CHAPTER IV
The Communist Challenge
The North Korean Army invaded South Korea at four o'clock in the morning of
25 June 1950-three o'clock in the afternoon of 24 June 1950, in Washington, D.C.
(Map I) Striking without warning in the pre-dawn dusk, communist units gained
complete tactical surprise as they burst across the 38th Parallel swiftly and in
strength. Coordinated columns of Russian-made tanks and Russian-trained infantry
followed massed artillery fires and rolled back the South Korean defenders,
engulfing and destroying whole units as they moved toward their objectives in a
well-conceived and carefully prepared military operation. North Korean planes,
giving tactical support, were virtually unchallenged. [1]
News of the invasion reached Seoul within an hour, before 0500. American
officers there were alerted by 0630 and began to arrive half an hour later at
their duty posts. Belief that the attack was nothing more than a border raid
soon faded. By 0800, it was obvious that many North Korean troops were involved
at many separate points. The use of armor and the major orientation on the
approaches to Seoul were ominous. ROK defenders at Ch'unch'on in central Korea
threw back the first attacks; but on the east coast, near Kangnung, an enemy
amphibious landing was unopposed.
[1] (1) Unless otherwise cited all material in this chapter dealing with
events in Korea comes from the following sources: Daily Opns Rpts, G-3, GHQ,
FEC, Jun. 50; DIS, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Jun. 50; Interv, Dr. Gordon Prange with Lt.
Col. A. J. Storey, Oct. 50; Interv, Maj. James F. Schnabel with Lt. Col. Leonard
Abbot, Oct. 50; Interv, Maj. Schnabel with Capt. Frederick Schwarze, former
ACofS G-2, KMAG, 17 Nov. 53. (2) The international communist bloc later charged
that the South Korean Army had invaded North Korea, thus triggering a North
Korean counterattack. Two documents captured following the fall of North Korea
have been authenticated as official attack orders issued by North Korean
military authorities to their commanders several days before the assault. Both
documents, Reconnaissance Order No. 1, issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff
of the North Korean 4th Division and discovered in Seoul on 4 October 195O, and
Operations Order No. 4, North Korean 4th Division, were issued on 22 June 1950.
See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts, Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of North Korean
Aggression), Part 2.
The Intelligence Failure
Agencies of the United States Government failed to forecast adequately the
North Korean attack. No report sufficiently valid or urgent reached Washington
officials before 25 June 1950 indicating that the attack would come when it did.
Some information sent to
Washington from the Far East reflected a strong possibility of action toward
the end of June, but faulty evaluation and dissemination prevented it from
reaching the right people in the proper form. The invasion therefore took all
the American political and military leaders by surprise.
The reasons for this intelligence failure are easy to understand. The United
States had written Korea out of its national defense plans, and as a result
indications from Korea received less attention than those from areas considered
more vital to American interests. There was nevertheless an intelligence effort
in Korea. KMAG officers worked closely with their ROK Army counterparts in
assembling data on North Korean activities. They sent this information to
Washington periodically and on occasion made special reports. Other agencies and
units in the Far East reported to appropriate officials in Washington. [2] KMAG,
not General MacArthur, had the responsibility of securing intelligence data on
Korea. When General Collins visited Tokyo in early 1950, he asked whether
MacArthur could furnish the JCS information on some areas beyond his sphere of
responsibility. MacArthur answered that he had promptly furnished such reports
whenever specific items had been developed but that he was reluctant to submit
unsupported estimates. If the JCS wanted to give him new intelligence
responsibilities, he said he would be glad to have them. He was confident that
he had enough personnel to handle them. [3]
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the FEC G-2, had on his own initiative
already established a surveillance detachment in Korea called the Korean Liaison
Office. In addition, according to General Willoughby, "The Embassy in Seoul
maintained military attache groups-Army, Navy, and Air, as well as their own
diplomatic and political specialists whose sole business was to gauge the trend
of events." [4]
[2] Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 37ff.
[3] Notes on Visit of JCS to FEC, 29 Jan-10 Feb., in G-3, DA file P & O
333 Pacific, sec. 1, Case 7/4.
[4] Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain, MacArthur,
1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 354.
[5] MacArthur Hearings, pp. 123, 350, 436, 1832, 1990-91
Significant troop movements and concentrations, forward stockpiling of
supplies, border evacuation, and North Korean Army reinforcement in men and
materiel were some of the meaningful indications reported to Washington from the
Far East before the June attack. But this information was poorly evaluated in
the field and at higher echelons. Secretary of State Acheson later testified:
Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of
June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department
of the Army, and by the State Department representatives here and
overseas, and shows that all these agencies were in agreement that
the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at that
time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer
of 1950 did not appear imminent. [5]
Since October 1946, when General Hodge had first reported that the North
Koreans intended to attack South Korea, dozens of such reports had poured into
Tokyo and Washington. Upon the outbreak of border fighting, the reports
gained credence. By late 1949, talk of a North Korean invasion was almost
routine in intelligence circles. [6] By early 1950, there was a pattern of
growing urgency. But it went undetected, or at least unheeded, against the more
riotous background of threatening communist activities in other parts of the
world-in Asia, western Europe, and the Middle East.
On 30 December 1949, General Willoughby sent to Washington several reports
that indicated a North Korean invasion in March or April 1950. But his own
personal evaluation was that "such an act is unlikely." On 19 February 1950, he
passed on two agent reports, which he also discounted, one saying that the North
Koreans would attack in March, the other in June. On 10 March, the Korean
Liaison Office sent him an agent's report that the North Korean invasion
schedule had been set back from March or April to June 1950. Late in March
Willoughby said:
It is believed that there will be no civil war in Korea this spring
or summer.... South Korea is not expected to seriously consider
warfare so long as her precipitating war entails probable
discontinuance of United States aid. The most probable course of
North Korean action this spring and summer is furtherance of attempts
to overthrow South Korean government by creation of chaotic
conditions in the Republic of Korea through guerrillas and
psychological warfare. [7]
Intelligence in Washington was more concerned with what appeared to be the
greater danger in Southeast Asia. Indochina seemed a much more likely target for
a communist take-over. In March 1950, Maj. Gen. Alexander R. Bolling, the
Department of the Army G-2, stated: "Recent reports of expansion of the North
Korean People's Army and of major troop movements could be indicative of
preparation for aggressive action." These preparations could be completed by
late spring 1950. This forecast was, however, vitiated by the next comment.
"Communist military measures in Korea will be held in abeyance pending the
outcome of their program in other areas, particularly Southeast Asia. If checked
or defeated there, the Soviet might divert effort toward South Korea. In that
event, invasion by the People's Army would be probable." [8]
The Office of Special Investigations, USAF, told Headquarters, Far East Air
Forces, in mid-April that Russia had definitely ordered an attack on South Korea
by the North Korean People's Army. But in early May 1950 the American Embassy in
Seoul reported little likelihood of a North Korean invasion in the near future.
[9]
[6] The author, upon being assigned to G-2, GHQ, FEC, in November 1949,
attended a briefing for newly arrived officers in the Dai Ichi Building in
Tokyo. Discussing the military situation in the Far East at that time, the
briefing officer, a major from the G-2 section, quite frankly stated that the
feeling in G-2 was that the North Koreans would attack and conquer South Korea
in the coming summer. The point was not emphasized particularly and the fact
seemed to be accepted as regrettable but inevitable.
[7] DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2669, 30 Dec. 49; No. 2720, 19 Feb. 49; No. 2754, 25
Mar 50; No. 2900, 18 Aug. 50; and KLO No. 518, 25 May 50.
[8] Int Div., GSUSA, DA, Weekly Intelligence Rpt, 7 Mar 50.
[9] (1) OSI Rpt (49) 52-12A-4-1, 17 Apr. 50. (2) Rad, Seoul 456, Drumright to
State, 4 May 50.
In May 1950, the Department of the Army G-2 said, "The movement of North
Korean forces steadily southward toward the 38th parallel during the current
period could indicate preparation for offensive action." On 23 May, in
another routine summary, he stated, "The outbreak of hostilities may occur at
any time in Korea and the fall of Indochina to the Communists is possible this
year." [10]
A report forwarded routinely on 19 June 1950, six days before the North
Korean assault, provided Washington with strong evidence of an imminent enemy
offensive-extensive troop movements along the 38th Parallel; evacuation of all
civilians north of the parallel for two kilometers; suspension of civilian
freight service from Wonsan to Ch'orwon and the transportation of military
supplies only; concentration of armored units in the border area; and the
arrival of large shipments of weapons and ammunition. But no conclusions were
drawn from these indications. [11] On the same day a report from General
Willoughby in Tokyo concluded, "Apparently Soviet advisers believe that now is
the opportune time to attempt to subjugate the South Korean Government by
political means, especially since the guerrilla campaign in South Korea recently
has met with serious reverses." [12]
The Department of the Army G-2 protested charges made later that he had
failed to interpret properly the information sent to him from the Far East
Command. "An analysis of reports received by G-2, DA," General Bolling told
General Collins,
shows that all reporting agencies were aware of [the North Korean]
capability to invade the Republic of Korea. There has been much
publicity originating from Tokyo and quoting Willoughby that he had
informed the Department of the Army that North Korean troops would
invade South Korea in June. The statements made by Willoughby are
correct in part, but he failed to indicate [in the publicity] his
conclusions that definitely discount the report referred to. In
short, there is no intelligence agency that reported a definite date
for the opening of hostilities or stated that an invasion was
imminent. In fact, the general tenor of reports indicated that the
North Korean regime would continue to employ guerrillas and
psychological warfare together with political pressure rather than
resort to the overt employment of military forces. [13]
American intelligence failed to predict the time, strength, and actual
launching of the attack because of reluctance to accept all the reports rendered
by Koreans, a distrust of Oriental agents and sources, and a belief that the
South Koreans were prone to cry wolf. Situations similar to that in Korea
existed in virtually every other land area around the periphery of the USSR.
Some appeared to be greater potential danger spots and diverted the focus of
interest from Korea. Signs which marked the prelude of the North Korean attack
had become accepted as routine communist activity. The increased troop movement
and activity in North Korea in the spring of 1950 followed a pattern established
by the communists in 1947 when they initiated an annual rotation of
completely equipped units from the parallel.
[10] Memo, ACofS G-2, DA, for Gen. Wade H. Haislip, 24 Aug. so, in G-2, DA
file SO 24366.
[11] Sec G-2, FEC, files, M.I.S., Item No. 684595, 19 Jul. 50.
[12] (1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2842, 19 Jun. 50. (2) General Willoughby later
insisted that "Washington" had been fully informed of what to expect in Korea
and should not have been taken by surprise. See Willoughby and Chamberlain,
MacArthur, 1941-1951, pp. 350-54. See also Douglas MacArthur,
Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 323-24.
[13] Memo, Gen. Bolling for DCofS for Admin., DA, 8 Oct. 50, in C-3, DA file
CofS 091, Case 28.
The forwarding of reports in a routine manner detracted from the significance
of the data in many cases. [14] In Congressional hearings immediately after the
North Korean attack, Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, director of the Office of
Military Assistance, was subjected to sharp questioning about the failure of the
Department of Defense to anticipate the attack. Telling the Secretary of Defense
of this experience, General Lemnitzer stated:
I believe that there are lessons to be learned from this situation
which can point the way to better governmental operations and thus
avoid costly mistakes in the future.... I recommend that ... a
clear-cut interagency standing operating procedure be established now
to insure that if (in the opinion of any intelligence agency,
particularly CIA) an attack, or other noteworthy event, is impending
it is made a matter of special handling, to insure that officials
vitally concerned ... are promptly and personally informed thereof
in order that appropriate measures may be taken. This will prevent a
repetition of the Korean situation and will insure, if there has been
vital intelligence data pointing to an imminent attack, that it will
not be buried in a series of routine CIA intelligence reports. [15]
In the final analysis, the controversy over the intelligence failure in Korea
is academic. The United States had no plans to counter an invasion, even had it
been forecast to the very day. The only planned reaction was to evacuate U.S.
nationals from the country.
MacArthur's Reaction
GHQ learned of the attack six and one-half hours after the first North Korean
troops crossed into South Korea. The telegram bearing the news from the Office
of the Military Attache in Seoul reported:
Fighting with great intensity started at 0400, 25 June on the Ongjin
Peninsula, moving eastwardly taking six major points; city of Kaesong
fell to North Koreans at 0900, ten tanks slightly north of Chunchon,
landing twenty boats approximately one regiment strength on east
coast reported cutting coastal road south of Kangnung; Comment: No
evidence of panic among South Korean troops.
A message ninety minutes later gave confirmation. General MacArthur
immediately informed Washington and, within a few hours, sent the first
comprehensive situation report on the Korean fighting. [16]
As the news from Korea worsened later that first day, General MacArthur
warned Washington officials, "Enemy effort serious in strength and strategic
intent and is undisguised act of war subject to United Nations censure." But he
hardly realized how strong it was. His situation report showed only three North
Korean divisions along the entire border. [17]
[14] Interv, Maj. Schnabel with Capt. Schwarze, 17 Nov. 53.
[15] Memo, Lemnitzer for Secy. Defense, Jul. 50.
[16] (1) Rad, ARMA 21, USMILAT Seoul to DA, Infor CINCFE, 25 Jun. 50. (2)
Rad, ARMA 22, USMILAT Seoul to DA, Info CINCFE, 25 Jun. 50. (3) Rad, C 56772,
CINCFE to DA, 25 Jun. 50.
[17] Rad, C 56777, MacArthur (Personal) to Irvin, 25 Jun. 50.
American Ambassador to Korea Muccio conferred with President Rhee, who said
that the ROK Army would be out of ammunition within ten days. Muccio quickly
cabled MacArthur for replenishment. The Ambassador had already
directed the acting chief of KMAG, Colonel Wright, to request an immediate
shipment of ammunition for 105-mm. howitzers, 60-mm. mortars, and .30-caliber
carbines. [18]
Before the day was out, General MacArthur ordered General Walker to load the
MSTS Keathley, then in Yokohama Harbor, with 105,000 rounds of 105-mm.
ammunition and 265,000 rounds of 81-mm. mortar, 89,000 rounds of 60-mm. mortar,
and 2,480,000 rounds of .30-caliber carbine ammunition. He wanted the
Keathley to reach Pusan no later than 1 July. He directed FEAF and
COMNAVFE to protect the Keathley en route and during cargo discharge. In
his information report to the Department of the Army, MacArthur said that he
intended "to supply ROK all needed supplies as long as they show ability to use
same." [19]
These actions MacArthur took independently. He received no authority from the
JCS to supply the ROK until the following day, at 1330, 26 June.
The United States Responds
MacArthur's immediate reactions-to send supplies, these to be protected by
air and naval escorts-were as far as he could go on his own authority. Certain
basic decisions had to be made in Washington, and the key man was the President
of the United States, Harry S. Truman. President Truman was at his home at
Independence, Missouri, on the evening of 24 June when Secretary of State Dean
Acheson telephoned him the news of the invasion. The President agreed with
Acheson that the United Nations Security Council should be asked to convene at
once in order to consider this threat to world peace.
Acheson called the President again the next morning, a Sunday, apprising him
of the dangerous nature of the developing crisis. The President decided to leave
for Washington without delay, and he asked the Secretary of State to meet with
the service secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately to work out a
plan for his consideration. [20]
[18] (1) Rad, USMILAT to CINCFE, sent about 1800, 25 Jun. 50. (2) Rad,
USMILAT to CINCFE, sent about one hour later, 25 Jun. 50.
[19] (1) Rad, 252130, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 25 Jun. 50. (2) Rad, C 56775,
CINCFE to DA, 25 Jun. 50.
[20] Truman, Memoirs, II, 331-43, gives a general background of
Presidential action and considerations in the first few days of Korean fighting.
(2) See also Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 402-13.
At 1400 that afternoon, responding to the call of the United States
Government, the United Nations Security Council convened. The U.S.S.R.
representative was absent, for he had begun a boycott of that body in January
195O because of the United Nations refusal to replace the Chinese Nationalist
representative with a Chinese Communist. Ernest A. Gross, Deputy Representative
of the United States, briefly outlined salient events in the establishment of
the ROK and the continuing opposition of the communists toward unification of
Korea, then denounced the unprovoked aggression. He submitted a resolution
designed to bring about an immediate cessation of hostilities and a restoration
of the 38th Parallel boundary by the withdrawal forthwith of North Korean armed
forces to it, and calling upon "all members to render every assistance to the
United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to
the North Korean authorities." The Security Council adopted the resolution by a
vote of nine to zero, with one abstention. Meanwhile, officials of the
Departments of State and Defense had met in impromptu session on Sunday morning.
Department of State representatives outlined a plan for supporting the ROK with
munitions and equipment and with U. S. naval and air forces. [21]
Early on Sunday evening, shortly before the President arrived in Washington,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a teletype conference with General MacArthur.
They notified MacArthur of the tentative plans made by Defense and State
officials to ship supplies and equipment, which MacArthur had already started,
and to extend his responsibility to include operational control of all U. S.
military activities in Korea. They said he might also be directed to commit
certain forces, principally naval and air, to protect the Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on
area to assure the safe evacuation of American nationals and to gain time for
action on the measures then before the United Nations. Most significantly, they
alerted him to be ready to send U. S. ground and naval forces to stabilize the
combat situation and, if feasible, to restore the 38th Parallel as a boundary.
This action, they said, might be necessary if the United Nations asked member
nations to employ military force. [22]
No decision on Korea could properly be made without a careful analysis of
USSR intentions. The United States believed Russia to be the real aggressor in
Korea, in spirit if not in fact, and effective measures to halt the aggression
might therefore provoke total war. Hence, a decision to meet force with force
implied a willingness to fight a full-scale war with Russia if necessary. The
determinant for Korea was, then, as always: "What will Russia do?" [23]
[21] (1) U. N. Doc. S/PV/473, 25, Jun. 50, Statement to the Security Council
by the Deputy Representative of the U. S. to the U. N. (Gross) (2) U. N. Doc
S/1501 (3) Rpt to Senate Committee on Armed Services and Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Record of Actions Taken by JCS Relative to the U. N.
Operation in Korea From 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951, 30 April 1951
(hereafter cited as JCS Rpt on Korea), pp. 5-6.
[22] Telecon, TT 3417, CINCFE and JCS, 2330Z, 25 Jun. 50.
[23] American determination to resist communist expansion is clearly
reflected in President Truman's later thoughts. He feared that if South Korea
was allowed to fall no other small nation would dare resist threats and
aggression by their stronger Communist neighbors. Not to challenge this
aggression would mean a third World War, just as similar failure to challenge
aggression had led to World War II. He also saw clearly that the very
foundations and principles of the United Nations were at stake. Truman,
Memoirs, II, 332.
The possible reactions of nations other than Russia were also important. Each
alternative open to the United States was accompanied by a strong chance of
alienating nations upon whose continuing friendship and support American policy
was based. Inaction would be condemned by some nations as a betrayal of the ROK
Government. It would gravely impair American efforts to maintain prestige in
Asia as well as in other areas, and would cause such nations as Great Britain,
Italy, and Japan to re-examine the wisdom of supporting the United States. On
the other hand, if the United States took unilateral military measures against
the North Korean attackers, Russian charges of imperialistic action and
defiance of the United Nations would appear valid to many nations. The effect
would be to anger these nations and to render them more susceptible to Russian
points of view.
The most sensible course seemed to be a co-operative effort among members of
the United Nations to halt the aggression. But South Korea needed help at once;
and the United Nations could hardly act swiftly enough. Furthermore, communist
members of the United Nations could be expected to oppose joint action.
President Truman and his key advisers gathered at the Blair House in
Washington on the evening of 25 June for an exchange of views. Five State
Department members, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Joint Chief of Staff were present. [24]
[24] (1) This group included all members of the National Security Council
except the Vice President and the chairman of the National Security Resources
Board. (2) Unless otherwise cited, material for this portion covering the
background of governmental decisions was derived from the following sources:
JCS Rpt on Korea; Albert L. Warner, "How the Korean Decision Was Made,"
Harper's, CCII (June 1951), 100-103: Beverly Smith, "Why We Went to War
in Korea," Saturday Evening Post (November 11, 1951); MacArthur
Hearings, pp. 931, 1049, 1475, 2579-81, 2584; and Truman, Memoirs,
II, 332-36. See also Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 13-14, and Acheson,
Present at the Creation, pp. 404-07.
[25] The Secretary of Defense later recalled that the only really violent
disagreement which ever arose between himself and the Secretary of State took
place at this meeting over the issue of the relative importance to American
security of Formosa and Korea. Johnson insisted that Formosa take first priority
in the evening's considerations, while Acheson insisted that Korea should be the
prime topic. President Truman settled the dispute in favor of Acheson. See
MacArthur Hearings, p. 2580.
At this meeting, the policy-makers discussed the major problems facing the
United States in the Far East. Foremost in their minds was a consideration of
Soviet intentions and American capabilities. Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of
Defense, believed strongly that Formosa was more vital to the security of the
United States than Korea, and at his direction General Bradley, now Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs, read a memorandum on Formosa prepared by General MacArthur. At
the insistence of Secretary of State Acheson, questions of Formosa were
postponed temporarily, and the attention of the group was redirected to Korea.
[25] Acheson recommended that General MacArthur furnish supplies and ammunition
to the ROK at once and that he be directed to evacuate U.S. nationals by any
means required. When no one offered to comment on Acheson's proposals, Johnson asked each defense
representative in turn for an expression of opinion. The responses came forth,
and "A major portion of the evening was taken in the individual, unrehearsed,
unprepared and uncoordinated statements of the several Chiefs and the
Secretaries." [26]
Earlier that day General Collins, the Army Chief of Staff, had received from
General MacArthur a comprehensive report on developing events in Korea, and he
outlined this to the group. All members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasized
the weakness of the American forces in the Far East and the absence of a general
plan for defending South Korea. Collins then suggested and the President
approved that General MacArthur be authorized to send a group of officers as
observers to Korea. Mr. Truman also approved a proposal that the Seventh Fleet
be ordered to the waters off Formosa and Korea at once, and Admiral Forrest P.
Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, left the meeting to start this movement.
[27] General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, also left the room to
initiate a concentration of jet aircraft on Formosa.
The President ordered that all U. S. intelligence agencies throughout the
world be alerted to recheck Soviet plans and intentions. He called also for
urgent study to determine what would be needed to destroy Soviet Far East air
bases if Soviet planes intervened in Korea. Finally, President Truman called
upon each man for his personal views. Everyone felt that whatever had to be done
to meet the aggression in Korea should be done. No one suggested that the United
Nations or the United States back away from the challenge. Vandenberg and
Sherman had said that American air and naval aid would be sufficient to stop the
North Koreans, but Collins believed that, if the ROK Army broke, American ground
forces would be required. [28]
General Bradley summed up the prevailing opinion. He said that the United
States would have to draw the line on communist aggression somewhere-and that
somewhere was Korea. He did not believe that Russia was ready to fight the
United States, but was merely testing American determination. President Truman
agreed emphatically. He did not expect the North Koreans to pay any attention to
the pronouncement of the United Nations, and he felt that the United Nations
would have to apply force. [29] Before the meeting adjourned at 2300, President
Truman approved the actions proposed by Secretary Acheson and already set in
motion by General MacArthur.
[26] MacArthur Hearings, p. 2580.
[27] President Truman identifies the proposal to move the Seventh Fleet as
having originated with Secretary of State Acheson. Johnson, however, testified
before a Congressional committee that the move had been recommended by him and
that the President had immediately approved his recommendation. See Truman,
Memoirs, II, 334; MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2580-81.
[28] Truman, Memoirs, II, 335.
[29] Ibid.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., called
General MacArthur into teleconference immediately after the meeting and informed
him of the decisions reached. MacArthur was to send all arms and equipment
needed to hold the Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on area, with enough air and naval cover to
insure safe arrival. He was to use air and naval forces to prevent the
Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on area from being overrun, thereby insuring the safe
evacuation of U. S. dependents and noncombatants. He was also told to send
selected officers of his staff into Korea as a survey mission. [30]
The commitment of air and naval units to Korea established a precedent for
the later commitment of U. S. ground troops. It was done without sanction of or
reference to the United Nations and in the full knowledge that U.S. air and
naval forces might engage in open conflict with North Korean units. Although
generally viewed as less vital than President Truman's later decision of 30 June
to support the ROK with U. S. ground forces, the authority to employ the Air
Force and the Navy on 25 June rendered the later decision one of degree rather
than one of principle. General Ridgway, who was present during the transmission
of initial instructions to General MacArthur by teleconference, recalls in his
memoirs:
I was standing by General Bradley at the telecom when the directive
went out authorizing the use of air and naval forces to cover the
evacuation of American personnel from the Seoul and Inchon area, and
I asked him whether this was deliberately intended to exclude the use
of ground forces in Korea. He told me, "Yes."
The officers to be sent to Korea as a survey mission were to send back
information and also to furnish overt evidence to ROK authorities that they had
not been abandoned. The Joint (Chiefs of Staff informed General MacArthur that
the Secretary of State wished KMAG liaison officers to stay with ROK units so
long as these units remained effective fighting forces. Answering a request from
KMAG, (General MacArthur said that immediate action was being taken and that
substantial logistic support was on its way to the ROK forces. [32]
The ROK Army acquitted itself well in some areas, poorly in others. In
sectors where they were well led and properly deployed the ROK Army units fought
bravely and well. Elsewhere, they fell back before the better-trained and
better-equipped North Koreans without offering determined or effective
resistance. All across the front the enemy's superior concentration of force,
his well-planned tactics, his armor and artillery supremacy, and his
consistently high caliber of leadership forced a general withdrawal.
[30] Telecon, TT 3418, JCS and OSA with CINCFE, 260355Z Jun. 50.
[31] General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (New York: Harper, 1956), p.
192.
[32] (1) Telecon, TT 3418, {2603552} Jun. 50. (2) Rad, CX 56796, CINCFE to
KMAG, 26 Jun. 50. (3) Rad, CX 46852, CINCFE to KMAG, 27 Jun. 50.
Four of the eight existing ROK divisions had been deployed widely throughout
the interior and southern sections of South Korea, while the four divisions
along the 38th Parallel had about one-third of their strength in defense
positions and the remainder in reserve ten to thirty miles below the parallel.
No ROK division was able to assemble its full combat strength in time to stem
the North Korean drive on Seoul. At Kaesong and Munsan-ni, in the Uijongbu
corridor, and at Ch'unch'on, the ROK soldiers put up a good fight but were
overwhelmed. An abortive ROK counterattack in the vital Uijongbu corridor
failed on 26 June, and North Korean entrance into Seoul seemed assured. [33]
Emergency Evacuation
The unexpectedly rapid and powerful communist onslaught exposed some 1,500
American civilians to immediate peril. The majority were families of AMIK
personnel, most of them in the Seoul area. Additionally, more than a hundred
women and a sizable number of male employees were working at Department of
State, ECA, and KMAG installations.
According to the evacuation plan drawn in July 1949 by GHQ and named CHOW
CHOW, the CG Eighth Army, CG FEAF, and COMNAVFE were assigned responsibilities
to evacuate U. S. civilians, U. S. military personnel, and designated foreign
nationals. The plan estimated that North Korean forces would require at least
ninety-six hours to overrun the Seoul-Inch'on area. [34]
In the early morning of 26 June (Korean time) Ambassador Muccio ordered all
dependents of U. S. Government and military personnel evacuated. Two commercial
freighters at Inch'on, SS Reinholt and SS Norge, were available,
but the Norge was too dirty to be used and nearly 700 passengers were evacuated
on the 26th aboard the SS Reinholt, a vessel normally accommodating only
twelve passengers. From the morning of 27 June (Korean time), FEAF transports
and commercial aircraft brought out others during two days of flights, and the
remaining surface evacuation was from Pusan.
A total of 2,001 people-1,527 of them U. S. nationals-were evacuated, all of
them to Japan, 923 by air and the remainder by surface transportation. Most
Americans evacuated were members of AMIK, U.S. Government employees, military
personnel, and their dependents. Missionaries comprised the next largest group
of American evacuees. [36]
Mounting in intensity, the battle for South Korea raged into its third day on
27 June, with Seoul the prime objective of the North Korean attack. The
communists apparently judged that with the ROK capital in their hands the rest
of South Korea would yield easily. By the evening of 27 June, the main North
Korean forces were fourteen miles north of Seoul. Midnight found the northern
defenses of the city under small arms fire with armor rumbling toward the
outskirts. At 0300, on 28 June, all Americans remaining in the city were ordered
to leave. The first artillery fire struck Seoul around 0600, 28 June. By that
night the city had fallen to the invaders.
ADCOM Arrives in Korea
[33] For a detailed account, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to
the Yalu, Chapters III and V.
[31] There is a striking similarity between the evacuation on 26 June 1950
and the plan for evacuation prepared in GHQ almost a full year before. See Staff
Sec Rpt, G-3, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan-31 Oct. 50, p. 14, and supporting Doc 8.
[35] War Diary, EUSAK, sec. I, Prologue, 25 Jun.-Jul. 50. p. 4
[36] Staff Sec Rpt, G-1, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan.-31 Oct. 50, p. 61.
General MacArthur's survey group entered Korea at 1900, 27 June, and at that
time he assumed his newly authorized control of all U. S. military activities in
Korea. Maj. Gen. John H. Church, who headed the group which was designated GHQ
Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM), had instructions to make contact with Ambassador Muccio and ROK officials and to send
MacArthur reports on the developing situation. A concomitant mission was to
instill an enthusiastic will to fight among ROK soldiers and officials. [37]
Ambassador Muccio met the group at the Suwon airport, south of Seoul and
Church established a temporary command post in the town of Suwon. After a
frustrating period of communications failures and general confusion, Church made
contact with General Chae Byong Duk, Chief of Staff, ROK Army and suggested they
establish a joint headquarters. Chae agreed. [38]
Church told Chae that he had to use any organized group in the vicinity to
resist the entry of North Koreans into Seoul by street-to-street fighting. He
recommended straggler points between Seoul and Suwon to stop the retreating ROK
soldiers and to reorganize them into effective units. He insisted that the Han
River bordering Seoul on the south be defended at all costs.
On 28 June, Chae gathered about 1,000 ROK officers and 8,000 men and
organized them into units near Suwon. Then he dispatched them to defensive
positions on the south bank of the Han River. [39]
That evening, Church felt "a reasonable defense of the Han River line from
the south bank could be accomplished." But if the 38th Parallel were to be
restored, he believed, American ground forces would have to be used. He radioed
this opinion to MacArthur together with an admittedly fragmentary report of the
situation. [40]
Developments in Washington
Amidst disheartening reports from Korea, President Truman and his advisers
met again at the Blair House in Washington at 2100, EDT, 26 June. The group was
substantially the same that had gathered previously. The President had received
a personal and vehement appeal for help from Syngman Rhee, and General Bradley
made known MacArthur's latest dispatches forecasting the early fall of Seoul.
[41]
[37] Opns Instructions to Gen. Church, GHQ, FEC, 27 Jun. 50. (2) Rad, CS
56850, CINCFE to KMAG, 27 Jun. 50.
[38] Rpt, Gen. Church, sub: Activities of ADCOM, 27 Jun.-15 Jul. 50, copy in
OCMH.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not record these meetings. During the
hearings on relief of General MacArthur, Senator Harry Cain told General
Bradley, "... history will not he able to relate the circumstances surrounding
the beginning of the war because the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no notes on the
subject." See MacArthur Hearings, p. 350.
The progressive decline of South Korean resistance and the increasingly
obvious evidence of North Korean military strength led Secretary of State
Acheson to recommend that American air and naval forces be permitted to engage
in combat operations to support the ROK. He proposed also that the U.S. Seventh
Fleet be ordered not only to protect Formosa from attack but also to prevent an
attack from there on the mainland. The President approved these measures, and
after an hour the group adjourned.
Within a few minutes after adjournment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called
General MacArthur into teleconference. They removed restrictions against air and
naval operations against North Korean military targets below the 38th Parallel.
They informed him about the new missions of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in Formosan
waters. They urged him to spread the news that American help was on the way to
South Korea in order to maintain South Korean morale. [42]
The air of spontaneity and extemporaneousness which marked the actions of the
President and his advisers during the first week of the Korean War is
misleading. The key advisers called to informal meetings at the Blair House
included all the members of the National Security Council who were available in
Washington. Thus, although the sometimes ponderous and always time-consuming
normal procedures of the council to develop positions on matters of broad
general policy were not followed, the President received its views and advice.
[43] He obviously felt no need for Congressional approval, believing that his
decisions were within his prerogatives as Commander in Chief. Later objection by
Congress that he had usurped its authority was stilled effectively by widespread
public approval of Mr. Truman's actions. [44] Although the President's decisions
were decidedly toward complete resistance of aggression, without the slightest
tendency to conciliate or appease, the United States, on 27 June, had yet to
choose whether to mount a unilateral effort or to promote United Nations action.
The advantages of acting under the auspices of the United Nations were apparent
to all, but in the absence of specific knowledge on the final attitude of that
body, and in a full realization of the need for quick and effective action,
American officials pursued an independent course that could later be
synchronized with any U.N. plan. On 27 June, after the ROK Government had
appealed to the United Nations for assistance, Warren R. Austin, United States
Representative to the United Nations, addressed the United Nations Security
Council, denounced the North Korean action, and demanded stronger measures by
the body than the proclamation of 25 June, which was having no effect. The
Security Council condemned the North Korean attack as a breach of the peace,
called for an immediate cessation of fighting, and recommended that members of the United Nations "... furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed
attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." [45] This
resolution confirmed actions already taken by the United States.
[42] Telecon TT 3426, CINCFE and JCS, 27017Z Jun. 50.
[43] Hoare, "Truman (1945-1953)," p. 191, states, "... the President was, for
all practical purposes, consulting the NSC, but telescoping its deliberations."
[44] See Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 31, and Acheson, Present at
the Creation, pp. 413-15.
MacArthur Visits Korea
Given the grave danger of a complete collapse of morale and fighting spirit
among the South Korean people, General MacArthur felt that only a dramatic move
would stiffen their resolve to resist. He decided to visit the country as
immediate, symbolic proof of American backing. According to General Almond,
MacArthur's chief of staff, the visit was also a search for firsthand knowledge
of what the Korean Army was doing, what it intended to do next, and what
President Rhee and Ambassador Muccio had to say.
Against the advice of his staff officers, who were apprehensive over
extremely poor flying conditions and the threat of enemy air attack, General
MacArthur flew to Korea. He landed at Suwon Airfield at 1115, 29 June 1950. Five
members of his staff and four newsmen were with him. [46]
Although two YAK fighter planes of the North Korean Air Force appeared over
Suwon and one dropped a bomb at one end of the runway, MacArthur and his party
landed safely. They went to a small schoolhouse where General Church and the
American officers of ADCOM awaited them. President Syngman Rhee, Mr. Muccio, and
General Chae were also there. At General MacArthur's request, the meeting opened
with a resume of the current military situation by General Church, who said he
had been able to locate only 8,000 of the ROK Army's original 100,000 men. While
he was speaking, he received a report that 8,000 more had been gathered and that
Korean officers hoped to have another 8,000 by evening.
After a few brief remarks from Muccio, General MacArthur stated, "Well, I
have heard a good deal theoretically, and now I want to go and see these
troops...." MacArthur and his group, in "three old, broken-down cars," drove
thirty miles north to the south bank of the Han below Seoul, where they could
see the enemy firing from the city at targets near them. By mid-afternoon,
MacArthur had seen all he needed to and returned to Suwon Airfield, then
departed about 1600.
[45] Department of State, Guide to the U. N. in Korea, Dept. of State
Publication No. 4299 (Washington, 1951), p. 13.
[46} (1) This account of General MacArthur's visit is based on an interview
with Lt. Col. Anthony Storey, General MacArthur's personal pilot, by Dr. Gordon
W. Prange, then Chief, Military Hist. Sec GHQ, FEC, {FEC,} UNC, in 1951, and on
an account contained in General Almond's testimony before the Internal Security
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on 23 November 1954, contained in
U.S. News and World Report (December 10, 1954), pp. 86-94; all quotations
are as General Almond gave them in his testimony. (2) See also Willoughby and
Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951, pp. 356-57, and Maj. Gen. Courtney
Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History (New York: Knopf, 1956),
pp. 321-32.
The fall of Seoul and the obvious weakening of the ROK forces demonstrated
the need of additional American efforts. Since the United Nations Security Council had called for assistance
by member nations to repel the invaders, more, obviously, could be done.
[47] Memo, Gen. Bolte for Secy. Army, 28 Jun. 50, sub: Sit in the Far East,
in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 25.
Army officials in Washington who were analyzing the developments in Korea
unanimously felt that the USSR had deliberately fostered the outbreak in Korea.
General Bolte, then the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, Department of the Army,
reported to Secretary Pace, on 28 June, "There can be no doubt but that the
invasion of South Korea is a planned Soviet move to improve their cold war
position at our expense." [47] Bolte suggested that the Russians actually were
testing United States determination to oppose their expansion. He pointed out
that there was no way of knowing whether the Korean aggression was a prelude to
a "hot" war, but he reminded Pace of American emergency plans in case a shooting
war with the USSR came. These plans relegated the Far East to a position of
secondary strategic importance but provided for the defense of Japan, Okinawa, and the
Philippines. General Bolte was justifiably concerned over the possibility that a
massive response to the Korean incident might weaken the Army's ability to
defend these islands.
If, the Army G-3 told the Secretary, the American air and naval forces
already committed failed to stop the North Korean invasion and if it became
necessary to send American ground troops from Japan, the United States garrison
there would be reduced to a point where "it would be most doubtful that, in the
event of a major war, Japan could be held against Soviet attack." If ground
forces sent to Korea from Japan were replaced, "the taking of small
reinforcements from the small strategic reserve [General Reserve] in the United
States would seriously affect our war readiness in other areas." [48]
President Truman's principal advisers met with him again at 1700, on
Thursday, 29 June. Secretary of Defense Johnson presented a draft directive to
General MacArthur that implied an American intention to go to war with the
Soviet Union. Truman turned it down on the ground that it was too strong. He
stated categorically that he did not want to see even the slightest implication
of such a plan. He wished to be certain that the United States would not become
so deeply involved in Korea that it could not take care of other situations
which could well develop. [49]
But when Department of Defense officials requested permission to carry out
air operations north of the 38th Parallel, Truman agreed. When Pace cautioned
that such operations should be clearly limited, Truman agreed. He pointed out
his desire that these aerial attacks in North Korea be restricted to attacks on
military targets, since he wished it clearly understood that operations in Korea
were only for the purpose of restoring peace and the pre-invasion border. [50]
[48] Ibid.
[49] Truman, Memoirs. II, 341.
[50] Ibid.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff then sent General MacArthur additional
instructions. He could send his planes into North Korea to bomb "purely
military" targets. He had to keep these planes well clear of the frontiers of
Manchuria and the Soviet Union. Army ground forces, both combat and service
troops could, if it became necessary, be sent into the Pusan area to hold the port
and the airfield facilities there. Naval vessels could also bombard targets
authorized for attack by aircraft. [51] From stocks available in the Far East
Command, he was to furnish the Republic of Korea munitions and supplies to keep
ROK forces in action. He was to submit estimates of the amounts and types of aid
required by the Republic of Korea which he was unable to provide from his own
sources. He was to have operational control of the Seventh Fleet but only to
neutralize Formosa. [52]
There was a grave note of caution. The Far East commander was reminded that
the United States decision to commit naval, air, and limited ground forces in
support of the South Koreans constituted no decision to engage in a war with the
Soviet Union should Soviet forces intervene in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
concluded their instructions to their field commander by pointing out: "The
decision regarding Korea, however, was taken in full realization of the risks
involved. If Soviet forces actively oppose our operations in Korea, your forces
should defend themselves, should take no action to aggravate the situation and
you should report the situation to Washington." [53]
General MacArthur immediately directed his air and naval commanders to carry
out intensive operations against the North Korean military machine. [54]
[51] General MacArthur had not waited for this JCS directive to order
operations in North Korea. On the flight to Korea, according to Colonel Storey,
his pilot, MacArthur had issued orders via his plane radio at 0800 (Korean
time), 29 July 1950, saying to FEAF headquarters back in Tokyo, "Partridge from
Stratemeyer, Take out North Korean airfields immediately. No publicity.
MacArthur approves." This action took place twenty-four hours before the JCS
authorized such action in accordance with the Presidential approval. Col. John
Chiles, then SGS GHQ, UNC, told the author (September 1955) that he heard
MacArthur give this order, dictating it to General Stratemeyer. And one of the
newspapermen who was present on the plane, Roy McCartney, recounts the following
narrative contained in Norman Bartell, ed., With the Australians in Korea
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pages 165-79: "On the way to Korea,
MacArthur resumed pacing, while weighing out loud how he could 'take out' the
airfields from which North Korean Yak fighters were operating. 'Where's the
President's directive?' he asked his intelligence chief, Major General Charles
A. Willoughby. 'How can I bomb north of the 38th Parallel without Washington
hanging me?' Willoughby, it turned out, had left Truman's directive in Tokyo. A
half hour later MacArthur emerged from his private cabin and remarked almost
casually, 'I've decided to bomb north of the 38th Parallel. The B-29s will be
out tomorrow. The order has gone to Okinawa.'" General Whitney describes this
incident in his book on General MacArthur and concludes, "Here was no timid
delay while authorization was obtained from Washington; here was the capacity
for command decision and the readiness to assume responsibility which had always
been MacArthur's forte." See Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With
History, p. 326.
[52] Rad, JCS 84681, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun. 50.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Rad, CX 56954, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and FEAF, 30 Jun. 50.
CINCFE's Personal Report
Soon thereafter, General MacArthur dispatched to Washington his frank and, in
some respects, gloomy impressions of his visit to Korea. He told Washington
officials:
I have today inspected the South Korea battle area from Suwon to the
HAN River. My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions
as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further
support our mission. . . . Organized and equipped as a light force
for maintenance of interior order [the
Korean Army was] unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely,
they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such a force as
that embodied in the North Korean Army.
The Korean Army had made no preparations for a defense in depth, for
echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or
if made not executed for the destruction of supplies or materiel in
event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost or
abandoned their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no
means of intercommunication. In most cases, the individual soldier,
in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They
are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some
semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have
sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars and anti-tank
guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest
utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance of example of
leadership of high quality.
The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according
to their scale of living. They have retained a high degree of
national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading
south from Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the
Communist rule.
South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000
effectives. North Korean military forces are as previously reported,
backed by considerable strength in armor and a well-trained, well-
directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is
now obvious that this force has been built as an element of communist
military aggression.
I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of
supplies through the air-head at SUWON and the southern port of
PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, but is subject to constant air-
attack. Since air-cover must be maintained over all aircraft
transporting supplies, equipment and personnel, this requirement
operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength.
North Korean air, operating from near-by bases, has been savage in
its attacks in Suwon area.
It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will
threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to
establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical.
The defense of this line and the Suwon-Seoul corridor is essential to
the retention of the only airhead in central Korea.
The Korean Army is entirely incapable of counter-action and there is
grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy advance
continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the
Republic.
The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the
ability to regain later the 105t ground, is through the introduction
of US Ground Combat Forces into the Korean battle area. To continue
to utilize the Forces of our air and navy without an effective ground
element cannot be decisive.
If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a United States
Regimental Combat Team to the reinforcement of the vital area
discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two-division
strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.
Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army-Navy-
Air team in this shattered area, our mission will be needlessly
costly in life, money and prestige. At worst it might even be doomed
to failure. [55]
[55] (1) Rad, C 56942, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun. 50. (2) General Whitney states
that MacArthur wrote the report during the return flight from Suwon, using a
pencil and pad. See Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History, p.
332.
This message reached Washington an hour before midnight on 29 June. Because
of its urgent tone and extremely pessimistic outlook, General Collins consulted
with General MacArthur in a teleconference four hours later. He informed the Far
East commander that one RCT could be moved to Pusan to guard
that port. MacArthur protested that this hardly satisfied the basic
requirements. He urged speed in securing permission to place American forces in
the battle area.
Lacking the authority to grant this request, Collins told MacArthur he would
try to gain Presidential approval. Collins called Secretary of the Army Pace,
who called the White House. The President immediately approved dispatching one
RCT to the battle area. In less than an hour, word was flashed to Tokyo, "Your
recommendation to move one RCT to combat area is approved. You will be advised
later as to further build-up." [56]
Throughout this period of intensive search for decisions, culminating finally
in the decision to meet the aggressor in ground combat, the President of the
United States had been the ultimate arbiter of each step. President Truman had
solicited the advice of those best qualified to judge the military effects and
requirements of each move taken. General Collins briefed him daily, passing on
the views of the Joint Chiefs. But the President made the final choice himself.
Earlier the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not favored the use of American ground
forces in Korea, [57] primarily because they knew how unprepared they were for
large-scale combat. They were reluctant also to weaken the small General Reserve
in the United States, which represented the minimum essential for defense.
Deploying any part of the Reserve to the Far East would be a risky, perhaps
disastrous, undertaking because of possible Soviet involvement following
American action. [58]
General MacArthur quite clearly had tipped the balance in favor of troop
commitment. The risks had not changed or lessened, but the nation's leaders
became convinced that communist seizure of Korea could not be tolerated.
MacArthur's personal appeal, in fact, received even wider recognition on 30 June
when he was told, "Restriction on use of Army Forces ... are hereby removed and
authority granted to utilize Army Forces available to you." [59]
[56] Telecon, TT 3444, CINCFE and JCS, 300742 Jun. 50.
[57] Handwritten Note, to Memo, Dep. Secy. JCS for JCCS. 28 Jun. 50, sub:
Preparation of Study.
[58] Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense when the decision was made,
subsequently testified to an almost neutral attitude on the part of himself and
his chief assistants. "Neither I nor any member of the Military Establishment in
my presence recommended we go into Korea." Johnson recalled, "The recommendation
came from the Secretary of State, but I want to repeat that it was not opposed
by the Defense Department, all the members of which had severally pointed out
the trouble, the trials, tribulations, and the difficulties." See MacArthur
Hearings, p. 2584.
[59] Rad, JCS 84718, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun. 50.
