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Operation CHROMITE: The Forces

MacArthur planned his bold amphibious venture at Inch'on sustained only by hope, credit, and promises. At no time during his planning did he have the men and guns he would need. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, moreover, frequently told MacArthur that, with the military resources of the United States at rock bottom and because of the short-fused target date on which MacArthur adamantly insisted, the needed men and guns might not arrive on time. The disagreements over time, place, and method of landing stemmed in part from this fact and were certainly of less significance. MacArthur well knew that even with the fullest support by Washington he might not have by his chosen D-day enough trained men and equipment to breach enemy defenses and to exploit a penetration. Trained men, especially those with amphibious training, were at a premium in the United States as well as in the Far East. To assemble, equip, and move these men secretly and swiftly to the battle area by 15 September would require an enormous, finely coordinated effort by all involved. The difficulties were appalling, and to surmount them called for extraordinary energy and ingenuity.

The nature and location of the planned landing dictated that it be directed by a tactical headquarters separate from the Eighth Army. General Walker had his hands full in the Pusan Perimeter and could not easily divide his attention, effort, or staff. The size of the landing force, initially set at about two divisions, indicated a need for a corps command. It was for this reason that MacArthur, concurrently with his efforts to bring the two corps headquarters to his theater in late July, had asked that the commander and planning staff of the I Corps be flown to Tokyo. [1] But by the time General Coulter and his skeleton staff reached Japan, a need for the I Corps in the Pusan Perimeter forced MacArthur to send Coulter on to Korea.

[1] Rad, CX 58296, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jul. so.

Since the amphibious operation could not be made without a corps headquarters, members of JSPOG recommended that their chief, General Wright, ask MacArthur either to organize a provisional corps headquarters locally or to bring from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) headquarters, commanded by General Shepherd. General Wright chose the latter course and suggested to General Almond that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, be asked if the Marine headquarters could be moved. "There is urgent need" General Wright argued, "to get a headquarters in being for the GHQ Reserve operation. This headquarters must be one that can operate in the field as a going concern with such things as situation reports, operations reports, communications, etc., happening automatically." Forming a provisional headquarters from theater officers did not appeal to Wright. "A provisional command group selected from GHQ officers will not be a going concern unless it has time to get together and train in the field," he pointed out. "This is true no matter how efficient the individual officers are." Too little time remained to form and train such a group since, Wright warned, "With the target date of 15 September, only thirty days remain in which to complete the landing plan, embarkation plan and the embarkation of the assault element." Wright cited amphibious doctrine which set from go to 150 days for planning. For this reason alone he felt that the trained headquarters from Hawaii should be used if available. General Hickey agreed with Wright. Hickey told General Almond:

   Utilization of this headquarters and staff which is already organized   and functioning offers many advantages over the hasty throwing   together of a provisional Corps headquarters and staff from available   personnel. The latter would be at best only a half-baked affair and   would contribute to reducing the efficient functioning of GHQ because   of the key personnel withdrawn. [2]

General MacArthur did not accept Wright's suggestion. First of all, after the amphibious landing at Inch'on itself, CHROMITE would be an overland campaign. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, MacArthur wanted the detailed CHROMITE planning accomplished under his own close and constant supervision, and not by a group less subject to his direct view than his own GHQ staff. Wright therefore made no further attempt to bring in the outside headquarters. [3]

General Wright's second attempt to arrange a headquarters proved more successful. "As your advisor on tactical organization and operations for forces," he told Almond on 10 August, "I strongly recommend that we immediately activate a command for the GHQ Reserve." This command, in Wright's concept, was to be very similar to a corps headquarters. Because of its specialized mission the command would not need an artillery headquarters, observation battalion, engineer brigade, or engineer topographical company. He recommended that this headquarters be moved to the field immediately since the target date of 15 September was fast approaching and the group would have to be ready to load aboard ship by 10 September. Only twenty-five days remained in which to complete corps-level plans, to condition units for the field, to develop standing operating procedures, and to give combat training to headquarters personnel. [4]

General MacArthur accepted Wright's recommendation and ordered the formation of a provisional planning staff, forerunner of the actual corps staff, from officers of his own GHQ staff. To conceal its true purpose, he designated this new group as the Special Planning Staff, GHQ. General Almond chose the officers for this staff and on 15 August directed them to begin part-time planning, and to continue to work on their regular jobs only as necessary.

[2] Memo, JSPOG for Gen. Wright, 7 Aug. 50, with Ind, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.

[3] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr., Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond to Brig Gen. Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History, HQ, DA, 10 Feb. 67, OCMH files.

[4] Memo, Gen. Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC, 10 Aug. 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.

Almond named Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, who had arrived from the United States on 6 August, as chief of staff of the Special Planning Staff. Ruffner assembled his staff in a bunker-type concrete structure near the Dai Ichi Building on 15 August. As a first step, these officers drew up a troop list and a standing operating procedure for the landing. When General Ruffner asked what forces would be used for the landing and breakout, MacArthur replied, "The 7th Division which is half-under-strength, the Marine Brigade in Korea, other marines from the United States, and a battalion of Marines from the Mediterranean." [5]

MacArthur had not yet named a commander for the invasion forces. Near the end of the third week in August, General Almond suggested to him that the time had come to appoint such a commander. MacArthur turned to his chief of staff and said, "It is you." MacArthur told Almond that he would continue as chief of staff, Far East Command, "in absentia." He was so confident of ending the war by a quick victory at Inch'on, that he believed Almond could return to Tokyo within only a few weeks after the initial landing. In effect, MacArthur put General Almond, as well as other officers on the new corps staff, on loan to the corps from GHQ for the landing operation. [6]

On 21 August, General MacArthur asked to be allowed to activate, from sources already available in his theater, Headquarters, X Corps. Department of the Army readily granted this authority. [7]

The Special Planning Staff had already prepared its version of the best organization for the new corps headquarters. General Almond approved it. The major deviation from standard corps Tables of Organization and Equipment was the addition of a small transportation section and an area command, headquarters and headquarters detachment, of about ninety officers and men. General Ruffner told General Almond that, since X Corps would be operating separately "until such time as link-up is effected," it would have to carry out some functions normally carried out by an Army headquarters. [8]

The corps was activated without a TO & E, Table of Allowances, or Table of Distribution being prescribed. The staff used published equipment and personnel tables as guides, but modified the structure to enable the corps headquarters to operate as a separate corps along the lines of a field army headquarters. As a result, all equipment drawn had to be requisitioned and such requests had to be approved as items over and beyond authorized allowances. Each requisition, in fact, had to be reviewed personally by the corps G-4, Col. Aubrey D. Smith, and approved by the chief, Supply Division, G-4, GHQ. Limited time, inexperienced people, and the urgent press of planning the impending operation greatly complicated this problem. [9]

[5] (1) Diary, CG X Corps, Opn CHROMITE, 15 Aug.-30 Sep. 50, copy in OCMH. (2) Interv, Col. Appleman with Gen. Ruffner, 27 Aug. 51.

[6] Interv, Col. Appleman with Gen. Almond, 13 Dec. 51.

[7] (1) Rad, C 60800, CINCFE to DA, 21 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, W 89390, DA to CINCFE, 22 Aug. 50.

[8] Memo, CofS Special Planning Staff, GHQ (Gen. Ruffner), for CofS GHQ (Gen. Beiderlinden), 23 Aug. 50, sub: Org., G-1, GHQ Daily Log, Item 26, 23 Aug. 50.

[9] Comments, Col. Smith, former ACofS G-4, X Corps, contained in HQ, EUSAK, Mono, Martin Blumenson, Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, pp. 51-53, copy in OCMH.

General MacArthur formally established the X Corps on 26 August. The Special Planning Staff, GHQ, became Headquarters, X Corps, and General Almond was officially designated commanding general in addition to his duties as chief of staff and deputy commander, Far East Command, United Nations Command. All units or detachments in or en route to Japan and previously designated GHQ Reserve were assigned to X Corps. Next, on X September, MacArthur assigned the code name, Operation CHROMITE, to the planned landing at Inch'on; and, on 6 September, he confirmed in writing what he had already told his major commanders orally, that D-day for Operation CHROMITE was September (15)1950. [10]

With time running short and an ominous amount of detailed planning and coordination remaining, officers of the new corps headquarters worked around the clock. General Almond crammed as much field training and testing into the few busy days before embarkation as he could. On 1 September, his entire corps staff together with coordinators and umpires moved to a wooded area near Camp Drake in suburban Tokyo and set up a field command post. A tactical exercise prepared by General Willoughby was used to test the readiness of the green headquarters. On the second day of the exercise, General Almond, to measure the mobility and flexibility of his staff, ordered the entire group to displace to Atsugi, twenty miles away, with no break in the continuity of the maneuver. Realism in the maneuver was achieved by confronting the staff with situations closely paralleling those expected at the actual landing. Four main situations were presented, covering the breakout from the beachhead, a counterattack by enemy reserves, an opposed river crossing, and the exploitation of the breakout. Results of this maneuver, which ended on 3 September, made it apparent that General Almond's choice of staff officers had been excellent the staff demonstrated a state of readiness far beyond expectations. [11]

Marine Forces

The vital factor of the landing operation remained the availability of a strong? well-balanced, and specially trained and equipped amphibious striking force, and enough follow-up units to consolidate and exploit the initial landing. The former could come only from Marine and Navy sources, while a full Army division could provide the latter. MacArthur obtained these forces only after two months of making insistent demands on Washington and by taking unusual steps within his own command.

[10] (1) GHQ, UNC GO 324, 26 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, C 61660, CINCFE to Major Comds and DA, 6 Sep. 50. (3) Ltr., CINCFE to All Major Comdrs., 6 Sep. 50, sub: Designation of D-day.

[11] Rpt, JSPOG for CofS GHQ, sub: Map Maneuver X, copy in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. This exercise revealed that the corps had no proper equipment for bridging the Han River.

Like its sister services, the U.S. Marine Corps had shrunk in size during the postwar years. On 30 June, the Marine Corps had only 74,279 officers and men scattered widely among security, training, and administrative posts throughout the world. The operating segment of the Marine Corps, 40,000 officers and men, included the Fleet Marine Force, security forces, and Marines afloat. The Fleet Marine Force was, in turn, divided into Pacific and Atlantic sections. Each of these had a reinforced but reduced strength division and an understrength air wing. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, held the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Air Wing while the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, had the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Air Wing. The combined strength of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions did not equal that of a single war-strength Marine division.

Early in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved sending a Marine RCT with supporting tactical air to the Far East Command. [12] The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated at Camp Pendleton, California, on 5 July around the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, and Marine Air Group 33 of the 1st Marine Air Wing. The provisional brigade began loading from the west coast almost immediately and sailed on 14 July with about 4,500 ground troops. This number included engineers, a tank company, a light artillery battalion, a 4.2-inch mortar company, amphibious elements, and three infantry battalions, and about 1,350 men in the air group. As of 9 July, Admiral Radford judged this Marine force capable of specialized missions, including amphibious landings, "under conditions where appropriate higher echelon agencies are present." [13] The information on the amphibious capabilities of the new force was well received by General MacArthur since it blended admirably with plans then being developed by his staff. He radioed Washington at once, asking that the Marine brigade, "in view of the extensive opportunity for amphibious employment," be expanded to a full Marine division with appropriate air support. [14]

A few days after this request, General Collins arrived in Tokyo where, in a discussion of the need for forces on 13 July, General Almond upped MacArthur's previous request, asking Collins for a 2-division corps of Marines. The Army Chief of Staff replied that the Marines were in the same position as the Army, very short of men, and that even if another Marine division could be built, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had other plans for it. But, before leaving Japan, General Collins told General MacArthur privately that he believed one full Marine division could be sent him.

In Washington, meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in Collins' absence agreed to bring the 1st Marine Division to war strength. This decision received strong backing from Admiral Radford who personally urged the Chief of Naval Operations to give General MacArthur a full Marine division as soon as possible. Admiral Sherman supported Radford, but with reservations. Radford's support nonetheless proved instrumental in bringing the 1st Marine Division to war strength. [15]

On 19 July, General MacArthur called again for the 1st Marine Division, this time stipulating that all units of the division and the air wing should arrive by 10 September. He also asked that equipment and personnel be sent at once to bring the 5th Marine RCT, already on the way, to full war strength. [16]

[12] Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul. 50.

[13] Rad, 0922322, CINCPACFLT to CINCFE, 9 Jul. 50.

[14] (1) Rad, CX 57553, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Jul. 50. (2) Rpt, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, Hist. Sec G-3, HQ, U.S. Marine Corps, ch. II, p. II, copy in OCMH.

[15] (1) Memo, Col. Dickson for Gen. Bolte, 15 Jul. 50, sub: Visit to FEC, Tab B. (2) Rad, C 57814, CINCFE (Gen. Collins) to DA (Gen. Haislip), 14 Jul. 50. (3) Note by Secy. for JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac. Case 28. (4) Rad, 080941Z, CINCPACFLT (Radford) to CNO (Sherman), 8 Jul. 50. (5) JCS 1776/25, Memo, CNO for JCS, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Recommendations of CINCPACFLT Concerning Support of CINCFE.

[16] Rad, CX 58239, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul. 50.

To fill the 1st Marine Division, the Marine Corps drew men and equipment from all over the United States. So empowered by Presidential authority, the corps called 138 units with a strength of 1,800 officers and 31,648 enlisted Marines, its entire Organized Ground Reserve, to active service. It also brought 6,800 Regulars of the 2d Marine Division from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to Camp Pendleton. An effort was made, however, to avoid stripping the Atlantic area completely of Marines. Admiral Sherman felt that denuding the Atlantic area would be too dangerous; and at Sherman's insistence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that they could not send him the full Marine division before November or December. Nor could they determine the extent to which the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade could be strengthened until Admiral Sherman conferred with Admiral Radford in Hawaii. [17]

This threat to his plans drew fire from MacArthur, and he urgently requested the Joint Chiefs to reconsider. Provision of the full division by so September he saw as an absolutely vital element of his entire plan. "There can be," he charged, "no demand for its use elsewhere which can equal the urgency of the immediate battle mission contemplated for it." [18]

Unknown to MacArthur, an influential ally had already come to his support. Admiral Radford, before meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations, had sought the advice of General Shepherd. The Marine general spoke out strongly for General MacArthur and recommended that his request for Marine forces be met in the manner desired. General Shepherd believed that the Fleet Marine Force "as a whole" could provide the amphibious striking force and that it could do so without a serious or lasting impact on the Marine force's readiness to meet other commitments. "I feel," he told Admiral Radford, "that there is a serious war in progress in Korea and employment of amphibious forces will prove the key of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our arms." He held that the Fleet Marine Force was ready "at this moment" to send to Korea a force strong enough to lead the counteroffensive amphibious movement, "the task for which Marines are trained and constituted." [19]

Back in Washington, General Bolte added his support to General MacArthur's plea for early arrival of the Marines. He recommended to General Collins that the latter use his influence with the Joint Chiefs to support MacArthur in his call for a full Marine division in the theater by 10 September. [20]

[17] (1) Rad, JCS 86511, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul. 50. (2) Wilbur W. Hoare, Jr., The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, draft MS, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 13.

[18] (1) Rad, CX 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul. 50. (2) This statement reflects General MacArthur's conviction that "Washington" followed a policy of slighting his command in favor of the western European area. General Whitney's account of this transaction is interesting, if abbreviated. ". . . on July 10," Whitney says, "MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the 1st Marine Division. Profiting by his experience with Washington's penchant for skeletonizing his forces, he carefully stipulated a division at full strength. He was turned down flat. He patiently tried again five days later, saying: 'I cannot emphasize too strongly my belief in the complete urgency of my request.' He was turned down again." See Whitney, MacArthur; His Rendezvous With History, p. 343.

[19] Memo, Gen. Shepherd, CC FMPAC, for Adm. Radford, CINCPAC, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.

[20] Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 21 Jul. 50, sub: Augmentation of Provisional Marine Brigade, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 24.

The intervention of Generals Shepherd and Bolte prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider. On 22 July, they notified General MacArthur that they would review their previous decision. They asked him to help by telling them what he meant to do with the Marine brigade between its arrival date in late July and 10 September. At the same time, they ordered the brigade brought to full war strength and the Marine Air Group enlarged to full squadrons. [21]

Replying immediately, General MacArthur said that the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, when it arrived on about 1 August, would be kept in Japan as GHQ Reserve, "To be used in Korea only in event of a critical situation." Meanwhile, he would train, outfit, and prepare the brigade for major amphibious operations in September. [22]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, meanwhile, been weighing General MacArthur's need for a full Marine division by 10 September against the dangers in cutting Marine strength in other parts of the world. Admiral Sherman proposed and the other Joint Chiefs approved a compromise by which the Marine strength in the Far East Command would be built up to two war-strength RCT's by mid-September. Even this solution, which would put only two-thirds of a Marine division in Korea by 15 September, would greatly reduce Marine security forces in the United States and cause an extensive call-up of Reserves. The Joint Chiefs, in a teleconference on 24 July, told MacArthur that, "We have now determined it is practicable to further augment the Marine Brigade after its arrival in Japan and bring it to division war strength less one RCT by mid-September. We have directed that this be done. The third RCT cannot be furnished until winter." General MacArthur did not care for this compromise and remonstrated at once. "Subtraction of an RCT from the Marine division," he contended, "tends to jeopardize the entire conception and would involve risks that cannot be determined finally at this time. I regard the third RCT as essential." But Washington officials stood firm. They explained, with forbearance, that the only trained Marine battalions left after sending two regiments to the Far East Command would be one battalion in the 2d Marine Division, one afloat in the Mediterranean, and a battalion of school troops at Quantico, Virginia. These they considered the minimum for absolutely essential needs in the Atlantic. [23]

[21] Rad, JCS 86778, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jul. 50.

[22] Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50.

[23] (1) Memo, CNO for JCS, 24 Jul. 50, sub: Deployment of Fleet Marine Forces to the FEC, cited in Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. V, ch. IV, p. 14. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS and CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.

Still unhappy with the new arrangements, MacArthur shelved the matter for the time being. Other developments were pressing. Whereas the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade had been headed for Kobe, Japan, mounting pressure by the enemy against Walker's perimeter and signs of a strong enemy force sweeping down the west coast to outflank Eighth Army forced MacArthur to abandon plans to keep the Marines as GHQ Reserve in Japan. On 25 July, he ordered the ground elements of the brigade diverted to Pusan, and to be prepared to execute a rapid non-tactical debarkation. Units and equipment peculiar to amphibious operations were kept on board ships and taken to Kobe. Upon landing at Pusan on 3 August, the ground troops of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade were attached to General Walker's Eighth Army and went into a Reserve assembly near Masan. [24]

While hastily assembling another RCT in the United States for shipment to the Far East Command for use by 10 September, the Joint Chiefs on 10 August decided they need not wait until winter to send General MacArthur the third regiment of the Marine division. On that date, they authorized the formation of the final regiment, the unit to arrive in the Far East Command during September. In order that the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the impact of their decision, Admiral Sherman sketched for them the drastic measures that the Marine Corps had to take to give MacArthur a full division. ". . . it will involve," he told them, "moving to the FEC the Marine battalion now in the Mediterranean, one battalion now at Camp LeJeune, and an RCT, less two battalions, to be formed at Camp Pendleton. So doing will eliminate the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force in the Atlantic for several months." The battalion from the Mediterranean would have to come directly from Suda Bay through the Suez Canal and be hastily augmented with men sent directly to the Far East Command. [25]

The 1st Marines' additional rifle companies and platoons to bring the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (5th Marines) up to war strength, and support and service units for the division had been building up at Camp Pendleton. These loaded at San Diego between 14 and 24 August and reached Japan between 28 August and 2 September. The third regiment was activated as the 7th Marines on 17 August at Camp Pendleton. Two understrength battalions of the 6th Marines from Camp Lejeune and individual Regulars and Reserves were assigned to the new regiment. Its other battalion, the peace-strength battalion from the Mediterranean, sailed directly to Japan from its post with the fleet. A third rifle company and third platoons for the battalion's other two companies formed with the main body of the 7th Marines. [26]

[24] (1) Rad, CX 586628, CINCFE to COMNAVFE, 28 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 58763, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and CG Eighth Army, 26 Jul. 50. (3) Rpt, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve, HQ U.S. Marine Corps, ch. II, p. 1, copy in OCMH.

[25] (1) Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 14. (2) Memo, CNO for JCS, 11 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 30/2.

[26] Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing-Victory Over Time and Tide," p. 28.

Admiral Sherman, during his visit to the Far East Command in late August, queried his Washington headquarters on the arrival date of this final component of the division. He was touring the battlefront in Korea when the discouraging reply reached him. "The limiting factor," Sherman learned, "is the readiness of Marine Corps troops, which cannot be advanced ahead of an already tight schedule." Owing to the need for training, the two Marine battalions from the United States could not reach the Far East Command until 19 September, while the battalion coming from the Mediterranean would arrive in Korea on 12 September. "It is impossible," Admiral Sherman was told, "for the entire Marine Division to arrive in Japan by 10 September." [27]

While aware of the problems facing the Marine Corps in readying units for shipment, Admiral Sherman was equally aware of MacArthur's problem. He ordered the expediting of the departure from the United States of the 7th Marines' RCT elements. Granting that a division commander could best judge his division's training requirements, Sherman nevertheless told naval officers in Washington that they must take account of the requirements of the Korean campaign and the great need for bringing the division up to strength as early as possible after the Inch'on landing. "It must be assumed," Admiral Sherman radioed his staff, "that the operation will not be delayed and if two battalions are late, the division will fight without them." [28] But for all of Sherman's urging, the 7th Marines with accompanying troops did not embark until 3 September, and reached Korea on the 215t, too late for the landing.

A minor controversy centered around General Walker's very natural unwillingness to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The brigade had been in almost constant action since its arrival, attacking and counterattacking in the southern sector of the Pusan Perimeter, and had proved to be a mainstay of General Walker's defense. When General Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, reached Tokyo on 22 August, he had assumed the brigade would be released to him. He had already ordered liaison officers exchanged between his division headquarters and the brigade staff, and key officers of the brigade had come to Tokyo for briefing on the landing operation. On 30 August, Smith asked Almond for the brigade at once. According to Smith, General Almond appeared very reluctant to commit himself. He apparently did not want to decide, in his capacity as chief of staff, GHQ, on a definite date at which the brigade would be released to the 1st Marine Division to operate under himself as commanding general, X Corps. General Smith, after his talk, made his request more official, sending a radio to commanding general, X Corps, asking for the brigade by 1 September. General MacArthur's headquarters on 1 September ordered the brigade made available to the 1st Marine Division on 4 September, but apparently because of objections raised by General Walker, rescinded the order the same day.

[27] (1) Rad, C 60782, CINCFE (Sherman) to JCS (CNO), 21 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, C 60823, CINCFE to CO EUSAK for Adm. Sherman, 21 Aug. 50.

[28] Rad, 221009, COM 7th Fleet to CNO, 22 Aug. 50.

At a showdown meeting on 3 September, General Smith, backed by Admiral Joy, Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble, and Admiral Doyle, again made his demand for the brigade to General Almond. General Ruffner and General Wright were also present. Almond proposed that the Marine brigade be left with General Walker. He offered to give the 1st Marine Division the 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, as a replacement unit. General Smith refused to accept at the last minute an untrained and untried Army unit for a specially trained and tested regiment of Marines. He felt that it would be unfair to the 32d Infantry and to his own division. He doubted also if it would be physically possible to make the substitution. Shipping had already left for Korea to pick up the Marine brigade and would have to return if it were to pick up the 32d Infantry. Naval officers unanimously opposed Almond's solution. Admiral Struble then hit upon a compromise. He suggested that one of the 7th Division's regiments be sent to Pusan, remaining aboard ship as a floating reserve. This Army regiment would be available to General Walker in extreme emergency and the Marine brigade would be released to the 1st Marine Division. Almond agreed to this plan.

General Wright flew to Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu on the next day, telling Walker of the new arrangements. He relayed instructions from General MacArthur to pull the Marine brigade out of the line not later than the night of 5-6 September and to send it straight to Pusan. To compensate in some measure for the loss of this valuable force, the 17th Infantry Regiment would arrive in Pusan Harbor before 7 September. Wright tendered further compensation when he told Walker that as soon as the first RCT of the 3d Division, the 65th Infantry, arrived in the theater it would be sent directly to Pusan for assignment to Eighth Army. This RCT would arrive in Korea between 18 and 20 September. Then, unless the 17th Infantry had already been committed to meet an emergency, it would be sent to rejoin its parent 7th Division in the Seoul-Inch'on objective area. General Walker complied with his orders and withdrew the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade from the perimeter on the night of 5-6 September. On 12 September it sailed from Pusan as the 5th Marines' RCT, to rendezvous with the 1st Marine Division at Inch'on. [29]

[29] (1) Ltr., Gen. Smith to Col. Appleman, copy in OCMH. (2) Rad, CX 61738, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 1 Sep. so, with penciled notations on copy in 8th Army file AG 322, 24 Aug.-13 Dec. 50. (3) MFR, 4 Sep. 50, sub: Visit to EUSAK, by Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, in AG, DA files (CofS), FEC, UNC. (4) Col. John C. Chiles, formerly SGS GHQ, FEC, told the author on 17 February 1955, that he had been present in the Dai Ichi Building during the conference. According to Colonel Chiles, when General Almond telephoned General Walker that he would have to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, General Walker became extremely excited and stated that he could not take the responsibility for the safety of the Pusan Perimeter if the brigade was taken from him. Admiral Doyle, on the other hand, said that he could not accept the responsibility for the Inch'on landing unless he was given the brigade. According to Colonel Chiles, General MacArthur personally made the decision.

The 7th Division

Even before he realized that the 7th Division would have to make up his major Army component for Inch'on, General MacArthur had begun to rebuild this depleted unit as much as he could. In mid-July, when the 2d Division was still slated for Inch'on, General MacArthur had ordered 20 percent of all combat replacements from the United States diverted to the 7th Division in Japan. He had also halted all further levies against the division for men and equipment. By stabilizing the division, by feeding in such resources as could be spared from Eighth Army, and by intensive training, he hoped to make the 7th Division strong enough to fight effectively in Korea by October. On 26 July, MacArthur ordered General Walker to prepare the 7th Division "by intensified training and re-equipping for movement to Korea at the earliest practicable date." This instruction illustrates the dual function then charged to General Walker. While directing his divisions in combat against the North Korean Army, Walker, at the same time, remained responsible for the training and rebuilding of the 7th Division nearly a thousand miles away. The division then stood at less than half strength, with only 574 officers and 8,200 enlisted men. Moreover, many of the division's enlisted men had had little training, and few of the specialists and experienced noncoms taken from the division to patch up units going into combat in early July had been replaced. [30]

Desperately short of men himself, General Walker urgently appealed to General MacArthur on 29 July for the 7th Division's 32d Infantry to be flown into his perimeter. This appeal came shortly before the 5th RCT, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and the 9th RCT of the 2d Division landed at Pusan. Knowing that these three regiments were to arrive and aware of the low combat potential of the 32d Infantry, General MacArthur denied this request, explaining that granting it "would completely emasculate present plans for the entire 7th Division, which is being reconstituted and will move to Korea, probably in late September." [31]

By 4 August, MacArthur saw clearly that if the amphibious force for the Inch'on landing included an Army division, his own command would have to provide it. He therefore called upon Walker to rebuild the 7th Division by 15 September. Walker was to let MacArthur know at once of any difficulties in getting the necessary material and people. MacArthur himself assisted the rebuilding process by moving to the division from Okinawa 1,600 men originally intended for a third battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment. He also diverted to the division an antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion newly arrived from the United States, as well as two companies of combat Engineers, and sent a rush call to the ZI port of embarkation asking that the three infantry battalion cadres destined for the division be sent without delay. [32]

[30] (1) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 19 Jul. 50, Item 62. (2) Rad, CINCFE to CC Eighth Army, 22 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 22 Jul. 50, Item 38. (3) Memo, G-1, GHQ for CofS GHQ, 24 Jul. 50, sub: Replacements for 7th Div., G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 24 Jul. 50, Item 36. (4) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 26 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 26 Jul. 50, Item 52. (5) Rpt, CG 7th Div. to CINCFE, 27 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 27 Jul. 50, Item 52.

[31] (1) Rad, CX 20657 KC0, CG, EUSAK to CINCFE, 29 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 30 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 30 Jul. 50, Item 26. [32] (1) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 9 Aug. 50, sub: Assignment of 29th Inf. (less two battalions), G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 9 Aug. 50, Item 53. (2) Rad, CINCFE to SFPE (Stoneman), 12 Aug. 50, G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 12 Aug. 50, Item 60. (3) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 10 Aug. 50, sub: Replacements for 7th Inf. Div., G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 10 Aug. 50, Item 19.

MacArthur held little hope that the key men transferred from the division to Korea could be replaced in kind, either from the United States or from Japan. Efforts to recover these specialists reached a new high on 7 August, when General Hickey visited Korea and sought the return of 7th Division specialists. Walker made a careful survey to determine if he could give up any of these men, but because of the low ebb in Eighth Army's fortunes and strength at the time, found their release impossible. [33]

The lack of specialists and trained men for the 7th Division was on General MacArthur's mind when he talked on 7 August with Harriman, General Ridgway, and General Norstad. MacArthur furnished a complete list of the specialists he needed but who could not be found in his command and asked why the Department of the Army did not quickly recruit experienced noncommissioned officers from among the many who had served in World War II. These men could be sent to him by fast ship and by air. [34]

Three days later, MacArthur informed the Department of the Army of the unusual steps he had taken to refurbish the 7th Division. He estimated that 30 percent of all replacements arriving in the theater before 10 September would be diverted to the 7th Division so that it would be only 1,800 men understrength by the CHROMITE target date. He had already exhausted all other sources of replacements. [35]

The high priority given the 7th Division worked hardships on the American divisions in Korea. All artillery replacements and all infantry replacements having certain qualifications were channeled to the division. These actions, while weakening other units, proved effective in bringing the 7th Division to a reasonable level. By 7 September, shortly before loading for the invasion at Inch'on, the division lacked only 1,349 officers and men of its full war strength. [36]

[33] Memo, Gen. Hickey, DCofS GHQ, for Gen. Almond, 7 Aug. 50, sub: Rpt of Visit to Korea, copy in OCMH.

[34] Truman, Memoirs, II, 351.

[35] Rad, CX 59802, CINCFE to DA, 10 Aug. 50.

[36] (1) Memo, CofS GHQ Reserve (Gen. Ruffner) for CofS GHQ (Gen. Almond), 28 Aug. 50, sub: Strength of 7th Div., G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 28 Aug. 50, Item 55. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 8 Sep. 50, sub: Status of 7th Inf. Div. Personnel, in CofS GHQ, UNC files.

[37] (1) Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 17 Aug. 50, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (2) Memo for Gen. Beiderlinden, 8 Sep. 50, sub: ROK Personnel With U. S. Units, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (3) Rad, CX 59818, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 11 Aug. 50. (4) Rad, CX 60020, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 13 Aug. 50.

Compensating, numerically at least, for this slight understrength of the 7th Division, MacArthur, after conceiving the idea that South Korea might be called on to provide soldiers for American units, attached more than 8,000 Koreans to the division. On 11 August he directed General Walker to procure, screen, and ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7th Division approximately 7,000 able-bodied male Koreans. Fortunately the ROK Government cooperated since no American commander had authority beyond merely requesting these men. As a commentary on the desperation out of which this measure was born, General Wright on 17 August talked to the chief of staff, GHQ, by telephone from Korea. He told him that about 7,000 Koreans were being shipped out of Pusan that day. "They are right out of the rice paddies," he said, "and have nothing but shorts and straw hats. I understand they have been inoculated, given a physical examination and have some kind of paper. I believe we should get busy on equipment." [37] These Korean men were brought to Japan, equipped and trained briefly, and then attached to the 7th Division. By 31 August, 8,652 Koreans had joined the 7th Division. [38]

In a related action, General MacArthur ordered General Walker to strengthen each company and battery of American troops under his command by adding a hundred Koreans as rapidly as individual arms and equipment could be procured. The increase was to be made without regard to the present or future strength of the ROK Army. He authorized Walker to raise the ROK Army to any number he deemed practicable or advisable and to requisition equipment when the figure had been determined. [39] But, by the end of August, little progress had been made toward attaching Koreans to American units other than the 7th Division. The 1st Cavalry Division had 739 Koreans, the 2d Division had 234, the 24th Division had 949, and the 25th Division 240. [40]

Admiral Joy recommended to General MacArthur on 7 August that amphibious training of the 7th Division begin immediately even though the unit was then at less than half strength. He pointed out that the embarkation date for the prospective assault amphibious landing was 5 September and that training a RCT to conduct an opposed amphibious assault would delay it. He had already conferred with the commanding general of the 7th Division and had instructed him on the training objectives to be achieved before embarkation. These included proficiency in amphibious operations. General MacArthur ordered amphibious training for the 7th Division to begin as soon as possible, under the control and supervision of COMNAVFE. [41]

Airborne Units

MacArthur had no airborne troops when the fighting began in Korea. The 11th Airborne Division, which had served on occupation duties, had returned to the United States more than a year before. MacArthur now wanted airborne forces badly. The ability of such airborne troops to drop behind enemy lines, to sever lines of communications, and to disrupt rear-area activities had been proven during World War II. The increasing vulnerability of the North Korean Army to such tactics provided the perfect setting for airborne employment, particularly in conjunction with amphibious attack.

[38] (1) The complete story of this unique experiment is contained in Mono, Maj. Elva Stillwaugh, Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict, copy in OCMH. (2) Telecon, TT 3708, DA and CINCFE, 30 Aug. 50.

[39] Rad, CX 59709, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 9 Aug. 50,

[40] Rpt, unsigned, 31 Aug. 50, sub: Strength of South Koreans Attached to U.S. Divs. as of 31 Aug., G-3 Opns Jnl, FEC and Pac Br, G-3, DA.

[41] (X) Rad, {0707027}, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, CX 59636, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army and COMNAVFE, 8 Aug. 50.

His early attempts to procure airborne troops included an effort on 8 July to have a complete regiment, with its equipment, flown to Japan. He apparently intended to use this airborne unit in Operation BLUEHEARTS. General Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff, offered to fly the regiment and its equipment to Japan in C-119 aircraft if other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it necessary. But this emergency aerial movement would have required the diversion of Military Air Transport Service carriers and commercial planes which already were flying huge cargoes of men and materiel to MacArthur. If MacArthur's estimates were correct, these shipments were much more sorely needed than an airborne RCT, and should take precedence.

For this reason, and because no airborne RCT's, except for those of the 82d Airborne Division, were ready to fight immediately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied MacArthur's July request. [42] But they did take steps to ready an airborne unit for deployment as soon as possible. Whereas MacArthur actually had asked for an RCT from the 82d Airborne Division, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided against weakening the only effective infantry division left in the United States and chose instead an RCT from the 11th Airborne Division. The commanding general of the 11th Airborne Division had been informed of the possible deployment on 7 July, but with the decision against air transport to Japan, no immediate action was taken. Planning continued, however, for possible movement by ship.

When General Collins learned during his conference in Tokyo that General MacArthur's plan for Inch'on included a role for the airborne RCT, he was somewhat concerned. He told General Almond, after hearing the latter describe the planned seizure of the north bank of the Han River by an airborne unit, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take a very personal interest in how General MacArthur employed the airborne troops. He assured General Almond that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would do their best to furnish planes to drop the vehicles and howitzers of the RCT, but cautioned against wasteful and improper employment of these specially trained troops. "Don't overestimate what one RCT can do," the Army Chief of Staff warned Almond. "Don't get too grandiose in your planned utilization of the limited troops available." [43]

[42] (1) Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS, 8 Jul. 50, sub: Troop Requirements Forwarded by General MacArthur to the DA for the JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 21. (3) Rad, WAR 85328, DA to CINCFE, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jul. 50.

[43] Memo, Col. Dickson for Gen. Bolte, sub: Record of Visit to FEC, 10-15 July 1950, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 3, Tab 6.

When using the phrase "limited troops available," Collins was not exaggerating. The 11th Airborne Division had so few men that only one RCT, at less than half its authorized infantry strength, could be formed on 15 July. Since the beginning of July Army authorities had been assigning all officers and men completing the Army Parachute School at Fort Benning, Georgia, to the 11th, feeding in about 400 trained jumpers each week. General Bolte, investigating the readiness date for the airborne RCT, was told that by transferring trained jumpers from the 82d Airborne, the 11th Airborne RCT could be readied for shipment to MacArthur by 1 August. On the other hand, the current process of filling the RCT with graduates of the parachute school only would slow its departure until 20 September. The latter method did not disrupt the 82d Airborne, however, and was therefore the method most acceptable to General Bolte and General Collins. On 18 July, the Department of the Army told General MacArthur that the 11th Airborne RCT would be ready at home station by about 20 September. Asked to comment, he objected that his plans for the landing at Inch'on required these troops in his theater by 10 September and urged every effort to have them there on time. [44]

The brief description presented orally to General Collins during his visit apparently had not justified sufficiently the need for immediate deployment of the RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked General MacArthur for a more detailed explanation of the mission he would give the airborne RCT in the landing operation. On 23 July, General MacArthur replied that he planned to mount an airdrop from Japan, landing the airborne troops in the Inch'on objective area as soon after D-day as the situation warranted. They were to seize a key communication center immediately ahead of troops advancing out of the beachhead area.

At this time, when it was not at all certain that sufficient amphibious forces could be sent to MacArthur or that the landing at Inch'on would even be made, MacArthur's requirement for airborne troops appeared, to Army officials, secondary. The condition of the 11th Airborne Division, moreover, remained such that the Department of the Army deemed it impractical to send any of the division's regiments into combat in September. Army authorities informed General MacArthur in teleconference that the RCT would be operational in Japan by 23 October, but that he could not count upon using it in his landing operations. In turn, MacArthur remonstrated once again, asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff expedite the arrival of the unit. [45]

Despite General MacArthur's protests, General Ridgway and General Haislip drew up a plan on 25 July to move the 187th RCT of the 11th Airborne Division to Japan with an operational readiness date in the Far East Command of 21 October. Infantry fillers would be transferred to the unit from the 82d Airborne if necessary. One hundred C-119 aircraft would arrive in the Far East Command in time to allow the RCT fifteen days of operational training prior to 21 October. On this basis, build-up of the 187th Airborne RCT went forward during July and most of August. By 19 August, the regiment had been built up to nearly 4,000 officers and men and was undergoing intensive training. [46] Arrangements progressed ahead of the original schedule and General MacArthur was told that the 187th RCT would be at the port of embarkation by 12 September. He again objected that in order to accomplish his planned operation he would have to have the unit and its required airlift in Japan by 10 September.

[44] (1) MFR, Col. Dickson, G-3, DA, 17 Jul. 50, sub: Readiness Date for the RCT of the 11th Abn. Div. (2) Memo, Gen. Ogden, Chief, Org and Training Div., G-3, DA, for Gen. Bolte, G-3, DA, 15 Jul. 50, same sub. Both in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 6/5. (3) Rad, W 86323, DA to CINCFE, 18 Jul. 50.

[45] (1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA with CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.

[46] (1) Memo, Gen. Timberman, Opns Div., G-3. for Gen. Bolte, G-3, DA, 25 Jul. 50, sub: Movement of RCT of 11th Abn. Div. to FECOM, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 6/5. (2) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Ridgway, 19 Aug. 50, sub: Movement of RCT of 11th Abn. to FEC, with 1st Ind by Gen. Ridgway (sgd F. F. Moorman) with Incls., same file.

But General Ridgway, himself an airborne officer, opposed any stepped-up shipment of the airborne RCT. He advised General Collins, after studying General MacArthur's objections, ". . . I think the only justification for compliance would be a situation so desperate that the addition of an RCT as a straight infantry outfit was necessary to save the situation. It does not appear to me that such is the case." General MacArthur's objections were overruled and, in mid-August, he was told not to expect the airborne troops in time for his landing operation. [47]

General Collins, on a second visit to Tokyo late in August, found General MacArthur still insistent that the airborne RCT be sent in time to take part in Operation CHROMITE, Collins promised to do what he could and, upon returning to Washington, made a special effort to expedite arrangements. His investigation convinced him that his staff had been doing its best, and on 25 August he explained to General MacArthur that he had satisfied himself that an airborne RCT could not be sent by 10 September. He had even considered taking a regiment from the 82d Airborne instead of the 11th, but had found that this drastic action would have made no appreciable difference in the arrival date. For the delay was no longer caused by personnel shortages but by difficulties in procuring, assembling, and loading the specialized equipment required for airborne operations. General Collins felt that every reasonable and practicable measure had been taken to expedite the arrival of the RCT but that the unit would not be there for CHROMITE.

In his final word to General MacArthur on 28 August, he pointed out that by expediting to the maximum extent, the 187th Airborne RCT could reach Sasebo, Japan, on 21 September. The unit could then complete preparations for an airborne drop of the entire regiment by 29 September, but no earlier. "I strongly urge," General Collins said, "it not be committed prior to that date. The unit is presently capable of daylight operations only. However, I am confident that this unit will, in all respects, meet the high combat standards set by our airborne units in the last war." There appeared to be no appeal from these opinions of the Chief of Staff, and General MacArthur acquiesced, replying that his plans would be adjusted. [48]

The 187th Airborne RCT left Camp Stoneman, California, on 6 September and arrived in Japan on 20 September with a strength of about 4,400 men and officers. [49]

[47] (1) Rad, CX 59999, CINCFE to DA, 13 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, W 88966, DA to CINCFE, 16 Aug. 50. (3) Memo, Gen. Ridgway for CofS, 14 Aug. 50, in CofS DA file 370, Case 11.

[48] (1) MFR, sgd Lt. Col. Herrick, 29 Aug. 50, sub: Advancement of Date of Movement to FEC of 187th RCT of 11th Abn. Div., in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 6/4. (2) Rad, W 90063, DA (Collins) to CINCFE (MacArthur), 25 Aug. 50. (3) Rad, WAR 89967, JCS (Collins) to CINCFE, 28 Aug. 50. (4) Rad, C 71576, CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA (Collins), 30 Aug. 50.

[49] (1) Interv, Capt. Charles Thebaud with Maj. C. M. Holland, 187th Abn. RCT, Beppu, Japan, 19 Jan 52. (2) Ltr., HQ, 187th Abn. RCT, to DA, 15 Dec. 51, sub: Insignia. (3) War Diary, 187th Abn. RCT, 1 Aug. to 31 Oct. 50.

The Assault in Readiness

The U.S. X Corps, at its embarkation, numbered slightly less than 70,000 men. Included as its major units were the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Division, the 92d and 96th Field Artillery Battalions, the 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, the 19th Engineer Combat Group, and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. The 1st Marine Division had a strength of 25,040 men, including 2,760 attached Army troops and 2,786 Korean marines. The 7th Marines, which arrived on 21 September, added 4,000 men to the division strength. [50]

The echelon of command for CHROMITE progressed downward from General MacArthur through Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, in the usual pattern established during World War II for amphibious operations. Admiral Struble, as Commander, Joint Task Force Seven, and Commander, Seventh Fleet, was actually in command of the amphibious phase of the operation. Under him, Admiral Doyle commanded the attack force (Amphibious Group One) which, in turn, controlled the landing force, composed of the 1st Marine Division. Command of the landing force was scheduled to pass to General Smith, Commanding Genera], 1st Marine Division, after the beachhead was secured and Smith had notified Doyle he was ready to assume command ashore. Command of the expeditionary troops, the U.S. X Corps, was to pass to General Almond from Admiral Struble after the corps had landed and Almond had indicated that he was ready to assume command. [51]

As D-day for Operation CHROMITE approached, the ports of Kobe, Sasebo, and Yokohama in Japan and Pusan in Korea became centers of intense activity. The 1st Marine Division, less the 5th Marines, loaded at Kobe, the 5th Marines at Pusan. The 7th Division loaded at Yokohama, and most of the escorting naval vessels, the Gunfire Support Group, and the command ships, at Sasebo. In order to reach Inch'on by 15 September, the landing ships, tank (LST's) had to leave Kobe by 10 September and the attack transports and cargo ships by 12 September. Only the assault elements were combat-loaded. The rest of the invasion force and the vast quantity of equipment and supplies were organization-loaded. [52]

General MacArthur, General Almond, and General Shepherd flew from Tokyo to Sasebo, joining naval commanders aboard the Mt. McKinley on the evening of 12 September. Some of the final arrangements for the landing were completed aboard the flagship.

[50] (1) 1st Marine Div. SAR, vol. 1, Annex A, 5. (2) Hist. Rpt, X Corps, G-3, Opn CHROMITE, p. 2.

[51] (1) Joint Task Force Seven, Inchon Rpt, Opn Plan. (2) X Corps Opn Order 1, Annex 1, 28 Aug.

[52] (1) 1st Marine Div. SAR, 15 Sep.-7 Oct. 50, Annex D, p. 4. (2) War Diary, 7th Inf. Div., Sep. 50.

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