CHAPTER IX
Operation CHROMITE: The Forces
MacArthur planned his bold amphibious venture at Inch'on sustained only by
hope, credit, and promises. At no time during his planning did he have the men
and guns he would need. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, moreover, frequently told
MacArthur that, with the military resources of the United States at rock bottom
and because of the short-fused target date on which MacArthur adamantly
insisted, the needed men and guns might not arrive on time. The disagreements
over time, place, and method of landing stemmed in part from this fact and were
certainly of less significance. MacArthur well knew that even with the fullest
support by Washington he might not have by his chosen D-day enough trained men
and equipment to breach enemy defenses and to exploit a penetration. Trained
men, especially those with amphibious training, were at a premium in the United
States as well as in the Far East. To assemble, equip, and move these men
secretly and swiftly to the battle area by 15 September would require an
enormous, finely coordinated effort by all involved. The difficulties were
appalling, and to surmount them called for extraordinary energy and ingenuity.
The nature and location of the planned landing dictated that it be directed
by a tactical headquarters separate from the Eighth Army. General Walker had his
hands full in the Pusan Perimeter and could not easily divide his attention,
effort, or staff. The size of the landing force, initially set at about two
divisions, indicated a need for a corps command. It was for this reason that
MacArthur, concurrently with his efforts to bring the two corps headquarters to
his theater in late July, had asked that the commander and planning staff of the
I Corps be flown to Tokyo. [1] But by the time General Coulter and his skeleton
staff reached Japan, a need for the I Corps in the Pusan Perimeter forced
MacArthur to send Coulter on to Korea.
[1] Rad, CX 58296, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jul. so.
Since the amphibious operation could not be made without a corps
headquarters, members of JSPOG recommended that their chief, General Wright, ask
MacArthur either to organize a provisional corps headquarters locally or to
bring from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC)
headquarters, commanded by General Shepherd. General Wright chose the latter
course and suggested to General
Almond that Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, be asked
if the Marine headquarters could be moved. "There is urgent need" General Wright
argued, "to get a headquarters in being for the GHQ Reserve operation. This
headquarters must be one that can operate in the field as a going concern with
such things as situation reports, operations reports, communications, etc.,
happening automatically." Forming a provisional headquarters from theater
officers did not appeal to Wright. "A provisional command group selected from
GHQ officers will not be a going concern unless it has time to get together and
train in the field," he pointed out. "This is true no matter how efficient the
individual officers are." Too little time remained to form and train such a
group since, Wright warned, "With the target date of 15 September, only thirty
days remain in which to complete the landing plan, embarkation plan and the
embarkation of the assault element." Wright cited amphibious doctrine which
set from go to 150 days for planning. For this reason alone he felt that the
trained headquarters from Hawaii should be used if available. General Hickey
agreed with Wright. Hickey told General Almond:
Utilization of
this headquarters and staff which is already organized
and functioning offers many advantages over the hasty throwing
together of a provisional Corps headquarters and staff from available
personnel. The latter would be at best only a half-baked affair and
would contribute to reducing the efficient functioning of GHQ because
of the key personnel withdrawn. [2]
General MacArthur did not accept Wright's suggestion. First of all, after the
amphibious landing at Inch'on itself, CHROMITE would be an overland campaign.
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, MacArthur wanted the detailed CHROMITE
planning accomplished under his own close and constant supervision, and not by a
group less subject to his direct view than his own GHQ staff. Wright therefore
made no further attempt to bring in the outside headquarters. [3]
General Wright's second attempt to arrange a headquarters proved more
successful. "As your advisor on tactical organization and operations for
forces," he told Almond on 10 August, "I strongly recommend that we immediately
activate a command for the GHQ Reserve." This command, in Wright's concept, was
to be very similar to a corps headquarters. Because of its specialized mission
the command would not need an artillery headquarters, observation battalion,
engineer brigade, or engineer topographical company. He recommended that this
headquarters be moved to the field immediately since the target date of 15
September was fast approaching and the group would have to be ready to load
aboard ship by 10 September. Only twenty-five days remained in which to complete
corps-level plans, to condition units for the field, to develop standing
operating procedures, and to give combat training to headquarters personnel. [4]
General MacArthur accepted Wright's recommendation and ordered the formation
of a provisional planning staff, forerunner of the actual corps staff, from
officers of his own GHQ staff. To conceal its true purpose, he designated this
new group as the Special Planning Staff, GHQ. General Almond chose the officers
for this staff and on 15 August directed them to begin part-time planning, and
to continue to work on their regular jobs only as necessary.
[2] Memo, JSPOG for Gen. Wright, 7 Aug. 50, with Ind, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC
files.
[3] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr., Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond to Brig Gen. Hal C.
Pattison, Chief of Military History, HQ, DA, 10 Feb. 67, OCMH files.
[4] Memo, Gen. Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC, 10 Aug. 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC
files.
Almond named Maj. Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, who had arrived from the United
States on 6 August, as chief of staff of the Special Planning Staff. Ruffner
assembled his staff in a bunker-type concrete structure near the Dai Ichi
Building on 15 August. As a first step, these officers drew up a troop list and
a standing operating procedure for the landing. When General Ruffner asked what
forces would be used for the landing and breakout, MacArthur replied, "The 7th
Division which is half-under-strength, the Marine Brigade in Korea, other
marines from the United States,
and a battalion of Marines from the Mediterranean." [5]
MacArthur had not yet named a commander for the invasion forces. Near the end
of the third week in August, General Almond suggested to him that the time had
come to appoint such a commander. MacArthur turned to his chief of staff and
said, "It is you." MacArthur told Almond that he would continue as chief of
staff, Far East Command, "in absentia." He was so confident of ending the war by
a quick victory at Inch'on, that he believed Almond could return to Tokyo within
only a few weeks after the initial landing. In effect, MacArthur put General
Almond, as well as other officers on the new corps staff, on loan to the corps
from GHQ for the landing operation. [6]
On 21 August, General MacArthur asked to be allowed to activate, from sources
already available in his theater, Headquarters, X Corps. Department of the Army
readily granted this authority. [7]
The Special Planning Staff had already prepared its version of the best
organization for the new corps headquarters. General Almond approved it. The
major deviation from standard corps Tables of Organization and Equipment was the
addition of a small transportation section and an area command, headquarters and
headquarters detachment, of about ninety officers and men. General Ruffner told
General Almond that, since X Corps would be operating separately "until such
time as link-up is effected," it would have to carry out some functions normally
carried out by an Army headquarters. [8]
The corps was activated without a TO & E, Table of Allowances, or Table
of Distribution being prescribed. The staff used published equipment and
personnel tables as guides, but modified the structure to enable the corps
headquarters to operate as a separate corps along the lines of a field army
headquarters. As a result, all equipment drawn had to be requisitioned and such
requests had to be approved as items over and beyond authorized allowances. Each
requisition, in fact, had to be reviewed personally by the corps G-4, Col.
Aubrey D. Smith, and approved by the chief, Supply Division, G-4, GHQ. Limited
time, inexperienced people, and the urgent press of planning the impending
operation greatly complicated this problem. [9]
[5] (1) Diary, CG X Corps, Opn CHROMITE, 15 Aug.-30 Sep. 50, copy in OCMH.
(2) Interv, Col. Appleman with Gen. Ruffner, 27 Aug. 51.
[6] Interv, Col. Appleman with Gen. Almond, 13 Dec. 51.
[7] (1) Rad, C 60800, CINCFE to DA, 21 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, W 89390, DA to
CINCFE, 22 Aug. 50.
[8] Memo, CofS Special Planning Staff, GHQ (Gen. Ruffner), for CofS GHQ (Gen.
Beiderlinden), 23 Aug. 50, sub: Org., G-1, GHQ Daily Log, Item 26, 23 Aug. 50.
[9] Comments, Col. Smith, former ACofS G-4, X Corps, contained in HQ, EUSAK,
Mono, Martin Blumenson, Special Problems in the Korean Conflict, pp. 51-53, copy
in OCMH.
General MacArthur formally established the X Corps on 26 August. The Special
Planning Staff, GHQ, became Headquarters, X Corps, and General Almond was
officially designated commanding general in addition to his duties as chief of
staff and deputy commander, Far East Command, United Nations Command. All units
or detachments in or en route to Japan and previously designated GHQ Reserve
were assigned to X Corps. Next, on X September, MacArthur assigned the code name,
Operation CHROMITE, to the planned landing at
Inch'on; and, on 6 September, he confirmed in writing what he had already told
his major commanders orally, that D-day for Operation CHROMITE was September (15)
1950. [10]
With time running short and an ominous amount of detailed planning and
coordination remaining, officers of the new corps headquarters worked around the
clock. General Almond crammed as much field training and testing into the few
busy days before embarkation as he could. On 1 September, his entire corps staff
together with coordinators and umpires moved to a wooded area near Camp Drake in
suburban Tokyo and set up a field command post. A tactical exercise prepared by
General Willoughby was used to test the readiness of the green headquarters. On
the second day of the exercise, General Almond, to measure the mobility and
flexibility of his staff, ordered the entire group to displace to Atsugi, twenty
miles away, with no break in the continuity of the maneuver. Realism in the
maneuver was achieved by confronting the staff with situations closely
paralleling those expected at the actual landing. Four main situations were
presented, covering the breakout from the beachhead, a counterattack by enemy
reserves, an opposed river crossing, and the exploitation of the breakout.
Results of this maneuver, which ended on 3 September, made it apparent that
General Almond's choice of staff officers had been excellent the staff
demonstrated a state of readiness far beyond expectations. [11]
Marine Forces
The vital factor of the landing operation remained the availability of a
strong? well-balanced, and specially trained and equipped amphibious striking
force, and enough follow-up units to consolidate and exploit the initial
landing. The former could come only from Marine and Navy sources, while a full
Army division could provide the latter. MacArthur obtained these forces only
after two months of making insistent demands on Washington and by taking unusual
steps within his own command.
[10] (1) GHQ, UNC GO 324, 26 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, C 61660, CINCFE to Major Comds
and DA, 6 Sep. 50. (3) Ltr., CINCFE to All Major Comdrs., 6 Sep. 50, sub:
Designation of D-day.
[11] Rpt, JSPOG for CofS GHQ, sub: Map Maneuver X, copy in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC
files. This exercise revealed that the corps had no proper equipment for
bridging the Han River.
Like its sister services, the U.S. Marine Corps had shrunk in size during the
postwar years. On 30 June, the Marine Corps had only 74,279 officers and men
scattered widely among security, training, and administrative posts throughout
the world. The operating segment of the Marine Corps, 40,000 officers and men,
included the Fleet Marine Force, security forces, and Marines afloat. The Fleet
Marine Force was, in turn, divided into Pacific and Atlantic sections. Each of
these had a reinforced but reduced strength division and an understrength air
wing. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, held the 1st Marine Division and 1st
Marine Air Wing while the Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, had the 2d Marine
Division and 2d Marine Air Wing. The combined strength of the 1st and 2d
Marine Divisions did not equal that of a single war-strength Marine division.
Early in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved sending a Marine RCT
with supporting tactical air to the Far East Command. [12] The 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade was activated at Camp Pendleton, California, on 5 July around the
5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, and Marine Air Group 33 of the 1st Marine Air
Wing. The provisional brigade began loading from the west coast almost
immediately and sailed on 14 July with about 4,500 ground troops. This number
included engineers, a tank company, a light artillery battalion, a 4.2-inch
mortar company, amphibious elements, and three infantry battalions, and about
1,350 men in the air group. As of 9 July, Admiral Radford judged this Marine
force capable of specialized missions, including amphibious landings, "under
conditions where appropriate higher echelon agencies are present." [13] The
information on the amphibious capabilities of the new force was well received by
General MacArthur since it blended admirably with plans then being developed by
his staff. He radioed Washington at once, asking that the Marine brigade, "in
view of the extensive opportunity for amphibious employment," be expanded to a
full Marine division with appropriate air support. [14]
A few days after this request, General Collins arrived in Tokyo where, in a
discussion of the need for forces on 13 July, General Almond upped MacArthur's
previous request, asking Collins for a 2-division corps of Marines. The Army
Chief of Staff replied that the Marines were in the same position as the Army,
very short of men, and that even if another Marine division could be built, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had other plans for it. But, before leaving Japan, General
Collins told General MacArthur privately that he believed one full Marine
division could be sent him.
In Washington, meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in Collins' absence
agreed to bring the 1st Marine Division to war strength. This decision received
strong backing from Admiral Radford who personally urged the Chief of Naval
Operations to give General MacArthur a full Marine division as soon as possible.
Admiral Sherman supported Radford, but with reservations. Radford's support
nonetheless proved instrumental in bringing the 1st Marine Division to war
strength. [15]
On 19 July, General MacArthur called again for the 1st Marine Division, this
time stipulating that all units of the division and the air wing should arrive
by 10 September. He also asked that equipment and personnel be sent at once to
bring the 5th Marine RCT, already on the way, to full war strength. [16]
[12] Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul. 50.
[13] Rad, 0922322, CINCPACFLT to CINCFE, 9 Jul. 50.
[14] (1) Rad, CX 57553, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Jul. 50. (2) Rpt, Mobilization of
the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, Hist. Sec G-3, HQ, U.S. Marine
Corps, ch. II, p. II, copy in OCMH.
[15] (1) Memo, Col. Dickson for Gen. Bolte, 15 Jul. 50, sub: Visit to FEC,
Tab B. (2) Rad, C 57814, CINCFE (Gen. Collins) to DA (Gen. Haislip), 14 Jul. 50.
(3) Note by Secy. for JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac. Case 28. (4) Rad, 080941Z,
CINCPACFLT (Radford) to CNO (Sherman), 8 Jul. 50. (5) JCS 1776/25, Memo, CNO for
JCS, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Recommendations of CINCPACFLT Concerning Support of CINCFE.
[16] Rad, CX 58239, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul. 50.
To fill the 1st Marine Division, the Marine Corps drew men and equipment
from all over the United States. So empowered by Presidential authority, the
corps called 138 units with a strength of 1,800 officers and 31,648 enlisted
Marines, its entire Organized Ground Reserve, to active service. It also brought
6,800 Regulars of the 2d Marine Division from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to
Camp Pendleton. An effort was made, however, to avoid stripping the Atlantic
area completely of Marines. Admiral Sherman felt that denuding the Atlantic area
would be too dangerous; and at Sherman's insistence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
informed General MacArthur that they could not send him the full Marine division
before November or December. Nor could they determine the extent to which the
1st Provisional Marine Brigade could be strengthened until Admiral Sherman
conferred with Admiral Radford in Hawaii. [17]
This threat to his plans drew fire from MacArthur, and he urgently requested
the Joint Chiefs to reconsider. Provision of the full division by so September
he saw as an absolutely vital element of his entire plan. "There can be," he
charged, "no demand for its use elsewhere which can equal the urgency of the
immediate battle mission contemplated for it." [18]
Unknown to MacArthur, an influential ally had already come to his support.
Admiral Radford, before meeting with the Chief of Naval Operations, had sought
the advice of General Shepherd. The Marine general spoke out strongly for
General MacArthur and recommended that his request for Marine forces be met in
the manner desired. General Shepherd believed that the Fleet Marine Force "as a
whole" could provide the amphibious striking force and that it could do so
without a serious or lasting impact on the Marine force's readiness to meet
other commitments. "I feel," he told Admiral Radford, "that there is a serious
war in progress in Korea and employment of amphibious forces will prove the key
of achievement of a timely and economical decision for our arms." He held that
the Fleet Marine Force was ready "at this moment" to send to Korea a force
strong enough to lead the counteroffensive amphibious movement, "the task for
which Marines are trained and constituted." [19]
Back in Washington, General Bolte added his support to General MacArthur's
plea for early arrival of the Marines. He recommended to General Collins that
the latter use his influence with the Joint Chiefs to support MacArthur in his
call for a full Marine division in the theater by 10 September. [20]
[17] (1) Rad, JCS 86511, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul. 50. (2) Wilbur W. Hoare, Jr.,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, draft MS, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 13.
[18] (1) Rad, CX 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul. 50. (2) This statement
reflects General MacArthur's conviction that "Washington" followed a policy of
slighting his command in favor of the western European area. General Whitney's
account of this transaction is interesting, if abbreviated. ". . . on July 10,"
Whitney says, "MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the 1st Marine
Division. Profiting by his experience with Washington's penchant for
skeletonizing his forces, he carefully stipulated a division at full strength.
He was turned down flat. He patiently tried again five days later, saying: 'I
cannot emphasize too strongly my belief in the complete urgency of my request.'
He was turned down again." See Whitney, MacArthur; His Rendezvous With
History, p. 343.
[19] Memo, Gen. Shepherd, CC FMPAC, for Adm. Radford, CINCPAC, in JSPOG, GHQ,
UNC files.
[20] Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 21 Jul. 50, sub: Augmentation of
Provisional Marine Brigade, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 24.
The intervention of Generals Shepherd and Bolte prompted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reconsider. On 22 July,
they notified General MacArthur that they would review their previous decision.
They asked him to help by telling them what he meant to do with the Marine
brigade between its arrival date in late July and 10 September. At the same
time, they ordered the brigade brought to full war strength and the Marine Air
Group enlarged to full squadrons. [21]
Replying immediately, General MacArthur said that the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade, when it arrived on about 1 August, would be kept in Japan as GHQ
Reserve, "To be used in Korea only in event of a critical situation." Meanwhile,
he would train, outfit, and prepare the brigade for major amphibious operations
in September. [22]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, meanwhile, been weighing General MacArthur's
need for a full Marine division by 10 September against the dangers in cutting
Marine strength in other parts of the world. Admiral Sherman proposed and the
other Joint Chiefs approved a compromise by which the Marine strength in the Far
East Command would be built up to two war-strength RCT's by mid-September. Even
this solution, which would put only two-thirds of a Marine division in Korea by
15 September, would greatly reduce Marine security forces in the United States
and cause an extensive call-up of Reserves. The Joint Chiefs, in a
teleconference on 24 July, told MacArthur that, "We have now determined it is
practicable to further augment the Marine Brigade after its arrival in Japan and
bring it to division war strength less one RCT by mid-September. We have
directed that this be done. The third RCT cannot be furnished until winter."
General MacArthur did not care for this compromise and remonstrated at once.
"Subtraction of an RCT from the Marine division," he contended, "tends to
jeopardize the entire conception and would involve risks that cannot be
determined finally at this time. I regard the third RCT as essential." But
Washington officials stood firm. They explained, with forbearance, that the only
trained Marine battalions left after sending two regiments to the Far East
Command would be one battalion in the 2d Marine Division, one afloat in the
Mediterranean, and a battalion of school troops at Quantico, Virginia. These
they considered the minimum for absolutely essential needs in the Atlantic. [23]
[21] Rad, JCS 86778, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jul. 50.
[22] Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50.
[23] (1) Memo, CNO for JCS, 24 Jul. 50, sub: Deployment of Fleet Marine
Forces to the FEC, cited in Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National
Policy, vol. V, ch. IV, p. 14. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS and CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.
Still unhappy with the new arrangements, MacArthur shelved the matter for the
time being. Other developments were pressing. Whereas the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade had been headed for Kobe, Japan, mounting pressure by the enemy against
Walker's perimeter and signs of a strong enemy force sweeping down the west
coast to outflank Eighth Army forced MacArthur to abandon plans to keep the
Marines as GHQ Reserve in Japan. On 25 July, he ordered the ground elements of
the brigade diverted to Pusan, and to be prepared to execute a rapid
non-tactical debarkation. Units and equipment peculiar to amphibious operations
were kept on board ships and taken to Kobe. Upon landing
at Pusan on 3 August, the ground troops of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
were attached to General Walker's Eighth Army and went into a Reserve assembly
near Masan. [24]
While hastily assembling another RCT in the United States for shipment to the
Far East Command for use by 10 September, the Joint Chiefs on 10 August decided
they need not wait until winter to send General MacArthur the third regiment of
the Marine division. On that date, they authorized the formation of the final
regiment, the unit to arrive in the Far East Command during September. In order
that the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the impact of their decision, Admiral
Sherman sketched for them the drastic measures that the Marine Corps had to take
to give MacArthur a full division. ". . . it will involve," he told them,
"moving to the FEC the Marine battalion now in the Mediterranean, one battalion
now at Camp LeJeune, and an RCT, less two battalions, to be formed at Camp
Pendleton. So doing will eliminate the capabilities of the Fleet Marine Force in
the Atlantic for several months." The battalion from the Mediterranean would
have to come directly from Suda Bay through the Suez Canal and be hastily
augmented with men sent directly to the Far East Command. [25]
The 1st Marines' additional rifle companies and platoons to bring the 1st
Provisional Marine Brigade (5th Marines) up to war strength, and support and
service units for the division had been building up at Camp Pendleton. These
loaded at San Diego between 14 and 24 August and reached Japan between 28 August
and 2 September. The third regiment was activated as the 7th Marines on 17
August at Camp Pendleton. Two understrength battalions of the 6th Marines from
Camp Lejeune and individual Regulars and Reserves were assigned to the new
regiment. Its other battalion, the peace-strength battalion from the
Mediterranean, sailed directly to Japan from its post with the fleet. A third
rifle company and third platoons for the battalion's other two companies formed
with the main body of the 7th Marines. [26]
[24] (1) Rad, CX 586628, CINCFE to COMNAVFE, 28 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 58763,
CINCFE to COMNAVFE and CG Eighth Army, 26 Jul. 50. (3) Rpt, Mobilization of the
Marine Corps Reserve, HQ U.S. Marine Corps, ch. II, p. 1, copy in OCMH.
[25] (1) Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. IV, ch.
V, p. 14. (2) Memo, CNO for JCS, 11 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case
30/2.
[26] Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing-Victory Over Time and Tide," p. 28.
Admiral Sherman, during his visit to the Far East Command in late August,
queried his Washington headquarters on the arrival date of this final component
of the division. He was touring the battlefront in Korea when the discouraging
reply reached him. "The limiting factor," Sherman learned, "is the readiness of
Marine Corps troops, which cannot be advanced ahead of an already tight
schedule." Owing to the need for training, the two Marine battalions from the
United States could not reach the Far East Command until 19 September, while the
battalion coming from the Mediterranean would arrive in Korea on 12 September.
"It is impossible," Admiral Sherman was told, "for the entire
Marine Division to arrive in Japan by 10 September." [27]
While aware of the problems facing the Marine Corps in readying units for
shipment, Admiral Sherman was equally aware of MacArthur's problem. He ordered
the expediting of the departure from the United States of the 7th Marines' RCT
elements. Granting that a division commander could best judge his division's
training requirements, Sherman nevertheless told naval officers in Washington
that they must take account of the requirements of the Korean campaign and the
great need for bringing the division up to strength as early as possible after
the Inch'on landing. "It must be assumed," Admiral Sherman radioed his staff,
"that the operation will not be delayed and if two battalions are late, the
division will fight without them." [28] But for all of Sherman's urging, the 7th
Marines with accompanying troops did not embark until 3 September, and reached
Korea on the 215t, too late for the landing.
A minor controversy centered around General Walker's very natural
unwillingness to release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The brigade had
been in almost constant action since its arrival, attacking and counterattacking
in the southern sector of the Pusan Perimeter, and had proved to be a mainstay
of General Walker's defense. When General Smith, commander of the 1st Marine
Division, reached Tokyo on 22 August, he had assumed the brigade would be
released to him. He had already ordered liaison officers exchanged between his
division headquarters and the brigade staff, and key officers of the brigade had
come to Tokyo for briefing on the landing operation. On 30 August, Smith asked
Almond for the brigade at once. According to Smith, General Almond appeared very
reluctant to commit himself. He apparently did not want to decide, in his
capacity as chief of staff, GHQ, on a definite date at which the brigade would
be released to the 1st Marine Division to operate under himself as commanding
general, X Corps. General Smith, after his talk, made his request more official,
sending a radio to commanding general, X Corps, asking for the brigade by 1
September. General MacArthur's headquarters on 1 September ordered the brigade
made available to the 1st Marine Division on 4 September, but apparently because
of objections raised by General Walker, rescinded the order the same day.
[27] (1) Rad, C 60782, CINCFE (Sherman) to JCS (CNO), 21 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, C
60823, CINCFE to CO EUSAK for Adm. Sherman, 21 Aug. 50.
[28] Rad, 221009, COM 7th Fleet to CNO, 22 Aug. 50.
At a showdown meeting on 3 September, General Smith, backed by Admiral Joy,
Vice Adm. Arthur D. Struble, and Admiral Doyle, again made his demand for the
brigade to General Almond. General Ruffner and General Wright were also present.
Almond proposed that the Marine brigade be left with General Walker. He offered
to give the 1st Marine Division the 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Division, as a
replacement unit. General Smith refused to accept at the last minute an
untrained and untried Army unit for a specially trained and tested regiment of
Marines. He felt that it would be unfair to the 32d Infantry and to his own
division. He doubted also if it would be physically possible to make the
substitution. Shipping had
already left for Korea to pick up the Marine brigade and would have to return
if it were to pick up the 32d Infantry. Naval officers unanimously opposed
Almond's solution. Admiral Struble then hit upon a compromise. He suggested that
one of the 7th Division's regiments be sent to Pusan, remaining aboard ship as a
floating reserve. This Army regiment would be available to General Walker in
extreme emergency and the Marine brigade would be released to the 1st Marine
Division. Almond agreed to this plan.
General Wright flew to Eighth Army headquarters in Taegu on the next day,
telling Walker of the new arrangements. He relayed instructions from General
MacArthur to pull the Marine brigade out of the line not later than the night of
5-6 September and to send it straight to Pusan. To compensate in some measure
for the loss of this valuable force, the 17th Infantry Regiment would arrive in
Pusan Harbor before 7 September. Wright tendered further compensation when he
told Walker that as soon as the first RCT of the 3d Division, the 65th Infantry,
arrived in the theater it would be sent directly to Pusan for assignment to
Eighth Army. This RCT would arrive in Korea between 18 and 20 September. Then,
unless the 17th Infantry had already been committed to meet an emergency, it
would be sent to rejoin its parent 7th Division in the Seoul-Inch'on objective
area. General Walker complied with his orders and withdrew the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade from the perimeter on the night of 5-6 September. On 12 September
it sailed from Pusan as the 5th Marines' RCT, to rendezvous with the 1st Marine
Division at Inch'on. [29]
[29] (1) Ltr., Gen. Smith to Col. Appleman, copy in OCMH. (2) Rad, CX 61738,
CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 1 Sep. so, with penciled notations on copy in 8th Army file
AG 322, 24 Aug.-13 Dec. 50. (3) MFR, 4 Sep. 50, sub: Visit to EUSAK, by Maj.
Gen. Edwin K. Wright, in AG, DA files (CofS), FEC, UNC. (4) Col. John C. Chiles,
formerly SGS GHQ, FEC, told the author on 17 February 1955, that he had been
present in the Dai Ichi Building during the conference. According to Colonel
Chiles, when General Almond telephoned General Walker that he would have to
release the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, General Walker became extremely
excited and stated that he could not take the responsibility for the safety of
the Pusan Perimeter if the brigade was taken from him. Admiral Doyle, on the
other hand, said that he could not accept the responsibility for the Inch'on
landing unless he was given the brigade. According to Colonel Chiles, General
MacArthur personally made the decision.
The 7th Division
Even before he realized that the 7th Division would have to make up his major
Army component for Inch'on, General MacArthur had begun to rebuild this depleted
unit as much as he could. In mid-July, when the 2d Division was still slated for
Inch'on, General MacArthur had ordered 20 percent of all combat replacements
from the United States diverted to the 7th Division in Japan. He had also halted
all further levies against the division for men and equipment. By stabilizing
the division, by feeding in such resources as could be spared from Eighth Army,
and by intensive training, he hoped to make the 7th Division strong enough to
fight effectively in Korea by October. On 26 July, MacArthur ordered General
Walker to prepare the 7th Division "by intensified
training and re-equipping for movement to Korea at the earliest practicable
date." This instruction illustrates the dual function then charged to General
Walker. While directing his divisions in combat against the North Korean Army,
Walker, at the same time, remained responsible for the training and rebuilding
of the 7th Division nearly a thousand miles away. The division then stood at
less than half strength, with only 574 officers and 8,200 enlisted men.
Moreover, many of the division's enlisted men had had little training, and few
of the specialists and experienced noncoms taken from the division to patch up
units going into combat in early July had been replaced. [30]
Desperately short of men himself, General Walker urgently appealed to General
MacArthur on 29 July for the 7th Division's 32d Infantry to be flown into his
perimeter. This appeal came shortly before the 5th RCT, the 1st Provisional
Marine Brigade, and the 9th RCT of the 2d Division landed at Pusan. Knowing that
these three regiments were to arrive and aware of the low combat potential of
the 32d Infantry, General MacArthur denied this request, explaining that
granting it "would completely emasculate present plans for the entire 7th
Division, which is being reconstituted and will move to Korea, probably in late
September." [31]
By 4 August, MacArthur saw clearly that if the amphibious force for the
Inch'on landing included an Army division, his own command would have to provide
it. He therefore called upon Walker to rebuild the 7th Division by 15 September.
Walker was to let MacArthur know at once of any difficulties in getting the
necessary material and people. MacArthur himself assisted the rebuilding process
by moving to the division from Okinawa 1,600 men originally intended for a third
battalion of the 29th Infantry Regiment. He also diverted to the division an
antiaircraft artillery automatic weapons battalion newly arrived from the United
States, as well as two companies of combat Engineers, and sent a rush call to
the ZI port of embarkation asking that the three infantry battalion cadres
destined for the division be sent without delay. [32]
[30] (1) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 19
Jul. 50, Item 62. (2) Rad, CINCFE to CC Eighth Army, 22 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily
Log, 22 Jul. 50, Item 38. (3) Memo, G-1, GHQ for CofS GHQ, 24 Jul. 50, sub:
Replacements for 7th Div., G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 24 Jul. 50, Item 36. (4) Rad,
CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 26 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 26 Jul. 50, Item 52.
(5) Rpt, CG 7th Div. to CINCFE, 27 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 27 Jul. 50, Item
52.
[31] (1) Rad, CX 20657 KC0, CG, EUSAK to CINCFE, 29 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CINCFE
to CG EUSAK, 30 Jul. 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 30 Jul. 50, Item 26. [32] (1) Memo,
G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 9 Aug. 50, sub: Assignment of 29th Inf. (less two
battalions), G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 9 Aug. 50, Item 53. (2) Rad, CINCFE to SFPE
(Stoneman), 12 Aug. 50, G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 12 Aug. 50, Item 60. (3) Memo, G-1
GHQ for CofS GHQ, 10 Aug. 50, sub: Replacements for 7th Inf. Div., G-1 GHQ Daily
Log, 10 Aug. 50, Item 19.
MacArthur held little hope that the key men transferred from the division to
Korea could be replaced in kind, either from the United States or from Japan.
Efforts to recover these specialists reached a new high on 7 August, when
General Hickey visited Korea and sought the return of 7th Division specialists.
Walker made a careful survey to determine if he could give up any of these men,
but because of the low ebb in Eighth Army's fortunes and strength at the time,
found their release impossible. [33]
The lack of specialists and trained men for the 7th Division was on General
MacArthur's mind when he talked on 7 August with Harriman, General Ridgway, and
General Norstad. MacArthur furnished a complete list of the specialists he
needed but who could not be found in his command and asked why the Department of
the Army did not quickly recruit experienced noncommissioned officers from among
the many who had served in World War II. These men could be sent to him by fast
ship and by air. [34]
Three days later, MacArthur informed the Department of the Army of the
unusual steps he had taken to refurbish the 7th Division. He estimated that 30
percent of all replacements arriving in the theater before 10 September would be
diverted to the 7th Division so that it would be only 1,800 men understrength by
the CHROMITE target date. He had already exhausted all other sources of
replacements. [35]
The high priority given the 7th Division worked hardships on the American
divisions in Korea. All artillery replacements and all infantry replacements
having certain qualifications were channeled to the division. These actions,
while weakening other units, proved effective in bringing the 7th Division to a
reasonable level. By 7 September, shortly before loading for the invasion at
Inch'on, the division lacked only 1,349 officers and men of its full war
strength. [36]
[33] Memo, Gen. Hickey, DCofS GHQ, for Gen. Almond, 7 Aug. 50, sub: Rpt of
Visit to Korea, copy in OCMH.
[34] Truman, Memoirs, II, 351.
[35] Rad, CX 59802, CINCFE to DA, 10 Aug. 50.
[36] (1) Memo, CofS GHQ Reserve (Gen. Ruffner) for CofS GHQ (Gen. Almond), 28
Aug. 50, sub: Strength of 7th Div., G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 28 Aug. 50, Item 55. (2)
Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 8 Sep. 50, sub: Status of 7th Inf. Div. Personnel,
in CofS GHQ, UNC files.
[37] (1) Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 17 Aug. 50, in CofS GHQ, UNC files.
(2) Memo for Gen. Beiderlinden, 8 Sep. 50, sub: ROK Personnel With U. S. Units,
in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (3) Rad, CX 59818, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 11 Aug. 50. (4)
Rad, CX 60020, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 13 Aug. 50.
Compensating, numerically at least, for this slight understrength of the 7th
Division, MacArthur, after conceiving the idea that South Korea might be called
on to provide soldiers for American units, attached more than 8,000 Koreans to
the division. On 11 August he directed General Walker to procure, screen, and
ship to Japan for use in augmenting the 7th Division approximately 7,000
able-bodied male Koreans. Fortunately the ROK Government cooperated since no
American commander had authority beyond merely requesting these men. As a
commentary on the desperation out of which this measure was born, General Wright
on 17 August talked to the chief of staff, GHQ, by telephone from Korea. He told
him that about 7,000 Koreans were being shipped out of Pusan that day. "They are
right out of the rice paddies," he said, "and have nothing but shorts and straw
hats. I understand they have been inoculated, given a physical examination and
have some kind of paper. I believe we should get busy on equipment." [37] These
Korean men were brought to Japan, equipped and trained briefly, and then
attached to the 7th Division. By 31 August, 8,652 Koreans had joined the 7th Division. [38]
In a related action, General MacArthur ordered General Walker to strengthen
each company and battery of American troops under his command by adding a
hundred Koreans as rapidly as individual arms and equipment could be procured.
The increase was to be made without regard to the present or future strength of
the ROK Army. He authorized Walker to raise the ROK Army to any number he deemed
practicable or advisable and to requisition equipment when the figure had been
determined. [39] But, by the end of August, little progress had been made toward
attaching Koreans to American units other than the 7th Division. The 1st Cavalry
Division had 739 Koreans, the 2d Division had 234, the 24th Division had 949,
and the 25th Division 240. [40]
Admiral Joy recommended to General MacArthur on 7 August that amphibious
training of the 7th Division begin immediately even though the unit was then at
less than half strength. He pointed out that the embarkation date for the
prospective assault amphibious landing was 5 September and that training a RCT
to conduct an opposed amphibious assault would delay it. He had already
conferred with the commanding general of the 7th Division and had instructed him
on the training objectives to be achieved before embarkation. These included
proficiency in amphibious operations. General MacArthur ordered amphibious
training for the 7th Division to begin as soon as possible, under the control
and supervision of COMNAVFE. [41]
Airborne Units
MacArthur had no airborne troops when the fighting began in Korea. The 11th
Airborne Division, which had served on occupation duties, had returned to the
United States more than a year before. MacArthur now wanted airborne forces
badly. The ability of such airborne troops to drop behind enemy lines, to sever
lines of communications, and to disrupt rear-area activities had been proven
during World War II. The increasing vulnerability of the North Korean Army to
such tactics provided the perfect setting for airborne employment, particularly
in conjunction with amphibious attack.
[38] (1) The complete story of this unique experiment is contained in Mono,
Maj. Elva Stillwaugh, Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict, copy in OCMH.
(2) Telecon, TT 3708, DA and CINCFE, 30 Aug. 50.
[39] Rad, CX 59709, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 9 Aug. 50,
[40] Rpt, unsigned, 31 Aug. 50, sub: Strength of South Koreans Attached to
U.S. Divs. as of 31 Aug., G-3 Opns Jnl, FEC and Pac Br, G-3, DA.
[41] (X) Rad, {0707027}, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, CX 59636,
CINCFE to CG Eighth Army and COMNAVFE, 8 Aug. 50.
His early attempts to procure airborne troops included an effort on 8 July to
have a complete regiment, with its equipment, flown to Japan. He apparently
intended to use this airborne unit in Operation BLUEHEARTS. General Vandenberg,
Air Force chief of staff, offered to fly the regiment and its equipment to Japan
in C-119 aircraft if other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it
necessary. But this emergency aerial movement would have required the diversion
of Military Air Transport Service carriers and commercial planes which
already were flying huge cargoes of men and materiel to MacArthur. If
MacArthur's estimates were correct, these shipments were much more sorely needed
than an airborne RCT, and should take precedence.
For this reason, and because no airborne RCT's, except for those of the 82d
Airborne Division, were ready to fight immediately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
denied MacArthur's July request. [42] But they did take steps to ready an
airborne unit for deployment as soon as possible. Whereas MacArthur actually had
asked for an RCT from the 82d Airborne Division, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
decided against weakening the only effective infantry division left in the
United States and chose instead an RCT from the 11th Airborne Division. The
commanding general of the 11th Airborne Division had been informed of the
possible deployment on 7 July, but with the decision against air transport to
Japan, no immediate action was taken. Planning continued, however, for possible
movement by ship.
When General Collins learned during his conference in Tokyo that General
MacArthur's plan for Inch'on included a role for the airborne RCT, he was
somewhat concerned. He told General Almond, after hearing the latter describe
the planned seizure of the north bank of the Han River by an airborne unit, that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take a very personal interest in how General
MacArthur employed the airborne troops. He assured General Almond that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff would do their best to furnish planes to drop the vehicles and
howitzers of the RCT, but cautioned against wasteful and improper employment of
these specially trained troops. "Don't overestimate what one RCT can do," the
Army Chief of Staff warned Almond. "Don't get too grandiose in your planned
utilization of the limited troops available." [43]
[42] (1) Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS, 8
Jul. 50, sub: Troop Requirements Forwarded by General MacArthur to the DA for
the JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 21. (3) Rad, WAR 85328, DA to CINCFE,
Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jul. 50.
[43] Memo, Col. Dickson for Gen. Bolte, sub: Record of Visit to FEC, 10-15
July 1950, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 3, Tab 6.
When using the phrase "limited troops available," Collins was not
exaggerating. The 11th Airborne Division had so few men that only one RCT, at
less than half its authorized infantry strength, could be formed on 15 July.
Since the beginning of July Army authorities had been assigning all officers and
men completing the Army Parachute School at Fort Benning, Georgia, to the 11th,
feeding in about 400 trained jumpers each week. General Bolte, investigating the
readiness date for the airborne RCT, was told that by transferring trained
jumpers from the 82d Airborne, the 11th Airborne RCT could be readied for
shipment to MacArthur by 1 August. On the other hand, the current process of
filling the RCT with graduates of the parachute school only would slow its
departure until 20 September. The latter method did not disrupt the 82d
Airborne, however, and was therefore the method most acceptable to General Bolte
and General Collins. On 18 July, the Department of the Army told General
MacArthur that the 11th Airborne RCT would be ready at home station by about 20
September. Asked to comment, he
objected that his plans for the landing at Inch'on required these troops in
his theater by 10 September and urged every effort to have them there on time.
[44]
The brief description presented orally to General Collins during his visit
apparently had not justified sufficiently the need for immediate deployment of
the RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked General MacArthur for a more detailed
explanation of the mission he would give the airborne RCT in the landing
operation. On 23 July, General MacArthur replied that he planned to mount an
airdrop from Japan, landing the airborne troops in the Inch'on objective area as
soon after D-day as the situation warranted. They were to seize a key
communication center immediately ahead of troops advancing out of the beachhead
area.
At this time, when it was not at all certain that sufficient amphibious
forces could be sent to MacArthur or that the landing at Inch'on would even be
made, MacArthur's requirement for airborne troops appeared, to Army officials,
secondary. The condition of the 11th Airborne Division, moreover, remained such
that the Department of the Army deemed it impractical to send any of the
division's regiments into combat in September. Army authorities informed General
MacArthur in teleconference that the RCT would be operational in Japan by 23
October, but that he could not count upon using it in his landing operations. In
turn, MacArthur remonstrated once again, asking that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
expedite the arrival of the unit. [45]
Despite General MacArthur's protests, General Ridgway and General Haislip
drew up a plan on 25 July to move the 187th RCT of the 11th Airborne Division to
Japan with an operational readiness date in the Far East Command of 21 October.
Infantry fillers would be transferred to the unit from the 82d Airborne if
necessary. One hundred C-119 aircraft would arrive in the Far East Command in
time to allow the RCT fifteen days of operational training prior to 21 October.
On this basis, build-up of the 187th Airborne RCT went forward during July and
most of August. By 19 August, the regiment had been built up to nearly 4,000
officers and men and was undergoing intensive training. [46] Arrangements
progressed ahead of the original schedule and General MacArthur was told that
the 187th RCT would be at the port of embarkation by 12 September. He again
objected that in order to accomplish his planned operation he would have to have
the unit and its required airlift in Japan by 10 September.
[44] (1) MFR, Col. Dickson, G-3, DA, 17 Jul. 50, sub: Readiness Date for the
RCT of the 11th Abn. Div. (2) Memo, Gen. Ogden, Chief, Org and Training Div.,
G-3, DA, for Gen. Bolte, G-3, DA, 15 Jul. 50, same sub. Both in G-3, DA file
320.2, Case 6/5. (3) Rad, W 86323, DA to CINCFE, 18 Jul. 50.
[45] (1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA
with CINCFE, 24 Jul. 50.
[46] (1) Memo, Gen. Timberman, Opns Div., G-3. for Gen. Bolte, G-3, DA, 25
Jul. 50, sub: Movement of RCT of 11th Abn. Div. to FECOM, in G-3, DA file 320.2,
Case 6/5. (2) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Ridgway, 19 Aug. 50, sub: Movement of
RCT of 11th Abn. to FEC, with 1st Ind by Gen. Ridgway (sgd F. F. Moorman) with
Incls., same file.
But General Ridgway, himself an airborne officer, opposed any stepped-up
shipment of the airborne RCT. He advised General Collins, after studying General
MacArthur's objections, ". . . I think the only justification for compliance
would be a situation so desperate that the addition of an RCT as a
straight infantry outfit was necessary to save the situation. It does not appear
to me that such is the case." General MacArthur's objections were overruled and,
in mid-August, he was told not to expect the airborne troops in time for his
landing operation. [47]
General Collins, on a second visit to Tokyo late in August, found General
MacArthur still insistent that the airborne RCT be sent in time to take part in
Operation CHROMITE, Collins promised to do what he could and, upon returning to
Washington, made a special effort to expedite arrangements. His investigation
convinced him that his staff had been doing its best, and on 25 August he
explained to General MacArthur that he had satisfied himself that an airborne
RCT could not be sent by 10 September. He had even considered taking a regiment
from the 82d Airborne instead of the 11th, but had found that this drastic
action would have made no appreciable difference in the arrival date. For the
delay was no longer caused by personnel shortages but by difficulties in
procuring, assembling, and loading the specialized equipment required for
airborne operations. General Collins felt that every reasonable and practicable
measure had been taken to expedite the arrival of the RCT but that the unit
would not be there for CHROMITE.
In his final word to General MacArthur on 28 August, he pointed out that by
expediting to the maximum extent, the 187th Airborne RCT could reach Sasebo,
Japan, on 21 September. The unit could then complete preparations for an
airborne drop of the entire regiment by 29 September, but no earlier. "I
strongly urge," General Collins said, "it not be committed prior to that date.
The unit is presently capable of daylight operations only. However, I am
confident that this unit will, in all respects, meet the high combat standards
set by our airborne units in the last war." There appeared to be no appeal from
these opinions of the Chief of Staff, and General MacArthur acquiesced, replying
that his plans would be adjusted. [48]
The 187th Airborne RCT left Camp Stoneman, California, on 6 September and
arrived in Japan on 20 September with a strength of about 4,400 men and
officers. [49]
[47] (1) Rad, CX 59999, CINCFE to DA, 13 Aug. 50. (2) Rad, W 88966, DA to
CINCFE, 16 Aug. 50. (3) Memo, Gen. Ridgway for CofS, 14 Aug. 50, in CofS DA file
370, Case 11.
[48] (1) MFR, sgd Lt. Col. Herrick, 29 Aug. 50, sub: Advancement of Date of
Movement to FEC of 187th RCT of 11th Abn. Div., in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 6/4.
(2) Rad, W 90063, DA (Collins) to CINCFE (MacArthur), 25 Aug. 50. (3) Rad, WAR
89967, JCS (Collins) to CINCFE, 28 Aug. 50. (4) Rad, C 71576, CINCFE (MacArthur)
to DA (Collins), 30 Aug. 50.
[49] (1) Interv, Capt. Charles Thebaud with Maj. C. M. Holland, 187th Abn.
RCT, Beppu, Japan, 19 Jan 52. (2) Ltr., HQ, 187th Abn. RCT, to DA, 15 Dec. 51,
sub: Insignia. (3) War Diary, 187th Abn. RCT, 1 Aug. to 31 Oct. 50.
The Assault in Readiness
The U.S. X Corps, at its embarkation, numbered slightly less than 70,000 men.
Included as its major units were the 1st Marine Division, the 7th Division, the
92d and 96th Field Artillery Battalions, the 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor
Battalion, the 19th Engineer Combat Group, and the 2d Engineer Special Brigade.
The 1st Marine Division had a
strength of 25,040 men, including 2,760 attached Army troops and 2,786 Korean
marines. The 7th Marines, which arrived on 21 September, added 4,000 men to the
division strength. [50]
The echelon of command for CHROMITE progressed downward from General
MacArthur through Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, in the usual pattern established during
World War II for amphibious operations. Admiral Struble, as Commander, Joint
Task Force Seven, and Commander, Seventh Fleet, was actually in command of the
amphibious phase of the operation. Under him, Admiral Doyle commanded the attack
force (Amphibious Group One) which, in turn, controlled the landing force,
composed of the 1st Marine Division. Command of the landing force was scheduled
to pass to General Smith, Commanding Genera], 1st Marine Division, after the
beachhead was secured and Smith had notified Doyle he was ready to assume
command ashore. Command of the expeditionary troops, the U.S. X Corps, was to
pass to General Almond from Admiral Struble after the corps had landed and
Almond had indicated that he was ready to assume command. [51]
As D-day for Operation CHROMITE approached, the ports of Kobe, Sasebo, and
Yokohama in Japan and Pusan in Korea became centers of intense activity. The 1st
Marine Division, less the 5th Marines, loaded at Kobe, the 5th Marines at Pusan.
The 7th Division loaded at Yokohama, and most of the escorting naval vessels,
the Gunfire Support Group, and the command ships, at Sasebo. In order to reach
Inch'on by 15 September, the landing ships, tank (LST's) had to leave Kobe by 10
September and the attack transports and cargo ships by 12 September. Only the
assault elements were combat-loaded. The rest of the invasion force and the vast
quantity of equipment and supplies were organization-loaded. [52]
General MacArthur, General Almond, and General Shepherd flew from Tokyo to
Sasebo, joining naval commanders aboard the Mt. McKinley on the
evening of 12 September. Some of the final arrangements for the landing were
completed aboard the flagship.
[50] (1) 1st Marine Div. SAR, vol. 1, Annex A, 5. (2) Hist. Rpt, X Corps,
G-3, Opn CHROMITE, p. 2.
[51] (1) Joint Task Force Seven, Inchon Rpt, Opn Plan. (2) X Corps Opn Order
1, Annex 1, 28 Aug.
[52] (1) 1st Marine Div. SAR, 15 Sep.-7 Oct. 50, Annex D, p. 4. (2) War
Diary, 7th Inf. Div., Sep. 50.
