Thirty-five years ago, I was sitting
where you are sitting today. I was a member of what was
then called the "Amphibious Warfare School, Junior
Course." The student body was made up of first
lieutenants, captains, and majors. The Amphibious
Warfare School, Senior Course, corresponds to
today's Command and Staff College and had
lieutentant colonels as students.
On graduation I was ordered to the 2nd
Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. So were a good number
of my classmates. I was assigned to the 1st Battalion,
6th Marines; and as a major, was given command of
Weapons Company. The battalion had just come back from
the Mediterranean and we were still unpacking
expeditionary boxes when, on 25 June, the North Koreans
crossed the 38th Parallel. In short order we moved west
on a troop train to Camp Pendleton where we became the
3d Battalion, 1st Marines, with about ten days to build
from our half-strength peacetime tables of organization
to war-time strength, before sailing from San Diego.
Our regimental commander was Colonel "Chesty"
Puller. We landed at Inchon on 15 September and that
was the first we saw of the 5th Marines which had come
up from the Pusan Perimeter. We did not see the 7th
Marines until we reached Seoul.
We were successful at Inchon and Seoul
- and that success I think can be attributed to the
quality of leadership at all levels. From the division
commander, Major General Oliver P. Smith, on down,
virtually every officer and non-commissioned officer
was a World War II veteran. In my company I had
corporals who could do a platoon sergeant's job and
do it well, and in fact were so soon doing. The
Reserves that filled up our ranks at Camp Pendleton
were outstanding - indistinguishable from the
Regulars.
Also, a great advantage we had was that
a remarkable number of the officer's knew each
other well even though the Division had come together
on the battlefield. A large proportion of the captains
and majors had just graduated, as I, from the Junior
Course.
I don't know what you have in your
syllabus now, but in those days we spent a good deal of
time with the fundamentals of tactics and techniques,
with many, many map exercises, command post exercises,
and field exercises. We knew the school solution and we
were ready to apply it.
In an infantry battalion of that time
there were three rifle companies - we would soon learn
that we needed four rifle companies - a weapons
company, and a headquarters and service company. In my
weapons company I had a heavy machine gun platoon - the
heavy machine gun of the day was the water-cooled .30
caliber Browning, a superb weapon - an 81mm mortar
platoon, and an anti-tank-assault platoon. The
anti-tank platoon had 3.5-inch rocket launchers - which
we just gotten to replace our 2.36-inch launchers -
flame throwers, and demolitions. As Weapons Company
commander I was also the battalion's Supporting
Arms Coordinator. I am a believer in weapons companies
and I am a believer in organic supporting arms
coordinators.
Now for the Battle for Seoul.
You have heard the broad outlines of
the battle. Now I will tell you how it was at the
company and battalion level, at least how it was at my
company, and my battalion level. Here I want to say,
and those of you who have been in combat already know
this, that every man has his own war, his own battle. I
am speaking today not as a historian but as a
participant. A historian can be objective. A
participant cannot; he can only be subjective. I will
tell you of the battle from my own narrow
perspective.
We had landed, as I have said, at
Inchon on 15 September. In the advance on Seoul, the
5th Marines were on the left and the 1st Marines on the
right. The 5th Marines took Kimpo Airfield on the 17th
and crossed the Han River northwest of Seoul on the
20th. They would have three days of hard fighting
taking the high ground immediately northwest of Seoul.
Meanwhile, the 7th Marines had unloaded at Inchon the
afternoon of the 21st and reached Kimpo that evening.
The 1st Marines crossed the river on the 24th and the
next day, 25 September, both the 1st and 5th regiments
went into the city itself. The 7th Marines, in reserve,
crossed the river and took up a position behind the 5th
Marines. General Almond, the X Corps commander, who on
21 September took personal command of the operations
ashore, ordered the U.S. Army's 32d Infantry
Regiment, followed by the 17th ROK Regiment, also to
cross the Han on 25 September and occupy "South
Mountain" to the east of Seoul. The North Korean
commander, Major General Wol Ki Chan, had chosen to
ignore the occupation of South Mountain and
concentrated his forces first on the high ground
northwest of Seoul and then on the defense of the city
itself. For this he had about 10,000 troops. At the
battalion and company level we were only dimly aware of
these developments.
Our attack began at 0700 on the 25th.
RCT-1, with the 2d KMC Battalion attached, was given a
zone of action about a mile wide going right through
the center of the city to the high ground to the
northeast. The 2d KMC Battalion was to mop up behind us
and then revert to its own regimental control. The 5th
Marines were to come into the city on our left from the
northwest and the 7th Marines, committed to combat for
the first time, were to the north and left of the 5th
Marines.
The mission assigned the 3d Battalion,
1st Marines, was to advance along the axis of Ma Po
Boulevard to seize Duksoo Palace, taking the railroad
station en route. To give you an analogy: this was
rather like crossing the Anacostia River and moving up
Pennsylvania Avenue to capture the Captitol, taking
Union Station along the way. And we had to do this in
one day. General Almond wanted the city secured by 26
September.
We had heavy going all day. George and
How Companies were in the assault, with George on the
left and on Ma Po Boulevard itself. Item Company was in
reserve. As Weapons Company Commander and Supporting
Arms Coordinator I had a most frustrating day as we
were operating under a very restrictive fire plan.
Damage to the city and civilian casualties were to be
held to a minimum; hence, we could not get artillery
support, except for directly observed targets and we
could not get close air support at all. Our Corsairs
had done a superb job from Inchon to Seoul, but air was
ruled out of the picture once we got into the city
itself.
I want you to visualize Ma Po
Boulevard. It was a wide avenue. Seoul, of course, was
a much less modern city than it is now. Ma Po Boulevard
was a solidly built up street, mostly two and three
story structures of stucco or masonry construction, and
occasional more impressive buildings - churches,
hospitals, and so on - often enclosed with a walled
compound. The street itself was interrupted by repeated
echelons of barricades. These barricades were made for
the most part of large rice straw bags filled with
earth. Other reports to the contrary, you didn't
blow up these barricades or push them aside. They were
much too heavy and inert for that. We had to contend
with them in place. Not all of them were defended.
Those that were defended had long-barreled Soviet-made
anti-tank guns - 45mm if my memory serves me - heavy
water-cooled Maxim machine guns - the equivalent of our
Brownings - and rather awkward looking anti-tank
rifles. There were also plenty of small arms fire and
sniping from all sides.
You have heard that we went through the
interior walls of the buildings. Perhaps there was some
of that but I saw none of it. The house-to-house
fighting was chiefly a matter of grenades, M-1 rifles,
and BAR automatic fire.
We had the intermittent support of
tanks. The battle tank was the M-26 Pershing and our
tankers had received them just before the Inchon
landing. The tanks were at their best when they were
being used as an assault gun. They were in direct
support of us rather than attached; therefore, they
came and went pretty much as they pleased. Back at the
Junior Course we had frequently argued the respective
merits of supporting arms assigned - that is, organic -
or attached. This was particularly true when our
battalion was operating more-or-less independently
which was a good part of the time.
By the middle of the afternoon the
situation was about as follows:
George Company had reached what the
company commander thought was Duksoo Palace, but could
not get across a small bridge to get to it.
How Company had reached a railroad
station but the company commander was having a hard
time convincing anyone he was there because the map
would indicate that the railroad station was to the
right of George Comapny and he was insisting that he
was in front of George Company and that George was
calling down artillery fire on him.
Our battalion commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Tom Ridge, sent me forward to see if I could
straighten things out. I found the George Company
commander in a highly agitated state. I also found that
he was very wrong in his map reading. he was about a
mile short of Duksoo Palace. What was in front of him
was something else. We later found out that it was a
girl's school. I said "Let's make one
more try to get across the bridge." I
couldn't get him an artillery preparation, but I
promised to give him the best I had with my 81mm
mortars which were close behind George Company. We
drenched the other side of the bridge with a couple
hundred 81 mortar shells, but the attack failed. George
Company commander was nearly distraught. He said,
"Take my bars, I've had it."
All of this was reported to Colonel
Ridge who ordered me to stay with George Company and to
organize the defense for the night. I put a road block
across the boulevard on our side of the bridge, manning
it with two rifle squads, a heavy machine gun section,
a rocket squad, and a 75mm recoilless rifle section
from the regimental Antitank Company. Our attached
engineers put in a field of anti-tank mines on the
bridge itself. There was a section of tanks with us and
I asked them to stay, but they said they had to go back
to re-arm and re-fuel and they would see us in the
morning.
There was a sizable hill to the left
rear of the road block with a house on it. George
Company set up its command post in the cellar of the
house. I established the battalion observation post -
that is to say, my radio operator, my runner, and
myself immediately in front of the house. Behind me was
a set of steps that led down into the cellar. Item
Company was on the high ground on the right of the
battalion sector and How Company, which had become
disorganized during the day, was to fill in the center
of our position. The battalion CP was about a half mile
to the rear in a brick-walled compound.
My communications consisted of the
normal radio nets - we were then using the SCR-300 -
and wire from the OP back to the battalion switchboard
and also direct lines from the OP to the 81mm mortar
battery position which was about 150 yards to the rear
of the road block.
At about midnight Colonel Ridge ordered
me to send out a patrol to make contact with a similar
patrol which was being sent out by 5th Marines. I could
hear heavy firing to my left front and it was obvious
that the 5th Marines were heavily engaged. I doubted if
a patrol could get to them. I was told to send out the
patrol anyway. I formed up a patrol, under a Corporal
Collins, of eight Marines from George Company, three
young Koreans who had joined us, and a Marine from
Weapons Company to guide them through the minefield we
had laid on the bridge. I felt I was kissing them
goodbye.
The patrol got off at about
twelve-forty-five. Almost immediately I received
another call from battalion. We were to jump off in a
night attack at 0130. I argued the point. A night
attack? Without reconnaissance or a rehearsal? What
were our objectives?
Unknown to me, Colonel Ridge had
already made these same arguments to Colonel Puller who
had already made them to General Smith who had already
made them to General Almond, but General Almond was
adament. In late evening an aerial reconnaissance
report had told him that the enemy was streaming
northward out of the city. At 2009 he had sent the
following message to General Smith:
"You will push attack now to
the limit of your objectives in order to insure maximum
destruction of enemy forces. [Signed]
Almond."
I was told that the attack would be
preceded by an intensive 15-minute artillery
preparation. About this time I heard a fire fight to my
front and I knew my patrol had been intercepted.
Several members of the patrol filtered back across the
bridge reporting that they had been ambushed,
I was sitting in the open, getting
ready for the jump-off, when I heard the sound of armor
clanking down Ma Po Boulevard. I flashed a mechanized
warning over the tactical net and then reached for my
hotline to the road block. As I did so the lead tank
fired its first round. These were Soviet-made T-34s
with 85mm guns. That first round cracked behind me as I
dived for the cellar steps. My radio operator did not
follow me. That first round had gone right through him.
Like for us, it was apparently SOP for the North Korean
tankers to have an armor-piercing round in their tank
chamber. If it had been high-explosive shell rather
than AP I would have been dead.
I asked that the artillery preparation
which had gotten ready for our attack be fired and in
minutes it came thundering down on the enemy
column.
A short while later a sergeant
telephoned me from the road block that they had knocked
out the lead tank with a combination of 75mm
recoilless, 3.5-inch rocket, and heavy machine gun
fire. The lieutenant in charge of the road block was
wounded and he, Sergeant Caldwell, had taken over.
At about 0230 enemy small arms reached
a crescendo and I began hearing the distinctive brrrp
brrrp of their sub-machine guns signalizing the
beginning of their assault. I estimated that we were
being attacked by at least a battalion supported by 10
to 12 tanks. All this time our artillery had continued
to fire. I asked that they shorten their range to the
minimum that would clear the mask of high ground we
were occupying. The 81mm mortars were already firing at
minimum range. This high-angle fire plus heavy fire
from George Company and my heavy machine guns broke up
the assault.
At about 0315 the artillery liaison
officer telephoned me that they would have to cease
barrage fire or the tubes of their guns would burn out.
As soon as the artillery stopped firing, the tanks
started moving again. In the light of the burning
buildings I could see three of them clearly, rolling
forward on Ma Po Boulevard about 500 yards to my front.
I asked for renewed artillery fire. While waiting for
it, I engaged the tanks with two of my heavy machine
guns. I could see my tracers whanging off the face
plates of the tanks. This momentarily silenced the
tanks. I asked for and was given the fires of a 155mm
battery. I adjusted the fires on the tanks and asked
that the guns be held on target for a repeat if
necessary. The 155mm fire crippled the tanks,
apparently making them immobile, but they continued to
fire. Luckily for us they were shooting high and the
rounds were going over our heads.
I was worried over what would happen
when daylight came and they could see to adjust their
shooting. I also wondered if they could get together
for another infantry assault. I called battalion and
asked them to find out what time would be first light.
The answer that came back was, as I remember, 0526. I
called down to the road block and asked that a 75mm
recoilless rifle be sent up to me on the hill. By this
time only one enemy gun was still firing at us.
Afterward I learned that it was a self-propelled 76mm
gun, a near-twin to the T-34 tank. I pointed it out to
the recoilless rifle gunner and told him to shoot as
soon as there was enough light to get a clear sight
picture. I told him he would get only one chance. He
did as he was told and we got the gun. However, we were
so intent on getting off that round we forgot about the
back blast of the recoilless rifle. It bounced of the
mud-and-wattle side of the house behind us and knocked
us head-over-heals. We thought it very funny at the
time. And that is how the night ended.
Throughout the night, First Sergeant
Rocco Zullo of George Company had been a paragon of
leadership, striding up and down the line ensuring that
his riflemen stayed in action. I was also tremendously
proud of my machine gunners. I had ten heavy machine
guns on the line and during the night they fired 120
boxes - that is to say 30,000 rounds - of
ammunition. Four of those guns were with me on the hill
and they fired 80 boxes - 20,000 - of those rounds. But
not all men, not even all Marines, are brave in combat.
As daylight came, many of the bodies huddled in the
foxholes that I thought dead popped up out of their
holes like so many prairie dogs.
Four battalions of artillery had fired
for us and I was told we emptied out all the shells of
their on-postion reserves as well as an Army supply
point.
In the full flush of morning I was
ordered to send out a patrol to ascertain the damge we
had done and what still remained in front of us. A
section of Marine tanks came rumbling up from the rear.
I formed a tank-infantry patrol with the tanks and a
half-strength platoon. Our engineers went out on the
bridge to pick up the unexploded mines. They found them
all except, as it turned out, one. The patrol went
forward and - you guessed it - one of the tanks hit the
missing mine. The rifle platoon took something like 19
casualties, almost as many as the whole night's
fighting cost us.
When we got through counting we put the
score at seven tanks, two self-propelled guns, and
eight anti-tank guns. We also swept up 83 prisoners. I
put the enemy dead at about 250; someone else higher up
raised the figure to 475 to 500.
That was the end of the heavy fighting
in Seoul. The city was declared secure on 27 September,
and three days later, as you have heard, President
Syngman Rhee and General Douglas MacArthur made a
triumphal re-entry into the capital.
Marines would not again be engaged in
serious urban combat until the Tet Offensive of 1968
and the Battle for Hue. Coincidentally, the Marines in
the Battle for Hue would again be battalions from the
1st and 5th Regiments. There are similarities and there
are differences in the two battles. I think it would be
very instructive if you were to have a panel of
battalion commanders and company commanders from these
two battles discuss them with you. Such battalion and
company commanders are available in the Washington
area.
