CHAPTER XIX
The Crossroads
Although the war had again shifted in favor of United Nations forces, the
Eighth Army successes through the end of February 1951 could not be considered
an indication of eventual victory. The most that could be predicted was that the
enemy forces then arrayed in Korea would be incapable of forcing the Eighth Army
from the peninsula.
For anyone committed to the viewpoint that a war offers its participants only
the alternatives of victory or defeat, the current situation was intolerable.
General MacArthur represented this viewpoint in his suggested counteractions to
the Chinese intervention. The rejection of his proposals, he maintained, would
lead to disaster, their acceptance to victory. He neither sought nor suggested
any middle course.
President Truman, on the other hand, recognized other alternatives and was
willing to examine them. Consequently, by the close of February, he had not yet
granted any of MacArthur's calls for increased action against Communist China.
Furthermore, the resurgence and stiffening of the Eighth Army under Ridgway had
created an atmosphere in which the next course of action did not have to be
decided in haste or out of a feeling of desperate weakness.
The original purpose of United Nations military operations in Korea-to repel
the aggression and to restore peace and security in the area-of course remained
unchanged. So did the longer range and long-standing objective of the United
Nations, and particularly of the United States since Cairo, "to bring about the
establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Korea." The achievement
of these goals, particularly the longer range objective, by military means,
however, had become less likely after the impact of Chinese intervention and the
American decision in December not to commit additional forces to Korea. The
alternatives consequently narrowed to some sort of accommodation that would
provide a halt or at least a lull in the fighting during which diplomatic
negotiation might salvage the prestige of the United States and the United
Nations and at the same time bring some result not too far short of the basic
objectives.
Through March 1951, the United States, as the Unified Command of the United
Nations, continued to fight without
having elected any new political or military courses of action. Neither
the Department of State, responsible for advising the President on political
matters, nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his principal military advisers, seemed
willing to state definitely a proposed course of action until the other party
had done so. Frequent meetings took place between State and Defense
representatives, but each Department deferred to the other for a clear statement
of what should be done in Korea. [1]
During exploratory talks on 6 February, the representatives of the Department
of State had listed five courses of action which the United Nations might
follow: an all-out military effort to conquer all Korea and unify the country by
force; complete abandonment of Korea to the Communists; extension of hostilities
to China, thus removing pressure on Korea; an indefinite military stalemate at
approximately the present battle line; or a peaceful settlement through
negotiation. The initiative in the first three courses would have to be taken by
the United Nations, but in the fourth, stalemate, neither side would have to
take the initiative. In view of the Communist rejection of overtures by the
United Nations, the initiative for bringing about a peaceful settlement, the
fifth step, now lay primarily with the Communists.
The Joint Chiefs maintained that they could not intelligently choose any one
of these steps without knowing what political course the United States meant to
follow; and since future political moves by the United States remained obscure,
the Joint Chiefs recommended no military course of action other than a
continuation of an aggressive defense. [2] The Department of State nevertheless
informed American allies participating in Korea of the five alternative courses
of action that the United Nations might consider. [3]
The Secretary of State took the position on 23 February 1951 that neither the
United Nations nor the United States had assumed any obligation to unify Korea
by military means. The 7 October 1950 resolution of the General Assembly was
permissive but not mandatory on this point. Secretary Acheson believed that most
governments having troops in Korea, including the principal allies of the United
States, would not support unification as a war aim but would continue to support
it as a political objective. [4]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not sure that the political objectives were
still valid and recommended to the Secretary of Defense on 27 February that
these objectives be reviewed for either reaffirmation or modification. Once
these objectives were firmly established, the Department of State should be able
at least to develop some short-range political courses leading toward those
political objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt they would then be able to
analyze the military capabilities of the United Nations and recommend military
courses of action to be taken in conjunction with and in furtherance of these
political courses of action. [5]
[1] (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 920-21. (2) Summary of Notes on
JCS-State Mtg., 13 Feb. 51, JSSC Rpt to JCS, p. 123.
[2] (1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 920-21. (2) JSSC Rpt to JCS, p. 119.
[3] Rad, DA-IN 3983, 21 Feb. 51, in G-3, DA files.
[4] JCS 1776/192, Incl B, App. to Annex A.
The 38th Parallel Again
The 38th Parallel assumed an ominous significance in the eyes of some United
Nations members in February and March as MacArthur's forces again drove
northward and it appeared that the Eighth Army, after pushing forward slowly,
would soon be able to cross over. Many officials, allied and American, viewing
the thrice-crossed parallel as a symbolic barrier beyond which MacArthur's men
should not again venture lest the enemy strike even harder in retaliation,
became greatly concerned.
General MacArthur had fended off newsmen's questions on the subject in
mid-February by telling them that for the time being any talk of crossing the
parallel except by patrol actions was purely academic. MacArthur took this
opportunity to reaffirm his belief that the Chinese should be attacked on their
own soil, holding that the existing superiority of the Chinese Communist enemy
must be materially reduced before he could seriously consider conducting major
operations north of the 38th Parallel. [6]
This was merely a public airing of the view he had already expressed to
General Taylor on 11 February, when he had pointed out that unless he received
authority to strike enemy bases in Manchuria, his ground forces as then
constituted could not safely attempt major operations in North Korea. He had at
the same time, of course, told Taylor that even if he found it possible to cross
the parallel in force, he still would not do it until he had received
instructions from Washington. [7]
General MacArthur's directives with regard to the 38th Parallel had not
changed. He still possessed the authority to cross granted him on 27 September
by the United States and tacitly confirmed on 7 October by the United Nations
General Assembly. But the Department of State was keenly aware of the concern
felt by some of the members of the United Nations over the advisability of
re-entering North Korea. To allay this concern, and in anticipation of the
arrival of United Nations forces at the parallel, Secretary Acheson on 23
February asked Secretary Marshall to consider revising the 27 September
directive so as to limit MacArthur's advance. Acheson added that any subsequent
decision to move substantial forces above the parallel would require preliminary
discussions with other governments having troops in Korea. [8]
Acheson enclosed a memorandum the tenor of which was generally pessimistic
and which he suggested Marshall send the President. In it, Acheson pointed out
that any decision to press for the unification of Korea by military action would
mean a vast increase in United States military commitments; would almost
certainly require the extension of hostilities to Communist China; would greatly
increase the risk of direct Soviet
intervention; and would require a major political effort to obtain the
agreement of other directly interested nations to take such action. [9]
[5] Memo, JCS, sgd. Bradley, for Secy. Defense, 27 Feb. 51, sub: Action to be
Taken by U.N. Forces With Respect to the 38th Parallel.
[6] Statement, Gen. MacArthur, 13 Feb. 51, in MacArthur Hearings, p.
3539.
[7] Rad, C 55315, MacArthur (Personal) for Gen. Taylor, 11 Feb. 51.
[8] JCS 1776/192, Incl B, App. to Annex A.
Acheson judged that virtually all members of the United Nations, including
most of those actively participating in Korea, strongly opposed any general
advance across the 38th Parallel. This opposition was based on the belief that
once the enemy had been driven out of South Korea the primary objective of
repelling the aggression had been accomplished; that an advance in North Korea
would make an early negotiated settlement of the Korean fighting impossible,
since the enemy would accept nothing less than the status quo ante bellum; that
crossing the parallel would greatly increase the pressure for extending the
hostilities into China and in turn would involve American military resources to
an increased extent in indecisive operations in Asia; and that a crossing would
greatly increase the risk of Soviet involvement and general war. [10]
A major advance across the parallel, Acheson claimed, would require full
consultation with major allies and their agreement, which under current
circumstances would be extremely difficult to obtain. Any unilateral re-entry
into North Korea by the United States, on the other hand, would create a severe
crisis within the free world and could lead to the withdrawal of certain allies
from the Korean War. Acheson did concede that all of South Korea must be
captured, claiming that such would constitute a major victory for United Nations
forces since it would deny the enemy their main objective. Nor did Acheson
propose to forbid MacArthur's men to set foot across the parallel; rather, he
proposed that no major crossing should be made. He recognized that so long as
fighting in Korea continued, MacArthur must be free to attack with naval and air
power across the parallel and to take such ground action in North Korea as was
required to interrupt enemy offensive preparations. [11]
It is evident that the Department of State officials were looking forward to
a possible settlement of the Korean crisis by negotiation. They considered it
important that United Nations military action produce a desire on the part of
the enemy to negotiate rather than to fight, and at the same time not create a
situation in which he would balk at a negotiated settlement. In other words,
MacArthur's forces should inflict so many casualties on the enemy that he would
be anxious to negotiate, but on the other hand, this punishment should take
place in the vicinity of the parallel and not in the course of pushing the enemy
so far back that he would refuse to accept a settlement at the line where the
fighting ended. [12]
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
Secretary of the Army Pace, Secretary of the Air Force Finletter, and
Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball examined the Acheson proposals and found
them reasonable. All three agreed that MacArthur should not attempt a general
advance north of the 38th Parallel except to take advantage of favorable terrain
for defense. Secretaries Pace and Finletter wanted the United States to adopt
this policy of restraint and to announce it to the world "as a matter of principle."
But on this point
Secretary Kimball dissented on grounds that discussing such a decision with
other governments or publicly announcing that MacArthur was more or less bound
to the 38th Parallel would have a bad effect from a military standpoint. [13]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, took hearty exception to the Department
of State proposals. They pointed out that so long as the political objectives of
the United Nations remained unchanged, its military forces should not be
forbidden, for political reasons, to advance north of the 38th Parallel. Such a
prohibition would be wholly inconsistent with the political objectives. [14]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed, along with Generals Ridgway and
MacArthur, that any directive halting MacArthur at the parallel would permit the
enemy to build up in North Korea such a concentration of military forces that
MacArthur's own forces would be jeopardized. Nor would a United Nations
prohibition against crossing the 38th Parallel impose a comparable restriction
on enemy forces. The Joint Chiefs told the Secretary of Defense that their own
combined military experience convinced them it would be impracticable to
undertake aggressive defensive operations to keep the numerically superior enemy
off-balance and to disrupt his preparations for new offensives if the 38th
Parallel became a limiting feature of military operations. In sum, MacArthur had
to have freedom of maneuver if for no other reason than to insure the safety of
his forces. [15]
The Joint Chiefs considered it premature even to make a preliminary
determination of MacArthur's action when he reached the parallel. They reminded
Secretary Marshall of MacArthur's announced intention to apply to them for
instructions if he found no major enemy strength disposed south of the parallel.
Until MacArthur reported his findings, the Joint Chiefs considered any decision
on crossing the parallel to be militarily unsound. For any decision to restrain
United Nations forces made on the political level and in consultation with other
nations would inevitably be disclosed to the Chinese and North Koreans who then
could base their own courses of action upon known intentions of friendly forces.
Pressing once again for a decision by the Department of State as to the course
of action to be taken to reach United States political objectives in Korea, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff told Secretary Marshall, "Until this governmental decision
is reached there should be no change in that part of the directive to General
MacArthur which now permits him so to dispose his forces either north or south
of the 38th Parallel as best to provide for their security." [16]
[13] Memo, Secys. Army, Navy, and Air Force for Secy. Defense, 26 Feb. 51,
sub: State Dept. Draft Memo for the President on the 38th Parallel, in G-3, DA
file 381 Korea, Case 3/3.
[14] Memo, JCS for
Secy.
Defense, 27 Feb. 51, sub: Action to be
Taken With Respect to the 38th Parallel.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
Because of these strong objections, Secretary Marshall told Secretary Acheson
that he did not believe the memorandum opposing a general advance across the
38th Parallel should be sent to President
Truman. Marshall himself agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there was
a risk in disclosing to the enemy a United States military decision, that
freedom of action and freedom of maneuver had to be maintained for United
Nations ground forces, and that it was, in any event, too early from a military
point of view to reach a final determination on crossing the parallel. [17]
On 2 March, General MacArthur submitted through channels a proposed report to
the United Nations for the period 15-28 February which concluded with the
statement:
While President Truman has indicated that the crossing of the
parallel is a military matter to be resolved in accordance with my
best judgment as a theater commander, I want to make it quite clear
that if and when the issue actually arises, I shall not arbitrarily
exercise that authority if cogent political reasons against
crossing are then advanced and there is any reasonable possibility
that a limitation is to be placed thereon.
But Washington authorities saw no profit in unnecessarily calling the
attention of the United Nations to the 38th Parallel and asked MacArthur to
delete this portion of his report. Both the Department of State and the
Department of Defense agreed that references to the 38th Parallel from the
military point of view should be avoided whenever possible; and General
MacArthur subsequently agreed to the excision of this part of his report. [18]
Advances in Korea
The United Nations surge up the Korean peninsula had slackened somewhat in
late February. But by 2 March, General Ridgway completed plans for Operation
RIPPER in which all corps would move northward through successive phase lines to
seize Hongch'on and Ch'unch'on in the central sector and to destroy all enemy
forces, material, and supplies in the path of the advance. [19] (See Map
VII.) Ridgway's troops opened Operation RIPPER on 7 March. Stubborn delaying
actions permitted only short gains during the first week, but by 13 March, enemy
resistance began to diminish. By 16 March, the enemy was attempting to disengage
and withdraw, and by the 18th Seoul was once again in United Nations hands and
all other objectives were generally attained. The enemy's decreasing effort to
contest Eighth Army's advances, observations of sizable enemy groups moving
northward out of the battle areas, and statements by captured soldiers, all
pointed to an enemy decision to fall back on prepared positions north of the
38th Parallel. Enemy reserve forces had been located close to the parallel for
some time, and MacArthur's intelligence officers therefore reasoned that the
enemy had had time to prepare strong defenses on or near this line of latitude.
[20]
[17] Ltr., Secy. Defense Marshall to Secy. State Acheson, 1 Mar. 51, in G-3,
DA file 381 Korea, Case 3/4.
[18] (1) Rad, C 56709, CINCFE to DA, 2
Mar. 51. (2) Telecon, TT
4477, 7
Mar. 51 (s) Telecon, TT 4479, 9
Mar. 51,
[19] Ltr., CG EUSAK to CINCFE, 2
Mar. 51, sub: Operation
RIPPER, with Incls, in G-3, GHQ, UNC files.
[20] Telecon, TT 4498, DA to GHQ, 15
Mar. 51.
The Department of the Army G-3, General Taylor, was somewhat displeased
because he was not given the details of Operation RIPPER in advance, nor even
told that it was taking place. On 17 March, he asked MacArthur to send him
the details embodied in operational directives issued by General Headquarters
and/or Eighth Army. He suggested further that in the future the Department of
the Army be an information addressee for all operational directives, to include
those of the Eighth Army. MacArthur's headquarters had not planned Operation
RIPPER nor had it issued any operational directives or orders. Ridgway had taken
care of the whole thing, merely advising MacArthur of his plans. General
MacArthur brushed aside General Taylor's request by telling him that Operation
RIPPER was merely a development of the constant interchange between his
headquarters and the commanders in Korea, and that no formal orders had been
issued by him. MacArthur insisted that Taylor was being kept fully informed of
all operations of the command but that it was impracticable to give Taylor every
detail of inter-command arrangements. [21]
[21] (1) Rad, DA 86022, DA to CINCFE, 17 Mar. 51. (2) Rad, CINCFE to DA Mar.
51.
Seeking More Forces
As one means of increasing MacArthur's ground strength in Korea, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff meanwhile had recommended to the Secretary of Defense in late
January that the Department of State be asked to seek additional forces from
U.N. members who they believed were not contributing all they could. Secretary
Marshall had asked the Department of State to do this on 30 January. On 23
February, Secretary Acheson told Marshall that some action would be taken to
carry out this proposal. Australia and New Zealand would be pressed to furnish
an additional infantry battalion each. Canada would be asked to increase its
commitment to brigade size, according to the original plan which had been
canceled in October. Certain Latin American countries also would be asked to
send ground forces to Korea. The Department of State thought that it would be
unwise, however, to ask Turkey and Greece for more ground forces and also that
there were no other countries capable of sending forces to Korea at that time.
General Taylor pointed out several factors which he felt should be taken into
consideration by the Army Chief of Staff with regard to forces from other U.N.
countries. He told General Collins on 14 March that in light of the need for
redeploying United States ground combat units to more strategic areas as soon as
possible, it would be a good idea to remove them from Korea if they could be
replaced. Too, a United Nations force composed of complete divisions from
several different countries other than the United States would provide a means
of testing certain organizational and operational methods under study in NATO.
Furthermore, it would be a long time, according to General Taylor, before ROK
Army units could be strengthened to a point where they might relieve some United
States combat troops.
It appeared to Taylor that Turkey, Greece, Great Britain, the Philippines,
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand were capable of furnishing
sizable forces up to division strength for service in Korea. The difficulty
would be in providing logistic support to these forces since the total materiel
resources of the United States were needed for current U.S. programs. Hence, any
equipment furnished for training or employing new units in Korea could be
furnished by the United States only if its programs were reduced accordingly.
[22]
[22] Memo. Gen. Taylor, G-3 DA, for CofS USA 14 Mar. 51, sub: Increasing
Foreign Contingents in Korea to Div. Size, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 63.
American military authorities, despite possible logistic headaches, continued
to insist that other nations could and should contribute more heavily to the
United Nations fighting team in Korea. Robert Lovett, Acting Secretary of
Defense, notified Secretary of State Acheson on 31 March that the Department of
Defense was not satisfied that everything possible had been done to induce these
other nations to furnish more forces, and that the current situation in Korea
presented an opportunity to renew requests for fuller participation by other
members of the United Nations. Lovett charged that the heavy commitment of
United States ground troops, the high casualties suffered, the long months of
unrelieved combat duty, and the desirability of reassigning experienced soldiers
to form cadres for mobilization of new units in the United States and of
redeploying battle-tested units to other strategic areas made it all the more
imperative that U.S. units in Korea be relieved. [23]
Mr. Lovett wanted real, not token, assistance from these other nations, and
requested that the Department of State once again prevail on such countries
having trained manpower resources to provide contingents of worthwhile size and
to equip these units and support them themselves. He particularly had in mind
the Commonwealth nations of Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, all of which
could, he felt, well afford to increase the size of their contingents in Korea.
He thought also that Great Britain might be able to furnish a full division,
while Latin American countries such as Brazil and Mexico appeared to have the
military manpower necessary to send sizable units to Korea. [24]
President Truman Is Displeased
Almost by default, a political course of action began to emerge in mid-March.
Encouraged by the results of Operation RIPPER, which proved that the military
initiative in Korea no longer lay with the enemy, U.S. policy planners decided
that efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement should be renewed. These
planners, from both Defense and State, now believed that Ridgway's punishing
attacks might have rendered the Chinese more amenable to a political settlement.
To both Departments, it appeared that the most logical beginning of a
negotiated settlement was for President Truman to appeal directly to the Chinese
Communists. For while earlier attempts to bring about negotiations had failed,
President Truman had in none of these instances been the one to suggest opening
negotiations. Furthermore, the situation seemed particularly propitious because
enemy forces were being pushed back into North Korea and could therefore
negotiate on the basis of their prewar status. [25]
The Department of State drafted such a Presidential declaration and after
obtaining the Joint Chiefs' approval of its content, began to clear it with the
other United Nations members having troops in Korea. [26] In substance, the
President was to point out that the aggressors in Korea had been driven back to
the general vicinity from which their unlawful attack had first been launched
and that, therefore, the principal objective of repelling North Korean and
Chinese Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea had been achieved. He
would assert further that United Nations objectives, such as unification and the
establishment of a free government in all of Korea, could and should be
accomplished without more fighting and bloodshed. The Chinese Communists were,
in effect, to be invited to cease fire and to negotiate a settlement of the
outstanding issues. They were also to be
warned that if they refused to negotiate, the United Nations would be forced
to continue the fighting. [27]
[23]
Ltr., Actg.
Secy. Defense (Lovett) toSecy.
State, 31 Mar. 51, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 148/19.
[24] Ibid.
[25] MacArthur Hearings, p . 343.
[26] Ibid., pp. 343-44
On 20 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff alerted General MacArthur to the
planned Presidential announcement. He was also informed that some nations
consulted believed that an advance by major forces of the United Nations Command
across the 38th Parallel would endanger further diplomatic efforts, and was
reminded that time would be needed to determine the reactions of all concerned,
including the Communist governments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already told
the Department of State that the 38th Parallel had no tactical significance, a
judgment with which the Department of State now agreed. But State had asked the
military advisers just what freedom of action MacArthur should have for the next
few weeks in order for him to maintain contact with the enemy and at the same
time insure the safety of his forces; and the Joint Chiefs, in turn, asked
MacArthur to make his own recommendations as to what latitude he required. [28]
MacArthur interpreted the latter request as a possible prelude to an order
forbidding him to cross the 38th Parallel and immediately recommended that no
further military restrictions be imposed upon his command. He explained that
since he was forbidden to use his naval and air arms as he had suggested, and
since the enemy's ground potential so far exceeded his, it remained completely
impractical anyway to attempt to clear North Korea. In sum, MacArthur felt that
his current directives were adequate and should not be changed. [29]
The proposed Presidential announcement was never made. For while it was still
being prepared, General MacArthur issued a public statement on 24 March that in
the eyes of Washington officials completely vitiated the contemplated political
move. In his statement, MacArthur declared that the tactical successes of his
forces clearly showed Communist China to be a vastly overrated military power
weak in everything but human resources. Continuing, he said, "Even under the
inhibitions which now restrict the activity of the United Nations forces and the
corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has shown its
complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea." The
confident tone of this statement contrasted sharply with MacArthur's reports to
Washington two months earlier. He also reiterated his oft-aired contention that
". . . the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must
find their answer in the diplomatic sphere." [30]
Unmindful of the President's scheduled call on the enemy for negotiation,
MacArthur then declared:
Within the area of my authority as the military commander, however,
it should be needless to say that I stand ready at any time to
confer in the field with the Commander-in-Chief of the enemy forces
in the earnest effort to find any military means whereby
realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in
Korea, to which no nation may justly take exception,
[27] JSSC Rpt. to the JCS, p. 131.
[28] Rad, JCS 86276, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Mar. 51.
[29] Rad, C 58203, CINCUNC (MacArthur) to DA for JCS, 21 Mar. 51.
[30] MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 387-88.
THE CROSSROADS
might be accomplished without further bloodshed.
President Truman was angered by MacArthur's statement since it tacitly
preempted the President's prerogatives and criticized, by implication at least,
the national policy. Besides infuriating the President, MacArthur's announcement
brought down upon Washington a rash of inquiries from allies of the United
States as to whether MacArthur's words were the precursor of a drastic change in
national policy. [31]
President Truman, on the same day he heard MacArthur's statement, called in
Acheson, Rusk, and Lovett to discuss what response to MacArthur's act would be
appropriate. They agreed that the 6 December directive to MacArthur and the
other commanders made plain what they could and could not say without prior
clearance. They further agreed that MacArthur had violated this directive. But
MacArthur was not censured for this violation, only reminded once again of the
directive itself. In an immediate dispatch, the Joint Chiefs notified MacArthur,
"In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by
you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December. The President
has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an
armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS." [32]
General MacArthur had not known the contents of the proposed Presidential
declaration. The information he received from the Joint Chiefs on 20 March did
little more than tell him that some sort of Presidential announcement was to be
made. Also, in his own offer to confer in the field with the enemy commander,
MacArthur had stressed the terms, "Within the area of my authority as a military
commander. . . ," and "... to find any military means...." Evidence that such a
move would have been quite proper is available. Shortly after the Inch'on
landing, when it was thought the North Koreans might sue for peace terms, the
Deputy Under Secretary of State told the Department of Defense, "A cease-fire
should be a purely military matter and accordingly they (the North Koreans)
should communicate their offer to the Commanding General of the unified command
. . . who is the appropriate representative to negotiate any armistice or
cease-fire agreement." [33]
[31] (1) Ibid. (2) The President interpreted MacArthur's action as
threatening the enemy with an ultimatum, implying that the United States and its
Allies might attack China without restraint. This had implications far greater
than usurpation of a prepared statement which the President had intended to
make. In the President's mind, MacArthur had once again openly defied the policy
of his Commander in Chief. See Truman, Memoirs, II, pp. 442-43.
[32] MacArthur Hearings, pp. 344, 3542.
[33]
Ltr., Dept. of State (Deputy Under
Secy.Matthews) to OSD (Gen. Burns), 15 Sep. 50, in G-3 DA file 091 Korea, Case
99, App. to JCS 1776/105.
On the related issue of recrossing the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur did
not intend to hold the Eighth Army below the line unless so ordered by
Washington. Nevertheless, he instructed General Ridgway on 22 March not to move
above the parallel in force until specifically authorized to do so. To any press
inquiries on the probability of a crossing, Ridgway was to reply that the
decision would have to be made by MacArthur himself. MacArthur informed Ridgway
that a new directive for
operations in Korea was expected from Washington shortly, apparently in the
belief that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by asking what freedom he needed in his
future operations, meant to send him new instructions, including orders on
crossing the 38th Parallel. But Washington authorities sent him no new directive
on either the parallel or the conduct of future operations. [34]
As to the immediate future, MacArthur told Ridgway, "My present intention is
to continue current type of action north of the parallel, but not to proceed
further than your logistics would support a major operation." MacArthur
evidently was more concerned with the logistical than with the political
implications of re-entering North Korea. He continued, "At that time to pass
from the present tactics which you have so ably conducted to ranger-type probing
by battalions or companies from divisional fronts operating for ten-day periods
with self-contained supplies supplemented by guerrilla type activities. If you
have any suggestions, let me have them." General Ridgway replied that he would
issue all necessary instructions to insure compliance. He interpreted
MacArthur's term "in force" as permitting at least one reinforced infantry
battalion per corps to cross the parallel if a potentially fruitful opportunity
should present itself. [36]
Bevin and the British View
In spite of the intransigence thus far shown by the Communists toward every
United Nations suggestion of settling the Korean problem by talking instead of
fighting, the British Government remained hopeful that the Communists would
eventually agree to negotiate. On 3O March, British Foreign Secretary Bevin
proposed a new attempt at negotiation. Bevin suggested the issuance of a clear
statement of Korean policy, agreed to by all countries having forces in Korea
and specifically endorsed by the unified command. This, he thought, would
provide a basis for approaching the Peiping and USSR governments in order to
explore Chinese Communist readiness to negotiate a settlement by some procedure
other than that of the Committee of Good Offices of the United Nations, which he
felt could not by itself obtain the cooperation of the Chinese. Specifically,
Bevin recommended a joint declaration by all nations having forces in
Korea-expressing their desire to see an independent and unified Korea, their
agreement to the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and their readiness to
achieve these objectives by other than military means. At the same time,
President Truman, in his capacity as Chief Executive of the state providing the
unified command, would announce that the unified command fully endorsed the
military implications of the joint declaration. Following these two statements
of policy, the Chinese and the Russians would be asked to express their views as
to the best means of bringing about a peaceful settlement in Korea. With
reference to the Presidential declaration proposed earlier and General MacArthur's
statement of 24 March, the
British foreign secretary noted that MacArthur's action was further reason for
considering an entirely new procedure since it was now unlikely that any further
statement by the unified command alone would be taken seriously by the
Communists. [36]
[34] Rad, C 58292, MacArthur (Personal) for Ridgway, 22 Mar. 51.
[35] (1) Ibid. (2) Rad, G-3 412 KCG, Ridgway (Personal) for MacArthur,
22 Mar. 51.
Ridgway Re-enters North Korea
Lacking specific instructions to the contrary, General MacArthur meanwhile
approved plans developed by General Ridgway for advancing above the 38th
Parallel. On 22 March, Ridgway informed MacArthur that he had prepared plans to
advance, if MacArthur approved, to a line that, except for a short stretch in
the west, lay just above the parallel, generally between the confluence of the
Han and Yesong Rivers on the west coast and the town of
Yangyang on the Sea of Japan. Ridgway explained that operations to reach this
line would have as their objective not the seizure of terrain but the maximum
destruction of enemy troops and materiel, and that they would be conducted with
particular care to maintain major units intact and to keep casualties to a
minimum. He assured MacArthur further that he had no intention of outrunning his
logistical support. MacArthur approved Ridgway's plan without hesitation, and
without referring it to Washington. [37]
[36] Rad, 825, Dept. of State to USUN NY, 30 Mar. 51, in G-3, DA file 091
Korea, Case 167/2.
Ridgway opened the first phase of this advance (Operation COURAGEOUS) on 22
March, moved steadily forward all along the front, and attained positions
generally along the 38th Parallel by the 30th.
[37] Rad, G-3 412 KCG, Ridgway (Personal) for MacArthur, 22 Mar. 51.
Except for a small area in the west, South Korea thus was cleared of
organized enemy forces. The latter suffered enormous casualties, although as a
result of the relatively slow Eighth Army advance compelled by Ridgway's
insistence on careful coordination and the preservation of lateral security, the
enemy units themselves managed to withdraw intact. [38]
By the time the Eighth Army regained the parallel, Ridgway, on 29 March,
completed the details of instructions for the next forward step, which he called
Operation RUGGED. The new objective, Line KANSAS, differed slightly from
Ridgway's 22 March concept by starting at the junction of the Han and Imjin
Rivers, not the Han and Yesong, then running northeastward and eastward to
Yangyang. [39]
General MacArthur flew into Korea on 3 April to discuss this next step
northward with General Ridgway and to look at the ground situation. At that
time, Ridgway explained that when he had sought approval for an advance to the
Yesong-Yangyang line, he had believed he would find good hunting in the western
area between the Imjin and the Yesong. But recent intelligence had revealed very
few enemy forces in that region and Ridgway therefore had decided not to advance
as far as the Yesong. Ridgway told MacArthur that the strongest possible line he
could seize was the one toward which he was now aiming, Line KANSAS. MacArthur
agreed and told Ridgway he wanted him to make a very strong fight for this line,
with any advance beyond it carefully limited and controlled. [40]
On 5 April, MacArthur notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Eighth Army
had jumped off in its drive across the parallel to destroy enemy forces and
supplies south of Line KANSAS. MacArthur also informed the Joint Chiefs that
Ridgway intended to follow Operation RUGGED with Operation DAUNTLESS which would
take the Eighth Army twenty miles farther into North Korea, in the west central
zone, and enable it to seize Line WYOMING and thereby gain control of an area
known to be a point of concentration for enemy troops and supplies. MacArthur
explained that, once Lines KANSAS and WYOMING had been seized, he intended to
maintain contact with the enemy only by patrols of battalion size. The existing
logistical limitations, combined with the terrain, weather conditions, and
intelligence of enemy dispositions, had convinced him that a further advance in
force beyond the present objective lines was not feasible. [41]
[38] Comd Rpt., Eighth Army, Narrative, Mar. 51.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ridgway, The Korean war: Issues and Policies, p. 420.
[41] Rad, C 59397, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr. 51.
The enemy did not strongly resist the crossing of the parallel. By 9 April,
all units in the U.S. I and IX Corps and ROK I Corps had fought their way
forward to positions on Line KANSAS; and although the U.S. X and ROK III Corps
in the central and east central sectors had been slowed down by rugged terrain
and inadequate supply routes, these two corps by the same date were drawing near
their KANSAS objectives. Throughout this early April advance, Ridgway and
MacArthur were aware that the
enemy, particularly the Chinese, was building up in rear areas and was daily
increasing his capability to launch an offensive. The enemy build-up was
especially notable in the Ch'orwon-P'yonggang-Hwach'on triangle in the west
central area, which in turn accounted for Ridgway's plan to seize this area by
advancing to Line WYOMING. On 31 March, General MacArthur had reported to the
Department of the Army that an enemy offensive of great strength might be
expected at any time after 1 April. He estimated that the Chinese had 274,000
troops in Korea and 478,000 regular troops in Manchuria. The North Koreans were
believed to have approximately 198,000 men, including guerrillas, available for
an attack. [42]
Keeping the enemy's offensive capability constantly in mind, Ridgway made
plans to contain the expected offensive by rolling to the rear with the enemy's
punch. On 12 April, he issued Operation Plan AUDACIOUS, which called for an
orderly, fighting withdrawal through successive phase lines. This withdrawal
would be made only on Ridgway's order and would be conducted in such a manner as
to inflict maximum losses on the enemy and to preserve all friendly units
intact. [43]
About the time Ridgway issued this plan, he became aware that publishing it
would be one of his last acts as the Eighth Army commander. As a result of a
decision made by President Truman two days earlier, the general who had
revitalized the Eighth Army was about to be elevated to higher command, not
primarily because of Ridgway's accomplishments, but more because of the
President's exasperation with General MacArthur.
[42] (1) Rad, CX 59065, CINCFE to DA for G-2, 31 Mar. 51. (2) Telecon, TT
4597, DA and GHQ, 13 Apr. 51. (3) Telecon, TT 4603, DA and GHQ, 15 Apr. 51.
[43] Comd Rpt., Eighth Army, Apr. 51, Narrative, pp. 11-13.
