It was not Lacedaemon alone that gave birth to warriors, ... they were
produced in all countries where men were found capable of instructing others
in the art of war|
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, The Discourses
The North Korea People's Army had been from the beginning under the
supervision of the Soviets. At first the Peace Preservation Corps had undertaken
the organization and training of a military force. Then, when the Soviets
began to withdraw their occupation forces in February 1948, the North Korean
Government established a Ministry of Defense and activated the North Korea
People's Army. Soviet instruction and supervision of the Army continued,
however, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from North Korea. One prisoner
stated that every training film he ever saw or used had been made in the
USSR. About three thousand Russians were active in the Army program before
June 1950. In some instances as many as fifteen Soviet officers served
as advisers on an N.K. infantry division staff. The adviser to a division
commander reportedly was a Soviet colonel. 
The Soviet diplomatic mission to North Korea, apparently organized in
January 1949, became the post-occupation body for Soviet control of the
country. By June 1950 every member of the Soviet diplomatic staff in North
Korea was either an army or an air force officer. Col. Gen. Terenty F.
Shtykov, commander of the Soviet occupation forces in North Korea and,
after their withdrawal, the Soviet Ambassador there, apparently functioned
as the senior Soviet officer in the country. Intelligence reports indicate
that Premier Kim Il Sung received weekly instructions from the USSR through
Ambassador Shtykov. 
In June 1950 Kim Il Sung was Commander in Chief of the North Korean
armed forces. His deputy was Marshal Choe Yong Gun. Both had left Korea
in their youth, resided in China for long periods of time, and, ultimately,
gone to Moscow for training. Kim Il Sung returned to Korea on 25 September
1945 under Soviet sponsorship, landing at Wonsan on that date with a group
of Soviet-trained guerrillas.
For all practical purposes the North Korean ground forces in June 1950
comprised two types of units: (1) the Border Constabulary (BC or Bo
An Dae) and (2) the North Korea People's Army (NKPA or In Min Gun).
The Border Constabulary, an internal security force, was organized,
trained, and supervised by Soviet officials. It was uncommonly strong in
political indoctrination and supported and promoted the Communist party
line throughout North Korea. All officer training for the Border Constabulary
was under the direct supervision of Soviet advisers on the school staffs.
The Border Constabulary had its beginnings as early as September 1945,
when anti-Japanese and Communist Koreans, guerrillas who had fled from
Korea and Manchuria to Soviet territory, came back to Korea and formed
the nucleus of what was called the Peace Preservation Corps. It numbered
about 18,000 men and drew its personnel mostly from Communist youth groups.
Its officers were usually active Communists. In May 1950 the effective
strength of the North Korean internal security forces was approximately
50,000, divided among the Border Constabulary, the regular police, and
the "thought" police. 
The Border Constabulary in June 1950 consisted of five brigades of uneven
size and armament-the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th. The 1st
Brigade numbered 5,000 men; the 3d and 7th each had a
strength of 4,000. These three brigades were stationed just north of the
38th Parallel. The 7th was in the west, deployed from Haeju to the
coast, just above the Ongjin Peninsula; the 3d was east of the 7th,
in the center from Haeju to the vicinity of Chorwon; and the 1st
was at Kansong on the east coast. These three brigades, totaling 13,000
men, were armed and equipped to combat-infantry standards. The brigades
each had six or seven battalions composed of three rifle companies each,
together with machine gun and mortar companies, an antitank platoon, and
the usual headquarters and service units.
The BC 2d Brigade, with a total strength of only 2,600, was divided
into seven battalions. It held positions along the Yalu and Tumen River
boundaries separating North Korea from Manchuria and the USSR. This brigade
had little heavy equipment and few mortars, machine guns, or antitank guns.
The BC 5th Brigade, with a strength of about 3,000 men, had headquarters
at Pyong-yang, the North Korean capital. It was responsible for railroad
The North Korea People's Army
The North Korea People's Army in June 1950 constituted a ground force
of eight infantry divisions at full strength, two more infantry divisions
activated at an estimated half strength, a separate infantry regiment,
a motorcycle reconnaissance regiment, and an armored brigade. Five of the
infantry divisions and the armored brigade had well-trained combat personnel.
Many of these soldiers were hardened veterans who had fought with the Chinese
Communist and Soviet Armies in World War II.
The North Korea People's Army was officially activated on 8 February
1948. Its first full infantry divisions, the 3d and 4th,
were established between 1947 and 1949: and its first armored unit, the
105th Armored Battalion, was established in October 1948. The latter
increased to regimental strength in May 1949. Conscription for replacements
and build-up of the North Korea People's Army apparently began about July
1948. After a meeting of USSR and Communist China officials, reportedly
held in Peiping early in 1950 to explore the advisability of using the
North Korea People's Army for an invasion of South Korea, there was a rapid
build-up of that Army. It increased its training program, transferred ordnance
depots from urban to isolated rural sites, and readied hidden dump areas
to receive supplies, weapons, and munitions of war from the USSR. At the
beginning of this build-up there were in Korea about 16,000 repatriated
North Koreans from the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF). In April 1950 Communist
China returned 12,000 more veterans of the CCF to Korea where they formed
the N.K. 7th Division (redesignated the 12th about 2 July
The Korean veterans of the Chinese Communist Forces made up about one
third of the North Korea People's Army in June 1950 and gave it a combat-hardened
quality and efficiency that it would not otherwise have had. Five of the
eight divisions in the North Korea People's Army-the 1st, 4th, 5th,
6th, and 7th (12th) Divisions-had in their ranks substantial
numbers of CCF soldiers of Korean extraction. The 5th, 6th, and
7th (12th) Divisions had the largest number of them. Also, many
of the NKPA units that did not have rank and file soldiers from the CCF
did have officers and non-commissioned officers from it. 
Special mention needs to be made of the N.K. 5th, 6th, and 7th
Divisions. In July 1949 the Chinese Communist Forces transferred all
non-Koreans in the CCF 164th Division, then stationed in Manchuria,
to other Chinese divisions and filled the 164th with Korean re-placements.
Near the end of the month the division, about 7,500 strong, moved by rail
to Korea where it reorganized into the 10th, 11th, and 12th Rifle
Regiments of the N.K. 5th Division. 
At the same time, in July 1949, the CCF 166th Division moved
to Korea and reorganized into the 13th. 14th, and 15th Regiments
of the N.K. 6th Division. The story of the Koreans in this division
goes back to 1942 when the Chinese Communists formed a Korean Volunteer
Army largely with deserters from the Japanese Kwantung Army. This
division had a strength of about 10,000 men when it entered Korea; there
800 replacements brought it to full strength. 
In February 1950 all Korean units in the Chinese Manchurian Army assembled
in Honan Province. They numbered about 12,000 men drawn from the CCF 138th,
140th, 141st, and 156th Divisions. Some of them had participated
in the Chinese Communist advance from Manchuria to Peiping, and all were
veteran troops. In the first part of April these troops moved by rail to
Korea. In the Wonsan area these CCF veterans re-organized into the 1st,
2d, and 3d Regiments of the N.K. 7th Division. 
In addition to these three divisions, the N.K. 1st and 4th
Divisions each had one regiment of CCF veterans. All the units from
the CCF Army upon arrival in North Korea received Soviet-type arms and
North Korean uniforms and were retrained in North Korean tactical doctrine,
which closely followed the Russian.
In March 1950 North Korea activated two new divisions: the 10th,
around Manchurian-trained units, and the 15th, with men from
three youth-training schools and veteran Communist officers and noncommissioned
officers. Although activated in March, the 15th Division received
most of its troops near the end of June-after the invasion had started.
In early June the 13th Division was activated; the last one to be
activated before the invasion of South Korea. 
By June 1950, the 105th Armored Regiment had become the 105th
Armored Brigade with a strength of 6,000 men and 120 T34 tanks. Its
equipment-tanks, weapons, and vehicles-was Russian-made. The brigade had
three tank regiments-the 107th, 109th, and 203d-each with
40 tanks, and a mechanized infantry regiment, the 206th, with a
strength of about 2,500 men. A tank regiment had three medium tank battalions,
each having 13 tanks. The battalions each had three tank companies with
4 tanks to a company. Tank crews consisted of five men. Battalion, regimental,
and division tank commanders each had a personal tank. The 105th Armored
Brigade was raised to division status in Seoul at the end of June 1950
before it crossed the Han River to continue the attack southward. 
In addition to the 120 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade, the
better part of another tank regiment appears to have been available to
North Korea in late June. Thirty tanks reportedly joined the N.K. 7th
(12th) Division at Inje in east central Korea just before it crossed
the Parallel.  This gave North Korea a total of 150 Russian-built T34
tanks in June 1950.
In the six months before the invasion, a defensive-type army of 4 divisions
and an armored regiment had doubled in strength to form 7 combat-ready
divisions and an armored brigade. And there were in addition 3 other newly
activated and trained divisions, and 2 independent regiments.
The North Korean ground forces-the NKPA and the Border Constabulary-in
June 1950 numbered about 135,000 men. This estimated total included 77,838
men in seven assault infantry divisions, 6,000 in the tank brigade, 3,000 in an independent infantry regiment,
2,000 in a motorcycle regiment, 23,000 in three reserve divisions, 18,600
in the Border Constabulary, and 5,000 in Army and I and II
Corps Headquarters. 
The North Korean infantry division at full strength numbered 11,000
men. It was a triangular division composed of three rifle regiments, each
regiment having three battalions.  The division had as integral parts
an artillery regiment and a self-propelled gun battalion.
There were also medical, signal, anti-tank, engineer, and training battalions,
and reconnaissance and transport companies.
The artillery support of the North Korean division in 1950 closely resembled
that of the older type of Soviet division in World War II. A division had
12 122-mm. howitzers, 24 76-mm. guns, 12 Su-76 self-propelled guns, 12
45-mm. antitank guns, and 36 14.5-mm. antitank rifles. In addition, the
regiments and battalions had their own supporting weapons. Each regiment,
for instance, had 6 120-mm. mortars, 4 76-mm. howitzers, and 6 45-mm. antitank
guns. Each battalion had 9 82-mm. mortars, 2 45-mm. antitank guns, and
9 14.5-mm. antitank rifles. The companies had their own 61-mm. mortars.
A North Korean rifle regiment at full strength numbered 2,794 men-204 officers,
711 noncommissioned officers, and 1,879 privates. 
From the beginning the Soviet Union had been the sponsor for the NKPA
and had provided it with the sinews of war. Most important at first were
the Russian-built T34 tanks of the 105th Armored Brigade. The T34
was a standard medium tank in the Soviet Army at the end of World War II.
The Russians first used this tank against the Germans in July 1941. Guderian
gives it the credit for stopping his drive on Tula and Moscow.  The
T34 weighed 32 tons, was of low silhouette, had a
broad tread, and was protected by heavy armor plate. It mounted an 85-mm.
gun and carried two 7.62-mm. machine guns, one mounted on the bow and the
other coaxially with the gun. 
Other ordnance items supplied to the NKPA by the Soviets included 76-mm.
and 122-mm. howitzers; 45-mm. guns; 76-mm. self-propelled guns; 45-mm.
antitank guns; 61-mm., 82-mm., and 120-mm. mortars; small arms; ammunition
for these weapons; and grenades. From the Soviet Union North Korea also
received trucks, jeeps, radios, and fire control, signal, and medical equipment.
In the spring of 1950 the Soviet Union made particularly large shipments
of arms and military supplies to North Korea. One captured North Korean
supply officer stated that in May 1950, when he went to Ch'ongjin to get
supplies for the N.K. 5th Division, Soviet merchant ships were unloading
weapons and ammunition, and that trucks crowded the harbor waterfront area.
Korean-speaking crew members told him the ships had come from Vladivostok.
Markings on some of the North Korean equipment captured in the first few
months of the Korean War show that it was manufactured in the Soviet Union
in 1949-50 and, accordingly, could not have been materiel left behind in
1948 when the occupation forces withdrew from North Korea, as the Soviets
have claimed. 
North Korea began the war with about 180 aircraft, all supplied by Russia.
Of these about 60 were YAK trainers; 40, YAK fighters; 70, attack bombers;
and 10, reconnaissance planes. The North Korean Navy had approximately
16 patrol craft of various types and a few coastwise steamers reportedly
equipped with light deck guns. 
The Republic of Korea Armed Forces
In June 1950 President Syngman Rhee was Commander in Chief of the South
Korean Army. Under him was Sihn Sung Mo, the Minister of National Defense.
The Deputy Commander in Chief actually in command of the Army was Maj.
Gen. Chae Byong Duk.
The origins and development of an armed force in South Korea had their roots, as in North Korea, in the
occupation period after World War II. At first the principal objects of
the U.S. occupation were to secure the surrender of the Japanese troops
south of the 38th Parallel, return them to Japan, and preserve law and
order until such time as the Koreans could do this for themselves.
In January 1946 a Korean constabulary was authorized and established.
This organization took form so slowly that a year later it numbered only
5,000 men. By April 1947, however, it had doubled in strength and by July
of that year it had reached 15,000. The constabulary became the Republic
of Korea (ROK) Army in August 1948 and grew so rapidly in the next few
months that by January 1949 it numbered more than 60,000 men.  In March
1949 the Republic of Korea had an Army of 65,000, a Coast Guard of 4,000,
and a police force of 45,000-a total security force of about 114,000 men.
The United States had equipped about 50,000 men in the Army with standard
infantry-type weapons and materiel, including the M1 rifle and 60-mm. and
81-mm. mortars. 
Upon withdrawal of the last of the U.S. occupation force at the end
of June 1949 a group of 482 United States military advisers began working
with the South Korean Army. This small group of U.S. Army officers and
enlisted men, established on 1 July 1949 with an authorized strength of
500 men, was called the United States Korean Military Advisory Group to
the Republic of Korea (KMAG). Its mission was "to advise the government
of the Republic of Korea in the continued development of the Security Forces
of that government."  KMAG was an integral part of the American
Mission in Korea (AMIK) and, as such, came under the control of Ambassador
Muccio. In matters purely military, however, it was authorized to report
directly to the Department of the Army and, after co-ordinating with Ambassador
Muccio, to inform General MacArthur, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE),
of military matters.
In April 1950 the South Korean Government began the formation of combat
police battalions to relieve the Army of internal security missions, but
of twenty-one battalions planned only one, that activated at Yongwol on
10 April 1950 to provide protection for the power plant, coal mines, and
other vital resources in that vicinity, was in existence when the war started.
By June 1950 the Republic of Korea armed forces consisted of the following:
Army, 94,808; Coast Guard, 6,145; Air Force, 1,865; National Police, 48,273. When the war began nearly a month
later the Army had a strength of about 98,000, composed of approximately
65,000 combat troops and 33,000 headquarters and service troops. 
In June 1950 the combat troops of the ROK Army were organized into eight
divisions: the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions.
Five of them, the 1st, 2d, 6th, 7th, and Capital, had 3 regiments; two
divisions, the 3d and 8th, had 2 regiments; and one division, the 5th,
had 2 regiments and 1 battalion. Only four divisions, the 1st, 6th, 7th,
and Capital, were near full strength of 10,000 men.
The organization of the combat divisions and their present-for-duty
strength are shown in Table 1. For some unknown reason the ROK Army headquarters
report, on which Table 1 is based, does not include the 17th Regiment.
It numbered about w,500 men and was part of the Capital Division in the paper organization of the Army.
TABLE 1-ROK COMBAT DIVISIONS, 1 JUNE 1950
|1st Infantry Division
Col. Paik Sun Yup, CO
|2d Infantry Division
Brig. Gen. Lee Hyung Koon, CO
| 3d Infantry Division
Col. Yu Sung Yul, CO (Brig. Gen. Lee Joon Shik took command of 3d Div
on 10 Jul 50).
|5th Infantry Division
Maj. Gen. Lee Ung Joon, CO
|1st Separate Battalion
|6th Infantry Division
Col. Kim Chong O, CO
|7th Infantry Division
Brig. Gen. Yu Jae Hung, CO
|8th Infantry Division
Col. Lee Jung Il, CO
|Capital Infantry Division
Col. Lee Chong Chan, CO
Col. Paik In Yup, CO
Source: ROK Army Hq, Consolidated Morning Rpt, 1 Jun 50.
In the early summer of 1950 the 1st, 7th, 6th, and 8th Divisions, considered
the best in the ROK Army, held positions along the Parallel in the order
named, from west to east. Beyond the 1st Division at the extreme western
end of the line was the 17th Regiment of the Capital Division on the Ongjin
Peninsula. The other four divisions were scattered about the interior and
southern parts of the country, three of them engaged in antiguerrilla activity
and training in small unit tactics. The Capital Division's headquarters
was at Seoul, the 2d's at Ch'ongju near Taejon, the 3d's at Taegu, and
the 5th's at Kwangju in southwest Korea. 
The South Korean divisions along the Parallel were equipped mostly with
the United States M1 rifle, .30-caliber carbine, 60-mm. and 81-mm. mortars,
2.36-in. rocket launchers, 37-mm. antitank guns, and 105-mm. howitzers
M3. The howitzers had been used in the U.S. infantry cannon companies in
World War II. They had a shorter barrel than the regular 105-mm. howitzer
M2, possessed no armor shield, and had an effective range of only 7,250
yards (8,200 yards maximum range) as compared to 12,500 yards for the 105-mm.
howitzer M2. There were five battalions of these howitzers organized into
the usual headquarters and service companies and three firing batteries
of five howitzers each. The 1st, 2d, 6th, 7th, and 8th Divisions each had
a battalion of the howitzers. A sixth battalion was being formed when the
war started.  Of 91 howitzers on hand 15 June 1950, 89 were serviceable.
The South Korean armed forces had no tanks, no medium artillery, no 4.2-in.
mortars, no recoilless rifles, and no fighter aircraft or bombers. The
divisions engaged in fighting guerrillas in the eastern and southern mountains
had a miscellany of small arms, including many Japanese Model 99 World
War II rifles.
In October of 1949 the ROK Minister of Defense had requested 189 M26
tanks but the acting chief of KMAG told him the KMAG staff held the view
that the Korean terrain and the condition of roads and bridges would not
lend themselves to efficient tank operations. About the same time a KMAG
officer pointed out to Ambassador Muccio that the equipment provided the
ROK's was not adequate to maintain the border, and he cited the fact
that North Korean artillery out-ranged by several thousand yards the ROK
105-mm. howitzer M3 and shelled ROK positions at will while being out of
range of retaliatory fire.
The ROK Army in June 1950 had among its heavier weapons 27 armored cars;
something more than 700 artillery pieces and mortars, including 105-mm.
howitzers and 81-mm. and 60-mm. mortars; about 140 antitank guns; and approximately
1,900 2.36-in. bazookas. In June 1950 it had about 2,100 serviceable U.S.
Army motor vehicles for transportation, divided between about 830 2 1/2-ton
trucks and 1,300 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps). Motor maintenance was of a low
The South Korean Air Force in June 1950 consisted of a single flight
group of 12 liaison-type aircraft and 10 advance trainers (AT6). Maj. Dean
E. Hess, KMAG adviser to the South Korean Air Force, had a few (approximately
10) old F-51 (Mustang) planes under his control but no South Korean pilots
had yet qualified to fly combat missions. These planes were given to the
ROK Air Force on 26 June 1950.
On 25 June the South Korean Navy consisted of a patrol craft (PC701)
recently purchased in the United States from surplus vessels, 3 other similar
patrol craft at Hawaii en route to Korea, 1 LST, 15 former U.S. mine sweepers,
10 former Japanese mine layers, and various other small craft. 
In June 1950 the ROK Army supply of artillery and mortar ammunition
on hand was small and would be exhausted by a few days of combat. An estimated
15 percent of the weapons and 35 percent of the vehicles in the ROK Army
were unserviceable. The six months' supply of spare parts originally provided
by the United States was exhausted. 
The state of training of the ROK Army is reflected in the Chief of KMAG's
report that a majority of the units of the South Korean Army had completed
small unit training at company level and were engaged in battalion training.
In summary, the North Korean Army in June 1950 was clearly superior to
the South Korean in several respects: the North Koreans had 150 excellent
medium tanks mounting 85-mm. guns, the South Koreans had no tanks; the
North Koreans had three types of artillery-the 122-mm. howitzer, the 76-mm.
self-propelled gun, and the 76-mm. divisional gun with a maximum range
of more than 14,000 yards which greatly out-ranged the 105-mm. howitzer
M3 of the ROK Army with its maximum range of about 8,200 yards. In number
of divisional artillery pieces, the North Koreans exceeded the South Korean
on an average of three to one.  The North Koreans had a small tactical
air force, the South Koreans had none. In the North Korean assault formations
there were 89,000 combat troops as against approximately 65,000 in the
South Korean divisions. Also, North Korea had an additional 18,600 trained
troops in its Border Constabulary and 23,000 partially trained troops in
three reserve divisions. In comparison, South Korea had about 45,000 national
police, but they were not trained or armed for tactical use. The small
coast guard or navy of each side just about canceled each other and were
The superiority of the North Korean Army over the South Korean in these
several respects was not generally recognized, however, by United States
military authorities before the invasion. In fact, there was the general
feeling, apparently shared by Brig. Gen. William L. Roberts, Chief of KMAG,
on the eve of invasion that if attacked from North Korea the ROK Army would
have no trouble in repelling the invaders.
 DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 32; Ibid., Aug 50, Nr
171, pp. 16-17; Ibid., Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 36; 24th Div G-2 PW
Interrog File, 6-22 Jul 50; GHQ FEC MIS GS, History of the North Korean
Army, 31 July 1952 (hereafter cited as GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army),
 DA Intel Rev, Apr 51, Nr 179, p. 32; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army.
 DA Intel Rev, Jun 50, Nr 169, pp. 20-23.
 Future reference to the two opposed Korean forces generally will
be North Korean or N.K. and South Korean or ROK. The abbreviation
N.K. will precede a numbered NKPA unit: ROK will precede a numbered
South Korean unit.
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, pp. 3, 8-24; DA Intel Rev,
Sep 51, Nr 184, p. 18; Ibid., Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 36; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K, 12th Div), p. 41. PW Interrog
estimates of number of CCF veterans in the N.K. 1st, 4th, 5th, and
6th Divisions. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issues 94, 95, 100
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), p. 29:
Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 41; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army,
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 37: GHQ
FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p 23.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 100 (N.K. 6th Div), pp. 27-29
GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 23.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), pp. 41-
44; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 23.
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 24; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 104 (N.K. 10th and 13th Divs), pp. 43, 57.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 4 (N.K. 105th Armd Div), pp.
 Ibid., Issue 99 (N.K. 12th Div), p. 42.
 DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, p. 38.
 The estimate of 135,000 is based on the following tabulation,
drawn principally from N.K. PW interrogation reports:
|7th (12th) Div
|776th Ind Inf Unit
|12th MTsP (Motorcycle Regt)
|105th Armored Brig
|B.C. 1st Brig
|B.C. 2d Brig
|B.C. 3d Brig
|B.C. 5th Brig
|B.C. 7th Brig
|Army, I and II Corps Hq
[a] Indicates the figure is based on U.S. military intelligence or
strong inferential data but not on extensive PW reports or order of
battle documents. No figure for the strength of II Corps, organized
about 12 June 1950 has been found. The strength for Army, I, and II
Corps Headquarters possibly should be increased to 6,000-7,000. N.K.
I Corps was activated about 10 June 1950. See GHQ FEC, History of
the N.K. Army pp. 41-43. According to some PW reports, there was a
17th Motorcycle Regiment in the enemy's order of battle at the
beginning of the invasion.
The KMAG report for the semiannual period ending 15 June 1950 gives,
a total North Korean ground force estimate of 117,357 men, including
64,372 for the North Korea People's Army and 27,600 for the Border
Constabulary. The ROK Army G-2 estimate of North Korean strength,
according to Capt. Frederick C. Schwarze (Asst G-2 Adviser to ROK
Army in Seoul when the invasion occurred) was 175,000. Schwarze,
Notes for author.
 The 12th Division had a strength of 12,000.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), Chart, p.
32: Issue 100 (N.K. 9th Div), p. 49; GHQ FEC, History of the N.K.
Army, Charts 3b,-8.
 General Heinz Guderian. Panzer Leader (New York: E. P.
Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952), pp. 162, 233-38.
 Not until the end of the third week of the war did American
intelligence settle on the identification of the T34 tank.
Characteristics of the Russian-built T34 medium tank used by the North
Weight (combat-loaded) ............................... 35 short tons
Length (not including gun) ........................... 19.7 feet
Width (over-all) ..................................... 9.8 feet
Width (between track centers) ........................ 8.0 feet
Height (to top of turret) ............................ 7.9 feet
Ground clearance ..................................... 1.3 feet
Turret traverse ............................. 360° hand and electric
Rate of fire (85-mm. gun) ................... 7-8 rounds per minute
Ammunition carried .......................... 85-mm. 55 rounds
7.62-mm. 2,745 rounds
Type ...................................... 12 cylinder, Diesel
Horsepower ................................ 493
Type ...................................... Diesel
Capacity (main tanks) ..................... 143 gallons
Maximum speed ............................. 30-34 miles per hour
Source: EUSAK WD, 8 Sep 50, an. 1, to G-2 PIR 58.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 106 (N.K. Arty), pp. 1-40;
DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr 178, pp. 54, 56; Ibid., Jun 51, Nr 181,
pp. 26-27; Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, sec. III, p. 6.
 ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 96 (N.K. 5th Div), p. 38;
GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 24; DA Intel Rev, Mar 51, Nr
178, pp. 54-56.
 Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, sec. III, p. 6; Capt Walter
Karig, Comdr Malcolm W. Cagle, and Lt. Comdr Frank A. Manson,
"Battle Report Series," vol. VI, Battle Report, The War in Korea
(New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, 1952), p. 67.
 Sawyer, KMAG MS, pts. I and II. This is the best available
study on KMAG policies and operations in Korea.
 The Conflict in Korea, p. 9.
 Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, Annex 1. The Department of
the Army in a message to General MacArthur dated 10 June 1949
established KMAG. It became operational in Korea on 1 July 1949.
Msg, G-3 Plans and Opns to CINCFE WARX90049, 10 Jun 49. The KMAG
personnel present for duty 1 July 1949 numbered 482: 165 officers, 4
warrant officers, and 313 enlisted men. Sawyer, KMAG MS; Msg,
WX90992, DA to CG USAFIK, 2 Jul 49, cited in General Headquarters
Support and Participation, 25 June 1950-30 April 1951, by Maj. James
F. Schnabel (hereafter cited as Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and
Participation in Korean War), ch. I, pp. 4.-5. This is Volume I of
Far East Command, United Nations Command, History of the Korean War,
 Interv, author with Maj Gen Chang Chang Kuk (Military Attaché,
Korean Embassy, Washington), 14 Oct 53. General Chang was G-3 of the
ROK Army in June 1950. Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-Jun 50, Annex IX.
Major Hausman says he always considered 10,000 as the table of
organization strength of a South Korean division. Some references
give the figure as 9,500. General Chang said the ROK Army considered
9,000-9,500 as T/O strength of a division in June 1950. Spelling of
names and rank as of June 1950 checked and corrected by General Chang and
by General Paik Sun Yup, ROK Chief of Staff, in MS review
comments, 11 July 1958. In accordance with Korean usage, the
surnames come first, the name Syngman Rhee is one of the rare
exceptions to this rule. Korean personal names ordinarily consist of
 Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50; EUSAK WD, Prologue, 25
Jun-12 Jul 50; Interv, author with Col Rollins S. Emmerich, 5 Dec 51
(Emmerich was KMAG senior adviser to the ROK 3d Division in 1950).
 Rpt, USMAG to ROK. 1 Jan-30 Jun 50, Annex X; Interv, author
with Maj Hausman; Col William H. S. Wright, Notes for author, 1952
(Wright was CofS and Acting CO of KMAG at the time of the invasion).
 The original U.S. commitment in July 1949 was to supply the
Korean Army with an issue of equipment and a six months' supply of
spare parts for a force of 50,000. See Memo, Gen Roberts to All
Advisers, KMAG, 5 May 50, sub: Korean Army Logistical Situation. The
Department of State gives $57,000,000 as the value of military
equipment given to South Korea before its invasion by North Korea,
with a replacement cost at time of delivery to South Korea of
$110,000,000. See The Conflict in Korea, p. 10.
 Karig, et al., Battle Report, The War in Korea p. 68.
 Rpt, USMAG to ROK, 1 Jan-15 Jun 50, sec. VI, pp. 18-22.
 The maximum range off the Soviet artillery used by the N.K.
Army in June 1950 was as follows: 122-mm. howitzer, 12,904 yards;
76-mm. SP gun, 12,400 yards; 76-mm. divisional gun, 14,545 yards.
The average North Korean division had 48 122-mm. howitzers, 76-mm. SP
and non-SP guns; the ROK division had 15 105-mm. howitzers M3.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation