CHAPTER XIV
The Threshold of Victory
The gauntlet cast down by the Chinese in late October and early November left
American intelligence experts guessing. Were the Chinese merely saving face?
Were they bluffing? Or did the Communist Chinese seriously mean to throw their
vast armies into Korea to defeat MacArthur's United Nations forces? American and
other intelligence analysts might disagree on Chinese motives and intentions.
But all corroborated that Chinese armies had massed in great strength along the
Yalu in Manchuria, disposed for early action in Korea if the signal came, and
that an unknown number had entered Korea. It was indeed a time for careful
treading and sober consideration.
Eighth Army's Plans and Problems
The temporary setbacks in early November did not alter MacArthur's plans. He
continued to prepare for the northward advance in the face of proof that Chinese
Communist forces had entered Korea. General Bolte had visited Korea just after,
as he described it, "the Chinese had destroyed the 8th Cavalry Regimental Combat
Team." He found General Walker apprehensive but confident over the ultimate
outcome. Walker assured Bolte that he had no intention of going on the defensive
and had withdrawn only as a temporary regrouping measure. Walker, at the time,
was bringing up his IX Corps on the right of his I Corps in order to renew the
attack in greater strength. [1]
Walker intended to advance three corps abreast, the U.S. I Corps on the west,
the U.S. IX Corps in the center, and the ROK II Corps on the east. He had set
D-day at 15 November and given his army the mission to "attack to the north
destroying enemy forces, and advance to the northern border of Korea in zone."
[2]
[1] Memo, G-3 (Bolte) for CofS USA, 14 Nov. 50, sub: Visit of Gen. Bolte and
Party to the Pacific Area, in G-3, DA file Pac, Case 8/2.
[2] (1) EUSAK Opns Plan No. 14, 6 Nov. 50. (2) War Diary, EUSAK G-3 Sec, 6
Nov. 50.
Walker's main concern in preparing for the attack lay in alleviating a
shortage of supplies in his forward areas. Since moving above P'yongyang, the
Eighth Army had been supplied mainly by airlift. General Milburn, commanding the
I Corps, told General Bolte that his corps was operating with only one day of
fire and one and one-half days of POL in reserve. General Walker felt that he
could not improve this dangerous situation in the face of the limited
transportation, the poor roads, and the long distances involved, unless the
Chinnamp'o port was in full operation. General Bolte thought that the solution
to these supply problems lay in greater effort by the Air Force. He pointed out
that the Air Force was lifting 1,000 tons daily but could double this with more
flight crews and better maintenance. "Cargo aircraft stand idle and supply is
critical," Bolte complained to Washington, "Cannot this be remedied soonest? I
emphatically recommend more help including triple crews immediately." [3]
In response to Bolte's question, General Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United
States Air Force, stepped in and asked General Stratemeyer, the FEAF commander,
if his command was supporting the Eighth Army to its fullest capability.
MacArthur's air chief replied indignantly that his planes could do no more to
step up airlift tonnage because the capacity of Korean airfields simply would
not permit doubling airlift while at the same time rendering combat tactical air
support. "General Bolte's statement re the ground situation is quite correct,"
he asserted, "but his statements re Tunner's [CG FEAF Combat Cargo Command] are
not quite so accurate. We could use much more airlift than is available, but
Bolte's recommended solution of triple crews is an over-simplification." [4]
Reporting by teleconference to the Army chief of transportation on 9
November, the transportation officer of the Far East Command sketched the
situation with regard to ports and lines of communication in Korea. Pusan was
handling about 15,000 metric tons of supply daily, and Inch'on about 8,000
metric tons. Chinnamp'o, a vital port since it was much closer to the front, had
been opened for partial operation but could handle only shallow-draft vessels.
The port had not been completely mineswept, and the large tidal basin at the
port had silted up considerably. Some LST's were being unloaded even though they
rested on the bottom of the harbor at low tide. [5]
Rail lines were equally restrictive. Single-track bottlenecks and destroyed
bridges materially reduced their capacity. The supply shortage remained serious,
and General Walker decided to postpone his attack. On 14 November, General
MacArthur's headquarters so notified the Department of the Army. When pressed
for reasons, the Far East Command staff officers told their counterparts in
Washington that the logistical estimate on which General Walker's decision was
based was not available to GHQ. Meanwhile, Walker's forces took a few steps
forward along the Ch'ongch'on River to positions they would use as a line of
departure when they did reopen their general advance. [6]
[3] Rad, CM-IN 8483, CINCFE (Bolte) to DA, 6 Nov. 50.
[4] (1) Rad, AFOOP-OD56864, CG USAF to CG FEAF, 10 Nov. 50. (2) Rad, AX 3359
B VCAP, CG FEAF to CG USAF, 12 Nov. 50.
[5] Telecon, TT 3992, DA to GHQ, 9 Nov. 50.
[6] Telecons, TT 4011, DA to GHQ, 14 Nov. 50, and TT 4016, 15 Nov. 50.
The Eighth Army would need about 4,000 tons of supply per day in order to
sustain the offensive northward. By 20 November, the efforts of all supply
agencies began to pay off and achieved the
required figure. [7] General Walker, on 22 November, notified General
MacArthur that the logistics problems in the forward area of the Eighth Army had
been solved and that he could now support a renewed offensive. [8]
The X Corps Plan
Logistically, the X Corps on the east coast enjoyed a somewhat better status
than Eighth Army. Supplies came in at Wonsan, Hungnam, and Iwon. Almond's combat
units sat relatively close to those ports in early November. ROK units moving up
the east coast were actually supplied by LST's operating over the beaches. The
situation of the 7th Division and the 1st Marine Division, however, became
progressively more difficult logistically as they moved inland away from the
ports. [9]
The reverses suffered by the Eighth Army and the appearance of Chinese troops
in front of his own troops sobered General Almond considerably. Whereas earlier
he had pressed the Marines to push forward as rapidly as possible to the border,
the brief Chinese intervention caused him to grow more cautious for a few days.
But the virtual disappearance of the Chinese from the field had the same effect
on him as it had had on General MacArthur. In any case, Almond was under orders
to resume the advance. On 11 November, he again directed the Marines to advance
to the north. [10]
The presence of Chinese forces at the front of the X Corps caused General
MacArthur's staff to re-examine the scheduled operations of Almond's corps. The
staff now assumed that the coming attacks would not be routine marches to the
border. General Willoughby's intelligence report to the Department of the Army
on 10 November showed that the enemy's offensive potential had been materially
strengthened. Particularly significant was a Chinese build-up in the
Changjin-Pujon Reservoir area. Willoughby told Department of the Army that this
build-up posed a serious threat to Almond's forces not only in the immediate
area but also in the coastal area along the northeast shoreline of Korea. "It is
believed," Willoughby stated, "that this enemy concentration even now may be
capable of seizing the initiative and launching offensive operations." He
speculated that such operations might take the form of a concerted drive to the
south in an effort to cut off U.N. forces then located to the north and east of
Hungnam. Willoughby estimated that as of that date there might well be as many
as 64,200 regular Chinese troops in Korea. By the next day, on 11 November, he
had raised this figure to 76,800. [11]
[7] (1) Interv, Col. Appleman with Col. Albert K. Stebbins, EUSAK G-4, 4 Dec.
53. (2) War Diary, EUSAK, G-4 Journal, Rad 7, 241015 Nov. 50. (3) Interv, Col.
Appleman with Gen. Allen, 15 Dec. 53.
[8] Rad, GX 50025 KGIX, CG Army Eight to CINCFE, 22 Nov. 50.
[9] Telecon, TT 3992, DA and GHQ, 9 Nov. 50.
[10] X Corps Opns Order No. 6, 11 Nov. 50.
[11] (1) Telecon, TT 3996, DA and GHQ, 10 Nov. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 4000, DA
and GHQ, 11 Nov. 50. (3) Later analyses of Chinese troop movements and order of
battle during this part of November show that, in fact, the Chinese had, as of
this date, moved 300,000 men, organized into 30 divisions, into Korea. In front
of the Eighth Army stood 180,000 men and 120,000 were concentrated in front of
Almond's X Corps. See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu,
pp. 768-69.
In the face of the enemy strength evident in General Almond's area and in the
Eighth Army's zone, General Wright's JSPOG staff closely examined the original
plan developed for X Corps operations. The Eighth Army attack was to be the main
U.N. effort. Wright's staff looked at the X Corps' plans from the standpoint of
"how can X Corps best assist Eighth Army?" The JSPOG planners had either not
consulted or did not believe intelligence estimates forwarded to Washington by
Willoughby, since their planning assumptions credited the Chinese with less
strength than shown in Willoughby's reports of the same date. According to JSPOG
assumptions on 12 November, the Eighth Army faced 18,000 Chinese troops, and the
X Corps, 7,500. These troops were in addition to 50,000 North Koreans fronting
the X Corps' path of advance. The Chinese were credited with the ability to
reinforce at the rate of 24,000 men per day. [12]
As JSPOG officers saw it, Almond's plan called for an advance to the Korean
border and destruction of enemy forces; keeping contact with the Eighth Army;
protection of the Eighth Army's right flank against enemy forces sideslipping
into it from the north; elimination of guerrillas; administration of his area.
These projected operations would not provide direct assistance to the Eighth
Army in its attack, but JSPOG officers noted that successful completion of X
Corps plans would be of considerable incidental aid to the Eighth Army. [13]
Advantages seen in the X Corps' planned operation were that momentum of
forces moving along an established direction would be retained; North Korean
forces would not have time to dig in and resist; logistics difficulties within
the X Corps would be minimized; and the route of the 1st Marine Division's
advance (to Changjin thence north to the Yalu) would pose a threat of
envelopment to the enemy. On the other hand, certain disadvantages would result
if the X Corps carried out the operation as then planned. The X Corps' drive
would not immediately affect enemy forces facing the Eighth Army. The direction
of movement of the center of mass in the X Corps would be away from the main
strength of the enemy. The most significant observation was the statement that
by continuing to advance to the north, "X Corps incurs the danger of becoming
seriously over-extended," and that if progress by the right flank of the Eighth
Army was appreciably slower than X Corps', the left flank of the X Corps would
be exposed. [14] For all practical purposes, that flank was already exposed.
A prophetic warning was contained in the portion of the staff study
discussing the advance of the Marine elements of the X Corps:
As the 1st Marines move toward Changjin they will tend to be
extended. The left flank of the Marines will be on the mountainous
ridge that divides the watersheds of the peninsula. It is generally
impassable for heavy military traffic. However, prisoner reports
show that the 124th CCF Division entered North Korea at Manpojin
and is now in the Choshin [Changjin] Reservoir area. If the 1st
Marine Division attacks north beyond this route well ahead
of the Eighth Army it will be vulnerable to attacks on its flank
and rear. [15]
This line of reasoning was quite in harmony with the views of General Smith,
the Marine division commander. General Smith on 15 November received a visit
from the chief of staff to COMNAVFE, Rear Adm. Albert K. Morehouse, whom Admiral
Joy had sent to Korea on a liaison and inspection tour. At that time Smith,
feeling that he was, as he expressed it, "talking in the family," expressed
frank concern over what he considered General Almond's unrealistic planning and
his tendency to ignore enemy capabilities when he wanted a rapid advance. [16]
Smith's views on the combat scene are further illustrated by a personal
letter to General Cates, the Marine Corps Commandant, on the same day, 15
November. He frankly admitted that he felt Almond's orders were wrong and that
he, as Marine commander in Korea, was not going to press his own troops forward
rashly to possible destruction. "Our orders still require us to advance to the
Manchurian border," Smith said. "However, we are the left flank division of the
Corps and our left flank is wide open." Smith pointed out that there was no
Eighth Army unit closer to his flank than eighty miles southwest. While the X
Corps, according to Smith, could assure him "when it is convenient" that there
were no Chinese on his flank, he observed, "if this were true, there could be
nothing to prevent the Eighth Army from coming abreast of us. This they are not
doing." [17]
Smith deliberately stalled on the advance because he did not like the
prospect of stringing out his division along "a single mountain road close to
200 miles long." Smith's principles, which he followed all the way and which
probably accounted for a good number of saved lives a month or so later, called
for concentrating his entire division into a reasonable sector and developing as
completely as possible his main supply route. He built under adverse conditions
an airfield at Hagaru-ri, and, through a slower advance, took care of his flank
security. He outposted the high ground along both sides of his main supply route
at all times. [18]
JSPOG officers believed that if X Corps operations were to be effective in
assisting the Eighth Army, only one general course of action lay open. Almond
should attack to the northwest, thus threatening the rear of the Chinese
formation facing the Eighth Army and forcing their withdrawal to avoid
envelopment. If Almond called off his advance north, two divisions could be made
available for this attack. Since the attack would probably develop on a narrow
front as a struggle for control of the route of advance, concentration of forces
for a coordinated attack would not be necessary. The attack could be launched at
once using forces already in position. [19]
[15] Ibid.
[16] Aide-Memoire, Gen. Smith, p. 600.
[17] Ibid., p. 609.
[18] See Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine
Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. III, The Chosin Reservoir
Campaign, ch. VII.
[19] Staff Study, X Corps Assistance to Eighth Army, 12 Nov. 50, JSPOG files.
The JSPOG staff concluded that the X Corps must eliminate enemy forces in the
reservoir area before any operations were feasible, and that once Changjin
was cleared it might be feasible to revise the X Corps-Eighth Army boundary
and direct X Corps to attack to the northwest to cut the Manp'ojin-Kanggye road,
which enemy forces, in all likelihood, were using as a main supply route. They
recommended that no change in the projected operations of the X Corps be made
immediately, but that the X Corps be directed to begin planning for an attack to
the northwest to cut the enemy main supply route. [20]
It is apparent that the joint planning staff did not like the look of the
situation in northeast Korea and did not completely endorse Almond's plan for
operating there. But the planners hedged. Two factors may have caused them not
to speak out against the plan. First, they must have known that MacArthur was
set on attacking to end the fighting. Also, they had a no more acceptable
solution to the problem than that under consideration. [21]
The advantages which the staff read into Almond's plans were so innocuous as
to seem fabricated. On the other hand, the disadvantages, or more exactly, the
dangers of Almond's intended advances, were plainly and honestly stated. An
objective appraisal would have weighed the advantages against the disadvantages
and found the scale tipped completely on the side of disadvantages and danger.
Had this been done, it is entirely likely that MacArthur's advisers would have
urged immediate changes in Almond's planned operations to include more limited
objectives, more coordinated advances, and, possibly, even preparations for
defensive action.
By personal letter to General Almond on 10 November, General Wright outlined
the general plan to be carried out by the Eighth Army and relayed General
MacArthur's desire that the X Corps do everything possible to assist Eighth
Army. Then, on 15 November, and accepting the recommendation of the JSPOG staff,
MacArthur directed Almond to develop, as an alternate feature of his operation,
plans for reorienting the attack to the west upon reaching the vicinity of
Changjin town, north of the Changjin Reservoir. This alternate operation would
be executed upon order from General MacArthur. [22]
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] (1) X Corps Comd Rpt, 27 Nov. 50, p. 9 (2) Rad, CX 69009, CINCFE to CG X
Corps, 15 Nov. 50.
Meanwhile, General Almond had been doing some planning of his own and on 14
November sent a letter to General Wright which, in effect, was quite in line
with the order to plan for a westward move after clearing the town of Changjin.
General Almond told General Wright:
I have your letter of 10 November relaying the CinC's directive
that the X Corps be made fully familiar with Eighth Army's plan in
order to be prepared for any possible change for a strong effort in
coordinating with Eighth Army's attack. Two members of my planning
staff have just returned from Eighth Army with a draft copy of
General Walker's Operation Plan No. 15, yet to be published in
final form. They discussed Eighth Army's plan at some length with
General Walker and certain members of his staff.
As you may already know, the Eighth Army plan is for a very
deliberate and thorough advance to objectives distant only an
average of some 20 miles North of present front line positions.
You will recall that during your recent visit with us at WONSAN we
presented X Corps capabilities of making an all-out effort, with
not less than two US divisions, to the west in the event of an
enemy breakthrough or envelopment of Eighth Army's right flank. We
have devoted continuing efforts in planning possible operations not
only to further the CinC's overall objective of securing all of
North Korea within our assigned zone as expeditiously as possible
but also to assist Eighth Army's effort.
With the containment by Eighth Army of the Communist offensive in
that area, coupled with the unchanged overall mission, it now
appears to me to be inadvisable, at this stage of Eighth Army and X
Corps operations, for X Corps forces to operate in any strength to
the west. The principal reason for this conclusion is that the only
two feasible vehicular routes to the westward in X Corps zone,
short of CHOSIN Reservoir, [23] are the YONGHUNG-TAEPYONG-NI and
the WONSAN-YANDOK roads. Since both of these routes enter the
Eighth Army zone in rear of General Walker's present front lines,
any advance in strength to the westward over them would appear to
be a fruitless operation. Even contacting the Eighth Army right
flank in the vicinity of ONYANG-NI with more than foot troops would
require a major engineer road-building effort in the mountains to
the eastward thereof.
In view of the foregoing, I am convinced that X Corps can best
support Eighth Army's effort by continuing its advance to the
north, prepared to move westward if desirable when X Corps elements
are well north of CHOSIN Reservoir, and they will be prepared to
trap and destroy any enemy forces engaging Eighth Army which depend
upon a line of communication through MANPOJIN. North of CHOSIN
Reservoir suitable lateral routes to the west appear to exist but
these routes would have to be verified when that area is reached.
Thus, X Corps Operation Order No. 6, 11 November 1950, directing
advance in zone to the north border of Korea is in accordance with
Part II, CX67291, and is I believe, at present the most important
contribution we can make to the overall operation in Korea. The
success of this advance will result in the destruction of Chinese
and North Korean forces in the reservoir area, which might
otherwise be employed on the Eighth Army front, and will place X
Corps units in a position to threaten or to cut enemy lines of
communication in the Eighth Army zone. As a corollary, X Corps will
secure the important hydroelectric power installations in its zone
and will be well along toward completing its ultimate mission prior
to the advent of severe winter conditions.
I fully appreciate the CinC's desire for us to assist the Eighth
Army in every possible way. I trust that my analysis of present X
Corps capabilities explains our views here and hope that energetic
execution of my Operation No. 6 will place assistance to the Eighth
Army before the cold weather now upon us is much more severe. [24]
[23] Chosin Reservoir is the Japanese name for the Changjin Reservoir, and is
the name by which U.N. forces best knew this body of water. The Pujon Reservoir,
east of the Changjin, was also best known by its Japanese name, Fusen.
[24] Ltr., Gen. Almond to Gen. Wright, 14 Nov. 50.
General Willoughby continued to report a crucial build-up of forces in the
Changjin-Pujon Reservoir area north of Hamhung-Hungnam. Even as Almond and
Wright exchanged views on the best course of action for the X Corps, Willoughby
informed Washington that his study revealed a great vulnerability of the open
west flank of the X Corps and of the main supply route leading from Hungnam to
the Changjin Reservoir. Almost 10,000 enemy troops had been spotted immediately
west of this vital line. In addition, the enemy had the equivalent of four
divisions in the Changjin-Pujon area. With this strength, the Chinese could
counterattack to the southeast with troops from the Changjin area in an effort to isolate X Corps
forces northeast of Hungnam, could conduct active guerrilla operations against
corps lines of communications, could throw a combined offensive against X Corps
using guerrillas and other forces, or could launch an offensive against the gap
between the Eighth Army and X Corps by sideslipping to the southwest from the
Changjin Reservoir area. [25]
[25] Telecon, TT 4028, DA and GHQ, 17 Nov. 50.
On 20 November General Almond, acting on instructions from General MacArthur,
warned his command that minimum forces only were to advance to the immediate
vicinity of Korea's northern border. No troops or vehicles were to go beyond the
boundary into Manchuria or the USSR, and no fire was to be exchanged with, or
air strikes brought down on, forces north of the northern boundary. Damage,
destruction, and
disruption of power plants were to be avoided. [26]
Troops of the 17th Infantry, 7th Division, reached the Yalu River at
Hyesanjin on 21 November. General MacArthur immediately congratulated General
Almond, who, in turn, commended the 7th Division for "an outstanding military
achievement." Almond's message ended on an optimistic note when he told Maj.
Gen. David G. Barr, "The 7th Division has reached its objective and I am
confident that you will hold it." [27]
[26] Rad, X 12811, CG X Corps to All Comdrs, 20 Nov. 50.
[27] Rads, X 2867 and X 2859, CG X Corps to CG 7th Division, 22 Nov. 50.
Almond meanwhile ordered a plan made for a westward advance along the
Hagaru-ri-Mup'yong-ni axis. He directed that the road to the Changjin Reservoir
be developed as a corps supply road and that an RCT of the 7th Division be
assigned to seize Changjin town and to protect the east flank of the 1st Marine
Division. The two objectives,
Changjin and Mup'yong-ni, were too widely separated to be assigned to a
single division. General Almond also directed that the planners take into
consideration that extreme winter temperatures of 30 to 40 degrees below zero
Fahrenheit would severely restrict both friendly and enemy operations.
On 23 November, Colonel Chiles, X Corps operations officer, took this plan to
Tokyo where he discussed it with General MacArthur's staff. On 24 November,
General MacArthur directed that the plan be carried out with one modification, a
shift of the proposed boundary between the X Corps and Eighth Army farther west
and south in the zone of the 1st Marine Division. General Almond was told to
designate his own D-day. [28] The details of the corps plan were passed on to
General Walker and the Eighth Army staff by visiting GHQ officers on 24
November. [29]
General Almond ordered his troops to advance at 0800, 27 November. The final
assignment of tasks directed the 1st Marine Division to seize Mup'yong-ni and
advance to the Yalu, the 7th Division to attack from the Changjin Reservoir and
advance to the Yalu, and the ROK I Corps to advance from Hapsu and Ch'ongjin
areas to destroy the enemy. [30]
The Cautious View
Other friendly nations meanwhile were concentrating on the threatening
situation developing along the Yalu border and took a consistently darker view
of it than did the United States. On 13 November, the Australian Prime Minister
informed the United States through diplomatic channels that the Australian
Government now believed that Chinese intervention had created a new situation in
Korea which called for careful examination. He recommended "military caution"
and forecast that the consequences of Manchurian border incidents could be so
grave that it might be best "temporarily to ignore Chinese Communist provocation
to the extent possible." [31] From embassies located in Peiping came other
warnings. The Swedish Ambassador to Communist China reported in mid-November
that Chinese Communist movements toward Korea were on a large scale. The Burmese
Embassy in Peiping at the same time expressed the view that the Chinese
Communists were ready to go to any length to aid the North Koreans and that they
were fostering mass hysteria based upon an alleged United States intention to
invade Manchuria. The Netherlands on 17 November passed along to the United
States Government information from Peiping that Chinese intervention in Korea
was motivated by fear of aggression against Manchuria. If U.N. forces halted
fifty miles south of the Yalu, the Netherlands believed, there would be no
further intervention.
[28] Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 24 Nov. 50.
[29] Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps and CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov. 50.
[30] X Corps Opns Order No. 7, 25 Nov. 50.
[31] Intelligence Rpt, 13 Nov. 50, in C-2, DA files.
General MacArthur was prescient in his apprehension that steps might be taken
to prevent his advance to the northern border of Korea. Strong sentiment was
developing among other members of the United Nations and within the Department
of State for a solution
to the problem of Chinese intervention through means other than those
currently planned. General Bolte pointed out to General Collins on 20 November
that the State Department was seriously considering a "buffer state" or
neutralized zone as a means of stopping the military action in Korea and
decreasing the possibility of world conflict. This idea, according to General
Bolte, was being pushed within the Department of State with considerable vigor,
to the extent that specific proposals by which the policy would be presented
were being drawn up. The British Government had reportedly suggested that such
an approach should be considered by the United Nations. [32]
Bolte left no doubt as to where he stood. He told Collins that he was as
unalterably opposed to a buffer zone concept as was General MacArthur. Bolte
felt that any buffer zone offer by the United States could seriously restrict
the United Nations (and the United States) militarily without any resulting
gain. He recommended strongly that General MacArthur's missions and directives
not be changed. [33]
The move to halt the United Nations Command short of the international
boundary took more definite form on 21 November with scheduling of a meeting
between the representatives of the Department of Defense and the Department of
State to discuss the possibility of negotiating with the Chinese Communists to
end the fighting in Korea by establishing a demilitarized zone on one or both
sides of the Korean-Manchurian frontier. General Bolte again addressed the Chief
of Staff on the matter and again expressed strong feelings against any such
method of curtailing military operations in Korea. "In light not only of the
United Nations objectives in Korea," Bolte said, "but also of our national
objectives world-wide, and until such time as CINCUNC indicates that he is
unable to continue the action against the Chinese Communists, his directives . .
. should not be changed, and a decision to halt the action in Korea short of the
Korean frontier should not be made on military grounds." The Army's top planning
officer felt that the only grounds on which MacArthur should be ordered to halt
his advance would be that further offensive action would cause too great a risk
of global war and conversely that cessation of the offensive would tend to
minimize that risk. In General Bolte's opinion, a continuation of the action
would not, of itself, engender risk of general war nor would a cessation of the
action lessen such a risk. He held a rather optimistic view of the United
Nations Command's combat potential, saying, "It is not envisaged that the
Chinese Communists can succeed in driving presently committed United Nations
forces from Korea, unless materially assisted by Soviet ground and air power."
He believed that MacArthur had sufficient strength to hold any line in North
Korea "in light of circumstances now prevailing." Bolte admitted that the drive
to the border would no doubt increase the tenseness of the situation to some
extent. But he emphasized that the decision to cross the 38th Parallel was based
on the consideration that all
of Korea should be cleared of Communist forces, and that attack from
Manchuria would be recognized as an open act of military aggression. Further,
the United Nations would actually have a better chance of localizing the
conflict by driving all Communist forces from North Korea. A show of strength
might well discourage further aggression where weakness would encourage it. [34]
[32] Memo, Bolte for CofS USA (Gruenther), 20 Nov. 50, sub: Buffer State in
North Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 120.
[33] Ibid.
General Bolte urged that if the Secretary of State suggested ". . . a new
United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a demilitarized zone in
North Korea to be administered by a United Nations body with Chinese Communist
representation," the Defense Department oppose it. He concluded, prophetically,
that ". . . history has proved that negotiating with Communists is as fruitless
as it is repulsive. The present case is no exception." [35]
As a result of the conference and of further moves by other members of the
United Nations a compromise solution was worked out. Assistant Secretary of
State Rusk prepared a message for General MacArthur along general lines agreed
to by the Department of Defense. He forwarded this message to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, noting that "we fully recognize that the Department of State does not
have drafting responsibility with respect to this message, but we thought that a
revised draft might provide the most convenient means for setting forth our
views for the consideration of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff." General Collins made a few alterations in the State Department draft and
on 24 November the Joint Chiefs sent the revised message to General MacArthur.
[38]
This message could in no way be considered a directive to MacArthur. At best,
it was a tentative proposal for a course of action that left him with both the
initiative and the responsibility for deciding which way the war should go.
General Collins frankly told MacArthur that the question of halting short of the
border had been raised because of the growing concern among other members of the
United Nations. The United States was faced, in this as in other instances, with
loss of support in the United Nations if it did not carefully consider the views
of its allies in Korea. Collins warned that the United States anticipated
proposals within the United Nations for resolutions which would place unwelcome
restrictions on MacArthur's advance. Considerable sentiment existed among other
nations in favor of establishing a demilitarized zone between the United Nations
forces and the frontier in the hope of reducing Chinese Communist fear of
military action against Manchuria and a corresponding sensitivity on the part of
Russia with respect to Vladivostok. [37]
[34] Memo, G-3 DA for CofS USA, 21 Nov. 50, sub: State-Defense High-Level
Mtg. on Korea, with Annex A.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Rad, WAR 97287, CofS USA (Collins) to CINCUNC, 24 Nov. 50.
[37] Ibid.
The consensus among American political and military leaders in Washington,
crystallized at the meeting of Department of Defense and State officials, had
been that no change should be made in MacArthur's immediate mission; but that
the highest officials in the American Government should at once draft a
course of action to permit the establishment of a unified Korea and, at the
same time, reduce the risk of more general involvement. The State-Defense group
had worked out in exploratory discussions certain military measures which, it
seemed to them, might reduce the tension with Communist China and the Soviet
Union, thus avoiding a rift between the United States and its allies. These
measures, which if adopted would change MacArthur's mission, were transmitted to
him. [38]
The measures assumed that MacArthur could push to the Yalu. General Collins
suggested that after advancing to or near the Yalu MacArthur pull his forces
back. Using a holding force of ROK troops, he would secure the terrain
dominating the approaches leading from the mouth of the Yalu to the area held by
the 7th Division near Hyesanjin. Other United Nations troops would fall back
into reserve positions to support the South Koreans if necessary. This plan
would be used only if effective enemy resistance ceased. The line held would be
extended eastward through Ch'ongjin on the Sea of Japan with no advances being
made by Almond's forces beyond this line. "It was thought," General Collins
explained, "that the above would not seriously affect the accomplishment of your
military mission." [39]
Only if it were militarily necessary would the United Nations troops destroy
the hydroelectric installations in North Korea. The United Nations Committee for
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea would deal at the appropriate time
with appropriate representatives, presumably the Chinese Communists, to insure
an equitable distribution of power from these installations. And in the event
that the Chinese did not again attack in force, orderly elections could be held
in North Korea and the country unified in line with United Nations plans. No
decision had yet been made on procedures for handling the matter of entering
northeastern Korea, which was extremely sensitive since dealings there would be
with the USSR and not China. [40]
"While it is recognized," General Collins went on, "that from the point of
view of the commander in the field this course of action may leave much to be
desired, it is felt that there may be other considerations which must be
accepted...." Apparently, American authorities still felt that the Chinese were
interfering reluctantly in Korea. General Collins postulated that this course
"might well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria
without loss of face...." The Russians, too, might be reassured; and it was felt
that Russian concern was at the root of their pressure on the Chinese to
interfere in Korea. [41]
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
General Collins asked for MacArthur's comments on the proposals, to include
timing and method of announcement if he agreed. He wanted to be sure that the
measures did not impede the military operation, yet felt it important that the
Chinese and Russians not misinterpret MacArthur's intention as aggression
against their borders. General Collins concluded:
Since there are many political and military implications involved
in these ideas and since other nations would be involved, no action
along these lines is contemplated until full opportunity has been
given for further consideration of your views, final decision by
the President and, possibly discussion with certain other
countries. [42]
General MacArthur turned thumbs down on the proposals. But his reply, in
contrast to his earlier blast against any form of restriction upon his advance,
was temperate. The tone of his reply approached, in some respects, patient
forbearance. The anticipated move to halt his advance had come, not as an order,
but as a suggestion which could become an order only after time-consuming
negotiation. Walker's forces had already jumped off toward the border and well
might reach it before further political action could be taken.
"The concern underlying the search for the means to confine the spread of the
Korean conflict is fully understood and shared here, but it is believed that the
suggested approach would not only fail to achieve the desired result but would
be provocative of the very consequences we seek to avert," General MacArthur
stated. He had just returned to Tokyo from a tour of the battlefront where he
had flown over the Yalu River area in a "personal reconnaissance." This flight
had convinced him beyond all doubt that it would be utterly impossible to stop
upon commanding terrain south of the Yalu if he were to keep the lines of
approach to North Korea from Manchuria under effective control. The terrain,
ranging from the lowlands in the west to the rugged central and eastern sectors,
could not easily be defended. Only along the river line itself, a line which he
was not proposing to sacrifice once achieved, were there natural defense
features to be found such as in no other defense line in all of Korea. "Nor
would it be either militarily or politically defensive," he asserted, "to yield
this natural protective barrier safeguarding the territorial integrity of
Korea." [43]
General MacArthur feared, aside from the military foolishness of such a move,
that the political results would be "fraught with most disastrous consequences."
Any failure on the part of the United Nations Command to keep going until it had
achieved its "public and oft-repeated" objective of destroying all enemy forces
south of Korea's northern boundary would be viewed by the Korean people as
betrayal. The Chinese and all other Asians would, he maintained, view it as
weakness and appeasement of the Communist Chinese and Russians. [44]
[42] Ibid.
[43] Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC (MacArthur) to DA for JCS, 25 Nov. 50.
[44] Ibid.
He presented a novel secondary argument against establishment of any sort of
buffer zone by pointing out that political tension between Manchuria and Korea
required that the international boundary be closed to minimize bandit raids and
smuggling. His study of Russian and Chinese propaganda caused him to doubt that
either nation was actually concerned over the fate of the Yalu power
installations. The ROK unit which had reached the Yalu at Ch'osan in October had
found that the power plants there had
been shut down for a full month with much of the machinery and equipment
removed, and nothing had been said by the Russians or the Chinese about the loss
of power. "In view of these factual considerations," he said, "one is brought to
the conclusion that the issue of hydroelectric power rests upon the most tenuous
of grounds." [45]
General MacArthur continued his argument by emphasizing that the entry of
Chinese Communist forces into the Korean conflict was a risk which the United
States had taken with its eyes wide open when it sent troops into Korea. "Had
they entered at the time we were beleaguered behind our Pusan Perimeter
beachhead," MacArthur surmised, "the hazard would have been far more grave than
it is now that we hold the initiative...." United Nations forces were committed
to seize the entire border area, and had already, in General Almond's sector,
occupied a sector of the Yalu River. Yet, in his opinion, there had been no
noticeable political or military reaction by the Chinese or Russians. [46]
He then outlined his plans for the future in Korea, telling the Joint Chiefs
of Staff that as soon as his men consolidated positions along the Yalu River he
would replace American troops with ROK forces. He would then order, through
public announcement so the Chinese could not fail to hear, the return of
American forces to Japan, and the parole of all prisoners of war to their homes,
and would leave the unification of Korea and the restoration of the civil
procedures of government to the people, with the advice and assistance of United
Nations authorities. [47]
If this plan did not effectively appeal to reason in the Chinese mind,
MacArthur maintained, ". . . the resulting situation is not one which might be
influenced by bringing to a halt our military measures short of present
commitments." But by resolutely meeting those commitments and accomplishing the
publicly proclaimed military mission of destroying enemy forces in Korea, the
United States could find its only hope of checking Soviet and Chinese aggressive
designs before those countries were committed to a course from which ". . . for
political reasons . . . they cannot withdraw." [48]
General Bolte urged the Chief of Staff to subscribe to these views and
recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterate their approval of the idea
of a full force advance to the border. But events were to overtake any such
action by the Joint Chiefs. [49]
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Memo, Gen. Bolte for CofS USA, 27 Nov. 50, sub: U.S. Courses of Action
in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 121.
MacArthur Attacks
Across most of the battlefront during mid-November the enemy seemed to be
withdrawing. Cautious probings by U.N. units occasionally brought strong local
reaction, but American commanders noted a definitely defensive trend. On 20
November, as the Eighth Army moved into position for the coming drive northward,
the United Nations Command reported to Washington that the
enemy had broken contact and was apparently withdrawing to positions farther
north in Eighth Army's zone. But in the eastern sector, Almond's troops were
still meeting resistance. "Recent reports seem to indicate," MacArthur's staff
informed Washington on 20 November, "that the enemy is organizing the ground to
take advantage of rough terrain, but it is still not clear as to just what this
general limited withdrawal activity may portend." These officers noted that
similar withdrawals by the enemy in the past had preceded offensive actions. "On
the other hand," they pointed but to Army officials in Washington, "the sudden
reversal coupled with limited withdrawals and considerable activity in the
vicinity of strong defensive points may indicate a high level decision to defend
from previously selected and prepared positions." [50]
Another enemy, North Korea's winter weather, had made its unwelcome
appearance. On 14 November, the temperature across the entire front plummeted to
readings ranging from ten degrees above zero in the west to twenty degrees below
zero in northeastern Korea.
General Walker's orders to his commanders reflected a considerable degree of
caution and some respect for the enemy forces facing Eighth Army. He directed a
closely coordinated attack by phase line in order to have the army under control
at all times for any sudden tactical change required by enemy action. The days
of the reckless pursuit had apparently ended. [51] Most units reached their line
of departure by 17 November. Since the logistical picture had improved and
promised to improve more in the near future, Walker announced to his commanders
that the attack northward would start on 24 November. [52]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been kept informed of the situation as it
developed throughout the month, and on 18 November General MacArthur notified
them that the Eighth Army would launch its attack as scheduled on 24 November.
He emphasized that the delay in mounting the offensive had been caused by
logistical difficulties, not enemy action. Rather euphemistically perhaps, in
light of later events, he assured the Joint Chiefs that intensified air attacks
by his air forces during the preceding 10-day period had been very successful in
isolating the battle area, stopping troop reinforcement by the enemy, and
greatly reducing his flow of supplies. [53]
There was an almost complete absence of enemy contact on the entire Eighth
Army front as Walker's men assumed their starting positions on 22-223 November.
General MacArthur, suspicious of this unusual quiet and somewhat worried over
the gap between the X Corps and Eighth Army, ordered General Stratemeyer to
patrol this gap with great care. But American pilots flying from twelve to
sixteen sorties in daylight hours and a half-dozen sorties at night located no
enemy forces in the gap. [54]
[50] Telecon, TT 4036, DA and GHQ, 20 Nov. 50.
[51] (1) EUSAK Opn Plan No. 15, 14 Nov. 50. (2) War Diary, EUSAK, G-3 Sec, 11
and 14 Nov. 50.
[52] RAD, 172100, CG EUSAK to CG IX Corps, CG X Corps, and CG ROKA, 17 Nov.
50.
[53] Rad, C 69211, CINCUNC to DA, 18 Nov. 50.
[54] (1) Rad, CX 69453, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 21 Nov. 50. (2) Rad, CG FEAF to
CINCFE, 22 Nov. 50.
General Willoughby reported to the
Department of the Army on the day before the attack that he felt the Chinese
Communist Army was having supply problems of its own and intimated that, if the
Chinese did try to stop Eighth Army, they would be at a disadvantage. He told
Washington military authorities that the Chinese had "embarked on their Korean
venture in some cases with only three days rations" and that constant contact
with U.N. ground forces and the pounding from American air had undoubtedly
depleted the enemy's ammunition reserves. "Constant United Nations pressure
along the entire line during the past few weeks," Willoughby stated, "should
make it perfectly clear to the Reds that this drain on fire power is certainly
not apt to be decreased but increased." He did not consider it likely that the
Chinese high command would make any appreciable effort to alleviate the supply
shortages of their forces, ". . . as the Chinese have always been, by western
standards, notoriously poor providers for their soldiers." On the day of the
jump-off, 24 November, Willoughby's intelligence staff predicted that the U.N.
forces were opposed, in Korea, by 82,799 North Korean soldiers and a Chinese
Communist military force of between 40,000 and 70,935. [55]
In a communique issued only hours before Walker's divisions started
northward, the United Nations commander sketched an optimistic picture of what
he referred to as his "massive compression envelopment." He felt that the Air
Force had sharply curtailed enemy reinforcement and resupply. General Almond's
forces had "reached a commanding enveloping position cutting in two the northern
reaches of the enemy's geographical potential," and Walker's forces were now to
move forward to "complete the compression and close the vise." "If successful,"
General MacArthur declared, "this should for all practical purposes end the
war." [56]
[55] Telecons, TT 4058 and TT 4063, DA and GHQ, 24-25 Nov. 50.
[56] Communique No. 12, GHQ UNC, 24 Nov. 50.
