KOREA REMEMBERED
Chapter 10f

NINER NINER

"Bushy Pembroke"

Service details

"Bushy" graduated from the Royal Military College in 1950with the Sword of Honour. He was awarded a Military Cross for outstanding courage underfire in Korea. On his return to Australia he completed a long and distinguished militarycareer, finally retiring in Sydney where he and his family now reside.

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I arrived in Korea in July 1951, having graduated from Duntroon inDecember 1950. I was in Korea, therefore, some 10 weeks before Operation Commando. As canbe expected, for a raw young infantry graduate from Duntroon, these were weeks ofcontradictions, surprises, boredom, fear, elation, activity and self-doubt. It wasartillery in front of the infantry lines!; the nearest enemy miles away; hard physicalwork on defences, company cooks preparing hot meals, long range patrols into "noman's land" with the knot in the stomach as one experienced the first enemy shellsand mortar bombs landing ( remotely!) nearby; the first deaths - assault pioneers blown-upin our own lines (mines); trying to understand and communicate with one's NCOs, gnarledveterans of World War 11; coping with a fiery and overactive Company Commander; routineadministration a bottle of Asahi beer with one's batman in the twilight who said "Warwas Hell"?

Somehow the briefing for Operation Commando seemed like just anotherlong-range patrol. I didn't feel that I was about to enter my first major battle. Lots ofstuff about1 Corps, Brigade objectives, enemy intentions etc. None of it seemedparticularly immediate or relevant to 9 Platoon. Just another long hot walk with nothingexciting likely to happen.

The first three days confirmed the initial impression. Crossing theImjin, days of following the point platoon, along ridge lines, across paddy fields mencarrying enormous loads struggling to their feet to "continue the advance";taking up defensive positions for the night, organizing sentries; the eerie feeling ofbeing above the clouds as the morning fog covered the valleys; the occasional shell andmortar bomb; trying to follow the "battle" from the Platoon radio. Where was theCompany Commander? Where were Maurie and Jimmy? What a strange battle! Not what I learntin Military History.

The 4th of October - at last some action. C Company is to attack therear of 355 to assist the KOSB. Maurie Pears’ 7 Platoon is to take the first 220feature in Phase 1. 9 Platoon is to be in reserve with Sergeant Jack Morrison's VickersSection. Again the feeling of remoteness from reality as 7 Platoon and CompanyHeadquarters move forward through the fog.

Suddenly for the first time in days Operation Commando becomes real.Bursts of small arms fire, the crump of mortar bombs, the explosion of grenades signifiedthat 7 Platoon was heavily involved. A major memory is of the irrepressible Jack Morrisonfiring his machine guns at the Chinese running down the back of 355. He was soprofessional, so calm and actually enjoying himself. Then, the first reports ofcasualties. Maurie Pears has lost a whole section! - 9 Platoon to move forward immediatelyto the 220 feature. It must be 9 Platoon's turn - will I do as well as Maurie?

More small arms fire, mortar bombs, grenades, our artillery shellingthe rear of 355 - suddenly it seems all over. 9 Platoon has not contributed very much. Iwill never forget a tired, blackened Maurie Pears coming back later that day and saying" Arthur, war IS hell". I felt rather ashamed.

Next morning we moved back to the main battalion area. The main attackon 317 was to go in next morning, with C Company in reserve. The 5th October was a repeatof the 4th except on a much bigger scale. Through the fog, sounds of very heavy fightingalong the valley - our artillery pounding objectives, air strikes, mortar bombs exploding,tanks blazing away. The constant rattle of small arms fire. Again not much information-Basil Hardiman hit, Geoff Leary hit, calls for medical evacuation by helicopter ( ratherrare then). Still C Company sat and watched.

Suddenly Jack Gerke appeared full of urgency as usual. C Company tomove forward at last to pass through D Company and take 317. However, Baldy had to becleared first by 8 Platoon. Waiting once again whilst Baldy was cleared, then late in theafternoon the order came to take 317. Despite being prepared, the reality of having toattack 317 at the end of a long day came as a shock. I remember being worried about myPlatoon's packs, and how they would get forward to us that night. Jack Gerke soon set mestraight. We were to get 317 as fast as possible and hold it at all costs, nothing elsemattered.

In the attack on 317 the Chinese were "beaten for pace" - wewere moving too fast for them. I shall never forget the sight of a wild, red eyed,blackened Jim Young giving us some quick information as we moved through; the tremendousbombardment of 317 as we advanced; small groups of dazed Chinese moving down past us.Strangely we ignored each other - they were intent on avoiding our murderous shelling; wewere conscious of our own orders not to let anything hold us up. We finally scrambled upthe last precipitous few yards and 317 was ours. Probably I was aware at the time, but Ihave no memory of 7 Platoon assaulting with 9 Platoon. My memories of 317 are of JackGerke, CSM Arthur Stanley, and

9 Platoon. Our packs did not arrive that night, we spent a ratherhungry and cold night in our trenches under desultory shelling and mortaring.

During these days, the men were phlegmatic. Despite days of constantmovement, the heavy loads, the "fog of war", I can't remember any seriousgrumbles. When the order finally came to go, they moved fast and professionally to take317.

Late that night Jack Gerke briefed me to secure at first light aheavily wooded knoll about half way to the Hinge. This was not an attack but rather anexpansion of the Company's defended area. As usual a heavy fog covered the area as wemoved down the slope of 317 then up the steep incline to the wooded knoll. Corporal DannyPowell's section was in the lead. I sent him forward to reconnoitre the knoll, while theremainder of us went to ground. After some time he reported back that there was a largenumber of enemy on the knoll, some cooking breakfast, apparently feeling safe because ofthe thick fog. In whispers we quickly decided a plan of attack, with one section left ofthe track and the other right. We decided on a grenade assault with Danny Powell, who knewthe exact location, to give the signal for all to throw grenades. The result wasdevastating for the main part of the Chinese force huddled over their cooking fires. Wethen charged forward firing rifles and Owen guns.

Almost immediately a Chinese sentry emerged from thick scrub rightbeside Platoon Headquarters, firing a machine gun from the hip. Poor Lance Corporal Yeofell dead, shot through the head. Further machine gun fire came from another position upthe knoll towards the Hinge. I sent a section forward, and after a brief firefight theenemy was eliminated. Meanwhile the remainder of the Platoon moved through to clear theenemy position. We found nineteen enemy dead, many more badly wounded and took seventotally shocked and bewildered Chinese prisoners. As I recall, because every man wasessential to defence, I asked Company Headquarters to send forward men to escort theprisoners back and help with the wounded.

Meanwhile the Platoon prepared a defensive position covering the maindangers - the saddle leading up to the Hinge and the northern spur running down to thevalley. Most of the Chinese bodies were pushed into the steep wooded re-entrants leadingoff the spur. Throughout the early part of the action, my batman Pete Barlow gave greatassistance as radio operator. He spoke quietly to Company Headquarters as if a radiocommentator reporting the action; the move to the knoll, the assault, the Chinesereaction, the enemy casualties and our own. He was totally calm the whole time, andperformed the invaluable service of keeping Jack Gerke fully informed whilst I was busywith more urgent matters.

The rest of the day was a confused picture of digging in, reorganizing,coping with the many enemy dead, repelling small counter-attacks, all under constantshelling, mortaring and small arms fire. I shall never forget the calmness andprofessionalism of my seasoned section commanders as they dealt with each situation inturn. I can still see Sergeant Mickey Newell calmly and cheerfully going from pit to pitissuing rations, ammunition and checking on casualties. The knoll was unusual because itwas so heavily wooded. It was not to remain that way for long. I am still not sure whetherthe trees helped by providing cover or increased our casualties because the shells burstin the treetops.

9 Platoon heaved a collective sigh of relief when towards dusk CaptainArthur Rofe's A/Tk Platoon arrived to boost our reduced numbers overnight, until B Companypassed through next morning. As it was then getting too dark for a thorough reconnaissanceof the position, and movement was difficult because of the shelling and mortaring, hedecided that I should retain overall command and jointly we agreed on the best way toposition his Platoon to cover my areas of defensive weakness.

Compared with the previous day the night was relatively uneventful. Atfirst light B Company moved through in preparation for its attack on the Hinge. Thesuccessful but costly attack by B Company took the pressure off 9 Platoon but the enemyquickly realized that the way to defeat B Company was to interdict the route from 317through 9 Platoon’s knoll to the Hinge. All day he kept up a barrage of shells andmortar bombs on this lifeline. 9 Platoon no longer felt isolated but felt it was playing akey part in the final battle of Commando.

Towards afternoon the battle faded away. It seemed the worst was overand all I'm sure were congratulating themselves on having survived. Then came the momentof Commando, which is sharpest in my memory. I was in my weapon pit hoping for a quietnight. I glanced at my watch. It was exactly 2000 hrs. Suddenly in a great arc to thefront the sky lit up with an incredible series of flashes. Some thirty seconds later thearea from 317 to the Hinge received an immense concentration of shells and mortar bombswhich lasted for what seemed an eternity. Movement was impossible and for the first time Iunderstood what artillery neutralization of an area really meant.

The main Chinese regimental counter attack struck B Company but 9Platoon also received its share of attention. It was dark and the knoll was heavily woodedwith the sections relatively dispersed; control was therefore difficult, particularly withshells and mortar bombs constantly bursting amongst the trees. The situation brought hometo me the difficulty under such conditions of actually "seeing" the enemy. Thereis movement in that re-entrant but exactly where and how many? Opportunities to get agroup of enemy clearly in one's sights and fire effectively are few and far between. Thisemphasizes the importance of clearly appreciating lines of approach and sticking to thepre-determined fire plan.

Under the circumstances the effectiveness of our own artillery andmortar fire was paramount. I have no doubt that B Company and 9 Platoon would have beenoverrun that night if the many hundreds of Chinese who died in the re-entrants and on thespur lines from our artillery and mortar fire, had been able to reach the forward sectionpositions. However in war things are never one sided. Amongst the many tribulations fromthe Chinese fire, 9 Platoon's morale was visibility shaken for a while when a shell scoreda direct hit on a weapon pit killing all three occupants. Throughout that long night, fromthe radio and those passing through to B Company, I learned of the hazardous situation ofB Company and the incredible bravery of those parties who struggled forward to keep BCompany supplied. Then, after a night of feverish activity, it was dawn and OperationCommando was over. My final memory was moving back to 317 and seeing Jack Gerke, gray withfatigue and the pain of his wound, but with the glint of victory in his eye

It's so difficult to sum up my impressions after 40 years. Perhaps amongthe main ones were a feeling of inadequacy compared with the competent, experienced NCOs.Difficulty in understanding how 9 Platoon's part fitted into the overall plan. An initialsense of not really being part of the battle; the look on the faces of the men as theystood over their fallen mates; the comradeship and steadfastness of the men on 9 Platoonwho uncomplainingly did everything that was asked of them and more. Above all afrightening but most humbling experience. I shall never forget what the NCOs and men of 9Platoon taught me about soldiering and the essential human values of living and dying.

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