The Chinese Spring Offensive
According to information accumulated by UNC
intelligence, the enemy high command during the course of the New Year's
offensive had decided to use the People's Air
Force in support of future ground
operations.1 In addition to more MIG-15s, the Chinese acquired enough
Ilyushin (IL-10) ground-attack planes by March to equip at least two air
regiments, and they held a special airground training conference in Mukden. The
air commander, Liu Ya-lou, meanwhile had worked to develop Korean airfields on
which to base supporting aircraft. He began this project at the turn of the year
after his superiors forbade him to mount massed air attacks on UNC troops and
installations from Manchurian fields for fear of concerted
retaliation.2 To get the Korean air bases he needed,
Liu had planned to establish air superiority over northwestern Korea and then to
repair and improve air facilities in the protected region. Since the MIG-15s and
IL-10s were short range aircraft, he also planned to restore forward airfields
near the 38th parallel through which to stage them.
Liu was handed control of the air between
the Yalu and Ch'ongch'on rivers in January, when the Fifth Air Force demolished
its forward fields at Kimpo and Suwon during the New Year's offensive and
redeployed all jet fighters to Japan. Even by staging through other fields in
southern Korea, the jets' range was too short to hold air superiority in the far
northwest. Only in the first week of March was the Suwon field sufficiently
repaired to allow jets to stage through it and reenter MIG Alley, and only at
the end of the month could the Fifth Air Force compete with Liu's forces on near
even terms.
Enemy troops and civilian labor forces
meanwhile began rehabilitating airfield runways and constructing revetments for
aircraft. Under the MIG umbrella in the northwest they improved fields at
Sinuiju, Uiju, and Sinanju. Outside the MIG cover they worked on a cluster of
fields in and around Pyongyang, the fields at Wonsan and Yonp'o on the east
coast, and four forward fields on the Hwanghae peninsula below P'yongyang.
Far East Air Forces reconnaissance
discovered Liu's work in February. Bomber Command prepared plans for attacks on
the fields, but Brig. Gen. James E. Briggs (who had replaced General O'Donnell
in January) believed the fields could not be destroyed once and for all because
of the large repair crews available to the enemy high command. He elected to
withhold B-29 strikes until the fields were about to become operational. He
intended to bomb the fields out of action at that time and to keep them
neutralized with attacks just heavy enough and frequent enough to offset
repairs. Aerial photographs showed the fields almost ready to receive aircraft
near mid-April, and Briggs delivered repeated attacks between the 17th and 23d,
concentrating on the forward fields and those in and around P'yongyang. The
strikes stymied Liu's plans and preparations. At least there would be no air
support during the spring offensive.
The Ground Plan
The immediate objective of the ground
attack was Seoul, whose capture Peng Tehhuai reportedly promised to Mao Tse-tung
as a May Day gift. Peng planned to converge on the city, employing principally
his fresh III, IX and XIX Army Groups,
a force of about two hundred seventy thousand
men. From above the Imjin on the west wing of the main effort, the XIX Army Group was to attack
southeast toward Seoul, crossing the river on a twelve-mile front centered on
the Korangp'o-ri bend and advancing on the capital through a narrowing zone
between Routes 1 and 33. (Map 32) The group commander, Yang Teh-chih, planned to cross the Imjin
with two armies, the 64th between Route 1 and the town of Korangp'ori, the 63d between Korangp'o-ri and the
confluence of the Imjin and Hant'an rivers. Yang's deployment would pit the
64th Army against
the bulk of the ROK 1st Division and the 63d Army
against the British 29th Brigade occupying the
left half of the 3d Infantry Division's sector.4
Map 32. The
Chinese Spring Offensive, the Main Effort, 22-30 April 1951
Out of the ground between the Imjin and
Ch'orwon, the III Army Group was to advance south on the Route 33 axis, its three armies
attacking abreast in columns of divisions. Nearest the Imjin, the 15th Army had a narrow zone
between the river and Route 33 projecting through the area occupied by the 65th
Infantry. Along Route 33 and east of it, the 12th
Army and 60th Army
at group center and left were to attack through
ground held by the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team on the right flank of
the 3d Division and through the Pogae-san ridges occupied by the Turkish brigade
and 24th Infantry in the sector of the 25th Infantry Division.5
On the left of the main effort, the IX
Army Group was to advance southwest out of the
Kumhwa area, guiding on Route 3. Sung Shihlun, the group commander, set the
27th Army on his right for an attack astride Route 3. The 27th
thus initially would be advancing in a zone centered on the boundary between
the 25th and 24th Divisions. Similarly, the 20th Army on the group's left
would attack athwart the I-IX Corps boundary through portions of the 24th
Division and ROK 6th Division sectors.6
Peng's plan included auxiliary attacks
along each flank of the main effort and another east of the Hwach'on Reservoir.
In the west, the North Korean I Corps was to move southeast toward Seoul over Route 1 and through the ground
between the road and the Han River, but its leading forces displacing forward
from behind the Yesong River would not reach the Imjin in time to participate in
the opening attack on the ROK 1st Division. In the area adjacent to the Hwach'on
Dam, the somewhat worn 39th and 40th Armies of the XIII Army
Group were to assist with holding attacks on either side of Route 17 in the
eastern portion of the ROK 6th Division's sector and the sector of the 1st
Marine Division.7
In what would be essentially a separate
effort east of the Hwach'on Reservoir, North Korean forces were to strike for
Yanggu and Inje, where breakthroughs could open up Routes 29 and 24 leading
southwestward to Ch'unch'on and Hongch'on. The North Korean III Corps, whose 1st, 15th, and 45th Divisions
had been holding the entire eastern front except
for the coastal area, had sidestepped westward into a narrow zone abutting on
the reservoir for the attack in the Yanggu area. Moving south through the upper
Soyang River valley from its assembly at Komisong, the North Korean V
Corps had deployed in the vacated ground for the attack toward Inje. The
V Corps commander, General Pang, chose to
attack with his seasoned, if understrength, 6th and 12th Divisions,
keeping in reserve the 32d, a nearly full strength but green division
that had replaced the 7th while the corps was in Komisong.8
III Corps commander General Yu elected a different course, committing
only the 45th Division in what would be its first offensive of the war,
perhaps because it had the virtue of eighty-six hundred men, more than twice the
strength of either of Yu's other divisions. The deployment of the 45th
Division set it against the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division at the edge of
the reservoir above Yanggu and the 17th and 32d Infantry Regiments of the 7th
Division in the adjacent ground to the east. On the opposite wing of the North
Korean effort, the 6th Division faced the ROK 3d Division. At center, the
12th Division was poised for an attack in a zone straddling the X
Corps-ROK III Corps boundary and leading directly to Inje.9
Panic at the IX Corps Left
During the afternoon of 22 April, IX Corps airborne artillery observers located
and brought down fire on a large enemy force concentrated ahead of the ROK 6th
Division. Anticipating an attack, General Chang halted his division's advance
toward line Wyoming about 1600 and ordered his forward regiments, the 19th and
2d, to develop defensive positions tied in with each other and with the 24th
Division and 1st Marine Division on their respective outside flanks. Chang moved
his reserve 7th Regiment into supporting positions immediately behind the 2d
Regiment, ahead of which more enemy forces had been observed than ahead of the
19th Regiment. Placing reserves so close to the front went against the
recommendation of his KMAG adviser, but Chang intended that this show of support
would counter uneasiness that had begun to spread among his line forces at word
of a probable Chinese attack.10
General Hoge moved three corps artillery
units forward during the afternoon to help the 1st Marine Division and, in
particular, to reinforce the support being given the ROK 6th Division by the New
Zealand artillery; Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar Battalion; and the division's
own 27th Field Artillery Battalion. The corps' latest ground gains had opened
Route 17 in the 1st Marine Division's sector far enough north to allow use of a
twisting, narrowly confined valley road branching west off Route 17 near the
village of Chich'on-ni into the ROK 6th Division's rear area. The 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion moved up
Route 17 and out the minor road to the west edge of the Marine sector from where
its 155mm. self-propelled howitzers could support both the marines and the South
Koreans. The 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and 2d Rocket Field
Artillery Battery, both equipped with 105mm. howitzers, used the winding valley
road to reach the right half of the ROK sector, where they took position behind
the 7th Regiment near the South Korean artillery and American 4.2-inch
mortars.11
For reasons that never became clear, the 2d
and 19th Regiments failed to develop the defensive positions ordered by General
Chang. With numerous gaps and open outside flanks, the division front was
vulnerable to infiltration, and the nearby reserves were almost as subject to
attack as were the forward units. Forces of the 60th Division, 20th Army, hit Chang's lines about 2000.
Without artillery support and with little other supporting fire, van units of
the 179th Regiment, 60th Division, struck the inside battalion of the 2d
Regiment. Forces following punched through a central gap, some veering west and
east behind the 19th and 2d Regiments, others continuing south toward the 7th
Regiment. Within minutes both line regiments were in full flight. Caught up in
the rush of troops from the 2d Regiment, the 7th Regiment joined the wild
retreat. Abandoned weapons, vehicles, and equipment littered vacated positions
and lines of drift as the South Koreans streamed south, east, and west, rapidly uncovering the fire support
units.12
The New Zealand artillery supporting the
19th Regiment in the west managed to withdraw with guns and equipment intact
down the Kap'yong River valley to a position four miles north of the British
27th Brigade assembled near Kap'yong town. To the east, Chinese following the 2d
and 7th Regiments caught the ROK 27th Field Artillery Battalion in position.
Under fire, its members abandoned guns and joined the southerly surge of
infantrymen. The American support units pulled out all weapons and equipment but
came under fire as they moved east on their narrow access road to join the 92d
Armored Field Artillery Battalion. Hampered further by ROK troops, trucks, and
paraphernalia cluttering and finally blocking the poor road, Company C, 2d
Chemical Mortar Battalion, and the 2d Rocket Field Artillery Battery reached the
92d with none of their principal weapons, the 987th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion with about half its equipment.13
Having lost radio and wire communications
with his regimental commanders soon after the panic began, General Chang was
hard pressed to regain control of his forces, even when they outdistanced the
Chinese pursuit after midnight. Traveling rear areas throughout the night, Chang
and his staff established a degree of order near dawn, collecting about
twenty-five hundred members of his three regiments some ten miles south of the
division's original front.14 To the same
depth, the South Korean rout had peeled open the flanks of the 24th Division and
1st Marine Division to the west and east.
At the first indication of the South Korean
retreat, the 1st Marine Division commander, General Smith, had begun to shore up
his left flank, drawing a battalion from the 1st Marines in reserve near
Ch'unch'on and sending it out the valley road from Chich'onni to establish
defenses tied in with the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion. En route aboard
trucks before midnight, the 1st Battalion struggled west against a current of
retreating South Koreans and scarcely managed to establish a position before
dawn.15
Operating in a zone coinciding with the
eastern third of the ROK 6th Division sector and the western edge of the Marine
sector, the 40th Army of the XIII Army
Group was well
situated to exploit the exposed Marine flank. The 120th Division at the army's
left, in particular, had virtually the entire night to move deep into the
vacated ROK sector and sweep behind the Marine front. But, either unaware of the
opportunity to envelop the marines or, more likely, unable to change course
rapidly, the 120th attempted only local frontal assaults on the 7th Marines west of
Hwach'on town, none of which penetrated or forced a withdrawal. Farther east,
forces of the 115th Division, 39th Army,
penetrated the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment
above the Hwach'on Dam and slashed southwestward to occupy heights commanding
the town of Hwach'on in the 5th Marines' central sector; American and ROK counterattacks
eliminated this penetration near dawn, and the 115th made no further attempt to
take the dam or town.16
Eager to close ranks as the IX Corps front
quieted after daylight on the 23d, General Hoge ordered the ROK 6th Division to
occupy positions on line Kansas, which was some three miles north of the area in
which General Chang was reassembling his forces. The 1st Marine Division was to
pull back against the Pukhan River to a line anchored near the Hwach'on Dam and
curving southwest to a juncture with the South Koreans.17 Manning the long curve would compel
General Smith to commit his entire division, and even then he would not be able
to set up a solid front. And General Chang faced no small task in recovering
troops who had scattered east and west into adjacent sectors, reorganizing his
entire division, and then moving his nervous forces north toward the enemy. But
the adjustments, if achieved, would retain control of the Hwach'on Dam,
eliminate the marines' open left flank, and join the two IX Corps divisions with
a minimum of movement.
Below Ch'orwon and Kumhwa
At the right of the I Corps, the
59th Division, 20th Army, though kept under artillery fire while massing in the Kwandok-san
ridges below Kumhwa, struck hard at the center of the 24th Division. Leading
forces opened a gap between the 19th and 5th Infantry Regiments; reinforcements
widened the attack but concentrated on moving through
the gap and down a ridge behind the inside battalion of the 19th Infantry.
Pressure on the adjacent battalion of the 5th Infantry forced it to withdraw
almost a mile. Quick to follow, Chinese reengaged the battalion within an
hour.18
Regimental reserves took up blocking
positions on the flanks of the enemy penetration and helped to confine it, but
General Bryan's attempt to move part of his reserve 21st Infantry from line
Kansas north onto high ground at the point of penetration failed when Chinese
occupied the ground first. By daylight the Chinese drove almost three miles
through the center of the division. Bryan withdrew his line regiments down the
sides of the enemy wedge into positions below it, where, though kept under
pressure at center, they were able to stand. Meanwhile, on learning of the ROK
6th Division's retreat on his right, Bryan set the 21st Infantry in blocking
positions along the endangered flank. The Eighth Army Ranger Company, attached
to the 21st, patrolled east in search of Chinese approaching the flank but made
no contact.19
In the Pogae-san ridges below Ch'orwon, the
2d Motorized Artillery Division prepared the way for infantry attacks on the 25th Division with a
threehour bombardment, dropping most of its fire on the Turkish brigade along
Route 33. On the east wing of the III Army
Group, the
179th Division, 60th Army, attacked behind the fire about midnight, its bulk hitting the
Turks, some forces spilling over against the 24th Infantry at division center.
The latter bent back the left of the 24th's line while the forces attacking the Turkish
position penetrated at several points and so intermingled themselves that
artillery units supporting the brigade were forced to stop firing lest they hit
Turks as well as Chinese. Further fragmented by persistent attacks through the
night, the Turkish position by morning consisted mainly of surrounded or
partially surrounded company perimeters, and Chinese penetrating between the
Turks and the curled-back left flank of the 24th Infantry moved almost two miles
behind the division's front. Ahead of the 27th Infantry on the division's right,
enemy forces (apparently the westernmost forces of the 27th Army) massed and began
their approach at first light, but heavy defensive fire shattered the formation
within half an hour, and the Chinese attempted no further attack on the
regiment.20
Near dawn General Bradley ordered the 24th
and 27th Infantry Regiments to withdraw two miles and instructed the Turkish
brigade to leave the line and reorganize south of the Hant'an River. The 35th
Infantry came out of reserve to take over the Turkish sector. The Turks fought
their way off the front during the morning and, except for one company that had
been virtually wiped out, assembled below the Hant'an in better condition than
Bradley had expected. The Chinese followed neither the Turks nor the two
regiments, and the division sector quieted as Bradley developed his new
line.21
Along the Imjin
General Soule considered the 3d Division's
front along the Imjin between Korangp'o-ri and Route 33 to be particularly
vulnerable to attack, not only because the line was long and thin with gaps
between defensive positions but also because it lay generally alongside and at
no great distance from Route 33, his main axis of communications. The 65th
Infantry and the attached Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team occupied the
right half of the line, with the Filipinos on the outside flank athwart Route 33
and the 2d and 3d Battalions facing northwest and west along the Imjin. In
regimental reserve, the 1st Battalion was located along Route 33 just above the
Hant'an River.22
The British 29th Brigade with the Belgian
battalion attached held the remainder of the division's line. The 1st Battalion
of The Gloucestershire regiment (Glosters) anchored the brigade's left flank
astride minor Route 5Y near the villages of Choksong and Solmari. The right
flank of the ROK 12th Regiment, the nearest position of the ROK 1st Division,
was a mile to the southwest. Northeast of the Glosters, beyond two miles of
unoccupied hills, the 1st Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers, held a
central position below the lower arm of the rightangle bend in the Imjin. At the
brigade's right, the Belgian battalion occupied Hill 194, a low mass located
above the Imjin inside the rightangle bend. Placing the battalion above the
river entailed a risk, at least to Belgian vehicles. Although the Imjin behind
Hill 194 was fordable, the east bank in that area was almost vertical. Vehicular
movement to and from the position followed secondary Route 11, the
29th Brigade's supply road to the south, and depended on two ponton bridges, one
crossing the Hant'an near its mouth, the other spanning the Imjin a half mile
farther west. The only alternate route was a rudimentary track that followed the
upper bank of the Hant'an and connected with Route 33, and its use depended on
the Imjin span. Both bridges were vulnerable to enemy action, resting as they
did in a milewide gap between the Belgians and fusiliers. Reserves available to
the 29th Brigade included the 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles, and the 52-ton
Centurion tanks of C Squadron, 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars. Both units were
centrally located along Route 11.23
Looking at the 3d Division's line as the
Chinese might see it, General Soule believed the most vulnerable point was the
Imjin angle: a penetration there could easily cut Route 33 and imperil the 65th
Infantry north of the cut. Because of this danger the British had set the
Belgian battalion above the river inside the angle. Without the 15th Infantry,
which was in corps reserve, Soule clustered what reserves he had behind the
Imjin east of the Belgians. He set the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry and the
64th Tank Battalion just above the Hant'an, principally to thicken the central
position, and the remainder of the 7th Infantry below the Hant'an for possible
employment either north in the 65th Infantry's sector or west in the British
sector.24
Vanguards of the 34th Division, 12th Army, and
29th Division, 15th Army, opened stinging assaults on the 65th Infantry about midnight,
driving one company of the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team off position
almost immediately. Through the remainder of the night the two enemy divisions
failed to reinforce their attacks beyond replacing losses, and they made no
further gains. The attacks subsided after an early morning Filipino
counterattack recovered the ground lost in the initial assaults. But the
withdrawal of the Turkish brigade then under way to the east was uncovering the
65th's right flank, and the regiment's position, as General Soule had
anticipated, was also threatened by XIX Army Group
attacks on the British 29th Brigade to the
southwest.25
Patrols of the 187th Division, 63d Army, approached the three battalions on the British front near midnight
on the 22d. Entering the gap between the Northumberland Fusiliers and Belgians,
a large patrol moved along the Imjin on the Belgian side of the river, passed by
a Belgian listening post below Hill 194, and continued east toward the two
unguarded bridges on the Belgian access route. On receiving the Belgians' report
of the patrol at brigade headquarters, Brigadier Brodie sent a motorized
detachment from the Ulster battalion to secure the bridges, but while moving up
Route 11 to the Hant'an crossing the detachment drove into an ambush and was all
but wiped out.26
A Chinese force following the patrol split
as it reached Hill 194, some members turning to attack the Belgians, the
remainder continuing toward the bridges. Most of the Belgian front was under
assault by first light. The Chinese who bypassed Hill 194 meanwhile reached the
bridges, crossed the Imjin, and attacked Company Z of the Northumberland
Fusiliers on Hill 257 bordering the river almost due south of the
crossings.27
Company Z was the right rear unit of a
squarish fusilier position marked out by four widely spaced company perimeters
at the corners. Well downstream from Z, Company X at the left front corner
occupied Hill 152, the crest of a ridge edging the Imjin. Chinese fording the
river and attacking Hill 152 forced Company X to withdraw about the same time
that the attack out of the Belgian area carried Chinese inside Company Z's
position on Hill 257. Thus Company Y at the right front corner, though not under
assault, was precariously situated, with Chinese moving past on left and
right.28
About daybreak, reinforcements, apparently
from the 188th Division, 63d Army, doubled the strength of the Chinese attacking the Belgians
on Hill 194. A Belgian patrol slipping off the rear of the hill meanwhile
confirmed that Chinese controlled the two bridges on the access route by firing
from the near slopes of Hill 257. As the Chinese stepped up their attack,
General Soule sent a company of the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and two platoons of the 7th's tank company to reclaim
the bridges and remain in support of the Belgians. Reaching the bridge area over
the track along the Hant'an, the tankers found no Chinese at the crossings but
came under mortar and small arms fire from Hill 257, fire which kept the
following infantry at bay. One tank platoon moved to Hill 194 to reinforce the
Belgians while the other deployed near the bridges and fired on Hill 257. The
amount of Chinese return fire raised doubts that foot troops and wheeled
vehicles could pass safely through the bridge area.29
Wary of a strike down Route 11 by the
Chinese attacking the fusilier battalion, in particular by those attacking
Company Z on Hill 257, Brigadier Brodie after daylight on the 23d organized
defenses athwart the road about two miles below 257. The fusiliers withdrew to a
ridge bordering Route 11 on the west while the bulk of the Royal Ulster Rifles
battalion occupied positions east of the road. The Chinese, as a result, gained
control of a wide expanse of ground between Brodie's new central position and
the Belgians. There also remained between the fusiliers and Gloster battalions a
two-mile gap, which aerial observers as early as 0830 reported Chinese to be
entering. Having all but depleted brigade reserves, Brodie asked for help from
General Soule, who agreed to send the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, to establish
positions between Brodie's central and left flank
defenses.30
At the brigade's left, the Gloster
battalion also had had to give ground after a hard, costly battle lasting the
night. The battalion's position astride Route 5Y, as originally developed, was a
set of company perimeters about a mile and half below the Imjin. From Hill 148
west of the road and Hills 182 and 144 east, Companies A, D, and B commanded
long spurs sloping toward the river. Giving the position some depth was Company
C, a mile behind Company D on Hill 314 below the towering crest of Karnak
Mountain (Hill 675), easily the dominant height in the entire brigade area. West
of Route 5Y opposite Hill 314, battalion pioneers secured Hill 235. The
battalion commander, Lt. Col. James P. Carne, had set up headquarters and placed
his mortars along 5Y where it bent through a valley behind Company G and just
above the village of Solma-ri. After Chinese patrols were observed on the north
bank of the Imjin during the day, Colonel Carne established an additional
position at last light on the 22d. Certain that the Chinese had located Gloster
Crossing, a ford straight ahead of his lines, since his sappers earlier had
marked its course with buoys, Carne concealed sixteen men of Company C in ambush
in ruined buildings at the near end of the crossing.31
Able to see the far bank clearly by the
light of the full moon, the ambush party watched seven Chinese step into the
water about 2200, allowed them to reach the near bank, then shot down all seven
with a brief burst of fire. Before withdrawing to their company position after
exhausting their ammunition, the sixteen Glosters defeated three more crossing
attempts, killing altogether some seventy Chinese. The small force itself
suffered no casualties.32
On the heels of the ambush party's
withdrawal, a battalion of the 559th Regiment,
187th Division, forded the river at Gloster
Crossing and a mile and a half west at an underwater bridge that past Gloster
reconnaissance had somehow failed to reveal. British artillery bloodied and
delayed the forces at Gloster Crossing, but the Chinese approaching from the
northwest were already climbing the long spurs toward Company A.33
Company A turned back repeated charges
until almost dawn, when its fifty-eight ablebodied men lost the dominant platoon
position located among the ruins of an ancient castle near the crest of Hill
148. Company D lost no important ground on Hill 182 to the Chinese attacking out
of the Gloster Crossing area but also suffered high casualties. Company B on
Hill 144 was no more than brushed by Chinese patrols and survived the night
intact.34
Colonel Carne pulled his forward companies
back to the Solma-ri area shortly after daylight, covering their withdrawal with
heavy mortar and artillery fire and air strikes. West of Route 5Y, much-reduced
Company A occupied Hill 235 and Company D a squarish flattop hill extending east
from 235 toward the position of Company C on the opposite side of the road.
Company B took position just east of Company C. Under the pounding covering
fire, the Chinese went to ground, either to take cover or to hold up their
attack until reinforcements crossed the Imjin.35
Adjusting the Line
Considering the forward I Corps and IX
Corps positions untenable, opened to envelopment as they were by the flight of
the ROK 6th Division, General Van Fleet about midmorning on 23 April ordered
General Milburn and General Hoge to withdraw and directed all corps commanders
to develop defenses in depth along line Kansas. At the same time, Van Fleet
canceled the advance to line Alabama which was to have been opened on the 24th
by forces east of the Hwach'on Reservoir.36
For the forces east of the reservoir, the
initial task created by Van Fleet's order was to block a North Korean salient
being driven into line Kansas. (Map 33) Above Yanggu, adjacent to the
reservoir, the inexperienced North Korean 45th
Division had attacked during the night behind
mortar and artillery barrages but had made only a few
local gains against the 32d Infantry on the right flank of the 7th Division. On
the east flank of the enemy attack, the North Korean 6th Division was more successful
in assaults on the ROK 3d Division. Forcing its left and center units to the
southwest, the North Koreans by midmorning on the 23d pushed the 3d Division
well back from Route 24, partially opening the way to Inje.37
Map 33. The
Eastern Front, 22-24 April 1951
A bigger threat to Inje materialized at the
right flank of the X Corps, where the North Korean 12th Division caught the X Corps
and ROK III Corps part way through the shift of divisions required for the now
canceled advance to line Alabama. The 12th
Division struck the 35th Regiment of the ROK 5th
Division at midnight on the 22d and began sliding forces into the twomile gap
between the 35th and the 5th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division to the east. By
first light the 35th Regiment abandoned its position and fell back in disorder
almost to the Soyang River below Inje. Taken under frontal attack and threatened
with encirclement by the North Koreans working through the gap, the 5th Regiment
followed suit but withdrew in better order, falling back gradually while still
in contact toward a line two miles above Inje. During the day, Col. Min Ki Shik,
in command of the ROK 5th Division, took charge of all forces in the Inje area,
which now included the 3d Regiment of the ROK 7th Division, and organized
defenses above Inje generally in the area toward which the 5th Regiment was
withdrawing. By evening of the 23d Colonel Min set the 27th, 36th, and 3d Regiments on the line while the 35th
Regiment continued to reorganize behind it and the 5th Regiment continued to
withdraw toward it.38
As the initial IX Corps step to the rear
General Hoge let stand his plan to pull the 1st Marine Division onto a line
curving from the Hwach'on Dam southwestward along the Pukhan River and to push
the ROK 6th Division north onto line Kansas. The marines occupied their arching
line, designated Pendleton, by late afternoon, the 1st Marines taking up widely
separated battalion positions on the division's left to refuse the flank and stretch the line toward the planned
connection with the South Koreans. With all regiments on line, the division
faced as much to the west as to the north. The 92d Armored Field Artillery
Battalion and the units that had joined it after scrambling out of the ROK 6th
Division's sector withdrew to the vicinity of Chich'onni, where the bulk of the
Marine division's artillery, the 11th Marines, was clustered. General Hoge
directed the 92d, which absorbed the members of the weaponless 2d Rocket Field
Artillery Battery, and the halfequipped 987th Field Artillery Battalion to
reinforce the fires of the 11th Marines. Company C, 2d Chemical Mortar
Battalion, out of action for lack of weapons and equipment, left the division sector
for refurbishing. 39
Since the ROK 6th Division had lost its artillery support during
the debacle of the previous night, General Hoge directed the British 27th
Brigade to recommit the New Zealand artillery and transferred the 213th Field
Artillery Battalion from a reinforcing mission in the Marine sector to support
the South Koreans. During the afternoon the New Zealand unit, accompanied by the
Middlesex battalion for protection, moved up the valley of the Kap'yong River
while the 213th circled out of the Marine sector and moved up the valley of a
Kap'yong tributary in the eastern portion of the South Korean sector.40
Meanwhile, as the day wore on, the move of
the ROK 6th Division north to line Kansas appeared less and less probable. Still
reorganizing the division at midday, General Chang informed corps headquarters
that he would have his forces on the line by 1700. But as that hour approached,
no part of the division had yet moved forward.41
Wary of another failing performance by
Chang's division, General Hoge in midafternoon ordered the British 27th Brigade
to block the Kap'yong River valley behind the South Koreans to prevent enemy forces from coursing down the valley and cutting
Route 17 at Kap'yong town. Brigadier Burke was to establish the blocking
position along the trace of line Delta four miles north of town where the
Kap'yong River flowing from the northwest was joined by the tributary from the
northeast just above a large bend turning the Kap'yong southwest toward the
Pukhan. From hill masses rising on either side of the junction of the Kap'yong
and its tributary the commonwealth forces could cover both valley
approaches.42
Burke organized the block with the 3d
Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, and 2d Battalion, Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry, setting the Australians in the Hill 504 mass on the
right to block the valley approach from the northeast, the Canadians on the
crest and slopes of Hill 677 to control the Kap'yong valley. Four American
units-all but one platoon of Company A, 72d Tank Battalion; Company B, 2d
Chemical Mortar Battalion; and Companies B and C, 74th Engineer Combat
Battalion-moved up in support, the tankers taking position with the Australians,
the mortarmen setting up in a small lateral valley behind Hill 504. The
engineers bivouacked along the Kap'yong about a mile in rear of the blocking
position.43
The artillery battalions assigned by General Hoge to
support the ROK 6th Division were still moving into position when reports
reaching corps headquarters indicated that General Chang had given up attempts
to move his division to the Kansas line and had deployed in the vicinity of his
assembly area. Doubtful that the division was in position or condition to
perform better than it had the night before and thus fearful that the supporting
battalions were out on a limb, the corps artillery officer authorized the 213th
Field Artillery Battalion to withdraw behind the 27th Brigade's blocking
position at the first sign of another ROK rout. Alerted to the possibility of a
repeat performance by the South Koreans, Brigadier Burke prepared to pull out
the New Zealanders and Middlesex battalion and at
dark placed the forces at
the blocking position on a 50 percent
alert.44
General Chang's failure to place the
6th Division on line Kansas also left the
1st Marine Division vulnerable. Its long front along the Pukhan was protected on the east by the barrier of the
Hwach'on Reservoir, and its west flank was no longer wide open as it had been the night before, but the nearest solid position was that of the 27th Brigade above
Kap'yong. The intervening seven-mile gap offered the Chinese an open
southeastward shot at Ch'unch'on and the intersection of Routes 17 and 29 and
thus an opportunity to envelop the marines or at least cut their lines of
communications. Balancing this risk against that of a nighttime withdrawal that
probably would have to be made while under attack, General Hoge directed the
Marine division to withdraw to line Kansas the following morning. This move
would shorten the front enough for the bulk of one regiment to be taken off the
line and sent south to defend Ch'unch'on.45
25th Infantry Division Front South of Ch'orwon
Along the eastern portion of the I Corps
line, the 25th Division, whose front had quieted after daylight on the 23d, was
on line Kansas by midafternoon. The 35th and 24th Infantry Regiments reoccupied
the division's former positions on the ridges between the Hant'an and Yongp'yong
rivers while the 27th Infantry and Turkish brigade assembled immediately behind
the Yongp'yong. At the far corps right, Chinese maintained pressure against the
center of the 24th Division, mainly against the 19th Infantry, and attempted to
follow the division's withdrawal but gave up after suffering heavy casualties to
the covering artillery fire. The division occupied line Kansas about 1800, the
19th and 21st Infantry Regiments on left and right, the 5th Infantry in reserve about five miles behind
the line. Later, on receiving word that the ROK 6th Division would not move
north onto line Kansas, the 21st Infantry refused its right as far as possible
with its reserve battalion, and General Bryan deepened the protection by moving
a battalion of the 5th Infantry into blocking positions along the east
flank.46
24th Infantry Division Forces Retreat to Line Kansas
Under General Soule's plan for pulling back
the 3d Division's rightmost forces, the 7th Infantry was to occupy the
division's eastern sector of line Kansas. Protected on the west by the
Belgian battalion, the 65th Infantry was to leapfrog
off line Utah, pass through the 7th Infantry via Route 33, and assemble in
division reserve near Route 33's junction with Route 11. Exactly how the
Belgians would then get out of the Imjin angle was yet to be
determined.47
65th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division Troops Retreat From Line Utah
The battalions of the 65th Infantry began
bounding off line Utah about noon, moving easily as the Chinese opposite made no
attempt to follow. Except for the tanks supporting the Belgian battalion, the
division reserves stationed earlier above the Hant'an dropped below the river
during the 65th's leapfrog action. No interference
materialized out of the Imjin angle as the Belgians, though heavily engaged,
held their ground with the assistance of air strikes and artillery and tank
fire. Bringing up the regimental rear, the 3d Battalion of the 65th, reinforced
by the 3d Reconnaissance Company and 64th Tank Battalion, occupied a position
blocking Route 33 just above the Hant'an, which was to be held until the Belgian
battalion had withdrawn from Hill 194.48
Belgian Troops Retreat From the Hill 194 Area
In considering ways to get the Belgian battalion out of the Imjin angle, Brigadier
Brodie early in the afternoon proposed to General Soule that the Belgians destroy
their vehicles and withdraw east across the Imjin off the back side of Hill 194.
But Soule believed that the bridge area could be opened for the vehicles by attacking
Hill 257 from the south. About 1400 he ordered the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, to make
the attack and instructed the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team, then leading
the 65th Infantry off line Utah, to join the 29th Brigade and take over the 1st
Battalion's previously assigned mission of occupying a position in the gap
between the fusilier and Gloster battalions.49
In carrying out its original mission, the
1st Battalion, with a platoon of regimental tanks attached, by 1400 had moved up
Route 11 behind the fusiliers, turned its three rifle companies west on a wide
front, and begun sweeping the slopes rising to Hill 675, the peak of Kamak
Mountain, in the gap area. It was 1800 before the
commander, Lt. Col. Fred C. Weyand, could reassemble the battalion and open the
attack on Hill 257 to the north. Once above the fusilier-Ulster lines, the
battalion came under heavy fire from the flanks and front and had to fight off
Chinese groups who attempted to knock out the supporting tanks with grenades and
shaped charges. By 2000 the battalion had gained no more than a foothold in the
257 hill mass.50
In the Belgian withdrawal, begun as the
attack on Hill 257 opened, the bulk of the battalion moved off the back side of
Hill 194 and waded the Imjin under the cover of artillery fire and air strikes.
Harassed by mortar fire until they ascended the steep east bank, the Belgian
foot troops by 1830 were out of contact and en route east to Route 33 and then
south to an assembly area to await the battalion's vehicles. In column, drivers
raced the vehicles over the Imjin bridge while the 7th Infantry tankers sent to
the Belgians during the morning fired on the slopes of Hill 257 to the south and
the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, moved into the hill mass from the opposite
direction. Incoming fire from 257 destroyed four trucks but was generally weak.
Although it had not cleared 257, Colonel Weyand's battalion apparently had
distracted most of the Chinese holding the hill. Once the last vehicle had
crossed the bridge about 2000, the motor column followed the track along the Hant'an to reach Route
33. Troops and vehicles reunited, the Belgian battalion moved south and
assembled near the Routes 33-11 junction.51
Behind the Belgians, the 3d Battalion of
the 65th Infantry, 64th Tank Battalion, and 3d Reconnaissance Company left their
Hant'an blocking position, the 3d Battalion joining the 7th Infantry on line
Kansas, the tankers and reconnaissance troops assembling close to 3d Division
headquarters near the Routes 33-11 junction. With considerable difficulty the
1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, meanwhile disengaged at
Hill 257 and returned to the 7th's sector of line Kansas, where it went into
reserve. Ahead of all these movements, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat
Team, en route to occupy the gap in the 29th Brigade's lines, reached the
brigade headquarters area along Route 11 about 2000, too late in the day,
Brigadier Brodie decided, for it to attempt to take position between the
fusilier and Gloster battalions.52
The withdrawal to line Kansas and other
force adjustments swung the 3d Division south like a gate hinged on the west at
the position of the Gloster battalion, which, after Colonel Carne consolidated
forces in the Solma-ri area, had remained quiet throughout the day except for
meeting engagements between patrols in Company B's sector at the far right. Both
the 64th and
63d Armies,
however, had built up forces below the Imjin to the front and flanks of the
battalion.53
To the left of the Glosters, the
192d Division, 64th Army, had begun to ford the Imjim at three points on the Korangp'o-ri
bend by daybreak. Sighted by air observers, the crossing operation was shut off
by 1100 by air strikes and artillery fire, and most of the Chinese who had
crossed by that time hesitated in areas not far below the river. A few
company-size groups moved south and tested positions of the 12th Regiment at the
right of the ROK 1st Division but were turned back by noon. Sorties by two task
forces of South Korean infantry and tanks of the 73d Tank Battalion, which was
attached to the 1st Division, punished Chinese forces ahead of ROK lines until
dusk. One task force estimated that it killed three thousand
Chinese.54
Gloster forces on Hill 235 meanwhile caught
sight of Chinese on the near high ground in the gap between the battalion and
the ROK 12th Regiment. They had come either from the Korangp'o-ri bend or out of
the Gloster Crossing area, where, despite British
mortar and artillery fire, the 187th Division,
and apparently the 189th Division, pushed
additional forces over the Imjin. To the northeast, units of the 187th and 188th Divisions continued to
enter the gap between the Glosters and fusiliers, directing their movement
mainly toward Hill 675. Some forces worked through each gap and reached Route 5Y
early in the afternoon. An attack by these forces on the Gloster supply point
along the road made clear that the battalion at Solma-ri had been
surrounded.55
Given this penetration and the buildup of
Chinese below the Imjin in the west and given, in particular, the frail central
position of the ROK 6th Division and open ground on either side of it, which
invited envelopments both west and east, it was doubtful that the I and IX Corps
lines as they stood at dark on the 23d could be held against the next surge of
enemy attacks. Earlier in the day a number of officers had recommended long
withdrawals to General Van Fleet to gain time to organize stronger defenses. One
division commander in the I Corps had proposed falling back to line Golden just
above Seoul. But Van Fleet had refused to give ground voluntarily in deep
withdrawals. While by no means assuming a stand-or-die position, the enemy, he
insisted, would have to "take all he gets."56
Notes
1 In assessing their New Year's offensive, the Chinese
reportedly attributed its failure largely to the absence or air support. With
strong air support, a Chinese special aviation group concluded, "we could have
driven the enemy into the sea." See Futrell, The United States Air Force in
Korea, p. 265.
2 General Ridgway received
authority for precisely such retaliation in late April. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff told him: "he might now use United States forces within his command to
conduct high altitude reconnaissance of enemy air bases in Manchuria and on the
Shantung Peninsula, and further, that if United Nations forces in Korea were
subjected to major enemy air attacks from outside Korea, he could at his
discretion, and without the necessity of securing prior approval of the JCS, or
higher authority, attack enemy air bases in the areas mentioned above." See MS,
Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, p. 163.
3 The information in this
subsection is based on Futrell, The United States Air Force in
Korea, pp. 265-78.
4 Griffith, The Chinese People's Liberation Array, p. 162;
USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 96, 16-28 Feb 53; 1 Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase
Spring Offensive, April 1951, copy in CMH.
5 USAFFE Intel Dig, no.
1, 1-31 Dec 52.
6 USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 99,
16-31 Jan 53.
7 Hq, FEC, History of the
North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; USAFFE Intel Dig, no. 115, 1-15 Feb 53.
8 The North Korean 7th Division, which had been reduced
to about regimental strength during recent operations, was transferred to the
VII Corps in the Wonsan area.
9 GHQ, FEC, Order of Battle
Information, North Korean Army, 20 Aug 51 and 16 Sep 51; Hq, FEC, History of the
North Korean Army, 31 Jul 52; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51.
10 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951, a special file
of correspondence and reports on the operations of the ROK Division, 22-24 Apr
51; Interv, Appleman with Lt Col Thomas E. Bennett, KMAG Advisor to 7th Regt,
ROK 6th Div, in CMH; Eighth Army POR, 22 Apr 51.
11 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, IXACT-1288, CG IX
Corps to CG IX Corps Arty, 14 Apr 51; Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951;
Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, p. 155.
12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div, 1951.
13 Wood, Strange
Battleground, pp. 73-74; Eighth Army AG File 6 ROK Div, 1951; 1st Lt. Martin
Blumenson, "Artillery in Perimeter Defense, April 1951," copy in CMH.
14 Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK
Div, 1951.
15 1st Marine Div Hist Diary,
22-23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The EastCentral Front,
pp. 104-05.
16 1st Marine Div Hist Diary,
23 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The East-Central Front, pp.
105-07.
17 Rad, IXACT-1330, CG IX
Corps to CG 1st Marine Div et al., 23 Apr 51.
18 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
19 Ibid.
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps
Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51.
21 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Rpt, The Communist First
Phase Spring Offensive, Apr 51.
22 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51.
23 Ibid.; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barclay,
The First Commonwealth Division, p. 62; Crahay, Les Belges En Coree,
pp. 60, 74, 80; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth
Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3
(reserves).
24 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51,
sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr
51, Incl 3 (reserves).
25 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
26 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 75-76;
3d Div POR 158, 22 Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2 and 24, 23 Apr 51.
27 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, p. 76;
Barclay, The First Commonwealth
Division, p. 62; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 27, 38,
46, 52, and 65, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51.
28 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 2, 24, 38, 39, 46, and 52, 23
Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51; Barclay, The
First Commonwealth Division, p. 62.
29 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 62, 65, 75, 97, 105, and 114, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion,
22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB
Action, 2225 Apr 51); Crahay, Les Belges En Coree,
pp. 76-79.
30 Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves); 3d Div Comd Rpt,
Nar, Apr 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 34 and 81, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr
51.
31 3d Div Sit Ovlay, 22 Apr
51; E. J. Kahn, Jr., "A Reporter in KoreaNo One But the Glosters," New
Yorker, 26 May 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 11-13,
16-18. Captain Farrar-Hockley was the adjutant of the Gloster battalion during
the battle at the Imjin.
32 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 2, 23
Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp. 18-22; Robert O. Hones, Now Thrive the Armourers
(London: George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 150.
33 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword, pp.
22-25; Hones, Now Thrive the Armourers, p. 150.
34 3d Div POR 159, 23 Apr 51;
3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 52, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the
Sword, pp. 25-31, 36.
35 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 74, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div POR
159, 23 Apr 51; Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the
Sword, pp. 30-35.
36 Rad, GX-4-4635 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 23 Apr 51.
37 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entry 1000, 23 Apr 51;
Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51.
38 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 285, 23
Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Entries 1405, 1500, 2130, 240905, and 240940, 23 Apr 51,
and Briefing Notes for CG; Eighth Army POR, 23 Apr 51.
39 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka,
and Hicks, The East-CentralFront, pp. 110-13; After Action Intervs,
Blumenson, "Artillery in Perimeter Defense"; 1st Marine Div POR no. 230, 23 Apr
51; Rad, IX ART-68, CG IX Corps to COs 987th FA Bn, 92d AFA Bn, and 11th Marine
Regt, 23 Apr 51.
40 Rads, IX ACT-1338 and IX-ACT 1330, CG IX Corps to CG
27th BCB and CG 1st Marine Div, respectively, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs,
1st Lt. Martin Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Maj Don W. Black,
Asst S3, IX Corps Arty, and Ca apt Blaine Johnson, Asst S3, 213th FA Bn.
41 Ltr, Brig Gen George B. Peploe, IX Corps CofS, to CG
Eighth Army, 5 May 51, sub: Report on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in
Military Operations During the Period 22-24 April 1951, in Eighth Army AG File,
6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951.
42 Rad, IX ACT-1338, CG IX
Corps to CG 27th BCB, 23 Apr 51.
43 Ibid.; Rad, IX ACT-1340, CG
IX Corps to CG 27th BCB, 23 Apr 51; After Action Intervs, Blumenson, "Tanks
Above Kap'yong," Intervs with 1st Lt Kenneth W. Koch, CO, Co A, 72d Tank Bn, and
Maj Wade H. Padgett, S3, 74th Engr Cmbt Bn; N. Bartlett, ed., With the
Australians in Korea (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pp. 91-92;
Wood, Strange Battleground, pp. 74-75;
Barclay, The First Commonwealth Division, p. 68.
44 Ltr, Peploe to CG Eighth Army, 5 May 51; sub: Report
on Disintegration of the 6th ROK Division in Military Operations During the
Period 22-24 April 1951, and Overlay, Disposition of 6th ROK Div, 231800 Apr 51,
both in Eighth Army AG File, 6 ROK Div (1 May), 1951; After Action Intervs,
Blumenson, "Tanks Above Kap'yong," Intervs with Black and Johnson; Barclay,
The First Commonwealth Division, p. 67;
Bartlett, With the Australians in Korea,
p. 94.
45 Rad, IX ACT-1339, CG IX Corps to CG 1st Marine Div, 23
Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, The
East-Central Front, p. 117.
46 I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring
Offensive, Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
47 3d Div 01 15-12, 23 Apr
51.
48 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 112 and 143, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div
POR 159, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
49 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 108,
110, 112, and 114, 23 Apr 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
50 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entry 61, 24
Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3 (reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div
G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51). See also article by two
participants in the Hill 257 battle, Capt. William F. Long, Jr., and Capt.
Walter M. Turner, "Challenge Accepted," in Combat
Forces Journal, January 1952, pp. 12-16.
51 Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, pp. 79-81;
Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire
Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 2225 Apr
51).
52 3d Div G3 Jnl, Entries 139,
141, 148, 157, 180, 182, and 189, 23 Apr 51; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army,
15 May 51, sub: Report of Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 3
(reserves) and Incl 16 (3d Div G3 Summary of 29th BIB Action, 22-25 Apr 51); 3d
Div PORs 159 and 160, 23 and 24 Apr 51.
53 Farrar-Hockley The Edge
of the Sword, pp. 30, 36.
54 Eighth Army G3 Jnl, 23 Apr
51; Eighth Army PIR 285, 23 Apr 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps
Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; I Corps Rpt, The Communist First Phase Spring Offensive,
Apr 51.
55 Farrar-Hockley, The Edge
of the Sword, p. 34; Hones, Now Thrive the Armourers, pp. 152,
155; Ltr, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 May 51, sub: Report of
Gloucestershire Battalion, 22-25 Apr 51, Incl 14 (Summary of Enemy Operations);
Kahn, "A Reporter in Korea- No One But the Glosters."
56 Interv, Appleman with Van
Fleet, 15 Sep 51, copy in CMH.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
