If men make war in slavish observance of rules, they will fail.... War
is progressive, because all the instruments and elements of war are progressive.|
ULYSSES damnyankee S. GRANT
The situation on Eighth Army's southern front was chaotic by midday
of 1 September. The North Koreans at one place had crossed at the Kihang
ferry, captured Agok, engaged Kouma's tanks, and scattered A Company, 9th
Infantry of the 2d Division, at its positions from Agok northward. (See
Map VI.) Lieutenant Rodriguez succeeded in withdrawing most of A Company
to its old positions on the ridge line back of the river. From there at
daylight the men could see enemy soldiers on many of the ridges surrounding
them, most of them moving east. After several hours, Lieutenant Fern, 2d
Platoon leader, sent a patrol down the hill to Agok to obtain supplies
abandoned there during the night. The patrol encountered a small enemy
group in the village, killed three men and sustained two casualties, but
returned with much needed water, rations, and ammunition.
Later in the morning enemy barges crossed the Naktong below A Company
but they were out of range. Rodriguez sent a squad with a light machine
gun to the southern tip of the ridge overlooking Agok to take these enemy
troops under fire. About halfway down, the squad came upon a critically
wounded Negro soldier. Around him lay ten dead North Koreans. The wounded
man was evacuated to the company command post but died that afternoon.
When the squad reached the tip of the ridge they saw that an enemy force
occupied houses at its base. They reported this to Lieutenant Fern, who
called for artillery fire through the forward observer. This artillery
fire was delivered within a few minutes and was on target. The North Koreans
broke from the houses, running for the river. At this the light machine
gun at the tip of the ridge took them under fire, as did another across
the Naktong to the south in the 25th Division sector. Proximity fuze artillery
fire decimated this group. Combined fire from all weapons inflicted an
estimated 300 casualties.
In the afternoon, light aircraft dropped food and ammunition to the
company; only part of it was recovered. The 1st Battalion ordered Rodriguez to withdraw the company that night.
Lieutenant Fern's 2d Platoon led the A Company withdrawal immediately
after dark, moving eastward along the ridge crest. At the eastern tip the
platoon started down. Near the bottom the leading men saw a column of about
400 North Koreans marching on the road some 200 yards below them with a
number of machine guns mounted on wheels. Rodriguez ordered the company
to circle back up the ridge and away from the road. Fern was to bring up
the rear and carry with him the wounded, two of whom were litter cases.
Transporting the wounded over the rough terrain in the darkness was a slow
and difficult task and gradually Fern's platoon fell behind the others.
By the time he reached the base of the ridge he had lost contact with the
rest of the company.
At this juncture a furious fire fight erupted ahead of Fern. Enemy machine
gun fire from this fight struck among the 2d Platoon and pinned it down.
For their safety, Fern decided to send the wounded back into the ravine
they had just descended, and put them in charge of Platoon Sgt. Herbert
H. Freeman and ten men. Several stragglers from the advanced elements of
the company joined Fern and reported that Rodriguez and the rest of the
company had run into a sizable enemy force and had scattered in the ensuing
fight. Lieutenant Rodriguez and most of the company were killed at close
range. In this desperate action, Pfc. Luther H. Story, a weapons squad
leader, so distinguished himself by a series of brave deeds that he was
awarded the Medal of Honor. Badly wounded, Story refused to be a burden
to those who might escape, and when last seen was still engaging enemy
at close range. Of those with Rodriguez, approximately ten men escaped
to friendly lines.
Fern decided shortly before dawn that he must try to escape before daylight.
He sent word by a runner back to Freeman, who should have been about 500
yards in the rear, to rejoin the platoon. The runner returned and said
he could not find Freeman. There had been no firing to the rear, so Fern
knew that Freeman had not encountered enemy troops. Two men searched a
second time for Freeman without success. Fern then decided that he would
have to try to lead those with him to safety.
A heavy ground fog, so thick that one could hardly see twenty-five yards,
developed in the early morning of 2 September and this held until midmorning.
Under this cloak of concealment Fern's group made its way by compass toward
Yongsan. From a hill at noon, after the fog had lifted, the men looked
down on the battle of Yongsan which was then in progress. That afternoon
Fern brought the nineteen men with him into the lines of the 72d Tank Battalion
Upon reporting to Lt. Col. John E. Londahl, Fern asked for permission
to lead a patrol in search of Sergeant Freeman's group. Londahl denied
this request because every available man was needed in the defense of Yongsan.
As it turned out, Freeman brought his men to safety. Upon moving back from
Fern's platoon during the night battle, he had taken his group all the
way back up to the top of the ridge. They had stayed there in seclusion
all day, watching many enemy groups moving about in all directions below
them. Freeman assumed that most of A Company had been killed or captured. For five days and nights
he maintained his squad and the four wounded behind enemy lines, finally
guiding them all safely to friendly lines. 
The End of Task Force Manchu
It will be recalled that the North Koreans who crossed near the middle
of the Naktong Bulge in front of B Company, 9th Infantry, surprised the
advanced support elements of Task Force Manchu at the base of Hill 209
where the Yongsan road came down to the Naktong. Some elements of the two
Heavy Weapons Companies, D and H, had already started to climb the hill
to emplace their weapons there when the North Korean surprise river crossing
caught most of the support elements and the Heavy Mortar Company at the
base of the hill. This crossing was about five miles north of the enemy
crossing that had all but destroyed A Company near the division's southern
The perimeter position taken by the men of D and H Companies, 9th Infantry,
who had started up the hill before the North Koreans struck, was on a southern
knob (about 150 meters high) of Hill 209, half a mile south across a saddle
from B Company's higher position. As the night wore on, a few more men
reached the perimeter. In addition to the D and H Company men, there were
a few from the Heavy Mortar Platoon and one or two from B Company. Altogether,
there were approximately 60 to 70 men, including 5 officers, in the group-an
actual count was never made. An inventory of the weapons and equipment
disclosed that the group had 1 SCR-300 radio; 1 heavy machine guns, 1 operable;
2 light machine guns; 1 BAR; about 20 M1 rifles; and about 40 carbines
or pistols. Lieutenant Schmitt assumed command of the group. 
During the night Lieutenant Schmitt established radio communication
with the 1st Battalion, 9th infantry, and received promises of help on
the morrow. When daylight came Schmitt and his group saw that they were
surrounded by enemy. One force occupied the higher knob half a mile above
them, formerly held by B Company. Below them, North Koreans continued crossing
the river and moving supplies forward to their combat units, some of them
already several miles eastward.
Enemy troops were not long in discovering the Task Force Manchu group.
They first attacked it at 1400 that afternoon, and were repulsed. That
night an estimated company attacked three times, pressing the fight to
close quarters, but failed each time to penetrate the tight perimeter.
Daylight of the second day disclosed many enemy dead on the steep slopes
outside the perimeter.
By that morning (2 September) the need for hand grenades was desperate. About 0900 MSgt. Travis E. Watkins
of H Company shot and killed two enemy soldiers 50 yards outside the northeast
edge of the perimeter. He jumped from his hole to get the weapons and grenades
of the dead men; 20 yards from them three hidden enemy soldiers jumped
to their feet and opened fire on him. Watkins killed them and gathered
weapons, ammunition, and insignia from all five before returning to the
perimeter. An hour later a group of six enemy soldiers gained a protected
spot 25 yards from a machine gun position of the perimeter and began throwing
hand grenades into it. Although already wounded in the head, Watkins rose
from his hole to engage them with rifle fire. An enemy machine gun immediately
took him under fire and hit him in the left side, breaking his back. Watkins
in some manner managed to kill all six of the nearby enemy soldiers before
he sank into his hole paralyzed from the waist down. Even in this condition,
Watkins never lost his nerve, but shouted encouragement to his companions.
He refused any of the scarce rations, saying that he did not deserve them
because he could no longer fight. 
In the afternoon of 2 September Schmitt succeeded in radioing a request
to the 1st Battalion for an airdrop of supplies. A division liaison plane
attempted the drop, but the perimeter was so small and the slopes so steep
that virtually all the supplies went into enemy hands. The men in the perimeter
did, however, recover from a drop made later at 1900 a case of carbine
ammunition, 2 boxes of machine gun ammunition, 11 hand grenades, 2 1/2
cases of rations, part of a package of medical supplies, and 21 cans of
beer. Pfc. Joseph R. Ouellette, H Company, left the perimeter to retrieve
an airdrop of water cans but found on reaching them that they were broken
and empty. Like Watkins, he distinguished himself by leaving the perimeter
to gather weapons, ammunition, and grenades from the enemy dead. On one
such occasion an enemy soldier suddenly attacked Ouellette, who killed
the North Korean in hand-to-hand combat. 
In helping to recover the airdropped supplies on the evening of 2 September,
Lieutenant Schmitt was wounded but continued to exercise his command, encouraging
the diminishing group by his example. That same afternoon, the North Koreans
sent an American prisoner up the hill to Schmitt with the message, "You
have one hour to surrender or be blown to pieces." Failing in frontal
infantry attack to reduce the little defending force, the enemy now obviously
meant to take it under observed and registered mortar fire. 
Forty-five minutes later enemy antitank fire came in on the knob and
two machine guns from positions northward and higher on the slope of Hill
209 swept the perimeter. Soon, enemy mortars emplaced on a neighboring high finger ridge eastward registered
on Schmitt's perimeter and continued firing until dark. The machine gun
fire forced every man to stay in his hole. The lifting of the mortar fire
after dark was the signal for renewed enemy infantry attacks, all of which
were repulsed. But the number of killed and wounded within the perimeter
was growing, and food, water, and ammunition were needed. There were no
medical supplies except those carried by one aid man.
The third day, Sunday, 3 September, was the worst of all. The weather
was terrifically hot. There was no water, and only one can of C rations
per man. Ammunition was almost gone. Since the previous afternoon, enemy
mortar barrages had alternated with infantry assaults against the perimeter.
Survivors later estimated there were about twenty separate infantry attacks-all
repulsed. Two enemy machine guns still swept the perimeter whenever anyone
showed himself. Dead and dying were in almost every foxhole or lay just
outside. Mortar fragments destroyed the radio and this ended all communication
with friendly units. Artillery fire and air strikes requested by Schmitt
never came. Some enemy soldiers worked their way close to the perimeter
and threw grenades into it. Six times Ouellette leaped from his foxhole
to escape grenades thrown into it. Each time the enemy fired on him from
close range. In this close action Ouellette was killed. Most of the foxholes
of the perimeter received one or more direct mortar hits in the course
of the continuing mortar fire. One of these killed Lieutenant Schmitt on
3 September. He had given his men heroic leadership and had inspired them
by his example throughout three days and nights of the ordeal. The command
passed now to 1st Lt. Raymond J. McDoniel of D Company, senior surviving
In the evening, relief came in the form of rain. McDoniel spread out
two blankets recovered with airdropped supplies the day before, and wrung
from them enough water to fill a 5-gallon can. The men removed their clothing
and wrung water from them to fill their canteens.
The fourth night passed. At daylight on the morning of 4 September only
two officers, McDoniel and Caldwell, and approximately half the men who
had assembled on the hill, were alive. Some men had broken under the strain
and in a state of shock had run from their holes and were killed. As the
day passed, with ammunition down to about one clip per man and only a few
grenades left and no help in sight, McDoniel decided to abandon the position
that night. He told Caldwell that when it got dark the survivors would
split into small groups and try to get back to friendly lines. That evening
after dark the North Koreans tried to get their men to assault the perimeter
again, but, despite shouted orders of "Manzai!" only a few grenades
fell inside the perimeter-apparently the enemy soldiers had had enough
and refused to charge forward.
At 2200, McDoniel and Caldwell and twenty-seven enlisted men slipped
off the hill in groups of four. One poignant scene etched itself on the
minds of Sergeant Watkins' comrades. Watkins, still alive in his paralyzed
condition, refused efforts of evacuation, saying that he did not want to be a burden to those who had a chance to get away. He asked
only that his carbine be loaded and placed on his chest with the muzzle
under his chin. He smiled a last farewell to his buddies and wished them
well when they started off the hill. 
McDoniel and Caldwell started off the hill together, their plan being
to make their way to the river and follow it downstream. At the road they
encountered so much enemy activity that they had to wait about an hour
for the supply-carrying parties, tanks, and artillery to clear so that
they could cross. Once across the road the two men found themselves in
the middle of a North Korean artillery battery. They escaped unobserved
and hid in a field near the river at daybreak. That night the two men became
separated when they ran into an enemy outpost. The next morning two enemy
soldiers captured Caldwell, removed his boots and identification, smashed
him on the head with a rock, and threw him over a cliff into the Naktong
River. Caldwell, not critically injured, feigned death and escaped that
night. Four days later, on 10 September, he entered the lines of the 72d
Of the twenty-nine men who came off the hill the night of 4 September,
twenty-two escaped to friendly lines-many of them following the Naktong
downstream, hiding by day and traveling by night, until they reached the
lines of the 25th Division. 
Members of Task Force Manchu who escaped from Hill 209 brought back
considerable intelligence information of enemy activity in the vicinity
of the Paekchin ferry crossing site. At the ferry site the enemy had put
in an underwater ford. A short distance downstream, each night half an
hour after dark they placed a metal floating bridge across the river and
took it up before dawn the next morning. Carrying parties of 50 civilians
guarded by four soldiers crossed the river continuously at night at, a
dogtrot, an estimated total of 800-1,000 carriers being used at this crossing
The Battle of Yongsan
On the morning of 1 September the 1st and 2d Regiments of
the N.K. 9th Division (the 3d Regiment had been left at Inch'on),
in their first offensive of the war, stood only a few miles short of Yongsan
after a successful river crossing and penetration of the American line.
At that point the chances of the division accomplishing its assigned mission
must have looked favorable to its commanding general, Pak Kyo Sam.
As the N.K. 9th Division approached Yongsan, its 1st Regiment
was on the north and its 2d Regiment on the south. The division's attached
support, consisting of one 76-mm. artillery battalion from the I
Corps, an antiaircraft battalion of artillery, two tank battalions
of the 16th Armored Brigade, and a battalion of artillery from the
4th Division, gave it unusual weapon support. Crossing the river
behind it came the 4th Division, a greatly weakened organization,
far understrength, short of weapons, and made up mostly of untrained replacements.
A captured enemy document referred to this grouping of units that attacked
from the Sinban-ni area into the Naktong Bulge as "the main force"
of I Corps. Elements of the 9th Division reached the hills
just west of Yongsan during the afternoon of 1 September. 
On the morning of 1 September, with only the shattered remnants of E
Company at hand, the 9th Infantry had virtually no troops to defend Yongsan.
General Keiser in this emergency attached the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion
to the regiment. The 72d Tank Battalion and the 2d Division Reconnaissance
Company also were assigned positions close to Yongsan. Colonel Hill planned
to place the engineers on the chain of low hills that arched around Yongsan
on the northwest.
Capt. Frank M. Reed, commanding officer of A Company, 2d Engineer Combat
Battalion, led his company westward on the south side of the Yongsan-Naktong
River road; Lt. Lee E. Beahler with D Company of the 2d Engineer Battalion
was on the north side of the road. Approximately two miles west of Yongsan
an estimated 300 enemy troops engaged A Company in a fire fight. Two quad-50's
and one twin-40 gun carrier of the 82d AAA Battalion supported Reed's men
in this action, which lasted several hours. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Beahler
protested his position because of its long frontage and exposed flanks.
With the approval of General Bradley, he moved his Engineer company to
the hill immediately south of and overlooking Yongsan. A platoon of infantry
went into position behind him. Captain Reed was now ordered to fall back
with his company to the southeast edge of Yongsan on the left flank of
Beahler's company. There, A Company went into position along the road;
on its left was C Company of the Engineer battalion, and beyond C Company
was the 2d Division Reconnaissance Company. The hill occupied by Beahler's
D Company was in reality the western tip of a large mountain mass that
lay southeast of the town. The road to Miryang came south out of Yongsan,
bent around the western tip of this mountain, and then ran eastward along
its southern base. In its position, D Company not only commanded the town
but also its exit, the road to Miryang. 
North Koreans had also approached Yongsan from the south. The 2d Division
Reconnaissance Company and tanks of the 72d Tank Battalion opposed them
in a sharp fight. In this action, SFC Charles W. Turner of the Reconnaissance Company particularly distinguished
himself. He mounted a tank, operated its exposed turret machine gun, and
directed tank fire which reportedly destroyed seven enemy machine guns.
Turner and this tank were the objects of very heavy enemy fire which shot
away the tank's periscope and antennae and scored more than fifty hits
on it. Turner, although wounded, remained on the tank until he was killed.
That night North Korean soldiers crossed the low ground around Yongsan
and entered the town from the south. 
About 0300, 2 September, D Company of the 2d Engineer Battalion alerted
A Company that a long line of white-garbed figures was moving through Yongsan
toward its roadblock. Challenged when they approached, the white figures
opened fire-they were enemy troops. Four enemy tanks and an estimated battalion
of North Koreans were in Yongsan.
The North Koreans now attempted a breakthrough of the Engineer position.
After daylight, they were unable to get reinforcements into the fight since
D Company commanded the town and its approaches. In this fight, which raged
until 1100, the engineers had neither artillery nor mortar support. D Company
remedied this by using its 9 new 3.5-inch and 9 old 2.36-inch rocket launchers
against the enemy infantry. The fire of the 18 bazookas plus that from
4 heavy and 4 light machine guns and the rifles, carbines, and grenades
of the company inflicted very heavy casualties on the North Koreans, who
desperately tried to clear the way for a push eastward to Miryang. Tanks
of A and B Companies, 72d Tank Battalion, at the southern and eastern edge
of Yongsan shared equally with the engineers in the honors of this battle.
Lieutenant Beahler was the only officer of D Company not killed or wounded
in this melee, which cost the company twelve men killed and eighteen wounded.
The edge of Yongsan and the slopes of the hill south of the town became
a shambles of enemy dead and destroyed equipment. 
While this battle raged during the morning at Yongsan, Colonel Hill
reorganized about 800 men of the 9th Infantry who had arrived in that vicinity
from the overrun river line positions. Among them were F and G Companies,
which were not in the path of major enemy crossings and had succeeded in
withdrawing eastward. They had no crew-served weapons or heavy equipment.
In midafternoon (2 September) tanks and the reorganized 2d Battalion, 9th
Infantry, attacked through A Company, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, into
Yongsan, and regained possession of the town at 1500. Later, two bazooka
teams from A Company, 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, knocked out three T34
tanks just west of Yongsan. American ground and air action destroyed other
enemy tanks during the day southwest of the town. By evening the North
Koreans had been driven into the hills westward. In the evening, the 2d Battalion and A Company, 2d Engineer
Combat Battalion, occupied the first chain of low hills half a mile beyond
Yongsan, the engineers west and the 2d Battalion northwest of the town.
For the time being at least, the North Korean drive toward Miryang had
been halted. 
At 0935 that morning (2 September), while the North Koreans were attempting
to destroy the Engineer troops at the southern edge of Yongsan and clear
the road to Miryang, General Walker talked by telephone with Maj. Gen.
Doyle O. Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, Far East Command, in Tokyo. He
described the situation around the Perimeter and said the most serious
threat was along the boundary between the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions. He
described the location of his reserve forces and his plans for using them.
He said he had started the marines toward Yongsan but had not yet released
them for commitment there and he wanted to be sure that General MacArthur
approved his use of them, since he knew that this would interfere with
other plans of the Far East Command. Walker said he did not think he could
restore the 2d Division lines without using them. General Hickey replied
that General MacArthur had the day before approved the use of the marines
if and when Walker considered it necessary. A few hours after this conversation
General Walker, at 1315, attached the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to
the 2d Division and ordered a co-ordinated attack by all available elements
of the division and the marines, with the mission of destroying the enemy
east of the Naktong River in the 2d Division sector and of restoring the
river line. The marines were to be released from 2d Division control just
as soon as this mission was accomplished. 
A conference was held that afternoon at the 2d Division command post
attended by Colonel Collier, Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, General
Craig and Maj. Frank R. Stewart, Jr., of the Marine Corps, and General
Keiser and 2d Division staff officers. A decision was reached that the
marines would attack west the next morning at 0800 (3 September) astride
the Yongsan-Naktong River road; the 9th Infantry, B Company of the 72d
Tank Battalion, and D Battery of the 82d AAA Battalion would attack northwest
above the marines and attempt to re-establish contact with the 23d Infantry;
the 2d Engineer Combat Battalion, remnants of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry,
and elements of the 72d Tank Battalion would attack on the left flank,
or south, of the marines to reestablish contact with the 25th Division.
Eighth Army now ordered the 24th Division headquarters and the 19th Infantry
to move to the Susan-ni area, eight air miles south of Miryang and fifteen
miles east of the confluence of the Nam and the Naktong Rivers. There it
was to prepare to enter the battle in either the 2d or 25th Division zone.
Colonel Fisher, commanding officer of the 35th Infantry, 25th Division,
each morning flew along the Naktong River east of the Namji-ri bridge to see if North Koreans had crossed from the 2d Division
At 1900 the evening of 2 September, Colonel Hill returned to his command
post east of Yongsan where he conferred with Colonel Murray, commanding
the 5th Marines, and told him that his line of departure for the attack
the next morning was secure. The troops holding this line on the first
hills west of Yongsan were: G Company, 9th Infantry, north of the road
running west through Kogan-ni to the Naktong; A Company, 2d Engineer Combat
Battalion, southward across the road; and, below the engineers, F Company,
9th Infantry. Between 0300 and 0430, 3 September, the 5th Marines moved
to forward assembly areas-the 2d Battalion north of Yongsan, the 1st Battalion
south of it. The 3d Battalion established security positions southwest
of Yongsan along the approaches into the regimental sector from that direction.
During the night, A Company of the engineers had considerable fighting
with North Koreans and never reached its objective. At dawn 3 September,
Reed led A Company in an attack to gain the high ground which was part
of the designated Marine line of departure. The company fought its way
up the slope to within 100 yards of the top, which was held by the firmly
entrenched enemy. At this point Captain Reed caught an enemy-thrown grenade and was wounded by
its fragments as he tried to throw it away from his men. The company with
help from Marine tank fire eventually gained its objective, but this early
morning battle for the line of departure delayed the planned attack. 
The Marine attack started at 0855 across the rice paddy land toward
enemy-held high ground half a mile westward. The 1st Battalion, south of
the east-west road, gained its objective when enemy soldiers broke under
air attack and ran down the northern slope and crossed the road to Hill
116 in the 2d Battalion zone. Air strikes, artillery concentrations, and
machine gun and rifle fire of the 1st Battalion now caught enemy reinforcements
in open rice paddies moving up from the second ridge and killed most of
them. In the afternoon, the 1st Battalion advanced to Hill 91.
North of the road the 2d Battalion had a harder time, encountering heavy
enemy fire when it reached the northern tip of Hill 116, two miles west
of Yongsan. The North Koreans held the hill during the day, and at night
D Company of the 5th Marines was isolated there. In the fighting west of
Yongsan Marine armor knocked out four T34 tanks, and North Korean crew
members abandoned a fifth. That night the marines dug in on a line generally
two miles west of Yongsan. The 2d Battalion had lost 18 killed and 77 wounded
during the day, most of them in D Company. Total Marine casualties for
3 September were 34 killed and 157 wounded. Co-ordinating its attack with
that of the marines, the 9th Infantry advanced abreast of them on the north.
Just before midnight, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, received orders
to pass through the 2d Battalion and continue the attack in the morning.
That night torrential rains made the troops miserable. The enemy was strangely
quiet. September 4 dawned clear.
The counterattack continued at 0800, 4 September, at first against little
opposition. North of the road the 2d Battalion quickly completed occupation
of Hill 116, from which the North Koreans had withdrawn during the night.
South of the road the 1st Battalion occupied what appeared to be a command
post of the N.K. 9th Division. Tents were still up and equipment
lay scattered about. Two abandoned T34 tanks in excellent condition stood
there. Tanks and ground troops advancing along the road found it littered
with enemy dead and destroyed and abandoned equipment. By nightfall the
counterattack had gained another three miles. 
That night was quiet until just before dawn. The North Koreans then
launched an attack against the 9th Infantry on the right of the marines,
the heaviest blow striking G Company. It had begun to rain again and the
attack came in the midst of a downpour. In bringing his platoon from an
outpost position to the relief of the company, SFC Loren R. Kaufman encountered
an encircling enemy force on the ridge line. He bayoneted the lead enemy scout and engaged
those following with grenades and rifle fire. His sudden attack confused
and dispersed this group. Kaufman led his platoon on and succeeded in joining
hard-pressed G Company. In the ensuing action Kaufman led assaults against
close-up enemy positions and, in hand-to-hand fighting, he bayoneted four
more enemy soldiers, destroyed a machine gun position, and killed the crew
members of an enemy mortar. American artillery fire concentrated in front
of the 9th Infantry helped greatly in repelling the North Koreans in this
night and day battle. 
That morning (5 September), after a 10-minute artillery preparation,
the American troops moved out in their third day of counterattack. It was
a day of rain. As the attack progressed, the marines approached Obong-ni
Ridge and the 9th Infantry neared Cloverleaf Hill-their old battleground
of August. There, at midmorning, on the high ground ahead, they could see
enemy troops digging in. The marines approached the pass between the two
hills and took positions in front of the enemy-held high ground.
At 1430 approximately 300 enemy infantry came from the village of Tugok
and concealed positions, striking B Company on Hill 125 just north of the
road and east of Tugok. Two enemy T34 tanks surprised and knocked out the
two leading Marine Pershing M26 tanks. Since the destroyed Pershing tanks
blocked fields of fire, four others withdrew to better positions. Assault
teams of B Company and the 1st Battalion with 3.5-inch rocket launchers
rushed into action, took the tanks under fire, and destroyed both of them,
as well as an armored personnel carrier following behind. The enemy infantry
attack was quite savage and inflicted twenty-five casualties on B Company
before reinforcements from A Company and supporting Army artillery and
the Marine 81-mm. mortars helped repel it. 
September 5 was a day of heavy casualties everywhere on the Pusan Perimeter.
Army units had 102 killed, 430 wounded, and 587 missing in action for a
total of 1,119 casualties. Marine units had 35 killed, 91 wounded, and
none missing in action, for a total of 126 battle casualties. Total American
battle casualties for the day were 1,245 men. Col. Charles C. Sloane, Jr.,
who had commanded part of Task Force Bradley, resumed command of the 9th
Infantry, relieving Colonel Hill. 
During the previous night, at 2000, 4 September, General Walker had
ordered the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade released from operational control
of the 2d Division effective at midnight, 5 September. He had vainly protested
against releasing the brigade, believing he needed it and all the troops
then in Korea if he were to stop the North Korean offensive against the
Pusan Perimeter. At 0015, 6 September, the marines began leaving their lines at Obong-ni Ridge and headed for Pusan. 
The American counteroffensive of 3-5 September west of Yongsan, according
to prisoner statements, resulted in one of the bloodiest and most terrifying
debacles of the war for a North Korean division. Even though remnants of
the division, supported by the low strength 4th Division, still
held Obong-ni Ridge, Cloverleaf Hill, and the intervening ground back to
the Naktong on 6 September, the division's offensive strength had been
spent at the end of the American counterattack. The 9th and 4th
enemy divisions were not able to resume the offensive. 
Once again the fatal weakness of the North Korean Army had cost it victory
after an impressive initial success-its communications and supply were
not capable of exploiting a breakthrough and of supporting a continuing
attack in the face of massive air, armor, and artillery fire that could
be concentrated against its troops at critical points.
The 23d Infantry in Front of Changnyong
North of the 9th Infantry and the battles that ebbed and flowed in the
big bulge of the Naktong and around Yongsan, the 23d Infantry Regiment
after daylight of 1 September found itself in a very precarious position.
Its 1st Battalion had been driven from the river positions and isolated
three miles westward. Approximately 400 North Koreans now overran the regimental
command post, compelling Colonel Freeman to withdraw it about 600 yards.
There, approximately five miles northwest of Changnyong, the 23d Infantry
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, miscellaneous regimental units,
and regimental staff officers checked the enemy in a 3-hour fight. Capt.
Niles J. McIntyre of the Headquarters Company played a leading role. 
The infallible sign of approaching enemy troops could be seen in Changnyong
itself during the afternoon of 2 September-at 1300 the native population
began leaving the town. A little later a security force of 300 local police
under the command of Maj. Jack T. Young and Capt. Harry H. White withdrew
into the hills eastward when two groups of enemy soldiers approached from
the northwest and southwest. North Koreans were in Changnyong that evening.
With his communications broken southward to the 2d Division headquarters
and the 9th Infantry, General Haynes during the day decided to send a tank
patrol down the Yongsan road in an effort to re-establish communication.
Capt. Manes R. Dew, commanding officer of C Company, 72d Tank Battalion,
led the tanks southward. They had to fight their way down the road through
enemy roadblocks. Of the three tanks that started, only Dew's tank got
through to Yongsan. There, Captain Dew delivered an overlay of Task Force Haynes' positions to General Bradley.
Still farther northward in the zone of the 38th Infantry the North Koreans
were far from idle. After the enemy breakthrough during the night of 31
August, General Keiser on 1 September had ordered the 2d Battalion, 38th
Infantry, to move south and help the 23d Regiment establish a defensive
position west of Changnyong. In attempting to do this, the battalion found
enemy troops already on the ridges along the road. They had in fact penetrated
to Hill 284 overlooking the 38th Infantry command post. This hill and Hill
209 dominated the rear areas of the regiment. At 0600, 3 September, an
estimated 300 North Koreans launched an attack from Hill 284 against Colonel
Peploe's 38th Regiment command post. Colonel Peploe organized all officers
and enlisted men present, including members of the mortar and tank companies
and attached antiaircraft artillery units, to fight in the perimeter defense.
Peploe requested a bombing strike which was denied him because the enemy
target and his defense perimeter were too close to each other. But the
Air Force did deliver rocket and strafing strikes.
This fight continued until 5 September. On that day Capt. Ernest J.
Schauer captured Hill 284 with two platoons of F Company after four efforts.
He found approximately 150 enemy dead on the hill. From the crest he and
his men watched as many more North Koreans ran into a village below them.
Directed artillery fire destroyed the village. Among the abandoned enemy
materiel on the hill, Schauer's men found twenty-five American BAR's and
submachine guns, a large American radio, thirty boxes of unopened American
fragmentation and concussion grenades, and some American rations. 
Meanwhile, during these actions in its rear, the 1st Battalion, 23d
Infantry, was cut off three miles westward from the nearest friendly units.
On 1 September Colonel Hutchin had received instructions from the regiment
to withdraw to the Changnyong area. At 1400 he sent a tank-infantry patrol
to see if his withdrawal road was open. It reported that an estimated enemy
battalion held the mountain pass just eastward of the battalion's defense
perimeter. Upon receiving this report Colonel Hutchin requested permission
by radio to remain in his present position and from there try to obstruct
the movement of North Korean reinforcements and supplies. That evening
Colonel Freeman approved this request, and thus began the 1st Battalion's
3-day stand as an island in a sea of enemy. During this time C-47 planes
supplied the battalion by airdrops. 
The 2d Division, however, did not leave Colonel Hutchin to his own devices
in his isolated perimeter position. Instead, on the morning of 1 September,
it started the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, in an attack westward from
the 23d Regiment command post near Mosan-ni to open the enemy-held road
to the 1st Battalion. On the second day of the fighting at the enemy-held
pass, the relief force, under Maj. Everett S. Stewart, the battalion executive officer and temporarily acting battalion commander,
broke through the enemy roadblock with the help of air strikes and artillery
and tank fire. The advanced elements of the battalion joined Hutchin's
battalion at 1700, 2 September. That evening, North Koreans strongly attacked
the 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, on Hill 209 north of the road and opposite
Hutchin's battalion, driving one company from its position. 
On 4 September, General Haynes changed the boundary between the 38th
and 23d Infantry Regiments, giving the northern part of the 23d's sector
to the 38th Infantry, thus releasing Colonel Hutchin's 1st Battalion for
movement southward to help the 2d Battalion defend the southern approach
to Changnyong. The 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, about 1,100 men strong
when the enemy attack began, was now down to a strength of approximately
The 23d Infantry now made plans to concentrate all its troops on the
position held by its 2d Battalion on the Pugong-ni-Changnyong road. Colonel
Hutchin succeeded in moving the 1st Battalion there and took a place on
the left flank of the 2d Battalion. At the same time the regimental command
post moved to the rear of this position. In this regimental perimeter,
the 23d Infantry fought a series of hard battles. Simultaneously it had
to send combat patrols to its rear to clear infiltrating enemy from Changnyong
and from its supply road.
The N.K. 2d Division made a desperate effort against the
23d Infantry's perimeter in the predawn hours of 8 September, in an attempt
to break through eastward. This attack, launched at 0230 and heavily supported
with artillery, penetrated F Company. It was apparent that unless F Company's
position could be restored the entire regimental front would collapse.
When all its officers became casualties, 1st Lt. Ralph R. Robinson, adjutant
of the 2d Battalion, assumed command of the company. With North Koreans
rapidly infiltrating his company's position and gaining its rear, Robinson
in the darkness made his way through them 500 yards to A Company's position.
There he obtained that company's reserve platoon and brought it back to
F Company. He accomplished the dangerous and difficult task of maneuvering
it into the gap in F Company's lines in darkness and heavy rain. 
The enemy attack tapered off with the coming of daylight, but that night
it resumed. The North Koreans struck repeatedly at the defense line. This
time they continued the fighting into the daylight hours of 9 September.
The Air Force then concentrated strong air support over the regimental
perimeter and gave invaluable aid to the ground troops. Casualties came
to the aid stations from the rifle companies in an almost steady stream
during the morning. All available men from Headquarters Company and special
units were formed into squads and put into the fight at the most critical
points. At one time, the regimental reserve was down to six men. When the
enemy attack finally ceased shortly after noon the 23d Regiment had an estimated combat efficiency
of only 38 percent. 
This furious night and day battle cost the enemy division most of its
remaining offensive strength. The medical officer of the 17th Regiment,
2d Division, captured a few days later, said that the division evacuated
about 300 men nightly to a hospital in Pugong-ni, and that in the first
two weeks of September the 2d Division lost 1,300 killed and 2,500
wounded in the fighting west of Changnyong. 
Even though its offensive strength was largely spent by 9 September,
the enemy division continued to harass rear areas around Changnyong with
infiltrating groups as large as companies. Patrols daily had to open the
main supply road and clear the town.
A North Korean Puzzle
While the N.K. 2d Division was making its great effort near the
middle of the U.S. 2d Division line, a sister organization, the N.K. 10th
Division, on its left to the north failed to give the assistance that
was expected of it in the co-ordinated corps attack. And therein lies one
of the greatest North Korean failures of the war to exploit an opportunity.
The singular behavior of this enemy force puzzled American commanders at
the time, although they were thankful that it took the pattern it did.
The N.K. 10th Division was the northernmost major organization of
the N.K. I Corps. A large part of it occupied Hill 409 in a deep
fold of the Naktong River just west of Hyongp'ung. Elements of this division
streamed off Hill 409 the night of 31 August-1 September and struck the
1st Battalion, 38th Infantry, which formed the extreme right flank of the
U.S. 2d Division. Holding the town of Hyongp'ung was C Company, which withdrew
from it under enemy attack during the night of 2-3 September. Beginning
with 3 September, Hyongp'ung for two weeks was either in enemy hands or
a no man's land. 
North and east of the Hill 409 and Hyongp'ung area lay a virtually roadless,
high mountain area having no fixed U.N. defensive positions. This, too,
was a no man's land in early September. Four miles north of Hyongp'ung
was the Yongp'o bridge across the Naktong and the 1st Cavalry Division
boundary. The Yongp'o bridge site was defended by the 3d Battalion, 23d
Infantry, attached to the 1st Cavalry Division for that purpose, until
0410, 5 September, when the British 27th Infantry Brigade relieved it and
went into the line there. This, as previously noted, was the British brigade's
first commitment in the Korean War. 
During the first two weeks of September large numbers of the enemy 10th Division came off Hill 409 and roamed the mountain mass northeast
of Hyongp'ung in the gap between the U.S. 2d Division and the British 27th
Brigade. This caused Eighth Army concern for the safety of Taegu. Gradually,
ROK police and British combat patrols forced the North Koreans back to
Hill 409. On 6 September, the day after they went into the line, the British
had a taste of what the Korean War was like. A combat patrol of the Argylls
under Capt. Neil A. Buchanan encountered an enemy unit and had to make
its escape, leaving behind, on his own orders, Captain Buchanan badly wounded
and, at his side, his wounded batman. Neither was seen again. The British
company nearest Hill 409 was so isolated that airdrops of ice to it replaced
carrying water cans up the hill. 
Had the enemy 10th Division thrown its full weight into a drive
eastward, south of Taegu, it might well have precipitated a major crisis
for Eighth Army. It could have moved either northeast toward Taegu or southeast
to help the 2d Division, next in line below it, but it did neither.
Its relative inactivity in the vicinity of Hill 409 when its companion
divisions were engaged m desperate combat above and below it is something
of a mystery. Captured enemy material and statements of prisoners indicate
that its mission may have been to stay on Hill 409 until the N.K. II
Corps had captured Taegu, but they indicated, also, that the division
command was inept. The 10th Division caused General Walker much
concern at this time. He and his staff found it puzzling to reconcile the
division's favorable position with its inactivity. General Walker charged
Colonel Landrum, now Deputy Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, to watch the situation
closely and inform him daily on it. At least twice daily Landrum insisted
on a summary from the Army G-3 of activities in front of the N.K. 10th
The 34th Infantry - The Rock of the Nam
On the 25th Division's right flank and north of the Haman breakthrough,
the 35th Infantry Regiment at daylight, 1 September, still held all its
positions except the low ground between Komam-ni and the Nam River, which
the two companies of ROK police had abandoned at midnight. (See Map
V.) In a counterattack after daylight, K Company and tanks had
partially regained control of this area, but not completely. Large numbers
of North Koreans, by this time, however, were behind the battle positions
of the 35th Infantry as far as the Chirwon-ni and Chung-ni areas, six miles
east of Komam-ni and the front positions. The North Koreans continued to
cross the Nam River after daylight on 1 September in the general area of
the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions. Aerial observers saw an estimated
four companies crossing there and directed proximity (VT) fuze fire of
the 64th Field Artillery Battalion on the crossing force, which destroyed an estimated
three-fourths of it. Fighter planes then strafed the survivors. Aerial
observers saw another large group in the open at the river later in the
day and directed artillery proximity fuze fire on it with an estimated
200 enemy casualties. 
The enemy I Corps plan of attack below the Nam River,
as indicated by the North Korean action, seemed to be for its 6th Division
to push east along the main Chinju-Komam-ni-Masan highway through the
1st Battalion, 35th Infantry, and at the same time for major elements of
its 7th Division to swing southeast behind the 2d Battalion, 35th
Infantry, and cut the Chirwon road. This road crossed the Naktong River
over the cantilever steel bridge at Namji-ri from the 2d Division zone
and ran south through Chirwon to join the main Masan highway eight miles
east of Komam-ni near the village of Chung-ni, four miles northwest of
Masan. These two avenues of approach-the Komam-ni-Masan highway and the Chirwon road
converging at Chung-ni-formed the axes of the enemy attack plan.
Engineer troops counterattacking up the secondary road toward Chirwon
during 1 September made slow progress, and enemy troops stopped them altogether
in the early afternoon. The 35th Infantry was now surrounded by enemy forces
of the N.K. 6th and 7th Divisions, with an estimated three
battalions of them behind its lines. Speaking later of the situation, Colonel
Fisher, the regimental commander-a professional soldier, trained at West
Point, and a regimental commander in World War II-said, "I never intended
to withdraw. There was no place to go. I planned to go into a regimental
perimeter and hold."  His regiment demonstrated its competency
to do this in the September battle along the Nam, winning a Distinguished
Unit Citation for its performance there.
On that first day of the enemy thrust, a critical situation existed
in the 25th Division sector. Because of it, General Walker flew to General
Kean's command post at Masan. In the ensuing discussion there, Kean asked
Walker for authority to commit the remainder of the 27th Infantry Regiment
(Walker had already released one battalion to Kean's control for use in
the 24th Infantry sector) against the large enemy groups behind the 35th
Infantry. Walker refused. By midafternoon, however, Kean felt that the
situation was so critical that he ordered the 2d Battalion, commanded by
Colonel Murch, to attack behind the 35th Infantry. A large part of the
division artillery was under direct infantry attack and he felt it mandatory
upon himself to commit the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry. He gave this order
on his own authority as the responsible commander on the ground, notwithstanding
General Walker's earlier refusal. At a later date when General Walker knew
all the facts, he approved General Kean's action. 
During the predawn hours of 1 September, when the N.K. 7th Division
troops had swung left after crossing the Nam River to roll up that
flank, widen the gap, drive the American troops from their hill positions
overlooking the Nam River, and secure a broad bridgehead for the division,
the first American unit they encountered was G Company, 35th Infantry,
at the north shoulder of the gap. While some enemy units peeled off to
attack G Company, others continued on and engaged E Company, two miles
downstream from it, and still others attacked scattered units of F Company
all the way to its 1st Platoon, which guarded the Namji-ri bridge. There,
at the extreme right flank of the 25th Division, this platoon drove off
an enemy force after a sharp fight. By 2 September, E Company in a heavy
battle had destroyed most of an enemy battalion.
Of all the 2d Battalion units, G Company received the hardest blows.
Before dawn of 1 September enemy troops had G Company platoons on separate
hills under heavy assault. Shortly after 0300 they overran the 3d Platoon,
Heavy Mortar Company, and drove it from its position. These mortarmen climbed
Hill 179 and on its crest joined the 2d Platoon of G Company.
Meanwhile, the 3d Platoon of G Company, on a low hill along the Nam
four miles from its juncture with the Naktong, was also under close-in
attack. After daylight, Capt. LeRoy E. Majeske, G Company commanding officer,
requested artillery concentrations and air strikes, but the latter were
slow in coming. At 1145, the enemy had almost reached the crest of the
hill, and only the narrow space covered by the air identification panel
separated the two forces. A few minutes later Majeske was killed, and 2d
Lt. George Roach, commanding the 3d Platoon, again reported the desperate
situation and asked for an air strike. The Air Force delivered the strike
on the enemy-held side of the hill, and this checked the assaults. But
by this time many enemy troops had captured and occupied foxholes in the
platoon position and from them they threw grenades into other parts of
the position. One of the grenades killed Lieutenant Roach early in the
afternoon. SFC Junius Poovey, a squad leader, now assumed command. In this
close fight, one of the heroes was Cpl. Hideo Hashimoto, a Japanese-American,
who edged himself forward and threw grenades into the enemy holes, some
of them only ten to fifteen feet away. By 1800, Sergeant Poovey had only
12 effectives left in the platoon; 17 of the 29 men still living were wounded.
With ammunition almost gone, Poovey requested and received authority to
withdraw into the main G Company position. After dark, the 29 men, 3 of
them carried on stretchers, escaped by timing their departure from the
hill with the arrival of friendly tanks which engaged the enemy and diverted
attention from the beleaguered men on top. The group reached the G Company
position on Hill 179 half an hour before midnight. 
While G Company held its positions on Hill 179 on 2 September against
enemy attack, Colonel Murch's 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, started an attack
northwest toward it at 1700 from the Chung-ni area. The battalion made
slow progress against formidable enemy forces. The night was extremely
dark and the terrain along the Kuhe-ri ferry road was mountainous. After
fighting all that night the battalion, the next day at 1500, reached a
position 1,000 yards south of the original defensive positions of G Company,
35th Infantry. A co-ordinated attack by armor, artillery, air, and infantry
got under way and by 1800 the battalion had re-established the battle line.
In this attack the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, killed 275 enemy and recovered
a large part of the equipment G Company had lost earlier.
Colonel Murch's battalion remained on the regained positions during
the night of the 3d. The next morning Murch received orders to attack to
the rear and clear the alternate route on the western edge of the battalion
zone. At 0800 G Company, 35th Infantry, relieved Murch on the regained
positions and the latter started his attack back up the supply road. While this
was in progress, word came that North Koreans had again driven G Company
from its newly re-established position. Murch turned around, attacked,
and once more restored the G Company positions. By noon of 4 September,
Murch again turned over these positions to G Company and resumed his attack
to the rear along the road in the gap between the 1st and 2d Battalions,
35th Infantry. Almost immediately he was in contact with enemy forces.
Soon North Korean machine guns were firing on Murch's men from three directions.
Torrential rains fell and observation became poor. By this time, Murch's
battalion was running short of ammunition. Murch ordered the battalion
to withdraw about 500 yards to favorable terrain so that he could try to
effect a resupply.
But this was not easy to do. He had cleared the supply route two days
previously in his attack to the G Company position but now it was closed
again. With several thousand North Korean soldiers behind the 35th Infantry
front, it was like pulling one's thumb from a pail of water-the space filled
again immediately. Murch requested air supply and the next morning, 5 September,
eight transport planes accomplished the resupply and the 2d Battalion,
27th Infantry, was ready to resume its attack to the rear. By evening that
day it had cleared the supply road and adjacent terrain of enemy soldiers
for a distance of 8,000 yards to the rear of G Company's front-line positions.
There Murch received orders to halt and prepare to attack northeast to link up with
Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry. 
After Murch had left the Chung-ni area on 2 September in his attack
toward G Company, enemy infiltrators attacked the 24th Infantry command
post and several artillery positions. To meet this new situation, General
Kean, again acting on his own authority as the responsible commander on
the ground, ordered the remaining battalion of the 27th Infantry (technically
still the 3d Battalion, 28th Infantry), commanded by Lt. Col. George H.
DeChow, to attack and destroy the enemy operating there. General Kean notified
Eighth Army of his action at 1250, 2 September. 
After an early morning struggle on 3 September against several hundred
North Koreans in the vicinity of the artillery positions, DeChow's battalion
launched its attack at 1500 over the high, rugged terrain west of the "Horseshoe,"
as the deep curve in the Masan road was called, four miles east of Komam-ni.
Its mission was to seize and secure the high ground dominating the Horseshoe,
and then relieve the pressure on the 24th Infantry rear. Initially only
one artillery piece was in position to support the attack. After the battalion
advanced some distance, an enemy force, estimated at the time to number
more than 1,000 men, counterattacked it and inflicted heavy casualties,
which included thirteen officers. The K Company commander, 1st Lt. Elwood
F. James, was killed while leading an assault. Additional tanks moved up
to help secure the exposed right flank and rear, and air strikes helped
to contain the enemy force. The battalion finally succeeded in taking the
high ground. 
The next morning, 4 September, instead of continuing the attack toward
the 24th Infantry command post, DeChow, on changed orders, attacked straight
ahead into the Komam-ni area where enemy troops were fighting in the artillery
positions. This attack got under way at 0900 in the face of severe enemy
small arms fire. In the afternoon, heavy rains slowed the attack, but after
an all-day battle, I and K Companies, with the help of numerous air strikes,
captured the high ground dominating the Komam-ni crossroads. Numerous casualties
in the battalion had led General Kean to attach C Company, 65th Engineer
Combat Battalion, to it. The next day, 5 September, the 3d Battalion turned
its attack across rugged terrain toward Haman and drove through to the
vicinity of the 24th Infantry command post. In its attack, the 3d Battalion
counted more than 300 enemy dead in the area it traversed. 
The series of events that caused General Kean to change the direction
of DeChow's attack toward Komam-ni began at 0100, 3 September. The 1st
Battalion, 35th Infantry, protruded farther westward at this time than
any other unit of the U.N. forces in Korea. Back of its positions on Sibidang-san
the main supply route and rear areas were in enemy hands, and only in daylight
and under escort could vehicles travel the road. On Sibidang-san the battalion
had held its original positions after the heavy fighting of pre-dawn 1
September, completely surrounded by barbed wire, booby traps, and flares,
with all supporting weapons inside its tight perimeters. The battalion
had the advantage of calling by number for previously zeroed and numbered
protective fires covering all approaches, which were quickly delivered.
An hour after midnight an unusually heavy enemy assault struck the battalion.
The fight there continued until dawn 3 September, when the 1st Battalion,
35th Infantry, counted 143 enemy dead in front of its positions, and on
that basis estimated that the total enemy casualties must have been about
500 men. 
In this night battle the 64th Field Artillery Battalion gave invaluable
support to the 1st Battalion and became directly involved itself in the
fighting. About fifty North Koreans infiltrated before dawn to A Battery's
position and delivered a banzai-type assault. Enemy soldiers employing
submachine guns overran two artillery-machine gun perimeter positions,
penetrating to the artillery pieces at 0300. There, Capt. Andrew C. Anderson
and his men fought hand-to-hand with the North Koreans. Some of the guns
fell temporarily into enemy hands and one North Korean scrawled on a howitzer
tube, "Hurrah for our Company!" But the artillerymen threw the
North Koreans out, aided greatly by the concentrations of fire from C Battery,
90th Field Artillery Battalion, which were placed within fifty yards of
the battery and sealed off enemy reinforcements. In defending its guns
in this night battle, A Battery lost seven men killed and twelve wounded-about
25 percent of its strength. 
The day before, the 159th Field Artillery Battalion also had distinguished
itself in defending its guns in close fighting.
Fighting in support of the Nam River front in the northern part of the
25th Division sector were five batteries of the 159th and 64th Field Artillery
Battalions (105-mm. howitzers) and one battery of the 90th Field Artillery
Battalion (155-mm. howitzers), for a total of thirty-six guns. One 155-mm.
howitzer, called by Colonel Fisher "The Little Professor," fired
from Komam-ni on the Notch back of Chungam-ni, through which funneled much
of the N.K. 6th Division's supplies. Another forward artillery piece kept
the Iryong-ni bridge over the Nam under fire. The 25th Division artillery
estimated it killed approximately 1,825 North Korean soldiers during the
first three days of September. 
In this critical time, the Fifth Air Force added its tremendous fire
power to that of the division artillery in support of the ground force.
On 3 September, General Kean, speaking of the action during the past two
days, said, "The close air support rendered by Fifth Air Force again
saved this division as they have many times before."  This view was supported by General
Walker in an interview in November. Speaking then to a U.S. Air Force Evaluation
Group, General Walker said, "I will gladly lay my cards right on the
table and state that if it had not been for the air support that we received
from the Fifth Air Force we would not have been able to stay in Korea."
It is not possible here to follow in detail the confused ebb and flow
of battle behind the 35th Infantry. Battalions, companies, and platoons,
cut off and isolated, fought independently of higher control and help except
for airdrops which supplied many of them. Airdrops also supplied relief
forces trying to reach the front-line units. Tanks and armored cars ran
the gantlet to the isolated units with supplies of food and ammunition
and carried back critically wounded on the return trips.
In general, the 35th Infantry fought in its original battle line positions,
while at first one battalion, and later two battalions, of the 27th Infantry
fought toward it through the estimated 3,000 North Koreans operating in
its rear areas.
In the confused fighting in the rear areas there were several cases
of North Korean atrocities. One of the worst occurred when a group of company
mess parties in jeeps pulling trailers with hot breakfast were following
tanks toward the front lines. About a mile and a half from G Company, 35th
Infantry, the column came under enemy fire in a defile. The tanks went
on through, but most of the other vehicles under Capt. Robert E. Hammerquist,
2d Battalion S-3, turned back. At least one of the mess parties, however,
pressed on after the tanks. Some of this group were captured. One of its
members hid in a haystack and later escaped. He told of hearing the torture
and murder of one man. He heard agonized screams, recognized the man's
voice, and could hear him saying between sobs, "You might as well
kill me now." Later when the area was cleared of enemy this man's
body was found castrated and the fingers cut off.  Many soldiers of
the 25th Division later saw the bodies of Americans lying in a ditch in
the 35th Infantry area, their hands tied and their feet cut off. Still
others saw dead Americans with their tongues cut out. Members of the N.K.
7th Division apparently perpetrated these atrocities. 
During the September offensive enemy action in rear areas of the 25th
Division carried right to Masan. Guerrilla activity increased, with the
most tragic single incident taking place during the night of 3-4 September.
That night about fifteen guerrillas, including one woman, attacked a radio
relay station near Changwon, only four miles from Masan. They surprised
a group of seven Americans and two South Koreans inside a tent on a hilltop.
The guerrillas tied up the Americans, took documents from files, gathered up all weapons,
and then the woman shot every one of the prisoners with a tommy gun. Two
wounded Americans lived to tell the story. 
Even in Masan, General Kean faced a dangerous situation. The town was
a nest of Communist sympathizers and agents. At the peak of the enemy offensive,
Han Gum Jo, manager of the Masan branch of the Korean Press Association,
confessed that he was chief of the South Korean Labor Party in Masan and
that he funneled information to the enemy through a Pusan headquarters.
The chief of guards of the Masan prison was the head of a Communist cell
and seven of his guards were members. This and other counterintelligence
information came to light at a time when desperate fighting was in progress
only a few miles away. General Kean considered the situation so menacing
that he ordered Masan evacuated of all people except the police, public
officials, railroad and utility workers, and necessary laborers and their
families. Evacuation was to be completed in five days. On 10 and 11 September
alone the 25th Division evacuated more than 12,000 people by LST from Masan.
Although the 25th Division generally was under much less enemy pressure
after 5 September, there were still severe local attacks. On 6 September
Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, moved north from the Haman
area to join Murch's 2d Battalion in the clean-up of enemy troops back
of the 35th Infantry and below the Nam River. Caught between the 35th Infantry
on its hill positions along the river and the attacking 27th Infantry units,
large numbers of North Koreans were killed. Sixteen different groups reportedly
were dispersed with heavy casualties during the day. By morning of 7 September
there was clear evidence that survivors of the N.K. 7th Division
were trying to escape across the Nam River. The 25th Division buried
more than 2,000 North Korean dead, killed between 1 and 7 September behind
its lines. This number did not include those killed in front of its positions.
About 9 September Colonel Fisher traveled over these rear areas where fighting
had been intense. He was astonished at the number of North Korean dead
that littered the fields. Speaking of that occasion he has said, "The
area of Trun in the Falaise Gap in Europe couldn't match it. Flies were
so thick in some areas it limited vision." 
Heavy rains caused the Nam and Naktong Rivers to rise more than two
feet on 8 and 9 September, thereby reducing the danger of new enemy crossings.
At this juncture one of the ironies of the Korean War occurred. On the
8th, American jet planes (F-82's) mistakenly bombed the Namji-ri bridge
over the Naktong and with one 500-pound bomb destroyed the 80-foot center
span. Only the bridges north of the juncture of the Nam with the Naktong
were supposed to be subject to aerial attack at this time. Lieutenant Vickery's
1st Platoon of F Company, 35th Infantry, had effectively defended the bridge-the link
between the U.S. 2d and 25th Divisions-throughout the enemy offensive.
The platoon had become so closely identified with this bridge that in the
25th Division it was called "Vickery's Bridge." Vickery had placed
one squad on the north side of the bridge. From the south side it was supported
by the rest of the platoon, a tank, and one 105-mm. howitzer, fondly called
"Peg O' My Heart."
Some of the local commanders thought that had the North Koreans bypassed
this bridge and crossed the Naktong farther east there would have been
nothing between them and Pusan. However, North Korean attacks against Vickery's
men were a nightly occurrence. The approaches to the bridge on the north
side were mined. At one time there were about 100 North Korean dead lying
in that area. One morning a pack of dogs were tearing the bodies when one
of the animals set off a mine. That scattered the pack and the dogs in
their wild flight set off more mines. Pieces of dog went flying through
the air like rocks. 
Counterattack at Haman
In the middle of the 25th Division line, south of the 35th Infantry,
the enemy breakthrough at Haman became a terrifying fact to the division
headquarters after daylight, 1 September. General Kean, commanding the
division, telephoned Eighth Army headquarters and requested permission
to commit, at once, the entire 27th Infantry Regiment, just arrived at
Masan the previous evening and still held in Eighth Army reserve. General
Walker denied this request, but did release one battalion of the regiment
to General Kean's control. 
General Kean immediately dispatched Colonel Check's 1st Battalion, 27th
Infantry-which had been alerted as early as 0200-from its assembly area
near Masan toward Haman, to be attached to the 24th Infantry upon arrival
at Colonel Champney's command post. The 1st Platoon of the 27th Regiment's
Heavy Mortar Company; a platoon of B Company, 89th Tank Battalion; and
A Battery, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, reinforced Check's battalion.
Check with his battalion arrived at Champney's 24th Infantry command post
two miles east of Haman at 1000. 
The scene there was chaotic. Vehicles of all descriptions, loaded with
soldiers, were moving down the road to the rear. Many soldiers on foot
were on the road. Colonel Champney tried repeatedly but in vain to get
these men to halt. The few enemy mortar shells falling occasionally in
the vicinity did no damage except to cause the troops of the 24th Infantry
and intermingled South Koreans to scatter and increase their speed to the
rear. The road was so clogged with this frightened, demoralized human traffic
that Colonel Check had to delay his counterattack. In the six hours he
waited at this point, Check observed that none of the retreating troops
of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 24th Infantry, could be assembled as units. Sgt. Jack W. Riley of the 25th Military Police Company
tried to help clear the road. Men ran off the mountain past him, some with
shoes off, half of them without weapons, and only a few wearing helmets.
He shouted for all officers and noncommissioned officers to stop. None
stopped. One man who appeared to have some rank told him, "Get out
of the way." Riley pulled back the bolt of his carbine and stopped
the man at gun point, and then discovered that he was a first sergeant.
Asked why they would not stay in and fight; several in the group that Riley
succeeded in halting simply laughed at him and answered, "We didn't
see any MP's on the hill." At 1600, the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry,
assembling in the rear of the 27th Infantry, could muster only 150 to 200
At 1445, General Kean's orders for an immediate counterattack to restore
the 24th Infantry positions arrived at Champney's command post. Check quickly
completed his attack plan. For half an hour the Air Force bombed, napalmed,
rocketed, and strafed Haman and adjacent enemy-held ridges. Fifteen minutes
of concentrated artillery barrages followed. Haman was a sea of flames.
Check's infantry moved out in attack westward at 1630, now further reinforced
by a platoon of tanks from A Company, 79th Tank Battalion. Eight tanks,
mounting infantry, spearheaded the attack into Haman. North Koreans in
force held the ridge on the west side of the town, and their machine gun
fire swept every approach-their "green tracers seemed as thick as
the rice in the paddies." Enemy fire destroyed one tank and the attacking
infantry suffered heavy casualties. But Check's battalion pressed the attack
and by 1825 had seized the first long ridge 500 yards west of Haman; by
2000 it had secured half of the old battle position on the higher ridge
beyond, its objective, one mile west of Haman. Two hundred yards short
of the crest on the remainder of the ridge, the infantry dug in for the
All day air strikes had harassed the enemy and prevented him from consolidating
his gains and reorganizing for further co-ordinated attack. Some of the
planes came from the carriers Valley Forge and Philippine Sea,
200 miles away and steaming toward the battlefield at twenty-seven knots.
The crisis for the 25th Division was not lessened by Eighth Army's telephone
message at 1045 that the 27th Infantry was to be alerted for a possible
move north into the 2d Division sector.
West of Haman the North Koreans and Check's men faced each other during
the night without further battle, but the North Koreans, strangely for
them, kept flares over their position. In the rear areas, enemy mortar
fire on the 24th Regiment command post caused Colonel Champney to move
it still farther to the rear.
In the morning, under cover of a heavy ground fog, the North Koreans
struck Check's battalion in a counterattack. This action began a hard fight
which lasted all morning. Air strikes using napalm burned to death many North Koreans and helped the infantry in gaining
the ridge. At noon, the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, at last secured the
former positions of the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry, and took over the
same foxholes that unit had abandoned two nights before. Its crew-served
weapons were still in place. During 2 September, the Air Force flew 135
sorties in the 25th Division sector, reportedly destroying many enemy soldiers,
several tanks and artillery pieces, and three villages containing ammunition
Early the next morning, 3 September, the North Koreans heavily attacked
Check's men in an effort to regain the ridge. Artillery, mortar, and tank
fire barrages, and a perfectly timed air strike directed from the battalion
command post, met this attack. Part of the battalion had to face about
and fight toward its rear. After the attack had been repulsed hundreds
of enemy dead lay about the battalion position. A prisoner estimated that
during 2-3 September the four North Korean battalions fighting Check's
battalion had lost 1,000 men. 
Colonel Check's battalion held the ridge until dark on 4 September,
then the 1st Battalion and F Company of the 2d Battalion, 24th Infantry,
which had reorganized in the rear, relieved it. The 1st Battalion, 27th
Infantry, thereupon moved back into a secondary defensive position a mile
and a half east of Haman. Colonel Champney moved his command post back
into Haman, placing it at the base of a hill 300 yards west of the center
of the town. 
That night there was a repetition of the earlier disgraceful episode.
Before dawn, 5 September, an enemy force of two companies, only half-armed,
moved against Haman. A part of this force approached the hill at the western
edge of Haman where H Company was posted as security for the 24th Regimental
command post situated at its base. The H Company men left their post without
firing a shot, abandoning two new machine guns. Men in the regimental command
post had their first intimation that enemy troops were in the vicinity
when the North Koreans opened fire on them with the captured machine guns.
A small group of North Koreans infiltrated into Haman within 100 yards
of the command post, where members of the I&R Platoon drove them off
in a grenade battle. In the course of this action, an enemy grenade blew
up an ammunition truck. The exploding shells and resulting fires gave the
impression from a distance that a heavy fight was in progress.
About twenty enemy soldiers approached, undiscovered, close enough to
the 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry, command post west of Haman to throw grenades
and fire burp guns into it. Perhaps 45 soldiers of the battalion command
group and 20 South Korean recruits were in position there at the time.
The enemy was driven off at dawn, but Maj. Eugene J. Carson, battalion
executive officer, then discovered that he had on position with him only
30 men, 7 of them wounded. Looking back down the hill, Carson saw approximately
40 men get up out of the rice paddies and go over to a tank at a roadblock
position. These men reported to the regiment that they had been driven
off the hill. Three tanks near the command post helped clear the town of
North Koreans. 
At the time of this enemy infiltration, a white officer and from 35
to 40 Negro soldiers left their position south of Haman at a roadblock
and fled to the rear until they reached Colonel Check's 1st Battalion,
27th Infantry, command post a mile and a half away. There, at 0500 this
officer said 2,000 North Koreans had overrun his position and others near
Haman, including the 24th Regiment command post. Check reported this story
to General Kean, and then sent a platoon of tanks with a platoon of infantry
toward Haman to find out what had happened. Some of his officers, meanwhile,
had stopped about 220 soldiers streaming to the rear. Colonel Check ordered
these men to follow his tank and infantry patrol back into Haman. Some
of them did so only when threatened with a gun. The tank-led column entered
Ham in unopposed, where they found the 24th Regiment command post intact and everything quiet. 
The next day, 6 September; a sniper severely wounded Colonel Champney
while the latter was inspecting his front-line positions west of Haman.
Champney was evacuated at once. Colonel Corley, commanding officer of the
3d Battalion, succeeded to the command of the regiment.  Corley, known
as "Cash Pays the Rent" because that was a favorite saying of
his, became a highly regarded commander of the "Deuce-Four" Regiment.
He was destined to fight in four campaigns of the Korean War, winning a
Distinguished Service Cross, three Silver Stars, and the Legion of Merit
to add to the decorations he had already won as a much-decorated battalion
commander of World War II. This 36-year-old energetic West Point combat
leader was soon well-known throughout the regiment.
Battle Mountain and Sobuk-san
Although the enemy 6th and 7th Divisions had massed their
troops for the attempted breakthrough of the U.S. 25th Division positions
along the Nam and Naktong Rivers as already related, the 6th Division
did not altogether ignore the mountain backbone stretching southward
toward the coast. Enemy artillery and mortar fire fell on Battle Mountain
P'il-bong, and Sobuk-san during the period of the enemy offensive and there
were strong local attacks and patrol actions. The 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry,
never succeeded in gaining possession of the highest peak of Sobuk-san,
which would have given observation into the valley below and into the enemy's
rear areas. The instability of the 24th Infantry at this time made it necessary
for General Kean to order Colonel Throckmorton to send his only regimental
reserve, E Company, north into the 24th Infantry sector along the Haman
road to protect the right flank of the 5th Regimental Combat Team. In this
position, Capt. William Conger, E Company commander, collected stragglers
from the 24th Infantry every night and the next morning sent them back
to their units. Even the Navy entered the battle in this part of the line,
for its destroyers standing off the south coast gave illumination at night
by directing their searchlights against low-hanging clouds on Sobuk-san.
One destroyer was on station almost continuously, supporting the ground
action with the fire of six 5-inch guns. An artillery aerial observer directed
this naval gunfire through the fire direction center. 
On 7 September, a North Korean attack succeeded once again in driving
ROK and American troops from Battle Mountain. The 25th Division ordered
Colonel DeChow to retake the peak. DeChow, who had just counterattacked
through the rear areas of the 24th Infantry to the vicinity of Haman, prepared
his 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, for the attempt. Companies K and B of
the 24th Infantry were to follow him and secure the crest if he regained
it. For three days, 7, 8, and 9 September, the 3d Battalion counterattacked up Battle Mountain.
On the 9th, Capt. William Mitchell led his I Company to the top and engaged
in hand-to-hand combat with the North Koreans. L Company followed to the
crest but the dug-in enemy drove both companies off and back down the slope.
An estimated two companies of enemy troops held the crest of Battle Mountain
and two more companies protected their flanks. DeChow's 3d Battalion suffered
heavy casualties in these three days of fighting. On the afternoon of the
9th the American counterattack force dropped back to the high ground which
it had recaptured on the 7th, 1,000 yards east of Battle Mountain. Artillery,
mortars, and air strikes pounded the enemy position on Battle Mountain.
During this impasse, word came from the 25th Division for the battalion
to move to the vicinity of Masan. 
With the failure of the 3d Battalion, 27th Infantry, to hold the high
knob on Battle Mountain after its attacks on 8-9 September, Colonel Corley,
the 24th Infantry commander, on the evening of the 9th decided to give
up the attempt. He had K Company, 24th Infantry, and C Company, 65th Engineer
Combat Battalion, dig in on the hill east of and lower than Battle Mountain,
surrounded them with barbed wire and mine fields, and placed registered
artillery and mortar fires on all enemy approaches to the position. He
planned to contain the enemy on Battle Mountain by artillery and mortar
fire. The North Koreans on Battle Mountain attacked the lower American
defensive position many times on subsequent nights, but all their attacks
were driven off. Thus, finally, after a month of almost constant battle
the North Koreans gained and held possession of the crest of Battle Mountain.
The defensive fires of the 24th Regiment and attached artillery, however,
contained them there and they were unable to exploit the possession of
this battle-torn peak. 
With Battle Mountain in their possession, the North Koreans set out
to gain control of P'il-bong, a towering peak 250 feet higher than Battle
Mountain and an air mile to the southeast. In the predawn hours of 14 September
an enemy force of 400-500 men attacked I and L Companies, 24th Infantry,
on P'ilbong. Several attacks were repulsed, but because of men leaving
their positions L Company's strength dwindled from 100 to 40 men. Only
the determined leadership of Maj. Melvin R. Blair, a replacement officer
who had just assumed command of the battalion, held these men in the fight.
With the remnant of L Company, Blair withdrew toward I Company's position
on the crest of P'ilbong, only to find that this company under a relatively
minor attack had, unknown to him, left the hill. A wounded North Korean
sniper, hidden along the trail, shot Blair in the leg. Blair refused to
be evacuated, but he could not hold P'il-bong with the handful of men remaining
with him and it was lost. 
Just as soon as the crisis passed for the 25th Division, General Walker ordered it on 7 September to release the 5th Regimental Combat Team
within twenty-four hours. The continuing crisis north of Taegu made it
mandatory for Walker to build up his reserve there. That evening the 1st
and 2d Battalions, 27th Infantry, moved from the Nam River battlefield
to relieve the 5th Regimental Combat Team on the Masan front. Colonel Michaelis
assumed command of the regimental zone at 1500, 9 September. The 3d Battalion,
27th Infantry, broke off its counterattacks on Battle Mountain that day,
rejoined the regiment, and took its place in the southern end of the line
on 11 September. Meanwhile, the 5th Regimental Combat Team began moving
to Samnangjin on the 10th, the last train with its units clearing Masan
at 1600 the next day. Upon arrival at Samnangjin, it passed to Eighth Army
About the time the all-out North Korean assault on the Pusan Perimeter
had been turned back and the 27th Infantry was relieving the 5th Regimental
Combat Team in the line west of Masan, the "beer issue" came
to a head and evoked strong reactions from the men who were fighting the
Korean battles. Free beer had been provided U.S. soldiers on much the same
basis as candy bars and cigarettes. It had been purchased with appropriated
money and issued at intervals as supplementary to the food ration. Various
temperance, church, and social groups, and some individuals in the United
States protested the issue of beer to the soldiers. The controversy even
reached the floor of Congress, with one Congressman who favored the free
beer ration saying, "Water in Korea is deadlier than bullets."
The pressure was sufficient to cause the Army through the Far East Command
to order that 12 September would be the last day free beer could be issued
to the troops. A typical infantryman's comment was, "Those organizations
or whatever they are have nothing to do with us. We are doing the fighting
over here and it gets pretty bad. One can of beer never hurt nobody."
But henceforth, Eighth Army troops could obtain beer purchased only with
non-appropriated funds and issued through the post exchanges. 
The defensive battles on the Masan front during August and early September
brought to a head a problem that had bothered General Kean ever since the
25th Division entered the Korean War; in a larger sense, it was a problem
that had concerned Eighth Army as well. Two of the division's regiments,
the 27th and the 35th, had performed well in Korea. Not so the 24th Infantry,
the division's third regiment. Ever since its entrance into combat in the
Sangju area in July the Negro regiment had given a poor performance, although
there were some exceptions and many individual acts of heroism and capable
performance of duty. The unstable nature of the regiment was demonstrated
in the fighting on Battle Mountain during August. Then, on the night of
31 August-1 September two battalions evaporated in the face of the enemy,
and a large part of them repeated this performance four nights later. General
Kean placed his two stronger regiments usually in the more critical terrain of the division
front, but, nevertheless, the 24th Regiment constituted a weak link in
the division line that might break at any time and bring disaster to the
division and possibly to the army. Eighth Army and the 25th Division assigned
officers of an unusually high caliber to the 24th Infantry to give it strong
leadership, but this did not solve the problem.
After the enemy breakthrough in the 24th Infantry sector on 1-5 September,
General Kean decided he had to seek a solution. On 9 September he recommended
to General Walker the immediate removal of the 24th Infantry Regiment from
combat, and that the troops of the regiment be transferred as replacements
on a percentage basis to other U.S. Army units in Korea. In making these
recommendations General Kean said in part, "It is my considered opinion
that the 24th Infantry has demonstrated in combat that it is untrustworthy
and incapable of carrying out missions expected of an infantry regiment."
Nearly all officers serving in the regiment agreed with General Kean, and
so did many of the Negro noncommissioned officers and enlisted men themselves.
General Walker did not act on General Kean's recommendation since many
considerations seemed to make such action impossible at the time. 
Coinciding with this heavy fighting at the Pusan Perimeter in the south
a new and disturbing element appeared far to the north. In Tokyo and Washington,
American military leaders studied reports they received indicating that
Chinese Communist troops were moving north through China and concentrating
along the Yalu River opposite Korea. An incident at this time added to
the build-up of threatening storm clouds to the north. On 4 September,
a twin-engine bomber wearing a red star passed over a screening ship of
a U.N. naval task force operating in the Yellow Sea off the west coast
of Korea, approximately at the 38th Parallel. The bomber continued on toward
the center of the naval formation and opened fire on a U.N. fighter plane
patrol which reurned its fire and shot it down. A destroyer of the task force recovered
the body of one of the bomber crew members-he was an officer of the Armed
Forces of the Soviet Union. 
At mid-September the Eighth Army and the ROK Army were still engaged
with North Korean forces at nearly all points of the Pusan Perimeter. After
two weeks of the heaviest fighting of the war they had just barely turned
back the great North Korean offensive on the main axes of the attack: in
the east around P'ohang-dong and the Kyongju corridor, in the center at
the approaches to Taegu, and in the south around Yongsan and the approaches
to Masan. The battles of the Perimeter would go on, that was certain, for
the issue there had not been concluded.
But overriding all other factors, favorable and unfavorable, comforting
or disquieting, bearing on the Korean War at mid-September was the knowledge-now
become widespread among U.N. forces in Korea-that an amphibious landing
behind the enemy's lines was imminent. The date set for it was 15 September.
 Ltr, Fern to author, 1 Apr 56; Ltr, Cody to author, 18 Nov 55.
Department of the Army General Order 70. 2 August 1951, awarded the
Medal of Honor to Private Story. General Order 187, 5 December 1950,
awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Sergeant Freeman. EUSAK.
 Ltr, Caldwell to author, 29 May 53: Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun
53; Hill, MS review comments, 2 Jan 58; 9th Inf WD, Sep 50, Incl B, Col
Charles C. Sloane, Jr., Hill 209 (1138-1386), with sketch map; Ibid.,
app., 1st Lt Raymond J. McDoniel, Notes (this document misspells
"McDoniel" as "McDaniel,"); Sheen, From Encirclement to Safety. The
officers on the hill were Lt Schmitt, CO H Co; Lt McDoniel, Plat Ldr D
Co; Lt Paul E. Kremser. Plat Ldr H Co; Lt Caldwell. Plat Ldr D Co; and
Lt Edmund J. Lilly III, Plat Ldr B Co.
 Sworn affidavit, SSgt Grover L. Bozarth and Sgt Ralph G. Lillard, H
Co, 9th Inf, 13 Sep 50, Yongsan, recommending Watkins for Medal of Honor
DA AG files.
 McDoniel, Notes cited n. 2, Sep 50; Ltr, Caldwell to author, 29 May
53. Department of the Army General Order 25, 25 April 1951, awarded the
Medal of Honor posthumously to Private Ouellette.
 EUSAK WD, 9 Sep 50, an. 1 to PIR 59; 9th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50, account
of Lt McDoniel; Sloane, Hill 209, Sep 50. General Order 54, 6 February
1951, awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously to Lieutenant
 Ltr, Caldwell to author, 29 May 53; McDoniel, Notes, Sep 50.
 Ltr, Caldwell to author, 29 May 53: McDoniel, Notes, Sep 50; Bozarth
and Lillard Affidavit; Ltr, MSgt Robert S. Hall (1st Bn, 9th Inf, Aug-
Sep 50-Hall maintained morning rpts) to author, 1 Jun 54. Department of
the Army General Order 9, 16 February 1951, awarded the Medal of Honor
to Sergeant Watkins posthumously.
 McDoniel, Notes, Sep 50; New York Times September 9, 1950. Three
weeks later, when the N.K. 9th Division had been driven back across the
Naktong, a party of 9th Infantry men climbed to the tragic perimeter on
Hill 209g. They found most of the dead had been blown to pieces in the
foxholes, and it was often difficult to tell whether two or three men
had occupied a particular hole. There were approximately thirty American
dead at the site, fifteen of whom could be identified. Sloane, Hill 209,
 EUSAK WD, PIR 59, an. 1, 9 Sep 50.
 GHQ FEC, History of the North Korean Army, p. 68; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 9th Div), p. 49, and Issue 94 (N.K. 4th
Div), pp. 49-50; ATIS Interrog Rpts, Issue 4, p. 118, Rpt 949, 1st Lt So
Chung Kun (captured 3 Sep 50, Yongsan); EUSAK WD, 14 Sep 50, an. to PIR
64, and 9 Sep 50, POW Interrog Rpt of 1st Lt So Chung Kun, 9th Div, and
Interrog Rpt of Cha Sook Wha, interpreter, 16th Regt, 4th Div.
 Ltrs, Capt Lee E. Beahler to author, 10 Jun and 1 Jul 53 (sketch
map of D Co positions with ltr of 1 Jul); Ltr, Reed to author, 20 Jul
53; Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53.
 Department of the Army General Order 10, 16 February 1951, awarded
the Medal of Honor to Sergeant Turner posthumously.
 Ltrs, Beahler to author, 10 Jun and 1 Jul 53; Ltr, Reed to author,
20 Jul 53; Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, Msg
1525, 2 Sep 50; Ibid., PIR 52, 2 Sep 50. General Order 59, 8 February
1951, awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Lieutenant Beahler for
heroic leadership in this action. EUSAK.
 Ltrs, Beahler to author. 10 Jun and 1 Jul 53; Ltr, Reed to author,
20 Jul 53; Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53; Cody, Operation Manchu;
EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 2 Sep 50; Ibid., Br for CG, 2 Sep 50; GHQ FEC Sitrep,
2 Sep 50.
 Transcription and summ of fonecon, Walker with Hickey, 0935 2 Sep
50, CofS files, FEC; EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, Opn Ord 021315 Sep 50.
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, and Br for CG, 2 Sep 50; 9th Inf WD, 3 Sep 50,
Opn Ord 11 and accompanying overlay, 030300 Sep 50; 1st Prov Mar Brig
SAR, 1 Aug-6 Sep 50, p. 15; 2d Div Arty WD, entry 12, 2335 2 Sep 50;
Fisher, MS review comments, 7 Nov 57.
 Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53; Ltr, Beahler to author, 10 Jun
53; 1st Prov Mar Brig SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, entry for 3 Sep, p. 15; 5th
Mar SAR, 3 Sep 50; 2d Bn, 5th Mar, SAR, addendum 1, 3 Sep 50; Montross
and Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, pp. 217-20.
 Ltr, Reed to author, 20 Jul 53; Ltr, Beahler to author, 10 Jun 53
5th Mar SAR, 3 Sep 50.
 Entries for 3 Sep, Marine sources cited n. 20; 1st Bn, 5th Mar,
SAR, 3 Sep 50; Montross and Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, pp. 220-22;
Geer, The New Breed, p. 94.
 1st Prov Mar Brig SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, pp. 15-16; 1st Bn, 5th Mar
SAR, 4 Sep 50; Geer, The New Breed, p. 96; Montross and Canzona, The
Pusan Perimeter, pp. 227-29.
 Department of the Army General Order 61, 2 August 1951, awarded the
Medal of Honor to Sergeant Kaufman.
 9th Inf WD, 5 Sep 50; 1st Prov Mar Brig SAR, 5 Sep 50; 1st Bn, 5th
Mar SAR, 5 Sep 50; Geer, The New Breed, pp. 97-98; Montross and Canzona,
The Pusan Perimeter, pp. 234-37.
 GHQ FEC Sitrep, 5 Sep 50; 9th Inf WD, 5 Sep 50, GO 11.
 2d Div Narr Summ, 1 Sep-31 Oct 50, p. 14; EUSAK WD, 4 Sep 50, Opn
Ord at 042000. The removal of the Marine brigade from the Naktong front
will be discussed further in the next chapter.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 9th Div), p. 52.
 Freeman, MS review comments, 30 Oct 57; Highlights of the Combat
Activities of the 23d Infantry Regiment from 5 August to 30 September
1950, MS, prepared in the regiment, copy in OCMH.
 2d Div Arty WD, 2 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, 7 Sep 50, an. to PIR 57.
 2d Div Arty WD, 2 Sep 50; Interv, author with Hill, 30 Jun 53.
 38th Inf Comd Rpt, Narr Summ, Sep-Oct 50; EUSAK PIR 58, 8 Sep 50;
2d Div PIR 14, 7 Sep 50.
 23d Inf WD, Narr Summ, Sep 50.
 Interv, author with Lt Col Everett S. Stewart, 19 May 53; 23d Inf
WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 131, 1715 1 Sep 50. General Order 196, 14 December
1950, awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Colonel Hutchin. 2d
 2d Div Arty WD, 2 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, 7 Sep 50, an. to PIR 57.
 23d Inf WD, Narr Summ, Sep 50; Interv, author with Meszar, 15 May
53; Highlights of Combat Activities of 23d Inf.
 EUSAK WD, 21 Sep 50, ADVATIS Interrog Rpts, Sr Lt Lee Kwan Hyon,
Med Off, N.K. 17th Regt, 2d Div; ATIS Interrog Rpts, Issue 6, p. 81, Kim
Il Chin and Issue 7, p. 3, Yu Tong Gi; 23d Inf Comd Rpt, Sep 50, Narr
Summ, p. 10.
 38 Inf Comd Rpt, Sep-Oct 50, Narr Summ; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 4-5 Sep
50. Records of the 38th Infantry for September 1950 were lost in the
withdrawal from Kunu-ri, 30 November, and the command report compiled
later from recollections of regimental personnel lacks precise
information on time, place, and overlay data for this period.
 GHQ FEC Sitrep, 5 Sep 50; Ibid., G-3 Opn Rpt 70, 2 Sep 50.
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1330, 10 Sep 50: GHQ FEC Sitrep, 13 Sep 50; Lt
Col C. I. Malcolm of Poltallock (London: Thomas Nelson Se Sons, Ltd.,
1952), The Argylls in Korea, pp. 11-12; Coad, The Land Campaign in
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 104 (N.K. 10th Div), p. 49;
Interv, author with Stephens, 8 Oct 51; Interv, author with Brig Gen
George B. Peploe, 12 Aug 51; Ltr and notes, Landrum to author, recd 28
 25th Div WD, 1 Sep 50; 64th FA Bn WD, 1 Sep 50.
 Interv, author with Fisher, 5 Jan 52; 35th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50.
 Ltr, Kean to author, 22 Apr 53; Barth MS, p. 27.
 35th Inf WD, 1-2 Sep 50; 2d Bn 35th Inf WD, 1 Sep, and Narr story
of action Sep 50; 25th Div WD, 1-2 Sep 50; New York Herald Tribune,
September 3, 1950, Homer Bigart dispatch; New York Times, September 4,
1950, W. H. Lawrence dispatch.
In grenade fighting on slopes the practice of "cooking the grenade"
developed. In order to avoid allowing enemy troops time to pick up and
throw a grenade back, soldiers pulled the pin, released he handle in the
grip for a brief period, and then threw the grenade.
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1125 and 1410, 3 Sep 50: 2d Bn, 27th Inf, WD,
Unit Rpt, Sep 50; 27th Inf WD, Unit Rpt, Sep 50; Murch, MS review
comments, 2 Jan 58.
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1250 2 Sep 50; 25th Div WD, 2 Sep 50; Ltr, Kean
to author, 22 Apr 53. The 3d Bn, 29th Inf, became operational as the 3d
Bn, 27th Inf, by 25th Div GO 134, 10 Sep 50. The 1st Bn, 19th Inf became
operational as the 3d Bn, 35th Inf, the same date. EUSAK GO 49, 2 Sep
50, authorized the transfer.
 DeChow, MS review comments, Jul 53; Interv, author with Flynn (3d
Bn, 27th Inf, Sep 50), 5 Nov 53; Barth MS, pp. 28-29.
 DeChow, MS review comments, Jul 53; Barth MS, pp. 28-29.
 35th Inf WD, 3 Sep 50; 1st Bn, 35th Inf, Unit Rpt, Sep 50; EUSAK WD,
G-3 Jnl, 0445, 3 Sep 50.
 64th FA Bn WD, 3 Sep 50: Barth MS, p. 29; 159th FA Bn WD, Sep 50;
EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 0445 3 Sep 50; File supporting DUC, 35th Inf Regt,
DA, AG files.
 25th Div WD, 4 Sep 50; Barth MS, pp. 22, 31.
 "Air War in Korea," Air University Quarterly Review, vol. IV, No. 3
(Spring, 1951), 61.
 Interv, USAF Evaluation Board with Lt Gen Walton Walker, 25 Nov 50.
See also New York Times, September 3, 1950, for General Collins'
statement quoting Walker.
 Interv, author with Maj Joe B. Lamb, CO 2d Bn, 35th Inf, 4 Sep 51
Intervs, author with 2d Lt Dillon Snell and 1st Lt Charles J. Hoyt, 2d
Bn, 35th Inf, 4 Sep 51; Ltr, Hammerquist to author, 17 Apr 53; 35th Inf
Unit Hist, 3 Sep 50.
 Interv, author with Lamb, 4 Sep 51; Interv, author with Sawyer
(Recon Co, 25th Div, Sep 50), 27 Jun 51.
 EUSAK WD, G-3, Coordinating Protection Lines of Communications Rear
Areas, 4 Sep 50 New York Herald Tribune, September 4, 1950; 25th Div WD,
4 Sep 50.
 25th Div WD, 3, 7, 11 and 15 Sep 50.
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl 0720, 5 Sep 50; 27th Inf WD, 5 Sep 50; 2d Bn,
27th Inf, Unit Rpt, Sep 50; 25th Div WD, 6 Sep 50; Barth MS, p. 28;
Fisher, MS review comments, Jan 58.
 35th Inf WD, S-2 and S-3 Jnls, item 15, 9 Sep 50; 35th Inf Unit
Hist, Sep 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl, 1015, 10 Sep 50; Fisher, MS review
comments, 7 Nov 57, and Jan 58.
 Ltr, Kean to author, 2 Apr 53; Barth MS, p. 27.
 27th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; Interv, author with Check 6 Feb 53.
 2d Bn, 24th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; EUSAK IG Rpt, 24th Inf, Sep 50,
testimony of Check, Riley, and Roberts.
 1st Bn, 27th Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; A Co, 78th Hv Tk Bn WD, Sep 50; 24th
Inf WD, 1 Sep 50; 25th Div WD, 1 Sep 50; EUSAK IG Rpt, Check testimony;
Newsweek, September 11, 1950, pp. 18-20.
 1st Bn, 27th Inf WD, 2 Sep 50; 24th Inf WD, 2 Sep 50; 25th Div WD,
2 Sep 50; EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Check and Capt Don K. Hickman, Ex
Off, 1st Bn, 27th Inf; New York Herald Tribune, September 2, 1950,
 1st Bn, 27th Inf WD, Sep 50 Opn Rpt, 3 Sep 50; 27th Inf WD, 3 Sep
50, and Rpt of captured documents; Barth MS, p. 27.
 27th Inf WD, 4 Sep 50; 24th Inf WD, 4 Sep 50; Interv, author with
Champney, 22 Jul 51; Corley, MS review comments for author, 22 Jul 53.
 Interv, author with Champney, 22 Jul 51; EUSAK WD, 14 Sep 50,
Interrog Rpt, Yun Che Gun; 24th Inf WD, 4-5 Sep 50; EUSAK IG Rpt,
testimony of Champney, Roberts, and Carson.
 EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Check, Hickman, and Capt James D.
Hunsaker, S-3, 1st Bn, 27th Inf.
 24th Inf WD, 6 Sep 50; 25th Inf WD, 6 Sep 50; Interv, author with
Champney, 22 Jul 51.
 25th Div WD, 9 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, 5 Oct 50, Arty Sec, Arty Info Bul
8, 3 Oct 50; Throckmorton, Notes for author, 17 Apr 53.
 25th Div WD, 8-9 Sep 50; 24th Inf WD, 9 Sep 50; EUSAK WD, G-3 Jnl,
1245, 9 Sep 50; DeChow, MS review comments, Jul 53.
 Interv, author with Corley, 6 Nov 51; 24th Inf WD, 9 Sep 50.
 Interv, author with Corley, 6 Nov 51; 3d Bn, 24th Inf WD, 14 Sep
50; EUSAK IG Rpt, testimony of Corley.
 EUSAK WD, G-3 Sec, 8-9 Sep 50; 27th Inf WD, 7-9 Sep 50; Ibid., Unit
Rpt, Sep 50.
 See 25th Div WD, 11 Sep 50; New York Times, September 14, and
October 16, 1950; New York Herald Tribune, September 13, 1950.
 Ltr, Kean to CG, Eighth Army, 9 Sep 50, in EUSAK IG Rpt. The 24th
Regiment continued to serve in Eighth Army as an all-Negro unit for
another year. Its troops were then transferred as replacements to other
infantry units of the army, integrated usually in a proportion of about
 New York Times, September 5, 1950, gives the State Department note
announcing this incident. The Times of 7 September gives a summary of
the Russian version, and the claim for damages for the bomber and three
Russian crewman, which U.S. Ambassador Alan G. Kirk refused to accept.
On 31 August, Ambassador Warren Austin told the U.N. Security Council
that a U.S. F-51 fighter plane on 27 August may have strafed the An-tung
Airfield in Manchuria, five miles from the Korean border, and thereby
have unintentionally violated the territory of Communist China.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation