Advance to the Parallel
As a first step in the attempt to block and
attack the North Korean I Corps, Ridgway on 21 March ordered his own I Corps to
move forward to line Cairo, which he extended southwestward across General
Milburn's zone through Uijongbu to the vicinity of Haengju on the Han. (Map 28)
At points generally along this line six to ten miles north of line Lincoln
Milburn's patrols had made some contact with the North Korean I Corps west of
Uijongbu and the Chinese 26th Army to the east. Milburn was to occupy line Cairo
on 22 March, a day ahead of the airborne landing at Munsan-ni, and wait for
Ridgway's further order to continue north.1
Requiring Milburn to stand along line Cairo
unless instructed to proceed stemmed from Ridgway's not yet having given the
final green light to the airborne landing as of the 21st. Operation TOMAHAWK, as the landing was called,
would take place only if Ridgway received assurances that weather conditions on
23 March would favor a parachute drop and that ground troops could link up with
the airborne force within twenty-four hours. If these assurances were
forthcoming, the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, with the 2d and 4th
Ranger Companies attached, was to drop in the Munsan-ni area on the morning of
the 23d and block Route 1. Milburn was to establish physical contact with and
assume control of the airborne force once it was on the ground. At the same
time, he was to open a general corps advance toward line Aspen, which traced the
lower bank of the Imjin River west and north of Munsan-ni, then sloped eastward
across the corps zone to cut Routes 33 and 3 eight miles north of Uijongbu. Once
on Aspen, Milburn was to expect Ridgway's order to continue to line Benton, the
final COURAGEOUS objective
line, some ten miles farther north. Reaching Benton would carry the I Corps
virtually to the 38th parallel except in the west where the final line fell off
to the southwest along the Imjin.2
Because the I Corps otherwise would have an
open east flank when it moved to line Benton, Ridgway extended the line
southeastward into the IX Corps zone across the front of the 24th Division and
about halfway across the front of the ROK 6th Division to a juncture with line
Cairo. When Ridgway ordered the I Corps to Benton, General Hoge was to send his
western forces to the line to protect the I Corps flank.
Meanwhile, in concert with Milburn's drive to lines Cairo and Aspen, Hoge was to
complete the occupation of his sector of line Cairo. Elsewhere along the army
front, the X Corps and the ROK III and I Corps remained under Ridgway's
order of 18 March to reconnoiter the area between the Hwach'on Reservoir and the
east coast. As yet, neither Almond's patrols nor those of the South Korean corps had moved that deeply into enemy
territory.3
Map 28.
Operation COURAGEOUS, 22-28 March 1951
The three divisions of the I Corps started
toward line Cairo at 0800 on 22 March. The ROK 1st Division, advancing astride
Route 1 in the west, overcame very light resistance and had troops on the phase line by noon. The 3d
Division astride Route 3 in the center and the 25th Division on the right also
met sporadic opposition but moved slowly and ended the day considerably short of
the line.4
Practice Jump from C119s by 187th Regimental Combat Team Members
General Milburn meanwhile assembled an
armored task force in Seoul for a drive up Route 1 to make the initial contact
with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team if and after it dropped on
Munsan-ni. Building the force around the 6th Medium Tank Battalion borrowed from
the 24th Division of the IX Corps, he added the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, and
all but one battery of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion from the 3d
Division; from corps troops he supplied a battery of the 999th Armored Field
Artillery Battalion and Company A, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion. He also
included two bridgelaying Churchill tanks from the 29th British Brigade,
recently attached to the I Corps. Lt. Col. John S. Growdon, commander of the 6th
Medium Tank Battalion, was to lead the task force.5
Ridgway made the final decision on the
airborne operation late in the afternoon of the 22d during a conference at
Eighth Army main headquarters in Taegu. General Partridge, the Fifth Air Force
commander, assured him that the weather would be satisfactory on the 23d; Col.
Gilman C. Mudgett, the new Eighth Army G-3, predicted not only that contact with
the airborne unit would be made within a day's time, as Ridgway required, but
that the entire I Corps should be able to advance rapidly.6 Given
these reports, Ridgway ordered the airborne landing to take place at 0900 on the
following day.7
On hearing the final word on the Munsan-ni
drop, General Milburn directed Task Force Growdon to pass through the ROK 1st
Division on line Cairo early on 23 March and proceed via Route 1 to reach the
airborne troops. His three divisions meanwhile were to resume their advance with
the objective of reaching line Aspen. The ROK 1st Division, which would be
following Task Force Growdon, was to relieve the 187th Airborne Regimental
Combat Team upon reaching Munsan-ni, and the airborne unit then was to prepare
to move south and revert to Eighth Army reserve.8
Task Force Growdon, completely motorized,
passed through the ROK 1st Division shortly after 0700. No enemy forces opposed
the armored column as it moved ahead of the South
Koreans, but within minutes the third tank in column hit a mine while bypassing
a destroyed bridge at the small Changnung River. The task force was held up
while engineers removed a dozen other mines from the bypass. Proceeding slowly
from that point with a mine detector team leading the way afoot, Colonel
Growdon's column moved only a mile to the village of Sinwon-ni before
encountering more mines. As the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team began
landing at Munsan-ni at 0900, Growdon's task force was at a halt some fifteen
miles to the south.9
C-46s and C-119s of the 315th Air Division
had begun lifting the airborne troops from the Taegu airfield shortly after
0700, all heading initially for a rendezvous point over the Yellow Sea west of
the objective area.10 The second serial of aircraft, with the 1st
Battalion of the 187th aboard, was in flight only briefly before engine trouble
in the lead plane forced the pilot to return to Taegu for a replacement
aircraft. The combat team landed before the new lead plane, whose passengers
included the 1st Battalion commander, could reach Munsan-ni. The drop, as a
result, did not come off entirely as planned.11
General Bowen, commander of the 187th, had
designated two drop zones, one about a mile northeast of Munsan-ni, another about three miles southeast of
town. The 1st Battalion was to land in the lower zone, the remainder of the
combat team in the one to the north. 12 As planned, the 3d Battalion with the 4th Ranger Company attached
jumped first, Bowen having given it the mission of securing the northern drop
zone. Bowen's plan went awry when the leaderless second serial of planes
mistakenly followed the first and dropped the 1st Battalion also in the northern
zone. The 2d Battalion with the 2d Ranger Company attached followed not long
after, then the 674th Airborne Field Artillery Battalion, and at 1000 the
artillery heavy drop.13
In the brief interval between the drops of
the 1st and 2d Battalions, General Ridgway arrived by L-19, landing on a road
between Munsan-ni and the northern drop zone. En route, he had flown over Task
Force Growdon then held up at Sinwon-ni, a fact he passed to General Bowen.
Airborne again shortly after 1000, Ridgway saw a single stick of paratroops jump
from a plane over the lower drop zone. The replacement plane carrying the 1st
Battalion commander and party had finally reached Munsan-ni, and its passengers
had jumped in the correct zone not knowing that they would be the only troops in
the area.14
To the north, resistance in and immediately
around the drop zone was minor and sporadic, amounting to a few small groups of North Koreans and a meager amount of fire from
mortars located somewhere to the north. Overcrowding caused by the 1st
Battalion's misdirected drop complicated the 3d Battalion's assembly, but units
managed to sort themselves out and secure the borders of the drop zone. An
unexpected annoyance was created by civilians who appeared in the drop zone and
began carrying away parachutes. Shots fired over their heads ended the attempted
theft. Against moderate but scattered opposition the 2d Battalion proceeded to
occupy heights northeast of the drop zone, and under the command of its
executive officer the 1st Battalion, less Company B, moved into the ground to
the north and northwest, clearing Munsan-ni itself in the
process.15
Company B went on a rescue mission to the
southern drop zone after learning that the command group of the 1st Battalion
had come under fire from enemy forces on Hill 216 overlooking the drop zone from
the northwest. Company B forced the enemy group off the hill, allowing its
survivors to withdraw to the southwest, and reached the drop zone by 1500. The
rescue force and the battalion command group arrived at the regimental position
to the north about two hours later. By that time Bowen's forces had secured all
assigned objectives.16
Battle casualties among the airborne troops
were light, totaling nineteen. Jump casualties were higher- eight-four- but
almost half of these returned to duty immediately after treatment.
Enemy casualties included 136 dead counted
on the field and 149 taken captive. Estimated enemy losses raised the total
considerably higher. Prisoner interrogation indicated that the enemy forces who
had been in the objective area were from the 36th
Regiment of the North Korean 19th Division
and had numbered between three hundred and five
hundred. Most of the remainder of the North
Korean I Corps apparently had withdrawn above the Imjin well before the airborne
landing.17
The point of Task Force Growdon reached Munsan-ni at 1830 on the 23d, but the
remainder of the
extended column took several hours longer. The force encountered no enemy
positions along Route 1 but was kept to an intermittent crawl by having to lift
or explode over a hundred fifty live mines, some of them booby-trapped, and
almost as many dummy mines, including a five-mile stretch of buried C-ration and
beer cans. Casualties were few, but four tanks were disabled by mines. As the
last of these tanks hit a mine a mile below Munsan-ni, the explosion attracted
enemy artillery fire that damaged two more. The tail of the task force finally
arrived at the airborne position at 0700 on 24 March.18
General Milburn's orders to the 187th for
operations on the 24th called only for patrolling. Having been given control of
Task Force Growdon by Milburn, General Bowen
built his principal patrols around Growdon's tanks and sent them to investigate
ferry sites on the lmjin and to check Route 2Y, an
earthen road running east from Munsanni, as far as the village of Sinch'on, ten
miles away. One patrol made contact while checking an lmjin ferry site and ford
ten miles northeast of Munsan-ni. Six enemy were killed and twenty-two captured.
The patrol suffered no casualties, but a tank had to be destroyed after it
bogged down at a stream crossing while approaching the lmjin. A few rounds of
artillery fire meanwhile fell in the northern drop zone but caused no
casualties.19
The ROK 1st Division in the meantime had
advanced steadily toward Munsan-ni without enemy contact. Early on the 24th Task
Force Boone, a division armored column consisting of Company C, 64th Tank
Battalion (on loan to General Paik from the 3d Division), Paik's tank destroyer
battalion (organized as an infantry unit), and two of his engineer platoons,
stepped ahead of the division and reached the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat
Team at midmorning. By day's end the remainder of the division occupied a line
extending from positions athwart Route 1 about three miles below Munsan-ni
northeastward to Pobwon-ni, a village on lateral Route 2Y six miles east of
Munsan-ni area. General Paik relieved General Bowen of responsibility for the
Munsan-ni area at 1700 and placed Task Force Boone in position just above the
town.20
The lack of resistance to the wider sweep of the ROK 1st Division's advance
confirmed that the bid to block and attack the North Korean I Corps had been
futile. To the east, that the Chinese 26th Army still had forces deployed
to delay the advance of the 3d and 25th Divisions had become equally clear. On
the I Corps right, the 25th Division on 23 and 24 March had run into a large
number of minefields and small but well entrenched enemy groups employing small
arms, machine gun, and mortar fire. At nightfall on the 24th General Bradley's
forces held positions almost due west of Uijongbu in the 3d Division's zone at
corps center.21
Somewhat unexpectedly, the 3d Division had
come up against unusually strong Chinese positions. On 23 March General Soule's
forces had occupied the Uijongbu area with little difficulty. First to enter the
town itself was Task Force Hawkins, built around the bulk of the 64th Tank
Battalion and two platoons of tanks from each of the 15th and 65th Infantry
Regiments. Reaching Uijongbu about 0900 and finding it undefended, the task
force reconnoitered north several miles on Route 33 before returning to the
division position. Mines disabled two tanks, but otherwise the task force made
no contact.22
Though it thus appeared that the 3d
Division could continue to move forward with relative ease, General Soule's
forces came under heavy lire when they resumed their attack on the morning of
the 24th. The Chinese had organized strong positions in the Hill 468 mass rising
three miles northwest of Uijongbu and the 337 mass about a mile north and
slightly east of town. From these positions they were
in fair condition to block advance on the Route 33 axis to the north and over
Route 3 leading out of Uijongbu to the northeast. On the division's right, the
15th Infantry eventually managed to clear Hill 337 on the 24th, but the 65th
Infantry on the left failed in an all-day attempt to force the Chinese from the
468 mass.23
General Milburn viewed the situation at
corps center as an opportunity to trap and destroy the Chinese holding up the 3d
Division. After General Soule's forces encountered the strong enemy positions on
the morning of the 24th, he ordered General Bowen to pull in his patrols and
prepare the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for an eastward attack on the
Route 2Y axis. The objective was high ground abutting Route 33 about ten miles
north of Uijongbu, thus just above the trace of line Aspen, whence Bowen was to
prevent the Chinese in front of the 3d Division from withdrawing over Route 33.
The 3d Division was to continue its northward attack in the meantime and
eventually drive the Chinese against Bowen's position.24
3d Infantry Division Troops in the Uijongbu Area, March 23 '51
General Bowen started east at 1800,
intending to march as far as Sinch'on during the night and open his attack the
following morning. From Task Force Growdon, Company C was the only unit of the
6th Tank Battalion able to move at 1800; all other companies of the battalion
had too little fuel after patrolling and were to catch up with Bowen's column
after being resupplied from Seoul. The Growdon force now also was short the 2d Battalion, 7th
Infantry, which had been sent back to the 3d Division.25
A force shaped around the tanks of Company
C led the way toward Sinch'on. But after seven miles, as Bowen's column moved
through a system of ridges, landslides in defiles twice trapped the leading
tanks, and in the second instance no bypass could be found. As engineers tried
to open the road, rain began to fall and became steadily heavier. With the rain
making a poor road even worse, Bowen ordered the tanks back to Munsan-ni. After
the engineers had cleared the road sufficiently, his remaining forces proceeded
to Sinch'on, arriving about 0600 on the 25th.26
A half hour later Bowen ordered the 2d
Battalion, with the 3d Battalion following in support, to seize Hill 228 rising
on the west side of Route 33. Running into small arms, machine gun, and mortar
fire from enemy positions on several nearer heights and hampered by a continuing
driving rain, the two battalions at day's end were some two miles short of Hill
228, and Route 33 remained available to the Chinese in front of the 3d Division if they chose to
withdraw over it.27
Withdrawal seemed to be the Chinese
intention. The 3d Division met only light resistance when it resumed its attack
from the south on the 25th and advanced two miles beyond the hill masses where
strong Chinese positions had delayed it the day before. The tank company of the
65th Infantry meanwhile moved ahead on Route 3X, a secondary road angling
northwest off Route 33 to Sinch'on, in an attempt to contact the 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team. Mines along the road disabled four tanks and kept the
company from reaching its destination, but it encountered no enemy positions.
The withdrawal of the Chinese delaying forces was confirmed on the 26th when the
3d Division and the 25th Division as well moved forward against little or no
opposition.28
To the north, the Chinese continued to
oppose the efforts of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team to capture Hill
228. Using Route 33 and a lesser road to the west, two tank columns from the 3d
Division joined Bowen's forces during the afternoon of the 26th, but, even with
armored support, it was 0900 the following day before the 187th captured Hill
228.29 Using the remainder of the 27th for reorganization and resupply,
General Bowen attacked the heights on the east side
of Route 33 early on 28 March and occupied them after an all-day battle to
eliminate stiff enemy resistance.30
The 15th and 65th Infantry Regiments of the
3d Division meanwhile reached the airborne forces, the 1st Battalion of the 15th
Infantry making first contact late in the afternoon of the 27th. Despite General
Milburn's hopes for the operation, the two regiments drove no enemy forces into
the guns of the airborne unit. Either the Chinese resisting the eastward attack
of the 187th had kept Route 33 open long enough for the forces withdrawing
before the 3d Division to pass north, or the withdrawing enemy units had used
another road, perhaps Route 3. Moving through spotty resistance, the 25th
Division on the right had kept pace with the 3d Division, and by nightfall on 28
March both were on or above line Aspen.31
Riper Concluded
Late on 26 March, as it became obvious that
the Chinese were backing away from the 3d and 25th Divisions, General Ridgway
had ordered the I and IX Corps to continue to line Benton. As originally
conceived, the IX Corps advance to Benton was limited to General Hoge's western
forces and was intended simply to protect the I Corps' right flank. But Ridgway
had since modified his plan of operations, widening the advance to include the
entire IX Corps and all other forces to the east.32
On 23 March he had lengthened line Benton
eastward through the 1st Cavalry Division's patrol base at Ch'unch'on and as far
as the 1st Marine Division's zone on the IX Corps right, where it joined the
last few miles of line Cairo. On the following day he had extended line Cairo
from its original terminus in the Marine zone northeastward across the remainder
of the army front to the town of Chosan-ni on the east coast.33 The
final objective line of the RIPPER operation thus had become a combination of the Benton and Cairo
lines following the upstream trace of the Imjin virtually to the 38th parallel
in the west, hanging slack a few miles below the parallel for almost all of its
remaining length to the east, then rising to an east coast anchor some eight
mile above the parallel. (See Maps 26 and 27.)
Ridgway's forces achieved the adjusted line
by the end of March, encountering no more than the sporadic delaying action that
had characterized the opposition to Operation RIPPER
from the outset. Thus, since 7 March Eighth Army
forces had made impressive territorial gains, recapturing the South Korean
capital and moving between twenty-five and thirty miles north to reach-or all
but reach-the 38th parallel. Estimates of enemy killed and wounded during the
month were high, and some forty-eight hundred Chinese and North Koreans had been
captured. Nevertheless, the results in terms of enemy troops and supplies
destroyed were considerably less than anticipated. The clear fact was that the
enemy high command had been and still was marshaling its main forces beyond the
reach of the RIPPER operation. Equally obvious was that only advances above the 38th
parallel could attack these main forces.34
The Parallel Question
Earlier, as General Ridgway was about to
open Operation COURAGEOUS, the gains he already had registered in his KILLER and RIPPER advances had influenced a
decision in Washington by which operations above the parallel assumed new
importance as a political question. The decision centered on how and when to
approach the desired ceasefire. Notwithstanding the building evidence of enemy
offensive preparations, officials of the Departments of State and Defense
believed that Ridgway's recent successes might have convinced the Chinese and
North Koreans that they could not win a military victory and, if this was the
case, that they might agree to negotiate an end to hostilities. On the advice of
these officials, President Truman planned to make a public statement suggesting
the United Nations' willingness to end the fighting. The statement was carefully
worded to avoid a threatening tone and so to encourage a favorable reply. Truman
intended to deliver the appeal as soon as his statement had been approved by
officials of all nations that had contributed forces to the U.N.
Command.35
The timing of the presidential announcement
was tied also to the fact that Ridgway's forces were fast approaching the 38th parallel. The consensus
in Washington was that the Chinese and North Koreans would be more inclined to
agree to a cease-fire under conditions restoring the status quo ante bellum, that is,
if the fighting could be ended in the vicinity of the parallel where it had
begun. Therefore, while there was no intention to forbid all ground action above
the parallel, there was some question in the mind of Secretary of State Acheson
and among many members of the United Nations whether the Eighth Army should make
a general advance into North Korea.36
The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General
MacArthur of the president's plan in a message radioed from Washington on 20
March. They informed him of the prevalent feeling in the United Nations that the
U.N. Command should make no major advance above the 38th parallel before the
presidential appeal was delivered and the reactions to it determined. They also
asked for his recommendations on how much freedom of ground action UNC forces
should have in the vicinity of the parallel during the diplomatic effort to
provide for their security and to allow them to maintain contact with the
enemy.37
MacArthur, of course, had been pressing
Washington for decisions favoring a military, not a diplomatic, solution to the
war. Shortly before he received the joint Chiefs' message he again had expressed
his views in a letter to Republican Congressman Joseph W. Martin of
Massachusetts, the-minority leader in the House of Representatives.38
The congressman earlier had written MacArthur asking for comment on Martin's
thesis that Nationalist Chinese forces "might be employed in the opening of a
second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea." MacArthur
replied that his own view followed "the conventional pattern of meeting force
with maximum counterforce," that Martin's suggestion on the use of Chiang
Kai-shek's forces was in consonance with this pattern, and that there was "no
substitute for victory."39
Although he had been denied the decisions
that in his judgment favored a military solution, MacArthur nevertheless wanted
no further restrictions placed on the operations of his command. In so advising
the joint Chiefs on 21 March, he pointed out, as he had some time earlier, that
under current conditions any appreciable UNC effort to clear North Korea already
was out of the question.40
While awaiting a response, MacArthur
informed General Ridgway of the new development on 22 March. Although MacArthur
expected that the response from Washington would be a new directive for ground
operations, possibly one forbidding an entry into North Korea in strength, he
intended in the meantime to allow the Eighth Army to advance north of the
parallel as far as logistics could support major operations. Ridgway otherwise was to be
restricted only by having to obtain MacArthur's specific authorization before
moving above the parallel in force.41
In acknowledging these conditions Ridgway
notified MacArthur that he currently was developing plans for an advance that
would carry Eighth Army forces ten to twenty miles above the parallel to a
general line following the upstream trace of the Yesong River as far as
Sibyon-ni in the west, falling off gently southeastward to the Hwach'on
Reservoir, then running almost due east to the coast. As in past and current
operations, the objective would be the destruction of enemy troops and materiel.
MacArthur approved Ridgway's concept but also scheduled a visit to Korea for 24
March, when he would have an opportunity to discuss the plans in more
detail.42
Before leaving Tokyo on the 24th, MacArthur
issued a communique in which he offered to confer with his enemy counterpart on
arranging a ceasefire. He specified that he was making the offer "within the
area of my authority as the military commander" and that he would be in search
of "any military means" for achieving the desired result. He thus kept the bid
itself within the military sphere.43 But in leading up to his offer
MacArthur belittled China's military power, noting in
particular that Chinese forces could not win in Korea, and made statements that
could be, and were, interpreted as threatening that the United Nations would
decide to attack China if hostilities continued. These remarks prompted other
governments to ask about a possible shift in U.S. policy, and in President
Truman's judgment they so contradicted the tone of his own planned statement
that he decided not to issue it for fear of creating more international
confusion.44
MacArthur's announcement thoroughly angered
the president. It was, he wrote a few days later, "not just a public
disagreement over policy, but deliberate, premeditated sabotage of US and UN
policy."45 Moreover, MacArthur had not cleared his communique with
Washington as the president's directive of December 1950 required for all
releases touching on national policy. Truman considered MacArthur's violation of
the directive as "open defiance of my orders as President and as Commander in
Chief."46 His immediate act was to order the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
send MacArthur a reminder of the December directive. Privately, he decided that
MacArthur should be relieved.47
Included in the reminder sent by the joint
Chiefs on 24 March (received in Tokyo on the 25th) were orders that MacArthur
report to them for instructions should his counterpart respond to his offer and
"request an armistice in the field." No such response was expected, however, and
since Truman had canceled his own cease-fire initiative, operations in strength
above the 38th parallel again had become a tactical question for General
MacArthur and General Ridgway to answer. MacArthur, in fact, publicly revealed
his answer before he really knew that the diplomatic effort to achieve a
cease-fire had been canceled. Upon his return to Tokyo late on 24 March
following his conference with Ridgway and a visit to the front, he announced
that he had directed the Eighth Army to cross the parallel "if and when its
security makes it tactically advisable.48 More specifically than that, of course, MacArthur had approved
Ridgway's concept of a general advance as deep as twenty miles into North
Korea.
The Rugged and Dauntless
Concept
In advance of issuing orders for attacks above
the 38th parallel, General Ridgway assembled corps and division commanders at
his Yoju headquarters on 27 March to discuss courses of action that were now
open to them or that they might be obliged to follow. The possibility of Soviet
intervention again had been raised, he told them. According to a reputable
foreign source, the USSR planned to launch a large
scale offensive in Korea near the end of April employing Soviet regulars of
Mongolian extraction under the guise of volunteers. Ridgway doubted the accuracy
of the report, but as a matter of prudence, since the Eighth Army might be
ordered out of Korea in the event of Soviet intervention, he intended to pass
the evacuation plan outlined by the Eighth Army staff in January to corps
commanders for further development. Lest Eighth Army forces start "looking over
the shoulder," no word of the course of action or preparations for it was to go
beyond those working on the plan.49
Alluding to past and recent proposals of
cease-fire negotiations, Ridgway also advised that future governmental decisions
might compel the Eighth Army to adopt a static defense. Because of its inherent
rigidity, such a stance would require strong leadership and imaginative tactical
thinking, he warned, to stand off a numerically stronger enemy that might not be
similarly inhibited in the choice of tactics.
The Eighth Army meanwhile would continue to
move forward and in the next advance would cross the 38th parallel. Ridgway now
agreed with General MacArthur's earlier prediction that a stalemate ultimately
would develop on the battlefront, but just how far the Eighth Army would drive
into North Korea before this occurred, he informed the assembled commanders,
could not be accurately assessed at the moment.50
General MacArthur and General Ridgway meet on East Coast, April 3 '51
Ridgway had revised his concept for
advancing above the parallel since meeting with MacArthur on 24 March. He
originally had intended to direct a strong attack northwestward across the
Imjin, expecting that in moving as far as the Yesong River the attack force
would find the elusive North Korean I Corps. His intelligence staff later
discovered that the bulk of the North Korean corps had withdrawn behind the
Yesong and also warned that the attack force would be
vulnerable to envelopment by a fresh Chinese unit located off the right flank of
the advance. (The unit was the XIX Army Group, which intelligence had not
yet fully identified.) Ridgway, as a result, elected to limit operations
northwest of the Imjin to reconnaissance and combat patrols.51
He planned now to point his main attack
toward the centrally located road and rail complex marked out by the towns of
P'yonggang in the north and Ch'orwon and Kumhwa in the south.
This complex,
eventually named the Iron Triangle by newsmen searching for a dramatic term, lay
twenty to thirty miles above the 38th parallel in the diagonal corridor dividing
the Taebaek Mountains into northern and southern ranges and containing the major
road and rail links between the port of Wonsan in the northeast and Seoul in the
southwest. Other routes emanating from the triangle of towns connected with
Pyongyang to the northwest and with the western and eastern halves of the
present front. A unique center of communications, the complex was of obvious
importance to the ability of the enemy high command to move troops and supplies
within the forward areas and to coordinate operations laterally.
Ridgway's first concern was to occupy
ground that could serve as a base both for continuing the advance toward the
complex and, in view of the enemy's evident offensive preparations, for
developing a defensive position. The base selected, line Kansas, traced the
lower bank of the Imjin in the west. From the Imjin eastward as far as the
Hwach'on Reservoir the line lay two to six miles above the 38th parallel across
the approaches to the Iron Triangle. Following the lower shoreline of the
reservoir, it then turned slightly north to a depth of ten miles above the
parallel before falling off southeastward to the Yangyang area on the coast. In
the advance to line Kansas, designated Operation RUGGED, the I and IX Gores were to
seize the segment of the line between the Imjin and the western edge of the
Hwach'on Reservoir. To the east, the X Corps was to occupy the portion tracing
the reservoir shore and reaching Route 24 in the Soyang River valley, and the
ROK III and I Corps were to take the section between
Route 24 and Yangyang.52
In anticipation of enemy offensive
operations, Ridgway planned to pull substantial forces off the line immediately
after reaching Kansas and prepare them for counterattacks. The IX Corps was to
release the 1st Cavalry Division. Under army control, the division was to
assemble at Kyongan-ni, below the Han southeast of Seoul, and prepare to meet
enemy attacks aimed at the capital city via Route 1 from the northwest, over
Routes 33 and 3 from the north, or through the Pukhan River valley from the
northeast. In the X Gores zone, the bulk of the 2d Division was to assemble at
Hongch'on ready to counter an attack following the Route 29 axis, and a division
yet to be selected from one of the two ROK corps in the east was to assemble at
Yuch'on-ni on Route 20 and prepare to operate against enemy attacks in either
corps sector. The 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, which on 29 March left
the I Corps zone for Taegu, meanwhile was to be ready to return north to
reinforce operations wherever needed.53
While these forces established themselves
in reserve, Ridgway planned to launch Operation DAUNTLESS, a limited advance toward the
Iron Triangle by the I and IX Corps. With the objective only of menacing the
triangle, not of investing it, the two corps were to attack in succession to
lines Utah and Wyoming. They would create, in effect, a broad salient bulging above line
Kansas between the Imjin and Hwach'on Reservoir and reaching prominent heights
commanding the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa base of the communications complex. If struck by
strong enemy attacks during or after the advance, the two corps were to return
to the Kansas line.54
To maintain, and in some areas regain,
contact with enemy forces, Ridgway allowed each corps to start toward line
Kansas as it completed preparations. The RUGGED
advance, as a result, staggered to a full start
between 2 and 5 April. When General MacArthur made his customary appearance on
the 3d, this time in the ROK I Corps zone on the east
coast, Ridgway brought him up to date on plans. MacArthur agreed with the
RUGGED and DAUNTLESS concept, urging in particular
that Ridgway make a strong effort to hold the Kansas line. At the same time,
MacArthur believed that the two operations would move the battlefront to that
"point of theoretical stalemate" he had predicted in early March. He intended to
limit offensive operations, once Ridgway's forces reached their Kansas-Wyoming
objectives, to reconnaissance and combat patrols, none larger than a
battalion.55
Notes
1 Rad, GX-3-3813 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
al., 21 Mar 51.
2 Rads, GX-3-3900 KGOO, GX-3-3908 KGOO, and GX-3-4040
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., first two 21 Mar and last 22 Mar 51;
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51.
3 Rads, GX-3-3813 KGOO, GX-3-4040 KGOO, and GX-3-4149
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., first one 21 Mar and last two, 22 Mar
51.
4 I Corps Opn Dir 50, 21 Mar 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
5 I Corps Opn Dir 51, 22 Mar 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task Force Growdon, in CMH.
6 Colonel Mudgett replaced Dabney, now a briga dier
general, on 21 March 1951.
7 Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 21 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Rad,
GX-3-4097 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 22 Mar 51.
8 Rad, GX-3-4040 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I
Corps et al., 22 Mar 51; Rad, CIACT 3-30, CG I Corps to CO
6th Med Tk Bn, 23 Mar 51; 1 Corps Opn Dir 52, 23 Mar 51.
9 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task
Force Growdon.
10 The provisional Combat Cargo Command had been
discontinued and the 315th Air Division activated to replace it on 25 January
1951. Brig. Gen. John P. Henebry had replaced General Tunner as commander of the
315th on 8 February 1951.
11 Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk, in CMH; 187th
Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Futrell; The United States Air Force in Korea,
pp. 353-55.
12 Accompanying the 187th to provide additional medical
support was a para-surgical team from the Indian 60th Field Ambulance and
Surgical Company.
13 187th Abn RCT Opn O 2, 22 Mar 51; 187th Abn RCT Comd
Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk.
14 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS
Rpt, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk.
15 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army
Study, Operation Tomahawk; I Corps POR 576, 23 Mar 51.
16 Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk.
17 Rad, GX (TAC) 124 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 23
Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Operation Tomahawk.
18 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task
Force Growdon.
19 I Corps Opn Dir 52, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army Study,
Operation Tomahawk; ibid., Task Force Growdon.
20 I Corps POR 576, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3
Consolidated Opn Rpt, 24 Mar 51; Rad, CIACT 3-35, CG I Corps to CG 1st ROK Div,
24 Mar 51; I Corps Comd, Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
21 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Div Comd
Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
22 1 Corps G3 Jnl, 23 Mar 51; 3d Div G3 Jnl, 23 Mar 51;
3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
23 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
24 Rad, CIACT 3-37, CG I Corps to CG 1st ROK Div et al.,
24 Mar 51; 187th Abn RCT S3 Jnl, 24 Mar 51, and Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar
51.
25 187th Abn RCT S3 Jul, 24 Mar 51, and Comd Rpt, Nar,
Mar 51; Eighth Army Study, Task Force Growdon.
26 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army
Study, Task Force Growdon.
27 187th Alm RCT S3 Jnl, 25 Mar 51; Eighth Army Study,
Operation Tomahawk.
28 Eighth Army G3 Consol Opn Rpt, 25 Mar 51; I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
29 On the 26th General Soule reported to General Ridgway
that one of his tanks had knocked out a T34. This piece was the first enemy
armor destroyed by ground action since Ridgway had taken command of the Eighth
Army. The T34 may have belonged to the 17th Mechanized Division of the
North Korean I Corps. See Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
30 187th Abn RCT Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 3d Div Comd Rpt,
Nar, Mar 51.
31 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar,
Mar 51.
32 Rad, GX-3-4877 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CGs I and IX
Corps, 26 Mar 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51.
33 Rad, GX-3-4228 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
al., 23 Mar 51; Rad, GX (TAC) 128 KCG, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 24 Mar
51.
34 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 and
G2 SS Rpts, Mar 51.
35 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 266;
Truman Years of Trial and Hope, p. 440; Acheson, Present at the
Creation, pp. 517-18; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp.
357-58.
36 Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 263-66; Acheson,
Present at the Creation, p. 517; Rees, Korea: The Limited War,
p. 208.
37 Rad, JCS 86276, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Mar 51.
38 The Tokyo dateline of MacArthur's letter was 20
March. Since Tokyo time is fourteen hours ahead of Washington time,
MacArthur presumably wrote his letter before the joint Chiefs of Staff prepared
their message of the same date.
39 Both letters are quoted in MacArthur,
Reminiscences, pp. 385-86.
40 Rad, C 58203, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 21 Mar
51.
41 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 358-60;
Rad, C 58292, MacArthur for Ridgway, 22 Mar 51.
42 Rad, G-3-4122 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 22 Mar
51; Rad MacArthur to Ridgway, 23 Mar 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Mar
51.
43 To this extent, MacArthur's action was in accord with
earlier advice a Department of State official gave the Department of Defense
shortly after the Inch'on landing: "A cease-fire should be a purely military
matter and . . . the Commanding General of the unified command . . . is the
appropriate representative to negotiate any armistice or cease-fire agreement."
See Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 359.
44 MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 387-88;
Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 440-42.
45 Ltr, Truman to George M. Elsey, 16 Apr 51, quoted in
D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, vol. III, Triumph and
Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1985), p. 588.
46 Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, pp. 441-12.
47 Ibid., pp. 442-43. When asked some years later why he
did not relieve MacArthur at the time, Truman replied that he wanted a "better
example of his insubordination, and I wanted it to be one . . . that everybody
would recognize for exactly what it was, and I knew that, MacArthur being the
kind of man he was, I wouldn't have long to wait." See Merle Miller, Plain
Speaking (New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1973), pp. 302-03.
48 Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 270-71;
Ridgway, The Korean War, p. 116; copy of MacArthur's 24
March statement with Ridgway papers in CMH.
49 Discussion of the conference is based on MS, Ridgway,
The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 405, 407-10; Ridgway, The
Korean War, pp. 121-23, 157.
50 The conference had a tragic postscript when the light
plane returning General Kim, commander of the ROK I
Corps, to Kangnung crashed in the Taebaeks, killing the general and his pilot.
General Paik, the excellent leader of the ROK 1st Division, became the new
commander of the ROK I Corps early in April and Brig. Gen. Kang Moon Bong took
command of the 1st Division.
51 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Ridgway, The Korean War,
pp. 120-21; Eighth Army PIR 254, 23 Mar 51, and PIR 259, 28 Mar
51.
52 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps et al., 29 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, Apr
51.
53 Rad, GX-3-5348 KGOP, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Gores et al., 29 Mar 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 29 Mar
51.
54 Rad, GX-4-805 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to CG I Corps et
al., 3 Apr 51.
55 Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 2 and 3 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-979
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 4 Apr 51; Eighth Army CG SS Rpt, Apr
51; MS, Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, pp. 419-20; Ridgway,
The Korean War, p. 121; Rad, C 59397, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
