On the Western Front
Since January, after the Fifth Air Force
evacuated the airfields at Kimpo, Seoul, and Suwon, a shortage of fields,
especially of airstrips near the front, had impeded close air support to the
Eighth Army. Early in March General Partridge had approved plans for the
construction of all-weather fields, including three forward strips, but only in
June would he acquire enough engineer aviation battalions to begin any extensive
airfield development. Consequently, at the opening of the Chinese April
offensive only three Fifth Air Force groups were based in Korea. All other
groups flew from bases in Japan, a situation that raised the related problems of
distance and range limitations. Staging through Korean fields, primarily the
airfield at Taegu, helped, but the time that aircraft based in Japan could spend
at the front was nevertheless reduced. Compensating considerably were the
fighter squadrons of the 1st Marine Air Wing, five land based in southeastern
Korea, another aboard the escort carrier Bataan
with Task Force 95 in the Yellow Sea. To help
further, Task Force 77 in the Sea of Japan shifted its fast carrier operations
from interdiction to close support beginning on 23 April.1
Though unable to operate at top capacity,
the Fifth Air Force alone flew some three hundred forty close support sorties on
the 23d, a number that almost equaled the highest flown during a single day so
far in the war, and the 1st Marine Air Wing flew over a hundred fifty missions.
The bulk of the air strikes supported the I Corps as General Milburn pulled the
24th and 25th Divisions and the rightmost forces of the 3d Division back to line
Kansas. He judged that the Fifth Air Force and Marine attacks, in combination
with artillery fire, had been instrumental in preventing Chinese forces from
following his withdrawal closely.2
Defending the Kansas Line
Chinese following the withdrawal of the
24th and 25th Divisions finally reestablished contact with small, groping
attacks near midnight on the 23d. Almost at the same hour, far harder attacks
struck the ROK 1st Division and British 29th Brigade along the Imjin,
particularly their neighboring interior units, the
12th ROK Regiment and the British brigade's isolated
Gloster battalion at Solma-ri. (See Map 32.)
The midnight exploratory probes in the
eastern half of the corps sector developed into stout but not overpowering
daytime assaults by three divisions against the 24th Infantry on the right of
the 25th Division and on the entire front of the 24th Division. The 179th Division seized Hill 664, the highest ground in the
24th Infantry sector, but failed in daylong attacks to dislodge the regiment and
two reinforcing battalions of the 27th Infantry from a new line established in
the foothills of the high feature. Forces of the 80th and 59th
Divisions kept the 24th Division's front under pressure all day, but only
the 80th attacking the 19th Infantry made any penetrations, all shallow.
Counterattacks by regimental reserve forces eliminated all of them. Of more
concern was a visible enemy buildup in front of the division, particularly ahead
of the 21st Infantry on the right flank.3
At the Gloster battalion's Solma-ri
position along the Imjin, the 187th Division
reopened its attack on the British by sending its 559th Regiment up
the slopes east of Route 5Y toward Company C near the road and Company B on
the battalion's right flank. Unaware of exactly where or how the two companies
were deployed, the enemy regiment attacked obliquely across the Gloster front,
wasting the force of repeated assaults and taking heavy casualties from Gloster
fire partially enfilading the skirmish lines. Finally correcting the direction
of attack, the Chinese shoved their way onto the
highest ground inside Company C's position to command the remainder of the
company's hill and the valley behind, where the mortars and battalion
headquarters were located. Expecting that the Chinese would quickly exploit
their advantage, Colonel Carne ordered the troops in the valley and Company C to
withdraw west across Route 5Y to positions between Companies A and D in the Hill
235 area. The withdrawal would leave Company B isolated on the east flank, but
Carne doubted that the unit could make the long trek to Hill 235 from its
distant position without becoming scattered and lost in the darkness; he decided
to wait until daylight to pull it in.4
While Carne had few alternatives, he had to
a degree played into Chinese hands. Making no move to follow Company C when it
broke away or to move into the valley, where much of the battalion's ammunition,
food, and other supplies lay abandoned after the hasty evacuation of the
headquarters site, the attack force turned its weight against Company B,
surrounding and squeezing the unit with assaults from all directions. Though
steadily weakened by casualties, the isolated company turned back the repeated
rushes until dawn. Then the Chinese changed tactics, keeping the company
encircled and engaged all around but concentrating forces on the north for an
assault on one platoon. Penetrated by the focused attack, the Gloster company
had no choice but to try to disengage. Colonel Carne covered the attempt with
every weapon he could bring to bear on the Chinese who had hemmed in the company and
had left only a path down wooded slopes to the south, where the Glosters,
breaking away in groups, tried to get through the smaller ranks of Chinese who
had circled behind them. The attempt, if unavoidable, was disastrous. Only
twenty men reached the main body of the battalion at Hill 235.
Along Route 11 northeast of the Glosters,
forces of the 188th Division meanwhile had followed the late night withdrawal of the 1st
Battalion, 7th Infantry, out of the Hill 257 mass and engaged the Northumberland
Fusiliers and Royal Ulster Rifles standing across the road about two miles to
the south. Handling the Chinese frontal pressure fully occupied the two
battalions and left them vulnerable to a flanking or enveloping attack out of
the gap between the fusiliers and Glosters, a gap that as a result of the
Glosters' withdrawals to the Hill 235 area had widened to four
miles.5
In a move to fill the gap at least
partially and at the same time to restore the deteriorating Gloster position,
the 3d Division commander, General Soule, early in the morning of the 24th
directed Brigadier Brodie to move a reserve battalion into the gap and also to
send a tank-infantry force up Route 5Y to clear the road and reinforce the
Gloster battalion. For the latter effort Brodie added six Centurions from C
Squadron, 8th Hussars, to the three rifle companies and four light tanks of the
Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team and sent the force toward the Glosters
about 0730. Word that reinforcements were on the way reached Colonel Carne as the few survivors of Company B began to trickle
in at Hill 235. By midmorning, however, perhaps because the Glosters had
reported a large enemy buildup in their area, Brodie changed the concept of the
operation. The 10th Battalion Combat Team now was to set up a blocking position
at a pass about two miles below Hill 235, and from there only tanks were to move
on to join the Gloster battalion. Brodie may not have been aware that the big
Centurions, leading the way up Route 5Y at the moment, would be unable to
proceed much farther than the blocking position. As the hussars had learned
during earlier reconnaissance, the road beyond became too narrow at defiles to
allow the nearly twelve-foot-wide tanks to pass. The attempt to reach the
Glosters, in any case, could be made only by the 10th Battalion Combat Team's
four light tanks. Brodie also gave the Glosters the choice of fighting their way
to safety, apparently visualizing a linkup of Glosters and Filipinos at the
latter's blocking position. But Colonel Carne, doubting that his weakened
battalion could make it and remaining under the impression that the full
tankinfantry force would attempt to reach him, elected to stay in position in
the hope that the approaching column would succeed.6
The Belgian battalion, which Brodie
intended to place in the gap between the Glosters and Northumberland Fusiliers,
had made a second march during the night after withdrawing out of
the Imjin angle, moving from its initial assembly along Route 33 to an area near
the 29th Brigade's command post. Tired and somewhat disorganized by the Imjin
angle battle and disengagement, the Belgians needed rest and time to straighten
their ranks before moving into the gap. The commander, Colonel Albert Crahay,
informed Brodie that the battalion would be ready by the start of the
afternoon.7
General Soule, however, had second thoughts
about committing the Belgians. Nine Glosters who had been captured during the
Chinese attack on the battalion's supply point the day before and who had been
taken off to Hill 675 in the gap escaped their captors during an early morning
air strike (Mustangs dropping napalm) and reached the 29th Brigade command post.
They reported at least a thousand Chinese to be on Hill 675, an estimate tending
to confirm other reports that the Chinese in the 675 area had reached regimental
strength. Reluctant to pit the Belgians against that possible enemy strength,
Soule about noon informed Brodie that the Belgian battalion was not to be
committed to action without division approval.8
Soule did not question Brodie's decision to
stop the 10th Battalion Combat Team short of the Gloster battalion. Because of
the growing enemy strength in the Gloster and gap areas, Soule now planned to attack with two battalions of the 65th Infantry, the
bulk of the 64th Tank Battalion, and the 10th Field Artillery Battalion to
relieve the Glosters and clear the Chinese from Hill 675. The 10th Battalion
Combat Team, as an attachment to the 65th Infantry, was to remain in its
blocking position until the attack force passed through, then was to follow the
force to its objectives. Soule set the attack for 0630 on the 25th after
checking with Brodie to ask if that timing was satisfactory in light of the
Gloster battalion's overnight reverses and present condition. Brodie assured him
that the Glosters could hold out until relieved by the 65th Infantry.9
In a midafternoon conference at the 3d
Division airstrip, Soule briefed General Milburn, General Van Fleet, and General
Ridgway (who had arrived in Korea at noon) on the attack plan. They questioned
waiting until morning to attack. But Soule told them that the attack could not
be made in what remained of the afternoon: the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 65th
Infantry were then only beginning to assemble for the attack a mile west of the
29th Brigade's command post and two miles southeast of Hill 675 and would not
complete their move until 1730. Soule, in any case, had no reason to believe
that the Gloster battalion could not hold its position; he had Brigadier
Brodie's assurance. According to a noontime report from the 29th Brigade, the
battalion's only critical supply need was radio batteries, which, along with a resupply of
other items, were to be airdropped before dark. The 10th Battalion Combat Team
meanwhile had broken through a spot of resistance about three miles south of
Hill 235 and, with its light tanks now leading, the Centurions next in column,
and foot troops bringing up the rear, was grin on the move toward the
Glosters.10
By 1530 the tanks leading the 10th
Battalion Combat Team were climbing into the pass where the Filipino force was
to set up the blocking position. Encouraged by the column's progress, Brigadier
Brodie reverted to his original plan and instructed the entire force to go on to
the Glosters. He had scarcely issued the order when the point tank lost a track
to a mine or mortar round in an extremely narrow, steep-sided defile. Chinese
strung out atop the hills bordering both sides of the defile swept the road with
fire while others armed with charges worked down the steep banks toward the
disabled tank. The M24 crews to the rear, evidently believing the road ahead of
them to be mined, made no attempt to pull or push the damaged tank out of the
defile or to rescue the stranded crew. Two less cautious Centurion crews
squeezed their huge tanks past the Filipino armor and went as far forward as the
narrowing road allowed. Though they stopped short of the disabled M24, their
covering fire allowed its crew to escape. Meanwhile, the Filipino infantry
became involved in a fire fight with Chinese
occupying two hills abutting the road some two hundred yards to the
rear.11
When Maj. Henry Huth, in command of the
Centurions, radioed brigade headquarters that the road was blocked and that the
wide Centurions in any case could not get through the defile, he was given
authority to withdraw. Major Huth understood the clearance to withdraw to apply
to the 10th Battalion Combat Team as well as his group of tanks, and he gave the
Filipinos the word to return to their assembly area after the combat team
commander, Lt. Col. Dionisio Ojeda, told him that he did not believe his three
rifle companies could move forward through what appeared to be a battalion of
Chinese. If someone at brigade headquarters had allowed the 10th Battalion
Combat Team to withdraw, it was only afterward that Brigadier Brodie sought
General Soule's approval of the move.12
At the same time, apparently after discussing a
breakout with Colonel Carne, who began to prepare plans, Brodie requested
permission to pull the Gloster battalion out after dark. Soule, however, was
certain the Glosters would suffer high losses in a nighttime withdrawal and
instructed Brodie to hold both battalions in their present locations until the
65th Infantry reached them the next day. Brodie nevertheless
permitted the 10th Battalion Combat Team, already en route to the rear, to
continue its withdrawal. Leapfrogging rear guards, alternately tanks and
infantry, held off Chinese who followed part of the way back and allowed the
force to reach its starting point about 1900. General Soule, who had gone to the
7th Infantry front after his conference with Brodie, was unaware of the 10th
Battalion Combat Team's withdrawal until he returned to headquarters about 2100.
At that late hour he could only accept Brodie's handling of the matter. A late
evening report on the Glosters from Brodie's headquarters reassured him,
however, that the isolated battalion could hold its ground without reinforcement
until relieved by the 65th Infantry. The position, according to the report, was
"fairly safe," and although the battalion had had some weapons and equipment
shot up, its casualties did not appear to be heavy.13
If the Gloster position could be called
"fairly safe," it was only because the Chinese swarming around Hill 235 had
attempted no further daylight assaults after destroying Company B. The
ablebodied strength of the battalion was down to around three hundred fifty men.
Supplies were so critically short that Colonel Carne had had to risk sending a
carrying party to the former headquarters site in the valley. Under the
concealment of smoke, the group retrieved a small
quantity of food, water, ammunition, and radio batteries. Carne pounded the
remaining supplies and several vehicles in the valley with artillery fire to
prevent them from falling into Chinese hands. The arrangements for resupply by
airdrop, under way since midmorning, meanwhile bogged down in the mix of 29th
Brigade, 3d Division, and I Corps channels for lack of an order to execute, and
the drop finally was postponed to 0700 on the 25th. A last-minute effort to
free-drop a few supplies from two 3d Division light aircraft was only partially
successful, much of the material landing outside the Gloster position. Together,
the sortie to the valley and the free-drop gave the Glosters scarcely enough for
another night of modest battle.14
Colonel Carne had given Brigadier Brodie a
correct appraisal of the battalion's condition after the brigade commander
informed him of the 10th Battalion Combat Team's unsuccessful attack and relayed
General Soule's order that the battalion was to stay in position. While not
asking to withdraw, Carne warned that his reduced battalion would not be able to
handle the Chinese much longer. Less lenient than he had been with the 10th
Battalion Combat Team, Brodie insisted that it was essential that the Glosters
remain in position as directed by General Soule. Carne chose to make his stand
on the long, thin crest of Hill 235, where extremely steep slopes except on the northwest and southeast limited the
approaches favoring enemy attacks in strength. To prevent the Chinese from
observing the change of position, Carne waited until after dusk to move his
forces. The Glosters were dug in by 2100, Company A on the northwest and west,
Company C and the remnants of Company B on the south and southeast, and Company
D on the north and northeast.15
To the left of the Glosters, the
64th Army had
shown little of the clumsiness with which its 192d
Division opened operations against the ROK 1st
Division. Driving out of its shallow bridgehead inside the Imjin River's
Korangp'o-ri bend at midnight on the 23d, the 192d
slowly, but persistently, forced the 12th
Regiment at the right of the ROK line to give ground. The pressure on the South
Koreans increased around dawn, after the 190th
Division crossed the Imjin at several points
southwest of Korangp'o-ri town and sent van units down the boundary between the
ROK 11th and 12th Regiments. Also crossing the Imjin during the night in the
Korangp'o-ri bend area, the 189th Division
of the 63d
Army advanced southeast on a course taking it
into the gap between the ROK 12th Regiment and the Gloster battalion on Hill
235.16
By noon a battalion leading the attack of
the 190th Division drove a wedge more than a mile deep between the 11th and 12th
Regiments. General Kang countered by sending a tank infantry force- two battalions of his reserve 15th ROK Regiment and
Company A, 73d Heavy Tank Battalionagainst the penetration. By evening the task
force drove out the Chinese and established defensive positions in the gap that
had been opened between the 11 th and 12th Regiments. By that time the
192d Division had
pressed back the 12th Regiment roughly three miles to the southwest of its
original positions, widening by the same distance the gap between the South
Korean division and the Gloster battalion on Hill 235. The 189th Division, after brushing
the right flank of the 12th Regiment, meanwhile began passing through the
widening gap between the South Koreans and Glosters.17
As the 12th Regiment gave ground during the
afternoon, General Milburn ordered his lone reserve, the 15th Infantry of the 3d
Division, out of its assembly on the northwest outskirts of Seoul into positions
six miles behind the South Koreans to block a secondary road, Route 1 B, which
if the Chinese reached would afford them an easy path to Route 1 and Seoul.
Milburn shortly diverted the 1st Battalion of the 15th to clear Route 2X, a
lateral secondary road connecting Route I to Route 3 at Uijongbu, after
receiving a report that two hundred fifty infiltrating Chinese had set up a
roadblock about seven miles west of Uijongbu. The 1st Battalion located the
enemy force at 1800, killing twenty before the remaining Chinese broke away into
nearby hills. With darkness approaching, the battalion commander elected to await morning
before attempting to clear the surrounding area. Meanwhile, as General Milburn
committed his only reserve unit, air observers and agents working in the area
along Route 1 above the Imjin reported enemy forces moving south toward the
river. The North Korean I Corps appeared ready to open its supporting
attack along the west flank of the main enemy drive.18
Well before daylight on the 25th General
Milburn became convinced that the I Corps would have to give up the Kansas line.
As suspected, the North Korean I Corps was joining the offensive,
although its initial move ended abruptly when its 8th Division attempted to cross the Imjin over the railroad bridge near
Munsan-ni and was blown back with high losses from artillery fire and air
attacks.19 But the 190th and 192d Divisions attacking in strength
just after midnight drove the ROK 1st Division back another mile before giving
respite, widening still more the gap between the South Koreans and Glosters. The
189th Division continued, if slowly, to pass through the gap.20
Before midnight the entire front of the 3d
Division was under assault. On Hill 235, scarcely an hour after Colonel Carne redeployed the Gloster battalion on the crest of the
hill, Chinese attacked up the more gentle ascents on the northwest and
southeast. In repeated rushes, with the lulls between used to bring up
reinforcements, the Chinese failed to survive heavy Gloster fire concentrated on
the two approaches until daylight, when an assault from the northwest carried
the 235 peak. But so few Chinese survived this assault that a small Gloster
counterattack easily restored the peak position. While Chinese gunners and
mortarmen kept the Glosters under fire, another assault force began forming on
the northwestern slopes, only to be almost totally destroyed by a flight of
F-80s answering an earlier Gloster call for air support. During what would
become a long lull, the Chinese bean again to bring more men
forward.21
Other Chinese forces- from the 187th
and 188th Divisions and possibly from the 189th- meanwhile moved far enough
through the gaps on either side of the isolated Glosters to deliver small arms
and mortar fire on the assembly areas of the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 65th
Infantry, the Belgian battalion, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, the
British 45th Field Regiment, and the command post of the 29th British Brigade.
Some forces of the 188th Division
coming down from Hill 675 reached Route 11 a mile
and a half behind the Northumberland Fusilier and Royal Ulster Rifle Battalions
while those two units were fully engaged in beating back frontal assaults by
other forces of the 188th.22
By dark on the
24th there had been no enemy action against the 7th Infantry deployed athwart
Route 33 at the right of the 3d Division. With the sector quiet, the 1st
Battalion, 7th Infantry, had no difficulty in replacing the 3d Battalion, 65th
Infantry, at the center of the regimental front in midafternoon to allow the
latter to join its regiment near the 29th British Brigade command post in
preparation for the scheduled attack to relieve the Gloster battalion. But after
unproductive opening attacks on the 65th Infantry and Philippine 10th Battalion
Combat Team and a slow approach to line Kansas, the 29th Division opened more
effective assaults on the 7th Infantry between 2000 and midnight of the
24th.23 Two regiments of the division attacking across the Hant'an
River hit all three battalions of the regiment. Hardest hit was the 2d Battalion
on the right flank, which by 0230 on the 25th was surrounded. On orders of the
regimental commander, Colonel Boswell, the battalion gradually infiltrated south
in small groups and reassembled some four miles below line Kansas around
daylight. The 1st and 3d Battalions held their ground but remained under
pressure throughout the night.24
In the eastern half of the corps sector,
the remainder of the 29th Division,
the 179th Division,
and the 81st
Division opened and steadily intensified attacks
on the 25th Division between dusk and midnight.
Simultaneous with frontal assaults on the 35th
Infantry at the left, forces of the 29th Division apparently
coming out of the adjacent sector of the 7th Infantry to the west drew close enough to place fire on the regimental command post and supporting artillery units. On the right, Chinese penetrated and scattered the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry. Unable to restore the position, General Bradley pulled the 24th Infantry and 27th Infantry onto a new line about a mile to the south but gained no respite as the Chinese followed closely:25
In the 24th Division sector at corps right,
two companies of Chinese infiltrated the positions of the 19th Infantry during
the night. But a greater danger was posed by the 60th Division, which, after
again routing the ROK 6th Division, reached and attacked the right flank of the
21st Infantry. The 21st bent its line and tied it to the position of its reserve
battalion on the flank. But the 60th,
if it should shift to the south past the refused
flank and the blocking position set up by the battalion of the 5th Infantry,
could slip into the division and corps rear area through the big opening created
by the ROK 6th Division's second retreat.26
Because of this danger on his exposed right
flank, the continuing and effective heavy pressure on the 25th Division, and the
threat of a major enemy penetration through the wide gap between the ROK 1st
Division and 3d Division, General Milburn at 0500 on the 25th ordered a withdrawal to line
Delta, which, as set out in previously prepared corps plans, lay four to twelve
miles, west to east, below line Kansas. He instructed the 24th and 25th
Divisions to begin their withdrawals at 0800 but directed the ROK 1st Division
and 3d Division not to withdraw until the surrounded Gloster battalion had been
extricated. He specifically instructed General Soule to get the Glosters out
before withdrawing, "even if you have to counterattack."27
Withdrawal to Line Delta
East of the
Imjin
With the Yongp'yong River at its back, the
25th Division faced a canalized withdrawal over two bridges in the southeastern
corner of its sector, one on Route 3, the other at Yongp'yong town two miles to
the west. Earlier, after the Chinese had captured Hill 664 three miles directly
north of the Route 3 crossing, General Bradley had set the 3d Battalion, 27th
Infantry, in a blocking position above the bridge. For the withdrawal he ordered
all of the 27th Infantry to cover both river crossings while first the 24th
Infantry and then the 35th Infantry pulled back, the 24th using the Route 3
bridge, the 35th using the crossing at Yongp'yong town. To cover the withdrawing
27th Infantry, Bradley deployed his attached Turkish brigade astride Route 3
five miles below the Yongp'yong River. Despite the
difficulty of withdrawing while heavily engaged, Bradley's forces succeeded in
breaking contact with small losses. By early evening the 27th Infantry and 35th
Infantry were deployed on line Delta, left to right, with the Turkish brigade
and 24th Infantry assembled close behind the line.28
In the 24th Division sector, General Bryan
deployed the 5th Infantry astride secondary Route 3A three miles behind line
Kansas to cover the withdrawal of the 19th and 21st Regiments. Attached to the
5th in support were its usual companion, the 555th Field Artillery Battalion,
and Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion. Also directed by Bryan to join the
covering force was the 8th Ranger Company, which, as an attachment to the 21st
Infantry, had been patrolling to the east in search of Chinese coming out of the
IX Corps sector and currently was in an isolated position atop Hill 1010 about a
half mile off the right flank of the 21st. But before the Rangers could make
their move, they were surrounded and attacked by forces of the 60th Division. The 3d Battalion,
5th Infantry, which Bryan earlier had placed in a blocking position along his
east flank, meanwhile observed Chinese moving south and west past its
position.29 The
60th Division obviously had found and was moving into the open flank.
First the 19th Infantry, then the 21st
Infantry, broke contact and withdrew without difficulty. By 1830 both regiments
were in position on line Delta and were deployed as before, the 19th on the
left, the 21st on the right. Once on Delta, the 21st Infantry was engaged by
Chinese moving in from the northeast but turned back these forces with no loss
of ground. Later in the evening the 21st made contact with the ROK 6th Division,
which General Hoge had managed to redeploy at the left of the IX Corps sector of
the Delta line.30
Lt. Col. Arthur H. Wilson, Jr., who had
recently replaced Colonel Throckmorton as the 5th Infantry commander, was forced
to delay his withdrawal until the 8th Ranger Company, which was attempting to
fight its way out of its encircled position, reached him. To assist the attempt,
Wilson sent five tanks toward Hill 1010. En route, the tankers met and took
aboard sixty-five Rangers, most of them wounded. They were all who had survived
the breakout attempt.31
It was late afternoon before the tankers
returned with the Rangers and Colonel Wilson got his forces in march order for
withdrawing down Route 3A through the positions of the 19th Infantry and into an
assembly area four miles behind line Delta. The 3d Battalion led the way south,
followed by the 555th Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Battalion, 2d Battalion,
and, as rear guard, Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion. A few mortar rounds
exploded around the 3d Battalion as it cleared a defile about a half mile from
the Delta front. Battalion members assumed that these were registration rounds fired by the 19th Infantry. Actually,
they were the opening shots of a large Chinese force occupying the ridges along
both sides of the road from the defile north for more than a mile. A crescendo
of Chinese small arms, machine gun, recoilless rifle, and mortar fire brought
the remainder of Colonel Wilson's column to an abrupt halt and began to take a
toll of men, weapons, and vehicles.32
Hardest hit was the 555th Field Artillery
Battalion. Its return fire, including direct fire from its howitzers, silenced
the Chinese along the west side of the road; but the fire from obviously larger
numbers of Chinese on the east side grew in volume and kept most of Wilson's
column pinned down. Three attacks by forces of the 1st Battalion were broken up,
as was an attempt by the 2d Battalion to deploy. An attack from the south by
Company A, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, and a company from the 19th Infantry
failed at the narrow lower end of the defile at a cost of two tanks and the
infantrymen riding them.33
Searching for a way around the roadblock,
rearguard tankers from Company D meanwhile found a track branching west off
Route 3A a mile north of the defile and a connecting road leading south to be
free of Chinese. Moving out under continuing fire, but not pursued by the Chinese,
Wilson's forces followed the roundabout route and escaped without further
losses, reaching the lines of the 19th Infantry shortly after dark. During the
night, aircraft and artillery bombarded the weapons, vehicles, and equipment
left behind: seven tanks, five from Company D, 6th Medium Tank Battalion, and
two from the 5th Infantry's regimental tank company; eleven howitzers from the
555th Field Artillery Battalion; and a host of trucks, more than sixty from the
555th alone. The artillerymen also suffered the most personnel casualties. The
initial count was one hundred killed, wounded, and missing, a figure somewhat
reduced later as stragglers regained 24th Division lines over the next two
days.34
Hill 235
No longer concerned with maintaining the 3d
Division's line Kansas positions along the Imjin after receiving General
Milburn's early morning withdrawal order, General Soule immediately canceled the
attack by the 65th Infantry originally scheduled to start at 0630 to relieve the
Gloster battalion and clear enemy forces from the Hill 675 area. The latest
report from the 29th Brigade, in any case, indicated that the Glosters were
holding their own, that they had "asked for some Arty but OK."35 To
rescue the Glosters, the main task seemed only to be to clear Route 5Y and
escort the battalion to the rear. More worrisome to General Soule was
a report that a large Chinese force (which would have
had to be the 189th Division) coming through the gap between the ROK 1st and 3d Divisions was
bypassing the 3d Division on the left and moving southeast toward Route 33, the
division's main line of communication. During the early morning Soule dispatched
the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 65th Infantry, the Philippine 10th Battalion
Combat Team, and the 3d Reconnaissance Company to take up positions athwart what
appeared to be the line of march of the enemy force to prevent it from reaching
the road. Since the Royal Ulster Rifle and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions
seemed certain to have difficulty in withdrawing with Route 11 now interdicted
by Chinese behind them, Soule left the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, in position
west of the 29th Brigade's command post to help cover the two battalions when
they came south. Brigadier Brodie strengthened the cover by deploying the
Belgian battalion across Route 11 just north of his command post. Except that
the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, might be diverted from its covering mission,
Soule by daylight on the 25th had committed all reserves available to him except
the division's 64th Tank Battalion and the 65th Infantry's tank company. Any
force formed to rescue the Glosters would have to be from these units. Soule
assigned that task as a joint venture to Brigadier Brodie and Colonel Harris,
commander of the 65th Infantry.36
Shortly after giving Brodie and Harris
responsibility for organizing the rescue mission, Soule allowed the 7th
Infantry, which remained under attack by the 29th Division and whose right flank
would soon be completely uncovered by the withdrawal of the 25th Division, to
begin its withdrawal. The 2d Battalion, already off the line, led the
withdrawal, while the 3d Battalion pulled out of its left flank position and
followed a trail leading southwest behind the covering 1st Battalion to reach
Route 33 and continue south. Company A fought a difficult but highly effective
rearguard action as the 1st Battalion disengaged near noon.37
Meanwhile, at 0800 Brigadier Brodie and
Colonel Harris were still conferring at Brodie's command post to decide the
composition of the rescue force. Concerned because the force was not yet on the
way, Brig. Gen. A. D. Mead, assistant division commander, joined the conference
at that time and emphasized the need for speed. Colonel Harris responded that he
understood his mission perfectly and that, if left alone, he and Brodie would
handle it.38
Major Huth, the British tank company
commander who had participated in the unsuccessful attempt to reach the Glosters
the day before, tried but failed to convince Colonel Harris that tanks would not
be able to reach the Glosters unless accompanied by a strong infantry force.
Harris' final decision, with which Brodie agreed, was
that the task called for light tanks only. Capt. Claude Smith, whose 65th
Infantry tank company thus was assigned the mission, wanted to use his entire
company. But Harris believed that one platoon was all that could be profitably
employed. Harris assured General Mead, however, that he was prepared to follow
up with greater strength if necessary.39
The tank platoon, short one tank left
behind for maintenance, started up Route 5Y after 0900. (Map 34)
Apparently out of a belated interest in speed, the tankers moved out before an
observer from the 10th Field Artillery Battalion, which was to have supported
the operation, could join them. Nor were the tankers in communication with the
regimental command post.40 The single source of reports on the
platoon's progress was a division observer periodically flying
overhead.41
Map 34. The
British 29th Brigade Sector, 25 April 1951
About the time that Captain Smith's tanks
began advancing toward the Gloster battalion, General Kang, the ROK 1st Division
commander, attempted a similar but somewhat stronger move, sending the 2d
Battalion of his 12th Regiment and two platoons of Company C, 73d Heavy Tank
Battalion, north to restore the right flank position lost by the 12th Regiment
on the 24th and then to make contact with the Glosters. Under way before 0900, the ROK battalion and American
tanks moved up the valley of the small Nullori River for perhaps a mile before
Chinese forces from heights edging the valley opened fire and brought the
advance to a halt. As of noon, the fire fight continued, with neither side
gaining the deciding edge.42 But although General Kang's attempt to
reach the Glosters had been stopped, it would shortly prove not to have failed
altogether.
The air observer following the progress of
the 65th Infantry's tank platoon on Route 5Y meanwhile reported that the tanks
had reached the Glosters and that they were on the way out. But the report was
incorrect. The tankers had got into a fire fight far short of Hill 235, had used
most of their ammunition, and, fearing they would be cut off when they sighted
Chinese moving on their flanks, had withdrawn, reaching their company area
between noon and 1300. Colonel Harris ordered another try by a different
platoon, which, accompanied by an artillery observer and tactical air control
party and escorted overhead by two flights of fighters and an observer, left
about 1400. A mile out of the company area, the platoon was flagged to a halt by
Major Huth, the British tank company commander, who convinced the platoon leader
that the light tanks could not reach Hill 235. As Colonel Harris decided against
any further attempt and withdrew his tanks, there was, in any case, little
reason to try again. Hours before, almost immediately after the early morning
planning conference with Colonel Harris, Brigadier
Brodie had taken private steps to get the Glosters out. Though he had voiced
agreement that the employment of a tank platoon was the practical solution to
opening Route 5Y for the battalion, he apparently was unconvinced that the small
armored force could succeed and about 0900 had ordered the Glosters to fight
their way back. Brodie followed with orders to the Royal Ulster Rifles and
Northumberland Fusilier Battalions to withdraw south over Route 11 through the
covering Belgian battalion.43 Once the Glosters, Royal Ulster Rifles, and Northumberland
Fusiliers reached the 29th Brigade command post area, the brigade was to move
back to the Delta line. But the withdrawals of all three battalions would take
decidedly different courses.
From its outset at midmorning the
withdrawal of the Royal Ulster Rifles and Northumberland Fusilier Battalions was
a fight to the rear with Chinese storming down on Route 11 from the Hill 675
area. To escape the Chinese, most of the British troops turned east off Route 11
and made their way out over open country. Worse off were some two hundred
wounded loaded on the backs and sides of eight Centurion tanks, which had no
choice but to run the gauntlet. Several tanks were disabled, and most of their
passengers were killed. Caught up in the fight, the Belgian battalion became
scattered but held its ground. Late in the afternoon Brigadier Brodie finally
succeeded in breaking contact and started his somewhat tangled forces, including the
Belgians but not the Glosters, toward line Delta. As the 29th Brigade cleared,
the 3d Battalion, 65th Infantry, briefly engaged Chinese near its blocking
position, then broke away and followed the British brigade.44 The
isolated Gloster battalion meanwhile had attempted
its breakout, the course of which was not yet clear to anyone in Brodie's
headquarters or that of the 3d Division.
British 29th Infantry Brigade Rest Following Difficult Retreat From the Imjin River
On Hill 235, during the continuing quiet
that had settled over the Gloster position following the devastating air strike
on the Chinese by the flight of F-80s, Colonel Carne had issued orders for the
battalion's withdrawal about 0930. If he knew that the 65th Infantry tank
platoon was then starting up Route 5Y toward him, he eschewed any attempt to
move south to meet it. Off the left rear of the battalion was a valley leading
upslope to a saddle about a mile southwest of Hill 235. Carne did not know the
exact location of the 12th ROK Regiment's position, nor did he know
that the 2d Battalion of the regiment and the two platoons of Company C, 73d
Heavy Tank Battalion, were then attacking generally toward him. But he believed
that moving southwest through the valley toward the right flank of the ROK 1st
Division would be the quickest way to reach safety and, if the Glosters could
make it through the saddle, that they would have a good chance of making it all
the way. With the 45th Field Regiment providing artillery support on call,
Company A was to lead the withdrawal about 1000, Company C and battalion
headquarters and support troops were to follow, and Company D was to bring up
the rear. When Carne announced that he would remain on Hill 235 with the
severely wounded men (about fifty litter cases), the battalion surgeon,
chaplain, and several enlisted medics volunteered to stay with
him.45
Since Chinese had been observed in that
area during the past two days, Company D commander Capt. M. G. Harvey considered
the valley a risky route, particularly for his company, which would be bringing
up the rear of the battalion. Even if Chinese were not on the heights bordering
the valley, he reasoned, they might be near enough to spot the Gloster movement
and set up a trap before Company D could clear the saddle. He preferred to try
the unexpected, to move forward off the steep northeast side of Hill 235 where
the Chinese had attempted no assault, follow Route 5Y for about a mile, swing
west through a lateral valley around the hill mass through which the remainder
of the battalion would attempt to pass, then turn
south through another valley toward the ROK 1st Division's lines. As Company A
led the rest of the battalion into the valley to the southwest, Captain Harvey
gave his men, including a dozen members of the support company who had been
operating with Company D, the choice of surrendering or going with him on the
roundabout route. If a man went down, Harvey warned, he would be left behind.
The entire group, about a hundred men, elected the escape attempt. If Colonel
Carne knew of Harvey's plan, he did not object. All Glosters, in any case, would
now be entirely on their own since, just as they began their withdrawal, Carne
received word from brigade headquarters- the last his feeble radio would pick
up- that the 45th Field Regiment was under too heavy fire to provide
support.46
A few minutes after the Glosters moving
into the valley to the southwest cleared Hill 235, Captain Harvey led his group
off the north side of the hill. All men had taken off their distinctive berets
to prevent easy identification by Chinese who might observe them. Moving
alternately at a trot and fast walk, they encountered only two Chinese, whom
they killed, on the northern leg of their route and none on the milelong stretch
to the west. At the point of turning south, Harvey offered his men a breather,
but they refused: They were determined, he recalled later, "to come out or get
bloody killed." Appearing overhead as they turned to enter the valley leading
south was a Mosquito plane whose pilot waggled wings in
recognition and stayed overhead to guide the column toward the 12th ROK
Regiment.47
About a mile into the valley, as Harvey's
group entered a narrow stretch, thirty or more Chinese riflemen and machine
gunners opened fire from the bordering ridges and chased the Glosters into the
nearest cover, a muddy ditch about a foot deep. As they crawled through the
ditch, the Mosquito pilot's call brought in fighter planes which worked over the
ridges but scarcely dampened the Chinese fire. At intervals the ditch petered
out, forcing Harvey and his men to dash forward to the next segment. In each
instance, Glosters were hit.48
Negotiating a slight bend in the ditch, the
Glosters were spurred on by the sight of American tanks a half mile or so down
the valley engaged in a fire fight with Chinese on the flanking hills. Spotting
the crawling troops a short time later, the tankers- the two platoons of Company
C, 73d Heavy Tank Battalion- mistook the muddied, hatless Glosters for enemy and
opened fire with machine guns and cannon. Six men were hit before the Mosquito
pilot overhead could drop a note identifying the approaching
troops.49
The tank company commander with several
tanks set out immediately to meet the Glosters. With the wounded inside and
others either trotting alongside or riding on the rear of the tanks, the two
platoons sprayed the hills to either side with heavy
machine gun fire as they escorted the survivors of Harvey's group to safety
behind the 2d Battalion, 12th ROK Regiment. A total of forty- Captain Harvey,
three other officers, and thirty-six men- were rescued.50
During the time that General Kang's
infantrytank group had moved up the Nullori valley and returned with the
Glosters about 1400, his 11th and 15th Regiments had fought off hard attacks by
forces, estimated at three regiments, of the 190th
and 192d Divisions.
As the Chinese attacks weakened and then faded
out around 1630, Kang pulled his division back to line Delta, setting the tank
destroyer battalion, 11th Regiment, and 15th Regiment on line and placing the
12th Regiment in reserve. To his east was the 65th Infantry, which after making
no contact with any large Chinese force advancing toward Route 33 had moved on
to the Delta line. General Milburn meanwhile released General Soule's 15th
Infantry from corps reserve in exchange for the tattered 29th British Brigade.
Soule set the 15th next to the 65th Infantry on line Delta and placed the 1st
Battalion, 7th Infantry, on the right flank of the 3d Division front while
keeping the remainder of the 7th in division reserve.51
As the 3d Division occupied positions along
line Delta, General Soule's only information on the condition and location of
the remainder of the Gloster battalion was a noontime report from a division observer flying over the Hill 235
area. "At CT 182005," the observer reported, "approximately 225 29th BIB
soldiers are located. They act as [if] they are lost. They walked to the end of
the road, found a dead end-returned to their present positions and set [sic]
down."52
The observer unwittingly had reported the
capture of the Glosters in the southwest valley. The "road" he mentioned was a
trail leading up to the saddle, the "dead end" the saddle itself. When the head
of the Gloster column reached the saddle, Chinese machine gunners cupped around
it opened fire, wounding several men but generally laying off the column. The
fire informed the Glosters that they were trapped. On orders from their
officers, the Glosters laid down arms. Chinese appearing from the heights above
them, uncertain about what to do with so many captives, initially took the
Glosters back down the trail and motioned to them to sit
down.53
At the beginning of the Chinese offensive
the Gloster battalion had numbered 28 officers and 671 men. In the Solma-ri area
to support the battalion were 6 officers and 22 men of the 70th Battery, Royal
Artillery, and 1 officer and 45 men of C Troop, 170th Mortar Battery, Royal
Artillery. In its initial accounting of losses, 29th Brigade headquarters
reported that 622 of these forces were "either KIA, WIA, or missing." Most of
the reported casualties later proved captured. From the Gloster battalion
itself, 21 officers and 509 men were taken captive, of whom 8 officers and 145
men had been wounded. Two officers and 24 men would
die in captivity.54 The high number of Glosters captured served to
emphasize how thoroughly entrapped by Chinese Colonel Carne's forces had become.
When General Ridgway demanded a formal
report on the loss of the Gloster battalion, General Van Fleet replied that in
his opinion, "all reasonable and possible courses of action" had been attempted
to save the unit. The failure of relief efforts he attributed to the strength
and determination of the Chinese attacks, the Chinese capability to exploit
early penetrations by infiltration and enveloping actions, and the limited
reserves available to General Milburn, General Soule, and Brigadier Brodie with
which to counter enemy successes.55 While he believed that the
Gloster position had had to be held as long as possible lest Chinese pour into
the 3d Division and I Corps rear areas, Van Fleet privately faulted General
Soule for tardiness in discovering how critical the Glosters' situation had
become and thus for failing to make timely decisions on when and how to relieve
the battalion.56
General Milburn found little fault with
either Soule or Brigadier Brodie, although in a report to Van Fleet he drew
particular attention to the confusion of instructions surrounding the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team's
unsuccessful attempt to reach the Glosters on 24 April. "It appears," he
nevertheless told Van Fleet, "that every effort was made to reach the Gloster
battalion when conditions over the remainder of the front are
considered."57
In line with Van Fleet's private
conclusions, General Soule admitted to not having been aware of the Glosters'
true situation. Had he known the truth on 24 April, he said later, he would have
taken command and pushed troops up Route 5Y to the battalion's position. At the
time, he explained, he had believed that Brigadier Brodie had enough force in
the Filipino battalion and supporting tanks to reach the Glosters, especially
since Brodie did not ask for additional help while preparing to send the 10th
Battalion Combat Team forward or while it was en route. Soule himself could not
have taken a hand to prevent the withdrawal of the Filipino battalion since he
was out of touch with Brodie's operation at the time, having gone to the sector
of the hard-hit 7th Infantry.58
Brigadier Brodie took, as he put it, "50%
responsibility" for failing to make clear to General Soule how serious the
Gloster battalion's situation had become on 24 April.
In Brodie's judgment, the 24th was the latest date on which the Glosters could
have been rescued. This opinion accounted for his disinterest in the plan to
send a tank platoon forward on the morning of the 25th and his consequent order
to the Glosters to attempt to break out of their surrounded position. Brodie, in
reviewing the action, was complimentary toward, not critical of, American
efforts to help the Gloster battalion.59 But behind his unwillingness
to assume full responsibility for informing General Soule of the battalion's
critical situation was perhaps a belief that Soule should have shown more
initiative in finding out for himself.
General Ridgway assessed the operation as
an example of the failure of a leader to know his men. Brigadier Brodie, Ridgway
believed, should have known that the Gloster commander, Colonel Carne, was much
given to quiet understatement and that his reports thus did not reflect the
seriousness of the battalion's circumstances. Brodie himself should have
determined the correct situation and should have sent or asked for help sooner.
In sum, as Ridgway told Brodie personally, "the Gloster battalion should not
have been lost."60
Notes
1 Futrell, The United
States Air Force in Korea, pp. 334-35; Montross,
Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central
Front, pp. 103, 108; Field, United States Naval
Operations, Korea, p. 346.
2 Futrell, The United
States Air Force in Korea, pp. 336-37; Montross,
Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central
Front, p. 108; 1 Corps, Rpt, The Communist First
Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 18.
3 I Corps, Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 19-20; Barth, Tropic Lightning and
Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
4 This paragraph and the one
following are based on Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp.
35-47.
5 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 1 Corps Report on Action (Johnson, G3), 3 May 51.
6 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 48, 52, 60, and 69, 24 Apr 51;
Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire
Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 14 May
51); Interv, Appleman with Maj Henry Huth, CO, C Sqn, 8th Hussars, copy in CMH;
3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51.
7 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 52, 24
Apr 51; Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 81-82.
8 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 80
and 96, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 5 May 51, sub: Report of
Action Involving the Loss of Gloucestershire Battalion, 29th British Brigade,
Tab A, I Corps Report on Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23,
24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51.
9 3d Div OI 15-13, 24 Apr 51;
3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 80, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May
51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 13 (Memo to CG
fr Brig Gen A. D. Mead, Dept CG, 3d Div, 7 May 51).
10 Interv, Appleman with Gen
Soule, 8 Sep 51, copy in CMH; Eighth Army CG Jnl, 24 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to
CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub; Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr
51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 13 (Memo to CG fr Brig Gen A. D. Mead, Dept CG,
3d Div, 7 May 51); 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 96, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr
51; Interv, Appleman with Huth.
11 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 109 and 138, 24 Apr 51; Interv,
Appleman with Huth.
12 Later investigation of the
withdrawal order came to no clear conclusion. There was no brigade journal
record of its issue, and no one at headquarters could recall its scope or
exactly who gave it. Available evidence indicates that the order did apply to
the entire force. The 3d Division G-3 Journal for 24 April 1951, Entry 129, for
example, records an evening report from the 29th Brigade stating in part that
the "relief force of 10th BCT and Tks have been ordered back."
13 Interv, Appleman with Huth; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG
Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51,
and Incl 5 (Statement of Col O. P. Newman, CofS, 3d Inf Div); Interv, Appleman
with Soule, 8 Sep 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 129, 24 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with
Capt M. G. Harvey, CO, Co D, 1st Bn, the Gloucestershire Regiment, 10 Sep 51.
14 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 47-50; Holies, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 163; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army,
15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 8 (Memo,
G4, 3d Div, to CG, 3d Div, 9 May 51, sub: Air Drop
for Gloucester Battalion).
15 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge
of the Sword, pp. 49-53.
16 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 23; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51;
Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0040, 24 Apr 51; 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy
Operations in the 29th BIB Sector During the Period 211800 to 251800 Apr 51, 9
May 51.
17 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries
0745 and 1515, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 286, 24 Apr 51; Eighth Army POR, 24
Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
18 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Rpt, The
Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 23; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry
2330, 24 Apr 51.
19 Heretofore lacking a truly
effective capacity for radar-directed night attacks, the Fifth Air Force now had
an MPQ radar detachment in support of each U.S. corps-one north of Seoul, one
near Hongch'on, and one near Wonju-and the system now worked with B-29s as well
as B-26s. See Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, pp. 328-30.
20 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 23-24;1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51;
Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean Army, 1952.
21 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge
of the Sword, pp. 52-64.
22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 158, 159, and 165, 24 Apr 51, and Entries 9, 20, 28,
30, 33, 40, and 50, 25 Apr 51.
23 The 7th Infantry later
estimated that it had been hit by forces from two divisions. See 7th Inf Comd
Rpt, Nar, Apr 51. If a second division was involved, it probably was the 34th
which also had participated in the initial attacks at line Utah.
24 3d Div, G2, Summary of
Enemy Operations, 21-25 Apr 51, 9 May 51; 3d Div POR 160, 24 Apr 51, and 161, 25
Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
25 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20-21;
Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro Leaf in Korea, pp. 80-81.
26 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 19; 24th Div
PIR 286, 24 Apr 51.
27 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 24; 1 Corps Withdrawal Plan "Golden"
#1, 17 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 0500, 25 Apr 51; Rad, Eighth Army AG In
no. CX 4329, CG I Corps to CG 3d Div et al., 25 Apr 51 (confirms oral orders);
3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 40, 25 Apr 51. Quotation is from last source.
28 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 20,
26.
29 Ibid., p. 24; 555th FA Bn
Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; 21st Inf S3 Jnl,
Entries 0421, 0650, 0750, and 0820, 25 Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj
Hamilton), 3d Bn, 5th RCT.
30 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51,
p. 25; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
31 New York Post, 26 May 51;
Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton).
32 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, p. 25: New York Post, 26 May 51;
Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 6th
Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51.
33 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Interv, Appleman
with Lt Col Harry E. Stuart, CO, 555th FA Bn, 9 Aug 51; 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt,
S3 Nar, Apr 51; Interv, Appleman with S2 (Maj Hamilton); New York Post, 26 May
51.
34 6th Med Tk Bn Comd Rpt, S3 Nar, Apr 51; Interv,
Appleman with Stuart, 9 Aug 51; Interv, Appleman with Lt Edward P. Crockett,
Plat Ldr, 5th Inf Regtl Tk Co; 555th FA Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 28, 25
Apr 51.
36 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 3d Div G3 Rpt, Nar of Opus, Apr 51; 65th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51;
Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division in Korea, p. 198; Rpt, CG 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25
Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available to CG, 3d Inf Div.
37 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 3d Div POR 161, 25 Apr 51; 7th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Gugeler,
Combat Actions in Korea, pp. 144-53 (revised edition, 1970). See the last for a detailed
account and appraisal of Company A's rear-guard action.
38 Memo, Brig Gen A. D. Mead
for CG, 3d Inf Div, 7 May 51.
39 Ibid.; Intervs, Appleman
with Huth, Capt Claude Smith, CO, 65th Inf Tk Co, and 1st Lt Myron Dushkin, 65th
Inf Tk Co.
40 At the end of the slow
planning session, Colonel Harris explained to General Mead that he had been
unable to dispatch the tanks sooner because of the arrangements that had had to
be made for communications and supporting fire. See Memo, Brig Gen A. D. Mead
for CG, 3d Inf Div, 7 May 51.
41 Intervs, Appleman with
Smith and Lt Col Alvin L. Newbury, CO, 10th FA Bn.
42 I Corps Report on Action of
Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51; 73d Hvy Tk
Bn Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
43 Interv, Appleman with
Newbury; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 90 and 128, 25 Apr 51. See also Intervs,
Appleman with Smith; Sgt Young Gladden, Jr., 65th Inf Tk Co; Dushkin; Huth; and
Brig Brodie, 10 Sep 51.
44 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 52
and 93, 25 Apr 51; 3d Div, G3, Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51, 14 May
51; 3d Div, G2, Summary of Enemy Operations, 21-25 Apr 51, 9 May 51; Ely Jacques
Kahn, The Gloucesters: An Account of the Epic
Stand of the Gloucestershire Regiment in Korea (London: Central Office of Information, 1951), p. 11; Holies,
Now Thrive the Armourers, pp. 166-67; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire
Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Annex 9, Reserves Available to CG, 3d Inf Div.
45 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge
of the Sword, pp. 64-67.
46 Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on
actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors;
Interv, Appleman with Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, The Gloucesters,
pp. 13-15; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the
Sword, pp. 64-67.
47 Interv, Appleman with
Harvey, 10 Sep 51; Kahn, The
Gloucesters, pp. 13-15.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors.
50 73d Hvy Tk Bn Comd Rpt,
Nar, Apr 51; Rpt, CG, 3d Inf Div, on actions of the Gloucestershire Battalion,
22-25 Apr 51, Interv with Survivors.
51 I Corps Rpt, The Communist
First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51, pp. 26-27; 65th Inf S3 Jnl, 25 Apr 51,
Results of Events; 3d Div POR 161, 25 Apr 51; 15th Inf Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51.
52 3d Div G2 Jnl, Entry 828,
25 Apr 51.
53 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge
of the Sword, pp. 64-67.
54 Msg, Maj-Gen Anthony
Farrar-Hockley thru British Embassy (Brig-Gen Watson) for author, 10 Aug 76;
Ltr, Maj-Gen Anthony Farrar-Hockley to author, 16 Sep 76; I Corps Report on
Action of Gloster Battalion, 29th British Brigade, 23, 24, 25 Apr 51, 3 May 51.
55 Rad, C 61606, CINCFE to CG
Eighth Army, 3 May 51; Ltr, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 26 May 51, sub: Report of
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51.
56 Interv, Appleman with Van
Fleet, 15 Sep 51.
57 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG
Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51.
58 Interv, Appleman with
Soule, 8 Sep 51.
59 Ibid. with Brodie, 10 Sep
51.
60 Interv, Mossman, Carroll,
and Miller with Ridgway, 30 Nov 56.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
