CHAPTER XIII
The Chinese Take a Hand
The Chinese Move
Unbeknown to MacArthur or to Washington authorities, the Chinese Communist
government had begun sending infantry divisions into North Korea on October.
Between 14 October and 1 November, it appears, some 80,000 troops from the
Chinese Fourth Field Army crossed the Yalu into Korea. More than
two-thirds of this force had been in Manchuria, near the border, since July
1950. Three days before these crossings, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
prefaced this invasion with a blunt public warning: "Now that the American
forces are attempting to cross the thirty-eighth parallel on a large scale, the
Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation
created by the invasion of Korea...." Ominously, the Chinese Foreign Office
described MacArthur's operations as ". . . a serious menace to the security of
China. . ." [1]
The first real proof that Chinese soldiers had entered the fighting came
about noon on 25 October, when the ROK 1st Division in western Korea clashed
with a Chinese force and captured the first Chinese Communist soldiers taken in
the Korean War. The ROK 1st Division commander, General Paik Sun Yup, found many
dead Chinese on the battlefield and so informed General Milburn, the I Corps
commander. General Paik also took prisoners, who, by revealing that they
belonged to organized units and that Chinese soldiers were in Korea in large
numbers, gave ample proof of intervention. In eastern Korea, Almond's troops met
Chinese units and took their first Chinese prisoners on the same day as did the
Eighth Army. By 31 October they had captured a total of twenty-five Chinese and
General Almond had personally interrogated some of them. [2]
[1] (1) Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 115. (2) Appleman,
South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 687 and 767.
[2] Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 675-708
The evidence, however, was not accepted at face value in any quarter that
counted. General Willoughby, after reporting to Washington that Chinese troops
had been captured and that he believed organized Chinese units to be in Korea,
said, on 28 October:
From a tactical standpoint, with victorious United States divisions
in full deployment, it would appear that the auspicious time
for intervention has long since passed; it is difficult to believe
that such a move, if planned, would have been postponed to a time
when remnant North Korean forces have been reduced to a low point
of effectiveness. [3]
Indeed, American ears were attuned to victory and the ominous harbinger of
military disaster wrought no change in General MacArthur's plans to advance to
the border with all speed and with all forces.
Despite the assurances they had received, the Joint Chiefs of Staff showed
apprehension over the indication of Chinese Communist intervention. General
Bradley noted on 31 October that the intervention was conforming to none of the
patterns envisaged by the Joint Chiefs in their studies and in their directives
to General MacArthur. Chinese actions were "halfway between" and left some doubt
as to what the specific countermoves by MacArthur should be. Bradley based his
analysis on information which showed that elements of five Chinese Communist
divisions had been identified south of the Yalu, the largest element being a
regiment. On the same day, General Collins told the Army Policy Council that
these reported crossings of the Yalu River might reflect a face-saving effort
since Chou En-lai had said that his government would not stand idly by and watch
the North Koreans go down in defeat. Collins did not think that the Chinese
would cross the river in sufficient numbers to risk a serious beating by
MacArthur's forces. Nevertheless, when asked if the Chinese could become a real
threat to the United Nations Command, Collins replied that they definitely could
in spite of their lack of air-power and their weakness in artillery. [4]
[3] DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2971, 28 Oct. 50.
[4] (1) Memo, CVRS for Maj. Gen. Robinson E. Duff, 31 Oct. 50, in C-3, DA
file 091 Korea, Case 14/38. (2) Min., Army Policy Council, 31 Oct. 50, in CofS,
DA file 334 (APC), 31 Oct. 50.
Eighth Army Grows Cautious
Despite the Chinese threat, General Walker attempted to carry out his current
instructions from General MacArthur. He sent two of his corps plunging toward
the border in the west. In the coastal sector, the I Corps fanned out in a
3-pronged drive, crossing the Ch'ongch'on River and rolling up hard-fighting
North Korean units making a last-ditch stand. Farther east, the ROK II Corps
pushed columns northward along main roads. One of these columns, a regiment from
the ROK 6th Division,
stepped far ahead of the others and on 26 October pushed its reconnaissance
troops all the way to the Yalu at Ch'osan. There was little elation over this
feat, for almost simultaneously other ROK divisions of the ROK II Corps ran head
on into very strong Chinese units. Not only was the ROK 1st Division badly
mauled, but the regiment of the ROK 6th Division on and near the border also was
cut off by the Chinese and nearly destroyed. The climax of this early Chinese
intervention came on the night of 1-2 November when the 8th Cavalry Regiment,
1st Cavalry Division, was attacked by a full Chinese division in positions near
Unsan and very roughly handled. [5]
As soon as Walker saw what was happening, he ordered the advance halted and
withdrew his forces back across the Ch'ongch'on, holding only a shallow
bridgehead above the river. When General MacArthur learned that Walker had
stopped driving toward the border, he directed his acting chief of staff,
General Hickey, to telephone Walker in Korea and find out why. Hickey reached
Walker's chief of staff, General Allen, who furnished an interim explanation on
1 November. Walker a few days later followed this with a fuller and more
detailed explanation in a letter to General MacArthur in which he said:
On 26 October Eighth Army was advancing on a broad front in widely
separated columns in pursuit of defeated North Korean Forces. The
advance north of Pyong-yang was based upon a calculated logistical
risk involving supply almost entirely by air-lift. Supplies
available were sufficient for bare maintenance of combat operations
of one reinforced American division and four ROK divisions against
light opposition with no possibility of accumulating reserves to
meet heavier opposition. An ambush and surprise attack by fresh,
well-organized and well trained units, some of which were Chinese
Communist Forces, began a sequence of events leading to complete
collapse and disintegration of ROK II Corps of three divisions.
Contributing factors were intense, psychological fear of Chinese
intervention and previous complacency and overconfidence in all ROK
ranks. There were no indications that Chinese troops had entered
Korea prior to contact. The presence of Chinese troops increased
materially the will to fight of remaining and reconstituted North
Korean units. The ROK Corps retreated in confusion to a position in
the vicinity of KUNURI, 13 miles from the only crossing area into
the I Corps combat zone, before some semblance of order could be
restored. Losses in equipment and personnel were large. The
collapse on the east flank together with heavy attack on the 1st
ROK Division and 8th Cav RCT on the east flank of the I US Corps
seriously threatened the only road supplying the I Corps and
dictated temporary withdrawal of exposed columns of 24th Inf. Div. on
the west, a regrouping of forces, an active defense, a build-up of
supplies pending resumption of offensive and advance to the border.
By intense effort progress is being made in reorganization and
stabilization of II ROK Corps, however, it is at most only fifty
percent effective at present. The 2d US Division has been brought
up in a position to take over in the event of collapse by ROK
forces.
There has never been and there is now no intention for this Army to
take up or remain on a passive perimeter or any other type of
defense. Every effort is being made to retain an adequate
bridgehead to facilitate the resumption of the attack as soon as
conditions permit. All units continue to execute local attacks to
restore or improve lines. Plans have been prepared for resumption
of the offensive employing all forces available to the
Army to meet the new factor of organized Chinese Communist Forces.
These plans will be put into execution at the earliest possible
moment and are dependent only upon the security of the right flank,
the marshaling of the attack troops and the restoration of vital
supplies. In this connection there now exists in the forward areas
only one day of fire. Opening of Port of Chinnampo and extension of
railroad to Pyongyang is essential to movement of supplies and
troops. [6]
[5] See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pages
689-708, for detailed account of these actions.
Meanwhile, traces of further Chinese participation in the west faded quickly
as the new enemy pulled back into the mountain masses from which he had come.
X Corps and the New Enemy
Across the Taebaek mountain range far to the east of the Eighth Army and
completely out of physical contact with Walker's forces, General Almond meantime
had landed the rest of his American forces and was preparing to carry out his
part of General MacArthur's directive to advance with all possible speed to the
border. His plan of advance called for the ROK I Corps to drive up the east
coastal road to the northeastern border of Korea. He ordered the U.S. 7th
Division, which had landed at Iwon, to drive up the corridor from Pukch'ong
through Pungsan and Kapsan to the Yalu River at Hyesanjin. To the U.S. 1st
Marine Division, Almond assigned the task of pushing up from Hamhung to the
Changjin Reservoir, from where it could either drive north to the border or
shift its attack to the west and then north again. The rear areas around
Wonsan-Hamhung were to be guarded by the 3d Division, which was en route from
Japan after having completed a very brief training period. [7] Until the 3d
Division arrived, the 1st Marine Division had the responsibility for securing
the Wonsan-Hamhung area and therefore would not be entirely free to concentrate
for its advance to the Changjin Reservoir.
It was while moving toward this reservoir that the ROK 26th Regiment had on
25 October found its way blocked by strong Chinese forces at the small village
of Sudong. Prisoners taken in the heavy fighting identified the unit opposing
the ROK regiment as the CCF 124th Division. The ROK regiment fell back
and for the next few days made no headway. But the 7th Marines, U.S. 1st Marine
Division, coming up from Hamhung, took over from the ROK unit on 2 November and
in a fierce running encounter, marked by the first and last appearance of
Chinese tanks in the area, virtually destroyed this Chinese division. The
124th was barely accounted for, however, before the Marines picked up
prisoners from a fresh division, the 126th.
It was now quite clear that the eventuality so long discussed by American
planners, Communist China's entry on the side of North Korea, was no longer
hypothetical. Yet there was great reluctance at Eighth Army and X Corps
headquarters, at GHQ in Tokyo, and in Washington to accept this intervention at
face value.
[6] Memo, Gen. Walker for Gen. MacArthur, 6 Nov. 50.
[7] War Diary, X Corps, 4 Nov. 50, G-1 Rpt, Notes on Conference Between CG X
Corps and Gen. Partridge, CG 5th AF, 4 Nov. 50.
Immediate Effects
The open employment of Chinese units against the United Nations Command in
late October and early November caused a swift reversal of plans to reduce
support to that command. General Bolte, Department of the Army G-3, had flown to
Tokyo on 31 October to confer with MacArthur. On the next day he discussed with
General MacArthur, General Wright, and the JSPOG staff the cancellation and
reduction of forces to be sent to Korea and the plans for redeployment of forces
already there. Even as these officers were talking, the Chinese struck Walker's
advancing divisions and hurled them back. From Tokyo Bolte flew to Korea where
he conferred with Walker, all corps commanders, and some division commanders. As
a result of his observations, General Bolte cabled Washington that he was ". . .
convinced that any deferment, cutback, or cancellation of requested units,
individuals, or material would be premature." He urged that full support of
MacArthur be continued. He pointed out that even the psychological impact of
withdrawal or diminution would now adversely affect the command in the field.
"Recent reverses-in Eighth Army," Bolte concluded, "require assurances of full
support, which I have given them." [8]
Army officials in Washington had anticipated General Bolte's call for
reappraisal. Maj. Gen. Robinson E. Duff, acting G-3 during Bolte's absence,
immediately replied that action had been started on 3 November to halt the
cutback trend. He had recommended to General Collins that all units originally
intended for shipment to FEC, but held in the United States when it appeared
they would not be needed to finish the job in Korea, be sent at once. He also
asked that the planned reduction in United Nations units be called off. [9]
[8] Rad, Gen. Bolte to Gen. Duff, 5 Nov. 50, in G-3, DA files.
[9] Rad, WAR 95938, DA to CG RYCOM (Pass to Bolte), 6 Nov. 50.
Robert A. Lovett, Deputy Secretary of Defense, also noted the new
developments with some alarm. He was particularly disturbed by an intelligence
report on 1 November which estimated that the Chinese Communists had decided to
establish a cordon sanitaire south of the Yalu border. This report,
coupled with what Lovett described as "the renewed vigor of the enemy attacks in
the border area," caused him to counsel the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider
their plans to reduce the number of United Nations units to be sent to Korea.
The acting G-3, General Duff, seconded this suggestion, pointing out that "the
possible utilization of the enormous manpower of Communist Asia against the
United States makes it mandatory at this time to provide General MacArthur with
the largest possible United Nations force until the overall situation is better
clarified." Duff held that it was now necessary, politically and militarily, to
set a pattern for the development and use of the manpower of other friendly
world areas, particularly those where manpower was the chief military resource.
The United States, Duff felt, could not continue to provide the bulk of
anti-Communist manpower for military operations, but ". . . must preserve its
technical and scientific resources, its
productive capacity, and its trained military leadership." [10]
On 6 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the time was no longer
propitious for reducing contributions from other nations and set out to amend
the steps they had already taken in that direction. They recommended to the
Secretary of Defense that, "due to the fluid situation in Korea," action on
cutting back United Nations forces be deferred. The Secretary of Defense
subsequently passed this recommendation to the Department of State and the move
to retrench was halted. [11]
From the Far East Command, the G-1, General Beiderlinden, again demanded
replacements. "This theater has been operating throughout hostilities seriously
understrength," he charged on 5 November. "The shortage of essential
replacements is continuing and reaching critical stage." The current situation
made it mandatory that replacement schedules be revised and that substantial
numbers of men be shipped at once. General Beiderlinden admitted that it would
be difficult to estimate what the losses would be in November and December, but
he maintained that the trend was upward to a marked degree. Department of the
Army officials were unable to understand, since there was no accompanying
explanation, on what basis Beiderlinden was predicting increased battle
casualties. When General Brooks, the Department of Army G-1, asked Beiderlinden
for an explanation at the next teleconference, it became apparent from the reply
that Beiderlinden had accepted Chinese Communist intervention as a proven fact
and that he expected the worst. He pointed out that battle casualties had risen
from 40 per day in October to 326 per day in the first week of November and that
this upward swing was no flash in the pan. He based his theory on a number of
disturbing considerations, and felt that the United Nations Command faced a
situation as dangerous as that of the Pusan Perimeter. He noted that the new
enemy would be better trained and equipped than the North Koreans, and that the
fighting would be carried on in bitter winter weather. Furthermore, the Eighth
Army was already experiencing transportation, supply, and evacuation
difficulties which would multiply; combat divisions were understrength; periods
which the individual soldier must spend in combat would probably increase; and
there had already been a great drop in morale among combat men at the prospect
of continued heavy fighting. [12]
[10] (1) Memo, Robert A. Lovett, Dep. Secy. Defense for JCS, 4 Nov. 50, sub:
Reduction in Forces to be Deployed in Korea. (2) Memo G-3 (Duff) for CofS, USA,
6 Nov. 50, sub: Utilization of U.N. Ground Forces Contingents, in G-3, DA file
091 Korea, Cases 111/8, 111/10.
[11] (1) Decision on JCS 1776/152, 6 Nov. 50. (2) Ltr., Secy. Defense to
Secy. State, 16 Nov. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Cases 111/8, 111/2.
[12] (1) Rad, CX 68300, CINCFE: to DA, 5 Nov. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 3982, DA
and GHQ (Brooks and Beiderlinden), 7 Nov. 50.
At a higher level, General MacArthur on 7 November appealed to the Joint
Chief of Staff for more combat strength. He told them that the appearance of the
Chinese Communist forces in strength had completely changed the over-all
situation and asked that all previous plans for sending men and units to his
command be put into full effect immediately. Holding that it was essential for
the replacement flow to his theater to be resumed at full force, MacArthur
asked also that all Army combat and service
units previously requested be sent without delay. He could not say at that date
whether more Army, Air Force, and Navy units than had already been asked for
would be required, but he was certain "that the full requirement for balanced
forces as stated during the earlier phases of the campaign must now be met with
possible appreciable augmentation thereof." "The alternatives," General
MacArthur warned, "are either a stalemate or the prospect of losing all that has
thus far been gained." [13]
Department of Army officials had already taken action to send 40,000
replacements to the Far East in November and December, and it was estimated that
all units in the Far East would be up to strength by March 1951. With regard to
the additional units, 112 combat and service units of various types had been
recommended for shipment to the Far East, although shipment of 92 of these was
contingent upon approval to send civilian component units overseas. On 16
November, the Chief of Staff told the United Nations commander that steps to
fulfill his needs were being taken. "In view of the gravity of the current
situation," Collins said, ". . . the flow of Army replacements has been resumed
at an increased rate and you will be informed earliest of the combat and service
type units alerted for movement to your command." [14]
One interesting outgrowth of the Chinese intervention was the effect on
personnel policy in the Far East with respect to the ROK soldiers who had been
integrated into American units in September. The Far East Command had
established a policy during the period of October optimism of releasing South
Korean soldiers to ROK Army control as American replacements arrived to take
their places. As of 7 November, over 8,000 of these Korean soldiers had been
released from Eighth Army's units. On that date, however, the practice was
suspended because of the new threat, and more than 20,000 Koreans remained in
American divisions. [15]
[13] Rad, CINCFE to DA, 7 Nov. 50.
[14] (1) Memo, Bolte for CofS USA, 10 Nov. 50, sub: Regarding CCF in Korea,
in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 14/42. (2) Rad, WAR 96672, DA (Collins) to
CINCFE, 16 Nov. 50.
[15] Telecon, TT 3992, DA (Brooks) and GHQ (Beiderlinden), 9 Nov. 50.
A Time for Reappraisal
One of the first intelligence reports on the Chinese intervention to reach
Washington was that of General Willoughby, who revealed on 2 November that
16,500 Chinese Communist soldiers had entered North Korea. The Chinese Communist
government reputedly was labeling these troops "volunteers." The Sinuiju radio
had announced that these troops formed the "Volunteer Corps for the Protection
of the Hydroelectric Zone" and had entered Korea expressly to prevent the
destruction of hydroelectric facilities along the Yalu. General Willoughby
admitted that the increasing resistance being met by MacArthur's forces had
removed the problem of Chinese intervention from the realm of the academic and
turned it into "a serious proximate threat." He was puzzled by the Chinese
device of committing "volunteers" in
"special units" instead of in regular organized regiments of the Chinese
Communist Army. He speculated that the Chinese, who he acknowledged were
extremely subtle and obsessed with "saving face," might be doing this in order
to have their cake and eat it too. By labeling their troops "volunteers" and
claiming that no recognized units of their army were in Korea, the Chinese would
avoid the appearance of intervention. Nor would they involve the prestige of the
Chinese Communist Army if defeated. On the other hand, by furnishing troops to
North Korea, China could claim credit for helping North Korea in its hour of
need. MacArthur's intelligence chief concluded by warning:
Although indications so far point to piecemeal commitment for
ostensible limited purposes only, it is important not to lose sight
of the maximum potential that is immediately available to the
Chinese Communists. Should the high level decision for full
intervention be made by the Chinese Communists, they could promptly
commit 29 of their 44 divisions presently deployed along the Yalu
and support a major attack with up to 15O aircraft. [16]
On the same day, 2 November, the American Consul General in Hong Kong sent
Washington a report that in August, at a conference of top Sino-Soviet leaders,
a joint decision had been made that Communist China would enter the Korean War.
According to his report, the formal decision had come on 24 October at a meeting
presided over by Premier Mao Tse-tung. An estimated twenty Chinese Communist
armies had been sent to Manchuria. [17]
On the next day, Willoughby reported 316,000 regular Chinese ground forces
and 274,000 Chinese irregulars, or security forces, in Manchuria. Most of the
regulars were believed to be along the Yalu at numerous crossing sites. [18]
These disclosures had an extremely ominous ring and, coupled with the news of
the withdrawal of Eighth Army before Chinese forces already in Korea, caused the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to call on General MacArthur for an evaluation. They
requested his earliest "interim appreciation of the situation in Korea and its
implications in light of what appears to be overt intervention by Chinese
Communist units." [19]
MacArthur's reply scarcely enlightened them. He told them, "It is impossible
at this time to authoritatively appraise the actualities of Chinese Communist
intervention in North Korea." MacArthur posed four courses of action which the
Chinese Communists might be following. The first was open intervention with full
force and without restraint; the second possibility, covert intervention
concealed for diplomatic reasons; the third course might be the use of
"volunteers" to keep a foothold in Korea; the fourth, Chinese forces might have
entered Korea assuming they would meet only ROK units which they could defeat
without great difficulty. [20]
[16] Telecon, TT 3968, G-2 DA (Bolling) with G-2 FEC (Willoughby), 2 Nov. 50.
[17] Intelligence Rpt, 2 Nov. 50, in G-2, DA files.
[18] Telecon, TT 3971, DA and GHQ UNC, 3 Nov. 50.
[19] Rad, WAR 95790, CSUSA to CINCFE, 3 Nov. 50.
[20] Rad, C 68285, CINCFE to DA for CSUSA for JCS, 4 Nov. 50,
Full intervention, according to General MacArthur, would represent a
"momentous decision of the gravest international importance." "While it is a
distinct possibility," he told the JCS, "and many foreign experts predict
such action, there are many fundamental logical reasons against it and
sufficient evidence has not yet come to hand to warrant its immediate
acceptance." Although he made no definite prediction, MacArthur felt that a
combination of the last three courses of action by the Chinese were, at the
moment, the most likely. In a cautious mood, he told the Joint Chiefs, "I
recommend against hasty conclusions which might be premature and believe that a
final appraisement should await a more complete accumulation of military facts."
Nothing in the tone or content of General MacArthur's report implied that an
emergency existed or that the situation even showed signs of getting out of
hand. His report was, in a sense, reassuring. [21]
On the same day that General MacArthur sent this appraisal to Washington, the
Chinese Communist government in an official statement charged that the United
States was bent on conquering not only Korea but also China, as "the Japanese
imperialists have done in the past." The statement, possibly made to prepare the
Chinese people for further moves in Korea, claimed that in order to protect
China, Chinese military forces must now assist North Korea. [22]
Chinese troops had crossed and were continuing to cross into North Korea over
a number of international bridges leading in from Manchuria. By 3 November,
General MacArthur's headquarters accepted the possibility that 34,000 Chinese
had entered Korea and that 415,000 regular troops were located in Manchuria,
ready to cross if ordered. Two days later, General Willoughby warned that the
Chinese Communist forces had the potential to launch a large-scale
counteroffensive at any time. [23]
The appearance of Chinese military formations in Korea, and evidence that
these forces were being augmented rapidly, caused MacArthur to call for an
all-out air effort to smash them. On 5 November, he directed General Stratemeyer
to throw the full power of the Far East Air Forces into a 2-week effort to knock
the North Koreans and their new allies out of the war. "Combat crews," he
ordered, "are to be flown to exhaustion if necessary." He instructed Stratemeyer
to destroy the Korean ends of all international bridges on the Manchurian
border. From the Yalu southward, and excluding only Rashin, the Suiho Dam, and
other hydroelectric plants, the Far East Air Forces would "destroy every means
of communication and every installation, factory, city, and village." MacArthur
warned that there must be no border violations and that all targets close to or
on the border must be attacked only under visual bombing conditions. [24]
[21] Ibid.
[22] Telecon, TT 3975, DA and GHQ, UNC, 5 Nov. 50.
[23] DIS GHQ, FEC UNC, No. 2977, 3 Nov. 50 and No. 2979, 5 Nov. 50.
[24] USAF Hist. Study No. 72, United States Air Force Operations in the
Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950-30 June 1952, ch. 1, p. 22.
On 6 November, General MacArthur notified Army authorities that he intended
to have his B-29's take out immediately the international bridges across the
Yalu between Sinuiju and An-tung. He hoped, by destroying these bridges, to
prevent or at least slow down
the flow of Chinese military strength into Korea. MacArthur conveyed this
information to Washington in a routine manner during a teleconference with the
Army staff at the Pentagon. [25]
Had this matter been handled routinely by the Army staff and merely reported
through channels, the mission might have been well under way before the nation's
leaders learned of MacArthur's intentions. However, General Stratemeyer,
apparently feeling that his chief's decision held more than passing interest,
sent to Air Force authorities in Washington a message describing his orders from
MacArthur. Within minutes, Under Secretary of Defense Lovett had been informed
and the fat was in the fire. [26]
Lovett doubted very seriously that the advantage of bombing the
Sinuiju-An-tung bridges would offset the great danger of bombing Chinese
territory. He went at once to discuss the problem with Secretary of State
Acheson and with the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dean
Rusk. The latter pointed out that the United States had promised the British
Government not to take action which might involve attacks on Manchuria without
consulting the British. Also, the United States was even then taking steps to
have the Security Council pass a resolution calling on the Chinese to halt
action in Korea, a resolution that surely would be jeopardized if bombs fell in
Manchuria. Rusk was concerned, too, over possible Soviet reaction if China
should invoke the mutual-assistance treaty with the Soviet Union.
Acheson and Lovett agreed that MacArthur's attack should be held up until the
Korean situation became much clearer, particularly in view of Rusk's comments.
Lovett then called Secretary Marshall and informed him of the details. Marshall
agreed that unless a mass movement across the Yalu was threatening the security
of MacArthur's forces, the planned bombing was unwise. Lovett then directed the
Air Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter, to tell the JCS of the feeling at State
and Defense that the action by MacArthur should await a decision from the
President himself. As a final step, Acheson called the President who was in
Independence, Missouri. President Truman stated that he would approve this
bombing only if there was an immediate and serious threat to MacArthur's forces.
Since MacArthur had reported no such threat and, indeed, only two days before
had cautioned Washington against precipitate judgment and had recommended a
wait-and-see attitude, the puzzlement of Mr. Truman and his chief advisers was
natural. The President directed that the attack be put off and that MacArthur be
asked to explain why he found this potentially dangerous action suddenly so
necessary.
[25] Telecon, TT 3976, DA and GHQ, UNC, 6 Nov. 50.
[26] Truman, Memoirs, II, 374
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on the President's instructions,
immediately directed MacArthur to call off until further orders any bombing of
the international bridges. "Consideration is being urgently given to the Korean
situation at the governmental level," they told him.
One factor is the present commitment not to take action affecting
Manchuria without consulting the British. Until further orders
postpone all bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian
border. Urgently need your estimate of the situation and the reason
for ordering bombing of Yalu River bridges as indicated. [27]
This order from Washington brought from General MacArthur an immediate
protest couched in strong terms which portrayed the situation in Korea in the
most pessimistic vein since July and August. He warned on 6 November that "men
and materiel in large forces are pouring across all bridges over the Yalu from
Manchuria," and, for the first time since Chinese entry had become evident,
admitted that the situation was serious. "This movement not only jeopardizes but
threatens the ultimate destruction of the forces under my command." He described
for them how the Chinese were moving across the bridges under cover of darkness.
Chinese troops could be committed without being attacked effectively by air
because of the short distances from the river to the front lines. "The only way
to stop this reinforcement of the enemy is the destruction of these bridges and
the subjection of all installations in the north area supporting the enemy
advance to the maximum of our air destruction," General MacArthur declared.
"Every hour that this is postponed will be paid for dearly in American and other
United Nations blood." He had intended hitting the main crossing at Sinuiju
within the next few hours but in accordance with the Joint Chiefs's order had
suspended the strike "under the gravest protest that I can make." He pointed out
that his original order to bomb the bridges was, in his opinion, entirely within
the scope of his directives, the rules of war, and the resolution made by the
United Nations. It constituted to him no slightest act of belligerency against
Chinese territory.
It is interesting to note MacArthur's reference to the resolution of the
United Nations since he received his operating instructions and directives from
the very quarter at which he was lodging his protest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The resolutions of the United Nations were merely guides which the United States
Government, as the Unified Command under the United Nations, used in determining
the specific policies for the United Nations Command in Korea. General MacArthur
seemed sure that the Joint Chiefs did not realize the disastrous effect, both
physical and psychological, that would result from the restrictions they were
imposing. In an extraordinary request, he asked that President Truman be
informed of the restriction, saying, "I believe that your instructions may well
result in a calamity of major proportion for which I cannot accept the
responsibility without his personal and direct understanding of the situation."
He concluded by asking immediate reconsideration of the decision. [28]
[27] (1) Rad, JCS 95878, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 6 Nov. 50. (2) This
series of actions reveals clearly the speed with which important decisions could
be taken and the "streamlining" of the normal policy-making methods.
Stratemeyer's message had been received in Washington about three and one-half
hours before his planes were scheduled to take off on their missions. In the
interim every appropriate official within the Defense and State Departments had
been consulted and the Presidential decision based on their advice had been
reached. The JCS had sent out the order to MacArthur only an hour and twenty
minutes before the B-29's were scheduled to take off from Japan. See Truman,
Memoirs, II, 374-75.
[28] Rad, C 68396, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 6 Nov. 50. That MacArthur did not
fully understand the mechanical procedures by which the instructions he received
were evolved in Washington is evident. He seems to have assumed that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff had ordered a halt to his planned attack without Presidential
backing.
The sense of grim urgency conveyed by MacArthur's protest and his
accompanying picture of a sudden, mammoth build-up of Chinese Communist forces
in Korea surprised Washington. General Bradley called the President and read to
him MacArthur's message. Still concerned over the dangers of bombing Manchuria
by mistake, Mr. Truman nevertheless agreed to let MacArthur go ahead with his
plans. President Truman, because MacArthur was on the scene and felt very
strongly that this was of unusual urgency, told Bradley to give him the green
light. [29]
Nevertheless, it was evident that both Truman and the military planners in
Washington were gravely concerned by the tone of MacArthur's protest. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur in an immediate reply that the situation he now
depicted had changed considerably from that described in his last report of 4
November. They agreed that destruction of the bridges in question would probably
alleviate the immediate problem but that the cure might be worse than the
ailment. It might well bring increased Chinese Communist effort and even Soviet
contributions in response to what the Communists might construe as an attack on
Manchuria. Not only would this endanger MacArthur's forces, it would enlarge the
area of conflict and American involvement to a dangerous degree. [30]
But in view of the apparent emergency, with men and materiel pouring across
the Yalu bridges, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur that he could bomb
these bridges but with certain restrictions. ". . . you are authorized to go
ahead with your planned bombing in Korea near the frontier including targets at
Sinuiju and Korean end of the Yalu bridges." This did not mean, General
MacArthur was cautioned, carte blanche to bomb any dams or power plants on the
Yalu River. The Joint Chiefs expressed deep concern that careless action by the
United Nations Command near the Yalu might trigger a crisis which would cause
the fighting to spread. They specifically warned MacArthur on this, urging him
to enforce extreme care to avoid Manchurian territory and airspace and to tell
them promptly of any hostile action from Manchuria. They chided him obliquely
for being lax in reporting new developments, prompted no doubt by the great
discrepancy between his description of the situation on 4 November and that of 6
November. Certainly the routine and special reports from his command had not
indicated so great a change in the Chinese Communist situation as appeared to
have actually taken place. "It is essential," the Joint Chiefs maintained, "that
we be kept informed of important changes in the situation as they occur and that
your estimate as requested . . . be submitted as soon as possible." [31]
American intelligence agencies had been busy, meanwhile, preparing the best
possible estimate of Chinese intentions based on the pooled information from all
[29] Truman, Memoirs, II, 376.
[30] Rad, JCS 95949, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov. 50.
[31] Ibid.
American intelligence agencies had been busy, meanwhile, preparing the best
possible estimate of Chinese intentions based on the pooled information from all
their sources. This estimate was furnished all high-level planning and policy
groups, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the same day General MacArthur's
pessimistic report arrived. The estimate concluded that between 30,000 and
40,000 Chinese were now in North Korea and that as many as 700,000 men,
including 350,000 ground troops could be sent into Korea to fight against the
United Nations forces. These Chinese forces would be capable of halting the
United Nations advance by piecemeal commitment or, by a powerful all-out
offensive, forcing the United Nations to withdraw to defensive positions farther
south. The report concluded with a significant warning:
A likely and logical development of the present situation is that
the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive
increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude
are involved. At any point the danger is present that the situation
may get out of control and lead to a general war. [32]
This chilling prognosis was followed at once by another report from the
United Nations commander. He confirmed that the Chinese threat was a real and
developing one. That Chinese forces were engaging his troops was unquestionable
although their exact strength was difficult for his commanders to determine.
They were strong enough to have seized the initiative from Walker's forces in
the west and to have materially slowed Almond's advances in the east. "The
principle seems thoroughly established," General MacArthur declared, "that such
forces will be used and augmented at will, probably without any formal
declaration of hostilities." He emphasized that if the Chinese augmentation
continued it could force the United Nations Command to perform a "movement in
retrograde." But he affirmed his intentions to resume his advance in the west,
possibly within ten days, and to try to seize the initiative, provided the enemy
flow of reinforcements could be checked. In his first reference to what he later
termed a "reconnaissance in force," General MacArthur told the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, "Only through such an offensive effort can any accurate measure be taken
of enemy strength." [33]
Once again he reiterated his conviction that the bridges had to be bombed "as
the only resource left to me to prevent a potential build-up of enemy strength
to a point threatening the safety of the command." This bombing was, in his
eyes, so plainly defensive that he could hardly conceive of its causing
increased intervention or provoking a general war, as the Joint Chiefs had
intimated it might do. He promised that there would be no violation of the
Manchurian or Siberian borders and that he would not destroy the hydroelectric
installations along the Yalu. [34]
[32] Intelligence Estimate, 6 Nov. 50, sub: Chinese Communist Intervention in
Korea, in G-2, DA files.
[33] Rad, C 68465, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 Nov. 50.
[34] Ibid.
Twelve railroad and highway bridges spanned the Yalu and Tumen Rivers from
Manchuria and Russia into Korea. The most important of these were the rail and
highway bridges at Sinuiju and An-tung. These bridges were 3,000 feet long and
very sturdy. The highway
bridge at Sinuiju had been built in 1900 by the American Bridge Company and
perhaps equaled in strength any in the world. Despite the swift current, winter
ice, and spring floods, the builders had laid the foundations on bedrock. The
Japanese had built an equally sturdy double-track rail bridge of twelve trusses
in 1934, 350 yards north of the highway bridge. It was the largest rail bridge
ever built by the Japanese. [35] Near Sakchu a double-track railway bridge
spanned the Yalu, while at Manptojin both a rail and footbridge crossed the
river. Other highway bridges were located at Ongondong, Ch'ongsongjin,
Lin-chiang, Hyesanjin, Samanko, and Hoeryong.
As authorized by the President, MacArthur sent his bombers, starting on 8
November, against the bridges at Sinuiju, Sakchu, Ch'ongsongjin, Manp'ojin, and
Hyesanjin. But bombing the Yalu River bridges involved almost insurmountable
difficulties. Antiaircraft fire from Manchuria forced the bombers above 20,000
feet, and enemy jet fighters threatened them on their bomb runs. MacArthur's
orders positively forbidding any violation of Manchurian airspace severely
limited the possible axes of approach to the bridges and permitted enemy
antiaircraft artillery to zero in on the flight path of the bombers. Also, the
provision that the bridges could be attacked only under visual bombing
conditions meant that any cloud cover at the target diverted the bombers to
secondary or last-resort objectives.
On 12 November, carrier-based Navy bombers joined in the effort to destroy
the bridges. All during November, the aerial attacks against the bridges
continued but the results were disappointing. By the end of the month, the air
effort had succeeded, at great cost, in cutting four of the international
bridges and in damaging most of the others. But by this time the Yalu was frozen
over in many places and enemy engineers were building pontoon bridges across the
Yalu at critical points. On 5 December, the bridge attacks were suspended. [36]
[35] (1) DA WIR No. 91, 17 Nov. 50, p. 38, NK Border Crossings. (2) FEC
Intelligence Digest, vol. 1, No. 13, 16-30 June 1953, p. 26.
[36] (1) USAF Hist. Study No. 72, U.S. Air Force Operations in the Korean
Conflict, 1 November 50-30 June 1952, ch. 1, pp. 27-31. (2) Maj. Gen. Emmett
"Rosie" O'Donnell, Commander, FEAF Bomber Command, during the period in
question, testified before the Senate committee investigating General
MacArthur's relief to the difficulty of destroying the Yalu bridges in November
1950. General O'Donnell said, "We were not, however, allowed to violate
Manchurian territory, and by violation of territory I mean we were not allowed
to fly over an inch of it. For instance, the Yalu has several very pronounced
bends like most rivers before getting to the town of Antung, and the main
bridges at Antung we had to attack in only one manner. There was only one manner
you could attack the bridge and not violate Manchurian territory, and that was a
course tangential to the southernmost bend of the river. So you draw a line from
the southernmost bend of the river to the bridge and that is your course, and
these people on the other side of the river knew that, and they put up their
batteries right along the line and they peppered us right down the line all the
way.... In addition to that, they had their fighters come up along side; while I
didn't see them myself, the combat mission reports indicate that they would join
our formation about 2 miles to the lee and fly along at the same speed on the
other side of the river while we were making our approach, and just before we
got to bombs-away position, they would veer off to the north and climb up to
about 30,000 feet and then make a frontal quarter attack on the bombers just
about at the time of bombs-away in a turn. So that they would be coming from
Manchuria in a turn, swoop down, fire their cannon at the formation, and
continue the turn back into sanctuary-and the boys didn't like it." See
MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3069-70.
The Sanctuary and Hot Pursuit
On at least three separate occasions, American pilots, through error, had
previously violated their instructions and attacked targets in Manchuria and
Siberia. Although the U.S. Air Force attributed these incursions upon neutral
territory to pilot and navigational error, these incidents, regardless of their
cause, were serious matters. It was entirely possible that either China or
Russia could have used the incidents as an excuse for expanding the war or for
retaliating in other forms. [37] Indeed, after mid-August, Chinese antiaircraft
batteries in Manchuria fired at U.N. aircraft flying south of the Yalu. By late
October one American plane had been shot down and another damaged. [38]
The Department of State had been particularly apprehensive lest further such
encroachments should provide the Russians or Chinese a semblance of
justification for overt attacks against the United States. In a series of
pointed questions addressed to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State
had asked whether it was necessary for American air and naval forces to operate
along the North Korean border and whether the Joint Chiefs should not caution
MacArthur against such operations. Secretary Marshall had requested advice from
the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs, who had already instructed General MacArthur
on the matter of border violations, felt that MacArthur was fully aware of the
necessity for avoiding such incidents and that they could not curtail his
mission. Consequently, on 1 November, the Joint Chiefs told the Secretary of
Defense, "The need for air interdiction operations in areas contiguous to the
international boundaries of Korea is sufficient justification for not further
delimiting air operations." They pointed out that it appeared to them that all
United Nations forces would be required to operate clear up to the international
boundaries of Korea. "Therefore," they said, "it is not considered desirable
from the military point of view, to deny these ground troops air and naval
support in these areas, nor would acceptance of the loss of life entailed by
such denial be justified." [39]
The efforts to bomb out the international bridges brought the question into
sharp focus. The sorties against these bridges continued to be strongly opposed.
Russian-built jet aircraft, later identified as MIG-15's presumably piloted by
Chinese pilots, had been encountered by American pilots in the area since 1
November, when one such aircraft made a non-firing pass at a U.N. plane; and
when the U.N. air force undertook the bombing of the Yalu bridges on 8 November
the enemy jet pilots attacked in earnest. One MIG was sent down in flames on the
first day of the attacks.
[37] USAF Hist. Study No 72, ch. 5, pp. 80-81.
[38] Rad, CX 68001, CINCFE to DA, 28 Oct. 50.
[39] (1) Memo, Ch. Intnl. Br., G-3, for Gen. Schuyler, sub: Delimitation of
Air Opns Along the Northern Border of Korea, JSPC 853/60. (2) JCS 2150/9, Incl
A, Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, 1 Nov. 50, in G-3 DA file 091 Korea, Case 115.
The enemy jets did not stray far from the Manchurian border, and since
American planes were forbidden to cross, enemy pilots enjoyed an almost
insurmountable advantage. They could break off combat whenever things got
too hot for them and dash across the border to safety. American Air Force
commanders naturally complained to General MacArthur about the protection
afforded enemy pilots by their Manchurian sanctuary.
MacArthur had already sought help. "Hostile planes are operating from bases
west of the Yalu River against our forces in North Korea," General MacArthur
informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 November. These planes were increasing
in number; and the distance from the Yalu to the main line of contact was so
short that it was almost impossible to deal effectively with the hit-and-run
tactics that enemy pilots were employing. "The present restrictions imposed on
my area of operation," MacArthur asserted, "provide a complete sanctuary for
hostile air immediately upon their crossing the Manchurian-North Korean border.
The effect of this abnormal condition upon the morale and combat efficiency of
both air and ground troops is major." General MacArthur predicted that unless
corrective measures were promptly taken the air problem could assume serious
proportions, and asked for instructions for dealing with this new and
threatening development. [40] He did not, it should be noted, ask specifically
for permission to bomb Manchurian air bases or to follow enemy planes across the
border.
The Joint Chiefs could not tell MacArthur to send his fighter planes into
Manchuria after the fleeing Chinese pilots. All they could do was push the
matter with their superiors, and in an immediate reply to the United Nations
commander they told him that "urgent necessity for corrective measures" was
being presented for highest United States-level consideration. [41]
Meanwhile, other member nations of the United Nations had noted the situation
growing out of Chinese intervention and American border violations with mounting
alarm. The French Government made two proposals designed to reassure the Chinese
that the United Nations Command meant to respect their territory. The French
first proposed that the United Nations General Assembly should publicly call
upon the United Nations Command to refrain from bombing the Yalu River power
installations "except the military necessity arises." The second proposal was in
the form of a resolution to be passed by the General Assembly which would assure
the Chinese that the United Nations Command considered the Chinese border
"inviolate." The Joint Chiefs had no objection to the first French proposal
since General MacArthur had already assured them he did not intend to bomb the
power installations. Besides, the phrase "military necessity" was extremely
elastic. But they considered the second French resolution wholly unacceptable
because the term "inviolate" would convey an impression to the Chinese that the
United Nations would not, under any conditions, trespass beyond the border,
whereas there was no guarantee that the United States might not have to operate
across the Chinese frontier even before the General Assembly had a chance to adopt
the French-sponsored resolution. [42]
[40] Rad, CS 68411, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 Nov. 50.
[41] Rad, CX 95978, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Nov. so.
On 10 November, the Secretary of Defense transmitted to the Secretary of
State the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the French proposals for
resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly. Marshall agreed with the
State Department view that some form of reassurances to the Chinese Communists
was called for. "I believe it should be made clear," he told Mr. Acheson, "that
a sanctuary for attacking Chinese aircraft is not explicitly or implicitly
affirmed by an United Nations action." [43]
A draft resolution calling for withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Korea
and sponsored by six nations of the United Nations, including France, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, was placed before the Security Council of the
United Nations on 10 November. This draft resolution assured the Chinese that ".
. . it is the policy of the United Nations to hold the Chinese frontier with
Korea inviolate and fully to protect legitimate Chinese and Korean interests in
the frontier zone...." (Department of Defense objections to the term "inviolate"
obviously were unavailing.) But this measure was never passed by the Security
Council since the representative of the Soviet Union exercised his power of veto
against it. [44]
On 16 November, President Truman also attempted to reassure the Chinese
Communist government that the United Nations Command had no designs on its
borders and, further, that the United States desired no expansion of the war. In
a public announcement, he took note of the resolution then under consideration
by the Security Council, affirmed American support of this resolution, and
declared that "Speaking for the United States Government and people, I can give
assurance that we support and are acting within the limits of United Nations
policy in Korea, and that we have never at any time entertained any intention to
carry hostilities into China." [46]
[42] Memo, Actg. ACofS G-3 (Duff) for CofS USA (Collins), 10 Nov. 50, sub:
Resolutions in the U.N. to Provide Certain Assurances to the Chinese Communists,
JCS 1776/157, Include to Decision on JCS 1776/157, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,
Case 14/39.
[43] Ibid.
[44] U.N. Doc. S/1894, Joint Resolution of the Security Council, 10 Nov. 50,
contained in Department of State Publication 4263, United States Policy in
the Korean Conflict, July 1950-February 1951, Doc. 13.
[45] Statement, President Harry S. Truman, 16 Nov. 50, quoted in Department
of State Publication No, 4263, Doc. 14,
Chinese aircraft operating out of bases in Manchuria meantime attacked
MacArthur's planes with increasing intensity. By mid-November, large groups of
Communist jet aircraft were ranging across the border to intercept U.N. fliers.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with General MacArthur that this should be
stopped and proposed corrective action. They favored the removal of as many
restrictions on U.N. air operations as would allow MacArthur's airmen to pursue
enemy attackers six or eight miles across the Manchurian border. This would
greatly reduce the Communist fliers' advantage of being able to attack and
escape without suffering effective retaliation. Secretary Marshall approved this
scheme and later testified that his views were shared by Secretary Acheson and
President Truman. But these American
authorities were reluctant for the United States to take the initiative in
giving MacArthur permission to enter Manchurian airspace. To do so without
consulting other nations whose forces were in Korea would be viewed by those
nations, it was believed, as unilateral American action and might well cause a
rift between the United States and its allies. [46]
Secretary Acheson, in mid-November, instructed his ambassadors in certain key
nations to sound out their attitude toward "hot pursuit," as the issue was
termed, of Chinese aircraft into Manchuria. The reaction was unanimously against
any such action by the United Nations Command. Typical was the attitude of one
nation whose official spokesman expressed the fear that "United States
unilateral action in this regard would afford a basis to the Soviet charge that
the United Nations is only a front for the United States." One American
ambassador after interviewing the officials of the country to which he was
accredited stated that he firmly believed that the Atlantic Pact nations would
disassociate themselves from such American action as being unilateral and
without United Nations endorsement. As a result, the United States shelved the
idea of carrying the air war into Manchuria. [47]
The Mission Is Re-examined
The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile reacted cautiously to the mounting
evidence of Chinese intervention. After examining intelligence from the theater
and other sources, they informed General MacArthur that the eventuality
anticipated in their instructions to him of 27 September, "entry into North
Korea by major . . . Chinese forces," appeared to have arrived. At least the
introduction of Chinese forces to the extent reported by him would so signify.
"We believe therefore," they warned him, "that this new situation indicates your
objectives as stated in that message, 'the destruction of the North Korean armed
forces,' may have to be re-examined." [48] A change of mission in the face of
Chinese pressure could mean abandoning the drive to the Yalu, going on the
defensive, and consolidating the ground seized since Inch'on.
But MacArthur was of no mind to abandon his drive to the Yalu. Protesting to
the Joint Chiefs against any re-examination of his mission, MacArthur pointed
out that their instructions to him on 10 October had exactly defined his course
of action in this present situation. They had told him, in the event of the open
or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units without
prior announcement, to continue the action as long as in his judgment his forces
had a reasonable chance of success. [49]
[46] All of the following are in the MacArthur Hearings: Testimony of
General Marshall, p. 329, 1912; Testimony of General Vandenberg, p. 1410;
Testimony of Secretary Acheson, p. 1723.
[47] JCS 2150/10, Note by the Secys. to the JCS, sub: Reactions to Proposal
to Permit U.N. Aircraft to Pursue Attacking Enemy Aircraft into Manchuria, 4
Dec. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 115/5.
[48] Rad. JCS 96060, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Nov. 50.
[49] Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd MacArthur, 9 Nov. 50.
MacArthur rejected completely any course of action short of his original
intentions. "In my opinion it would
be fatal to weaken the fundamental and basic policy of the United Nations to
destroy all resisting armed forces in Korea and bring that country into a united
and free nation," he charged. General MacArthur proclaimed his faith in the
effectiveness of air interdiction by telling the Joint Chiefs that he could,
with his air power, keep the number of Chinese reinforcements crossing the Yalu
low enough to enable him to destroy those Chinese already in Korea. He meant to
launch his attack to destroy those forces about 15 November and to keep going
until he reached the border. "Any program short of this," he explained:
would completely destroy the morale of my forces and its
psychological consequence would be inestimable. It would condemn us
to an indefinite retention of our military forces along difficult
defense lines in North Korea and would unquestionably arouse such
resentment among the South Koreans that their forces would collapse
or might even turn against us.
He charged that anyone who hoped that the Chinese, once they had succeeded in
establishing themselves in North Korea, would abide by any agreement not to move
southward would be indulging in wishful thinking at its very worst. [50]
The Joint Chiefs had told MacArthur that consultation with the British
Government on any new course of action against China was an integral part of
American policy. In an unusually vehement burst of impatience, MacArthur
directed a scathing comment at what he termed, "The widely reported British
desire to appease the Chinese Communist by giving them a strip of Northern
Korea," and cited British action at Munich in 1938 as historic precedent for
their present attitude. [51] He went further and referred to a State Department
criticism of the British appeasement of Hitler to lend emphasis to his
statement. He charged that any such appeasement of the Communists carried the
germs of ultimate destruction for the United Nations. "To give up any portion of
North Korea to the aggression of the Chinese Communists," General MacArthur
declared, "would be the greatest defeat of the free world in recent times.
Indeed, to yield to so immoral a proposition would bankrupt our leadership and
influence in Asia and render untenable our position both politically and
militarily." MacArthur asserted that by moving to halt his forces short of the
Yalu River American authorities "would follow clearly in the footsteps of the
British who by the appeasement of recognition lost the respect of all the rest
of Asia without gaining that of the Chinese segment." [52]
[50] Ibid.
[51] A current news report had stated that Mr. Bevin favored a buffer zone
south of the Yalu. Dr. Pannikar recalls that in mid-November Mr. Bevin sent a
message through his minister in Peiping to be conveyed to Chou En-lai or the
highest accessible Chinese official. Pannikar says of this message to which he
apparently was given access, "It was a strange communication, an elucidation of
the objectives of the United Nations in Korea, an assurance from Britain that
Chinese boundaries would be respected.... when Hutchinson [the British Minister]
discussed the matter with me I frankly told him that I doubted whether the
Chinese would look at any proposal which did not include an offer of direct
negotiations of the whole issue with them; and that I considered that the idea
of Britain assuring China of the inviolability of her boundaries was
patronizing, to say the least." See Pannikar, In Two Chinas: The Memoirs of a
Diplomat, pp. 114-15.
[52] Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd MacArthur, 9 Nov. 50.
After elaborating his point, General MacArthur said that he believed that the
United States should press the United Nations for a resolution condemning the
Chinese Communists and calling upon them to "withdraw forthwith to positions
north of the international border on pain of military sanctions by the United
Nations should they fail to do so." He ended his protest on a note of confidence
as he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff that complete victory could be achieved if
"our determination and indomitable will do not desert us." [58]
Despite the optimism implicit in General MacArthur's protest that his mission
should remain unchanged, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not cheered. His protest
merely underscored the critical need for a firm course of action to meet the
Chinese interference in Korea. President Truman directed the National Security
Council to meet on 9 November to consider on an urgent basis what the national
policy should be toward Chinese Communist participation. The Joint Chiefs had
been instructed to furnish their views on what should be done. It will be
recalled that the national policy agreed upon in September had provided that in
the case of Chinese Communist intervention the United States should attempt to
localize the action in Korea and thereby avoid a general war. A second position,
but one that had only tentative approval for use as a planning guide, stated, in
substance, that United Nations forces would continue the action so long as such
action had a reasonable chance of success, and that the United Nations commander
should be authorized to take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea
against Communist China. [54]
As of 8 November, however, no firmly established set of instructions
outlining detailed measures against Chinese Communist intervention, regardless
of degree, had been agreed upon by the nation's leaders. That was the task which
faced them as MacArthur, heartened by the dwindling evidence of Chinese
participation after the first week of November, demanded to be allowed to
continue his original line of action in Korea.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 November forwarded to the Secretary of Defense
for the National Security Council a lengthy analysis containing their view on
the significance of the Chinese intervention and some suggestions on what the
United States should do about it. Without accepting the theory that the Chinese
troops in Korea were volunteers, the Joint Chiefs expressed the opinion that
such a view was feasible in the event that the Chinese merely wanted to gain
time for the defeated and disorganized remnants of the North Korean Army. But
they pointed out that intelligence reports did not back up this theory, since
they showed that Chinese Communist soldiers were entering Korea both as
individuals and in well-organized, well-led, and well-equipped units, probably
of division size. [56]
[53] Ibid.
[54] Memo, ACofS S3 (Bolte) for CofS USA (Gruenther), 8 Nov. 50, sub: U.S.
Courses of Action With Respect to Korea, in Ss, DA file 091 Korea, Case 37.
[55] Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy. Defense (Marshall), 9 Nov. 50, sub:
Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea.
Examining Chinese motives in sending military forces against the United Nations Command,
the Joint Chiefs saw
three possibilities, although none of these had as yet been made clear by
Chinese actions either in Korea or in Manchuria. The Chinese might wish to
protect the Yalu River and the Changjin-Pujon Reservoir power complexes and
establish a cordon sanitaire in North Korea; they might wish to continue
the active but undeclared war in Korea to drain American resources without
expending too much of their own military strength; or they could be planning to
drive the United Nations forces from Korea. If the Chinese Communists were
prevented, through United Nations action, from obtaining electricity from the
Yalu power systems, Manchuria's economy would suffer severely. Consequently, if
the Chinese Communists had intervened in North Korea solely to protect the power
plants, it might be well, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Secretary of
Defense, to announce an unmistakably clear guarantee that the United Nations
would not infringe on the sovereignty of Manchuria, would not damage the power
plants, and would not interfere with their operation. If the Chinese Communists
rejected such a guarantee, the United States could feel fairly certain that they
had had some other objective in intervening. [56]
That the Chinese might be planning a limited war of attrition in Korea to tie
down and dissipate United States strength was also a real possibility. As the
Joint Chiefs pointed out, "Korea is at such a distance from the United States
that it would be expensive for the United States in manpower, materiel, and
money to conduct an undeclared war in that area over a long period." Conversely,
the Chinese, being next door to Korea, would find it comparatively inexpensive,
with their practically unlimited manpower and Soviet equipment, to carry on such
a war indefinitely. The continued involvement of United States forces in Korea
would, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be in the interests of
Russia and of world communism by imposing a heavy drain on U.S. military and
economic strengths. They still considered Korea a "strategically unimportant
area" and felt that, in the event of a global war, fighting in Korea would leave
the United States off-balance while Russia completed its plans for global
conquest. The Joint Chiefs could also visualize quite clearly a situation
whereby the United States, through concentrating its strength to defeat the
Chinese in Korea, might, "win the skirmish in Korea but lose the war against the
USSR if global war eventuates." [57]
The Joint Chiefs did not truly believe that the Chinese Communists intended
to drive the United Nations forces from all of Korea. While it was possible that
the Chinese did have that intention, the Joint Chiefs felt they could not force
MacArthur's men off the peninsula "without material assistance by Soviet naval
and air-power." If Russia did intervene to that extent, it would be evident that
World War III had begun and the United States should get its divisions out of
Korea as fast as possible. [58]
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid.
If the Chinese intervened in full
strength, the Joint Chiefs foresaw three possible courses of action for
United Nations forces: to continue the action as planned; to set up a defensive
line short of Korea's northern border; or to withdraw. In the first instance,
some augmentation of United Nations military strength in Korea might be
necessary if a drive to the Yalu were to succeed, even if no more Chinese troops
entered the fighting. The second course, pause and dig in, was, in the eyes of
the Joint Chiefs, perfectly feasible and, indeed, perhaps expedient in the face
of unclarified military and political problems raised by Chinese entry. But they
rejected withdrawal because "if conducted voluntarily it would so lower the
world wide prestige of the United States that it would be totally
unacceptable...." If the United Nations forces were compelled to leave Korea
involuntarily it "could only be accepted as the prelude to global war." With
specific reference to global war, the Joint Chiefs maintained that current
conditions did not conclusively indicate that global war was imminent, only that
the risk of global war had been increased. [59]
One significant conclusion drawn by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the
evidence which they had was that the United States should, as a matter of
urgency, make every effort to settle the problem of Chinese intervention by
political means. They recommended that, through the United Nations, the Chinese
be reassured concerning the intentions of the United Nations Command and, if
necessary, that direct negotiations be carried on through the diplomatic
channels of nations that had recognized Communist China and thus had some access
to the leaders of its government. Insofar as General MacArthur's assigned
mission in Korea was concerned, the Joint Chiefs were willing to await
clarification of the Chinese Communists' military objectives before recommending
a change in the plan to drive to the Yalu. But with respect to American
preparedness elsewhere, they recommended that plans and preparations be made on
the basis that the risk of global war had been substantially increased by the
Chinese action. [60]
At the very important meeting of the National Security Council on 9 November
in Washington, General Bradley presented views developed by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with regard to possible intentions of the Chinese Communists in Korea.
Bradley ventured a personal opinion that U.N. forces could hold in the general
area of their present positions but that the question of how much Chinese
pressure these forces would have to take before being impelled to attack the
Manchurian bases would become increasingly urgent. He pointed out, however, that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed that any decision to attack Chinese
territory would have to be a U.N. decision since under the terms of U.N.
authority, which now was the guiding force behind MacArthur's directives, no
such attack was authorized. Bradley told the assembled leaders that he did not
agree with MacArthur that the bombing of the Yalu bridges would stop the Chinese
from entering Korea in strength should they choose to continue
their incursions. General Smith added that within fifteen to thirty days the
Yalu would be frozen anyway, rendering the entire question of bridge bombing
academic. [61]
[59] Ibid.
[60] Ibid.
When Secretary of Defense Marshall questioned the disposition of X Corps,
which he felt was in some danger because of its great dispersion and lack of
depth, Bradley defended MacArthur's reasons. He pointed out that in deploying
his troops MacArthur sought to carry out his directives to occupy all of North
Korea and to hold elections. On this same point, Secretary Acheson pressed
Bradley to tell them whether there was not a better line for MacArthur's forces
to occupy in Korea. Bradley agreed that, from a purely military point of view,
the chances of defending a line in Korea would increase as that line was moved
south of the Yalu. But he noted also that any backward movement on MacArthur's
part would reduce U.N. prestige and might adversely affect the will of the South
Koreans to fight. [62]
Acheson then recommended consideration of a buffer zone twenty miles deep,
ten miles on each side of the Yalu. He felt that the Russians were interested in
such an arrangement. Insofar as the Chinese were concerned, he saw them as
having two interests, first, to keep the United States involved and, secondly
and less important, to protect the border and its power plants. The Chinese, of
course, would, if such a buffer zone were proposed, insist on the departure of
all foreign troops from Korea. This would have the effect of abandoning Korea to
the Communists. [63]
After studying these various views and recommendations, the National Security
Council recommended certain interim measures to the President of the United
States. These recommendations represented the combined sentiments of the
nation's policy-makers, and largely aimed at a possible political solution to
the problem of Chinese Communist intervention and in keeping with the
established policy of avoiding, by every honorable means, a general war.
The President later recalled that November 195O found the United States
mainly concerned with three moves with regard to Korea. The United States was
attempting to reassure its European allies, especially England and France, that
it did not intend to widen the conflict or to abandon Europe for new
entanglements in Asia. Secondly, in the United Nations the United States was
attempting to gain maximum support for resistance to Chinese Communist
intervention, at the same time avoiding any United Nations move toward military
sanctions against Peiping-which would have undoubtedly meant war. Third, the
United States was making every effort to ascertain the strength and direction of
the Chinese Communist effort. [64]
[61] Truman, Memoirs, II, 378-80.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid., 381.
Although these moves may seem to have been inadequate in light of the problem
that developed later, it should be remembered that the problem itself was then
in the formative stage. The
moves, at the time, did present a logical basis from which to proceed as the
problem developed, and formed the framework of the policy that the United States
pursued until changes were forced by the pressure of events.