Advance to the Han
When General Almond received General
Ridgway's 30 January question on a X Corps-ROK III Corps operation similar to
THUNDERBOLT, he was in the
process of extending the X Corps' diversionary effort ordered earlier by
Ridgway. Having achieved the Yoju-Wonju-Yongwol
line against little opposition, Almond was planning a
strong combat reconnaissance fifteen miles above this line. Searching that deep
at corps center and right could apply pressure on the North Korean V and
II Corps concentrated above Hoengsong and P'yongch'ang. At the same time,
the 2d Division, due to move north along the corps left boundary as far as
Chip'yong-ni, eight miles east of Yangp'yong, could protect the right flank of
the IX Corps as the THUNDERBOLT operation continued.1
In the recent course of protecting the IX
Corps right, a joint motorized patrol from the 2d and 24th Divisions on 29
January had moved north out of the Yoju
area on the east side of the Han to a pair of
railroad tunnels and a connecting bridge standing east and west athwart a narrow
valley four miles south of Chip'yong-ni. Chinese in the high ground overlooking
the tunnels quickly cut the patrol's route of
withdrawal, forced the group into hasty defenses on the nearest rises of ground,
and opened a series of assaults. The Chinese finally backed away after air
strikes were called in by the pilot of an observation plane who spotted the
ambush and after a motorized company of infantry reinforced the group about 0330
on the 30th. The waylaid patrol had suffered five dead, twenty-nine wounded, and
five missing out of a total strength of forty-five.2
At the discovery of Chinese at the twin
tunnels General Almond ordered the 2d Division to identify and destroy all enemy
units in that area. The 23d Infantry received the assignment. On 31 January
Colonel Freeman sent his 3d Battalion and the attached French battalion to the
tunnels after placing the 37th Field Artillery Battalion within a thousand yards
of the tunnel area in direct support.3
The infantry battalions reached and
established a perimeter around the tunnel-bridge complex without sighting enemy
forces. But from farther north Colonel Freeman's forces themselves were observed
by the 125th Division, 42d Army. Near dawn on 1 February the
375th and 374th Regiments attacked from the north and northeast,
respectively, and after daylight the 373d Regiment assaulted the
perimeter from the northwest and southwest. In hard, close-in fighting lasting
all day, the defending battalions, relying heavily on artillery fire and on more
than eighty air strikes, drew far more blood and finally forced the Chinese to
withdraw. Freeman's forces counted 1,300 enemy bodies outside their perimeter
and estimated total enemy casualties at 3,600. Their own losses were 45 killed,
207 wounded, and 4 missing.4
Judging from the two sharp actions at the twin tunnels,
the Chinese were determined to retain control of Chip'yong-ni. They had good
reason. The town was so situated that the force occupying it could control
movements over Route 2 to the west, over Route 24 to the northeast, over Routes
24 and 24A below town, and thus through the Yangp'yong-Ch'ungju segment of the
Han valley stetching to the southeast behind it. Eighth Army possession of
Chip'yong-ni, furthermore, would pose a threat of envelopment to enemy forces
opposing the I and IX Corps below the Han. For these same reasons General Almond
planned to seize Chip'yong-ni and incorporated this plan in his overall
recommendations for an operation styled after THUNDERBOLT.5
Also behind Almond's proposals were late
January intelligence reports of a strong enemy force assembling around
Hongch'on, at the intersection of Routes 24 and 29 twenty miles northeast of
Chip'yong-ni and fifteen miles north of Hoengsong. This force, apparently part
of the North Korean V Corps, could be preparing to advance southwest on Route 24
through Chip'yong-ni, then down the Han valley toward Yoju and Ch'ungju. Or the
V Corps might again push forces south on Route 29 through Hoengsong toward
Wonju. To spoil either move, Almond considered Hongch'on the proper main
objective of a X Corps attack.6
To disrupt both the V Corps and
II Corps, he outlined a coordinated X Corps-ROK III Corps advance,
Operation ROUNDUP. (
19) The current corps combat reconnaissance limit, generally the
Chip'yong-ni-HoengsongP'yongch'ang line, was to be the line of departure for
ROUNDUP and was to be
occupied in a preliminary advance by the 2d Division on the left, the 187th
Airborne Regimental Combat Team in the center, and the 7th Division on the
right. This advance would base American units far enough forward to support a
thrust at Hongch'on, which Almond planned South Korean forces would
make.7
Map 19.
Operation ROUNDUP, the X Corps Plan, 4 February 1951
He proposed a flanking operation against
Hongch'on by the ROK 5th and 8th Divisions accompanied by artillery and armor
drawn from the American units on the line of departure. From behind the 2d
Division on the left, part of the ROK 8th Division was to advance north over
Route 29 while the main body moved northwest to cut Route 24 roughly halfway
between Chip'yong-ni and Hongch'on, then turned northeast to hit
Hongch'on itself. On the right, the ROK 5th Division was to advance north
through the mountains east of Route 29 through part of the area occupied by the
North Korean II Corps, then swing west against
Hongch'on.8
The 2d Division was to appoint one light
artillery battalion, a medium battery, an automatic weapons battery, and a
motorized infantry battalion to move with and directly support the ROK 8th
Division. These units eventually constituted Support Force 21. The 7th Division
was to furnish a similar Support Force 7 for the ROK 5th Division. In each
instance the artillery commander of the American division was to coordinate all
artillery fire within his own zone and within the zone of the South Korean
division he was supporting.9 Later, because control of the South
Korean advance was centralized at corps headquarters and did not involve either
American division headquarters per se, a question-warranted or not-would arise
over who should order the displacement of these support forces.
Five armored teams, each comprising a
company of infantry and a platoon of tanks, also were designated, two by the 2d
Division, two by the 7th Division, and one by the 187th Airborne Regimental
Combat Team.10 Only three were used. Teams A and B from the 2d
Division were attached to the ROK 8th Division at the outset of the advance; Team E from the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team
later opened operations under the control of the corps armored officer.
By 5 February, the date set for opening the
Hongch'on strike, General Almond expected the ROK III Corps to have come up even
with the X Corps' line of departure. On the 5th the ROK III Corps should start
forward through successive phase lines, coordinating each phase of movement with
the X Corps' progress, to destroy North Korean II Corps forces in zone
and to protect the X Corps' right flank.11
General Ridgway approved Almond's plan on 1
February and made Almond responsible for coordinating the X Corps and ROK III
Corps attacks. Ridgway cautioned him, however, that for the remainder of
Operation THUNDERBOLT his
continuing mission of protecting the IX Corps' right flank would be the X Corps'
overriding tactical consideration. The next day Ridgway ordered the ROK I Corps
to capture the east coast town of Kangnung in an advance coordinated with the
progress of the ROK III Corps.12
The X Corps' preliminary advance to the
line of departure was largely but not fully effected by the target date. At the
corps west flank, the 23d Infantry moved north of the twin tunnels and occupied
Chip'yong-ni, surprisingly against no more than token opposition. At corps
center, the 38th Infantry, now commanded by Col. John G. Coughlin, occupied
Hoengsong, and the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team the ground immediately southeast." The 7th Division at
the corps right was not yet on the line. Its 17th and 31st Regiments were still
approaching over the Chech'on-P'yongch'ang and Yongwol-P'yongch'ang roads.
Behind the line traced by these clumps of Americans, the ROK 5th and 8th
Divisions were in final assemblies for the Hongch'on attack, one on either side
of Route 29.14
The assault divisions of the ROK III Corps, the ROK 7th
and 9th, also were somewhat short of the line of departure on the 5th, yet near
enough to satisfy General Almond. The day before, at a corps commanders'
conference at Suwon, he notified General Ridgway that he was ready to begin
Operation ROUNDUP. Ridgway
that day ordered a westward shift of the X CorpsROK III Corps boundary to give
the South Koreans more of the territory north of P'yongch'ang. Hence, when
ROUNDUP opened at 0800 on
the 5th, General Yu's two divisions faced the bulk of the North Korean II
Corps while General Almond's two assault units confronted the North Korean
V Corps in the Hoengsong-Hongch'on area.15
Thunderbolt Continued
Amid the ROUNDUP
preliminaries, the I and IX Corps to the west
continued their THUNDERBOLT advance, pushing infantry and tanks
supported by artillery and air strikes-and at the far west by naval
gunfire-through isolated but stubborn defenses. (Map 20) The advances,
slowed by careful lateral coordination and a full search of the ground, covered
two to six of the remaining fifteen miles to the Han. The IX Corps registered
the deepest gains as General Moore, now in command, shoved the 1st Cavalry and
24th Divisions up even with General Milburn's 25th and 3d Divisions.16 The THUNDERBOLT front by 5 February traced
a line running east and west through a point not far below Anyang on Route
1.17
As a result of General Ridgway's 31 January
instructions to his G-3 to arrange air attacks to isolate the battlefield south
of the Han, the daily army air requests to the Fifth Air Force came second only
to close support. The requests called for round-the-clock interdiction with
special attention to nighttime operations and with the intensity to prevent
enemy forces from moving north or south of the Han. General Partridge worked the
army requests into his daytime armed reconnaissance program and stepped up a
current night intruder effort along the Han from a point north of Kimpo airfield
eastward to a point near Yangp'yong. To prevent useless destruction in Seoul,
Partridge instructed his pilots not to attack residential areas unless military
targets were discovered within them.18
Map 20.
Operation THUNDERBOLT, 1-11 February 1951
Judging from reported results over the
first four days of February, the air attacks were something less than intensive.
Night intruder sorties totaled fiftyfive, ranging from six on the 2d to
twenty-two on the 3d. Targets reported destroyed or damaged included 50 troops,
1 antiaircraft gun, 14 vehicles, 4 railroad cars, 13 supply installations, and
517 buildings.19
The air effort had little effect on the
gradual retraction of enemy forces from below the Han sensed late in January.
The screen in front of the I and IX Corps by 5 February was one division
stronger after the 114th Division, 38th Army,
appeared opposite the 24th Division on the IX
Corps right. The addition raised the divisions in contact to seven: the North
Korean 8th on the
west, the three of the 50th Army in the center, and the three of the 38th Army on the east. Behind
the screen, much of the North Korean I Corps' reserve strength remained below the Han, the 47th Division occupying Inch'on,
the 17th Division located in the Seoul-Yongdungp'o area. But the XIII
Army Group commander had reassembled almost all of his
reserves above the river and had shifted the 42d
and parts of the 39th and 40th Armies eastward into the
area above Yangp'yong and Chip'yong-ni. The 66th
Army, whose troops had not moved below the Han,
also was east and north of Seoul. As last known, it was assembled near
Kap'yong.20
The newest prisoners and documents captured by the I and IX Corps
indicated that the enemy units still south of the Han would keep only light
forces engaged and would deploy in depth for a leapfrog delaying action pending
an enemy offensive around 8 February. The choice of date seemed to be tied
either to the opening of the Chinese New Year on the 6th or to the third
birthday of the North Korean Army.21 The eastward shift of
considerable Chinese strength into the territory above Yangp'yong and
Chip'yong-ni, as did the earlier engagements at the twin tunnels, pointed to the
Han valley below Yangp'yong as the likely main axis of an enemy advance. Heavy
enemy vehicular traffic also was sighted from the air, all of it moving south
and over half of it moving from the Wonsan area toward Ch'unch'on. This shift
could mean that the IX Army
Group was
rejoining the battle and was sending forces for employment in the central
region.22
The indications that the enemy would employ
only light forces and delaying tactics in front of the I and IX Corps provided
some assurance that the THUNDERBOLT forces would reach their Han objectives. The enemy concentration
to the northeast raised the same danger of envelopment that had partially
prompted the Eighth Army's withdrawal to line D a month earlier, but it was
possible that General
Almond's ROUNDUP advance would spoil the enemy buildup and quite probable that the
X Corps could at least protect the IX Corps' right flank.
The I Corps Reaches the
Han
At the resumption of THUNDERBOLT on the 5th, the two I Corps
assault divisions spearheaded their advance with tanks. General Milburn
previously had arranged but had not yet called for the strong armored thrust
along the west coast ordered by Ridgway on 31 January. On Milburn's further
order, two tank battalions, two infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and
a company of engineers were to assemble under Brig. Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr.,
assistant commander of the 1st Cavalry Division. When called, Task Force Allen
was to exploit any breakthrough that might occur, especially in the 25th
Division's zone, and was particularly to block the lateral Inch'on-Yongdungp'o
road and cut off enemy forces located west of Kimpo airfield.23
Between 5 and 8 February the smaller
armored forces ranging ahead of the I Corps' methodical infantry advance were
frequently delayed but seldom hurt by numerous minefields located on the curves
and shoulders of roads and on bypasses around destroyed bridges. The mines,
mostly wooden boxes with five to six pounds of explosives in each, were poorly
laid and camouflaged. Most were visible, and mine detectors picked up the
metallic igniters of those more deeply buried.24
Gains of one to four miles through the 8th
carried the 25th Division on the left within five miles of the
Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road and took the forwardmost force of the 3d Division at
the right within six miles of the Han itself. Beginning on the 6th, Milburn's
forces captured troops from the North Korean 47th Division in the area
north and northeast of Anyang. By the 8th it appeared that all or part of the
North Korean 17th Division had relieved the 47th at Inch'on; that
the latter had joined the North Korean 8th Division in holding back the I
Corps, taking up positions near the center of the corps zone; and that the bulk
of the 50th Army was sideslipping to the east.25
The strongest enemy positions facing the I
Corps on the 8th lay between Routes 1 and 55 across heights centered on Kwanak
Mountain, due south of Seoul, where the North Korean 47th Division had
been identified. Since the Kwanak heights were the last defensible ground on the
southern approaches to Seoul, their capture could climax the I Corps advance to
the Han. General Ridgway emphasized this probability to General Milburn at a
meeting of corps commanders on the 8th and urged him to push vigorously against
the Kwanak defenses. Earlier, after learning of the 47th Division's entry
on line, Ridgway asked Admiral joy to arrange an amphibious landing
demonstration at Inch'on to discourage further strengthening of the enemy screen
and perhaps draw off some opposing forces. Joy dispatched ships from Sasebo,
Japan, and from Pusan to join those already in Inch'on waters for a demonstration on the
10th.26
Snow and low-hanging clouds shut down air operations on
the 9th but had little ill effect on the I Corps. The 25th Division captured
Kwanak Mountain and, west of Route 1, advanced its infantry line within two
miles of the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road. Armored forces from the division
reconnoitered farther west and north within sight of Inch'on and Yongdungp'o. On
the corps right, the 3d Division moved two to three miles north, and a small
armored column, Task Force Meyer, spurted up Route 55 to become the first corps
troops on the Han. Minefields harassed the advance, but assault forces otherwise
consistently reported "no resistance."27
General Milburn judged that the
50th Army forces
previously in the 3d Division's zone had withdrawn above the Han or out of the I
Corps zone to the east. The North Korean 8th
and 47th Divisions,
on the other hand, might have moved northwest to
join the North Korean 17thDivision
just above the Inch'onYongdungp'o road to defend
the Kimpo peninsula. As part of a plan to spoil any such effort, Milburn on the
night of the 9th called for Task Force Allen to assemble behind the 25th
Division. The division was to seize the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road by noon on
the 10th, and Task Force Allen was then to advance
above the road in multiple columns to clear the Kimpo
peninsula.28
The landing demonstration at Inch'on
scheduled for the 10th now seemed apt to hinder rather than ease the I Corps
advance. The 25th Division armored force that had looked at Inch'on during the
day had seen no enemy activity. The enemy's abrupt withdrawal apparently had
included the Inch'on garrison. Since a simulated landing might prompt the North
Koreans to reoccupy Inch'on and in turn make the port more difficult for the
25th Division to capture, the amphibious feint was canceled. The naval force
assembled off Inch'on, however, did plan to investigate the port on the 10th
using a small party of ROK marines acquired from an offshore security force on
Tokchok-to, an island thirty miles southwest of Inch'on.29
5th Regimental Combat Team Advances Toward the Han River, Feb 5 '41
Snow showers through the morning of the
10th again canceled most of the I Corps' air support, but again with no ill
effect. A total absence of resistance except for more antitank mines allowed the
25th Division to seize the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road an hour ahead of schedule.
Under clearing skies, Task Force Allen moved into the Kimpo peninsula in two
columns promptly at noon. The column on the east aimed first for Kimpo airfield
due north, then for the road leading northwest along the lower bank of the Han. The column on
the west pushed up the center of the peninsula. The east force occupied the
airfield without a contest in midafternoon, and by nightfall both columns were
well up the peninsula, eight miles above the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road. One
machine gun position, a short fire fight with the tail of an enemy column
withdrawing across the frozen Han, twelve stragglers captured, and a little long
range fire were the only evidences of the North Korean I
Corps.30
Behind Task Force Allen the
24th, 35th, and attached ROK 15th Regiments of the
25th Division moved to the Han between Kimpo airfield and the edge of
Yongdungp'o. In the only brush with enemy forces, a South Korean patrol that
moved across the ice into the lower edge of Seoul was chased back by small arms
fire. On the corps right, the 15th and 7th Infantry Regiments of the 3d Division
joined Task Force Meyer at the Han, moving onto the high ground between
Yongdungp'o and Route 55. The only contact was an exchange of fire with enemy
forces in position on the north bank of the river.31
On the opposite corps flank, the 25th Division's
reconnaissance company and the Eighth Army Ranger company had moved westward
onto the cape holding Inch'on in company with Task Force Allen's noontime
advance above the Inch'on-Yongdungp'o road. Neither the Rangers, moving along
the southern shore of the cape, nor the reconnaissance troops, heading directly
for Inch'on, met resistance. The reconnaissance company entered the city at
1700, almost simultaneously with eighty ROK marines sent ashore in three small
powerboats by Task Force 95. As suspected, the North Korean garrison was
gone.32
The Rangers found a small spot of
resistance on the 11th on a ridge a mile south of Inch'on. The Rangers and some
of the reconnaissance troops eliminated it early in the afternoon. Task Force
Allen meanwhile resumed clearing the Kimpo peninsula on the morning of the 11th,
its troops in the van reaching the tip before noon. Immediately after General
Allen reported the peninsula clear, General Milburn dissolved the task force and
returned its components to their parent units now consolidating along the
Han.33
The IX Corps Finds a
Bridgehead
IX Corps gains from 5 through 8 February were slow and
short. The resistance emulated that encountered by the I Corps, but the terrain
was much rougher. Methodical coverage of the ground consumed considerable time.
As of the 8th, General Moore nevertheless believed
his corps could reach the Han in a reasonable length of time.34
Under a wet sky on the 9th, Moore's forces
met decidedly stiffer resistance, including counterattacks that forced some
corps units into short withdrawals. In sharp contrast to the virtual
disappearance of enemy forces before the I Corps on that date, the Chinese
opposite the IX Corps apparently planned to retain a bridgehead below the Han.
The bridgehead area as defined by Moore's forces on the 9th and 10th was about
fifteen miles wide, its west anchor located on the Han nine miles north of
Kyongan-ni, its east anchor on the river four miles below Yangp'yong. The
U-shaped forward edge dipped four to seven miles below the Han across a string
of prominent heights between those points.35
By holding this position the Chinese could
prevent IX Corps observation of the Yangp'yong area, already recognized as the
possible starting point of an enemy attack down the Han valley. This theory
gained support on the 10th when in clearing afternoon weather air observers
sighted large numbers of enemy troops moving east on Route 2 along the north
bank of the Han immediately behind the bridgehead area.36
Operation Roundup
As THUNDERBOLT
forces came up to the Han on the 10th, General
Almond's ROUNDUP operation
was in its sixth day. Although the advance started in the
THUNDERBOLT pattern, the
harsh mountains ahead of the X Corps and ROK III Corps inhibited a complete
ground search such as the I and IX Corps were making. In the X Corps zone, the
ROK 5th and 8th Divisions advanced in multiple columns astride the best roads,
tracks, or trails permitting passage through the convoluted ground. The ROK
troops climbed the higher ridges only when necessary to reduce an enemy
position. The main routes for the ROK 8th were Route 29 and a mountain
road-actually a poor stretch of Route 2- reaching west from Route 29 at a point
three miles above Hoengsong. (Map 21) The ROK 5th's principal paths
followed the upstream traces of two small rivers east of Route 29. Physical
contact between columns was rare, especially in the ROK 8th Division zone where
the columns diverged as they proceeded north and northwest.
After three days Almond perceived that the
attack on Hongch'on was as much a battle against terrain as against enemy
opposition. Resistance did stiffen after an easy opening day, but the defending
forces stayed to the tops of hills and allowed the South Koreans to bring down
heavy artillery concentrations and to maneuver around them. The ROK assault
forces, in Almond's estimation, had gained confidence over the three days,
substantially from the presence and support of the American artillery and tanks.
As of the 8th the success of the advance thus appeared largely to depend on
overcoming terrain limitations on infantry maneuver, tank movement, and
artillery forward displacement.37
Against the combination of enemy hilltop
defenses and difficult terrain, the two ROK divisions by 8 February had moved
three to six miles northwest, north, and northeast of Hoengsong. Almond decided
on the 8th that the ROK 8th Division's main effort to envelop Hongch'on from the
west could be eased by committing another division. Currently, one of the 8th
Division's regiments was moving north astride Route 29 while the other two were
pushing through rough ridges to the northwest to cut Route 24. If Almond set
another force in the center to move up Route 29, the ROK 8th could make its
enveloping move in full strength.38
Almond mistrusted his own reserve division,
the ROK 2d, still weak from losses in the Chinese New Year's offensive. He chose
not to reduce the strength of the 2d or 7th Division defenses along the line of
departure, and he could not use the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. On 4
February General Ridgway had notified him that the airborne troops were
scheduled to be taken off the line and that he was not to give them an offensive
role.39
On the 8th Almond asked Ridgway for the ROK
3d Division, then in ROK III Corps reserve. Ridgway hesitated to take General
Yu's only reserve. On the other hand, Yu's assault divisions were reporting good
progress through light to moderate resistance. Moving astride Route 60 from
P'yongch'ang toward Ch'angdong-ni, seventeen miles to the north, the ROK 7th had
advanced one regiment within three miles of the latter town. On the corps right,
the ROK 9th had moved above Chongson through the upper Han valley for almost twenty miles.
Since Yu could get help from the U.S. 7th Division, whose 31st Regiment was now
following the ROK 7th Division above P'yongch'ang, Ridgway agreed to the
transfer of the ROK 3d for the duration of Operation ROUNDUP, and Almond instructed the
division to be in position for an advance above Hoengsong on the morning of the
11th.40
Map 21.
Operation ROUNDUP, 5-11 February 1951
While Almond was arranging to assist the
ROK 8th Division's northwestward swing, a greater problem arose east of Route
29. On 7 February the ROK 5th Division, then advancing with two regiments
forward, had encountered a North Korean force estimated at four thousand. The
division commander planned to eliminate the enemy group on the 8th by bringing
up his reserve regiment on the left for an attack to the east concurrent with
attacks to the north and west by the center and right regiments. But his plan
was spoiled when the right regiment, the ROK 27th, was hit on the 8th by hard
North Korean attacks from the northwest and northeast. One battalion was
scattered, and the remainder of the regiment was forced to
withdraw.41
The regiment continued to receive attacks
until the early morning hours of the 9th when the North Koreans pulled away to
the northwest. The alarming note was that some or all of these forces had come out of the ROK III Corps zone. The North
Korean II Corps apparently was shifting forces westward to join the V
Corps in opposing the X Corps.42
General Almond was obliged to prevent
further incursion on his right if the envelopment of Hongch'on was to succeed.
On the 10th he directed the ROK 5th Division to advance and establish blocking
positions facing northeast near the corps boundary generally on the ground held
by the ROK 27th Regiment when it was attacked, some thirteen miles northeast of
Hoengsong. Along with this move, he ordered the U.S. 7th Division to send a
battalion northwest out of the area above P'yongch'ang toward a ground objective
sixteen miles due east of Hoengsong. This advance, he intended, would drive
enemy forces located near the corps boundary into the path of the ROK 5th
Division's attack. Almond also ordered a battalion of the 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team to move into position nine miles east of Hoengsong to
deepen the east flank blocking effort at the right rear of the ROK 5th
Division.43
The ROK 3d Division, assembling just east
of Hoengsong, was now to become the right arm of the maneuver against Hongch'on.
Behind the protection of the ROK 5th Division to the east, the ROK 3d was to
move north in two columns through the heights east of Route 29 to a point due
east of Hongch'on. There the right column was to face east in blocking positions
while the left column turned west toward the town. Both moves, the ROK 5th
Division's blocking effort at the right and the ROK 3d's attack to the north,
were to begin at noon on the 11th.44
Support Force 7 was now to support the ROK
3d Division. General Almond directed the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team
to place its 674th Field Artillery Battalion in direct support of the ROK 5th
Division and ordered the 96th Field Artillery Battalion, a corps unit previously
assigned to reinforce the fires of Support Force 7, to switch its reinforcement
to the 674th.45
Meanwhile, amid the adjustments in the X
Corps zone between 8 and 11 February, the ROK III Corps continued to gain
ground. The ROK 7th Division fought through Ch'angdong-ni and by evening of the
11th was echeloned left in regimental positions oriented north and northwest
from three miles above Ch'angdong-ni to seven miles below town. On the corps
right, the ROK 9th Division pushed nine more miles up the Han valley, making
contact with the ROK I Corps' Capital Division in the high peaks rising east of
the Han. Resistance was light on the 8th and 9th but stiffened over the next two
days when General Yu's forces ran into parts of the North Korean
31st Division. Obviously, not all of the II Corps had shifted west into the X Corps zone.46
The ROK I Corps, moving up the east coast
under General Ridgway's 2 February order to seize
Kangnung, more than achieved its objective. With naval gunfire support from the
Task Force 95 contingent in the Sea of Japan, and against fainthearted
opposition by the 69th Brigade, a unit of the North Korean III Corps that disappeared altogether on the 8th, the Capital Division
advanced in consistently long and rapid strides. In the Taebaek heights rising
west of the coastal road, one regiment by evening of the 11th held positions
five miles above Route 20, which meandered west and southwest out of Kangnung to
Wonju. The remainder of the division moving over the coastal road occupied
Kangnung, then Chumunjin eleven miles farther north, and at nightfall on the
11th had forces in position three miles above the latter town.47
Gains in the X Corps zone remained much
shorter. East of Route 29, the ROK 3d Division by dark on 11 February advanced
through light opposition to positions five miles above Hoengsong. Next east, the
ROK 5th Division reoriented and moved through moderate resistance within four
miles of its east flank blocking positions. The 1st Battalion, 187th Airborne
Regimental Combat Team, meanwhile went into the position designed to place it at
the right rear of the ROK 5th Division; from the P'yongch'ang area the 2d
Battalion, 31st Infantry, easily seized its terrain objective to the northwest
in the effort to drive North Korean forces into the ROK 5th Division's path. The
South Koreans, however, were yet some distance from their
objectives.48
On and west of Route 29, the ROK 8th Division found
lighter resistance, enemy forces tending to withdraw before actually obliged to
do so. By nightfall on the 11th the 21st Regiment stood astride Route 29 nine
miles north of Hoengsong. To the west, the 10th and then the 16th Regiments held
positions ten miles northwest of Hoengsong along the crest of the mountains
between Hoengsong and Route 24. A three-mile gap separated the 21st and 10th
Regiments, and about a mile of open space stood between the 10th and
16th.49
Two miles behind the 21st, the tanks and infantry of
Support Team B, which had been attached to the ROK regiment, were assembled
along Route 29. Another mile down the road, the infantry and artillery of
Support Force 21 occupied positions near the town of Ch'angbongni. Below Support
Force 21, the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, on General Almond's order had moved
up from Hoengsong into a blocking position at the junction of Route 29 and the
mountain road leading west. Support Team A, whose tanks and infantry were
attached to the 16th Regiment, was two miles farther out on the mountain road.
Still farther out, between Support Team A and the front of the 16th, which lay
across the mountain road, were the ROK 20th and 50th Field Artillery Battalions
and the command posts of both the 10th and 16th Regiments.50
The nearest of the 2d Division defenses
around Chip'yong-ni now stood four miles southwest of the 16th Regiment. After
securing Chip'yong-ni before the opening of Operation ROUNDUP, the 23d Infantry had
established a perimeter around the town, and Colonel Freeman had run patrols
east, west, and north. The patrol encounters with enemy forces were mostly
minor, but by 9 February one particularly strong position was discovered on Hill
444 some four miles east of Chip'yong-ni. On the 9th Freeman sent a battalion
east, and the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, came north from the Yoju area to
reduce the enemy strongpoint. The latter battalion occupied the height on the
11th and thus held the 2d Division position closest to the ROK 8th
Division.51
The Newest Army Estimate
Given continued reports of eastward Chinese
shifts and taking them as clear signs of an imminent enemy offensive in the west
central region, General Ridgway late on the 11th instructed General Almond to
patrol but not to attempt further advances toward Route 24 in either the 2d
Division or ROK 8th Division zones until the IX Corps had reduced the enemy's
Han bridgehead below Yangp'yong. To move forward while the IX Corps was still
held up could isolate and overextend Almond's leftmost units
in the area where the 39th, 40th, 42d,
and 66th Armies
were obviously massing.52
In view of an imminent enemy attack, Ridgway also
expressed concern over Almond's complex organization for battle in Operation
ROUNDUP, referring to the
intertwined command and control arrangements among corps headquarters, the ROK
assault units, the American support forces, and the latters' parent units on the
line of departure. Ridgway was not sure that these measures would provide the
tight control needed to prevent a confused intermingling of units during an
enemy attack.53
At the time Ridgway called Almond's
leftmost units to a halt, he had in hand one of the better intelligence
estimates prepared by his headquarters since he assumed command. Always seeking
to improve intelligence, he had directed the preparation of this analysis,
stipulating that it contain a survey of enemy strategic capabilities as well as
tactical courses of action.54
Stimulating Ridgway's unusual demand for a
strategic estimate at field army level was the yet unexplained lull in Chinese
offensive operations that had set in on 4 January after the Eighth Army gave up
Seoul and that now had lasted a month. The question was whether the lull represented a changing strategy, from one of
destroying UNC forces to one of containing them, or was merely the result of
logistical problems. (North Korean influence in shaping enemy strategy obviously
was discounted.)55
Col. Robert G. Fergusson, the acting G-2
who prepared the estimate, told Ridgway that the long lull was purely the
consequence of Chinese resupply, transportation, and reinforcement difficulties.
The slogan repeatedly given in statements by Chinese government officials
continued to be to drive UNC forces out of Korea. Fergusson predicted that once
the logistical problems were sufficiently relieved-and that time appeared to be
near-the campaign to push the United Nation Command off the peninsula would be
resumed with full acceptance of any further heavy personnel losses and supply
problems that might occur.56
The concentration of Chinese forces,
Fergusson pointed out, was in the area bordered on the northwest by the Pukhan
River and on the southeast by Route 24 between Yangp'yong and Hongch'on. From
southwest to northeast, the concentration included the 42d, 39th, 40th, and
66th Armies, whose
total strength was around 110,000. He was not sure that all of these units had
completed their shifts to the west central region.57 But with the enemy mass
centering there, the most likely paths of the next enemy advance were down the
Han valley toward Yoju and down Route 29 toward Wonju, with both paths then
turning toward the same deep objective, Ch'ungju. The advance might include deep
sweeps to the southwest to envelop the I and IX Corps.58
Because the enemy's problem of resupply
would progressively worsen as supply lines lengthened during an advance,
Fergusson judged that a sustained Chinese drive was unlikely. More probable was
a series of shallow enveloping maneuvers interspersed with halts for
reorganization and resupply. He believed that the Chinese would not open an
offensive until major units of IX Army Group moved down from the Wonsan
area within reinforcing range. These, he estimated, could reach the central
region no sooner than 15 February.59
Fergusson was wrong in considering the
arrival of IX Army Group units as a necessary condition and so was in
error on the nearest date of a Chinese attack. But in measuring all other
probabilities, he came remarkably close.
Notes
1 X Corps OI 84 and 86, 28 Jan 5 1, and OI 87
and 88, 29 Jan 51; X Corps Opn Plan 20, 31 Jan 51; 2d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, ]an 51;
2d Div Ol 17,31 Jan 51.
2 X Corps Comd Rpt,
Incls for Jan 51, Incl 4; Ltr, Hq, 23d Inf, 13 Mar 51, sub: After Action Report
Covering Operations of the 23d Regimental Combat Team During the Period 290630
Jan to 152400 Feb 51.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.; Ltr, G3
Eighth Army to CG Eighth Army, 3 Feb 51, sub: Results of 23d Infantry and French
Battalion Action at 010450 February 1951; Study, Col. Paul Freeman, "Wonju Thru
Chip'yong: An Epic of Regimental Combat Team Action in Korea," Apr 51, copy in
CMH.
5 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.; X Corps
Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51; X Corps Of 92 and 93, 1 Feb 51.
8 X Corps Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51.
9 Ibid., Annex C, X Corps Plan, and Appendix C
(Arty) to Annex C; X Corps, Memo for Lt Col Chiles, signed S. H. M., 4 Feb 51,
giving the composition of artillery and armored support. Two other support
forces, one from each division, were designated but never formed.
10 X Corps, Memo for Lt Col Chiles, signed S.
H. M., 4 Feb 51.
11 X Corps Opn Plan Roundup, 1 Feb 51.
12 Rad, GX-2-118
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps and C/S ROKA, 2 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt,
Nar, Feb 51.
13 Colonel Peploe, the former commander of the
38th Infantry, had been transferred to IX Corps headquarters, where he became
chief of staff and was promoted to brigadier general.
14 Eighth Army G3
Jul, Sum, 1-4 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
15 Notes of Corps
Commanders' Conference, Suwon, 041130 February, 4 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul,
Sum, 4 Feb 51.
16 General Moore took command of the IX Corps
on 31 January.
17 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jul, Sum, 1-4 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nat-, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt,
Nar, Feb 51.
18 Ltrs, Eighth Army G3 Air, signed by Gen
Allen, CofS, to CG Fifth Air Force, 1-4 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 676, CG Fifth Air Force
to CINCFE et al., 31 Jan 51; Rad, OPC 709, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al.,
1 Feb 51; Rad, OPC 730, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al., 2 Feb 51; Rad, OPC
753, CG Fifth Air Force to CINCFE et al., 3 Feb 51.
19 Eighth Army G3
Jul, G3 Air Briefing Rpts, 2-5 Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
20 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army PIRs 204-208, 1-5 Feb 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar,
Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
21 The North
Korean People's Army was officially activated on 8 February 1948.
22 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army PIRs 204-208, 1-5 Feb 51.
23 I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; 1 Corps Opn Dir 43, 2 Feb 51.
24 I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
25 Ibid.;
Conference Notes, Conference Between Eighth Army Commander and Corps Commanders
at Tempest Tac, 8 February 1951, copy in CMH.
26 Ibid.; Rad,
GX-2-621 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 6 Feb 51; Rad, GX-2-699 KGOO, CG Eighth
Army to CTG 95.1, 7 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 32110, COMNAVFE to CTF 90 and CTF 95, 6 Feb
51; Rad, MCN 32674, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 32587, COMNAVFE to
COMSEVENFLT, 7 Feb 51; Field, United States Naval Operations, Korea, p.
324.
27 Eighth Army G3
Air Briefing Rpt, 10 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 9 Feb 51; I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
28 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; I Corps Opn
Dir 44 (Operation PACEMAKER), 9 Feb 51.
29 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 10 Feb 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb
51; Rad, MCN 34233, CTF 95 to CTG 95.1, 9 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34279, CTE 95.14 to
CTG 95.1, 9 Feb 51; Rad, MCN 34332, CTG 95.1 to CTE 95.14, 9 Feb 51.
30 I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Air Briefing Rpt, 11 Feb 51.
31 I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
32 Eighth Army G3
Jul, Entries 1600 and 1850, 10 Feb 51; Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; I
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Field, United States Naval Operations,
Korea, p. 324.
33 I Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
34 Conference
Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army Commander and Corps Commanders at Tempest Tac, 8
Feb 51.
35 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
36 Eighth Army G3
Jul, Sum, 10 Feb 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
37 X Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Conference Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army Commander and Corps
Commanders at Tempest Tac, 8 Feb 51.
38 X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
39 Ibid.; Eighth
Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Incl
4.
40 X Corps Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Conference Notes, Conf Between Eighth Army Commander and Corps
Commanders at Tempest Tac, 8 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 7 Feb 51; X Corps
OI 99, 8 Feb 51.
41 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth
Army G3 Jul, Sum, 7 and 8 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Briefing for CG, 8 Feb
51.
42 Ibid.
43 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 8, 9, and 10 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3
Jul, Entry 1305, 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Briefing for CG, 11 Feb 51; X
Corps OI 101 and 102, 10 Feb 51.
44 Ibid.
45 X Corps 01 100,
9 Feb 51, and 01101, 10 Feb 51, Annex B (Arty).
46 Eighth Army G3
Jnl, Sum, 8, 9, 10, and 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Briefing for CG, 9, 10,
11, and 12 Feb 51.
47 Eighth Army Comd
Rpt, Nar, Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul, Sum, 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jul,
Briefing for CG, 12 Feb 51.
48 Eighth Army G3
Jul, Sum, 9, 10, and 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army PORs 638,
639, and 640, 10 Feb 51, and PORs 641, 642, and 643,
11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Briefing for CG, 10 and 11 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3
Jnl, Entry 2115, 11 Feb 51.
49 Ibid.
50 X Corps Comd
Rpt, Feb 51, Book of Inclosures, Ind 2, The Battle of Hoengsong; Ltr, Col Edwin
J. Messinger, CO 9th Inf, to CG 2d Div, 16 Feb 51, sub: Report of Investigation,
with Incls 1 and 2; Testimony Before the Eighth Army IG by Maj George Kessler,
KMAG Advisor to G1 and G4, ROK 8th Div, hereafter cited as Kessler Testimony
(with overlays), 15 Feb 51.
51 Eighth Army G3
Jul, Sum, 11 Feb 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Feb 51, Book of Inclosures, Incl 1,
Battle of Chip'yong-ni.
52 Rad, GX-2-1214
KGOO, CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, I1 Feb 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 11 Feb
51.
53 Rad, G-2-1174,
CG Eighth Army to CG X Corps, 11 Feb 51.
54 On 1 February
Ridgway personally told President Rhee that both U.S. and ROK intelligence were
inadequate and asked Rhee to take all possible steps to improve the ROK product.
See Eighth Army SS Rpt, Office of the CG, Feb 51, Nar and Incl 1. See also
Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Feb 51.
55 Eighth Army G2,
Estimate of Enemy Situation, 10 Feb 51.
56 Ibid.
57 It was on the
10th that air observers sighted eastward troop movements behind the enemy
bridgehead in the IX Corps zone.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation
