CHAPTER III
National Defense and the United States Army
It has become almost a truism that nations inevitably try to prepare for the
war they have just won. Except for substituting the Soviet Union in the role of
chief adversary the United States pursued a course between 1946 and 1950 that
appeared to lend credence to this theory. American military planning in these
years was shaped largely by World War II experience and the priority afforded to
Europe over the Pacific and Far East. In 1950 the defense of western Europe
still held first claim on American military resources, and plans were devoted
almost exclusively to general war. Furthermore, reflecting its coalition effort,
the United States sought to strengthen nations that might be helpful to it in
any crisis with the Soviet Union, its most likely opponent in a time of
increasing frictions throughout the world.
The Soviet Union and its allies were apparently superior to the United States
and its allies in conventional military strength, for except in nuclear weapons
the United States military power dropped sharply in the postwar years. Russia,
on the other hand, kept powerful military forces in being and strengthened and
modernized those of its satellite nations. Thus, the United States was resolved
to contain Russian influence and prevent threats to world peace and the
independence and stability of other nations by resorting to collective security
arrangements and acting through the United Nations.
Beginning in 1948, the United States gave military assistance to a number of
friendly nations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, to enable them to resist
communist encroachment and, if necessary, to join effectively with the United
States in any war with the communist bloc of nations. More significant was
United States sponsorship of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
which in April 1949 bound the United States, Canada, and ten nations of western
Europe together to prevent the communist seizure of western Europe. As the most
powerful single nation in NATO, the United States assumed a considerably
enlarged obligation in Europe.
The successful explosion by the Soviet Union of a nuclear device in September
1949 nullified to some extent the American atomic advantage and intensified efforts
by the United States Government to build stronger collective security
arrangements. But this event came too late to affect specific defense plans in
1950.
Strategic planning after World War II was carried on at the joint level and
approved by the President. Within the joint plans, each military service
prepared its own war and emergency plans. By 1950, broad national military
policy called for meeting an all-out Russian attack with a strategic offensive
in western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East.
The Army's Place in the National Defense Structure
The Secretary of the Army, appointed by the President, directed the
activities of the Army. The Chief of Staff, the top military man, advised the
Secretary and acted for him in carrying out approved Army plans. The Army staff
in Washington, D.C., responsible to the Chief of Staff, planned and supported
Army operations and activities throughout the world. The Chief of Army Field
Forces, stationed at Fort Monroe, Virginia, conducted the training of Army
units. [1]
The President, as Commander in Chief of all the military forces, exercised
his control through a chain of command extending downward through the Secretary
of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the commanders of certain
unified and specified commands. The Secretary of Defense, a member of the
President's Cabinet, was responsible for directing the services and for advising
the President on military matters. Under his jurisdiction the Army, Navy, and
Air Force were organized into separate departments. [2]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of
[1] (1) For detailed explanation of changes in Army organization just prior
to the outbreak of the Korean War, see Analysis and Explanation of Army
organization bill, DA, Feb. 50. (2) The Secretary of the Army was served by an
under secretary, two assistant secretaries, and such Army personnel as required.
The Chief of Staff's immediate military assistants in 1950 included the vice
chief of staff, two deputy chiefs of staff, a comptroller, four assistant chiefs
of staff, and a secretary of the general staff. The relationship between the
Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff kept the Army under civilian
control while leaving as much latitude as possible for military planning and
operations by the military experts. The Chief of Staff and his deputies
coordinated and controlled the operations of the Army at home and abroad as well
as planning for future operations. The chain of authority from the Secretary of
the Army through the Chief of Staff extended to the Chief, Army Field Forces, to
the army commanders in the continental United States, and to the various army
commanders overseas. The continental United States was divided into six
continental army areas and the Military District of Washington.
[2] The powers and authorities of the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force were much less than those enjoyed by their World War II
predecessors, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary
of Defense was an important member of the National Security Council (NSC), a
body which had also been established in postwar years, and which was charged
with advising the President on the integration of domestic, foreign, and
military policies relating to national security and with seeking the most
effective coordination among the services and other government agencies in areas
involving national security. For details of membership, functions, and
responsibilities of the Department of Defense and of the National Security
Council, see: National Security Act, 1947, PL 253, 80th Congress, 27 Jul. 47;
National Security Act Amendments, 1949, PL 216, 81st Congress, 10 Aug. 49:
Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington:
Public Affairs Press, 1956); Truman, Memoirs, II, 58-60; Statement, Gen.
George C. Marshall, MacArthur Hearings, pp. 583-84; Wilber W. Hoare, Jr.,
"Truman (1945-1953)", in Ernest R. May, ed., The Ultimate Decision, The
President as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960).
the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Chief of Naval
Operations, and a chairman appointed by the President, comprised the top
advisory body in the United States Government composed exclusively of military
men. They were designated by law as the principal military advisers to the
President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject
only to the authority of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the JCS was
specifically charged with the preparation of strategic plans and strategic
direction of the military forces; the preparation of joint logistic plans and
the assignment of logistic responsibility; review of the major requirements of
military forces in the light of prepared plans; and the establishment of unified
commands in strategic areas. [3]
After World War II, American armed forces in major overseas areas were
brought under the operational control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the
formal establishment of unified commands, which included contingents of all the
military services. Operating under the strategic direction of the JCS, each of
these commands was directly supervised by a particular chief of staff who acted
as the executive agent of the JCS. In 1950 the major overseas unified commands
established by the JCS were the Far East Command, the Alaskan Command, the
Caribbean Command, the Pacific Command, and the European Command. Within each of
these, individual service commanders commanded the forces of their respective
services- Army, Navy, or Air Force-but they were under the over-all supervision
of a designated commander in chief from one of the services, and he was named by
and responsible to the JCS.
Army Strength and Deployment-1950
In June 1950, the strength of the active Army stood at about 591,000 and
included ten combat divisions. About 360,000 troops were stationed within the
zone of the interior (ZI). The remaining 231,000 were disposed in overseas
commands, most of them performing occupation duties. The largest group overseas
(about 108,500) was located in the Far East. In Europe, approximately 80,000
U.S. soldiers were stationed in Germany, 9,500 in Austria, and 4,800 in Trieste.
Slightly more than 7,000 were assigned to the Pacific area and about 7,500 to
Alaska. In the Caribbean were about 12,200 troops. Several thousand more were
assigned to military missions throughout the world. [4]
[3] In their capacities as members of the JCS, the individual members
represented the entire military establishment and not their respective services.
The Secretary of the Army, for example, had no direct control over the Chief of
Staff of the Army in the latter's role as a member of the JCS. The chairman of
the JCS had no vote, but presided over the meetings and deliberations of the
body. He frequently represented the entire membership before the President, the
NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. Although not a member of the NSC, the
chairman of the JCS usually accompanied the Secretary of Defense to the meetings
of the NSC and explained or defended the views of the JCS, sometimes against the
opposition of the Secretary of Defense. For details of the composition,
functions, and responsibilities of the JCS in 1950, see National Security Act
1947, PL 253, sec. 211B, 80th Congress; National Security Amendments, 1949, PL
216, 51st Congress; Stanley, American Defense and National Security;
MacArthur Hearings, p. 904; Hoare, "Truman (1945-1953), pp. 185-94.
[4] (1) STW 1037, Weekly Estimate of Army Command Strength as of 26 June
1950, 2 Jul. 50, AGO Stat and Acc Br, copy in G-3 Deployments Br. (2) These
figures are at slight variance with those [Continued on next page.]
The force designated to carry out the Army's emergency assignments was called
the General Reserve. Except for one regimental combat team (RCT) in Hawaii, this
force consisted of five combat divisions and certain smaller units in the
continental United States. [5] The major General Reserve units on 25 June 1950
were the 2d Armored Division, 2d Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division, 82d
Airborne Division, 11th Airborne Division (- 1 RCT), 3d Armored Cavalry
Regiment, 5th RCT (located in Hawaii), and 14th RCT. In addition, there
[Continued from previous page] contained in STM-30, Strength Report of the
Army, X July 1950, which gives the following data on Army forces as of 30 June
1950: Total Strength 591,487; Zone of Interior 347,224; Overseas Strength
244,263. (3) Total strength in both compilations excludes the cadet corps at the
Military Academy,
[5] For precise definition of General Reserve, see SR 320-5-1, Dictionary of
United States Army Terms, Aug. 50. See also Directory and Station List, U.S.
Army, 30 Jun. 50, copy in OCMH.
were smaller combat support and service support units. [6]
Besides the General Reserve in the United States and Hawaii, four tactical
divisions and one RCT were located in the Far East Command. In Europe the Army
maintained one tactical division, one RCT, three cavalry regiments, and one
separate infantry regiment. One infantry battalion was in Alaska, and two
separate regiments were in the Caribbean area. [7]
The authorized strength of the Army, as opposed to its actual strength, was
630,201. Budget planning in the spring of 1950 contemplated a reduction of this
figure to 610,900. The proposed cut would have eliminated one of the Army's ten
tactical divisions; specifically, it would have reduced the number of divisions
in the FEC from four to three. [8]
The strength of the United States Army in 1950 was much less than American
military leaders wished. But government economies in the aftermath of World War
II allowed no increase.
Army Training
Training programs were hampered by lack of funds, and this, together with the
absence of a sense of urgency, detracted from the combat readiness of Army
forces in being in 1950. [9] Until 1949 basic training lasted only eight weeks,
and graduates sent overseas usually had to undergo further basic training before
they could be assigned to units. The Army put in a 14-week training cycle in
March 1949 and, although this cycle did not provide for branch training (i.e.,
artillery, engineers), it included a sufficient amount of basic subject material
to give an adequate foundation on which to build individual and unit training.
[10] This came rather late for the Korean War.
Army Supply Status
The Army had sufficient stocks of most items of materiel and equipment to
support its peacetime program. Certain imbalances-resulting from the cessation
or curtailment of production, the surplus property disposal program, and the
breakdown of distribution systems-existed, but these presented relatively minor
problems and were usually localized.
From the standpoint of war-readiness, the Army's supply position was much
more serious. Army procurement after World War II was limited mainly to food,
clothing, and medical supplies. The shift of American industry away from
military production forced the Army to operate almost exclusively with older and
obsolescent equipment. Nor was money available for new procurement. The Army
computed its requirements carefully, basing them on minimum essentials, only to
find that appropriations
[6] Memo for Gen. Collins, 9 Jul. 50, sub: Status of Major Units of the
General Reserve Which Have Not Been Committed to FECOM, unnumbered notebook of
Far East Br, G-3, DA, in G-3, DA files.
[7] (1) JSPC 853/6, 4 Jul. 50, App C to Include B, in G-3, DA files. (2) Four
training divisions also were stationed in the United States.
[8] Army Tentative Plans, FY 1952, Part I. p. 55.
[9] For information in detail on Army training in the postwar era, see:
Annual History, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), 1 January-31
December 1949 (hereafter cited as Annual History of OCAFF), Part I, ch. I, pp.
5-9, ch. VI, pp. 2-3, 5-6, ch. IX; ibid., 1950, vol. II, ch. XIV; Rpt of
Activities AFF, 1945-49, pp. 8, 10, 54-55. All in OCMH.
[10] Annual History of OCAFF, 1949, ch. VI, pp. 5-6.
habitually fell far short of meeting them. For the fiscal year 1948, for
instance, the Ordnance Department estimated it would need $750,000,000 to cover
procurement of essential ammunition and equipment, storage and distribution of
ordnance material, maintenance of stand-by plants and arsenals, training, and
research and development. The Bureau of the Budget cut this figure to
$275,,000,000, and the Congress reduced the appropriation in final form to
$245,532,000. [11]
Maintenance of available equipment assumed greater importance as World War II
items wore out under constant use or deteriorated in storage depots. Rapid
demobilization had hurt the Army's maintenance program by reducing personnel and
facilities to levels allowing proper storage and continuing maintenance on no
more than a token basis. At the same time, replacement parts and assemblies
became critical in many classes of equipment. [12]
Machine guns and towed artillery were in plentiful supply, but heavy
construction equipment, newly developed radios, self-propelled artillery, newer
tanks, and antiaircraft guns were critically short. Installations in the United
States supporting the current 10-division Army required more than 38,000
commercial-type motor vehicles, but in 1950 only 27,000 were on hand, and 23,000
of these were six or more years old. There were fewer than 900 serviceable light
M-24 tanks in the United States, 2,557 unserviceable ones; 1,826 serviceable
medium M4A3 tanks, 1,376 unserviceable ones. There were only 319 new M-46
General Patton tanks. [13]
Development of new weapons and vehicles continued, but at a decelerated pace.
New models being developed in the spring of 1950 would not be available for
issue before the end of 1952. Other research projects indicated many desirable
improvements in weapons and equipment, but funds were unavailable to complete
development and production. [14] Ammunition stocks in the United States were far
out of balance. Training activities, both of the active Army forces and the
civilian components, normal deterioration, and transfers to foreign countries
under military assistance programs, had eaten away much of the stockpile
remaining at the end of World War II, while economy budgets prevented
significant new procurement. The result was a woefully inadequate reservoir of
several types of ammunition. [15] In sum, the shortages of men and supplies
combined with inadequate training to affect adversely the combat readiness of
the Far East Command just as they hindered the effectiveness of the U.S. Army
elsewhere.
The Far East Command
On 16 December 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated General MacArthur
[11] Statement, Maj. Gen. Everett S. Hughes, 14 Mar 47, Hearings Before
House Subcommittee on Appropriations, 80th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 941,
967.
[12] G-4 Review of the Month, 1 Apr. 48, pp. 1, 29, in G-4, DA files.
[13] (1) Army Presentation Before JCS on Review of Service Establishment,
Phase II, Part III for FY 1951 Budget, 29 Jul. 49, pp. 143-47. (2) DF, Supply
Div. to Control Office, 11 Jul. 51, sub: Supply Sit in REC and U.S. as of 25
Jun. 50, with 7 Incls., in G-4, DA files.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Summary Sheet, CSCLD/16027, DCofS G-4 (Gen. Reeder) to CofS, 3 Apr. 50,
sub: Ammunition Reserve, in C-4, DA files.
Commander in Chief, Far East Command, effective 1 January 1947. No specific
boundaries were established, but forces placed under General MacArthur's command
were located in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, the Mariana
Islands, and the Volcano and Bonin Islands. These determined in a vague manner
the geographic limits of the Far East Command. [16]
The area was vast. It extended over 265,000 square miles of island area
inhabited by almost 100,000,000 people. Because of the preponderance of sea over
land within the Far East Command and because of the terrain and climatic
conditions, varying from sub-Arctic to tropical, the military garrison was
compartmented into geographical groups. The primary land area and the area
containing the largest number of U.S. troops was Japan. [17]
MacArthur's authorities and responsibilities as CINCFE were defined by
directives issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Three general missions were
assigned him. The first pertained to occupation of former enemy territories in
which he discharged U.S. occupation responsibilities in Japan, Korea, and former
Japanese islands. The second broad mission was to support U.S. policies within
the areas controlled by his forces. Third, CINCFE was to prepare to meet a
general emergency at any time. The top headquarters within the Far East Command
was General Headquarters (GHQ) located in Tokyo, Japan. This was essentially an
Army headquarters, staffed almost entirely by Army personnel, and resembling the
structure of General MacArthur's World War II headquarters. [18]
The Navy and Air Force felt that their activities within the Far East were
being directed by the Army staff under an Army commander. But General MacArthur
considered his authority over naval and air forces too limited. He complained
that he could not exercise sufficient control over the internal organization of
these services in his area, direct the troop control of their units, or
supervise fully their logistical operations. [19]
As Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), General
MacArthur controlled all Army units and personnel within his area. Since this
function was inherent in the broader designation of CINCFE, he
[16] Study, Requirements, Means Available, and Procedures Evolved to
Accomplish CINCFE Missions (hereafter cited as FEC Papers), Paper 1, 26 Oct. 49,
p. 2, in G-3, DA file P & O 333 Pacific, F/w-6/3.
[17] Ibid., pp. 5-7.
[18] (1) Ibid., Paper 5, pp. 2-6. (2) The directive from JCS which
established the command originally had stated, "Each unified commander will have
a joint staff with appropriate members from the various components of the
services under this command in key positions of responsibility." General
MacArthur had not gone all the way in meeting the spirit of unification. But a
joint committee of top-ranking Army, Navy, and Air Force officers was an
integral part of GHQ and met each week, though only to advise the Chief of
Staff, FEC (an Army officer), in "coordination of inter-service matters."
Additionally, frequent coordinating conferences were held by MacArthur with the
commanders of major air and naval elements within his command. Another
concession to the principle of unification of command within GHQ was the
establishment of the Joint Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to
"assist and advise the Commander-in-Chief Far East, on matters pertaining to the
exercise of unified command over Army, Navy and Air Forces allocated to the Far
East Command." The group consisted of three Army officers, three Navy officers,
and two Air Force officers, but hardly constituted a joint staff as envisioned
by the JCS instructions of December 1946. See JCS 1259/27, 14 Dec. 46, and USAF
in the Korean Conflict, USAF Hist. Study No. 71, p. 9.
[19] FEC Papers, Paper 12, 1 Oct. 49.
neither used the title commanding general, USAFFE, nor established a separate
staff. Because there were within his command a major air force and a major naval
headquarters, Far East Air Forces (FEAF) and Naval Forces, Far East (NavFE),
respectively, some resentment developed because the coequal Army headquarters,
AFFE, was absent. That all Army combat forces were assigned to subordinate Army
commands had the effect of placing these lesser headquarters on the same level
with FEAF and NavFE. General MacArthur defended this peculiarity in the command
structure by saying that imposing an Army headquarters between subordinate Army
units and GHQ FEC would duplicate the functions of GHQ and detract from the
essential and cohesive relationships between CINCFE and the Supreme Commander,
Allied Powers (SCAP). [20]
[20] (1) Ibid., Paper 13, p. 4. (2) A succinct and fairly accurate
description of the FEC structure was rendered by a representative of the
Department of the Army, Army War Plans Branch, who visited the command in
October 195O. He said: "Although a lack of balanced representation from the
three services keeps GHQ FEC from being classified as a joint headquarters in
the commonly accepted sense, certain joint features do exist.... Intelligence is
correlated in Army, Navy and Air Force Group with Theater Intelligence Section,
G-2; planning is coordinated through JSPOG, a joint committee (composed of the
Chiefs of Staff of the three Services) coordinates on the higher level. The Far
East Command is a unified rather than a joint command with command lines
following straight service seniority channels throughout as opposed to command
responsibilities on a joint basis by geographical area; e.g. there is no joint
commander of the Ryukyus or in Marianas-Bonins Command. CINCFE commands all
major Army commands as theater commander and commands all Navy and Air Force
commands through the Senior Commanders of those services." See Memo, Lt. Col.
Stevens, AWPB G-3, for ACofS G-3, 17 Oct. so, sub: Rpt of TDY in FEC, in G-3, DA
file 333 Pac, Case 7.
In June 1950 GHQ, FEC, located in Tokyo, Japan, with main offices in the Dai
Ichi Building, had Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond as chief of staff and Maj. Gen.
Doyle O. Hickey as deputy chief of staff. The major subordinate Army commands
were Eighth Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker; Headquarters and
Service Group, GHQ, commanded by Maj. Gen. Walter L. Weible; the Ryukyus Command
(RYCOM) under Maj. Gen. Josef R. Sheetz; and the Marianas-Bonins Command (MARBO)
headed by Maj. Gen. Robert S. Beightler. In the Philippines, the Thirteenth Air
Force controlled U.S. installations through PHILCOM (AF), a small and rapidly
diminishing headquarters commanded by Maj. Gen. Howard M. Turner, USAF. Naval
Forces, Far East, were commanded by Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy. Far East Air Forces
(FEAF), came under Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. FEAF and NavFE headquarters
were located in Tokyo in buildings separate from GHQ, FEC.
FEC Strategic Planning and Korea
General MacArthur's basic plan to meet a general emergency in the Far East
was to defend the Japanese islands. Operations were to be offensive-defensive,
with air and naval forces assuming the tactical offensive to protect the
withdrawal of forces from outlying areas and to deny to the enemy the control of
the sea and air approaches to Japan. The main body of Army forces would be
concentrated on Okinawa, the Marianas, and the Kanto Plain of Honshu. Those Army
forces located in Korea were to be precipitately withdrawn.
Regarding Korea, the JCS had advised the State-Army-Navy-Air Force
Coordinating Committee (SANACC), successor to the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee, in January 1948, that the withdrawal of the U.S. occupation forces
from South Korea would most likely lead
to communist domination of the entire nation. And since it was nevertheless
intended to evacuate American troops, eventual Russian control of Korea would
have to be accepted as a probability, even though establishing a ROK
constabulary force might serve as a temporary deterrent. [21]
The definitive write-off of Korea as an important strategic area came when
the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that no military security guarantee should be
extended to the Republic of Korea because such action would risk a major war in
an area where Russia would have nearly all the natural advantages. As a result,
the President, on 4 April 1948, approved a policy that stated: "The United
States should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that an
action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be
considered a 'casus belli' for the United States." From that moment, Korea was
of secondary importance to U.S. planners and policy makers. [22] General
MacArthur had been relieved of his responsibility for defending Korea when the
last American tactical units had been withdrawn from that country in 1949.
In mid-1949 General Omar N. Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, challenged the
national policy toward Korea. On the eve of the withdrawal of the last American
combat troops from the peninsula, General Bradley suggested taking the Korean
question again to the National Security Council. He feared that U.S. withdrawal
might be followed by an invasion from the north. He had had his staff review the
courses of action open to the United States in such an eventuality, and as a
result he recommended that, if an invasion took place, the U.S. nationals be
evacuated and the aggression immediately be presented to the United Nations
Security Council as a threat to the peace. A U.N. composite military force might
be considered as a last resort. [23]
Bradley's fellow members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to bring
this matter again before the National Security Council. They said:
From the strategic viewpoint the position of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff regarding Korea, summarized briefly, is that Korea is of little
strategic value to the United States and that any commitment to
United States use of military force in Korea would be ill-advised and
impracticable in view of the potentialities of the over-all world
situation and of our heavy international obligations as compared with
our current military strength. [24]
This concept dominated American planning for the Far East. By 1950, the
United States decided that, in the event of a Soviet attack in the area,
American Forces would conduct a strategic defense. Specific missions charged to
the Far East Command were: (1) defense of the Ryukyus and Japan; (2) protection
of air and sea lanes in the FEC; (3) denial of Formosa to the enemy; (4) support
of the Pacific Command, the Alaskan Command, and the Strategic Air Command; (5)
assistance to the Republic of the
[21] JCS 1483/50, Rpt by JSSC, title: U.S. Policy in Korea, 30 Jan 48. [22]
SANACC 176/39, 22 Mar 48, title: U.S. Policy in Korea,
[23] JCS 1776/4, 23 Jun. 49, Incl, Memo, CSA to JCS, 20 Jun. 49, sub:
Implications of a Possible Full-Scale Invasion From North Korea Subsequent to
the Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Korea.
[24] JCS 1776/4, 23 Jun. 49.
Philippines in defense of the islands; and (6) provision for the safety of
U.S. personnel in Korea. American airmen were to destroy or neutralize enemy air
power. [25]
That Korea was considered of little strategic worth to the United States had
scarcely been a matter of public knowledge until 12 January 1950, when Secretary
of State Dean Acheson said so in a speech at the National Press Club in
Washington. Outlining the defensive strategy in the Far East, he excluded Korea
and Formosa from the American defensive perimeter. Referring obliquely to Korea,
Mr. Acheson stated:
So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is
concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas
against military attack.... Should such an attack occur-one hesitates
to say where such an armed attack could come from-the initial reliance
must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations which so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by
any people who are determined to pro-
[25] FEOP 1-50, GHQ FEC, vol. I, 1 Feb. 50, in G-3, FEC files.
tect their independence against outside aggression. [26]
In the light of Secretary Acheson's remarks, it appeared that the United
States had no intention of fighting for South Korea. In the view of many
observers, his statement was an invitation to Communist China, North Korea, and
Russia that they could invade the republic with impunity.
MacArthur's Forces
The general decrease in Army strength that took place in 1947 was reflected
sharply in the Far East. General MacArthur had commanded over 300,000 troops,
including 42,000 in the Army Air Forces, in January 1947 [27] Just one year
later he had only 142,000 men. When asked early in 1948 if he could maintain
30,000 men in Korea, MacArthur told Army officials that to do so would cause a
breakdown in logistic support to the Far East Air Forces and a breakdown in the
general effectiveness in his command. The real cause of this situation, he
charged, was Washington's failure to send him even half the troops approved for
his command. [28]
MacArthur warned of irreparable damage to United States national interests in
the Far East unless his command was strengthened. In response, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff informed MacArthur that all services were having trouble keeping up to
authorized strength and that calculated risks in the allotment of manpower had
to be accepted throughout the world. Allocating 134,000 troops (including 28,800
Philippine Scouts) to his command, they ordered him to keep 30,000 troops in
Korea until elections had been held there. [29]
MacArthur protested. On 24 February 1948 he charged that his personnel
resources were exhausted. He asserted that there was no substitute for Army
troop strength and that it was essential to meet the dangers and difficulties
that existed in the Far East. [30]
There was actually a further decline. MacArthur's authorized strength for the
year beginning 1 July 1949 was to be only 120,000 men. Insofar as combat
strength was concerned, the Far East Command reached its lowest ebb at this
point, April 1948. The Eighth Army, upon which the combat effectiveness of the
command depended, was authorized 87,215 men, but had an actual strength of only
45,561 and a combat strength of 26,494. This combat strength was spread over
five divisions and an antiaircraft artillery group, making attainment of any
satisfactory degree of combat readiness very difficult. MacArthur's protests
continued, but to no avail. Exemplifying the general conditions within the
Eighth Army, two regiments of the 25th Division had less than 250 men each. [31]
On 3 August 1948 MacArthur complained that his carefully analyzed minimum
requirements for Army strength were being brushed aside. He was noti-
[26] (1) Speech, Mr. Dean Acheson to National Press Club, 12 Jan 50, quoted
in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 1811-12, (2) See also Acheson, Present at
the Creation, pp. 354-58.
[27] Strength Reports of the Army, Central Statistical Office, Office, Chief
of Staff, 1 Feb. 47, copy in OCMH.
[28] Rad, CX 58131, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jan 48.
[29] Rad, WARX 96357, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Feb. 48.
[30] Rad, CX 58837, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb. 48.
[31] (1) Rad, WAR 81295, DA to CINCFE, 6 May 48. (2) Rad, C 61072, CINCFE to
DA, 29 May 48. (3) Rad, C 61943, CINCFE to DA, 29 Jun. 48. (4) Rad, WARX 86492,
DA to CINCFE, 27 Jul. 48.
fied on 9 November 1948 that the nation's authorities were contemplating a
reduction in the strength of his Far East Air Forces. This news brought a sharp
rejoinder and a strategic estimate of his position in the Far East Command. He
maintained that he could not understand what devious thinking had prompted a
proposal for reducing his military strength. He said that it would endanger the
nation's military position in the Far East beyond the acceptable point of
calculated risk. MacArthur charged that the nation's planners should be
contemplating an increase in his naval, air, and ground forces. [32]
Despite MacArthur's insistent protests, the strength level in the Far East
Command continued with little substantive change. During visits to Tokyo by the
Department of the Army Staff, by the Secretary of the Army, and by members of
the JCS during 1948 and 1949, General MacArthur presented his views and protests
in person. He said consistently that the support which the Department of the
Army was giving to forces in Europe was out of proportion and that more support
should and could be given to his command in the Far East. [33]
The flow of replacements to the Far East picked up somewhat in 1949 although
budgetary limitations on the Army as a whole enforced restrictions on
replacements available to the Far East Command. By late 1949, the shortage of
funds had become so pronounced that the Department of the Army decided to reduce
the number of divisions in the Army from ten to nine. MacArthur's command was to
take the loss and during a discussion with MacArthur in October 1949 General
Collins, Army Chief of Staff, told MacArthur so. MacArthur, of course, objected.
The Department of the Army reversed its decision and kept ten divisions on duty.
[34] But, as noted above, the strength of the Far East Command had dwindled to
about 108,500 Army troops by June 1950.
The budget limitations and the low enlistment rate forced the Department of
the Army to devise a troop program and troop list which could not be manned at
100 percent strength. This reduced over-all personnel ceiling reflected manning
levels which, in turn, caused unavoidable reductions either by paring the
strength of all subordinate units or by eliminating certain units entirely.
Since administrative requirements continued or increased, combat units suffered
more than headquarters units. [35] As reflected in the FEC, this condition
caused the elimination of certain basic elements from combat units in order to
maintain the units within the command. Each of MacArthur's infantry divisions
had only one tank company instead of a tank battalion, and one antiaircraft
battery instead of an antiaircraft battalion. Each infantry regiment was short
its Table of Organization (T/O) tank company and lacked one infantry battalion;
each of the divisional artillery battalions was short one firing battery.
Although CINCFE had managed to retain the 4-division structure of Eighth Army,
he
[32] (1) Rad, W 92269, DA to CINCFE, 9 Nov. 48. (2) Rad, CX 65569, CINCFE to
DA, 23 Nov. 48.
[33] Rad, WAR 82319, DA to CINCFE, 6 Jan 49.
[34] (1) JCS 1800/54/56, Sep. 49. (2) JCS 2079/3, Oct. 49.
[35] Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug. so, with comments by Chief,
OCAFF, in S3, DA file 333 Pac, sec. I-A, Book I, Case 8/8 (1950).
had had to eliminate the normal corps headquarters and corps special troops
(artillery, engineer, and so forth). Service elements of Eighth Army were so
inadequate that over 150,000 Japanese personnel were being employed in roles
normally performed by service troops. [36]
The ratio of non-combat to combat personnel in the Far East was excessive.
This stemmed from the Army's attempts during the postwar years to make the Army
an attractive career by leaving the choice of arm or service largely to the
individual. The combat arms, and especially the infantry, failed to attract
sufficient men to keep their strength on a par with other arms and branches.
Also the fact that a substantial percentage of the already inadequate output of
stateside training divisions went to service schools for further training
reduced the number of men available for assignment to combat-type units except
in specialist capacities. [37]
MacArthur's combat forces in June 1950 comprised 4 under-strength infantry
divisions and 7 antiaircraft artillery battalions in Japan, 1 infantry regiment
and 2 antiaircraft artillery battalions in Okinawa. The major combat units were
the 1st Cavalry Division (actually infantry) in central Honshu, Japan; 7th
Infantry Division in northern Honshu and Hokkaido, Japan; 24th Infantry Division
in Kyushu, Japan; 25th Infantry Division in south central Honshu, Japan; and the
9th Antiaircraft Artillery Group in Okinawa. General MacArthur had registered
frequent protests that his missions in the Far East required a minimum force of
at least 5 full-strength infantry divisions, 23 antiaircraft artillery
battalions, and 1 separate RCT. [38]
Eighth Army, the main combat force of FEC, stood at about 93 percent of its
authorized strength on 25 June 1950. Each division had an authorized strength of
12,500 men as compared to its authorized war strength of 18,900 and none of the
divisions was even up to its peacetime authorization. Each division was short of
its war strength by nearly 7,000 men, 1,500 rifles, and 100 90-mm. antitank
guns; 3 rifle battalions, 6 heavy tank companies, 3 105-mm. field artillery
batteries, and 3 antiaircraft artillery batteries were missing from each
division. In terms of battle potential, the infantry divisions could lay down
only 62 percent of their infantry firepower, 69 percent of their antiaircraft
artillery firepower, and percent of their tank firepower. [39]
Until 1949 the primary responsibility of military units in the Far East
Command was to carry out occupation duties. Engaged in these administrative and
housekeeping tasks throughout Japan and the outlying areas, units had little
time or inclination for combat training. The situation was aggravated by
constant under-strength and excessive turn-over of personnel. This turnover
amounted to 43 percent annually in the FEC. Training in the rudimentary
functions of the soldier was carried on as time and facilities permitted during
the period from 1945 to 1949 with emphasis upon discipline, courtesy, and
conduct.
[36] FEC Papers, Paper 10, p. 7.
[37] Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug. 50.
[38] FEC Papers, Paper 10.
[39] Mono, 1st Lt. Charles G. Cleaver, Personnel Problems, in History of the
Korean War vol. III Part 2, MHS, HQ, FEC, 15 Aug. 52, p. 1 copy in OCMH.
No serious effort was made in these years to maintain combat efficiency at
battalion or higher level.
This situation changed markedly in April 1949 when General MacArthur issued a
policy directive announcing that the stern rigidity which had characterized the
occupation of Japan until that time was to be superseded by an attitude of
"friendly protective guidance." As a result of this change in policy, combat
divisions of Eighth Army were progressively relieved of the majority of their
purely occupational missions and directed to undertake along with FEAF and NavFE
an intensified program which would lead to the establishment of a cohesive and
integrated naval, air, and ground fighting team. Although large numbers of
officers and men were detached from military government and civil affairs
activities and returned to their parent combat units, there still remained many
administrative features of the occupation which could not be relinquished and
which constituted a considerable barrier to the full development of the planned
training program. [40]
Main objectives of the new training program announced by General MacArthur on
10 June 1949 called for the rapid integration of Army, Navy, and Air Force
components into an efficient team capable of performing its primary military
mission. Divisions were directed to complete RCT field exercises and develop
effective air-ground combat procedures prior to 31 July 1950 and to complete
amphibious landing exercises for one battalion of each division by 31 October
1950. Minimum proficiency levels to be attained were (1) company (battery)
levels by 15 December 1949; (2) battalion (squadron or task force) level by 15
May 1950; (3) regimental (group or task force) level by 31 July 1950; (4)
division (air force or task force) level by 31 December 1950; and (5) combined
and joint operations training to include amphibious exercises concurrently with
RCT and division-level training. [41]
In a country so heavily populated and predominantly agricultural as Japan, no
land was wasted and the maintenance of large military training areas would have
imposed a burden upon the Japanese economy which was not considered justified.
Consequently, troops were generally restricted in their training to small posts
of regimental size. Divisions could not be concentrated and trained together. On
8 August 1949 an area in the vicinity of Mount Fuji was acquired which would
accommodate limited division exercises over very rugged terrain. Every other
field training area was exploited to the utmost. Exploitation of the relatively
few training areas during favorable training weather, however, required that
some units undertake field firing problems and tests ahead of the actual phasing
of such training in the Mobilization Training Programs. For example, the 7th
Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division completed its battalion tests
before completing basic individual training in order to use that division's lone
training area. [42]
The Army's Career Guidance Program also worked to the disadvantage of the
[40] (1) FEC Papers, Paper 3, pp. 2-4. (2) GHQ, FEC Annual Narrative
Historical Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Dec. 49.
[41] FEC Papers, Paper 23, pp. 7-8.
[42] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
training program within the FEC according to General MacArthur's staff. Staff
visits indicated that a wide variance existed between the experience of
regimental commanders and their subordinate commanders. There was a great need
for improved leadership of combat units at the company and battalion levels.
Many officers possessing the qualities of leadership and training experience
necessary for proper development of FEC combat units had been given directed
military occupational specialties (MOS) under the Career Guidance Program and
could not be placed in command of troops where they were needed. From the
standpoint of the enlisted man the same situation seriously affected the
flexibility of organization and training. In their efforts to strengthen combat
units by transferring men from inactivated service units, FEC commanders ran
head on into the Career Guidance Program which prevented assignment of enlisted
men from one field to another. [43]
The readiness of combat units within the FEC was not enhanced by the quality
of enlisted personnel assigned from the zone of the interior. Replacements
arriving from the United States during 1949, for instance, were said by General
MacArthur's headquarters to have had a very high percentage of low intelligence
ratings and a much larger than usual number of men of questionable character.
This situation was reflected not only in training, but in discipline,
administrative problems, and a larger number of individual incidents which
caused criticism of American behavior. In April 1949, 43 percent of Army
enlisted personnel in the Far East Command rated in Class IV and V on the Army
General Classification Test. On an average, enlisted men of the FEC were several
years younger than their counterparts of World War II. Another factor which
intensified the difficulty of training for combat readiness was the incomplete
basic training received by recruits before shipment to the FEC. According to an
FEC report, recruits were not sufficiently indoctrinated to withstand the
inactive period of pipeline experience and had lost much of the benefit of basic
training before arriving in the Far East Command. [44]
General Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, visited the Far East Command in
the autumn of 1949 and looked into the training program then in progress. He was
generally satisfied with what he saw and with what he was told in conference
with General MacArthur. Reporting on his findings to the Secretary of the Army
General Collins said:
As a result of the reductions in strength of personnel . . . and
because our troops were primarily engaged in occupation missions
until recently, the troops of Eighth Army are not now in fighting
condition. However, they have recently been brought back up to
strength, are making excellent progress with realistic field training
and are planning exercises with close fighter-bomber support by the
early spring of 195O. Given
[43] (1) Ibid., p. 10. (2) This complaint from the FEC was verified at
a later date by a team of observers sent to the Korean battlefield in the first
month of the war. These observers noted that classification and assignment
procedures had placed in battlefield command officers and noncoms lacking
experience and proficiency. This kind of assignment had often resulted in poor
leadership, especially at the regimental and lower levels. The observers
concluded bluntly that the career program had been detrimental to combat
efficiency. See Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug. 50.
[44] FEC Papers, Paper 23, pp. 2-3.
another six months the divisions I inspected should be in excellent
shape. [45]
All units of Eighth Army had completed the battalion phase of their training
by the target date of 15 May 1950. An air transportability school had been
established and was functioning, pointing toward battalion airlift exercises. At
an amphibious training center near Tokyo, one battalion from each division had
received training in landing techniques and a joint landing exercise was
scheduled for August 1950. Reports on the Eighth Army's divisions which were
sent to the Department of the Army in May 1950 showed estimates ranging from 84
percent to 65 percent of full combat efficiency for the four divisions in Japan.
[46]
[45] Memo, Gen. Collins for Secy. Army, 20 Oct. 49, sub: Rpt of Visit to
Hawaii and FEC, in G-3, DA files.
[46] Rpt on Disposition, Strength, and Combat Capabilities of Major Army
Forces in Overseas Commands, 30 May 1950, Rpts Control Symbol WDGPO-6, CINCFE to
ACofS G 3, Opns, General Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., in G-3, FEC files.
FEC Supply Status
Equipment in the hands of MacArthur's troops was for the most part of World
War II vintage. Much of it had been through combat, and a good deal of it,
particularly the vehicles, had been serviced and maintained under difficulty
during the years of occupation.
Adding to the difficulty of the logistic situation was the unusual dependence
upon indigenous personnel which had developed within the U.S. Army in Japan
during the years following World War II. Basically, this dependence stemmed from
the acute shortages of trained American soldiers to perform specialized
functions of the type normally carried out by service units. In the absence of
sufficient service units and with emphasis transferred to a great extent from
field-type operations, the natural result had been to exploit the enormous pool
of manpower available in Japan. Japanese workmen carried out duties in support
of U.S. Army units and in installations ranging from menial mess-hall tasks to
highly technical functions calling for advanced training and great skill. Base
areas, depots, and ports were manned by Japanese personnel under Army
supervision, while protection of these installations, as well as other less
sensitive areas throughout Japan, was largely delegated to Japanese guards.
After the war's ending in 1945, vast quantities of U.S. materiel had been
left throughout the islands of the Pacific. This residue of the Pacific
fighting-vehicles, signal equipment, armament, and other types of military
equipment-was originally treated as excess. In many cases, it was left where it
lay when the fighting ceased, abandoned for all intents and purposes, or at best
gathered into assembly areas and maintained halfheartedly. Some was sold to
foreign governments or domestic firms at a fraction of its intrinsic value. In
the Philippines alone, 933,265 tons of such equipment had been disposed of
through surplus property channels by the end of 1947.
The main islands of Okinawa, the Philippines, and the Marianas-Bonins
contained the bulk of this equipment. Since these areas were part of the FEC,
the condition and disposition of the material were matters of concern to General
MacArthur. In 1947 he had ordered intensive surveys and the initiation of
measures to reclaim as much of it as possible. Investigation by ordnance
officers of the command showed that the greater part of all classes of this
military equipment had been left in open storage, without adequate safeguards,
with practically no proper segregation as to type, and with no attempt having
been made to classify or catalogue it.
In the years from 1947 until the outbreak of war in Korea, personnel of the
FEC had, therefore, been putting forth every effort to reclaim for military use
as much of this valuable equipment as possible. Under a program informally known
as Operation ROLL-UP, vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and other types of supplies
from the island areas had been segregated, classified, and transported to
facilities in Japan for repair and proper storage. Critical shortages in
qualified personnel plus the desire to arrive at the most efficient and
economical solution to the situation had forced this project to depend upon the
use of Japanese industry under the direction of a small American staff. [47] The
original objective of Operation ROLL-UP was to support the FEC and to equip
Eighth Army's infantry divisions at minimum cost and with maximum use of all
materiel which could be reclaimed. It was planned that the project would be
completed by 30 June 1950. As an indication of the progress attained, 200,000
measurement tons of ordnance supplies were moved to Japan from Okinawa during
1949. All types of vehicles, artillery pieces, and ammunition as well as other
items were affected by this program.
One result of Operation ROLL-UP was to prepare FEC repair and rebuild
facilities, including Japanese industry, for the great expansion necessary to
support extensive combat operations. In addition, thousands of military vehicles
were available in substantially better condition than would have otherwise been
the case. [48]
A shortage of supervisory personnel slowed the renovation program and made
unattainable the goal of completing Operation ROLL-UP by 30 June 1950. When the
North Korean attack came stocks of unusable equipment were still piled up in
storage shops. An estimated 80 percent of the Army's 60-day reserve of armament
equipment was unserviceable on 25 June. The Far East Command had received no new
vehicles, tanks, or other equipment since World War II. Almost 90 percent of the
armament equipment and 75 percent of the automotive equipment in the hands of
the four combat divisions on that date was derived from the rebuild program.
[49]
Levels of supply on hand in the FEC by mid-1950 amounted to a 60-day depot
level plus 30-day levels in station stocks. But supply resources were out of
balance both in quantity and quality. Some weapons such as medium tanks,
4.2-inch mortars, and recoilless rifles could hardly be found in the command.
Only a trickle of supplies was moving through the pipelines. Units deactivated
in the command had turned in large quantities of equipment, but most of this was
unserviceable. Eighth Army was authorized 226 recoilless rifles, but had only
21. Of 18,000 1/4-ton 4 X 4 vehicles in Eighth Army's stocks 10,000 were
unserviceable, and of 13,780 2 1/2-ton 6 X 6 trucks only 4,441 were in running
condition.
Total ammunition resources amounted to only 45 days' supply in the depots and
a basic load of training ammunition in hands of units. The level of perishable
food supplies was also 45 days in depot stocks and operating levels at various
stations. Petroleum products on hand included a level of 180 days packaged and
75 days bulk at depots, station levels of 15 days each of packaged and bulk, and
15 days with units. [50]
By mid-1950 American forces in the Far East had begun a gradual swing away
from their primary concern with occupation duties and had started to look more
closely to their combat skills. This shift came about more because of the
growing
[47] Administrative History of the Ordnance Section, GHQ, FEC, 1 January
1947-31 December 1949.
[48] Hist. Rpt, Ordnance Section, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan-31 Dec. 49.
[49] Mono, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions, HQ, EUSAK, ch. I, pp. 5,
7, copy in OCMH.
[50] MS, Maj. James A, Huston, Time and Space, ch. V, p. 41, and ch. 111, pp.
176, 186, copy in OCMH.
stability of occupied Japan than from any real fear that time was growing
short. That these forces were under-strength, inadequately armed, and sketchily
trained concerned mainly their commanders. These commanders, within the limits
of their resources, sought to overcome the inertia imposed by the years of
occupation and the prevailing, if uneasy, peace. But on the eve of the storm the
command was flabby and soft, still hampered by an infectious lassitude, unready
to respond swiftly and decisively to a full-scale military emergency.
