CHAPTER VI
A New Confidence
The outbreak of war in June 1950 had caught the United States flat-footed.
The nation had few forces immediately available and no plans for fighting in
Korea. Nevertheless, American leaders had developed in the post-World War II
years some policies and principles for meeting communist aggression which they
could use as a basis for raising forces and making plans for Korea. These
policies and principles provided, broadly, that the United States would work
closely with its treaty allies and with other free nations to stop all forms of
communist aggression, and that any military action would be taken under the
aegis, or at least with the sanction, of the United Nations, if at all possible.
The United States earnestly desired to avoid unilateral action, however
effective, which might alienate its friends and possibly goad the Soviet
Government into extreme action and all-out war. Too, it wished to put to full
use the military resources of its allies rather than bear the entire burden
single-handedly.
Within hours after word of the North Korean attack reached Washington, the
United States had called on the United Nations. The resolutions of 25 and 27
June, drawn up in haste and under pressure, had been steps in the right
direction but did not go nearly far enough toward the goal of restoring peace in
Korea.
The Security Council resolution of 25 June had called upon members to refrain
from helping the North Koreans. The United States Government directed a more
specific appeal to the Soviet Union through its embassy in Moscow, asking that
it prevail upon the North Korean leaders to halt the fighting. In response, the
Soviet Government called South Korea the aggressor and, by implication, refused
to mediate. [1]
Faced with Soviet refusal to give even lip service to the United Nations
resolution, and with a combat situation that worsened hourly, the United States
began carefully to press for a stronger stand and more effective action by the
United Nations.
[1] (1) Leland M. Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U. S. Policy in the United
Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), p, 106. (2) State
Dept. Bulletin, XXIII, 575 (July 10, 1950), 46-48.
On 3 July the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated
a proposed resolution to the delegations of the United States, the United
Kingdom, and France. It suggested that the Government of the United States would
direct the armed forces of member nations in Korea, but with the help of a "Committee on Coordination of
Assistance for Korea." This committee would coordinate all offers of assistance,
promote continuing participation in Korea by member nations, and receive reports
from the field commander. The exact extent of its control was not stated in the
proposal. [2]
When, on 4 July, the Department of State sought the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on the resolution, the latter opposed forming such a committee. They
felt that placing a United Nations committee in the channel between the U. S.
Government and the field commander would raise serious operational difficulties.
Even though the committee might never try to control military operations, the
possibility that it might do so brought the Joint Chiefs together in opposition.
They told the Secretary of Defense that, if a committee were needed for
political reasons, its powers must be defined and restricted so exactly that it
could never take on the nature of a U.N. command headquarters. [3]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a command arrangement in which the United
States, as executive agent for the United Nations, would direct the Korean
operation, with no positive contact between the field commander and the United
Nations. The major decisions, especially those of political content, must not in
any way be made, or influenced, by the officer commanding the U.N. forces in
Korea. If the United Nations were to deal directly with the commander on
assistance offers, for example, the top levels of the U. S. Government would be
bypassed and forces accepted or rejected by a commander, very likely an
American, whose outlook would be restricted by his own local situation. [4]
In spite of sympathetic consideration of the proposal by France and the
United Kingdom, the United States rejected the projected U.N. committee, and a
revised resolution developed. Because the United States occupied a privileged
position in the terms of the resolution, it would not have been seemly for the
American representative to introduce it. Accordingly, on 7 July, the delegations
of France and the United Kingdom brought the draft before the Security Council.
Seven votes in favor had been lined up in advance. The resolution therefore
passed the Security Council, by a vote of seven to zero, with three nations,
Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, abstaining. The Soviet representative had not yet
returned to the council and cast no vote.
[2] Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U. S. Policy in the United Nations, p.
119.
[3] Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy. Defense, 5 Jul. 50, sub: Proposed U. S.
Position With Regard to Forces in Korea.
[4] JCS 1776/19, Rpt by JSSC, 5 Jul. 50, sub: Proposed U. S. Position With
Regard to Forces in Korea.
This resolution made President Truman executive agent for the council in
carrying out the United Nations fight against aggression in Korea. The Security
Council recommended that contributing member nations furnish forces to a unified
command under the United States. It asked that the American Government select a
commander for this unified command and that the United States submit periodic
reports on the course of operations in Korea. President Truman designated the
Joint Chiefs of Staff his agents for Korea. To General Collins,
Army Chief of Staff, fell the task of serving the Joint Chiefs as their
primary representative in Korean operations. At the Army level, General Bolte,
the G-3, handled operational details for General Collins. Thus, with authority
granted by the United Nations, vested in the President, and running downward
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Army became responsible for
planning and directing the military operations of United Nations forces in
Korea. [5]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur be placed in command of United Nations forces. [6] President Truman
accepted their recommendation and notified General MacArthur of his appointment
on 10 July 195O. On 12 July Department of the Army officials sent detailed
instructions to MacArthur. They directed him to avoid any appearance of
unilateral American action in Korea. "For world-wide political reasons," they
cautioned, "it is important to emphasize repeatedly the fact that our operations
are in support of the United Nations Security Council." In furtherance of this,
General MacArthur would identify himself whenever practicable as Commander in
Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC), and whenever justified, would emphasize
in his communiques the activities of forces of other member nations. [7]
Two days later, on 14 July, President Rhee assigned control of his nation's
forces to General MacArthur, stating in a letter transmitted through the U. S.
Ambassador to Korea:
In view of the joint military effort of the United Nations on behalf
of the Republic of Korea, in which all military forces, land, sea and
air, of all the United Nations fighting in or near Korea have been
placed under the joint operational command and in which you have been
designated Supreme Commander, United Nations Forces, I am happy to
assign to you command authority over all land, sea and air forces of
the Republic of Korea during the period of continuation of the
present state of hostilities, such command to be exercised either by
you personally or by such commander or commanders to whom you may
delegate the exercise of this authority within Korea or adjacent
seas. [8]
Although the Security Council asked the United States to report to the United
Nations on activities of the unified command, no procedure was specified. On 13
July the Department of State proposed to the Secretary of Defense that reports
be sent to the Security Council each week. These would keep world attention on
the fact that the United States was fighting in Korea for the United Nations,
not itself. Apprehensive over world reaction to the naval blockade of Korea
ordered by President Truman on 3O June, the Department of State was convinced
that the Security Council resolutions of 25 and 27 June amply justified the
blockade, but wished the actual blockade declaration reported to the Security
Council in order to remove any doubt as to its legality. A report from the
unified command on the blockade seemed in order.
[5] MacArthur Hearings, pp. 14, 989, {326}, 1259, 1938.
[6] Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Designation of a United
Nations Unified Comdr. by the United States.
[7] Rad, WAR 85743, DA to CINCFE, 12 Jul. 50.
[8] Rad, State Dept. Msg. 41, U. S. Ambassador, Taegu, to Secy. State, 14
Jul. 50, 17 Jul. 50 containing text of Ltr., Rhee to MacArthur.
This proposal focused the attention of the Joint Chiefs on the need for a
definite arrangement on how and when reports should be made to the United
Nations. Late in July they directed General MacArthur to send them a report on
the actions of his forces every two weeks. The Joint Chiefs would, in turn,
submit the report through the Secretary of Defense to the Department of State
for presentation to the Security Council of the United Nations by the American
delegation at Lake Success, New York. General MacArthur was assured that he
would be consulted in advance if political considerations made it necessary at
any time for the Joint Chiefs to alter his reports. [9]
On 24 July 1950 General MacArthur issued orders establishing the United
Nations Command (UNC) with general headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. With few
exceptions, staff members of the Far East Command were assigned comparable
duties on the UNC staff. In effect, the GHQ, United Nations Command, was the
GHQ, Far East Command, with an expanded mission. [10] At the central core of
American direction of the operations in Korea on behalf of the United Nations
lay the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As advisers to the President, the Joint Chiefs
concerned themselves with every aspect of American military power and policy.
They had to deal simultaneously with problems at home and abroad, in western
Europe and in Korea.
They did not make the national military policy. Yet because they furnished
the President, normally through the Secretary of Defense, information and advice
to help him set this policy, what they did and what they thought held great
importance for the nation and for the Korean War. By the very nature of their
work, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to consider political factors in
deliberating national military problems. So closely intertwined were military
and political factors in the Korean War that they could not be isolated one from
the other.
The mechanical process by which military policy recommendations evolved
during the Korean War began with consideration of a particular problem within
the military staffs, usually the Army staff, and within the joint staff of the
JCS itself. The joint staff consisted of about two hundred officers selected
from all the services. These officers developed and furnished recommended
positions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
[9] (1) JCS 1776/39, Note by Secys, Rpts. by U. S. Government to UNSC, 18
Jul. 50. (2) MacArthur Hearings, Part II, p. 1515. (3) Rad, JCS 84885,
JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul. 50. (4) JCS 1775/62, Note by Secys., Rpts. by U. S.
Government to UNSC, 28 Jul. 50.
[10] (1) GO 1, UNC, 24 Jul. 50. (2) The United Nations, at no time in the
Korean War, sought to interfere in the control of operations which were the
responsibility of the United States. General MacArthur later testified to this
when he told a Senate investigating committee, ". . . my connection with the
United Nations was largely nominal . . . everything I did came from our own
Chiefs of Staff. . . . The controls over me were exactly the same as though the
forces under me were all Americans. All of my communications were to the
American high command here." See MacArthur Hearings, p. 10.
Once a final stand on a problem had been discussed and agreed upon by them,
the JCS presented their views in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Any
political aspects of the matter would be worked out at this level between the
staffs of the Defense and State Departments or, on occasion, between the
respective secretaries personally. The
Secretary of Defense then presented the views and recommendations thus
developed, with a clear statement of any divergencies, to the National Security
Council or, if more appropriate, directly to the President. On occasion, the
procedure varied but, normally, if there were time things were done in this
fashion.
The issues raised by Korea could not be separated from those involved in
planning for American defense on a worldwide scale. The withdrawal of men and
units from the General Reserve for employment in Korea was incompatible with
existing plans. If the Korean outbreak marked the initial stages of an all-out
war, it was unsound to tie up large forces in an area of limited strategic
significance. But the United States was committed, short of global war, to
repelling armed aggression in South Korea. Speculating on 13 July that
developments in Korea were part of a general USSR plan which might involve
correlated actions in other parts of the world, the JCS planning staff said:
It is now apparent from Korea that Russia is embarking upon an
entirely new phase in her program of world-wide Communist
domination. This is a phase in which she is now utilizing for the
first time the armed forces of her satellites to impose by military
strength a Communist-dominated government upon a weak neighboring
state considered incapable of successful military
opposition. [11]
A reappraisal of United States objectives and resources thus became
necessary. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly faced the major question,
"How much of our military strength can we commit to Korea without seriously
damaging our ability to meet a global emergency?" A correct solution to this
problem would enable them to determine, for instance, if partial mobilization
was needed. A second question was, "If we limit our commitments to Korea because
of the greater global threat, can we drive the North Koreans behind the 38th
Parallel?" [12]
Enemy victories in Korea forced the Joint Chiefs to take action without
awaiting answers to the vital questions. Courses of action had to be considered
individually as they arose. Decisions on them were greatly influenced by General
MacArthur's recommendations, but as each new move weakened the potential means,
without lessening the mission, it brought the need for answers to these
questions into urgent focus.
[11] JSPC 853/15, 13 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, sec. I-C, Case 16.
[12] JSPC 853/7/D, 5 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea.
[13] Study, JCS 1924/20, 14 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea.
By mid-July so much American military strength had been drawn into the Korean
War that American military capabilities for action elsewhere had been much
reduced. Reserves of trained men and materiel diminished as MacArthur's units
were brought up to war strength and given service support and replacement. A
further drain upon reserves of critical specialists and equipment would result
as operations progressed. [13] A key Army officer commented at this time, "Our
ground force potential is so seriously depleted that further significant
commitments of even a division or more
in size would vitally weaken our national security at home." [14]
The possibility that U. S. troops might be thrown out of Korea was far from
academic. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
pointed out on 12 July that the understrength U. S. 24th Division was facing 9
North Korean divisions numbering 80,000 men and equipped with a total of from
100 to 150 modern tanks. The enemy not only had a great advantage in numbers of
men and in tanks and artillery, but was also well trained, and was fighting
determinedly and with great skill. The JIC concluded that the North Korean Army
was capable of threatening the security of Pusan within two weeks. Lt. Gen.
Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for Administration, had sketched the
same depressing picture for the secretaries of the armed services on 10 July. He
told these men that, while MacArthur's forces had definitely slowed the enemy,
they could not hold unless they were substantially reinforced. [16]
Forced withdrawal of U. S. troops from Korea would be a political as well as
a military calamity. It could weaken American alliances and build up communist
political influence. It could discredit U. S. foreign policy and undermine
confidence in American military capabilities. Voluntary withdrawal could be more
damaging than a failure to have sent troops to Korea in the first place.
American commitments would be marked as unreliable by other nations and
considerable doubt would be cast on American ability to back up commitments in
the future. The United Nations actions resulted mainly from U. S. initiative,
and withdrawal from intervention on behalf of the United Nations could greatly
weaken American leadership within the United Nations.
Failure in Korea could force the United States to revise drastically its
policy of general containment of communism by reducing or limiting its
commitments and by planning to combat communist expansion only at selected
points. The United States would undoubtedly have to start partial military and
industrial mobilization to ready its forces for other, almost certain,
aggressions; or, in another approach, to begin full mobilization so as to be
prepared to threaten full-scale war in case of further Soviet aggression. [16]
[14] Quotation from Brig Gen. Cortlandt Schuyler, Memo for Gen. Lindsay, Adm.
Ingersoll, and Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, 14 Jul. 50, sub: Estimate of the
Korean Sit, JSPC 853/11, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea.
[15] JCS 1924/19, Decision on Estimate by JIC, 12 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file
091 Korea, Case 46. The JIC "Estimate of the Situation" included in JCS 1924/19
was not approved but merely noted by the JCS.
[16] JCS 1924/19, Annex D, 10 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea.
First Visit From Washington
President Truman sent two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Collins and General Vandenberg, to the Far East on 10 July 1950. They were to
bring back firsthand information to use in establishing the scope of expansion
of the U. S. military program. Immediately upon reaching Tokyo on 13 July 1950,
Collins and Vandenberg talked with General MacArthur and key members of his
staff. General MacArthur impressed upon them the dangers of underestimating the
North Koreans. He described
the enemy soldier as a tough, well-led fighter who combined the infiltration
tactics of the Japanese with the armored tactics of the Russians in World War
II. General MacArthur praised the North Korean Army's ability to march,
maneuver, and attack at night. So far, his own forces had not been able to do
the equivalent successfully. The North Korean Army exploited its tank firepower
to the greatest advantage. Its armored tactics were extremely efficient and
approximated, in his words, "the norm of tank effectiveness standard in the
Soviet Army." The flexibility of the North Korean commanders had been very
apparent in their quick adoption of night operations as a countermeasure against
intensified air attacks by American forces. [17]
General MacArthur confessed that the only hope he had seen a week earlier had
been "a desperate rearguard action," to slow the North Korean Army by "throwing
everything in Japan into the fight." He had done this as fast as he could
although his own forces were, as he phrased it, "tailored for occupation duty
and not for combat." [18]
By now he had taken a brighter view. He told Generals Collins and Vandenberg
that, while he could not predict where the military situation would be
stabilized, "that it will be stabilized is indisputable." Originally, he had
planned to stand near Suwon and then to envelop the north bank of the Han River.
After recapturing Seoul, he would have cut the enemy's line of communications
and his withdrawal route. He conceded that his forces were now too far south and
too weak to carry out this plan. He had, therefore, postponed its execution
until the situation could be stabilized and reinforcements reached him. He
placed no blame on General Dean or his men. General Dean had done as well as any
man could. The troops had done everything possible, but they were out-gunned,
outnumbered, and without adequate defense against the enemy's armor. [19]
General MacArthur then outlined his recommendations for winning the fight in
Korea. In his opinion, the success of the United States in Korea and the speed
of achievement of that success would be in direct proportion to the speed with
which the United States sent him reinforcements. All American forces he could
spare from Japan would have been sent to Korea by August. If the United States
backed this commitment with sufficient reinforcements from the zone of the
interior, there would be, in MacArthur's mind, no question as to the result.
Without full support, the result would vary in direct proportion to the support
received. MacArthur contended that if he were giving advice he would say, "In
this matter, time is of the essence." [20]
[17] Memo, Lt. Col. D. D. Dickson for Gen. Bolte, sub: Rpt of Trip to FEC,
10-15 Jul. 5O, Tab A: Remarks of Gen. MacArthur, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, sec.
I, Case 3. Quotations are taken from the notes kept by Col. Dickson.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
He expressed extreme impatience with delay or partial measures. The strength
of any military stroke depended entirely upon its speed. Accordingly, General
MacArthur wanted to "grab every ship in the Pacific and pour the support into
the Far East." He would not start modestly and build up, but would make the
complete effort at the beginning. In emphasizing these points, the veteran
commander said, "Business as usual-to hell with that concept." Admittedly the
United States was "playing a poor hand here," but long experience had shown
General MacArthur that "it is how you play your poor hands rather than your good
ones which counts in the long run." [21]
The question of how much American strength should be saved for areas in other
parts of the world obviously interested General MacArthur less than the Joint
Chiefs. He believed that winning in Korea would slow down worldwide communism
more than any other single factor. He assured his visitors that he fully
understood the American obligation to maintain its global military posture. But
he made a colorful analogy to point out the error of withholding strength from
the Korean battlefront. Assuming the world to be a metropolis of four districts
of which District No. 1 was the most important and District No. 4 least so,
General MacArthur asked his visitors to consider whether a fire in No. 4 should
be allowed to burn uncontrolled because city officials were saving their fire
equipment for District No. 1. As he concluded, "You may," he said, "find the
fire out of control by the time your equipment is sent to No. 4." A general
conflagration should not be handled by attempting to place Korea or the FEC in
terms of priority of area. General MacArthur felt that the United States would
win in Korea or lose everywhere. [22]
General Collins particularly wanted answers to several specific questions
which could help solve the major questions facing the Joint Chiefs. He asked
General MacArthur when he would be able to mount a counteroffensive and how many
American troops he would need in Korea after the fighting ended. Both questions
were keyed to the thorny issue of how much the United States should expand its
military program. General MacArthur insisted that a categorical reply to the
first question was impossible. When three divisions had been committed to Korea,
he hoped to stabilize the situation. He intended then to infiltrate north and
follow any North Korean withdrawal. He was centering his hopes on an amphibious
operation. The overland pursuit of North Korean forces was incidental to this
operation.
As to the second question, General MacArthur told General Collins that he
would not merely drive the invaders across the 38th Parallel. He meant to
destroy all their forces and, if necessary, to occupy all of North Korea. "In
the aftermath of operations," he said, "the problem is to compose and unite
Korea." His troop requirement in the Far East Command under this situation would
be eight infantry divisions and an additional Army headquarters.
Not only General MacArthur but also two of his key officers took advantage of
General Collins' presence to press for additional forces. General Walker,
commander in Korea, and General Almond, chief of staff, FEC GHQ, each emphasized
the need for eleven more infantry battalions and 3,600 fillers to be sent by
air. The fillers were needed to build up the 7th Division, which General Walker
described as "only a crust." General
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
Collins made no on-the-spot commitment since arrangements to meet these
requirements were already under way.
From the Tokyo conference, General Collins and General Vandenberg flew to
Korea. Collins talked briefly at Taegu with Walker, Dean, and members of the
Eighth Army staff. Agreeing with General MacArthur's analysis of the combat
scene, Walker told Collins that, barring unforeseen circumstances, he could hold
an extensive bridgehead with the troops en route to Korea from Japan. The
commander of the battered 24th Division, General Dean, was very worried over his
losses. On the day of General Collins' visit, the total of missing soldiers from
Dean's 24th Division had risen from 200 to well over 800. [23]
General Collins returned to Tokyo early on 14 July, leaving for Washington
the same day. Before leaving, the Army Chief of Staff gave General MacArthur his
personal ideas on which major units he could count on having for the offensive
which he had in mind. In addition to the four divisions already in the Far East,
these units were the 2d Division, the 1st Marine Division, the 4th RCT, the 29th
RCT, and an RCT from the 11th Airborne Division.
General MacArthur, after getting Collins' views, told the Chief of Staff that
he would make his plans on the basis of the anticipated strength of these units.
If Russia or Communist China intervened in force, the plans would have to be
changed. He assured Collins that he fully understood the problems faced in
Washington and the necessity of maintaining some kind of General Reserve. [24]
Air Operations-July 1950
While possible steps to improve MacArthur's ground strength were being
considered, moves to improve air operations in Korea were under way. Since there
was no provision in the FEC GHQ staff organization for joint representation of
the Navy and Air Force, the central command of air operations over Korea was not
possible below the level of General MacArthur himself. Anomalous and inefficient
operations sometimes resulted. In early July, as an example, the Navy sent
planes from Task Force 77 against targets that FEAF planned to attack the
following day. As a consequence, the Air Force medium bombers sat on the ground
the next day since it was too late to set up other targets. [25]
Someone obviously had to take over the responsibility, and General
Stratemeyer made the first bid for over-all control of air operations in Korea.
On 8 July, he told General MacArthur:
It is my understanding that the Navy contemplates bringing into your
theater some land-based aircraft; also, as you know, the Seventh
Fleet contemplates another strike with air at your direction in North
Korea. I request that all land-based naval aviation and carrier-based
aviation when operating over North Korea or from Japan, except those
units for anti-submarine operations, be placed under my operational
control. [26]
[23] Rad, C 57814, Collins to Haislip, 14 Jul. 50.
[24] Ibid.
[25] For detailed coverage of air and naval operations in Korea, see: Robert
Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York:
Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1961); James A. Field, Jr., History of United
States Naval Operations, Korea (Washington, 1962); and Commander Malcolm C.
Cagle and Commander Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis: U.
S. Naval Institute, 1957).
[26] Memo, Stratemeyer for MacArthur, 8 Jul. 50.
When the Navy objected to Stratemeyer's acquiring control of naval aircraft
for operations in Korea, General Almond, the chief of staff, worked out a
compromise in a directive issued in MacArthur's name on 8 July whereby
Stratemeyer would control all aircraft "operating in the execution of the Far
East Air Force mission as assigned by CINCFE." However, when engaged in naval
reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and support of naval tasks such as
amphibious assault, naval aircraft were to remain under the operational control
of COMNAVFE. [27]
U. S. and ROK ground troops needed every bit of close support that could be
given them in the first weeks of the Korean fighting. Artillery was at a
premium. There were not enough batteries, nor was there enough ammunition. In
view of shortages of infantry units and their organic support weapons, the Air
Force had to undertake a larger than normal role in ground force support.
Unfortunately, the Far East Air Force had an insufficient number of planes of
the most desirable types for supporting ground troops in close contact with the
enemy. Lacking, too, were men and facilities for air-ground control and
coordination. Drastic measures were taken. Aircraft normally employed in
interdiction missions behind enemy lines assumed ground support missions. The
use of B-29 bombers as close-support weapons, to the necessary neglect of other
functions behind enemy lines, prompted criticism and serious objections by Air
Force officials in the Far East. But General MacArthur overrode them on the
basis that, if the ground troops were overrun, interdiction of targets deep
behind enemy lines would have no significance. He ordered Stratemeyer to send
his B-29's "to strafe, if necessary" in order to stop the North Korean drive.
[27] CINCFE Ltr., 8 Jul. 50, sub: Coordination of Air Effort of FEAF and U.
S. NAVFE.
Within several weeks after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Air Force
established the FEAF Bomber Command as a subordinate element of FEAF. The bomber
command consisted of several bombardment groups comprised of medium bombers
(B-29's), the aircraft which had been so successful in World War II in the
strategic bombing of Japan. In the Air Force concept, this type of bomber should
have been employed against strategic targets beyond the area
of ground fighting including such installations as factories, rail yards,
warehouses, and other vital points on enemy lines of communication.
Nevertheless, because of immediate needs and the lack of other proper aircraft,
General MacArthur decided that these medium bombers would operate in support of
ground troops wherever necessary. General Stratemeyer had ordered the medium
bombers to operate only north of the 38th Parallel. MacArthur overruled him on
several occasions in mid-July and ordered the mediums sent against enemy troop
concentrations and other tactical targets immediately in front of the Eighth
Army lines. MacArthur, on 15 July, also told General Walker that future
emergency use of these medium bombers would he ordered by GHQ whenever Walker
felt it necessary. [28]
When General Vandenberg and General Collins came to the theater in mid-July,
this aspect of the air-ground relationship concerned both of them. Vandenberg
did not attempt to interfere since, if Eighth Army troops were driven off the
peninsula and the Air Force was meanwhile employing its bombers to bomb remote
industrial areas in North Korea, the resultant effect on public opinion would
have been most unfavorable. General Collins, on the other hand, expressed great
interest in the way the B-29's were being employed and asked to be kept
informed.
To tighten his control of the air effort in Korea, General MacArthur on 14
July established a GHQ Target Group, composed of a chairman, a senior Army
officer from Willoughby's G-2 section, and Air Force, Navy, and Army members.
This group was to advise on the use of Navy and air offensive power "in
conformance with the day-to-day situation." The group would recommend targets
and priorities which the Air Force and Navy would bomb. The decisions of the
target group were passed to the G-3 who passed on the orders to FEAF. Few of the
members appointed to the group were experienced pilots and their method of
operation consisted of studying maps of Korea, selecting likely targets from
these maps, and directing that they be bombed. It was an unwieldy and
impracticable method. [29]
[28] Rad, CX 57893, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 15 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 57755, CINCFE
to CG FEAF, 13 Jul. 50.
[29] (1) Check Sheet, Almond to All Staff Secs., GHQ FEC, 14 Jul. 50. (2)
Interv, Maj. Schnabel with Comdr. Reilly, JSPOG, GHQ, Nov. 51.
According to Air Force officials, this abnormal arrangement was not only
unproductive but wasteful. Since the target group performed its function using a
standard Army Map Service 1:250,000 map to select targets for medium bombers
without checking its information from other sources, an unusual situation
developed. Of 220 targets selected by the group between 17 July and 2 August, 20
percent did not exist on the ground. The FEAF commander called on General
MacArthur and the latter's chief of staff, General Almond, on 19 July to
complain of this procedure. Stratemeyer followed this visit with a memorandum on
21 July in which he recommended the creation of a target selection committee
which would include General Hickey, the FEC GHQ deputy chief of staff, General
Willoughby, the G-2, Lt. Gen. Otto P. Weyland, the vice commander for operations
of FEAF, and a Navy representative to be named by Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy. MacArthur approved this
recommendation immediately, and FEAF, using the new method, took over the actual
selection of targets for interdiction. [30]
The Withdrawal Continues
Meanwhile, the North Korean Army drove hard, aiming to destroy the Republic
of Korea and to throw the 24th Division out of Korea before ground
reinforcements arrived. At the Kum River line the enemy units again outflanked
the 24th Division. The 19th Infantry and its attached artillery lost nearly
one-fifth of their men and officers while vainly trying to keep the superior
enemy force from crossing the Kum an 16 and 17 July. Having breached American
defenses on the last natural barrier before the key railroad center of Taejon,
the enemy slashed southward, intent on taking Taejon with a further view,
apparently, of capturing the new South Korean capital of Taegu.
[30] USAF Hist Div., Dept. of the Air Force, United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean Conflict, 25 June-1 November 1950, 1 July 1952, p.
13.
General MacArthur's chief of staff, General Almond, contended in a letter
to General Collins on 17 July that the North Koreans hoped to capture Taegu
mainly for the psychological effect. The enemy commanders, having outflanked the
Americans, were attacking as well down the central corridor along the axis
Ch'ungju-Taegu, and were pushing back the South Koreans. Almond assumed Collins
that General MacArthur was aware of this "vital threat" down the middle.
Referring to the plans for the future which General MacArthur had sketched to
him three days before, Almond reported:
Our proposed projects are developing as planned and we are confident
that while the enemy stubbornly persists in his efforts to drive us
back, we have blunted his principal strikes, and he is bound to be
getting more exhausted while we become stronger each day and better
organized to stop him.... We have no fear of the outcome and
thoroughly understand that current conditions are the growing pains
precedent to future operations.
General Almond did not believe that Taejon could be held but was not unduly
alarmed. "It may not last there," he told Collins, "but the trend is much
better." [31]
The 25th Division, although its first elements had reached Korea on 9 July,
had not yet met the enemy. Nor had the 1st Cavalry Division, en route to Korea
while Almond was addressing Collins. The 24th Division, weakened and
disorganized, fell back upon Taejon alone, the enemy hard on its heels.
When President Truman, on 19 July, asked General MacArthur for his estimate
of the Korean situation, he received a reply that revealed a new confidence,
quite a contrast with the glum prognoses issued earlier in the month. The North
Koreans, MacArthur told the President, had lost their great chance for victory.
The extraordinary speed with which Eighth Army had been deployed from Japan and
the brilliant coordinated support by air and naval elements had forced the enemy
into "continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics.... I
do not believe that history records a comparable operation." His forces still
faced a difficult campaign. They would be hard pressed and could expect losses
as well as successes. But the initiative no longer lay entirely with the North
Koreans, and United Nations troops held Southern Korea securely. Apparently
heartened by the recent promises of reinforcements which would increase his own
strength as attrition cut the enemy's strength, General MacArthur assured
President Truman, "We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are
there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully
restored." [32]
[31] Ltr., Almond to Collins, 17 Jul. 50.
[32] (1) Rad, WH 498, Truman (Personal) to MacArthur, 19 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, C
58248, MacArthur (Personal) to Truman, 19 Jul. 50.
The 24th Division lost Taejon on 20 July in a hard-fought 2-day battle. The
division commander, General Dean, was captured after becoming separated from his
troops during the withdrawal from Taejon. Division casualties approached 30
percent. On 22 July the 1st Cavalry Division relieved the 24th at Yongdong. In a
17-day losing battle against two superior North Korean divisions, the 24th had
fallen back almost 100 miles, and had lost more than 2,400 men missing in action
and enough materiel to equip a full division. [33]
Two days later General MacArthur reaffirmed his confidence that he could hold
the invading communist armies. Called to a teleconference by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on 24 July and questioned on an enemy move around the left end of his line
which resembled the start of a double envelopment, General MacArthur admitted
that he lacked the strength to prevent it, but saw it as no serious threat. So
long as the North Koreans outnumbered the South Koreans and Americans at a
particular location they would always be able to mount enveloping attacks. But
their main effort continued to be in the center of the line, and the basic
question was whether they had sufficient strength to force withdrawals there. If
his own forces could hold the center, General MacArthur would have no special
worry about the incipient envelopment. "If our center is unable to hold," he
said, "our perimeter will have to be contracted." Referring to his recent
statements to President Truman which had predicted losses as well as successes,
General MacArthur pointed out that the situation was developing in accordance
with that estimate. [34]
[33] For the full story of the 24th Division's valiant fight on the Kum River
line and at Taejon, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the
Yalu, Chapters X and XI, pages 121-81.
[34] Telecon, TT 3573, Gens. Bradley, Collins, Norstad, and Adm. Sherman in
Washington with Gen. MacArthur in Tokyo, 24 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA files.
General MacArthur's piecemeal commitment in early July 1950 of inadequate
American forces weak in firepower, mobility, and reserves against a disciplined,
determined, and numerically superior enemy constituted a basic violation of U.
S. military doctrine. The violation could not be avoided and the consequences
had to be accepted. Had General MacArthur waited until his ground units were
completely combat-ready before sending them against the North Koreans, the
entire peninsula would probably have fallen to the communists. But his mission
was to assist the Republic of Korea and to prevent it from falling into enemy
hands. He parceled out his available means deliberately and in full knowledge of
the risk. At the end of July the situation of American forces in Korea remained
precarious. By breaking off with the enemy and retreating swiftly, the battered
ground units could have evacuated from Pusan with a good deal of their
equipment. Once back in Japan, reconstituted and resupplied, these forces could
have joined other units in a later concerted amphibious assault on Korea at a place of the American
commander's choosing. But never did General MacArthur seriously consider a
course other than a fighting withdrawal to a beachhead perimeter around Pusan,
with his men delaying the enemy to the limit of their abilities until
reinforcement arrived. Costly though it proved, this course avoided the loss of
prestige and political ill effects of voluntary evacuation, at the same time
providing a build-up area on the peninsula for later exploitation. [35]
The extraordinary efforts in Washington and Tokyo during July succeeded in
strengthening the unified command in Korea and staving off its complete
collapse. The full effects of these efforts, because of distances involved, did
not become apparent in Korea until July was nearly over. But with the arrival of
new men and new equipment, late in the month, backed by the assured arrival of
even greater combat strength in the near future, the odds in favor of ultimate
North Korean victory dropped sharply.
[35] The North Korean Premier, Kim Il Sung, later remarked on this American
tactic as if it were unfair, He said also, in a last appeal to his faltering
forces in October 1950, "The first error we committed was, instead of making a
complete siege and annihilating the enemy, we gave them enough lime to regroup
and increase their strength while retreating." See Order from Supreme Commander,
NKA, to All Forces, 15 Oct. 50, in ATIS Enemy Docs., Korean Opns, Issue 19, 30
Jan 51, Item 1.
