At 0633 on September 15, 1950,
LtCol R. D. Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines, reinforced by tanks and engineers, some
1250 Marines in all, landed in the assault of
Wolmi Do Island. This island guarded the seaward
approaches to Inchon. These Marines were veterans
of the vicious fighting on the Pusan Perimeter.
At 1700 that afternoon these men would have had a
ringside seat from which to watch the remainder
of their Regiment assault the beaches just to the
left (north) of the causeway, and the 1st Marines
(Regiment) land on beaches to the right (south)
of the causeway.
Taplett's landing had been
preceded by intense fire from Navy and Marine
aircraft from Sicily, Badoeng Strait, Valley
Forge, Philippine Sea, and Boxer. The cruisers
Toledo, Rochester, Kenya, and Jamaica added their
six and eight inch shells to the carnage on the
beach, as did a dozen destroyers and smaller
ships. The piece de resistance were the ugly,
squat shapes of three LSMRs, the 401, 403, and
404 which waddled close up to the already smoking
island and ripple fired hundreds of rockets into
what was already a smoking fiery mess. You may
bet that the Marines, bobbing around in LCVPs
waiting to go ashore, thought those "ugly,
squat LSMRs" were the most beautiful ships
in the U. S. Navy at that moment in time.
Some 400 North Koreans of the
2000 defenders of Inchon had been on Wolmi Do
that morning. When the fight was over
Taplett's battalion would count some 108
enemy dead and 136 prisoners. The 150 other
defenders were thought to have been entombed in
sealed emplacements and caves throughout the
island. Marine casualties amounted to 17 Wounded
in Action.
Naval gunfire support of Marine
landings during WW II in the Pacific had always
been a problem. Not surprisingly, Marines wanted
as much fire on the objective as they could get,
and the Navy almost always shortened or cancelled
scheduled pre-D Day bombardments. With the
exception of the landing on Guam on July 21,
1944, which had proceeded as flawlessly as an
amphibious assault across an enemy held beach
could be expected to go and with minimal
casualties, the Marine Corps had never been
satisfied with the time and attention devoted by
the U. S. Navy to shore bombardment. Example
after example could be cited where this occurred.
Wolmi-Do and Inchon would be an exception to the
pattern which had developed previously in that
the quantity and quality of the pre-landing
bombardments had fulfilled Marine requests and
expectations. The result of this bombardment was
that it saved Marine blood during the landing
portion of the operation.
Anyone interested in the issue of
pre-landing bombardment and the Navy/Marine Corps
conflict regarding this issue is urged to read
Holland M. Smith's Coral and Brass. This book
sets forth the Marine Corps side of the argument,
chapter and verse, through the Iwo Jima
operation.
The above was courtesy
of R. E.
Sullivan, Colonel, USMC ('43/'67)
(Ret.)
