the 2d Division and the ROK divisions on the eastern front.
Another captive taken on the 13th in the same general area said that the 15th
Army was to march east for three days and attack the 2d Division in
conjunction with North Korean attacks on the ROK front.14 Large enemy groups
reported by X Corps observers to be moving east as far as Yanggu on the 11th and
12th were believed to be Chinese, and a deserter from the engineer battalion of
the 80th Division, 27th Army, picked up on the 13th in the Ch'unch'on
area stated that his battalion had been bridging the Pukhan. The X Corps G2
believed it most likely, however, that the forces moving east of the Pukhan as
far as Yanggu were from the 39th Army or 40th Army, both of which
had been in the east central sector for some time. In any event, he considered
major Chinese operations on the eastern front to be impracticable. Given the
logistical difficulties the Chinese experienced in supporting offensive
operations even in the Seoul area, where the distance to their rear supply bases
was shortest and where the roads were more numerous and in better condition than
anywhere else, he doubted that they would commit a large force in the eastern
mountains where a supply line could not be maintained and where living off the
land would be almost impossible. The Eighth Army
intelligence staff as of 16 May had no corroborating evidence of the reported
movement east of the Pukhan and even had some doubt that the Chinese shift
extended as far east as Ch'unch'on.15
According to the consensus of current
estimates of enemy dispositions as of the 16th, the North Korean I Corps
on the west had spread forces eastward toward Route 33, taking over ground
previously occupied by the XIX Army Group. The 65th Army astride Route
33 north of Uijongbu and the 63d Army in the adjacent ground to the east formed the new
front of the XIX Army Group. Reports placed the 64th Army northwest of
the 65th. West to
east, the 60th, 15th, and 12th Armies were believed to occupy the new front of the III Army
Group from a point above the Pukhan River in the vicinity of Kap'yong
eastward almost to Ch'unch'on. More tentatively located, the 20th and 27th Armies of the IX
Army Group were reported to be off the front in the area north of Ch'unch'on
and the group's 26th Army possibly in the same vicinity. The XIII Army
Group apparently was still on the east central front, its 40th Army astride Route 17 just above Ch'unch'on and the 39th Army next to the
east with its bulk between the Hwach'on Reservoir and the Soyang River and light
forces occupying a bridgehead below the Soyang between Ch'unch'on and the river
town of Naep'yong-ni some ten miles upstream to the northeast. On the basis of
these dispositions, General Van Fleet continued to believe that the main enemy
effort would come in the west central sector,
probably toward the Han River corridor, and would be made by five armies, the
60th, 15th, 12th, 27th, and 20th. He also anticipated strong attacks toward Seoul over Route I and
through the Uijongbu corridor as well as another on the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on
axis.16
The Offensive Resumed
The actual extent of the Chinese shift from
the west had been indicated by the few reports of planned and ongoing movements
beyond the Pukhan. By 16 May Peng Tehhuai had moved five armies into the area
along the Soyang River between Ch'unch'on and Inje behind screening forces of
the 39th Army
and the North Korean III Corps. The 60th Army and 15th Army of the III Army
Group were in the area between Ch'unch'on and Naep'yong-ni. At and
immediately beyond Naep'yong-ni was the 12th
Army, organic to the III Army Group
but now attached to the IX Army Group. Farthest east, the 27th Army and 20th Army of the IX Army Group
were clustered in the vicinity of Kwandae-ri just west of Inje.17
Peng planned to launch his main attack on a
southeastward course below the Naep'yongni-Kwandae-ri stretch of the Soyang. His
reason for shifting the main effort into the higher Taebaeks despite the
portended logistical problems may have surfaced when Chinese captured in March,
April, and early May were asked about the worth of
People's Liberation Army weapons, training, and tactics. Almost unanimously the captives
considered the army's armament, preparations, and precepts to be inadequate for
the conditions of battle in Korea. Depreciating the "man over weapons" doctrine,
they conceded that men in superior numbers could defeat an enemy superior in
other respects only if the enemy's superiority was not too great.18
Such a realization by the enemy high command could have influenced the
decision to move the main effort: perhaps Peng chose to attack through some of
the most difficult ground on the front because the rugged ridges and sparse road
net would reduce to some degree the U.N. Command's advantage of superior
mobility, firepower, and air power.
As revealed by the captives taken on 10 and
13 May, the objective of the main effort- to be launched during the evening of
the 16th by the 15th, 12th, and 27th Armies- was to sever the six ROK divisions on the eastern
front from the remainder of the Eighth Army, to annihilate them, and to destroy
the 2d Division.19 In support of the main effort, the North Korean
V Corps was to attack out of the Inje area in the ROK III Corps sector,
and the North Korean II Corps, which had moved down from Hoeyang where it had
been refurbishing since late March, was to attack along the east coast and atop
the Taebaeks against the ROK I Corps. On the west
flank of the main attack, the 60th
Army, less its 181st Division, which had been
attached to the 12th Army to reinforce the main effort, was to conduct a holding
attack against the 1st Marine Division. The XIX Army Group, now stretched
out from the Kap'yong area west to Route 33 above Uijongbu, and the North Korean
I Corps, astride Route 1, were to make similar attacks in the IX Corps
and I Corps sectors.20
ROK Forces Give Way Again
Crossing the Soyang northwest of Kwandae-ri
with its 81st Division in the van, the 27th
Army opened against the ROK 5th and 7th
Divisions with hard blows centered at the seam between the two divisions that
almost immediately began to dislodge the line regiments. (Map 35) General Almond
authorized the two divisions to withdraw to No Name line around midnight. A
successful withdrawal by the artillery of both divisions down Route 24 into the
sector of the 2d Division may have caused erroneous early morning reports that
the two divisions were regrouping on No Name line. Later reports revealed a
familiar story of infantry units scattered by enemy attacks while they were
attempting to disengage, broken communications, loss of control, a search for
missing troops, and the reorganization of those that could be found. Reordered
forces of the ROK 5th Division were set out in echelon to the southeast along
the 2d Division's right flank. By noon on the 17th the only infantry units of the ROK 7th
Division that had been located were two battalions of the reserve 3d Regiment
which were in position and engaged six miles behind No Name line near the
village of Sangam-ni on the primitive road whose stretch northeast to Hyon-ni
and then Northwest to Inje was the single route serving the ROK III Corps
sector. Engaging the 3d Regiment were forces of the 81st Division, whose main body
had slashed southeast through the ground abandoned by the ROK 7th Division to
block the road just above Sangam-ni.21
Map 35. Battle
Below the Soyang, 16-20 May 1951
The 30th Field Artillery Battalion of the
ROK 9th Division discovered the roadblock the hard way while displacing as a
result of orders from ROK Army forward headquarters calling the ROK III Corps
and the ROK I Corps back to No Name line. Though the two corps had held up well
under attacks by the 6th and 12th Divisions of the North Korean V Corps and the 27th and 2d Divisions of the North Korean
II Corps, General Almond's midnight action allowing the ROK 5th and 7th
Divisions to retire to No Name line had led the ROK Army headquarters to follow
suit on the morning of the 17th. As the two ROK III Corps divisions drew back to
No Name positions centered above Hyon-ni, staying scarcely a step ahead of
pursuing North Korean forces, their artillery battalions (the 30th followed in
column by the 11th of the ROK 3d Division) moved below Hyon-ni toward Sangam-ni.
The Chinese blocking force waited until the 30th, filled a narrow stretch of
road twisting through a steep-sided defile in the
heart of its position, then blanketed the artillerymen with fire. In the
scramble out of the trap, only the tailend battery saved its guns and vehicles.
By evening the 11th Battalion and the crippled 30th Battalion returned north to
firing positions in the Hyon-ni area. General Yu meanwhile sent the corps
reserve, a regiment of the ROK 9th Division, south from Hyon-ni to deal with the
block, but its efforts were futile against the stronger Chinese force. With the
west flank left open by the collapse of the ROK 7th Division, the ROK III Corps was in danger of being enveloped, or, with the
Chinese 81st Division continuing to block the road to the rear and the North Korean
6th and
12th Divisions still pushing in from the north, of being caught in a costly
squeeze.22
The 2d
Division-Again
With the right flank of the 2d Division no
more than sketchily protected by ROK 5th Division units, General Ruffner's
forces also faced the prospect of being enveloped. Indeed, if any American
division seemed destined to be repeatedly involved in hard defensive battles, it
was the 2d. And, as in its difficult engagement along the Ch'ongch'on River in
late November, the division was again to be threatened from the east after ROK
forces gave way while it contended with strong Chinese attacks from the north.
General Ruffner had manned the left and
center of the division's fifteen-mile sector south of Naep'yong-ni with the 9th and 38th Regiments and had
reconstituted Task Force Zebra, the tankinfantry group that had performed well
in late April, to occupy the line at the right. The French battalion, the only
division reserve, was at Han'gye on Route 24, about five miles behind the Zebra
line, deliberately set there by Ruffner to reinforce quickly the somewhat thin
task force position.
Under earlier orders to send daily patrols
to the Soyang in the area immediately east of Ch'unch'on, the 9th Infantry had
deployed one battalion on No Name line and two in patrol bases. On the highest
ground in the division sector, two battalions of the 38th Infantry occupied a
string of prominent heights along No Name line, the 3d at the left, the 1st at
the right. (Map 36) Two miles out on the west, the 2d Battalion manned a patrol
base that blocked ridgeline and valley approaches to the 3d Battalion's
position. Above the right flank of the 1st Battalion, a provisional company of
South Korean rangers held a blocking position on a ridge offering enemy forces a
good approach down the boundary between the 38th Infantry and Task Force Zebra.
Colonel Coughlin, commander of the 38th, had set the attached Netherlands
battalion on Hills 710 and 975 behind the 1st Battalion with instructions to be
prepared to counterattack anywhere in the 1st's sector.23
Task Force Zebra, led as before by Lt. Col.
Elbridge L. Brubaker, commander of the 72d Tank Battalion, now included all but
one company of the tank battalion; the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry; the 1st
Ranger Company; the Ivanhoe Security Force (a
provisional company of South Korean troops originally organized for division
rear area security missions); and the 3d Battalion, ROK 36th Regiment, attached
from the ROK 5th Division. The ROK battalion occupied a patrol base along the
trace of the Missouri line and the Ivanhoe Security Force a forward blocking
position adjacent to the 38th Infantry's ROK rangers on the west flank. On No
Name line, the 2d Battalion of the 23d Infantry, Company C of the tank
battalion, and the ranger company stood athwart both Route 24 angling in from
the northeast through the Hongch'on River valley and a minor road running down a
valley from the northwest and joining Route 24 just behind the task force
position. West to east on ridges commanding the two roads were Companies F, E,
and G and the rangers. The tanks stood behind barricades of wire and minefields
blocking both valleys, though not the roads, which had been left free of
obstacles to allow patrols to pass through. Company B of the tank battalion, in
reserve, and the trains and command post of the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, were
at the valley village of Chaun-ni, on Route 24 two miles behind the lines.
Colonel Brubaker's command post was farther down Route 24 at the village of
Putchaetful.24
Jarring daylight probes of the Zebra patrol
base and sharp patrol skirmishes close to the lines of the 38th Infantry were
forerunners of attacks by one division of the 15th Army and two divisions
Map 36. 38th
Infantry and Task Force Zebra Positions, 16 May 1951 of the 12th.
In the 12th Army's
attack, launched about dusk, the press of
35th Division forces along the 38th Infantry-Task Force Zebra boundary jammed
the Ivanhoe Security Force and adjacent company of ROK rangers back against
Company F, 23d Infantry, before defensive fires smothered the assault. On the
12th's east wing,
the 92d Regiment, 31st Division, attacking the Zebra patrol base expelled and disorganized the 3d
Battalion, ROK 36th Regiment. South Koreans streamed through the main Zebra line
until midnight, most of them down the northwest valley defended by the 3d
Platoon of Company C, 72d Tank Battalion. French troops at Han'gye collected the
disordered groups as they continued down Route 24 and assembled them for
reorganization and screening for enemy infiltration.25
Shortly after midnight, fifty or sixty
Chinese leading a column of the 92d Regiment
in pursuit of the South Koreans charged through
the opening in the northernmost of two wire aprons strung across the valley.
Forced off the road by fire from the tankers, the Chinese deployed to the left
and right, exploding mines and setting off trip flares. The larger body of enemy
to the rear deployed under the light of the flares, and successive lines of
skirmishers attempted to break the wire and reach the tanks. The 3d Platoon,
reinforced by the 2d Platoon, shot down waves of charging troops while artillery
fire walked up the valley above the wire. When the Chinese gave up the
effort shortly before dawn, enemy bodies hanging in
the wire, sprawled in the minefields, and lying on the road and high ground to
the north numbered about four hundred fifty.26
First to feel the sting of hard attack in
the 38th Infantry's sector was the 2d Battalion. Concentrating on Company E on
Hill 755 at the center of the patrol base, a force from the 45th Division, 15th Army, though
delayed and hurt while breaching minefields and wire entanglements, drove off
the company with the second wave of its assault. About 0230, as the attack
spread to Company F on the left flank of the split position, Colonel Coughlin
ordered the patrol base force to withdraw behind the 3d Battalion. Apparently
spent by the effort to take Hill 755 and blanketed by covering artillery f-ire,
the Chinese made no immediate attempt to follow the withdrawal.27
At the right of the 1st Battalion, platoons
of Companies A and C occupying Hills 1051 and 914 and a saddle between turned
back a series of attacks opened at dusk by small units of the 35th Division in concert with
the assaults that drove back the two provisional ROK companies along the 38th
Infantry-Task Force Zebra boundary. But following these apparent tests of the
defenses, a full attack by the division's 103d
Regiment about 0200 shoved Company A forces out
of the saddle, opening the way for a sweep behind the 1st Battalion or for a
deep penetration down a valley leading southeast to Route 24 at Putchaetful, well behind the
positions of Task Force Zebra. Colonel Coughlin kept the gap under mortar and
artillery fire for the rest of the night and ordered the Netherlands battalion
to send a company north from Hill 975 at first light to close it. General
Ruffner directed the French battalion to send a company up the valley from
Putchaetful to clean out any Chinese who sifted through the mortar and artillery
barrages.28
Moving from Hill 975 toward Hill 1051 on
the near side of the saddle, the Dutch company lacked the numbers to push
through Chinese who by daylight closed in around a platoon of Company A on the
1051 crest. The remainder of the Netherlands battalion, under Colonel Coughlin's
order, joined its forward company about 0930, but, finding that Hill 1051 had
fallen to the Chinese, the Dutch commander, Lt. Col. William D. H. Eekhout, held
up his advance while he softened the height and the saddle beyond with
artillery. French troops meanwhile advancing up the valley northwest of
Putchaetful engaged enemy forces less than two miles above Route 24. An
estimated five hundred Chinese had worked their way into the valley. That more
were on the way became clear when a Chinese-speaking radioman with the
Netherlands battalion at midmorning intercepted a Chinese order to "send all
troops east of Hill 1051." That neither sender nor recipient of the order was
identifiable made estimating the strength of the forces involved impossible, but
the Chinese obviously planned to exploit the
breakthrough. Expecting that the Dutch attack to close the gap would start
shortly, General Ruffner ordered the French to assist by reinforcing the drive
up the valley; he urged speed so that the gap would be eliminated before the
Chinese could pour troops through.29
Before the Dutch and French were able to
move, "literally thousands" of Chinese, according to 38th Infantry estimates,
were passing through the gap by 1100. Groups moving along the far edge of the
saddle widened the opening by forcing a platoon of Company C off Hill 914.
Chinese killed or wounded by artillery pounding the saddle and the area below it
marked the paths of the larger number veering east toward the front of Task
Force Zebra and of the remainder heading down the valley toward the French.
Viewing this scene from the vicinity of Hill 1051, Colonel Eekhout continued to
hold up the Dutch attack.30
After the opening Chinese attacks and South
Korean withdrawals had exposed the division's east flank and bared the Task
Force Zebra front, General Ruffner had asked General Almond to return the
remainder of the 23d Infantry from corps reserve for use in thickening the Zebra
position. Almond released the regiment about 1130 after the Chinese strength on
the Zebra front began to build. Taking command of the front, including all Zebra
forces and the French battalion, at 1430, Colonel Chiles concentrated the 2d
Battalion in the left half of the sector, put in the 3d Battalion on the right,
and placed the 1st Battalion in reserve just above Han'gye. Except for
exchanging fire with Company F on the left flank, the Chinese moving onto the
front were inactive throughout the afternoon, but their number continued to grow
as the Netherlands battalion, though Colonel Coughlin on orders from General
Ruffner instructed it to attack at 1300, failed to advance.31
General Ruffner sensed from the Dutch
failure to move that Colonel Coughlin "was looking half way over the shoulder"
instead of concentrating on the essential task of closing the gap.32
Ruffner again ordered the Dutch to attack, this
time at 1500, and started forward by helicopter to direct the attempt himself,
but his craft crashed on a hilltop near the 1st Battalion command post. Neither
Ruffner nor his pilot was seriously injured, but Ruffner was stranded well
beyond the time set for opening the attack. Hiking to the battalion command post
to meet a rescue helicopter sent out by the division surgeon, he returned to his
headquarters after receiving assurances that the Dutch had jumped off on time.
There he learned that Chinese on and around Hill 1051 had stymied the Dutch and
that Chinese on the far side of the gap had shoved Company C completely out of
position and forced its remnants back to the position of Company F, 23d
Infantry. Ruffner now considered two courses open to him- to commit greater strength against the enemy
penetration or to set troops along its southwest shoulder, a move which, with
the French battalion blocking the valley in the 23d Infantry sector, would, if
somewhat thinly, seal off the penetration. He opted for the second course. By
evening he had the Netherlands battalion on the way to occupy Hill 975 and thus
extend the right flank of Company A, 38th Infantry, now on Hill 790 about a mile
below Hill 1051, and had the 2d Battalion of the 38th moving up to defend a
ridge curving southeast of Hill 975 to Hill 691.33
In search of reserves to back up his
hardpressed central forces, Ruffner at midmorning had asked General Almond's
permission to pull the two patrol base battalions of the 9th Infantry out of the
left sector, which was obviously outside the zone of the enemy's main attack.
Almond instructed him to plan the move but deferred a final decision until he
(Almond) could determine how the removal of the two battalions would affect the
dispositions of the 1st Marine Division. Almond raised the matter with General
Van Fleet during the afternoon while apprising the army commander of the corps
situation and bidding for reinforcement. Given the course of enemy attacks and
the enemy units so far identified, Almond believed that Peng Tehhuai was
attempting to turn the right flank of the X Corps with the 27th Army, would wait
until the 27th seriously threatened the flank, then would make his main effort
down the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis with the III Army Group. Captives taken during a local but stiff
four-hour nighttime attack on a battalion of the 7th Marines occupying a forward
blocking position on Route 29 had identified the 180th Division of the
60th Army, indicating that the full III Army
Group was in position for an attack such
as Almond anticipated. Almond doubted that the X Corps could hold against an
enemy move of this design unless the corps' hard-hit center and tattered right
were strengthened. In immediate reinforcement he asked for a regimental combat
team to help stabilize his right flank and for one heavy and two medium
artillery battalions to increase long range fire on enemy concentration
areas.34
To enable the 2d Division to place more of
its strength in the threatened areas, General Van Fleet moved the IX Corps-X
Corps boundary four miles east. In the resulting shift of units, the 7th
Division on the IX Corps right was to take over part of the 1st Marine
Division's sector, and marines were to relieve the 9th and 38th Regiments,
freeing them for employment farther east. Van Fleet also ordered the ROK III
Corps and ROK I Corps back to line Waco, which he had delineated in his
withdrawal plan of 28 April, some twelve to eighteen miles south of No Name
line. Allowing the ROK III Corps no option, he
ordered General Yu to eliminate the enemy roadblock at Sangam-ni so that all
vehicles and weapons could be evacuated. On the X Corps right, General Almond
was to organize positions angling southeast to a
juncture with the ROK III Corps on the Waco line
above the village of Habae-jae.35
Reinforcements ordered to the X Corps
sector by Van Fleet included the ROK 8th Division, which was to move north,
initially to Chech'on, as soon as security battalions and national police could
take over its antiguerrilla mission in southern Korea. An earlier arrival would
be the 3d Division less its 7th and 65th Regimental Combat Teams. Geared for a
move to the X Corps sector since I I May, the leading battalion of the 15th
Regimental Combat Team made the seventy-mile trip from its assembly area
southeast of Seoul to Hoengsong by midmorning of the 17th. The remainder of the
force, which included the division's medium artillery battalion, completed the
move early on the 18th. Also sent east by Van Fleet were a battery of 155-mm.
guns and a battery of 8-inch howitzers, both taken from the IX Corps. These
additions gave Almond a total of five battalions and four batteries of medium
and heavy artillery.36
In shifting marines east into the 2d
Division's sector, Almond initially ordered the relief of the 9th Infantry by
noon on the 18th. Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, the new commander of the 1st
Marine Division, made the move by pulling the 7th Marines back from their
forward patrol base and blocking positions to relieve the 1st Marines on No Name
line at the division's right, then by sidestepping the 1st Marines onto the 9th
Infantry's front. The 5th Marines, on the division's left flank, later were to
swing roundabout into the 38th Infantry's sector after being replaced by forces
of the 7th Division.37
Meanwhile, late on the 17th Almond
authorized both divisional and corps artillery units to quintuple their
ammunition expenditure (the Van Fleet day of fire) and directed them to
concentrate fire on likely avenues of enemy approach within three thousand yards
of defensive positions. Ammunition expenditure would increase dramatically,
reaching 41,350 rounds and 1,187 tons on 18 May and even higher amounts
afterward. As had been predicted by the Eighth Army G-4, sufficient ammunition
to support the heavy expenditure was maintained at the army supply point serving
the X Corps, but not without difficulty. The supply point stocks of two days of
fire at the Van Fleet rate dwindled to one and could not be raised above that
amount. The high consumption also strained corps and unit transportation in
hauling ammunition from the army supply point at Wonju to the base corps dump at
Hongch'on, a round trip of over sixty miles, and from Hongch'on to artillery
units. But resupply at the guns did remain adequate.38
The use of MPQ radars to direct bombers in
close support missions at night, a technique employed
only sparingly until April, also reached a peak, particularly in guiding B-29
sorties.39 On 17 May General Stratemeyer directed that no fewer than
twelve of the medium bombers be committed to the nightly support. Typical of one
night's effort was a drop of three hundred fifty 500-pound proximity-fuzed
general purpose bombs on twenty targets selected by X Corps headquarters, all of
them enemy troop concentrations, some within four hundred yards of the front.
Casualty estimates by follow-up patrols and the statements of captives attested
to the precision of the radar guided attacks.40
In the 2d Division sector, the main
nighttime targets of air and artillery attack-most observed in their approach
well before dark on the 17thwere fresh enemy columns coming in on the positions
of the 38th Infantry, passing through the gap, and moving east across the front
of the 23d Infantry. Crowding the front of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry,
forces of the 135th Regiment, 45th Division,
broke the wire and penetrated the line, but with
losses too high to be able to withstand counterattacks. Sweeps to clear rear
areas and a final counterattack to drive out Chinese who had occupied some of
the bunkers restored the battalion's position early on the 18th.41
To the east, the
course of battle meanwhile verged on the calamitous and chaotic for Chinese and
2d Division forces alike. From late afternoon traffic on the artillery net
Colonel Coughlin estimated the strength of the new influx of enemy forces in the
gap area to be three thousand. Early evening reports from the Netherlands
battalion on Hill 975 tended higher. The Dutch reported Chinese in waves of a
thousand each crossing the saddle between Hills 1051 and 914 and walking upright
through the artillery bombardment rather than in the crouch that soldiers tend
to assume when moving under heavy fire. Those not hit were simply stepping over
the fallen to continue moving down the valley. On the receiving end of the
Chinese stream, the 23d Infantry commander, Colonel Chiles, reported to General
Ruffner that bombing attacks and artillery barrages rolling up the valley were
carpeting the defile with enemy casualties.42
The estimates of enemy strength and losses
were not far off the mark. Coming through the fire-beaten gap and valley was the
181st Division, the
60th Army unit now
attached to the 12th Army. Its leading units had the French battalion under attack by dark.
Sharply hit from the front and flanked on the left after two hours under
assault, the French withdrew a mile south to hills edging Route 24 just above
Putchaetful. The battalion gained respite from attack for the remainder of the
night, but its withdrawal opened the left flank of the 23d Infantry and gave the
Chinese free access to Route 24 between Putchaetful and Chaun-ni. Small enemy
groups infiltrating Chaun-ni about 0330 harassed the
command posts of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 23d Infantry, and Company C, 72d Tank
Battalion, and blew up a loaded ammunition truck before pulling back into the
high ground west of the village. Of larger moment, the bulk of the enemy
division filled the hills bordering Route 24 on the west between Chaun-ni and
the French battalion. Forces on the south reengaged the French while detachments
slipping out of the hills about daylight mined the road a half mile below
Chaun-ni and at a second point farther south within view of the
French.43
Along the front of the 23d Infantry,
Chinese abused Company F on the left flank with fire and assault until about
midnight, then broke contact and moved east. The reach of an apparent general
enemy movement east and then south had been indicated earlier when the ROK 5th
Division units echeloned along the right flank of the 23d reported heavy
pressure and, with General Almond's approval, withdrew behind a lateral stretch
of the Hongch'on River almost due east of Chaun-ni. Leading the southeastward
swing was the 31st Division, sliding east onto the front of the 23d Infantry was the
35th Division, and
approaching from the northwest to join the move was the 34th Division, which, when
inserted between the 31st and 35th Divisions on the 18th, would fully commit the 12th Army. The 4th Platoon of
Company C, 72d Tank Battalion, moved out to the immediate right rear of the 3d Battalion following
the South Korean withdrawal, but a wide expanse of ground along the right of the
regiment remained open. With an uncovered flank inviting envelopment by the
enemy forces sweeping it on the east and its withdrawal route blocked by the
181st Division, the
23d Infantry by daylight on the 18th was in a situation similar to that of the
ROK III Corps.44
The situation in the sectors of the 1st and
2d Battalions, 38th Infantry, by morning of the 18th was equally critical.
Between these two battalions, the position of the Netherlands battalion on Hill
975 had crumbled of its own accord early the previous evening when most of the
Dutch troops, after witnessing the flow of Chinese through the gap, streamed off
the height. "They have seen so many Chinamen and [so much] firing today,"
Colonel Coughlin explained to General Ruffner, and they "think that if our air
and artillery can't stop them then there's not much they can do."45
Though their commander, Colonel Eekhout, regained control quickly, Colonel
Coughlin, at General Ruffner's instruction, sent the battalion into an assembly
near Hang'ye for rest and reorganization and stretched out the forces of Company
A and F to man the vacated position.46
Repair of the line at Hill 975 was still
under way when 44th Division forces broke it farther west with a hard punch at the juncture of Company B and Company A. Chinese coming through
lapped around Company B on Hill 724 and piled up on Hill 710 behind Companies A
and F. Company E, sent west from the Hill 975-Hill 691 ridge by Coughlin to plug
the new gap, bogged down in encounters at Hill 710, while Chinese moving south
off 710 surrounded and attacked the command posts of the 1st and 2d Battalions
collocated at the foot of the height and blocked the regimental supply road a
mile farther south. In what turned out to be an overreaction to the deeper enemy
incursion, Coughlin ordered back both Company E from Hill 710 and Company G from
the 975-691 ridge and sent a platoon of his tank company and a detachment of
Dutch troops up the supply road to clear the command post area. With little help
needed from the rifle companies, the tank-infantry team eliminated the enemy
roadblock and opened a way out for the beleaguered command post group by morning
of the 18th.47
None of the three forward companies was
under heavy pressure at daylight, but Company B remained surrounded, and
Companies A and F were isolated by the Chinese behind them. To the east, the 23d
Infantry was strained by heavy morning attacks, especially Company F on the left
flank and Company I on the right. As the attacks began to lash the 23d, General
Ruffner convinced General Almond that the 23d and the adjoining three companies
of the 38th had to withdraw immediately if they were to withdraw in good order. Almond instructed Ruffner to
establish a line running from the still solid position of Coughlin's 3d
Battalion in the Hill 800 complex southeast through Han'gye to Hill 693 six
miles beyond Route 24. To meet General Van Fleet's earlier order that the X
Corps tie in with the ROK III Corps on line Waco,
Almond extended the line another thirteen miles to the vicinity of Habae-jae;
along the extension he planned initially to set up blocking positions using
available units of the ROK 5th, 3d, and ROK 7th Divisions.48
In earlier moves to deepen the defense in
the 38th Infantry sector, General Ruffner during the night had shifted the 3d
Battalion, 9th Infantry, east to positions behind Colonel Coughlin's 3d
Battalion and shortly before daylight had ordered the 2d Battalion of the 9th to
move roundabout and come up on the right in the ground just west of Han'gye.
Upon relief by the 1st Marines around noon the 9th's remaining battalion was now
to insert itself between the 3d and 2d as the regiment developed defenses along
the divisions modified line between Hill 800 and Route 24. During the shift of
battalions, which would continue well into the afternoon, the 3d Battalion and
later the 2d were to send forces forward to break the ring of Chinese around
Company B of the 38th and clear Hill 710 behind Companies A and F to assist
their withdrawal. Once the three companies were back, the 38th Infantry, less
its 3d Battalion, was to become division reserve.49
For the 23d Infantry, assigned to occupy
the new line east of Route 24, the chief problem in getting back to the line was
the road block below Chaun-ni. Threatened in particular by the block were the
trains of the 2d and 3d Battalions, Company C of the 72d Tank Battalion, and two
platoons of the heavy mortar company, all located in and around Chaun-ni with no
alternate withdrawal route for wheeled vehicles. To the clear the road for the
trains, Colonel Chiles organized a twopronged attack, the 3d Battalion to make
sure that the east side of the road was clear, the 2d Battalion to take on the
task of forcing back the Chinese occupying the heights bordering the road on the
west. Company C of the 72d Tank Battalion was to bring up the rear, fending off
the Chinese still pressing the line if they attempted to follow the
disengagement. Two platoons of tanks from Company B of the 72d were to assist
the attack of the 2d Battalion from firing positions in the river bottom east of
the road opposite the Chinese blocking position.50
The Chinese let the 3d Battalion go when it
disengaged, but heavy tank fire, time on target artillery fire, and air strikes
were needed to keep enemy forces off the tail of the 2d Battalion as it peeled
off the line in a column of companies. Reaching the Chaun-ni area by early
afternoon, the 3d Battalion occupied hills opposite the roadblock while the 2d
Battalion attempted to
458
shove the Chinese away from the road.
Holding the advantage of superior numbers on commanding ground, the Chinese
within an hour convinced Colonel Chiles that his forces could not clear the
enemy position, at least not with any dispatch. The danger of being rolled up
from the north meanwhile was growing as Chinese coming into the area vacated by
the 3d Battalion joined the attempt to follow the rearward move. Electing a
faster, if riskier, course, Chiles ordered the trains to run by the roadblock
with two platoons of tanks from Company C as escort. The 2d Battalion in the
meantime was to cross the road at Chaun-ni and withdraw with the
3d.51
During the morning the intelligence officer
of the 72d Tank Battalion at Putchaetful had received a French report that
Chinese had mined the road, and he had relayed the report to an enlisted man at
the command post of the 2d Battalion of the 23d at Chaunni. At that point the
information had somehow gone astray. A costly consequence of the communications
lapse came when the convoy of wheeled vehicles interspersed among tanks
traveling in fourth gear attempted its run. A mine in a field planted a half
mile below Chaun-ni disabled the lead tank, trucks piled up behind, and enemy
fire from the hills and draws to the west chased drivers and tank crews as they
dropped down a twenty-foot embankment off the east shoulder of the road and
splashed across the Hongch'on River to reach cover behind the tanks of Company B
in the stream bed. The second tank in column shoved the abandoned trucks off the road and safely bypassed the knocked-out tank
but lost a track in the minefield near the French position. Observing both
explosions from Chaun-ni, a staff officer of the 2d Battalion ordered the
remainder of the convoy to move east off the road just below the village and
follow the stream bed south. The tanks churned in behind those of Company B, but
under small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire ranging in from the west, panicky
truck drivers drove helter-skelter into the hills beyond the stream bed. Some
vehicles caught fire; ammunition trucks exploded; others eventually were halted
by one or another accident of terrain. Leaving the hillside and draws looking
like a disorganized salvage yard, drivers and riders joined the withdrawal of
the 2d and 3d Battalions.52
Stragglers and abandoned communications
equipment, weapons, and personal gear dotted the track of the two battalions as
they made a tiring march under flanking fire from the west for part of the way
and under drenching rainstorms that broke about 1830. By midnight both units
were behind the 1st Battalion, which during the afternoon had occupied the first
ridge east of Route 24 on the new defense line. The 3d Battalion filled lower
ground between the ridge and the road while the 2d Battalion and the French
battalion, which had disengaged from the Chinese roadblock force as the two
battalions east of the road had come abreast, assembled to the rear for the
remainder of the night.53
To the north, a final mishap occurred along
Route 24 as the two remaining tank platoons of Company C brought up the rear of
the withdrawal. Ordered by the company commander to leave the road at Chaun-ni
and follow the stream bed south, as Company B already had done, one platoon
missed the turnoff point and came upon the disabled tank a half mile below town.
Unable to turn around in the narrow road space between the embankment on the
east and steep slopes on the west and faced with the danger of mines to the
south, the tankers chose the nearly vertical twenty-foot drop on their left. Two
tanks snapped drive shafts in the plunge.54
The two immobilized tanks raised Company
C's tank losses since 16 May to five. The trains of Company C, the 2d and 3d
Battalions, and half the heavy mortar company-more than a hundred fifty
vehicles, many with heavy weapons, ammunition, or other gear aboard-had been
left behind and by dark were being picked over by Chinese. Casualties suffered
by the 23d Infantry and its attachments totaled 72 killed, 158 wounded, and 190
missing. In return for these losses in men and equipment, the regiment exacted
an estimated 2,228 killed and 1,400 wounded and took 22 prisoners from the
Chinese 31st, 35th, and 181st Divisions.55
West of Route 24, the withdrawal of the
three companies of the 38th Infantry also took unexpected turns. By late
afternoon the 9th Infantry reinforced by the Dutch battalion and Company G
of the 38th had occupied positions between Hill 800
and Route 24 but had not cleared a way through the Chinese around Company B and
behind Companies A and F. In a new plan for getting the three units out, Colonel
Coughlin turned to the old technique of the rolling artillery barrage, coupling
it to an umbrella of circling aircraft. For ten minutes ahead of the withdrawal,
set for 1800, seven battalions of artillery-a mix of light, medium, and heavy
guns-were to fire across the front of the companies, then at 1800 were to place
concentrations on Hill 710 and to box in the three companies as they shifted
east and withdrew down the 975-691 ridge. A liaison plane overhead was to
control the delivery of air strikes and adjustment of the box as the companies
moved and also was to relay all other communications.56
A sudden, severe thunderstorm breaking
twenty minutes after the start of the withdrawal drove all planes back to their
bases and thus not only eliminated air support but also forced the artillery to
stop firing the protective barrage and interrupted radio contact between
Coughlin's headquarters and the withdrawing units. Small groups filtering
through the lines of the 9th Infantry during the remainder of the night were an
indication of the final disruption caused by the storm. Head counts on the
morning of the 19th were two officers and eighty-one men for Company A, no
officers and seventyfour men for Company B, and no officers and eighty-one men
for Company F. Casualties had reduced the other companies of both the 1st and 2d
Battalions to similar figures. Officer losses
in the 2d Battalion were especially high, among them the battalion commander,
battalion executive officer, battalion operations officer, and two company
commanders.57
The Battle Shifts East
The X Corps line shaped by the withdrawals
and shifts on the 18th amounted to a deep salient with the 3d Battalion, 38th
Infantry, at its apex in the Hill 800 complex and the 1st Marine Division
presenting a solid face toward Ch'unch'on on its northwest shoulder. Along its
upper northeast shoulder, the 9th Infantry and 23d Infantry carried the line
from the Hill 800 mass beyond Han'gye to a point about three miles short of Hill
683, which General Almond had set as the eastern limit of the 2d Division's new
sector. The 683 height had fallen to the Chinese, however, when the ROK 5th
Division forces that had taken position along the Hongch'on River east of
Chaun-ni were driven back and disorganized during the day by the 34th Division. Units regrouped
by nightfall- a mix of three battalions of infantry from the 35th and 36th
Regiments and a company of engineers- were clustered around the village of
Hasolch'i located on a lateral mountain track two miles south of Hill 683.
Pulling out of contact at the southern end of the 81st Division's roadblock at
Sangam-ni early in the day, the bulk of the 3d Regiment engineer battalion and
the tank destroyer company of the ROK 7th Division
now defended the X Corps' east flank from positions just below the village of
P'ungam-ni, six miles southeast of Hasolch'i. Of the 7th's other forces, about
seven hundred had been corralled far to the south in Chech'on; another group had
been found at the village of Soksa-ri, located on Route 20 over fifteen miles
southeast of P'ungam-ni in the ROK III Corps sector.58
South Korean troops straggling into the
area just north and east of Soksa-ri by nightfall attested to the misfortunes of
the ROK 3d and 9th Divisions when they had attempted to withdraw to line Waco.
In starting the move down the road from Hyon-ni, the ROK III Corps commander, General Yu, had ordered the 9th Division
to take the lead and deal with the Chinese roadblock at Sangam-ni while the 3d
Division, bringing up the rear, handled any North Korean attempts to roll up the
column from the north. By midmorning Yu's forces were caught in the predictable
squeeze, the 81st Division holding its Sangam-ni position against the 9th Division's efforts
to reduce it while forces of the North Korean 6th
Division and 12th
Division closed in on the 3d Division in the
Hyon-ni area. Both ROK divisions broke away in disorder into the heights east of
the road, leaving behind all remaining artillery pieces and more than three
hundred vehicles.59 Natural lines of drift through the mountains channeled the
disorganized troops southeast toward Soksa-ri.
Out of radio contact with his forces since
early morning but informed of their southeasterly movement by air observers,
General Yu air-dropped to some groups orders assigning them to line Waco
positions. He also set up straggler lines in the Soksa-ri area but by nightfall
had regained control of forces in little more than battalion
strength.60
While Yu struggled to reorder his two
divisions and deploy them on the Waco line, General Almond ordered additional
modifications of the X Corps front to straighten and shorten the line and to
shift 2d Division forces farther east into the weakly defended sectors of the
ROK 5th and 7th Divisions. The 5th Marines, now scheduled to take over the
western portion of the 2d Division's sector during the afternoon of the 19th,
were to occupy positions centered some three miles south of Hill 800 which would
eliminate the bulge manned by the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, in the Hill 800
mass and the two adjoining battalions of the 9th Infantry. Unaware that the 800
complex would be handed over, the 45th Division
meanwhile suffered unnecessarily in nightlong
attempts to take it. Successive assault waves of the fresh 133d
Regiment were
shattered, mainly by heavy concentrations of artillery fire. On the crest of
Hill 800, where the Chinese centered most of their charges, the men of Company
K, 38th Infantry, in fact did little fighting themselves but simply sat inside
their bunkers and allowed the Chinese to enter their lines, then called down a
blanket of artillery fire. The Chinese pulled back
about daylight on the 19th, leaving behind some eight hundred dead.61
The new line of the 2d Division, to be
occupied on the 19th, cut Route 24 just below Han'gye on the west and reached
across lateral ridges eastward, into what had become enemy territory, through
Hill 683 to the village of Nuron-ni, three miles above P'ungam-ni. General
Ruffner assigned the 23d Infantry to the central sector centered on Hill 683.
Given the 15th Regimental Combat Team of the 3d Division by Almond as a
replacement for the 38th Infantry's going into corps reserve, Ruffner ordered
the 15th initially to occupy the P'ungam-ni area as a preliminary to moving
forward to the Nuronni sector of the line. Both the 9th Infantry and the 15th
Regimental Combat Team thus faced the prospect of having to fight to gain the
line they were to defend, but, once the two regiments were on the line, the 2d
Division would hold good positions looking down into the valley of the Naech'on
River, a westward flowing tributary of the Hongch'on.62
To help strengthen the X Corps' eastern
sector, Van Fleet at midnight on the 18th ordered the remainder of the 3d
Division eastward from the Seoul area, the 7th Regimental Combat Team to move on
the 19th, the 65th Regimental Combat Team on the 20th. General Almond directed
the division, less its 15th Regimental Combat Team, which was to remain attached
to the 2d Division, to protect the X Corps' east flank from enemy attacks out of the sector of the
muddled ROK III Corps. General Soule was initially to
concentrate forces at Pangnimni, located on Route 20 fifteen miles south of
Soksa-ri, then reconnoiter and set up blocking positions in the Soksa-ri
area.63
From Hoengsong, where 3d Division
headquarters had set up on moving east with the 15th Regimental Combat Team,
Soule moved a tactical command post group to the Pangnim-ni area early on the
19th and sent his reconnaissance company up Route 20 to patrol as far as
Hajinbu-ri, five miles east of Soksa-ri. The company found the road clear and
made contact with ROK III Corps troops in the
Hajinbu-ri area. On its return run during the afternoon, the company left a
platoon in Soksa-ri to watch a mountain road reaching the village from Sangam-ni
and Habae-jae to the northwest, then moved on to Changp'yong-ni, six miles
southwest of Soksa-ri. There the 3d Battalion of the 7th Infantry, first to
arrive from the west, blocked Route 20 and mountain trails coming in from the
northwest. Reaching the area after dark, the remainder of the 7th Infantry
assembled at Ami-don, five miles south of Changp'yong-ni.64
At the right of the 2d Division fifteen
miles to the northwest, the 15th Regimental Combat Team attacked through the ROK
3d Regiment at 1100 to seize P'ungam-ni and high ground a mile and half to the
northwest along the trail leading to Nuron-ni on the modified No Name line
another two miles to the north. Moving against light
resistance, the combat team consolidated positions on its objective after dark.
As the 15th moved beyond the village, the ROK 3d Regiment and smaller units of
the ROK 7th Division in the area advanced through light to moderate opposition
to positions north and northeast of P'ungam-ni, the latter along a trail leading
to Habae-jae.65
At the new left of the 2d Division along
Route 24, the 181st Division wheeling out of its roadblock near Chaun-ni reengaged the 23d
Infantry just above Han'gye shortly before dawn and kept the 1st and 3d
Battalions pinned in position until counterattacks, artillery fire, and air
strikes called in under gradually clearing skies finally forced a release about
noon. The two battalions occupied positions straddling Route 24 on the new line
below Han'gye by early evening. While the 2d Battalion moved east to a centrally
located reserve position along the lateral track leading to Hasolch'i, the
attached French battalion attempted to take position on the regimental right and
make contact with a unit of the ROK 36th Regiment located northwest of Hasolch'i
in the sector to be occupied by the 9th Infantry. But Chinese stoutly defending
an intervening height prevented the French from closing ranks with the South
Koreans.66
It was well after dark before the 9th
Infantry completed its eastward shift into its new sector above Hasolch'i. First
to arrive, the 1st Battalion moved up on the right of the ROK 35th Regiment
into positions northeast of Hasolch'i looking down into the valley of a small
stream that fed the Naech'on River. The 2d Battalion took position behind the
forces of the ROK 36th Regiment to await daylight before relieving the South
Koreans and extending westward toward the French battalion. With a similar
objective the 3d Battalion assembled near Hasolch'i to await morning before
moving up on the right of the 1st Battalion to close the gap between the 9th
Infantry and the 15th Regimental Combat Team in the P'ungam-ni area.67
The ROK III Corps sector remained a scene
of tangled and scattered forces throughout the 19th, troops trickling into
collecting points along Route 20, some of both the 3d and 9th Divisions taking
up random positions about five miles above the road. None, despite General Yu's
air-dropped orders the day before, stopped on line Waco some seven miles farther
north. The one fortunate circumstance was an absence of enemy contact. In marked
contrast, the ROK I Corps all but completed an orderly withdrawal to the Waco
line, both its divisions moving along the coast, the Capital in the lead and the
11th, though not in contact, prudently bounding south by regiment in bringing up
the rear. Leading the way west along line Waco, the 26th Regiment of the Capital
Division refused the corps' inland flank left open by the ROK III Corps.68
In the array of enemy forces east of Route
24 by nightfall on the 19th, the full IX
Army Group stood opposite the X Corps' new eastern front
between Han'gye and Soksa-ri. Though the group remained generally on a
southeastward course, its attached 12th Army
was turning more to the south on the front of the
2d Division with four divisions abreast: the 181st
already was in the Han'gye area; the 35th was approaching next to the
east; the 34th was
entering the area above Hasolch'i, where its leading forces had stopped the
French battalion at the right of the 23d Infantry; and the bulk of the
31st now was
located above P'ungam-ni after being forced out of the village by the 15th
Regimental Combat Team. Making a fast march to the southeast of P'ungam-ni, the
93d Regiment of the
31st Division was
nearing Soksa-ri on Route 20. Using the mountain road running southeast from
Sangam-ni through Habae-jae to Soksari as its axis, the 27th Army also was headed for
the Soksa-ri area, advancing with its three divisions in column, the
81st still in the
van after helping to rout the ROK III Corps, the 79th and 80th trailing in the vicinity of
Habaejae. Behind the 27th Army, the 20th Army, in group reserve, was beginning to move southeast from the
Kwandae-ri area along the Soyang River. Coming from the Hyon-ni area on a line
of march projecting to Hajinbu-ri were the 6th
and 12th Divisions
of the North Korean V Corps, and moving toward
Hajinburi on a parallel course just to the east were the 2d and 27th Divisions of the North
Korean II Corps, which, after failing in frontal attacks against the ROK I Corps,
had shifted west in an apparent attempt to envelop the South
Koreans.69
464
Enemy action decidedly had slackened on the
X Corps front during the afternoon of the 19th after the 181st Division
gave up its attack on the 23d Infantry in the Han'gye area. But, with Chinese
continuing to mass ahead of the 2d Division, the slack appeared to be mostly a
result of attempts to move fresh units forward to
take over the assault. And though the pell-mell withdrawal of the ROK III Corps had taken its scrambled forces out of contact, the
passage of Chinese in strength southeastward through Habae-jae and beyond
presaged heavy action along Route 20. It seemed that enemy forces would not only
quickly revive their drive against the X an ROK III Corps but, with strong
Chinese reserves and North Korean divisions on the move, that they would
increase it.
Notes
1 These improvised
flamethrowers, called fougasses, threw out a mass of flame some ten yards wide
and up to forty yards long.
2 Since no attempt had been made to put the Hwach'on Dam
out of commission during the few days that the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment
occupied that area, Van Fleet meanwhile had asked Task Force 77 to destroy at
least two sluice gates to bring the water level so low that its release would
cause no serious flooding of the Pukhan. A dive-bombing attack launched from the
Princeton on 30 April by AD Skyraiders carrying one-ton general purpose
bombs produced a six-foot hole in one gate. Returning the following day with
torpedoes set for surface run- the only time this ordnance would be used in the
war- six of eight Skyraiders scored hits that removed one gate and destroyed the
lower half of another.
3 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May
51.
4 Rad, GX-5-114 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., I May 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 51; Rads,
CICCG 4-26 and CICCG 5-3, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 2 and 3 May 51,
respectively; Rad, GX-5-340 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps and
C/S ROKA, 4 May 51; Rad, GX-5-591 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps, 4 May
51.
5 Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army POR, 7 May 51; Rad, X 19577, CG
X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 7 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 8 May 51; Rad, X 1608, CG
X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 9 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 9 May 51; I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, May 51.
6 Eighth Army G3 and G2 SS Rpts, May 51; Rad, GX-5-1483
KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 9 May 51.
7 Eighth Army CG and C/S Jnl, May 51.
8 Van Fleet Day of Fire per Tube
| 105-mm. howitzer |
300 rounds |
| 155-mm. howitzer |
250 rounds |
| 155-mm. gun |
200 rounds |
| 8-inch howitzer |
200 rounds |
| 75-mm. howitzer |
250 rounds |
9 Rad, GX-5-1776 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X
Corps, 11 May 51; Eighth Army PIR 302, 10 May 51; Eighth Army G2 and G3 SS Rpts,
May 51; X Corps PIRs 226, 10 May 51, and 227, 11 May 51; IX Corps G2 Jnl, Sum,
11 May 51; Eighth Army CG and C/S Jnl, May 51; Eighth Army Arty SS Rpt, Jun 51.
10 Arriving on 6 May was the Imperial Ethiopian
Expeditionary Force to Korea, composed of volunteers from the Ethiopian imperial
bodyguard and consisting of an infantry battalion and a superfluous force
headquarters. Also known as the Kagnew battalion, the force had had only
rudimentary combat training and arrived without weapons and equipment. The
Ethiopians were scheduled to spend eight weeks at the U.N. center. Another May
arrival would be the 1st Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry, which
under the British rotation system would replace the 1st Battalion, Argyll and
Sutherland Highlanders, in the British 28th Brigade. Due to reach Japan in late
May for a month of training with equipment bought from the United States before
moving to Korea was the staff of a sixty-bed mobile surgical hospital from
Norway.
11 Rad, GX-5-1483 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
al., 9 May 51; Fox, "Inter-Allied Co-operation During Combat Operations," pp.
26, 29-30, 47; Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 94-95; Rad, GX-5-1450
KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CGs I, IX, and X Corps and CG 3d Div, 9 May 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 9 and 12 May 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea,
p. 207.
12 Rad, GX-5-1863 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to C/S ROKA, 11 May 51; Rad, GX-5-2149 KGOO , CG Eighth Army to CG X
Corps, 13 May 51; Rad, X 19645, CG X Corps to CGs 5th ROK Div and 7th ROK Div,
12 May 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 and 12 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 12 May
51.
13 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May
51; "Weather in the Korean Conflict," vol. II, pp. XIII-7-XIII-9; IX Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, May 51; Eighth Army PIR 307, 15 May 51.
14 The completeness and high
degree of accuracy of two Chinese documents captured on 19 May, one an order of
battle of UNC ground forces dated 29 April 1951, the other a map of their
dispositions dated 6 May 1951, revealed the success of enemy
intelligence.
15 X Corps G2 Section Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang River,"
30 Jun 51; X Corps PIRs 225, 9 May 51, 228, 12 May 51, and 229, 13 May 51;
Eighth Army PIR 307, 15 May 51.
16 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May 51; Eighth Army PIR 307, 15 May 51; X
Corps PIRs 226, 10 May 51; 227, 11 May 51, and 231, 15 May 51.
17 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Map 1B, Enemy Redeployment, May 51; Hq,
USAFFE, Intel Dig no. 1, 1-31 Dec 52, and no. 99, 16-31 Jan 53; Hq, FEC, History
of the North Korean Army.
18 See George, The Chinese
Communist Army in Action, pp. 168-75.
19 Other than the statements
of these captives and similar statements of others taken during the offensive,
available enemy sources do not disclose the terrain or other tactical objectives
set for the main attack.
20 X Corps Special Rpt,
"Battle of the Soyang River"; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang
River," 30 Jun 51; X Corps PIR 243, 27 May 51; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig no. 96,
16-28 Feb 53; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army.
21 X Corps G2 Section Rpt,
"Battle of the Soyang River," 30 Jun 51; X Corps G3 Jnl, Entries J-8 and J-41,
17 May 51; X Corps PIRs 232, 16 May 51, and 233, 17 May 51; X Corps PORs 232, 16
May 51, and 233, 17 May 51; Eighth Army G3 SS Rpt, May 51.
22 Eighth Army POR, 16 May 51;
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 16 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 17 May 51; Eighth Army PIR
309, 17 May 51; Eighth Army Arty SS Rpt, Jun 51.
23 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
24 X Corps Special Rpt,
"Battle of the Soyang River"; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist
Det, "Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
25 X Corps G2 Section Rpt,
"Battle of the Soyang River," 30 Jun 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 16 May 51; 2d Div
POR 611, 16 May 51; 2d Div PIRs 205, 16 May 51, and 206, 17 May 51; AA Rpt, 8th
Hist Det, "Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
26 AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det,
"Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
27 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 16
and 17 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; X Corps Rpt, "Operations of the
9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 June 1951"; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, "Battle of
the Soyang River," 30 Jun 51.
28 2d Div POR 611, 16 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 17 May 51; 38th Inf PIR 115, 17 May 51; 2d Div CofS
Jnl, Entries 9 and 19, 17 May 51.
29 2d Div POR 612, 17 May 51;
38th Inf POR 115, 17 May 51; X Corps Rpt, "Operations of 9th, 23d, 38th Inf
RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51"; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries
22, 30, 35, and 38, 17 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
30 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 40, 41, 42, and 44, 17 May
51.
31 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; X Corps Rpt, "Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May" Jun 51";
23d Inf POR 230, 17 May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
32 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 48,
17 May 51.
33 Ibid., Entries 67-71, 17
May 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf
S2 Jnl, Entries 51 and 62, 17 May 51; X Corps Rpt, "Operations of the 9th, 23d,
38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51."
34 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 34 and 39, 17 May 51; Rad, X 19711, CG X Corps to
CG Eighth Army, 17 May 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, May 51; X Corps G2 Section
Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang River," 30 Jun 51.
35 Eighth Army POR 872, 17 May
51; Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51; Rad, GX-5-2977 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA
and CG X Corps, 17 May 51.
36 Rad, GX-5-2974 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to G/S ROKA, 17 May 51; Rad, GX-5-2964 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG 3d
Div, 17 May 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 208;
Rad, GX-52972 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs IX and X Corps, 17 May 51.
37 X Corps OI 174, 17 May 51;
Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central
Front, pp. 125-26.
38 X Corps OI 174, 17 May 51;
X Corps Arty Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang River: An Analysis of Artillery Support,
X Corps Sector, 1 May-29 May 1951," 30 Jul 51; Eighth Army, "Logistical Problems
and Their Solutions"; X Corps G4 SS Rpt, May 51.
39 For an account of the
development and use of this technique, see Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 328-30,
338-40.
40 Rads, AX 9248 OP-OP2 and AX 9249 OP-OP2, CG FEAF to CG
BOMCOM et al., 17 May 51; Rad, AX 7713, CG FEAF to C/S USAF, 20 May 51; Futrell,
The United States Air Force in Korea,
p. 340.
41 2d Div PIR 207, 18 May 51. For a detailed account of
the defensive operations of the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, especially of
Company K, on 18-19 May, see Gugeler, Combat
Actions in Korea, pages 166-81.
42 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 78,
17 May 51; 38th Inf S2 Jnl, Sum, 17 May 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51.
43 X Corps Rpt, "Operations of
the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51"; 23d Inf ISUM, 172200 May 51; 23d
Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 58 and 84, 17 May 51; 23d Inf ISUM 181000 May 51; 2d Div PIR
207, 18 May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, "Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
44 23d Inf S3 Jnl, Entries 40,
44, and 47, 17 May 51; 23d Inf ISUM, 172200 and 181000 May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl,
Entry 90, 17 May 51; X Corps G2 Section Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang River," 30
Jun 51; X Corps Rpt, "Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun
51"; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, "Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
45 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 89,
17 May 51.
46 Ibid.; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
47 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf PIR 116, 18 May 51; 38th Inf S2
Jnl, Sum, 18 May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 2, 3, 6, 9, 11, and 16, 18 May
51.
48 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries 3, 5, 6, 8, and 10,
18 May 51; X Corps OI 175, 18 May 51.
49 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entries
84, 91, and 92, 17 May 51; 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Opus (S3), May 51; 9th
Inf POR 151, 151,18 May 51; 2d Div Of 71,18 May 51;
2d
Div CofS Jnl, Entries 2, 3, 9, and 11, 18 May
51; 2d Div POR 613, 18 May 51; X Corps Rpt,
"Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May -
2 Jun 51."
50 2d Div OI 71, 18 May 51;
23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det,
"Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
51 2d Div POR 613, 18 May 51; AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, "Battle of
Soyang," Jun 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 23d Inf POR 231, 18 May 51.
52 AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det, "Battle of Soyang," Jun 51; 2d
Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
53 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 23d Inf POR 231, 18 May 51.
54 AA Rpt, 8th Hist Det,
"Battle of Soyang," Jun 51.
55 Ibid.; X Corps Rpt,
"Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51"; Eighth Army G3
SSR, May 51.
56 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Opus
(S3), May 51; 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51.
57 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 2d Div CofS Jnl, Entry 8, 19 May 51; X Corps
Rpt, "Operations of the 9th, 23d, 38th Inf RCTs, 16 May-2 Jun 51."
58 X Corps POR 234, 18 May 51;
X Corps Special Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang River."
59 An officer from the North
Korean 6th Division captured later claimed that twelve hundred South Koreans and
much materiel were captured in the Hyon-ni area. See OB Info, North Korean Army,
Charts 4 and 9.
60 Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51;
Eighth Army Arty SSR, Jun 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 0920, 1030, and 1615,
18 May 51.
61 X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51;
38th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 38th Inf PIR 117, 20 May 51; Gugeler, Combat
Actions in Korea, p. 180.
62 X Corps OI 177, 19 May 51;
2d Div POR 614, 19 May 51.
63 Rads, GX-5-3166 KGOO and
GX-5-3174 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 18 and 19 May 51,
respectively; X Corps 01 177, 19 May 51.
64 Dolcater, 3d Infantry
Division in Korea, pp. 208-09; X Corps POR 235, 19 May 51.
65 Dolcater, 3d Infantry
Division in Korea, p. 208; 2d Div POR 614, 19 May 51; Eighth Army POR, 19
May 51.
66 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 2d Div POR 614, 19 May 51; 2d Div PIR 208, 20 May 51; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Nar,
May 51; 23d Inf ISUM, 19 May 51.
67 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, May
51; 9th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, May 51; 9th Inf PORs 152, 19 May 51, and 153, 20 May
51.
68 Eighth Army G3 SSR, May 51;
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 19 May 51; Eighth Army PORs, 19 and 20 May
51.
69 Eighth Army G2 SS Rpt, May
51; Eighth Army PIR 310, 18 May 51; X Corps G2 SS
Rpt, May 51; X Corps G2
Section Rpt, "Battle of the Soyang River," 30 Jun 51; X Corps PIRs 235, 19 May
51, and 237, 21 May 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army; OB Info,
North Korean Army, Charts 9 and 15; Eighth Army POR, 19 May 51.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
