The influence of growing fire-power on tactical defense is evident....
The defensive is able more than before to carry out its original mission,
which is to break the strength of the attacker, to parry his blows, to
weaken him, to bleed him, so as to reverse the relation of forces and lead
finally to the offensive, which is the only decisive form of warfare. |
RITTER VON LEEB, Defense
The dog days of August were at hand. The men in Eighth Army who survived
that period spoke afterward of it as "the days along the Naktong."
The Eighth Army no longer could withdraw when enemy pressure became oppressive.
It had to stand and fight and hold, or be driven out of Korea.
General Walker's defense plan centered on holding the road and rail
lines running in a large oval east of the Naktong, from Pusan north through
Miryang to Taegu, and hence east through Yongch'on to Kyongju, where they
turned back south to Pusan. Any further withdrawal and loss of these lines
of communication would render difficult any later U.N. attempt at a counteroffensive.
The North Koreans, in preparing to attack the Pusan Perimeter and its
communication system, had available four lines of advance toward Pusan:
(1) through or past Masan south of the confluence of the Nam and Naktong
Rivers, (2) through the Naktong Bulge to the rail and road lines at Miryang,
(3) through Taegu, and (4) through Kyongju and down the east coast corridor.
They tried them all simultaneously in August, apparently believing that
if they did not succeed at one place they would at another.
Along the Perimeter, the most important terrain feature for both the
United Nations and the North Koreans-helping the former and hindering the
latter-was the Naktong River, the second largest river in Korea. It formed
a huge moat in front of almost three-fourths of the Perimeter. Its numerous
great folds and bends resembled a huge snake contracting its length before
coiling. Along its lower course, the river is generally from one-quarter
to half a mile wide and more than six feet deep. Great sand beaches appear
at many places when the river is not swollen by rain. Hills come down close
to the water's edge on either bank, and rice paddy valleys of varying sizes
finger their way among the hills.
In Korea, the term hill came to mean to the soldiers anything
from a knoll to a towering mountain. A few of the hills bordering the lower Naktong
below Taegu on the east side rise to 1,200 feet elevation; three or four
miles back from the river they climb to 2,500 feet. On the west, or enemy,
side of the Naktong, the hills bordering the river are higher than on the
east, reaching 2,000 feet in many instances. North of Taegu, along the
upper reaches of the river, from Waegwan in a semicircle east to Andong,
the hills rise still higher, many of them to elevations of 2,000 and 3,000
The line of the Naktong as organized by the American forces was a series
of strongpoints on the highest hills, affording views of both the river
and the natural avenues of travel from it. During the day, these points
were hardly more than observation posts. At night they became listening
posts and tight little defense perimeters. Some of the posts were manned
only in the daytime. Others were held by no more than half a squad of men.
No one expected these soldiers to fight in position; they were a form of
intelligence screen, their duty being to observe and report. Jeep patrols
during the daytime ran along the river road. Quite obviously, the river
line was thinly held. Reserve troops some miles back from the river were
ready to counterattack against any enemy crossing.
Artillery and mortars were in positions back of the river. They were
laid to fire on known ferry and other probable crossing sites. The role
of the artillery and the mortars was to be a vital one in the Perimeter
fighting; their fire could be massed, within limits, against any major
enemy effort. The infantry and the artillery together were disposed so
as to hold the commanding ground and control the meager road net. The roads
necessarily were all-important.
No one doubted that the North Koreans intended to force a crossing of
the Naktong without delay. Time was against them. Every passing week brought
closer the prospect of more American reinforcements-troops, tanks, artillery,
and planes. North Korean Premier Kim Il Sung had set 15 August as the date
for final victory and the liberation of all Korea. This date marked the
fifth anniversary of freedom from Japanese rule. 
The Naktong Bulge
Seven air miles north of the point where the Naktong turns east and
the Nam enters it, the Naktong curves westward opposite Yongsan in a wide
semicircular loop. The bulge of land formed by this river loop measures
four miles east-west and five miles north-south. This particular loop of
the river and the land it enclosed on three sides became known to the American
troops as the Naktong Bulge during the heavy fighting there in August and
September. (See Map IV.)
Northward from the confluence of the Nam with the Naktong, the 24th
Division held the line of the lower Naktong for a distance of sixteen air
miles, or a river front of about thirty-four miles. The 34th Infantry was
on the lower, southern part; the 21st Infantry was on the upper part together
with the ROK 17th Regiment. The 19th Infantry, just arrived from Masan,
was re-equipping in the rear. In general terms, the 34th Infantry held the area west of
Yongsan in the Naktong Bulge, while north of it the 21st Infantry held
the area west of Changnyong.
The 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, held the river line in its regimental
front, while the 1st Battalion was in a reserve assembly area about four
miles back from the river near Yongsan. (Map 9) The 3d Battalion
front was about nine miles, or 15,000 yards long.  One may contrast
this battalion frontage of 15,000 yards with one of 10,000 yards for a
division at full strength, which U.S. Army doctrine considered normal.
The three rifle companies of the 3d Battalion-I, L, and K, in that order
from north to south-were on high hills overlooking the Naktong River. An
unoccupied gap of more than two miles lay between I and L Companies, and
another of more than three miles lay between L and K Companies. Because
of the river's course around the bulge, the three company positions resembled
the points of a broad triangle; I and K were the two extremities at the
eastern base and L the apex at the bulge of high ground extending westward
in the big fold of the river. Along this stretch of river there were at
least six ferry crossing sites. 
For almost the entire regimental front, hills 500 to 600 feet high rose
from the narrow river valley, in some instances abruptly from the water's
edge. In this nine miles of front two valleys formed entrances from the
river into the hill masses stretching eastward. The northern entrance was
at the Ohang village ferry crossing This crossing lay in the gap between
I and L Companies at the northern edge of the bulge. The other natural
entrance into the regimental zone lay four air miles south at the under
side of the bulge.
The 4.2-inch mortars supporting the 3d Battalion were about a mile and
a quarter back of the river in the draw that penetrated the hills from
the Ohang ferry site. The 3d Battalion command post was half a mile farther,
southeast in this same draw, at the village of Soesil. Commanding the battalion
was Lt. Col. Gines Perez, just arrived from the United States. At Yongsan,
six miles east of the river, Colonel Beauchamp had his regimental command
General Church ordered all civilians in the 24th Division zone to evacuate
from an area five miles deep east of the river. He warned them that if
they failed to do so, his troops might shoot them on sight as possible
enemy agents. He said he could take no more chances with civilians; "If
we are going to hold here, we cannot have any enemy behind us." 
The N.K. 4th Division Attacks into the Naktong Bulge
The first enemy crossings of the Naktong River, west of the Andong mountain
barrier, other than reconnaissance patrols, came on 5 August at three different
places. Two were north of Waegwan in the ROK Army sector. The third was
thirty miles south of Waegwan opposite Yongsan in the 24th Division sector, in the big bulge of the
Naktong. This third crossing of the river was made by the N.K. 4th
Division and was the one to have consequences which first threatened
Maj. Gen. Lee Kwon Mu commanded the N.K. 4th Division.
Already he had received the highest honors, the "Hero of the Korean
Democratic People's Republic" and the "Order of the National
Flag, 1st Class," for achievements with his division. Forty years
old, Lee had been born in Manchuria, had served in the Chinese Communist
8th Route Army, and, according to some reports, he had been
a lieutenant in the Soviet Army in World War II. After attending a school
in the Soviet Union in 1948 he returned to Korea where he became Chief
of Staff of the N.K. Army. Eventually he was relieved of this post. Shortly
before the invasion he was recalled by Premier Kim Il Sung's personal order
and given command of the 4th Division. The division itself
in August 1950 held the honorary name of "The 4th Seoul Division,"
"Seoul" indicating recognition of the division's part in the
capture of that city. 
By 4 August, the N.K. 4th Division had concentrated its
three regiments in the vicinity of Hyopch'on and was studying the American
dispositions and defenses opposite it on the east side of the Naktong.
An officer from the division headquarters, captured later, estimated the
division had a total strength of about 7,000 men at this time with about
1,500 men in each of the infantry regiments.
The division, with little or no preparation for it, intended to make
an immediate crossing of the river in co-ordination with other crossings
On the American side, General Church considered the northern part of
the 24th Division zone the more difficult to defend and reinforce because
of its poor road net. He believed for this reason that the North Koreans
were more likely to cross the river in that part of the division zone rather
than in the southern part. Therefore, when the N.K. 4th Division
crossed in the southern part, opposite the 34th Infantry, the crossing
was not where he had anticipated it would be, and it also came sooner than
he had expected. 
Red and yellow flares burst over the Naktong at midnight 5 August, as
800 North Koreans of the 3d Battalion, 16th Regiment,
began the crossing. Most of the men stripped off their clothing, rolling
it and their weapons into bundles to be carried on their heads, and stepped
into the shoulder-deep water. Others made rafts to float their clothes
and equipment across. This crossing was at the Ohang ferry site, three
and a half miles south of Pugong-ni and due west of Yongsan. There is some
evidence that the 1st Battalion of the regiment also crossed
at this time. None of the units in this initial crossing brought along
mortars or heavy weapons. After reaching the east side, the enemy soldiers
dressed, and in a column of platoons, marched southeast up the draw leading into the American lines. Their
objective was Yongsan. 
Simultaneously with this crossing, another enemy force tried to cross
the river some miles farther north in the zone of the 21st Regiment, 24th
Division. This force, after running into a mine field and being shelled
by artillery, was machine-gunned by infantry and driven back across the
river in confusion. 
The enemy force that crossed at Ohang penetrated the gap between I and
L Companies of the 34th Infantry, and followed the draw leading southeast
to a little valley through which the Yongsan-Naktong River road passed.
The battalion command post and the mortar position were approximately two
miles from the enemy crossing site and directly in the line of enemy advance.
At 0200, 6 August, the 34th Infantry reported to the 24th Division that
an enemy force had penetrated between I and L Companies. The North Koreans
moved along the draw without making any effort to attack the companies
on the hills overlooking the river. They overran the 4.2-inch mortar position,
but in so doing fully alerted the battalion command post near by. Aware
now of the enemy penetration, most of the troops there escaped to the rear.
Colonel Perez, commander of the 3d Battalion, made his way back three miles
along the Yongsan road to the 1st Battalion command post and there gave
Colonel Ayres his first news of the enemy crossing. 
Colonel Beauchamp, the 34th regimental commander, at 0520 reported to
General Church: "Enemy are across river in force in center of my sector.
It's pretty dark and situation is obscure. I am committing my reserve [1st
Bn] at daylight to clear up the situation. Get me a liaison plane in the
air at dawn."  Beauchamp ordered Ayres to counterattack with the
1st Battalion and restore the regimental position. At dawn there was no
indication that the rifle companies of the 3d Battalion on the hills along
the river, except L Company, had yet come under attack. Some elements of
L Company had been forced out of position and withdrew about a mile from
the river. The enemy apparently was content to leave the river line troops
alone except where they lay across his axis of advance. He was concentrating
on penetrating behind the river positions.
After the escape of the 3d Battalion headquarters troops, the positions
of B Battery, 13th Field Artillery, eastward at the northwestern base of
Obong-ni Ridge lay completely exposed to the enemy. At 0830 this battery
reported small arms fire in its vicinity. The 24th Division now estimated that 800
enemy were east of the river in its zone. 
Upon receiving the order to counterattack straight down the Yongsan-Naktong
River road, Colonel Ayres directed his executive officer to mount C Company
in trucks and send it down the road until he, Ayres, stopped it. Behind
C Company, A, B, and the Weapons Companies under the executive officer
were to follow on foot. Just the day before, 187 replacements had joined
Ayres, his S-3, and the Assistant S-3 set off in a jeep down the road
toward the river, ahead of the troops, to form an estimate of the situation.
They reached the vacated 3d Battalion command post without sighting enemy
troops. While looking around the command post and making plans for deployment
of the 1st Battalion when it came up, Ayres and those with him received
fire from the hills above them. The trucks carrying-C Company now began
to arrive. While the men detrucked, enemy fire hit two of them. 
Ayres hurried to Capt. Clyde M. Akridge, who had been in command of
C Company only a few days, and directed him to attack and seize the high
ground above the former 3d Battalion command post. Akridge organized his
company and started forward as enemy fire gradually increased. In leading
the attack, Captain Akridge was wounded three times and was finally evacuated.
Ayres took shelter at a culvert a short distance to the rear. From there
he, the weapons platoon leader, and mortarmen placed 60-mm. mortar fire
on the enemy-held hill until their ammunition was expended. While standing
up to direct this fire, the mortar sergeant was practically cut in half
by machine gun fire. Other men, lying prone, were hit. Ayres saw that he
would have to get back to A and B Companies if he were to influence the
actions of the battalion. With several members of the battalion staff he
dashed across the rice paddy. Enemy fire hit two of the party but all reached
the slopes of Obong-ni Ridge. They worked their way around the now abandoned
artillery position to the rear. 
Before Ayres and his party escaped, B Battery, 13th Field Artillery
Battalion, had come under enemy fire. At 1030 the battery commander assembled
about 50 men and withdrew along a narrow road with one howitzer, four 2
1/2-ton trucks, and three smaller vehicles. They abandoned four howitzers
and nine vehicles. The battery lost 2 men killed, 6 wounded, and 6 missing.
Meanwhile, in its attack, C Company had no chance of success; enemy
troops were on higher ground in superior numbers. The North Koreans let
loose a heavy volume of small arms and automatic fire against the company,
and soon the dry creek bed in which the men were moving was strewn with
dead and dying. After Colonel Ayres had dashed from the culvert across
the rice paddy, Lieutenant Payne and Lt. McDonald Martin, the latter wounded,
ran from the same culvert to a grist mill a short distance away, and south of the road. There,
others joined them in the next few minutes. In the fight outside, more
than half the company became casualties. According to the recollection
of the battalion commander, there were about thirty-five survivors in the
While C Company met the advancing North Koreans, A and B Companies had
started forward on foot from the battalion area before rations could be
issued to them. When he arrived at the 1st Battalion command post at Kang-ni,
Colonel Beauchamp learned that C Company had lost heavily to enemy action
up ahead and had been dispersed. He went forward at once and joined A and
B Companies, the latter cautiously leading the advance. The B Company point
met an enemy squad and killed ten of the enemy soldiers as they tried to
run back. Two antiaircraft vehicles, each mounting four .50-caliber machine
guns, were in the forefront of the attack that now got under way with A
Company on the left of the road and B Company on the right. Colonel Ayres
rejoined the battalion at this time. Even though enemy resistance at first
was light, the intense summer heat slowed the pace. Soon B Company on the
right encountered strong enemy forces on Cloverleaf Hill. They halted its
advance and knocked out one of the quad-50's on the road. On the left,
A Company under Capt. A. F. Alfonso continued its advance with only a few
casualties, passing the overrun artillery positions and reaching the area
where C Company had been overwhelmed by the enemy. 
The light tank in the lead fired on the grist mill, supposing it to
be enemy held, and scored a direct hit. This fire killed one, mortally
wounded two, and wounded less severely several other C Company men inside.
Then the tank and A Company men came charging up to the mill where several
survivors of C Company had been fighting off North Koreans since early
morning. North Korean soldiers several times had rushed to within grenade
range of the building but had not succeeded in entering it. Inside, the
men had stacked their dead against the walls to protect the living from
small arms fire. Thus, after a day-long ordeal, the survivors were rescued
by the A Company attack.
Captain Alfonso and his men set about loading dead and wounded into
abandoned but still operable 2 1/2-ton trucks. This done, he put a driver
and two riflemen from his company on each truck, and, with the tank leading,
he sent the vehicles back through enemy fire toward friendly lines. Lieutenant
Payne, knocked unconscious when the tank shell exploded against the grist
mill, regained consciousness for a few seconds when he was thrown into
a truck and heard a man say, "Payne is dead as a mackerel." A
little later he again regained consciousness when the truck ran into a
ditch under enemy small arms fire. This time he was able to crawl and walk the remaining distance to safety.
Following the road, Alfonso continued his attack toward the river against
light resistance. Just after sunset, about 2000, A Company reached the
river and joined part of L Company which was still in its position overlooking
the Naktong. The combined group was only about ninety men strong. They
sought temporary safety in a well dug perimeter position. Fortunately they
succeeded in establishing radio contact with the 1st Battalion through
an L Company artillery forward observer's radio by relay through B Company.
While A Company pushed on to the river, B Company dug in on part of
Cloverleaf Hill. Quiet gradually settled over the area. The day's action
made it clear that the North Koreans had penetrated eastward north of the
Yongsan-Naktong River road to Cloverleaf Hill, but had not yet crossed
south of the road to Obong-ni Ridge. Cloverleaf and Obong-ni together formed
a high backbone across the Yongsan road about three miles east of the Naktong
River and nearly halfway to Yongsan.
While the 1st Battalion counterattack was in progress, I Company abandoned
its hill position northward overlooking the river on the regimental right
flank. The Heavy Weapons Company, a mortar platoon, and A Company, 29th
Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons Battalion, joined I Company in withdrawing
northeast into the zone of the 21st Infantry. These units were not under
attack. Adjacent units of the 21st Infantry saw this movement and reported
it to General Church. He immediately ordered Colonel Beauchamp to stop
this unauthorized withdrawal and to relieve the company commanders involved.
Beauchamp sent his executive officer, Colonel Wadlington, to the scene
at once. Wadlington found the men moving east, turned them around, and
marched them back toward their former position. At noon General Church
sent the 24th Division Reconnaissance Company to block the Naktong River-Changnyong
road adjacent to I Company's former position. The Reconnaissance and I
Companies then attacked an enemy force that had by now occupied a hill
near Pugong-ni, but they were repulsed with considerable loss. 
By midmorning, General Church had become convinced that the bulk of
the enemy east of the river were in the bulge area. He thereupon committed
the 19th Infantry in an attack west along the northern flank of the 34th
Infantry. In this attack, the 19th Infantry trapped approximately 300 enemy
troops in a village east of Ohang Hill, a mile from the river, and killed
most of them. 
The day's action had not been without creditable performances by the
American troops. The counterattack of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry,
had driven back the enemy's advanced units and regained part of Cloverleaf
This, together with the fact that K, L, and A Companies held hill positions
above the Naktong without any sign of panic, prevented the enemy from seizing
at the outset the road net through Yongsan. Also, it gave time for the
19th Infantry, and later the 9th Infantry, to move up for counterattack.
Artillery fire and aircraft had kept the crossing sites covered, and
after daylight prevented enemy reinforcements from reaching the east side
of the river. When darkness fell, the artillery continued interdiction
fire on these crossing sites. The 24th Division had seventeen 105-mm. and
twelve 155-mm. howitzers available to deliver supporting fires covering
thirty-two miles of front. 
Just as the battle of the Naktong Bulge got under way, regrouping of
ROK troops made it necessary for Eighth Army to order the ROK 17th Regiment
released from the 24th Division. This regiment had been holding the right
flank of the division line. To take its place temporarily in the emergency,
General Church hastily formed Task Force Hyzer (3d Engineer Combat Battalion,
less A Company; 78th Heavy Tank Battalion, less tanks; and the 24th Division
Reconnaissance Company). Eighth Army allowed Church to keep the ROK 17th
Regiment in line the night of 6-7 August, and before dawn it repulsed several
enemy crossing attempts in its sector. On the morning of 7 August Task
Force Hyzer relieved it, and the ROK 17th Regiment moved to Taegu to rejoin
the ROK Army. This weakening of the line had been partly offset the previous
afternoon by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, 2d Infantry
Division, at Changnyong for attachment to the 24th Division. 
On the evening of the 6th, as the enemy held firmly to his bridgehead,
General Church ordered the 34th and 19th Infantry Regiments to continue
the counterattack the next morning. 
The Enemy Gains Cloverleaf-Obong-ni
During the night of 6-7 August, the enemy succeeded in moving an unknown
number of reinforcements across to the east side of the river in the bulge
area. Then, on the third night, 7-8 August, an estimated two more battalions
crossed the river in four different places. Enemy units that tried to cross
north of the bulge were driven back by the 21st Infantry; they then shifted
southward to cross. 
The continuation of the American counterattack in the bulge, on the
morning of 7 August, by the 19th Infantry and B Company of the 34th Infantry
was a feeble effort. Extreme heat and lack of food and water were contributing
factors in the failure to advance. The situation was not helped when friendly
aircraft mistakenly strafed the 19th Infantry positions. In its zone, B
Company, 34th Infantry, fell back after rescuing a few men of the Heavy
Mortar Company who had been missing since the previous morning. On their
part, the North Koreans pressed forward and occupied the greater part of
Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge. In doing this, they established themselves on dominating and critical terrain astride the
main east-west road in the bulge area. 
From the crests of Cloverleaf and Obong-ni the North Koreans could see
the American main supply road stretching back to Yongsan five miles away
and, for a distance, beyond that town toward Miryang. Cloverleaf (Hill
165), as its name indicates, is shaped like a four-leaf clover with its
stem pointing north. Cloverleaf is somewhat higher than Obong-ni Ridge
across the pass to the south of it. Obong-ni Ridge is a mile and a half
long, curving slightly to the southeast with a series of knobs rising from
300 to 500 feet above the rice paddies at its base. The road, where it
passes between Cloverleaf and Obong-ni, follows a winding, narrow passage
of low ground. The village of Tugok (Morisil) lies at the southern base
of Cloverleaf just north of the road.  Obong village lies at the eastern
base of Obong-ni Ridge half a mile south of the road. These two related
terrain features, Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, were the key positions
in the fighting of the Naktong Bulge. The battle was to rage around them
for the next ten days.
On the morning of 7 August, while the North Koreans were seizing Cloverleaf
Hill and Obong-ni Ridge, Col. John G. Hill received a summons to come to
the 2d Division headquarters. There he learned from the division commander
that General Walker had ordered the 9th Regiment (-) to report to General
Church. Hill started his troops to the bulge area at 0130, and reported
to General Church about 0830, 8 August. Church told Hill he wanted him
to attack at once and drive the North Koreans from the bulge salient. 
After some discussion it was agreed that the 9th Infantry would attack
The 9th Infantry, at full strength in troops and equipment and its men
rested, contrasted strongly with the regiments of the 24th Division on
the line. On 8 August, the strength of the 24th Division regiments was
approximately as follows: 34th Infantry, 1,100; 19th Infantry, 1,700; 21st
Infantry, 1,800.  The combat effectiveness of the 24th Division then
was estimated to be about 40 percent because of shortage of equipment and
understrength units. Fatigue and lowered morale of the men undoubtedly
reduced the percentage even more.
Hill's 9th Infantry relieved B Company, 34th Infantry, on part of Cloverleaf
Hill and members of the Heavy Mortar Company who were fighting as riflemen
across the road near Obong-ni Ridge. Colonel Hill placed the 1st Battalion
of the 9th Infantry on the left of the Yongsan road, the 2d Battalion on
the right side. His command post was at Kang-ni, a mile and a half eastward
toward Yongsan. Two batteries of the 15th Field Artillery Battalion (105-mm.
howitzers) supported his attack, with twelve 155-mm. howitzers and additional
105-mm. howitzers of the 24th Division on call. Hill's immediate objectives
were Cloverleaf Hill and Obong-ni Ridge. 
Colonel Hill's 9th Infantry attacked straight west late in the afternoon
of 8 August against Cloverleaf and Obong-ni. On the right, the 2d Battalion
succeeded in capturing part of Cloverleaf by dark, but not control of it
or that side of the pass. On the left, the 1st Battalion likewise succeeded
in gaining part of Obong-ni Ridge. But that night the North Koreans regained
the ridge. This situation changed little the next day. 
The enemy by now had begun to show increased interest in the hill positions
along the Naktong still held by American troops. At dawn on 7 August, Captain
Alfonso of A Company, 34th Infantry, discovered that the enemy had occupied
the ridge on his right which overlooked his position. By radio he directed
artillery fire on the hill. When he started a patrol out to determine the
result, enemy fire drove it back. An airdrop of supplies that afternoon
was only partially successful. The company recovered little more than half
the drop and lost some men to enemy fire in the process. The night passed
The next morning, 8 August, Alfonso's men could see North Koreans crossing
the Naktong below them in six boats, each holding about ten to twelve men.
They radioed for an air strike, and later, at a range of 1,000 yards, engaged
the enemy force with their .50-caliber machine gun, causing the North Koreans
to disperse along the river bank. There the air strike came in on them,
with undetermined results.
That afternoon, the North Koreans began registering mortar and artillery
fire on A Company's position, but ceased firing as soon as their registration
was accomplished. Alfonso and his men noticed an enemy column far off,
moving toward them. From this and the mortar and artillery registrations,
they concluded that the enemy would deliver a co-ordinated attack against
them that night. Alfonso requested permission to withdraw at 2300, and
this was approved by both the battalion and regimental commanders.
At 2230, Alfonso removed his wounded to the base of the hill; the others
followed. As the company started to withdraw along the road, heavy enemy
fire fell on their vacated position. The North Koreans soon learned that
the Americans were not there and redirected fire along the road. The company
was supposed to withdraw to friendly lines south of the road at the southern
end of Obong-ni Ridge. But, in a series of mistakes, one platoon kept to
the road or close to it and ran into an enemy position at the northern
end of Obong-ni. There it lost heavily. The rest of the company and the
L Company men with it finally reached the 1st Battalion lines east of Obong-ni
well after daylight, 9 August. 
Farther south near the river that morning, K Company received enemy
attacks, one enemy group overrunning the company's forward observation
post. Even though the enemy was behind it, the company received orders
to hold. The next day, 10 August, reorganized L Company took positions behind its right flank. 
On 10 August, at the critical battleground within the bulge, the North
Koreans on Cloverleaf Hill launched an attack which met head-on one by
the 9th Infantry. Officer losses had been severe in the 2d Battalion on
8 and 9 August. On the 10th, F was the only rifle company in the battalion
with more than one officer. In this fighting the North Koreans regained
all the ground they had lost earlier at Cloverleaf. But north of Cloverleaf,
the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, succeeded in capturing several hills along
the Naktong, the most important being Ohang Hill. The enemy repulsed all
its efforts to advance south from Ohang. The fighting on 10 August in the
vicinity of Ohang Hill reduced the 2d Battalion, 79th Infantry, to about
100 effective men in the rifle companies. 
That evening General Church placed Colonel Hill in command of all troops
in the Naktong Bulge. The troops comprised the 9th Regimental Combat Team
(less the 3d Battalion), 2d Division; and the 34th and 19th Infantry Regiments,
and the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, 24th Division, together with supporting
artillery and other attached units.  This command was now designated
Task Force Hill.
General Church ordered Colonel Hill to attack the next morning and restore
the Naktong River line. Hill and the other commanders involved worked out
the attack plan during the night. It called for the 9th and 19th Regiments
to drive southwest through the heart of the bulge. The 1st Battalion, 21st
Infantry, was to move during the night from the northern part of the division
zone to a point near the southern end of Obong-ni Ridge, and from there
attack southwest on the left of the 9th Regimental Combat Team. Meanwhile,
the 34th Infantry would protect the left flank of the combat team at Obong-ni.
As it chanced, enemy reinforcements reached the east side of the river
during the night and vastly increased the difficulty of this attack. Colonel
Hill had received reports as early as 8 August that the North Koreans were
working at night on an underwater bridge across the Naktong at the Kihang,
or Paekchin, ferry site in the middle of the bulge. The enemy 4th
Division completed this underwater bridge during the night of 710
August, and before daylight had moved trucks, heavy mortars, and approximately
twelve artillery pieces to the east side of the Naktong. Some of the equipment
crossed on rafts. Additional infantry units of the enemy division also
crossed the river during the night. A few tanks may have crossed at this
time.  By the morning of 11 August, therefore, five days after the
initial crossing, the North Koreans had heavy weapons and equipment across into their bridgehead.
The North Koreans built many underwater bridges across the Naktong during
August, 1950. They consisted of sandbags, logs, and rocks to a point about
one foot below the surface of the water. In effect, they constituted shallow
fords. In muddy water they were hard to detect from the air. Underwater
bridges similar to them had been built, and used extensively, by the Russians
in World War II, often as a surprise factor in battles on the Eastern Front.
They played an important part, for instance, in the crucial battle of Stalingrad.
The attack on 11 August; intended to push the enemy into the river,
failed completely. The N.K. 4th Division fought the 9th and
19th Regiments to a standstill at their lines of departure and in their
positions. Furthermore, the enemy drove the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry,
from its assembly area before it could start its part of the attack. During
the morning a new feature appeared in the bulge battle-North Korean use
of artillery in three groups of 6, 4, and 4 pieces, all emplaced near Kogong-ni,
about a mile behind the enemy positions on Cloverleaf and Obong-ni. In
the afternoon General Church found it necessary to change the order for
Task Force Hill from attack to one of dig in and hold. The greater part
of the N.K. 4th Division had now crossed into the bulge area.
That night the division completed its crossing of the river. 
Yongsan Under Attack
During 10-11 August, when the North Korean build-up on Obong-ni and
Cloverleaf was increasingly apparent, enemy groups also began to appear
in the extreme southern part of the 24th sector.  By 11 August there
was unmistakable indication that enemy forces in some strength had moved
around the main battle positions at Cloverleaf and Obong-ni and were behind
Task Force Hill.
On that day enemy artillery fire brought Yongsan under fire for the
first time. East of the town, enemy sniper fire harassed traffic on the
road to Miryang. South of Yongsan, an enemy force drove back a patrol of
the 24th Reconnaissance Company. And during the morning, North Koreans
surprised and killed a squad of K Company, 34th Infantry, guarding the
bridge over the Naktong at Namji-ri. Enemy control of this bridge cut the
Yongsan-Masan road and broke the only direct vehicular communication link
between the 24th and 25th Divisions. The situation was confused south of
Yongsan on 11 August, at the very moment Task Force Hill's attack was being
thrown back a few miles westward. In this emergency, General Church dispatched
the 14th Engineer Combat Battalion to Yongsan, and General Walker ordered
the 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, in army reserve at Masan behind Task Force
Kean, to attack north across the Naktong River over the Namji-ri bridge
into the southern part of the 24th Division zone. 
That night, 11-12 August, North Koreans built up their roadblock east
of Yongsan to greater strength and extended it to a point three miles east
of the town. A staff officer awakened Colonel Hill before daylight to inform
him that the enemy had ambushed several ambulances and trucks two miles
east of Yongsan. Although hard-pressed at Cloverleaf, Hill immediately
ordered F Company, 9th Infantry, out of the line there and dispatched it
together with a platoon of mortars to attack the roadblock. The 15th Field
Artillery Battalion helped by turning some of its guns to fire on it.
Simultaneously, 24th Division headquarters assembled from eight different
units about 135 men, including clerks, bakers, military police, and Reconnaissance
Company troops, under the command of Capt. George B. Hafemen, commanding
officer of Headquarters Company. This force hurriedly moved west from Miryang
and took up a position at the pass near Simgong-ni on the Yongsan-Miryang
road. Its mission was to block further eastward penetration of the enemy.
Two tanks accompanied Hafemen's force. Hafemen and his men held this position
all afternoon against North Korean attack. Three times armored cars came
through to them with food, water, and ammunition. 
The next day at noon, 13 August, General Church sent a plane to bring
Colonel Hill for a conference with General Walker at the 24th Division
command post. Walker asked Hill, "Can you raise the roadblock?"
Hill replied, "Yes, I have just flown over it, and I can clear it
by night." Walker seemed satisfied with this assurance. 
In the meantime, and pursuant to General Walker's order on the 11th,
Colonel Murch's 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry, had been engaged in helping
to clear the enemy from the area south of Yongsan. On the 11th Murch's
battalion departed from its assembly area near Masan and rolled north toward
the Naktong River. A steady stream of Korean refugees clogged the road.
As the battalion pushed its way through this traffic a refugee cart overturned,
exposing about fifteen rifles and several bags of ammunition. Approximately
twelve North Korean soldiers disguised as refugees accompanying it fled
across an open field. Infantrymen near the scene killed eight of them.
Continuing on, Murch's battalion engaged and dispersed an estimated 200
enemy troops near Iryong-ni, a few miles south of the Naktong River bridge.
The battalion crossed the river and by midnight had established a bridgehead
on the north side against enemy small arms fire. 
The next day Eighth Army attached the 27th Infantry to the 24th Division
with the mission of attacking north to Yongsan. Army estimates credited
two enemy battalions with being east of the Yongsan-Masan road. In the
fight northward during 12 August, Murch's 2d Battalion encountered entrenched enemy who fought with mortars, machine
guns, and small arms. An air strike co-ordinated with the ground attack
helped it drive the enemy from his positions. In this attack, the 2d Battalion
killed about 100 enemy, wounded an unknown number, and captured twelve
machine guns and a number of "Buffalo" guns (14.5-caliber antitank
The attack continued northward the next day with the 3d Battalion, 27th
Infantry, assisting the 2d Battalion. By midafternoon of 13 August both
battalions reached their objective, the high ground north and east of Yongsan.
Colonels Hill and Beauchamp met Colonel Murch in Yongsan as the latter's
2d Battalion effected juncture with Task Force Hill. In this advance, the
27th Infantry troops overran four pieces of enemy artillery; two of them
were captured U.S. 105-mm. howitzers. 
Still another American reinforcement had been converging on the enemy
at Yongsan-the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, of the 2d Division. This battalion
had just arrived at Miryang where it received orders to attack west. In
this, its first action, it had nine cases of heat exhaustion but only one
battle casualty.  Some of its troops met an advanced unit of the 27th
Infantry a mile east of Yongsan.
Thus, by evening of 13 August, General Walker's prompt action in committing
the 27th Infantry, together with the 24th Division's employment of headquarters
and engineer troops, had eliminated the dangerous enemy penetration south
and east of Yongsan.
On the 14th, a reinforced company of the 35th Infantry, 25th Division,
took up a defensive position south of the Naktong River at Namji-ri bridge,
relieving units of the 27th Infantry there. Responsibility for protecting
the bridge passed from the 24th to the 25th Division. 
Enemy action in the southern part of the 24th Division sector from 10
to 13 August convinced Colonel Hill that K and L Companies were doing no
good in their isolated hill positions near the Naktong. Accordingly, he
issued orders-received by the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, at 0200, 14
August-for these companies to abandon their positions and assemble in the
rear of the 1st Battalion as regimental reserve. They carried out this
movement without incident.
Battle at Cloverleaf-Obong-ni
During the enemy infiltration around Yongsan, fighting continued at
Cloverleaf, Obong-ni, and northward. There, the 9th Regimental Combat Team,
the 19th Infantry, and elements of the 34th Infantry succeeded in denying
gains to the enemy division, and so tied down its main force that the N.K.
4th Division could not exploit its penetrations southward.
Task Force Hill still had its mission of driving the enemy out of the
bulge and back across the Naktong. With the North Korean penetration south
[Caption] POINT OF A COMBAT COLUMN moving toward its position near
east of Yongsan eliminated on 13 August, Colonel Hill planned an attack
the next day with his entire force against the Cloverleaf-Obong-ni positions.
One hundred aircraft were to deliver a strike on these positions. Artillery
was to follow the strike with a concentrated barrage. The attacking ground
formations were essentially the same, and held the same relative positions,
as during their abortive attack three days earlier. The enemy division
apparently had its 5th Regiment on the north in front of
the 19th Infantry, the 16th Regiment on Cloverleaf and Obong-ni,
part of the 18th Regiment back of the 16th, and the
remainder of it scattered throughout the bulge area, but mostly in the
south and east. 
Task Force Hill was far from strong for this attack. The two battalions
of the 9th Infantry were down to approximately two-thirds strength, the
19th Infantry was very low in combat-effective troops, and the three rifle
companies of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had a combined strength
of less than that of one full strength rifle company. 
Monday, 14 August, dawned over the bulge area with a heavy overcast
of clouds. Rain had been falling since 0300. This prevented the planned
air strike. The 24th Division artillery, down to an estimated 40 percent
combat effectiveness at this time, had massed most of its guns in the low
ground just west of Yongsan under the command of Lt. Col. Charles W. Stratton,
Commanding Officer, 13th Field Artillery Battalion. These guns delivered
a 10-minute preparation. Then the infantry moved out. The two battalions
of the 9th Regimental Combat Team, the 1st on the right and the 2d on the
left, started up the slopes of Cloverleaf, while B Company, 34th Infantry,
began a holding attack against Obong-ni south of the road. Although it
almost reached the top of Obong-ni early in the morning, B Company was
driven back by 0800.
The main battle took place northward across the road on Cloverleaf.
There the American and North Korean troops locked in a close battle of
attack and counterattack. The 1st Battalion lost sixty men killed or wounded
in one hour of fighting. Both battalions of the 4th Regimental Combat Team
gained parts of the high ground but could not control the hill mass. Northward,
the 19th Infantry made no gain. 
That night on Cloverleaf was one of continuing combat. The North Koreans
attacked and infiltrated into the 8th Infantry's dug-in defensive positions.
The case of MSgt. Warren H. Jordan of E Company reflects the severity of
the fighting on Cloverleaf. From 10 to 17 August, he was forced on five
different occasions to take command of the company because all company
officers had been killed or wounded, or had suffered heat exhaustion. 
The enemy attack on the night of the 14th was not confined to Cloverleaf.
South of Obong-ni enemy troops virtually surrounded the 1st Battalion,
21st Infantry, and inflicted numerous casualties on it. At 0300 Colonel
Hill ordered Smith to withdraw. The battalion fought its way out of encirclement
before dawn and took up a new defensive position. It held this new position
at the south end of the main battle line with the help of a counterattack
by the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, which had been strengthened that morning
by the return of K and L Companies from their river hill positions. 
Very few of its members had any hope of dislodging the enemy when Task
Force Hill continued the attack on the morning of 15 August. Clouds and
rain still hampered air support. On the south end of Obong-ni, A and B
Companies, 34th Infantry, fought a savage encounter with North Koreans
on the ridge line. The 2d Platoon of A Company, led by SFC Roy E. Collins,
assaulted across a shallow saddle to an enemy-held knob. Enemy troops were
just over the crest of it on the reverse slope. A grenade fight immediately
developed. Men exchanged rifle fire at ten paces. One enemy soldier dived
over the ridge line and tackled Collins around the waist. To his amazement,
Collins learned that the enemy soldier wanted to surrender. This was the
only way he could do it. Within fifty minutes after launching the attack,
the platoon lost 25 men killed or wounded of the 35 who had dashed across
the saddle. Ten men withdrew while PFC Edward O. Cleaborn, a Negro, stubbornly
stayed behind to get in one more shot. He lost his life trying to get that
shot. With them the 10 able-bodied survivors took 9 wounded men, 3 of whom
died before they reached an aid station. 
Elsewhere, the North Koreans fought Task Force Hill to a standstill.
Colonel Hill had used all the resources at his command and had just barely
held the enemy on his front. Having no reserve he was powerless to maneuver.
General Church came up to Colonel Hill's command post during 15 August
and the two of them talked over the situation. Although they felt that
the N.K. 4th Division was growing weaker from attrition and
might have exhausted its offensive power in the costly stalemate fighting
at Obong-ni and Cloverleaf, they did not see how they, on their part, could
continue the attack. They agreed to discontinue the attack and defend in
General Walker had by now become most impatient at the lack of progress
in driving the enemy from the bulge. Church told Walker on the 13th that
the entire N.K. 4th Division was across and in the 24th Division
sector. General Walker discounted this with the curt rejoinder, "That
is not my information." Church insisted nevertheless that such was
the case. Intelligence later confirmed General Church's estimate. When the attack of 15 August failed, General
Walker knew he must commit more strength into the bulge if he was to drive
out the enemy. Impatient and angry, he came to Church's command post during
the morning and said, "I am going to give you the Marine brigade.
I want this situation cleaned up, and quick." 
Walker returned to Taegu about noon and called a conference of some
of his key staff officers to determine what forces were available to reinforce
the 24th Division. The Marine brigade was en route from the Masan area
to Miryang where it was to bivouac in army reserve. About 1300 Walker decided
definitely that he would use the marines in the Naktong Bulge and directed
Colonel Collier to fly to Miryang immediately and discuss the situation
with General Craig, the Marine brigade commander, who was expected to arrive
there momentarily. Collier told Craig of General Walker's instructions
as the two sat talking in a jeep. General Craig immediately ordered the
brigade headquarters to break bivouac and head for Yongsan. 
General Walker's decision on the 15th is only one of many that could
be mentioned to illustrate the command problems he had to face during the
two and a half months of the continuing battles of the Pusan Perimeter.
Serious trouble had developed at many places at this time. A quick glance
around the Perimeter for the period 11-15 August will show that Eighth
Army reserves were needed almost everywhere. Task Force Kean suffered its
severe setback at Bloody Gulch on 12 August. At the same time Task Force
Hill had failed at Obong-ni Ridge and Cloverleaf in the Naktong Bulge and
strong elements of the N.K. 4th Division were behind it near
Yongsan. In action yet to be described, the North Koreans had crossed the
Naktong and were approaching Taegu north of the bulge. Eastward, the ROK
forces were being driven back at a steady pace and the Perimeter was shrinking
visibly in that quarter. The N.K. 5th Division had entered
P'ohang-dong on the east coast and was in position to drive down the Kyongju
corridor to Pusan.
Beginning in the second week of August 1950, and continuing for the
next six weeks, the two forces locked in combat at nearly all points of
the Perimeter. Because it is necessary to separate the far-flung conflict
into parts in order to describe it, an element of distortion is thus introduced
into the Pusan Perimeter story. As the reader follows each single action
for this period he must constantly keep in mind, if he is to view the scene
at all as the contemporary commanders did, that equally intense and costly
struggles were in progress elsewhere.
Because of this multiplicity of battles taking place simultaneously
at different parts of the Perimeter, it is difficult to describe satisfactorily
the command problems daily confronting General Walker. He had to know,
or guess correctly, where the next crisis would appear. Or, if surprised
by an enemy action, he immediately had to find the means to meet it and
act quickly. A commander has to think of all the actions in progress, or
imminent, and make tactical decisions. balancing the needs of one part of his defense lines against those of others. A commander's
viewpoint, hour by hour, is determined by changing factors of a complex
situation. During the Pusan Perimeter battles in the summer of 1950 in
Korea General Walker faced a trying time. As historical perspective is
gained with the passing of time, Walker's chief claim to a high place in
United States military history may well rest on the tactics of his masterful
defensive operations on the Pusan Perimeter.
General Walker always considered the Yongsan-Miryang area just above
the confluence of the Nam River with the Naktong as a very dangerous axis
of enemy attack. In mid-August he considered the crisis in the Naktong
Bulge to be the most serious and important of the several that faced his
forces. Accordingly, he then committed there his strongest reserve. Eighth
Army attached the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to the 24th Division on
15 August, and ordered an attack as early as possible on 17 August to destroy
the enemy in the bulge east of the Naktong. 
On 16 August, as the tired men of Task Force Hill waited in their foxholes
for help, the North Koreans attacked the 9th Infantry on Cloverleaf. The
attacks were intense and at close quarters. North Koreans occupied some
of the American foxholes after killing their occupants. On the right, the
2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, lost ground. There was severe fighting also
on Ohang Hill where elements of the 19th and 34th Regiments narrowly escaped
being trapped. Captain Barszcz, commanding G Company, 34th Infantry, distinguished
himself by bravery and leadership in this action. 
In the midst of the battle of the bulge a new enemy crossing of the
Naktong occurred in the 1st Cavalry Division sector, just above the 24th
Division boundary. This enemy force, estimated at two battalions, established
itself on Hill 409, a mountain near Hyongp'ung. Because the area concerned
was more accessible by roads from the 24th Division sector than from the
1st Cavalry Division sector, General Walker on the evening of 13 August
shifted the 24th Division boundary northward to include this enemy penetration.
Just after midnight, 15-16 August, Eighth Army by telephone ordered
the 24th Division to take positive action against the enemy force on Hill
409 at the division's northern extremity near Hyongp'ung. This force had
now increased to an estimated regiment. Prisoners said it was the 29th
Regiment of the N.K. 10th Division, a division not
previously committed in action. Before daylight, the 1st Battalion, 23d
Infantry, arrived near Hill 409 to reinforce the 2 1st Infantry. The regiment
had arrived from the United States on 5 August and had gone to an assembly
area near Taegu with the certainty that it would soon be committed at some
point around the Perimeter. The enemy troops on Hill 409 posed a particular
danger. At any moment they might begin a drive southeast into the already
desperately hard-pressed American forces fighting in the Naktong Bulge. 
But this enemy force, fortunately and most comfortingly, made no effort
to leave Hill 409 where it had established itself during a most critical
moment of the bulge battle. Its inactivity within the American defense
perimeter demonstrated either a lack of co-ordination by the North Korean
command or an inelastic adherence to plans.
Marines Attack Obong-ni
Although the situation did not look good for the American forces in
the bulge on 15 August, the harsh prospect nevertheless gave a distorted
view unless one knew something of the picture on the "other side of
the hill." Actually, the N.K. 4th Division was in desperate
straits. Its food was in low supply. Ammunition resupply was difficult.
One regiment, the 18th, reportedly received its last ammunition
resupply on 14 August. Desertion among replacements, according to prisoners,
reached about 40 percent. Half the replacements did not have weapons, and
they were used for labor services in digging foxholes, carrying ammunition,
and foraging for food. The slightly wounded received but little medical
attention, and were immediately put back into the front line. A large part
of the severely wounded died from lack of medical care. Only the former
Chinese Communist Forces fanatical squad and platoon leaders maintained
high morale. 
In discussing plans for the attack with Marine brigade and regimental
commanders-Craig and Murray-Church and Hill learned that they did not want
to launch an attack until the carrier-based Marine Corsairs could participate.
The Badoeng Strait and the Sicily would not be in
position to launch their planes until 17 August. Plans were made, therefore,
to attack on that day. 
General Church was to command the co-ordinated attack of Army and Marine
troops. The attack plan placed the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on the
left in front of Obong-ni Ridge. (Map 10) On the extreme
left, the 1st Battalion (-), 21st Infantry, was to protect the marines'
left flank. The 8th Infantry stayed in front of Cloverleaf where it had
been fighting for a week. The road between Cloverleaf and Obong-ni was
the boundary between it and the marines. The 34th Infantry was north of
the 8th Infantry. Beyond it the 19th Infantry formed the extreme right
flank of the attack formations. The plan called for the 9th Infantry, after
it took Cloverleaf, to be pinched out by the units on either side of it.
They were to drive on to the Naktong. The 19th Infantry was to attack to
the river and seize Ohang Hill, which the North Koreans had regained. The
attack was to begin at 0800, 17 August. Fifty-four 105-mm. howitzers and
one battalion of 155-mm. howitzers were in place to support the attack. 
The 5th Marines had moved from the Masan front to Miryang, and then
on 16 August it received orders to attack Obong-ni the next morning. The
2d Battalion was to lead the assault, followed by the 1st and 3d Battalions
in that order. The 2d Battalion reached its assembly area in front of Obong-ni
Ridge after midnight. 
General Church had planned to coordinate a 9th RCT attack against Cloverleaf
with the Marine attack against Obong-ni Ridge. Colonel Murray, however,
requested that he be allowed to attack and secure Obong-ni first before the 9th RCT began its attack. Murray considered Obong-ni Ridge as his
line of departure for the main attack and thought he could capture it with
relative ease. Church, on the other hand, considered Obong-ni and Cloverleaf
to be interlocking parts of the enemy position and thought they should
be attacked simultaneously. However, he granted Murray's request. Between
Obong-ni and the Naktong River three miles away rose two successively higher
hill masses. Both Murray and Church expected the enemy to make his main
effort on the second ridge, the one behind Obong-ni. Information gained
later indicated that Colonel Chang Ky Dok's 18th Regiment,
reinforced by a battalion of the 16th Regiment, defended
Obong-ni Ridge. Other elements of the 16th Regiment apparently
defended Cloverleaf. 
Lt. Col. Harold S. Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, moved to its line
of departure on the east side of a narrow valley in front of Obong-ni about
1,000 yards from the ridge crest. There it waited for the preliminaries
to begin. The men studied intently the almost bare ridge opposite them,
with its series of six knobs-Hills 102, 109, 117, 143, 147, and 153-rising
progressively in height southward from 300 to 450 feet above the valley
floor. Deep erosional gullies ran down from the saddles between the knobs
leaving ribs of ground projecting from the ridge spine. About midway of
the ridge a big landslide had exposed a large gash of red ground.
A 10-minute artillery preparation, falling on areas back of Obong-ni,
began at 0735. Intentionally, there was no artillery preparation on Obong-ni
itself. Instead, eighteen Corsairs delivered an air strike on the ridge.
The strike was impressive. To observers, Obong-ni seemed to be blowing
up-"was floating," as General Church described it. 
Two companies, E on the left and D on the right, moved out from the
line of departure at 0800, using the red gash on Obong-ni as the boundary
between their zones of advance. Four platoons, numbering about 120 men,
constituted the assault formation that crossed the valley and started up
the slope. From the ridge itself they encountered no enemy fire, but from
Tugok village across the road to their right (north) came heavy small arms
and machine gun fire Some fire also came from their left flank near Obong
village. Mortar fire fell on the assault group when it reached the slope
At one point only did any of the marines reach the crest. This was just
to the right of the red gash where a rain-formed gully led upwards. Near
the crest the gully was so shallow it provided scarcely enough cover to
protect one man lying down. Using this gully as cover for part of his platoon,
2d Lt. Michael J. Shinka reached the top with twenty of his original thirty
men. As they scrambled into empty North Korean foxholes, grazing enemy
machine gun fire from the right swept over them and North Koreans in a
second row of foxholes a few yards down the reverse slope jumped up and
attacked them with grenades. Five marines were casualties in this attack; Shinka ordered the rest off
the ridge. They complied quickly, pulling their wounded back on ponchos.
Corsairs now returned and worked over the Obong-ni Ridge line and reverse
slope with a hail of explosives. A shortage of fuel tanks prevented use
of napalm. After the strike ended, the marines started upward again from
halfway down the slope where they had waited. Tanks moved out into the
low ground east of the ridge and supported the second attack by direct
fire into Tugok village and against the ridge line. At first there was
little enemy fire. Within a few minutes after the air strike had ended,
however, the North Koreans moved into their forward foxholes at the crest.
From these points they placed automatic fire on the climbing marines and
rolled grenades down on them. Again, only Shinka's platoon reached the
top. This time, starting with fifteen men, he had nine when he got there.
The small group could not stay on the crest, and they fell back down the
slope. Shinka crawled to the crest to see if he could find any marine wounded
on top; enemy fire hit him twice, one bullet shattering his chin, another
entering his right arm. He rolled down the hill. Enemy fire, inflicting
heavy casualties, pinned the other units to the ground on the side of the
The heavy enemy fire from Tugok and part of Cloverleaf Hill on the right
(north) was an important factor in turning back the Marine attack on Obong-ni.
At 1500 the 2d Battalion held positions about halfway up the slope. In
seven hours it had lost 23 killed and 119 wounded-a casualty rate of almost
60 percent of the 240 riflemen who had taken part in the attack. 
Because of the heavy losses in the 2d Battalion, General Craig had already
decided he would have to pass the 1st Battalion through it if the attack
was to continue. At 1245 Colonel Murray relayed the order to Colonel Newton
to move his 1st Battalion in position to resume the attack on Obong-ni.
The latter completed the relief of the 2d Battalion on the slopes by 1600.
24th Division Attack Gains Cloverleaf
It was apparent during the morning that the Marine planes had failed
to destroy the enemy soldiers in their deep foxholes on the reverse slope
of Obong-ni. It was also clear that the heavy enemy fire from gun positions
in Tugok village and on the high spurs of Cloverleaf had worked havoc among
the marines trying to climb the exposed slope of Obong-ni. In the plan
for resuming the attack there was one important change. Colonel Murray,
now convinced that it would be necessary for the 9th Infantry on his right
to attack Cloverleaf simultaneously with his attack against Obong-ni, went
to General Church and told him of his changed view. Church said the 9th
Infantry would attack after an artillery preparation. Murray informed Church and Hill
shortly after 1500 that the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, would be ready
to launch its attack at 1600. 
Shortly before 1600, the 24th Division began to deliver scheduled preparatory
fires on Cloverleaf, raking it from top to bottom. Part of the fire was
time-on-target air bursts. The flying shell fragments of the air bursts
spread a shroud of death over the crest and reverse slope. Then, at 1600,
the 9th Infantry and the marines began their co-ordinated attack. The 2d
Battalion, 9th Infantry, took Cloverleaf without difficulty. The artillery
barrage had done its work; enemy soldiers surviving it fled down the hill.
From Cloverleaf, the 9th Infantry now supported with its fire the attack
of the marines against Obong-ni. 
At Obong-ni, the North Koreans again stopped the frontal attack of the
marines. But this time, with enemy fire from Tugok and Cloverleaf almost
eliminated, the right-hand platoon of B Company near the boundary with
the 8th RCT was able to move to the right around the northern spur of Obong-ni
and reach its crest here above the road. The marines captured this knob,
Hill 102, about 1700. Then the next two knobs southward, Hills 109 and
107, fell to a flanking attack from the direction of Hill 102, supported
by fire from that hill. Enemy fire from the next knob southward, Hill 143,
however, soon forced the A Company platoon from the crest of Hill 117 back
to its eastern slope.
Just before dark the North Koreans made their first use of tanks in
this battle of the Naktong Bulge. While digging in for the night, men on
Hill 102 noticed three T34 tanks coming from the west. A fourth tank, not
in view at first, followed. They came steadily along the road toward the
pass between Obong-ni and Cloverleaf. By radio, B Company notified its
battalion command post in the valley that tanks were approaching.
Three American Pershings (M26's) clanked forward to positions at a curve
in the road in front of the Marine 1st Battalion command post. The 75-mm.
recoilless rifles already commanded the road where it emerged from the
pass. Two 3.5-inch rocket launcher teams hurried into position at the north
side of the road. Three Air Force P-51's sighted the enemy tanks and made
several strafing runs over them but without visible effect. Marines on
Hill 102 watched with fascination as the T34's rumbled into the pass.
Down below, a dust cloud rising over a shoulder of ground warned the
waiting bazooka teams that the T34's were about to come around the bend
in the road. Seeing the steel hulk of the leading tank slowly come into
view, one of the bazooka teams fired the first shot at a range of 100 yards,
hitting the tank in its treads. The tank came on with all guns firing.
A second rocket struck it just as a shell from a 75-mm. recoilless rifle
tore a hole in its hull. The tank stopped but continued firing its guns.
In another moment, the foremost American Pershing scored a direct hit on
this T34, setting it on fire. At least one enemy crew member abandoned
the tank. Small arms fire killed him. The second enemy tank now came into
view. The bazooka teams knocked it out. Two Pershing tanks destroyed the
third T34 the moment it swung into sight. Air action destroyed the fourth
tank before it reached the pass and dispersed enemy infantry accompanying
it. In this action, Pershing tanks for the first time came face to face
with the T34. 
When darkness fell, the marines dug in on a perimeter defense where
they were. From Hill 102, B Company extended its line over Hill log to
the saddle between it and Hill 117; there it met the defense line of A
Company which bent back down the east slope of 117 to the base of the ridge.
During the day the marines had 205 casualties-23 killed, 2 dead of wounds,
180 wounded. 
While this severe day-long battle had been in progress at Obong-ni,
the 34th and 19th Infantry Regiments on the 24th Division right started
their attacks late in the afternoon after repeated delays. Heavy air attacks
and artillery barrages had already hit on Ohang Hill during the afternoon.
This attack moved forward, but with heavy casualties in some units, notably
in L Company, 34th Infantry, which came under enemy fire from the rear
at one point. Ohang Hill, overlooking the Naktong River at the northern
end of the bulge, fell to the 19th Infantry by dusk. That night the 24th
Division intercepted an enemy radio message stating that North Korean troops
in the bulge area were short of ammunition and requesting permission for
them to withdraw across the Naktong. 
That evening, 17 August, American mortars and artillery registered on
corridors of enemy approach to Obong-ni and Cloverleaf and on probable
centers of enemy troop concentrations. Some artillery pieces fired on the
river crossing sites to prevent enemy reinforcements arriving in the battle
area. On Obong-ni that night, the marines, sure of an enemy counterattack,
set trip flares in front of their positions. One quarter of the men stood
guard while the remainder rested. On the left of the line, A Company had
lost its 60-mm. mortars in the evening when four white phosphorus mortar
shells struck in the mortar position, destroying the weapons and causing
At 0230, 18 August, a green flare signaled the expected enemy attack.
Coming from Hill 117, the North Koreans struck A Company and isolated one
platoon. Their attack formation then drove on and penetrated into B Company.
The glare from bursting 81-mm. mortar illuminating shells revealed the
North Korean method of attack. An enemy squad would rise from the ground,
hurl grenades, and rush forward a short distance firing to front and flank
with automatic weapons, and then drop to the ground. Successive enemy groups
would repeat the process. The attack forced A Company from its positions and back into the saddle south of Hill log.
In its sector, however, B Company drove the enemy from its perimeter in
forty-five minutes of hard fighting. Before daylight the North Korean attack
The total North Korean losses in this night battle was not known, although
183 enemy dead were counted later around the A and B Company perimeters.
The Marine losses were heavy. Digging in that evening with 190 men and
5 officers, B Company the next morning at daylight had 110 effectives;
A Company, starting the night with 185 men, had only 90 men at daylight
who could take their place in the line. 
After daylight, the Marine 1st Battalion reorganized, and A Company
prepared to attack south against Hill 117, to which the enemy attack force
had withdrawn. The company crossed the saddle easily, but machine gun fire
stopped it on the slope. The company commander called for an air strike.
After carefully checking the designated target, a Corsair dropped a 500-pound
bomb which scored a direct hit on the enemy emplacement. When bomb fragments,
rocks, and dirt had settled, the 3d Platoon leaped to its feet and dashed
up the slope. At the enemy emplacement they found the machine gun destroyed
and its crew members dead. In five minutes A Company was on top of Hill
The attack now continued on across the saddle toward Hill 143. Air strikes
and artillery fire greatly helped to win that point. The process was then
repeated with Hills 147 and 153. At nightfall only one small pocket of
enemy resistance remained on Obong-ni, and it was eliminated the next morning.
The formidable ridge had been captured by an attack beginning on the right
flank and moving progressively south and upward along its series of knobs
The Enemy Bridgehead Destroyed
While the 1st Battalion was driving to the southern tip of Obong-ni
on 18 August, the Marine 3d Battalion started an attack from the northern
end of the ridge toward Hill 206, the next ridge line westward. The 9th
Infantry supported this attack by fire from Cloverleaf. The 3d Battalion
was on its objective within an hour. It met virtually no opposition. 
The reason for this easy advance was apparent. At the same time that
the 3d Battalion was climbing Hill 206, aerial observers, forward artillery
observers, and front-line infantry units all reported seeing enemy groups
attempting to withdraw westward to the Naktong. They reported this movement
about noon. Forward observers adjusted air bursts (VT) and quick fuze artillery
fire on these groups. Part of the artillery firing on the river crossing
sites employed delayed fuzes for greater effectiveness against underwater
swimmers. Fighter planes ranged over the roads and trails leading down
the western slopes to the river and caught many enemy groups in the open. 
After the capture of Hill 206, Colonel Murray ordered the 3d Battalion
to continue the attack toward Hill 311, the last ridge line in front of
the Naktong. This attack slanted northwest. At the same time, the 34th
and 19th Infantry Regiments on the right flank of the 24th Division drove
south and southwest into the bulge. Only in a few places was resistance
moderate and as the afternoon wore on even this diminished. Troops of the
18th Infantry on Ohang Hill could see groups of 10 to 15 North Koreans
in the river, totaling perhaps 75 to 100 at one time, trying to cross to
the west side. Fighter planes strafed these groups all afternoon. Before
dark the Marine 3d Battalion captured most of Hill 311, the 34th Infantry
captured Hill 240, and the 18th Infantry captured Hill 223-the high hills
fronting the river. 
It was clear by evening, 18 August, that the enemy 4th Division
was decisively defeated and its survivors were fleeing westward across
the Naktong. The next morning, 19 August, marines and 34th Infantry troops
met at the Naktong. Prisoners captured that morning said most of the North
Korean survivors had crossed the river during the night. By afternoon,
patrols to the river found no enemy troops. The battle of the Naktong Bulge
was over. 
The N.K. 4th Division lost nearly all its heavy equipment
and weapons in the first battle of the Naktong Bulge. The Marine ordnance
section, which gathered up most of the destroyed or abandoned enemy heavier
weapons, recovered 34 enemy artillery pieces, 18 of them lined up along
the Yongsan-Naktong River road for supporting fires along the main axis
of enemy attack. The largest enemy artillery piece was 122-mm. in size.
The North Korean casualties in this battle were heavy. The 24th Division
buried more than 1,200 enemy dead. According to prisoners captured at the
end of the battle, each of the three rifle regiments of the N.K. 4th
Division had no more than approximately 300 to 400 men left after
they recrossed to the west side of the river. These prisoners said that
about one-half their wounded died for lack of medical care. The entire
4th Division reportedly numbered about 3,500 men on 19 August at the end of the bulge battle. 
After the Obong-ni battle ended, a count of enemy weapons destroyed
or abandoned there reportedly included 18 heavy machine guns of Russian
or American manufacture, 25 light machine guns, 63 submachine guns of Russian
or American manufacture, 8 antitank rifles, 1 3.5-inch rocket launcher,
and quantities of ammunition and grenades. Included in the captured enemy
equipment was a U.S. Army radio, SCR300, in good operating condition, set
to the frequency of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. This indicated that
the enemy had been intercepting conversations between A and B Companies
the night of 17-18 August and probably had known precisely their locations
and dispositions. 
The destruction, for all practical purposes, of the N.K. 4th
Division in the battle of the Naktong Bulge was the greatest setback
suffered thus far by the North Korean Army. The 4th Division
never recovered from this battle until after the Chinese entered the war
and it was reconstituted. Ironically, on 19 August, the day its defeat
became final, the division received from the North Korean headquarters
the order naming it a "Guard Division" for outstanding accomplishments
in battle (Taejon). 
On the afternoon of 19 August, the bulge battle over, Eighth Army ordered
the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade released from 24th Division control.
The brigade, reverting to Eighth Army reserve, assembled in the south near
Changwon, east of Masan, where it remained until 1 September. 
 1st Cav Div WD, Aug 50, G-2 Transl 0034, 191100 Aug 50.
 Ltr, Ayres to author, 5 June 53; Overlay of 3d Bn, 34th Inf
positions, 6 Aug 50, prepared by Col Beauchamp for author.
 Beauchamp overlay, 6 Aug 50; Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug
52; Interv, author with Col Gines Perez, 6 Aug 51.
 New York Herald Tribune, August 6, 1950, dispatch from Korea, 5
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, pp. 41, 58, 75; 24th Div WD, 6
Aug 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), pp. 43,
 ATIS Interrog Rpt 612, Issue 1, p. 25, Lt Jun Jai Ro; EUSAK WD, 8
Oct 50, G-2 Sec, PW Interrog, ADVATIS 1074, Jr Lt Chon Cho Hong.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52; Interv, author with Stephens,
8 Oct 51; Interv, author with Maj Sammy E. Radow, CO 1st Bn, 23d Inf, 16
 Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Interv, author with Perez,
6 Aug 51; 13th FA Bn WD, 6 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 6 Aug 50; EUSAK WD, 7
Aug 50, ATIS Interrog Rpt 452, ADVATIS 307, EUSAK 342, Lee Myong Hyon;
ATIS Interrog Rpt 453, Kim T'ae Mo; ATIS Interrog Rpt 453, Col Pak Kum
Choi. Colonel Pak gave the strength of the N.K. 26th Regt as follows:
1st Bn-500, 2d Bn-500, 3d Bn-800, Arty Bn-300, all other units-200;
total regimental strength, 2,300.
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 601, 061035 Aug 50; 3d Engr (C) Bn, Unit
Hist, S-2 Sec, Summ, 6 Aug 50.
 Ltr, Ayres to author, 3 Jun 53 and overlay showing 3d and 1st Bn,
34th Inf, positions, 5 Aug 50; AMS 1:50,000 scale map of Korea, L751,
1950, Namji-ri sheet (6820-II).
 Ltr, Ayres to author, 5 Jun 53; Interv, author with Ayres, 18 Nov
54; 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, 6 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, 6 Aug 50.
 24th Div WD, G-3 Jnl, entry 571, 060520 Aug 50.
 Interv, author with Beauchamp, 1 Aug 52; Interv, author with Ayres,
18 Nov 54; 13th FA Bn WD, 6 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 6 Aug 50.
 Ltr, Ayres to author, 5 Jan 53; Interv, author with Beauchamp, 18
Nov 54; Ltr, Beauchamp to author, 20 May 53, and attached comments.
 Ltr, Ayres to author, 5 Jan 53.
 13th FA Bn WD, 6 Aug 50.
 24th Div WD, 6 Aug 50; Interv, author with Cpl Stewart E. Sizemore
(D Co, 34th Inf, 6 Aug 50), 30 Jun 51; Ltr, Maj Charles E. Payne to
Ayres, 13 Dec 54, copy in OCMH; Interv, author with Ayres, 18 Nov 54.
 Ltr, Alfonso to Ayres, 27 Nov 54, copy in OCMH; Interv, author with
Ayres, 6 Nov 54; Inter, author with Beauchamp, 18 Nov 54; Ltr, Ayres to
author, 5 Jan 53; Ltr and comments, Beauchamp to author, 20 May 53. The
1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, had only 20 officers and 471 enlisted men
when it began the counterattack on 6 August. See 34th Inf WD, 7 Aug 50.
 Ltr, Payne to Ayres, 13 Dec 54; Ltr, Alfonso to Ayres, 27 Nov 54;
Intervs, author with Beauchamp, 8 Nov 54, and Ayres, 16 Nov 54.
 Ltr, Alfonso to Ayres, 27 Nov 54: Intervs, author with Beauchamp,
18 Nov 54, and Ayres, 16 Nov 54.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52; Interv, author with
Beauchamp, 18 Nov 54; 24th Div WD, 6 Aug 50, and G-3 Jnl. entries 593-
96, 061120-061150 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, 7 Aug 50.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52 24th Div WD, 6 Aug 50 and G-3
Jnl, entry 591, 061110 Aug 50.
 24th Div Arty WD. 23 Jul-25 Aug 50.
 24th Div WD, 6-7 Aug 50.
 Ibid., Opn Instr 18, 061900 Aug 50.
 9th Inf WD, 8 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, 8 Aug 50, 24th Div WD, 8 Aug 50;
ATIS Interrog Rpt 602, 19 Aug 50, Issue 1, pp. 4-5, Lee Ki Sun, 2d Bn,
18th Regt, N.K. 4th Div.
 19th Inf WD, 7 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, 7 Aug 50.
 Tugok is represented on the 1:50,000 scale map of Korea as Morisil.
To the troops at the time, however, this village was known as Tugok and
that name is used in the text.
 Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Brig Gen John J. Hill, MS
review comments, 2 Jan 58. The designation (-) has been used to indicate
a combat organization that is lacking one or more of its organic units.
 24th Div WD, 8 Aug 50.
 Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Interv, author with Beauchamp,
18 Nov 54: Ltr and comments, Beauchamp to author, 20 May 53; 9th RCT Opn
Ord 4, 081315 Aug 50: Ibid., Unit Rpt 1, 8 Aug 50.
 Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; 24th Div WD, 8-9 Aug 50.
 Ltr, Alfonso to Ayres, 27 Nov 54: Interv, author with Ayres, 16 Nov
54; 34th Inf WD, 9 Aug 50.
 34th Inf WD, 9-11 Aug 50.
 24th Div WD, 9-11 Aug 50: EUSAK WD, 22 Aug 50, ATIS Interrog Rpt
703, Kim Chi Ho; Hill, MS review comments, 2 Jan 58; Interv, author with
Montesclaros, 1 Oct 52. In the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, F Company
effectives numbered about 25; G Company, about 40; and E Company about
 24th Div WD, 10 Aug 50; EUSAK WD, Briefing for CG, 10 Aug 50; Ltr,
Church to author, 7 Jul 53; Ltr, Hill to author, 15 Apr 53.
 24th Div WD, 10-11 Aug 50; Intervs, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52, and
Beauchamp, 18 Nov 54.
 24th Div WD, 11 Aug 50; 9th RCT Unit Rpt 4, 10-11 Aug 50; ATIS
Interrog Rpts, Issue Nr 1, p. 90, Nr 644, 21 Aug 50, Kim Dok Sam; Ibid.,
Issue Nr 2, p. 8. Rpt Nr 703; EUSAK WD, 28 Sep 50, ADVATIS Interrog Rpt
of Maj Choe Chu Yong, Opns Officer, N.K. Arty Regt, 4th Div; Ltr, Hill
to author, 15 Apr 53.
 9th RCT Unit Rpt 4, 10-11 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 11 Aug 50: EUSAK WD,
28 Sep 50, Interrog Rpt of Maj Choe Chu Yong; EUSAK WD, 18 Aug 50, G-2
Sec, ATIS Interrog Rpt 644. Kim Dok Sam, a ROK officer, monitored enemy
radio conversations about N.K. artillery positions.
 24th Div WD, 10-11 Aug 50; 27th Inf WD, 10 Aug 50; Ltr, Hill to
author, 15 Apr 53; Ltr, Beauchamp to author, 20 May 53.
 19th Inf WD, 11 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 11 Aug 50; EUSAK WD, Aug 50
Summ, 10 Aug; Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Ltr, Murch to author,
7 Apr 54.
 Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; 24th Div WD, 11-12 Aug 50; New
York Herald Tribune, August 14, 1950, Bigart dispatch. General Order
111, 30 August 1950, awarded the Silver Star to 1st Lt. William F.
Coghill for gallantry in this action, 24th Div WD.
 Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Ltr, Church to author, 7 Jul
 Ltr, Murch to author, 7 Apr 54; Interv, author with Murch, 18 Mar
54; 27th Inf WD, 11 Aug 50.
 Ltr, Murch to author, 7 Apr 54; 24th Div WD, 12 Aug 50; 27th Inf
WD, 12 Aug 50; 2d Bn, 27th Inf WD, Aug 50 Summ of Activities.
 27th Inf WD, 13 Aug 60; GHQ FEC G-3 Opn Rpt 51, 14 Aug 50; 24th Div
WD, 13 Aug 50.
 23d Inf WD, Aug 50 Narr Summ.
 27th Inf WD, 14 Aug 50.
 34th Inf WD, 14 Aug 50; Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Ltr,
Hill to author, 15 Apr 53.
 9th RCT Opn Ord 5, 131300 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 13 Aug 50; 19th Inf
WD, 13 Aug 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div),
 9th RCT Unit Rpt 9, 14 Aug 50, gives the strength of its 1st
Battalion as 599 enlisted men and that of the 2d Battalion as 609
enlisted men, against an authorized strength of 883 enlisted men each.
Ayres, Notes for author, 24 Jan 55.
 9th RCT Unit Rpt 7, 13-14 Aug 50; Overlay to accompany FO 5, 9th
RCT, 131230 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 13-14 Aug 50; Interv, author with Hill,
1 Oct 52.
 Capt Perry Davis, The 2d Infantry Division in Korea, July-September
1950, MS, copy in OCMH (Davis was Public Info Off, 2d Div); Interv,
author with Hill, 1 Oct 52.
 Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Hill, MS review comments, 2 Jan
58; 24th Div WD, 14-15 Aug 50.
 Gugeler, Combat Actions in Korea, ch. 2, "Attack Along a
Ridgeline," pp. 20-29; 24th Div WD, 15 Aug 50; Abstract of A Co, 34th
Inf Morning Rpts, 14-15 Aug 50. In his account, Gugeler describes all
the action as taking place on 15 August. Some of the preliminary
incidents took place on the 14th, according to the morning reports of
 Intervs, author with Church, 25 Sep 52, and Hill. 1 Oct 52.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52.
 Collier, MS review comments, 10 Mar 58.
 EUSAK Opn Dir, 15 Aug 50: 24th Div WD, 16 Aug 50. The 24th Division
headquarters received the formal order the morning of 16 August.
 24th Div WD, 16 Aug 50; 9th RCT Unit Rpt 9, 15-16 Aug 50.
 24th Div WD, 12-16 Aug 50; 21st Inf WD, 12-16 Aug 50; ATIS Res Supp
Interrog Rpts, Issue 104 (N.K. 10th Div), p. 47; Capt William M.
Glasgow, Jr., Platoon Leader in Korea, MS in OCMH (Glasgow was Ldr, 2d
Plat, B Co, 23d Inf, ad Div); Interv, author with Stephens, 8 Oct 51;
EUSAK WD, 5 Aug 50, G-3 Sec, Briefing for CG; 23d Inf WD, Aug 50 Summ.
 EUSAK WD, 30 Aug 50, ATIS Interrog Rpt 880, Paek Yong Hwan; ATIS
Interrog Rpts, Issue 3, p. 180; 9th RCT Unit Rpt 7, 13-14 Aug 50.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52; Interv, author with Hill, 1
 24th Div Opn Directive 1, 16 Aug 50; Ibid., Opn Instr 25, 16 Aug
50; Ibid., WD, 16 Aug 50; Ibid., Div Arty WD, 23 Jul-25 Aug 50; Wood,
"Artillery Support for the Brigade in Korea," Marine Corps Gazette
(June, 1951), p. 19; Interv, author with Hill, 1 Oct 52; Ltr and
comments, Beauchamp to author, 20 May 53.
 5th Mar SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, 16 Aug: 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 7 Jul-6
Sep 50, 17 Aug: 24th Div WD, 17 Aug 50.
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52; Interv, author with Canzona
and Montross, Jun 54. See also Montross and Canzona, The Pusan
Perimeter, pp. 176-77. (The text and map, page 180, incorrectly identify
 Interv, author with Church, 25 Sep 52; 2d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 7 Jul-31
Aug 50, pp. 8-9.
 5th Mar SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50, Incl 4, sketch of 2d Bn attack, and 17
Aug 50; Andrew C. Geer, The New Breed: the Story of the U.S. Marines in
Korea (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952). Geer interviewed survivors of
the assault group.
 2d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 7 Jul-31 Aug 50, p. 9: Geer, The New Breed;
Montross and Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, p. 183; Newsweek, August 28,
1950; New York Times, August 18, 1950.
 5th Mar SAR, 17 Aug 50; 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR, Aug 50.
 Intervs, author with Church, 25 Sep 52, and Hill, 1 Oct 52.
 Ibid.; 9th RCT Unit Rpt 10, 16-17 Aug 50. The author was unable to
find the 9th Regimental Combat Team War Diary for August 1950.
 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 17 Jul 50; Geer, The New Breed, p. 71.
 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 17 Aug 50: 5th Mar SAR, 2 Aug-6 Sep 50. sketch
5. N.K. counterattack, night of 17-18 August; Geer, The New Breed.
 24th Div WD, 17 Aug 50; 34th Inf WD, Summ, 22 Jul-26 Aug 50; 13th
FA Bn WD, 17 Aug 50: 19th Inf Unit Rpt 38, 17 Aug 50; Interv, author
with Montesclaros, 1 Oct 52; Ltr and comments, Beauchamp to author, 20
 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR 17-18 Aug 50: Wood, "Artillery Support for the
Brigade in Korea," op. cit., p. 37; Geer, The New Breed, p. 76. There is
some discrepancy in the Marine casualty figures.
 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 18 Aug 50; Geer, The New Breed, p. 77-79;
Montross and Canzona, The Pusan Perimeter, p. 200.
 3d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 18 Aug 50.
 Wood, "Artillery Support for the Brigade in Korea," op cit.; ATIS
Res Supp Interrog Rpt., Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div). p. 49.
 3d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 18 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 18 Aug 50; Interv,
author with Montesclaros, 1 Oct 52.
 3d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 19 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 19 Aug 50; 1st Prov Mar
Brig SAR, 19 Aug 50, p. 13.
 Wood, "Artillery Support for the Brigade in Korea," op. cit.; GHQ
FEC Sitrep, 20 Aug 50; 24th Div WD, 19 Aug 50; 24th Div Arty WD, 22
Jul-25 Aug 50; ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpt, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div),
p. 49; EUSAK WD, 21 Aug 50, ATIS Interrog Rpt 705, Mun Il Pun;
Ibid., 8 Oct 50, G-2 Sec, ADVATIS 1074, Jr Lt Chon Cho Hong,
N.K. 4th Div Hq, said the 18th Regt had 900 men left; Ibid., 28 Sep 50,
ADVATIS, Maj Choe Chu Yong, Opn Off, Arty Regt, 4th Div, said the division
artillery crossed the Naktong with 12 guns and lost them all; ATIS Interrog
Rpts, Issue 2, Rpt 703, p. 8, Kim Chi Ho; Interv, author with Church,
25 Sep 52.
 2d Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 19 Aug 50, p. 9 (this source says there were 36
enemy machine guns on Obong-ni); 1st Bn, 5th Mar SAR, 18 Aug 50.
 GHQ FEC, History of the N.K. Army, p. 75: ATIS Res Supp Interrog
Rpts, Issue 94 (N.K. 4th Div), p. 49.
 24th Div WD, 19 Aug 50; 1st Prov Mar Brig SAR, 19 Aug 50; Ibid.,
22 Aug-1 Sep 50, p. 14.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation