CHAPTER V
Emergency Conditions, Emergency Measures
President Truman's decision to send American ground troops against the North
Koreans had come in time, but barely. Regardless of American air strikes against
their cities, communication lines, and troop columns, and despite naval surface
attack against their coastal installations and shipping, the invaders drove the
ROK Army down the peninsula. As the vague line of battle receded southward in
late June and early July it became clear that the Republic of Korea could not
stand by itself.
Armed with Presidential authority, MacArthur sent ground troops into the
fight as fast as he could move them. On 30 June, he ordered the 24th Division
from Japan to Korea, retaining the unit, for the time being, under his personal
control. On the recommendation of his chief of staff, General Almond, he ordered
a small task force from the division flown into Korea ahead of the main body to
engage the North Korean Army as quickly as possible, sacrificing security for
speed. Because it would go by air, he restricted its size to two rifle
companies, some antitank teams, and a battery of light artillery. This makeshift
unit was to report to General Church at Suwon by 1 July; but, realizing that
Suwon might fall at any time, General MacArthur authorized Church to divert the
force to Pusan if necessary. [1]
[1] (1) Rad, CX 56978, CINCFE 10 CG Eighth Army, 30 Jun. 50. (2) Rad, C
26979, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 30 Jun. 50. (3) Review Comments, Lt. Gen.
Edward M. Almond, 20 Feb. 69. (4) General MacArthur chose this division on the
basis of location. The 24th Division was closer to Korea than other combat units
in Japan and could be deployed more rapidly. From the standpoint of combat
readiness, while there was little to choose from among the four divisions in
Japan, the 24th Division had been reported on 30 May 1950 as having the lowest
combat effectiveness of the major units. This report gave the following
estimates of combat effectiveness for FEC divisions: 1st Cavalry-84 percent
combat effective 7th Division-74 percent combat effective; 25th Division-72
percent combat effective; 24th Division-65 percent combat effective. See Memo,
U.S. Army Major Units FEC, 3 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA files. (5) Interv, author with
Brig Gen. Edwin K. Wright, ACofS G-3, FEC, UNC, Dec. 51.
General Church meanwhile struggled to keep the ROK Army in the fight. He had
no real authority over the South Koreans, but his status as MacArthur's personal
representative gave weight to his advice to the ROK Chief of Staff. In effect,
Church took charge of the faltering South Korean Army. Many KMAG officers stayed with ROK combat units,
patrolling, feeding information to General Church, and doing whatever they could
to stiffen ROK resistance and morale. [2]
American advice could not stop North Korean tanks and artillery. The South
Koreans continued to fall back. General Church's command group pulled out of
Suwon in the early evening of 30 June to Taejon. Vowing to "run no farther,"
Church, together with Ambassador Muccio, awaited the small 24th Division task
force.
Around midnight, General Almond notified the American Embassy at Taejon that
bad flying weather had forced the diversion of the task force to Pusan, where it
would land as soon as the weather improved; the first contingents of the main
body of the 24th Division would land at Pusan by ship within twelve or fourteen
hours. General Almond emphasized that these men were not to be used as
"Headquarters Guards" but to fight the North Koreans. He was assured that the
railroads from Pusan to Taejon were operating and that there should be no
problem in moving these troops to the line of battle. Almond instructed Church
to concentrate railroad rolling stock near Pusan to keep it out of enemy hands
and to have it ready for the 24th Division. [3]
The small delaying force part of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry landed at
Pusan Airfield on 1 and 2 July, with Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith in command. The
artillery battery originally called for had been replaced by two 4.2-inch mortar
platoons. A platoon of 77-mm recoilless rifles and six 2.36-inch bazooka teams
had also been added. Because of the poor flying weather many trucks and some
soldiers could not be flown in until later. [4]
General MacArthur was concerned that the small force lacked artillery, and on
2 July he ordered General Walker to fly in howitzers from Japan if he had to. It
was unnecessary to do so, for elements of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion were
already on their way by LST, and they landed in Pusan that evening and moved at
once to the battle area. [5]
The commanding general of the 24th Division, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean, flew
to Pusan early in the morning of 2 July. After spending 24 hours becoming
acquainted with conditions, he telephoned from Taejon to Tokyo and spoke with
General Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ. Wanting his initial fight with the
North Koreans to be fully coordinated and supported, he told Hickey, "This first
show must be good.... We must get food and bullets and not go off half-cocked."
A few hours later, MacArthur named Dean commanding general, USAFIK. Dean assumed
control of KMAG and all other U.S. Army troops in Korea.
[2] Interv, author with Gen. Church, 16 Jul. 50, copy in OCMH.
[3] (1) Rad, A 041, ADCOM to CINCFE, 30 Jun. 50. (2) Rad, JSOB/G G-2 to Capt.
Hutchinson, 1130, 1 Jul. 50. (3) Memo, CofS GHQ, FEC, no signature, 1 Jul. 50,
sub: Telecon Between CofS GHQ and First Secy. of American Embassy, Taejon, 1120.
(4) Rad, CX 57009, CINCFE to ADCOM, 1 Jul. 50. All in AG, FEC files.
[4] Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 021810 Jul. 50, in AG, FEC files. [5]
(1) Rad, CX 57073, CINCFE to CG FEAF and CG Eighth Army, 2 Jul. 50. (2) Memo,
ACofS G-3, GHQ, for CofS ROK, GHQ, 021700 Jul. 50. Both in AG, FEC files.
Church's GHQ, ADCOM, served as his temporary staff. At the same time,
MacArthur set up the Pusan Base Command, subordinate to USAFIK and under Brig.
Gen. Crump Garvin. [6]
The other regiments of the 24th Division-the 34th and 19th Infantry, and the
remainder of the 21st Infantry, plus supporting units-moved to Korea rapidly. By
5 July, most of the division was there. To provide more armor General MacArthur
ordered Company A of the 1st Cavalry Division's medium tank battalion to bolster
the division. [7]
Meanwhile, Colonel Smith's delaying force, after reporting to General Church
at Taejon, was sent forward to engage the enemy on sight. Just above Osan, the
task force dug hasty positions on the night of 4 July and awaited the
approaching North Koreans. Shortly after 0800 on 5 July, the North Koreans
appeared. They struck the task force with infantry and about thirty Russian-made
T-34 tanks. The Americans stood until they expended their ammunition, then
abandoned the field, suffering heavy losses in the process. Their weapons had
proved to be almost useless against the enemy armor. Without reserves and with
open flanks, the task force remnants withdrew to avoid being surrounded and
destroyed.
The pattern of this first engagement was repeated during the following days.
All combat elements of the 24th Division closed with the enemy along the main
axis of his advance, but the North Korean firepower and greater strength
overwhelmed these units at every stand. The men and officers of the 24th
Division fought bravely, but their small numbers and inferior weapons left no
choice but retreat or annihilation.
General Dean hoped that the 34th Infantry could delay the North Korean
advance in the P'yongt'aek-Ch'onan-Kongju corridor. But between 5 and 8 July the
regiment, thrown into a fight for which it was unprepared, was cut to pieces.
Weak in numbers, completely out-gunned, unable to protect its flanks, and short
of ammunition the 34th retreated in some disorder, suffering extremely heavy
casualties.
The 21st Infantry held at Chonui and Choch'iwon for three days, slowed two
enemy divisions, but, after losing heavily in men and equipment, had to give way
on 12 July.
East of the main Seoul-Taegu rail and highway lines, the ROK Army tried to
stem the North Korean drive through the mountainous central and eastern regions.
In bloody hand-to-hand fighting that cost both sides dearly, the North Koreans
continued to advance. No defensive line appeared to offer the prospect of a
determined stand. [8]
[6] (1) Memo, 031140 Jul. 50, sub: Telecom Between ADCOM (Gen. Dean) and CofS
(Gen. Hickey). (2) Rad, CX 57153, CINCFE, to CG 24th Div., 3 Jul. 50. Both in
AG, FEC files.
[7] (1) Memo ACofS G-3, GHQ, for CofS ROK, GHQ, 2 Jul. 50. (2) Ibid.,
3 Jul. 50. (3) Rad., CX 57090, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 2 Jul. 50. All in AG,
FEC files.
[8] (1) Rad, ROB 104, CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 6 Jul. 50. (2) For a detailed
account of these actions, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the
Yalu, pp. 59-108. (3) General MacArthur later testified that he had sent the
initial task force in the hope of establishing a "loci [locus] of resistance,"
an "arrogant display of strength" that would fool the enemy into believing that
much more American resources were at hand than in actuality. See MacArthur
Hearings, p. 231.
MacArthur's Estimates
The under-strength American division so hastily deployed to Korea was unable
to stop the North Korean drive, but this fact did not become evident for several
days after the initial encounter at Osan. The situation in Korea could not be
accurately evaluated even in Tokyo let alone in Washington, where Army officials
could do little but wait impatiently for clarification through General
MacArthur's estimates and descriptions. Until these estimates arrived,
Washington could neither plan adequately nor gauge the scope of the job to be
done. The Army's plans for supporting MacArthur had to be based on requirements
established either directly or obliquely by his estimates. Washington
authorities had no recourse, in these early days, but to accept his judgment of
capabilities and requirements at face value. They knew the limits of the
nation's immediate resources. General MacArthur told them what was happening in
Korea and what he felt had to be done. In the search for a balance between what
they had and what was needed, the nation's military leaders followed advice from
the Far East commander which they could not accurately evaluate. [9]
MacArthur's early estimates fell short in appraising the ultimate necessary
force, but not in their appreciation of the caliber of the enemy and the
seriousness of the threat. The tenor of reports from Church, Dean, and others
had already convinced General MacArthur that the situation was indeed serious.
The degree of seriousness remained to be determined. He did not immediately
arrive at a full appreciation of the strength of the North Korean attack.
General MacArthur progressively revised upward his estimate of the strength he
would need to defeat the North Koreans.
Late in June, he implied that two American divisions could restore order.
[10] But by 7 July his views had changed materially. He told the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, "It is now apparent that we are confronted in Korea with an aggressive
and well-trained professional army equipped with tanks and perhaps other ground
material quite equal to, and in some categories, superior to that available
here." The enemy's leadership was "excellent." The North Koreans showed
understanding of and skill in tactical and strategic principles-demonstrated by
their break across the Han River. To halt and hurl back "this powerful
aggression" would, in MacArthur's opinion, require from four to four and
one-half full-strength American divisions supported by an airborne RCT and an
armored group. To reach this strength level in Korea 30,000 men and officers
would have to be sent him from the United States at once. "It is a minimum," he
warned the Joint Chiefs, "without which success will be extremely doubtful."
[11]
[9] Complementary to the failure of U.S. intelligence agencies to foresee the
North Korean assault is the failure to have determined the true quality of the
North Korean Army, especially the caliber of its training and the individual
worth of the North Korean soldier. General Bradley testified later. "The first
few days we did not know just how good these North Koreans were, and it was some
time before we could get a good picture...." See MacArthur Hearings, p
893.
[10] Rad, C 56942, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun. 50.
[11] Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 7 Jul. 50.
Dean echoed this conviction. In a personal letter to MacArthur on 8 July,
Dean set forth his views on the enemy strength and on his own most urgent needs.
He asked for battle-ready combat teams immediately, troops with full combat
loads and extra supplies, ready for coordinated action. [12]
North Korean armor had proven extremely effective. In their first
engagements, his troops, Dean pointed out emphatically, could not stop enemy
tanks. The 2.36-inch rocket launcher, an American antitank weapon of World War
II, proved dangerously disappointing against the enemy's heavily armored Russian
tanks. The launcher was ineffective against the front and side armor, and
American infantrymen quickly lost all confidence in it. [13] Direct fire by
artillery was of little help after the pitifully few 105-mm. antitank rounds
available at the guns were exhausted. Regular high-explosive projectiles, which
composed the bulk of artillery ammunition carried by his batteries, would not
penetrate armor deeply enough. Dean stressed the need for getting antitank
ammunition to his artillery at once. He described enemy tank tactics as
excellent and unusually effective despite terrain which confined tanks mainly to
roads. Asserting that "we cannot afford to be out-gunned and out-armored," the
hard-pressed American general appealed for American medium tanks and for 90-mm.
towed antitank guns. [14]
General Dean warned that the North Korean soldier was a dangerous foe. "I am
convinced," he told General MacArthur, "that the North Korean Army, the North
Korean soldier and his status of training and the quality of his equipment have
been underestimated." [15]
Dean's first-hand account, coupled with graphic evidence of enemy successes
on the situation maps in his own war room, brought General MacArthur to the
conclusion that he had been much too conservative. On 9 July 1950 he doubled his
estimate of the forces needed. "The situation in Korea is critical," he told the
Joint Chiefs. "It has developed into a major operation." For the first time he
expressed doubt that the Americans could stay in Korea.
To build up... sufficiently to hold the southern tip of Korea is
becoming increasingly problematical. I strongly urge that, in
addition to those forces already requisitioned, an army of at least
four divisions, with all component services, be dispatched to this
area without delay, and by every means of transportation available.
[16]
[12] Ltr., Gen. Dean to Gen. MacArthur, 080800 Jul. 50, sub: Recommendations
Relative to Employment of U. S. Army Troops in Korea, in AG, FEC files.
[13] This weapon, developed during World War II, was much publicized and
widely regarded as a "wonder weapon." In reality, the 2.36-inch rocket launcher,
or bazooka, did not deserve this reputation. There are relatively few recorded
instances in which it was successfully used against German armor. See Hugh M.
Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
(Washington, 1950), ch. XIV, p. 604. Also, the launcher ammunition used by
Dean's men was at least five years old and had deteriorated.
[14] (1) Ltr., Gen. Dean to Gen. MacArthur, 080800 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, ROB 110,
CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 6 Jul. 50.
[15] Ltr., Gen. Dean to Gen. MacArthur, 080800 Jul. 50.
[16] Rad, CX 57841, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Jul. 50.
To lend validity to this sudden revision, General MacArthur re-emphasized his
growing respect for the North Korean Army. He credited the North Korean Army and
its employment as being as
good "as any seen at any time in the last war." Enemy infantry was first
class. There were unmistakable signs of Soviet leadership and technical guidance
and of Chinese Communist participation. The attack could no longer be viewed as
an indigenous North Korean military effort. "To date," he admitted, "our efforts
against his armor and mechanized forces have been ineffective." This failure,
galling as it was, was not the fault of the fighting men "Our own troops," he.
pointed out, "are fulfilling expectations and are fighting with valor against
overwhelming odds of more than ten to one." [17] This appeal to Washington for
an additional army of four divisions climaxed a series of detailed requests for
men and units and marked the upper limit of MacArthur's requests for Korea.
[17] Ibid.
On 5 July General MacArthur had ordered the 25th Infantry Division into
combat, and by 9 July its first RCT had cleared Japan for Korea. All regiments
of the 25th Division had arrived in or were en route to Korea by 14 July. They
went into battle at once. The 15t Cavalry Division was by this time also
preparing for an amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea. In order to
bring these two divisions and the 24th Division to some semblance of effective
fighting strength, MacArthur stripped
the remaining FEC combat force, the 7th Division, of trained officers and
men. While this cannibalization of the 7th fell far short of building up the
other units to a satisfactory war strength, it left the 7th Division a skeleton,
temporarily useless for combat. [18]
As the odds grew large that the greater part of Eighth Army would have to
fight in Korea, it became apparent that General Walker would have to take
personal command there. USAFIK was a provisional headquarters, hastily formed
for a specific mission, and could not handle a large operation efficiently. When
General Dean proposed on 7 July that his headquarters absorb GHQ ADCOM, General
MacArthur had already decided that General Walker would take over. [19]
Five days later, on 12 July, MacArthur named Walker commander of the ground
forces in Korea. The USAFIK headquarters was dissolved, and General Church's
ADCOM group was ordered to Tokyo. [20]
The extension of Eighth Army's area of responsibility to include Korea
introduced the unique situation of an army fighting on one land mass with
responsibility for its own logistical support, including port operation and
procurement of supply, while administering occupied territory on another land
mass several hundred miles away and serving as its own zone of communications.
For the sake of convenience, forces in Korea were referred to as Eighth U.S.
Army in Korea (EUSAK) and those remaining in Japan were still referred to as
Eighth Army or as Eighth Army Rear. General Walker retained command of both.
When Walker assumed command in Korea, he had approximately 18,000 troops
spread along a defensive line running along the south bank of the Kum River to a
point just above Taejon, there curving northeastward through {Ch'ongju} and
across the Taebaek Range below {Ch'ungju} and Tanyang, finally bending southward
to the east coast of P'yonghae-ri. [21] Although General MacArthur had hoped to
save the 1st Cavalry Division for a later amphibious operation, he yielded to
battlefield necessity and sent that unit to Korea in mid-July. The division
loaded out of the Yokohama area between 11 and 17 July aboard LST's, other U.S.
naval craft, and Japanese-operated cargo ships. The unit was prepared to make an
amphibious landing on the east coast of Korea near P'ohang-dong, against enemy
opposition if necessary. No enemy appeared, and in the early morning of 18 July
the units started coming ashore. [22]
[18] (1) Rad, CX 57258, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 5 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, G-4
GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 10 Jul. 50, sub: Movement of 25th Inf. Div. to Korea. (3)
Memo, C-4 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 14 Jul. 50. (4) Rad, CX 57692, CINCFE to DA, 12
Jul. 50. All memos in AC, FEC files.
[19] (1) Ltr., CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 6 Jul. 50, sub: Org. of USAFIK. (2) Ltr.,
CINCFE to CC USAFIK, 1st {Ind}, 9 Jul. 50. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 146, 9 Jul. 50.
[20] (1) CO 13, GHQ FEC, 12 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 57765, CINCFE to CG Eighth
Army, 13 Jul. 50.
[21] Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 108.
[22] (1) Draft Plan, JSPOG GHQ, FEC, Operation BLUEHEARTS, 2 Jul. 50, in AG,
FEC files. (2) War Diary, 1st Cav. Div., Jul. 50.
The Build-up
The years of military privation since World War II had left their mark on the
ground forces of the United States. Not
only were they equipped with outmoded, worn weapons and equipment, but their
numbers were scant. Both Army and Marine troops had spread thin in their efforts
to perform their interim missions. Aside from scattered elements in the Pacific,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army's leaders had only the under-strength
General Reserve in the United States from which to draw immediately for fighting
men to throw into Korea. Additional ground strength could be developed through
Selective Service and through the call-up of Reserve Component forces, but these
methods would take time. Thus, when General MacArthur, reacting to North Korean
victories, impatiently demanded his due, the nation's military leaders faced a
dilemma of considerable complexity and prime importance. The very safety of the
nation stood, at times, in the balance.
Demands for combat forces by General MacArthur in July and August 1950 fell
into three broad categories: replacements, filler units and individual fillers,
and reinforcing units. To meet his demands in any of these categories would
affect the balance of United States military strength. Each tied in with
problems far broader in scope than General MacArthur's problems in Korea. Within
the limits imposed by national policy, as set by the President, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and the Department of the Army made every effort to meet the urgent
requirements developing in the Far East.
Replacements
The sources of replacements within the Far East quickly dried up. Men were
taken from administrative and noncombatant duties and sent to the combat units.
In the United States, every installation was combed for individuals who could be
shipped quickly to Korea.
General MacArthur first asked for 5,000 combat and 425 service replacements.
On 1 July, he asked that these troops be added to the normal number shipped to
his command each month, stipulating that they be qualified and experienced, for
they were "going directly into the combat zone in Korea for an indefinite
period...." [23] This number could be sent without difficulty, and most would
reach Japan within the month, the remainder early in August.
The Department of the Army gave MacArthur special dispensations that would
improve the replacement status in the Far East while not enfeebling military
strength elsewhere. He could retain enlisted men in his command even though
their foreign service tours had been completed. He could keep Reserve officers
after their category commitments had expired, if they agreed. He could call to
active duty limited numbers of Reserve personnel already in the Far East. [24]
[23] (1) Rad, CX 57013, CINCFE to DA, 1 Jul. 50. (2) General MacArthur's
2-division estimate was the basis for these figures. This estimate called for
deployment of 25,266 combat troops and 9,246 service troops in the combat zone.
The formula applied to this battlefield strength to determine replacement needs
was taken from FM 101-10, 10 August 1949, and provided a surprisingly accurate
figure. United States battle losses in July were 1.3 percent of total strength,
whereas the formula forecast had set expected losses at 1.35 percent. See Rad,
CX 58760, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul. 50.
[24] (1) Rad, C 57692, CINCFE to DA, 12 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS
GHQ, 5 Aug. 50, sub: Casualties and Replacements. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 41, 5
Aug. 50. (4) Rad, C 58232, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul. 50.
Airlift of replacements from the
United States to Japan began on a modest scale on 18 July. A lift of 80 men a
day was gradually expanded to 240 combat soldiers daily. Although sufficient air
transport was not immediately available, the Department of the Army and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff did everything possible to increase the aerial flow in
late July and early August. Replacements were flown to Japan in organized
packets of 39 men and 1 officer. Approximately 7,350 replacements reached Japan
in July 1950. [25]
Army officials in Washington asked General MacArthur to recheck his figures
on 23 July. Perhaps the actual casualties were fewer than the number forecast.
Maj. Gen. William A. Beiderlinden, the FEC G-1, informed Washington that the
actual number of men and officers lost in Korea closely approximated his earlier
educated guess. The only discrepancy was an excessive missing-in-action rate,
which reflected the ability of the North Koreans to envelop the under-strength
American units almost at will. Beiderlinden promised to read just FEC
requirements downward whenever this action became possible. [26]
The Department of the Army on 19 July had discarded peacetime strengths and
authorized full combat Table of Organization and Equipment (TO & E) strength
for all divisions operating in the Far East Command. This increase in authorized
men and officers, technically called filler replacements, when added to the
number of combat-loss replacements which MacArthur said he needed by 1 September
1950, brought the total replacement requirements of the command to 82,000 men.
[27]
[25] (1) Telecon, TT 3536, CINCFE and DA, 2100, 17 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ
for CofS GHQ, 17 Jul. 50, sub: Air Priority, Replacements Versus B-29 Engines.
(3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 40, 18 Jul. 50. (4) Rad, FAIRPAC 456, FAIRPAC to CINCFE,
26 Jul. 50. (5) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 1, 26 Jul. 50. (6) Rad, W 86607, DA to CINCFE,
20 Jul. 50. (7) Rad, W 86677, DA to CINCFE, 22 Jul. 50. (8) Rad, CX 58760,
CINCFE to DA, 27 Jul. 50.
[26] (1) Rad. W 87678, DA to CINCFE, 23 Jul. 50. (2) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 62, 23
Jul. 50. (3) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS, 24 Jul. 50, sub: Casualty Analysis. (4) G-1
GHQ Log, Item 37, 24 Jul. 50.
[27] (1) Rad, W 86450, DA to CINCFE, 19 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS
GHQ, 25 Jul. 50, sub: Replacement Sit in Japan. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 67, 25
Jul. 50. (4) General MacArthur had ordered on 11 July the establishment of an
Army replacement system by Eighth Army to support both Japan and Korea. A center
to receive, process, and allot the anticipated increased numbers of men and
officers slated for the Far East opened near Tokyo at Camp Drake on 24 July
1950. (5) Rad, CX 57662, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 11 Jul. 50. (6) Cleaver,
Personnel Problems, p. 82. (7) Memo, Col. Grubbs for Gen. Beiderlinden, 8 Aug.
50, sub: Assignment of Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 36, 8 Aug. 50.
Department of Army officials showed General MacArthur the bottom of the
replacement barrel on 30 July. All the men and officers eligible for overseas
assignment were being shipped to the Far East Command, except for slightly more
than a thousand to other joint commands. Despite Presidential approval for the
recall of 25,,000 enlisted Reservists, a severe shortage of replacements still
existed. Individual replacements from the Enlisted Reserve Corps would not be
available in quantity for at least two months. All of these men would have to go
to General Reserve units. The extensive levies placed upon the General Reserve
to furnish FEC replacements had cut the operating capabilities of the emergency
force to a dangerous level. For the immediate future, at least, the Army had
done about as much
as it could do. It could promise only the most austere replacement support to
General MacArthur. [28]
Bringing Divisions to Strength
Another significant effort involved the build-up of MacArthur's divisions
from under-strength, unbalanced peacetime divisions to fully manned, properly
constituted fighting divisions. With only two battalions in each regiment,
American forces in Korea could not employ normal tactical maneuvers based on the
full firepower and the flexibility of a triangular organization. Nor could they
guarantee flank protection. As General Dean said:
The two battalion regimental organization with which we are operating
does not lend itself to effective combat. The same is true, though
possibly to a lesser degree of our two battery artillery battalions.
Recommend that infantry battalions be sent us to bring all regiments
of the 24th Division up to regular triangular organization. [29]
Painfully familiar with the structural weaknesses of his combat divisions
General MacArthur appealed to the Department of the Army on 8 July saying, "In
order to provide balanced means for tactical maneuver, fire power, and
sustaining operations, it is urgently required that infantry divisions operating
in this theater be immediately expanded to full war strength in personnel and
equipment." The gravity of his concern prompted a second appeal two days later.
"I am sure that the Joints Chiefs of Staff realize," he said, "that the division
now in action in Korea, and the other two divisions soon to be committed are at
neither war strength nor at full authorized peace strength." General MacArthur
asked that completely manned and equipped battalion units be sent from the
United States wherever possible. [30] He needed 4 medium tank battalions, 12
tank companies, 11 infantry battalions, and 11 field artillery batteries
(105-mm. howitzers). [31] If these units could not be sent fully trained and
battle-ready as he desired, he wanted trained cadres, followed by filler
replacements. Asking that organized units, even if under-strength, be sent
first, he said he would find filler personnel in his own command.
The Far East Command could provide no trained cadres for new units. Only 60
percent of the first three grades authorized for existing FEC units were
available. If noncommissioned officers were taken from divisions already
fighting, these divisions would be dangerously weakened. General MacArthur urged
all possible speed in sending him units, cadres, and fillers. [32]
[28] Rad, W 87478, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jul. 50.
[29] Ltr., Gen. Dean to Gen MacArthur, 080800 Jul. 50.
[30] (1) Rad, CX 5746S, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, C 57561, CINCFE to
DA, 10 Jul. 50.
[31] The four FEC divisions had a total of 12 infantry regiments and 12 light
field artillery battalions. The Negro 24th Infantry had 3 battalions and the
Negro 159th Field Artillery Battalion had 3 105-mm. howitzer batteries and did
not require augmentation.
[32] Rad, CX 57573, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul. 50.
The acute shortage of infantry, artillery, and service support units in the
General Reserve in the United States turned these relatively modest demands into
a problem of major proportions. In marshaling organized combat units to fill out
the divisions in Korea and Japan, the Department of the Army
stripped battalions, companies, and batteries from the General Reserve. It
pulled trained noncoms from other units and formed provisional cadres for
General MacArthur's command. These drastic procedures not only vitiated the
combat readiness of the remaining units, but greatly reduced the mobilization
base for a later build-up of the Army General Reserve.
The dangers of denuding the General Reserve in the United States came under
consideration only as a secondary factor of the larger planning effort: how and
where the General Reserve should be tapped to bring FEC units to war strength.
The Department of the Army took in stride the decision to accept the great risk
of military weakness in the continental United States as it accepted at face
value General MacArthur's statement of his needs. [33]
Infantry Strength
The main considerations in selecting infantry battalions for Korea were early
arrival and combat effectiveness. Army authorities could have sent eleven cadres
for new infantry battalions, but new battalions, even with full cadres and
basic-trainee fillers, needed six months to become combat ready. Only in the
case of the 7th Division, still in Japan, were three battalion cadres
substituted for ready-to-fight units. The General Reserve held only eighteen
battalions of infantry at this time. From this small reservoir the Department of
the Army finally selected for the Far East Command 2 full battalions and 3
battalion cadres from the 3d Infantry Division; 1 full battalion from the 14th
RCT; and 3 battalions from the 5th RCT on Hawaii. The remaining 2 battalions
were taken from the 29th RCT on Okinawa. This unit was already part of the Far
East Command and its disposition did not affect the General Reserve.
The Department of the Army spared the 82d Airborne Division and the infantry
units of the 2d Armored Division. The former unit was not touched because
General Collins felt he must keep a completely manned and effective unit for
last-resort operations. The armored infantry battalions of the 2d Armored
Division were not particularly suited to the type of action taking place in
Korea and were passed over for that reason.
The removal of battalions from the General Reserve would reduce the training
and mobilization base in the United States by one-sixth. The 3d Division, the 2d
Armored Division, because of losses other than in infantry units, and the 14th
RCT would be fit only to serve as nuclei around which to build new units. Since
it would require from twelve to fourteen months to rebuild these combat units,
the Army's ability to carry out emergency missions would be nullified for at
least one year. [34]
[33 (1) Memo, CofS USA for Gen. Bolte, 17 Jul. 50, sub: Additional Units to
Meet Immediate Requirements of the FEC. (2) MFR, 17 Jul. 50, attached to (1).
(3) Memo, Study, same sub, 17 Jul. 50. All in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 17.
[34] Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate Requirements of FEC, Annex B.
Division Artillery Units
The same general criteria were used in choosing division field artillery
batteries from the General Reserve for shipment to the Far East. Although taking
only battery cadres would have placed less strain on Regular Army units,
complete
batteries were withdrawn. The 3d Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions each
furnished three 105-mm. howitzer batteries. Three batteries were originally
scheduled from the 14th RCT and two from the 6th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion. With the decision to commit the three batteries of the 5th RCT from
Hawaii, the levy on the 14th RCT was reduced to two and that on the artillery
battalion was canceled. These eleven artillery batteries were scheduled to reach
Korea at about 60 percent strength and at an estimated combat effectiveness of
40 percent. [35] The field artillery mobilization base was cut about 30 percent
by these transfers to Korea, and the ability of the Army to support other
operations with artillery was cut in half for a full year.
Battalion-sized units could be ready to leave their home stations two weeks
after receiving warning orders. But there was no hurry about alerting infantry
and artillery units, because all water shipping from the west coast was tied up
until about 15 August. The Chief of Transportation, U.S. Army, reporting that
30,000 men and 208,000 measurement tons of equipment were going to the Far East
under the most urgent priorities, recommended not shipping the augmentation
units until mid-August. General MacArthur was notified that the new infantry and
artillery units would reach him before the end of that month. [36]
When the Chief of Staff, GHQ, and the Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, reached
agreement in a telephone conversation on 12 July that two battalions of the 29th
Infantry on Okinawa should be sent to Korea as soon as possible, General
MacArthur ordered the Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, General Beightler, to
build these battalions to war strength and send them to Japan without delay.
[37] General Walker asked that the two battalions be sent directly to the battle
area, bypassing Japan. He said he would give them any training they needed. This
request was granted, and on 21 July the two battalions sailed from Okinawa for
Pusan, arriving four days later. [38]
[35] (1) Ibid., Annex C. (2) Rad, WAR 86246, DA to CINCFE, 19 Jul. 50.
(3) Rad, CX 58506, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 23 Jul. 50. (4) Rad, WAR 87500, DA to
CINCFE, 30 Jul. 50.
[36] (1) Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate Requirements of FEC. (2)
Rad, CX 58506, CINCFE to CC EUSAK, 23 Jul. 50 (passing on data from DA).
[37] CINCFE ordered these battalions sent at full war strength even though
his existing troop basis did not allow this.
[38] (1) Memo, CofS GHQ for ACofS G-3 12 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 57798, CINCFE
to CG RYCOM, 13 Jul. 50. (3) Rad, E 33465, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 14 Jul. 50.
(4) Rad, CX 57894, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 15 Jul. 50. (5) Rad, CX 57799, CINCFE to
DA, 13 Jul. 50. (6) Rad, WAR 85875, JCS to CINCFE, 13 Jul. 50.
[39] Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Ridgway, 1 Jul. 50, sub: Anticipated
Requirements of CINCFE.
General Bolte, the G-3, Department of the Army, had suggested to the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Administration, General Ridgway, on 1 July that the 5th RCT
stationed in Hawaii, be sent to Korea. [39] Ten days later, when General Collins
paused in Hawaii on his way to visit the Far East Command, he looked into the
matter. In a teleconference with Ridgway in Washington, Collins asked him to
query key staff officers on whether it would be better to send the 5th RCT as a
unit or break it down into battalions and battalion cadres to bring other FEC
regiments up to war strength. His own
feeling was that the 5th RCT should be employed as a regiment; not
cannibalized. Ridgway and other staff officers agreed, recommending that the
regiment be sent to Korea at its existing strength with all possible speed. On
13 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the commanding general, U.S. Army
Pacific, to send the regiment to Pusan at once. The regiment sailed for Korea on
25 July with 178 officers and 3,319 men, entered Korea on 31 July, and went into
combat immediately. [40]
By late July, the build-up of FEC divisions to war strength was well under
way. Of the 11 infantry battalions required, 8 had been sent or would reach
General MacArthur's command within thirty days. The shortage in division
artillery of 11 light batteries was also being rectified. Three batteries
arrived with the 5th RCT. Three were en route from the 2d Division, 2 from the
14th RCT, and 3 from the 2d Armored Division. [41]
Reinforcement by Major Units
While he had been asking for replacements and filler units, General MacArthur
had also been calling for major trained combat units from the United States.
Never in this early period did the Department of the Army openly question the
validity of any of MacArthur's demands. The continuing success of the North
Korean Army was proving vividly that the Far East Command needed fighting units.
But as the calls for help mounted they threatened to shrink the General Reserve
unduly and had to be considered in terms of national strategy and acted on at a
level above the Department of the Army.
The first request by General MacArthur for a major unit from the United
States came when he sought a Marine RCT with attached air support elements. Made
on 2 July, the request was approved on the next day by the Joint Chiefs, and
General MacArthur was told that the Marine unit would be sent to him as soon as
possible. [42]
A few days later came his first call for specific major Army units from the
General Reserve. He asked, on 5 July, that the 2d Infantry Division, then
training at Fort Lewis, Washington, be sent to Korea as soon as possible. He
also asked by name for smaller units which, if sent, would further reduce the
capabilities of the General Reserve. On 2 July General MacArthur had pointed out
that he must have more armored units since his four heavy tank battalions were
skeletons with only one company apiece. Two were already in Korea and the
remaining two were going. He asked for trained and organized tank companies from
the United States to bring these battalions to full strength. He asked also for
three additional medium tank battalions.
[40] (1) Telecon, TT 3512, Collins (Hawaii) and Ridgway (Washington), 11 Jul.
50. (2) Rad, WAR 85696, DA to CINCFE (for Collins), 12 Jul. 50. (3) Rad, WAR
85854, DA to CINCFE, 13 Jul. 50. (4) Rad, WAR 85874, DA to COMGENUSARPAC, 13
Jul. 50. (5) Rad, RJ 64645, CG USARPAC to CINCFE, 25 Jul. 50.
[41] (1) Rad, CX 8506, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 23 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, WAR 86246, DA
to CINCFE, 19 Jul. 50. (3) Rad, WAR 87500, DA to CINCFE, 30 Jul. 50.
[42] (1) Rad, C 57061, CINCFE to DA, 2 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to
CINCFE, 3 Jul. 50. For details of movement of Marine and airborne units, see
below, Chapter IX.
At the same time he made a bid for an RCT from the 82d Airborne Division and
another for an Engineer Special Brigade. The weakness of his antiaircraft
artillery defenses impelled him also to seek quick shipment of four additional
battalions of antiaircraft artillery. He backed up this request by pointing out
that Sasebo, the principal Japanese port of embarkation for Korea, was
completely undefended by antiaircraft artillery. [43]
These requests did not surprise Department of the Army officials, but they
did pose a serious problem and involve major decisions. General Bolte advised
General Collins to take units from the General Reserve and to send them to Korea
as reinforcing units. The Chief of Staff accepted this view. General Collins,
however, reluctant to tamper with the combat effectiveness of the 82d Airborne
Division, recommended that an RCT of the 11th Airborne Division, which was less
combat ready, be substituted. He had at first felt that sending four battalions
of antiaircraft artillery would be beyond the Army's capability. He told the
other members of the Joint Chiefs on 3 July that, as their executive agent for
the Far East Command, he had taken action to send two battalions to General
MacArthur. This was the maximum deployment of antiaircraft artillery he then
believed could be made from the General Reserve without reducing the Army's
ability to meet its emergency commitments. He reconsidered this problem in the
next few days, decided on 8 July to accept the risks, and released two
additional battalions to General MacArthur at once. [44]
While waiting for its recommendations to be considered by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Department of the Army suggested to General MacArthur certain
priorities for shipping units if their deployment was approved. "It is
emphasized," General MacArthur was told, "that final decision by higher
authority to furnish major reinforcements requested by you has not yet been
taken." The Department of the Army then outlined a proposed shipment schedule
for these units. General MacArthur reacted immediately and, citing his most
recent appraisal of the deteriorating combat situation, underscored the
"impelling urgency" of getting a favorable decision at once. He reversed the
proposed order of water shipment and asked that the armored units come first, to
be followed by the 2d Division, the antiaircraft artillery battalions, and the
Engineer Special Brigade. He asked also that the airborne RCT be flown to Japan
at once, together with its supporting airlift. [45]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the Army should send General Reserve
units to General MacArthur. But the issue was so important in terms of worldwide
commitments that the JCS on 7 July asked the Secretary of Defense to gain the
approval of the President. Mr.
[43] (1) Rad, O 57218, CINCFE to DA, 5 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, C 57093, {CINFE} to
DA, 2 Jul. 50. (3) Rads CX 57152, CINCFE to DA, 3 Jul. 50.
[44] (1) Memo, Gen. Bolte for DCofS for Admin (Gen. Ridgway), 7 Jul. 50. (2)
Memo, Gen. Collins for JCS, 3 Jul. 50, sub: FEC Requirements for Opns in Korea,
in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A, Book 1, Case 6. (3) Memo, Gen. Ridgway for
ACofS G-3, 8 Jul. 50. Although the Army Chief of Staff kept the JCS informed of
his decisions on the antiaircraft artillery battalions, he did not require their
approval to send the units.
[45] (1) Rad, WAR 85209, DA to CINCFE, 7 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to
DA, 8 Jul. 50.
Truman gave it, and the approved units were immediately ordered to prepare
for shipment. [40] By 9 July, the 2d Division, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade,
an RCT from the 11th Airborne Division, the 378th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance
Company, the 15th and 50th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions (AW), the 68th and
78th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions (90-mm.), and the 6th, 70th, and 73d Tank
Battalions had been approved for shipment to General MacArthur. [47]
The 2d Division
The deployment of the 2d Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the
battlefront in Korea began on 8 July when the unit was alerted for shipment.
[48] Nine days later, the first elements of the division sailed for Korea. One
of its regiments attacked the enemy in the field a single month after the first
alert.
The speed with which this division reached Korea as an effective fighting
force is remarkable when the scale of the shipment and its many complications
are considered. When it began preparing for shipment in early July, the 2d
Division was far from combat-ready. General Mark W. Clark, then chief of Army
Field Forces, had predicted after inspecting the division in June that it would
not be ready to fight for at least four months. The division was approximately
5,000 men short of war strength. Used during the preceding year as an overseas
replacement pool, it had undergone a personnel turnover of 138 percent in that
period. [49] General MacArthur's first move on being told that the division was
coming to his theater had been to ask that it be brought to full war strength
before sailing. [50]
[46] (1) Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, sgd Gen. Bradley, 7 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA
file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A, Case 6. (2) Rad, W 85359, DA to CINCFE, 10 Jul. 50.
(3) Note by Secys. to Holders of JCS 2147, 11 Jul. 50.
[47] (1) Memo, G-3 for Gen. Ridgway, 8 Jul. 50, sub: Action on Gen.
MacArthur's Request. (2) Memo. Gen. Thomas S. Timberman for Chief, Org and
Training Div., G-3, DA, 9 Jul. 50. (3) Ibid., 8 Jul. 50. All in G-3, DA files.
[48] Rad, WAR 85272, DA to CG Sixth Army, 8 Jul. 50.
[49] 2d Div., Comd Rpt, vol. 1, 8 Jul.-31 Aug. 50, prepared by Hist Sec, C-3,
HQ, 2d Inf. Div., pp. 9-22, copy in AGO Departmental Records, 302.
[50] Rad, CX 57573, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul. 50.
[51] (1) 2d Div., Comd Rpt, 8 Jul.-31 Aug. 50, pp. 1314. (2) Rad, AMGA 0720,
CG Sixth Army to DA (citing CINCFE radio message), 6 Jul. 50, G-1 GHQ Log, Item
6, 15 Jul. 50.
In order to comply, the Department of the Army transferred hundreds of men
from other units at Fort Lewis to the 2d Division. But putting approximately
1,500 replacements awaiting shipment to the Far East from Fort Lawton into the
division evoked an objection from General MacArthur. He remonstrated that all
replacements scheduled for his command must come to him directly and not to be
used as fillers for the 2d Division. He considered it "imperative that the
meager strength authorized units in combat be maintained." [51] The Army had
taken this action in order to get the 2d Division to Korea at full war strength
as quickly as possible. The 1,340 replacements already assimilated by the 2d
Division could not be retrieved. Further diversions were stopped because of
General MacArthur's objection, even though Army officials felt that their method
would have put the greatest number of
men in the Far East Command in the least period of time. [52]
Army officials were anxious not only to meet the requirements set up by the
Far East Command but also to do so in the manner designated by General
MacArthur. On 19 July, they told him to decide whether he wanted combat
replacements or a war-strength combat division. The second increment of the Rd
Division, scheduled to sail the next day, would leave at only half strength
because men from other stations in the United States could not reach Fort Lewis
by sailing time.
The division commander opposed sailing at only half strength, especially when
3,500 men were at west coast ports of debarkation awaiting shipment to the FEC
as replacements. Since airlift was very limited, these replacements could not
reach the FEC for at least three weeks. Washington asked General MacArthur for
an immediate decision as to whether 1,500 of these replacements could be placed
with the second increment of the 2d Division when it sailed the next day. [53]
General MacArthur's preoccupation with replacements led him to compromise by
agreeing that the maximum number of men from the ports of debarkation could be
sent on the same ships as the 2d Division, but not assigned to the division.
"Anything," his reply stated, "that will speed up movement of replacements to
this theater is desired." Fifteen hundred replacements sailed with the 2d
Division on 20 July. General MacArthur had intended to place these men in the
7th Division, but changed his mind. On 28 July he directed that they be assigned
to the 2d Division upon reaching Korea. [54]
In the early stages of the division's preparations, General MacArthur had
asked that it be shipped to Korea combat-loaded. Each increment would thus land
in Korea with its weapons ready to go, with organic vehicles and supporting
artillery on the same or accompanying ships, and with each shipload able to
operate independently in combat for a reasonable period of time.
While Washington recognized some advantages in combat-loading, there were
compelling reasons why it was not practical. The ships being used were not
designed for combat-loading. Furthermore, combat-loading would have delayed the
division's arrival in Korea by at least two weeks because it was slower than
ordinary unit-loading. The procedure also took nearly twice as much shipping
space. Since convoys were not being used, unit-loaded shipments would depart as
soon as they were loaded. Troops would travel on the same ship as their own
equipment insofar as possible. The rest of their equipment and supplies would
arrive on cargo shipping loaded for selective discharge to match the unit. [55]
[52] Telecon, DA and CINCFE, 16 Jul. 50, G-2 GHQ Log, Item 1, 16 Jul. 50.
[53] Rad, W 86378, DA to CINCFE, 19 Jul. 50.
[54] (1) Rad, C 58193, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul. 50, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 25, 19
Jul. 50. (2) Rad, W 86606, DA to CINCFE, 21 Jul. 50. (3) Memo, G-3 GHQ for G-1
GHQ, 28 Jul. 50, sub: Replacements 2d Inf. Div. and 7th Inf. Div., G-1 GHQ Log,
Item 54, 28 Jul. 50.
[55] (1) Rad, CX 57546, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul. 50. (2) Rad W 85426, DA to
CINCFE, 11 Jul. 50.
When the assistant division commander of the 2d Division arrived in Tokyo
late in July with the advance
party, he reported that almost 1,800 enlisted men had been released from the
division at Fort Lewis because they were due to be discharged within three
months. This information nettled MacArthur and he asked that these men be
retrieved and sent to him as replacements. He would see that they rejoined the
2d Division after its arrival. [56] General MacArthur's concern was allayed when
he was told that the Department of the Army had already decreed that men having
thirty days' service remaining were eligible for shipment to the Far East
Command. Port officials had already rounded up most of the men originally
released and had shipped them on 20 July. The rest would be shipped out as soon
as statutory authority was granted to keep all enlisted men in the service for
an additional year. [57]
As fast as ships were loaded they left for Korea. The first regiment of the
division unloaded in Korea on 31 July, while another regiment was still being
loaded on troop transports in the United States. By 19 August the entire
division had reached the Korean peninsula and was on its way into action as a
unit. [68]
Supporting Artillery
Lacking non-divisional artillery, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs on 19 July
to send him light, medium, and heavy artillery battalions. He asked for six
155-mm. howitzer Battalions, self-propelled, as the first shipment. He also
asked for an artillery group headquarters and a field artillery observation
battalion. He pointed out that his division commanders in Korea would be forced,
by the extensive frontages, broken terrain, and the limited road nets, to employ
their divisions by separate RCT's. With a projected American force in Korea,
based upon JCS-approved deployments as of that date, of 4 Army divisions and 1
Marine RCT, there would be 13 American regiments available in Korea. At least
ten of these regiments could normally be expected to be in the front lines at
any given time. Since only four battalions of 155-mm. howitzers would be present
with division artillery units, six more battalions would be required if each of
the ten regiments was to have a medium artillery battalion when it was used as
an RCT. Two 8-inch howitzer battalions and the 155-mm. guns would be required
for general support along the whole front. Light battalions could either
reinforce division artillery units, or, if desirable, be committed in support of
South Korean units. General MacArthur noted that the profitable extent to which
American artillery should be used in support of South Korean forces was under
study by his staff. He received no immediate reply and asked gain, only four
days later, for early arrival of the artillery urgently needed in Korea. [59]
[56] Rad, C 58583, CINCFE to DA, 25 Jul. 50.
[57] Rad, W 87191, DA to CINCFE, 27 Jul. 50.
[58] 2d Div., Comd Rpt, 8 Jul.-31 Aug. 50, pp. 23, 27-28.
[59] (1) Rad, CX 57746, CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 58055, CINCFE
to DA, 17 Jul. 50. (3) Rad, CX 57796, CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul. 50. General
MacArthur asked for the 155-mm. gun battalions after a conversation with General
Collins on 13 July in Tokyo.
The General Reserve, weak in all its components, was particularly deficient
in non-divisional field artillery. Only eleven battalions were in the United
States and all were below war strength. Only four 105-mm. howitzer
battalions, five 155-mm: howitzer battalions, one 155-mm. gun battalion, and one
8-inch howitzer battalion could be expected to be partially effective. But
Washington Army officials ordered three of the 155-mm. howitzer battalions, the
8-inch howitzer battalion, an observation battalion, and the 5th Field Artillery
Group headquarters to Korea. [60]
General MacArthur protested vigorously upon being told that only five
artillery battalions of the fifteen he had requested could be furnished him. He
pointed out that fifteen battalions were an essential minimum based on ten
infantry regiments fighting on the line at any given time. He had now decided
that there should be twelve U.S. regiments in action at all times. "Beyond
doubt," he predicted, "the destruction of the North Korean forces will require
the employment of a force equivalent at least to six United States infantry
divisions in addition to ROK ground forces." Fighting in World War II had proven
conclusively, according to him, that a field army could sustain a successful
offensive against a determined enemy, particularly over difficult terrain, only
if it had non-divisional artillery in the ratio of at least one for one as
compared to division artillery. While General MacArthur did not spell out these
latest requirements, he implied that twenty-four battalions of non-divisional
artillery would be needed. He recommended that, since the necessary battalions
were not available, they be activated and "an intensive training program of
appropriate scale be set in motion at once." [61]
Service Troops
Without an adequate support base behind the battle line in Korea and in the
larger service area in Japan, the fighting units could not sustain their
desperate defense, much less attack. Although the greatest emphasis was placed
on infantry, artillery, armored, and other combat-type units and soldiers during
July, the demand for service units and troops increased steadily. Technical
service units to supply front-line soldiers, to repair damaged weapons and
equipment, to keep communications in operation, and to perform the hundreds of
vital support operations required by a modern army, had been at a premium in the
FEC when the war broke out. Japanese specialists and workmen performed in large
part the peacetime version of service support for the Far East Command. The few
available service units had been depleted when specialists and other trained men
had been handed rifles and sent to fight as infantry.
[60] (1) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Strength and
Training Status, FA Units, in G-3, DA files. Blue Book, vol. II, Status of Units
and Equipment. (2) Rad, WAR 86427, DA to Continental Army Comdrs, Info to
CINCFE, 18 Jul. 50. (3) Rad, WAR 86558. DA to CINCFE, 20 Jul. 50.
[61] Rad, CX 58750, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul. 50.
Some types of combat and non-combat support were needed more immediately than
other types. In view, for instance, of the hundreds of tons of ammunition of all
types on its way to the Far East Command for the Korean fighting, ordnance
specialists qualified to handle ammunition were needed at once. General
MacArthur asked on 11 July that several hundred officers and men qualified for
this function be flown to his area
with all possible haste. The next day he sent a detailed requisition for Army
technical service units, showing, in order of priority within each service, the
support units needed immediately and those needed later to carry on the
essential service support operations in Japan by replacing units scheduled for
Korea. Support units coming from the United States did not appear on this
requisition of 12 July, but showed up two weeks later on a second requisition.
[62]
The stated requirements of the Far East Command for technical service units
were viewed in Washington as reasonable and just, but were beyond the
capabilities of the Department of the Army to supply. General MacArthur had
requested over 200 company-sized units from Chemical, Engineer, Medical,
Transportation, and other technical services. This requisition, if filled, would
involve shipment of 43,472 men and officers. The Department of the Army had only
about 150 company-sized service units in the United States.
Between the extremes of sending only cadres from such units and sending every
technical service unit from the United States to the Far East, the Department of
the Army charted a middle course. Cadres would have little immediate value in
Japan and Korea. But the General Reserve could not be stripped without
disastrous effect upon the mobilization base. [63] In order to preserve a
minimum mobilization base and still take the edge off the Far East commander's
most urgent requirements, Washington officials withdrew cadres for retention in
the United States and sent about eighty service support units of company size to
the Far East. Although these units were only at about 65 percent strength, their
specialized composition and the technical know-how of their men and officers
enabled them to function profitably, even at reduced strength. [64]
As the scale of the Korean action became clearer, General MacArthur on 25
July sent a supplemental list of technical service units which would be needed.
This list brought the total number of technical service units requested in July
to 501, totaling 60,000 men and officers. Officials of the Far East Command knew
that they would not receive the bulk of these units for a long time, but they
felt that Washington should know their requirements for planning purposes. [65]
The need for combat soldiers remained paramount. Of the service troops sent
to Japan as replacements in July, for example, 60 percent were assigned to
front-line fighting troops upon arrival in Korea. [66]
[62] (1) Rad, CX 57563, CINCFE to DA, 11 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 57693, CINCFE
to DA, 12 Jul. 50.
[63] For example, General MacArthur requested a corps signal battalion. There
was only one such unit in the United States. It would have required nine months
to reconstitute such a unit after selected personnel were available.
[64] Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate Requirements of FEC, Annex D.
[65] Memo, Col. Daniel H. Hundley for Gen. Beiderlinden, 25 Jul. 50, sub:
Additional Technical Service Units, C-3 GHQ Log, Item 43, 25 Jul. 50.
[66] Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug. 50, sub: Casualties and Replacements,
G-1 GHQ Log, Item 41, 5 Aug. 50.
The filler units and reinforcing units which the Department of the Army had
managed to scrape together for General MacArthur in the first month of the
campaign represented the maximum force which the United States was able
to furnish. These units might not be enough, but no more were going to be
sent until the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other planners had a chance to take a
better look at the way things were going. Department of the Army officials told
the Far East commander on 21 July that they were in no position even to consider
his request for another army of four divisions for the present. Before any
decision could be made on that request, American defense officials would have to
determine just how far they were going in rebuilding the General Reserve. Then
they would have to see if sending additional forces to Korea was as important to
national security as having them available for deployment elsewhere in the
world. [67]
[67] Rad, CM-OUT 86558, DA to CINCFE, 21 Jul. 50.
