Battle for Seoul
General Milburn intended to make no
stubborn or prolonged defense of line Delta. He considered it only a phase line
to be occupied briefly in the I Corps' withdrawal to line Golden. He planned to
mark out additional phase lines between Delta and Golden so that in each step of
the withdrawal displacing artillery units would remain within range of the line
being vacated and could provide continuous support to infantry units as they
withdrew. Each move to the rear was to be made in daylight so that any enemy
forces following the withdrawal could be hit most effectively with artillery
fire and air strikes.1
Milburn ordered the next withdrawal at
midmorning on the 26th after attacks opened during the night by the North
Korean I Corps and XIX Army Group made inroads along the western
portion of his Delta front. (See Map 32.)
Hardest hit were the 11th Regiment of the ROK 1st
Division astride Route I and the 65th Infantry at the left of the 3d Division.
Chinese also entered a five-mile gap between the ROK 1st and 3d Divisions but
made no immediate attempt to move deep. The next position to be occupied by Milburn's forces lay two to five miles below
line Delta, generally on a line centered on and slightly above
Uijongbu.2
General Hoge ordered conforming adjustments
of the IX Corps line. The ROK 6th Division was to withdraw and tie in with the
new right flank of the I Corps. Eastward, the British 28th Brigade was to
reoccupy the hill masses previously held by the Canadians and Australians above
Kap'yong; the 1st Marine Division was to pull back from line Kansas to positions
straddling the Pukhan, running through the northern outskirts of Ch'unch'on, and
following the lower bank of the Soyang River. Since the marines' withdrawal
otherwise would leave the X Corps with an open left flank, General Almond was
obliged to order the 2d and 7th Divisions away from the Hwach'on Reservoir and
the west shoulder of the North Korean salient in the Inje area. The new line to
be occupied by Almond's forces looped northeast from a junction with the 1st
Marine Division along the Soyang to a point two miles below Yanggu, then fell
off to the southeast to the existing position of the ROK 5th
Division below Inje.3
Although the I Corps withdrawal, and thus
the chain reaction eastward, was prompted by the heavy enemy pressure in the
corps' western sector, there was evidence by 26 April that the main effort of
the enemy offensive was beginning to falter. Enemy killed by infantry and
artillery fire and air strikes on the I Corps front were estimated to number
almost forty-eight thousand approximately the strength of five divisions.
Intelligence information indicated that the stand of the Gloster battalion
against forces of the 63d Army and the early
fumbling of the 64th Army had upset the attack schedule of the XIX
Army Group and that the group commander was committing the 65th Army
in an attempt to save the situation. But in this and other commitments of
reserves, according to prisoner of war interrogations, enemy commanders were
confused and their orders vague.4
With only the west sector of the army front
under any serious threat, and that beginning to show signs of lessening, General
Van Fleet on the 26th established an additional transpeninsular defense line
that in the central and eastern sectors lay well north of line Nevada, the final
line set out in the 12 April withdrawal plan. The new line incorporated the
fortifications of line Golden arching above the outskirts of Seoul. Eastward, it
bulged across the Pukhan River five miles above its
confluence with the Han, then turned steeply northeast, crossing Route 29 ten
miles below Ch'unch'on and cutting Route 24 fifteen miles south of Inje.
Continuing to angle northeast, the line touched the east coast just above
Yangyang. Implicit in Van Fleet's insistence on thorough coordination between
corps during the withdrawal to the new line was that its occupation would be
governed by the movement of the I Corps against the continuing enemy pressure on
its front. Van Fleet's assignment of corps sectors along the line made the IX
Corps responsible for defending the Pukhan and Han corridors; consequently, the
24th Division, currently located directly above that area, was to pass to IX
Corps control on the 27th. When, contrary to custom, Van Fleet gave the line no
name, it became known as No Name line.5
Of concern to Van Fleet after the I Corps
pulled back from the Imjin was the possibility that enemy forces would cross the
Han River estuary unseen west of Munsan-ni and sweep down the Kimpo peninsula
behind Seoul, overrunning Inch'on, Kimpo Airfield, and the Seoul airport in the
process. On 25 April he had asked the commander of the west coast group of Task
Force 95 to keep the possible crossing site under surveillance, and on the 26th
planes from the group's carriers began to fly over the area while in transit to
and from close support targets. The cruiser Toledo
meanwhile steamed for the Inch'on area
from the Sea of Japan to provide gunfire support.6
The USS Toledo In Action
Enemy forces reaching the I Corps phase
line after dark on the 26th attacked in each division sector except that of the
24th on the corps right. On the front of the 25th Division, Chinese concentrated
an assault between two companies of the 27th Infantry, some reaching as far as a
mile behind the line before regimental reserves contained them. A radar-directed
bomb strike brought down at the point of penetration and ground fire delivered
under light provided by a flare ship eliminated the enemy force.7
In a repetition of the
pattern of enemy attacks on the I Corps' Delta front the previous night, the
hardest assaults struck the ROK 1st Division and 65th Infantry at the left of
the 3d Division's position west of Uijongbu. Telling artillery fire and air
strikes helped contain penetrations of the 65th'' line and force the Chinese to
withdraw. Chinese attacking the 15th Regiment at the right of the ROK 1st
Division's line forced a twomile withdrawal before the South Koreans were able
to block the advance. North Koreans attacking down Route 1 against the 11th Regiment and against the
tank destroyer battalion west of the road broke through the lines of both units
and took a particularly high toll of tank destroyer troops before South Korean
counterattacks supported by American tanks stopped the advance.8
At 0600 on the 27th, the 24th Division
passed to IX Corps control, as had been directed by General Van Fleet, and what
had been the boundary between the 24th and 25th Divisions became the new corps
boundary. Shortly afterward, General Milburn ordered his remaining forces to
withdraw to the next phase line, which would be the last occupied by the I Corps
before it moved onto line Golden. West to east, the phase line lay one to seven
miles above Golden, touching the Han near the village of Haengju located almost
due north of Kimpo airfield below the river, cutting Route 1 and a minor road
from the north near the village of Kup'abal-li, crossing Route 3 four miles
south of Uijongbu, and also intersecting a minor road along the new corps
boundary that below the phase line and line Golden joined Route 2 reaching Seoul
from the east. Following suit, General Hoge ordered back the left of the IX
Corps. The 24th Division, to which Hoge attached the ROK 6th Division and
British 28th Brigade, was to take position adjoining the new I Corps line and
stretching along the lower bank of the Pukhan toward the Ch'unch'onSoyang River
position of the 1st Marine Division.9
On the I Corps right, the two line
regiments of the 25th Division had some difficulty in getting off the first
phase line. The 27th Infantry ran into enemy groups that had got behind the
regiment during the night, and Chinese closely following the 35th Infantry took
that regiment under assault when it set up a covering position to help the 27th
Infantry disengage. It was well into the afternoon before the two regiments
could break away. General Bradley deployed the same two regiments on the second
phase line. In preparation for further withdrawal, Bradley set the Turkish
brigade in a covering position midway between the phase line and line Golden and
assembled the 24th Infantry behind the Golden fortifications.10
On the 26th General Milburn had reinforced
the 3d Division with the 7th Cavalry. In preparation for the withdrawal on the
27th, General Soule deployed the cavalry regiment at the left rear of the
division as a precautionwhich proved fortuitousagainst a flanking attack by XIX
Army Group forces who were continuing to press hard against the adjacent 15th
Regiment of the ROK 1st Division. The cavalrymen fended off a Chinese attack
from the northeast that lasted into the afternoon. Along the second phase line,
General Soule meanwhile deployed his 7th and 15th Regiments at center and right
and assembled the 65th Infantry in reserve. He later set the 7th Cavalry on line
at the left.11
The continuing pressure kept the ROK 1st
Division pinned in position until late
afternoon, then diminished enough to allow the South Koreans to begin the
difficult task of disengaging while under attack. Enemy forces, however, failed
to follow the withdrawal. Along the second phase line, General Kang deployed the
11th, 15th, and 12th Regiments west to east and set out screening forces well to
the front.12
Enemy forces did not regain contact during
the night. General Milburn nevertheless expected an eventual followup in
strength and ordered his forces to occupy line Golden on the 28th. Again in
chain reaction, Milburn's withdrawal order set in motion the move to No Name
line by forces to the east.13
From the outset of the enemy offensive
General Van Fleet had believed that a strong effort should be made to retain
possession of Seoul, not only to gain the tactical advantage in maintaining a
foothold above the Han River but also to prevent psychological damage to the
Korean people. To give up the ROK capital a third time, he believed, "would ruin
the spirit of the nation."14 His determination to fight for the city lay behind his refusal to
allow the Eighth Army simply to surrender ground in deep withdrawals and behind
his order of 23 April directing a strong stand on line Kansas. Defeated in the
latter effort, mainly by the failures of the ROK 6th Division, he had laid out
No Name line in the belief that a successful defense of its segment athwart the Pukhan corridor would improve his chances of holding
Seoul and that the corridor area could be used as a springboard to recapture the
capital if the forces defending the city itself were pushed out.15 In
the central and eastern sectors, where enemy attacks had clearly lost their
momentum by 26 April, the occupation of No Name would obviate relinquishing
territory voluntarily, a cession that would occur if the forces in those sectors
moved back to line Nevada as prescribed in the 12 April withdrawal plan.
Convinced by the morning of the 28th that
the main enemy effort in the west was wearing out, Van Fleet informed corps
commanders that he intended to "hold firmly" on No Name line. They were to
conduct an active defense of the line, making full use of artillery in
conjunction with armored counterattacks. Though members of his staff considered
it a tactical mistake to risk having forces trapped against the north bank of
the Han, Van Fleet insisted that there would be no withdrawal from the line
unless extreme enemy pressure clearly imperiled Eighth Army positions, and then
only if he himself ordered it.16
In case Van Fleet had to call a withdrawal
from No Name line, the Eighth Army was to retire to line Waco, a move which
would still hold the bulk of the army well above line Nevada. In the west, the
new line designated by Van Fleet followed the Nevada trace along the lower bank
of the Han; in the central and eastern areas, it lay nine to eighteen miles
below No Name line. "For planning purposes only," Van Fleet issued instructions for occupying
line Waco late on the 28th.17
As I Corps forces began their withdrawal to
line Golden at midmorning on the 28th, North Koreans in regimental strength were
sighted massing near Haengju, the Han River village above Kimpo airfield,
apparently in preparation for crossing the river. The massed fire of two
artillery battalions and 8inch fire from the cruiser Toledo, now stationed just off Inch'on, inflicted heavy
casualties on the enemy group and forced the survivors to withdraw. A Chinese
battalion attacking the 7th Cavalry below Uijongbu early in the morning but soon
breaking contact after failing to penetrate and patrols investigating the
positions of the 25th Division around noon were the only other enemy actions
along the corps front during the day.18
The ROK 1st Division, which had scarcely
more than a mile to withdraw, reached line Golden early in the day. Assigned a
narrow sector from the Han to a point just short of Route 1, General Kang was
able to hold his 12th Regiment and tank destroyer battalion in reserve. The 11th
and 15th Regiments manning the Golden fortifications were able to use a
battalion each in outpost lines, organizing these units about two miles to the
northwest. Behind the 3d Division, the 1st Cavalry Division occupied Golden
positions between and including Routes 1 and 3. General Milburn ordered General
Soule to return the 7th Cavalry to the 1st Cavalry
Division, to assemble the 3d Division less the 65th Infantry in Seoul in corps
reserve, and to prepare counterattack plans. Milburn attached the 65th Infantry
to the 25th Division so that General Bradley, using the 65th and his own
reserve, the 24th Infantry, could man the eastern sector of the Golden line
while the remainder of his division was withdrawing.19
As deployed for the defense of Seoul by
evening of the 28th, the I Corps had six regiments on line and the same number
assembled in and on the edges of the city. Below the Han to meet any enemy
attempt to envelop Seoul were the British 29th Brigade at the base of the Kimpo
peninsula in the west and the Turkish brigade on the east flank. With adequate
reserves, fortified defenses, and a narrower front that allowed heavier
concentrations of artillery fire, the corps was in a position far stronger than
any it had occupied since the beginning of the enemy offensive.20
In contrast, there was further evidence
that the enemy's offensive strength was weakening. The most recent prisoners
taken had only one day's rations or none at all. Interrogation of these captives
revealed that local foraging produced very little food and that resupply had
collapsed under the Far East Air Forces' interdiction of enemy rear areas. The
steady air attacks also had seriously impeded the forward movement of artillery.
Confusion and disorganization among enemy forces appeared to be increasing.
Commanders were issuing only such general
instructions as "go to Seoul" and "go as far to the south as possible." On one
occasion, according to prisoners, reserve forces ordered forward moved south
under the impression that Seoul already had fallen. One factor in the
deterioration was a high casualty rate among political officers- especially at
company level- on whom the Chinese Army depended so heavily for maintaining
troop motivation and discipline.21
Obviously willing, if growing less able, to
continue the attack on Seoul, the North Korean 8th
Division assisted on its left by Chinese in what appeared to be regimental
strength struck the outpost line of the ROK 1st Division shortly before midnight
on the 28th. Accurate defensive fire, especially from tanks, artillery, and the
guns of the Toledo, broke up the attack before enemy assault forces could
get through the outpost line and reach the main South Korean positions.
Tank-infantry forces sent out by General Kang after daylight followed and fired
on retreating enemy groups for two miles, observing between nine hundred and a
thousand enemy dead along the route.22
The 8th
Division's attack proved to be the only serious enemy attempt to break
through the Golden fortifications. Another effort appeared to be in the offing
during the day of the 29th when patrols and air observers reported a large enemy
buildup on the front of the 25th Division, but heavy
artillery fire and air attacks delivered after dark broke up the enemy
force.23 Division patrols searching the enemy concentration area after
daylight on the 30th found an estimated one thousand enemy dead. Across the
corps front, patrols moving as much as six miles above line Golden on the 30th
made only minor contacts. On the basis of the patrol findings, General Milburn
reported to General Van Fleet that the enemy forces on his front were staying
out of artillery range while regrouping and resupplying for further
attacks.24 Actually in progress was the beginning of a general enemy
withdrawal.
In dropping back to No Name line, Eighth
Army forces since 22 April had given up about thirty-five miles of territory in
the I and IX Corps sectors and about twenty miles in the sectors of the X and
ROK III Corps. Logistical planning completed in
anticipation of the enemy offensive had kept line units well furnished with all
classes of supplies during the attacks and at the same time had prevented any
loss of stocks stored in major supply points during the withdrawal. Gearing
removal operations to the phased rearward movements, service forces had shifted
supplies and equipment southward to predetermined locations from which line
units could be readily resupplied without risking the loss of supply points to
advancing enemy forces.25
Steady rail movements and back loading
aboard ships had all but cleared Inch'on of supplies by the 30th, and LSTs were
standing by to take aboard the 2d Engineer Special Brigade and ten thousand
South Koreans who had been operating the port.26 Against the
possibility that Inch'on would have to be given up, General Ridgway on the 30th
took steps to forestall a repetition of the heavy damage done to the port when
it was abandoned in January, damage that had served only to hinder use of the
port after it was recaptured. Ridgway instructed General Van Fleet not to
demolish port facilities if it became necessary to evacuate Inch'on again but to
leave it to UNC naval forces to prevent the enemy from using the
port.27
Among U.S. Army divisions, casualties
suffered between 22 and 29 April totaled 314 killed and 1,600 wounded. In both
number and rate, these losses were scarcely more than half the casualties
suffered among the divisions engaged for a comparable period of time
during the Chinese offensive opened in late
November.28
Among a variety of estimates, an Eighth
Army headquarters report for the eight-day period from evening of the 22d to
evening of the 30th listed 13,349 known enemy dead, 23,829 estimated enemy dead,
and 246 taken captive. This report included information obtained daily from U.S.
and allied ground units only. At UNC headquarters in Tokyo, the estimate was
that enemy forces suffered between 75,000 and 80,000 killed and wounded, 50,000
of these in the Seoul sector. Other estimates listed 71,712 enemy casualties on
the I Corps front and 8,009 in the IX Corps sector. Although none of the
estimates was certifiable, enemy losses were unquestionably
huge.29
Notwithstanding the high enemy losses,
General Van Fleet cautioned on 1 May that the enemy had the men to attack again
"as hard as before or harder."30 The total strength of Chinese forces
in Korea as of that date was believed to be about 542,000 and that of North
Korean forces to be over 197,000. The 1 May estimate in General Ridgway's
headquarters credited the enemy with having 300,000 men currently in position to
attack, most of these on the central front.
Notes
1 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 28.
2 Ibid., pp. 28-33;
Rad, CIACT 4-15, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 26 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-19, CG
I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 26 Apr 51; Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in
Korea, pp. 203-04.
3 Rad, IXACT-1355, CG IX Corps to CG 1st
Marine Div, 26 Apr 51; Rad IXACT-1356, CG IX Corps to CGs 28th Brit Brig and ROK
6th Div, 26 Apr 51; X Corps 01 163, 26 Apr 51.
4 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 38; Hq, USAFFE, Intel Dig,
no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53, p. 27.
5 Rad, GX-4-5200
KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 26 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-5341 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CGs I and IX Corps, 26 Apr 51.
6 Rad, GX-4-5130
KNLO, CG Eighth Army to CTG 95.1, 25 Apr 51; Rad, CTE 95.11 to CTG 95.1, 26 Apr
51; Rad, AG In no. CX4480, CTG 95.1 to CG Eighth Army, 26 Apr 51; Field,
United States Naval Operations, Korea,
p. 346.
7 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 29-30.
8 Ibid., pp. 32,
34.
9 Rad, GX-4-5341
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I and IX Corps, 26 Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 29; Rad, CIACT 4-172, CG I
Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 27 Apr 51; Rad, IXACT1366, CG IX Corps to CG 24th Div
et al., 27 Apr 51.
10 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase
Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 30.
11 Ibid., p. 32; Rad, CIACT 4-167, CG I Corps
to CGs 1st Cav Div and 3d Div, 26 Apr 51.
12 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 34.
13 Rad, CICCG 4-22,
CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 28 Apr 51; Rad, CIACT 4-179, CG I Corps to CG 1st
Cav Div et al., 28 Apr 51.
14 Quotation from USAWC Research Paper, "A
Will to Win," based on Intervs, Col Bruce F. Williams with Van Fleet, 6 Apr 73,
p. 26.
15 Interv, Appleman
with Van Fleet, 15 Sep 51.
16 Ibid.; Rad, GX-4-5638 KGOO, CG Eighth Army
to C/S ROKA et al., 28 Apr 51.
17 Rad, GX-4-5749
KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 28 Apr 51.
18 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase
Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 30-34; Rad, CIACT 4-179, CG I Corps to CG 1st Cav
Div et al., 28 Apr 51; Rad, AG In no. CX-5246, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 29 Apr 51.
19 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 30, 33-34; Dolcater, 3d
Infantry Division in Korea, pp. 204, 206.
20 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 35 and Map 7, following p.
38.
21 Ibid., pp. 35,
38; George, The Chinese Communist Arm in
Action, p. 10.
22 Rad, CICCG 4-23,
CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 29 Apr 51; Rad, AG In no. CX 5260, CTF 95 to
COMNAVFE et al., 29 Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51, p. 36.
23 A number of
published works on the war report that six thousand enemy attempted to ferry the
Han and attack down the Kimpo peninsula to outflank Seoul on 29 April and that
air attacks defeated the effort. The official records do not support these
accounts. The authors may have been referring to the North Korean effort to
cross the river at Haengju on the 28th.
24 I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 36-37; Rad, CICCG 4-24, CG I
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 30 Apr 51.
25 Eighth Army,
"Logistical Problems and Their Solutions," pp. 105-06.
26 Also jamming
Inch'on in hopes of being evacuated by sea were some two hundred thousand
refugees. Most of these had come from Seoul during the past week, leaving only
about a hundred thousand inhabitants in the capital city.
27 Eighth Army,
"Logistical Problems and Their Solutions," p. 107; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; Rad, CX 61384, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 30 Apr 51.
28 Reister,
Battle Casualties and Medical Statistics,
p. 30.
29 Eighth Army G3
PORs, 22-30 Apr 51; Facts on File, vol.
XI, no. 548, 27 Apr-3May 51, p. 137; I Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 38; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51.
30 Facts on File, vol. XI, no. 548, 27 Apr-3 May 51, p. 137.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
