CHAPTER XVI
The Brink of Disaster
Reinforcement Prospects
When General MacArthur had warned General Collins on 6 December that unless
material reinforcements were sent within a reasonable time his forces in Korea
should be evacuated as soon as possible, Collins had replied that MacArthur
could expect no significant numbers of additional troops in the near future.
Collins had not spoken idly, as was borne out by Department of the Army officers
in Washington who were then examining the Army's currently available means of
strengthening MacArthur's command.
General Bolte had proposed on 3 December that the 82d Airborne Division, the
only combat-ready division in the United States, be sent to Japan immediately
where it would be available to protect the American base in Japan, or to fight
in Korea if needed. He felt that the division could move without its drop
equipment since the troops probably would be used in conventional ground
operations only. Bolte maintained that the division could reach Japan within
thirty-four days after being alerted. Since the division was approximately 2,000
men over-strength, a cadre of that size could be left in the United States to
activate another airborne division. The Army's G-4, Maj. Gen. William 0. Reeder,
admitted that, from the logistic standpoint, the division could be sent, but he
did not concur in sending it. General Ridgway recommended to the Acting Chief of
Staff, General Haislip, that any decision on sending the unit be postponed until
General Collins returned from Korea. On 8 December, after Collins' return, the
shipment was disapproved. [1]
[1] Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec. 50, sub: Movement of 82d Abn Div. to
FEC, with handwritten comments on original, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 59.
Aside from the 82d Airborne Division, the Army's means for reinforcing
MacArthur with combat-ready divisions were slight indeed. Two National Guard
divisions, the 28th and the 43d, could be readied for shipment to Korea by June
1951; two more, the 40th and 45th, could be sent by July 1951; by August, the
4th Infantry Division could join the others; and by September 1951 the 2d
Armored and 11th Airborne Divisions could be in Korea. But the current U.S.
ground force capabilities were so limited that the situation in Korea was likely
to run its course before significant deployments (other than the 82d Airborne
Division) could be made. Furthermore, "The greatly increased possibility that
global war will eventuate from the current crisis makes it mandatory that the
United States make no further deployments that are not in consonance with the
strategic concept of the current emergency war plan." [2]
Replacements
Furnishing individual replacements was an equally insoluble problem. When the
Chinese struck, each of MacArthur's divisions had lacked about 30 percent of its
men and officers. This weakness, acceptable during operations against an enemy
of inferior strength, became intolerable after the Chinese intervened. [3]
MacArthur made this very clear on 28 November when he appealed for more than
twice the number of replacements then scheduled for his command. He had been
notified that 33,000 replacements would arrive in December. He claimed that he
now needed 74,000 replacements to compensate for losses suffered in the Chinese
attack and to bring his units up to strength. This figure did not include losses
anticipated for January. [4]
The Department of the Army recognized MacArthur's need but could increase
neither the number nor the rate of replacement shipments. In fact, the promised
33,000 could not even be provided. The best estimate of shipments during
December was placed at 23,000. [6]
Chinese Nationalist Forces
In search of additional troops, MacArthur had reminded the Joint Chiefs of
Staff of Chiang Kai-shek's July offer to send 33,000 troops to serve under him
in Korea. This offer had been turned down on his own advice and on the advice of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But MacArthur felt that the Chinese intervention put
an entirely different light on the offer, and on 28 November applied to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for the services of Chiang's troops. He felt that the
original refusal had been prompted or at least influenced by the belief that the
use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea might give the Chinese Communists an excuse
for coming into the war. Another reason had been the need for the Chinese
Nationalists to conserve their strength to meet threatened attacks against
Formosa by the Chinese Communists. Neither reason remained valid, MacArthur
informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He maintained that the Chinese force on
Formosa was the only source of trained manpower available to him for early
commitment against his new enemy. He estimated that these troops could reach
Korea within two weeks and in far greater strength than the 33,000 originally
offered. "I strongly recommend," MacArthur urged the Joint Chiefs, "that the
theater commander be authorized to negotiate directly with the Chinese
Government authorities on Formosa for the movement north and
incorporation in the United Nations Command of such Chinese units as may be
available and desirable for reinforcing our position in Korea." [6]
[2] Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec. 50, sub: Further Reinforcements for
Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 125.
[3] Briefing, Gen. Gaither to Army Comdrs' Conference, 4 Dec. 50, in G-3, DA
file 337, Case 12/2.
[4] (1) Rad, CX 69983, CINCFE to DA, 28 Nov. 50. (2) Rad, WAR 97786, DA to
CINCFE, 1 Dec. 50.
[5] Rad, WAR 97786, DA to CINCFE, 1 Dec. 50.
Washington authorities did not share these views. They felt that the
introduction of Chinese Nationalist forces into the Korean conflict would
precipitate a full-scale war with Communist China and might trigger a global war
for which the United States was unprepared. Furthermore, the use of Chiang
Kai-shek's men would likely be unacceptable to some, if not all, of the United
Nations members with troops in Korea. The Commonwealth nations, for instance,
would very probably refuse to have their forces employed alongside Chinese
Nationalist troops. In case of a general war with China, moreover, it would be
better to use Nationalist forces on the mainland rather than in Korea. Also, in
view of an increasingly critical supply situation, complicated by recent
substantial losses in Korea, Washington was reluctant to equip Chinese
Nationalist troops for Korea. Politically, the move would commit the United
States to the Chinese Nationalist regime to an unacceptable extent. In any case,
Washington doubted that the employment of 33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops,
which represented the only firm offer made, would decisively influence the
situation in Korea. [7]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no immediate, definite answer to MacArthur,
merely replying that they were considering the proposal. But they warned that
the matter could have a worldwide impact which might disrupt the unity of the
nations associated with the United States in the United Nations and even isolate
the United States from its allies. [8]
On 18 December, General MacArthur made another attempt to procure major
reinforcements, although not for Korea, when he asked that the four National
Guard divisions called to active duty in September be sent to Japan at once. He
pointed out that a recent build-up of USSR propaganda interest in Japan and the
increasing tempo of international Communist pressure upon the remaining free
segments of Asia were alarming the Japanese. In order to provide reasonable
safeguards against any USSR thrust at Japan, he urged that these four divisions
be moved to Japan to complete their training. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told
MacArthur that it did not appear probable that the National Guard divisions
could be sent him, although General Collins, then away on a trip to Europe,
would have to give the final decision. Every effort would continue to bring
MacArthur's units to full strength and to keep them there. "Meanwhile," the
Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested, "you may wish to consider moving a portion of X
Corps to Japan without prejudice to future disposition." After General Collins'
return, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that since no decision had been made at
the governmental level as to the future United States course of action in Korea,
no additional divisions would be deployed to the Far East for the time being.
[9]
[6] Rad, C 50021, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov. 50.
[7] Draft Memo for JCS Representative, 1 Dec. 50, with Annex 1, in G-3, DA
file 091 Korea, Case 127/8.
[8] Rad, JCS 97594, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Nov. 50.
[9] (1) Rad, C 51599, CINCFE to DA, 18 Dec. 50. (2) Rad, CM-OUT 99274, JCS to
CINCFE, 19 Dec. 50. (3) Rad, JCS 99616, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Dec. 50. (4) Truman
says of this transaction, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and General Marshall held a
series of meetings with State Department officials, trying to find some way to
meet the problem. Reinforcements were simply not available.... The military
chiefs thought that we might consider ways to withdraw from Korea 'with honor'
in order to protect Japan. The State Department took the position, however, that
we could not retreat from Korea unless we were forced out," See Truman,
Memoirs, II, 432. The author has found no record of these meetings in
files available to him, nor does any indication of this type of thinking by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff appear elsewhere in their discussions.
Operation Pink
Not only had the Eighth Army and X Corps suffered numerous casualties in the
Chinese onslaught of late November and early December-they also had lost
considerable amounts of supplies and equipment through enemy action,
abandonment, and voluntary destruction. The widely separated units of X Corps,
particularly those in the Changjin Reservoir area, had left behind or destroyed
bedding, tentage, ordnance equipment, signal equipment, and engineer equipment
as they made their way back to Hamhung. General Almond's supply staff estimated
that the X Corps needed equipment for refitting one-half a division as a result
of the Chinese attacks against his forces in the Changjin Reservoir area.
General Walker's supply chief told the GHQ G-4 on 1 December that the Turkish
brigade had lost a large part of its equipment and that at least one RCT of the
2d Division would need considerable re-equipping.
From his depot stocks in Japan, General MacArthur ordered the immediate
shipment to Korea of major items of equipment for two RCT's. As one of the few
concrete steps which it could take to remedy the situation, the Department of
the Army started immediate action to furnish MacArthur's command with full
equipment for an infantry division. On 4 December, the Department's G-4, General
Larkin, ordered the immediate preparation, loading, and shipping on a priority
basis to the Far East Command a complete division set of equipment less
aircraft, general-purpose vehicles, ammunition, and certain other items either
not readily available for shipment or not essential to combat operations. This
shipping operation was code-named Operation PINK. Upon being informed of the
action being taken, MacArthur asked that equipment for two divisions, rather
than one, be sent. But the Department of the Army told him that, because of the
pending augmentation of the Army and the requirements of units ordered to his
command, further emergency shipments of equipment could not be made.
Operation PINK took place in an atmosphere of the greatest urgency. Four
ships loaded at San Francisco, California, and four at Seattle, Washington,
commencing on 5 December. On 9 December, these eight ships, partially
combat-loaded, sailed for the Far East. Much of the equipment they carried came
from Mutual Defense Assistance Pact (MDAP) stocks, from the Special Reserve, and
from troops located near San Francisco and Seattle. Among the items rushed to
MacArthur were 140 medium tanks. [10]
[10] (1) Telecon, TT 4088, DA and FEC, 2 Dec. 50. (2) Rad, WAR 97969, DA to
CINCFE, 4 Dec. 50. (3) DF, ACofS S4 to ChTechSves, 4 Dec. 50, sub: Emergency
Shipment of One Div. Set of TO & E Equipment to FEC, in FEC, G-4 file G-4/D5
WAR 98480, 9 Dec. 50. (4) Rad, WAR 98907, DA to CINCFE, 14 Dec. 50.
Possibility of Evacuation
During General Collins' absence from Washington in early December, other
leading officers of the Army staff, including Generals Haislip, Ridgway,
Gruenther, Bolte, and Reeder, studied the situation resulting from Chinese
intervention and its impact on the United States Army. These officers were
uncertain of the extent of the Korean crisis, but judging from the situation map
and MacArthur's gloomy reports, concluded that United Nations forces stood in
some danger of being overrun and destroyed.
General Bolte, mindful of MacArthur's warning, that unless large numbers of
ground troops were sent him at once he would be forced to withdraw his divisions
into beachheads, declared that MacArthur should be directed to pull out of
Korea. He pointed out that the additional forces needed by MacArthur simply did
not exist in the United States or in other member nations of the United Nations.
Hence, if MacArthur continued to fight in Korea, his command might be destroyed.
[11]
Bolte was convinced that the Chinese intervention had considerably enhanced
Russian capabilities in any global war, and that the United States must take
immediate countermeasures against this Russian advantage. Even in the most
optimistic circumstances MacArthur's forces in Korea, including seven U.S.
divisions, would be neutralized and useless in any effort to counter a USSR
attack on the United States or its allies. Consequently, Bolte recommended that
MacArthur's mission be modified at once to permit him to evacuate Korea as soon
as possible. [12]
The greatest concern and one shared by American military and political
leaders lay in the possibility that the Chinese intervention in Korea was only
the first step in a USSR move to conquer the world. Throughout December, these
authorities did what they could and considered what they could further do to
place the United States in the best possible position to meet the global war
that seemed so imminent. General Bolte set the stage for preparation at the
military level early in December when he urged that American unified commands be
alerted and authorized to put their current emergency war plans into effect in
case of attack. [13]
On 6 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the action recommended by
Bolte. They told their unified commanders worldwide that Chinese intervention
had greatly increased the possibility of general war. "Take such action," the
unified commanders were directed, "as feasible to increase readiness without
creating an atmosphere of alarm." [14]
[11] (1) MFR, 3 Dec. 50, sub: Korean Sit. (2) Memo, Gen. Bolte for CofS USA,
3 Dec. 50, sub: Course of Action To Be Taken as a Result of Developments in
Korea, both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 134.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Memo, Gen. Bolte for CofS USA, 3 Dec. 50, sub: Courses of Action To Be
Taken as a Result of Developments in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 134.
[14] Rad, JCS 98172, JCS to All Comdrs, 6 Dec. 50.
[15] MFR, 3 Dec. 50, sub: Korean Sit, G-3 091 Korea, Case 134.
At the Department of the Army level, Army officials in early December
considered the initiation of full mobilization without delay. [15] Full
mobilization was judged premature, but intermediate steps
were taken to increase the strength of the Army and greatly broaden the
mobilization and production bases. The National Security Council, acting on
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had approved on 22 November a
military program for fiscal 1951 providing an army of sixteen combat divisions
within a total Army strength of 1,263,000. By 30 June 1954, the Army would reach
a strength, through gradual expansion, of 1,353,000, with eighteen combat
divisions. [16]
Secretary of the Army Pace expressed the views of many Army officials when he
told the Army Policy Council on 6 December that as a result of the Chinese
intervention Americans were now living in a world essentially different from the
kind of a world they had been living in a week before. The Army's requirements
of 6 December were quite different from those of 30 November. He emphasized that
the Army's program of an orderly build-up was not good enough nor fast enough to
meet the emergency situation. General Ridgway, speaking for General Collins in
the latter's absence, told Pace that the Army staff had prepared a plan for
quick expansion to a 21-division army of 1,530,000 strength. Pace approved this
concept for planning purposes only. [17]
Still, the immediate threat posed by Chinese action and the larger threat of
possible global war gave some impetus to Army expansion. On 5 December, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended an accelerated rate of Army expansion with the
18-division force originally scheduled for June 1954 to be created by June 1952.
The National Security Council agreed to this action on 14 December. As a result
of this acceleration policy, the Department of the Army in December called two
more National Guard divisions, the 31st and 47th, to active Federal service,
beginning in January 1951. [18]
Various military authorities, including General Collins and General Ridgway,
had expressed the opinion that the President should proclaim a national
emergency. Such a proclamation would place in force the statutory provisions and
authorizations normally granted the President in time of war and facilitate the
expansion of the nation's armed forces and industrial facilities in support of
these forces. [19] On 15 December, in a radio address to the nation, President
Truman declared that a state of national emergency existed. On the following
day, he affixed his signature to a proclamation which said, in part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States
of America, do proclaim the existence of a national emergency,
which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses
of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end
that we may be able
to repel any and all threats against our national security....[20]
[16] JCS 2101/25, 22 Nov. 50.
[17] Min., 51st mtg. Army Policy Council, 6 Dec. 50, in CofS, DA file 334
(APC).
[18] (1) Memo, Gen. Ridgway for Gen. Haislip, 7 Dec. 50, sub: Briefing for
the Chief of Staff, in CofS, DA file 337, Case 14. (2) MFR, 11 Dec. 50, sub:
Conference, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45. (3) History of DA Activities
Relating to the Korean Conflict, 25 June 1950-8 September 1951, ACofS G-3, Army
War Plans Br, p. 4. (4) MFR, 11 Dec. 50, sub: Augmentation of the Army to
Eighteen Divs. in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45.
[19] (1) Min., 51st mtg. Army Policy Council, 6 Dec. 50, in CofS, DA file 334
(APC). (2) MFR, 11 Dec. 50, sub: Conference, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45. (3)
PL 450, 82d Congress, 2d session, H. J. Resolution 477 as amended by PL 12, 83d
Congress.
Washington officials asked MacArthur to sound out opinion within his command
on the President's proclamation. MacArthur replied that because of limitations
of time and the "far flung distribution" of his various subcommands no real
sampling of reactions to the speech could be obtained. But, as far as he could
judge, the reaction was favorable. "There can be little doubt, however,"
MacArthur concluded, "but that most would concur in my own personal opinion that
the crucial realities of the nation's present circumstances impel the immediate
and complete mobilization of our full military potential." [21]
X Corps Is Ordered Out of North Korea
The possibility that evacuation might be forced by enemy pressure was being
considered in Tokyo at this same time. On 6 December, General Wright gave
General MacArthur a detailed study of the problem of quitting Korea should it
become necessary. Wright pointed out that an evacuation through Inch'on would be
slow and dangerous. Pusan, on the other hand, offered every advantage for speedy
and efficient out-loading of men and equipment. At Pusan, twenty-eight ships
could be berthed around the clock while Inch'on could handle only LST's and
similar assault craft and then only for two 4-hour periods each day. Pusan had
pier-crane facilities for all types of heavy lift, while Inch'on had none, The
turnaround time from Japan to Pusan, moreover, was only one-fourth that from
Japan to Inch'on. By conservative estimate, General Wright believed that all
U.N. units and equipment could be taken out of Pusan five times as fast as from
Inch'on. Wright realized, too, that air operations against the Chinese would be
more effective as the enemy moved deeper into Korea. If the evacuation took
place from Pusan, it could be inferred that MacArthur's forces had delayed
successively and that rear airfields would be maintained and protected. Once
these forces reached the old Pusan Perimeter, Japanese airfields could be used
to continue effective support of the evacuation. [22]
Following this line of reasoning, General Wright then recommended that
Almond's corps be sea-lifted from the northeastern portion of Korea at the
earliest practicable date and relanded at Pusan or P'ohang-dong. Wright further
recommended that X Corps be absorbed by the Eighth Army. Thus strengthened, the
Eighth Army would make withdrawals in successive positions-if necessary, to the
Pusan Perimeter. [23]
[20] (1) Presidential Proclamation 2914, 16 Dec. 50. (2) MacArthur
Hearings, p. 3520.
[21] (1) Rad, DA 99090, DA to CINCFE, 17 Dec. 50. (2) Rad, C 51515, CINCFE to
DA for Haislip, 18 Dec. 50.
[22] (1) Memo, Gen. Wright for CofS, GHQ, UNC, 6 Dec. 50. (2) Comd Rpt, GHQ,
UNC, Dec. 50, Annex 4, Part III, "A" 741.
[23] Ibid.
General MacArthur was most reluctant to place Almond under Walker's command,
but yielded to what appeared to him to be the overriding wisdom of consolidating
his strength in Korea. On 7 December, he approved General Wright's
recommendations and notified
both Walker and Almond of his decision. [24] He told them:
Current planning provides for a withdrawal in successive positions,
if necessary, to the Pusan area. Eighth Army will hold the Seoul
area for the maximum time possible short of entailing such
envelopment as would prevent its withdrawal to the south. Planning
further envisions the early withdrawal of X Corps from the Hungnam
area and junction with Eighth Army as practicable. At such time, X
Corps will pass to command of the Eighth Army. [25]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur at once that they approved his
action and that they felt Almond's corps should be withdrawn from Hungnam as
early as practicable. [26]
At the 28 November meeting in Tokyo, Almond had told MacArthur that he could
hold at Hungnam forever if he were so ordered. Considered without reference to
the plight of the Eighth Army in the west, the presence of the X Corps on the
Chinese Rank could have proven of considerable military value. But military
considerations in northeast Korea had become secondary. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff shortly instructed MacArthur to ignore that region.
Upon returning from the Tokyo consultations, Almond had directed his forces
to retire upon Hungnam. The first order of business had been to extricate the
Army and Marine units cut off by the Chinese around the Changjin Reservoir.
Fighting as they withdrew and aided by concentrated close air support, these
Marine and Army troops reached Hungnam on 11 December. By the same date, most of
Almond's remaining forces had reached the same area.
MacArthur converted his 7 December withdrawal plans into orders on the 8th,
and on the 11th, flew into Yonp'o Airfield near Hungnam to hear in person
Almond's plan for taking the X Corps out of northeastern Korea. [27] Almond told
MacArthur that his corps could clear Hungnam by 25 December and close in Pusan
by 27 December. The total tonnage to be outloaded from Hungnam would reach
400,000 tons. To move this amount of tonnage by water, 75 cargo vessels, 15
troopships, and 40 LST's would be required. About 500 tons of men and equipment
would have to be airlifted each day from 14 to 18 December. Almond believed that
the withdrawal would be orderly, and that enemy forces in the area were too
limited to interfere with the movement. No supplies or organic equipment would
be destroyed or left behind. [28]
On 12 December, MacArthur notified the Department of the Army that the X
Corps had started withdrawing, with the ROK 3d Division already en route by
water to Pusan. The plan for the remainder of the evacuation provided for the
contraction of the corps defense perimeter around the Hamhung-Hungnam area as
the corps units departed in phases. [29]
[24] (1) Comments, Gen. Hickey on Appleman MS, 14 Feb. 56. (2) Rad, CX 50635,
CINCFE to All Comdrs, 7 Dec. 50.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Rad, JCS 94800, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Dec. 50.
[27] (1) Rad, CX 50801, CINCUNC to All Comdrs, 8 Dec. 50. (2) Comd Rpt, U.S.
X Corps, Dec. 50. (3) Rad, CX 50801, CINCUNC to CG X Corps, 9 Dec. 50.
[28] Memo, by Gen. Almond, 11 Dec. 50, sub: Movement of X Corps to the Pusan
Area, GHQ, UNC Comd Rpt, Dec. 50, Annex 4, Part III, "I" 1475.
[29] Rad, CX 51102, CINCFE to DA, 12 Dec. 50.
There were no manuals to rely on in
the planning and carrying out of the evacuation of such great numbers of
troops and such great quantities of equipment from an area under constant enemy
pressure. There was no time, either, for research or experimentation. Unlike
Dunkerque, the evacuation plan called for the removal of all equipment and
supplies. [30]
[30] X Corps Special Rpt, Hungnam Evacuation, December 1950.
Department of the Army officials were apprehensive lest Almond's force leave
behind supplies and equipment which would be of value to the enemy. On 19
December, in a teleconference with the Far East Command's representatives, they
asked what plans had been made for the evacuation or destruction of X Corps'
supplies and whether or not it appeared that these plans could be carried out
successfully. These officials were reassured by General MacArthur's staff, who
told them that the evacuation plan called for the transfer of X Corps' supplies
to the Eighth Army area. Such items as were excess or damaged but repairable
would be sent to Japan. Any
supplies which could not be loaded out in time would be destroyed. Most of
the stocks of food and ammunition would have been used up by troops covering the
evacuation. "The prospect of successfully implementing the evacuation,"
Department of the Army officials were reassured, "are excellent." [31]
[31] (1) Telecon, TT 4147, DA and GHQ, 19 Dec. 50. (2) Rad, C 51686, CINCFE
to DA, 20 Dec. 50.
Fortunately, and for reasons best known to themselves, the Chinese made no
concerted effort to overrun the beachhead, although light scattered thrusts
suggesting reconnaissance in preparation for larger operations were made by them
throughout the evacuation operation. As the corps perimeter contracted, naval
gunfire, artillery, and air support were intensified against the possibility of
enemy attempts to build up forces for major assaults. The 3d Division provided
the last defensive force for the perimeter, and, on 24 December, strongly
supported by naval gunfire and carrier-based marine and naval aircraft,
successfully executed the final withdrawal from the Hungnam beachhead. Extensive
demolitions of bridges and installations of military value were carried out at
the last minute. According to X Corps officers, no serviceable equipment or
supplies were abandoned, and all personnel were evacuated. [32] All together,
193 shiploads of men and materiel were moved out of Hungnam Harbor aboard Navy
transports. Approximately 105,000 fighting men, 98,000 Korean civilians, 17,500
vehicles, and 350,000 tons of bulk cargo were removed from the beachhead. [33]
As Almond's troops evacuated their holdings in northeast Korea, the Eighth
Army continued to withdraw to the south. Chinese pressure did not force these
displacements. They were part of Walker's general withdrawal plan to form a
continuous defensive line across Korea at the most advantageous position. The
Eighth Army still had no contact with the Chinese, but intelligence reports
showed that the enemy was moving into P'yongyang. By mid-December, the Eighth
Army occupied a vague line extending along the south bank of the Imjin River,
through Yongp'yong, Hwach'on, and Inje, to Yangyang on the east coast. [34]
The Chinese did not follow up Walker's withdrawal as closely as had been
expected. In mid-December, ROK units in east central Korea had been attacked by
North Korean troops. These North Korean forces appeared to be engaged in a
screening and reconnaissance mission for the Chinese. Since the North Koreans
were operating on their home grounds it was natural they should be used for this
purpose. Throughout the next several days, more and more North Koreans appeared
in front of the Eighth Army, apparently probing the line on behalf of the
Chinese. American authorities were frankly puzzled by the actions of the
Chinese. General Willoughby had several theories which he passed along to
Washington. "Due to the depth of the withdrawal executed by Eighth Army," he
said, "it is evident that the enemy, lacking any great degree of mobility has
been unable to regain contact." He surmised that the Chinese had expected Walker
to make a strong stand north of P'yongyang and that when he failed to do so the
Chinese had been thrown off-balance. "There is little doubt but that he is now
regrouping his forces under the screen of North Korean units," the UNC
intelligence chief asserted, "preparatory to renewing the offensive at a time of
his own choosing." It had been reliably reported that the Chinese had entered
P'yongyang soon after it was deserted by the Eighth Army, but the whereabouts of
the main body of Chinese forces in late December remained a mystery. [35]
[32] X Corps Special Rpt, Dec. 50, sub: Hungnam Evacuation, 9-24 Dec. 50.
[33] Comd Rpt, GHQ, UNC, Dec. 50.
[34] Comd Rpt, HQ, EUSAK, Dec. 50, p. 62, plate 6, line B.
[35] (1) Telecon, TT 4135, DA and GHQ, 14 Dec. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 4142, DA
and GHQ, 18 Dec. 50.
On 19 December, Willoughby again expressed his puzzlement, telling
Washington, "The whereabouts of the Chinese Communist forces and the reasons why
these units have remained so long out of contact continue in the speculative
realm." He felt that an offensive was not immediately forthcoming since the lack
of contact with the Chinese and the
relatively light pressure being exerted by North Korean forces against the
Eighth Army did not point in that direction. In order to find out just what was
going on, General MacArthur directed Walker to conduct aggressive ground
reconnaissance to a considerable depth through the North Korean screen with
particular attention to finding probable routes of enemy advance, locations,
strengths, and to capture Chinese prisoners for interrogation. [36]
General Walker was killed in a vehicle accident near Uijongbu, Korea, on the
morning of 23 December 1950. General Milburn, the I Corps commander, became
acting commanding general of the Eighth Army. The possibility that Walker might
be killed had been discussed earlier by General MacArthur and General Collins
during the latter's visits to the Far East. General MacArthur had told Collins
that if Walker were lost he wanted General Ridgway, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Administration, Department of the Army, and one of General
Collins' key assistants in Washington, as Eighth Army commander. MacArthur was
familiar with Ridgway's fine combat record in World War II and realized that
Ridgway, in his position at the Department of the Army, was in extremely close
touch with the Korean situation and capable of stepping in at once. Upon
Walker's death, an
immediate call was made from Tokyo to General Collins, who obtained clearance
from Secretary Marshall and President Truman on the designation of Ridgway as
the new Eighth Army commander. [37] General Ridgway left Washington almost
immediately and reached Tokyo at midnight on Christmas Day.
[36] (1) Telecon, TT 4147, DA and GHQ, 19 Dec. 50. (2) Telecon, TT 4156, DA
and GHQ, 21 Dec. 50.
No American outside the Far East knew more about the Korean situation than
General Ridgway. In his position as deputy chief of staff for administration all
reports, studies, and recommendations on Korea at the national level had passed
through his hands. It was he who had taken much of the action to speed the
shipments of units and replacements to MacArthur in July and August. He had gone
with the President's special representative, Mr. Harriman, to Tokyo in August
during the touch-and-go battles around Pusan. He had conferred with MacArthur
and seen the Eighth Army's plight at first hand.
Ridgway's whole career had prepared him to command the Eighth Army. As a
young officer he had served in China and in the Philippines. During World War II
he had commanded an airborne division, later, a corps. He had led his troops
brilliantly through Sicily and Normandy, through the Battle of the Bulge, and to
the Baltic at the war's end. After the war, in a variety of staff and command
assignments, Ridgway had gained valuable knowledge of Communist methods,
purposes, and strategies. He was convinced they had to be stopped in Korea.
Ridgway took command of forces in Korea that had suffered a month of
reversals. No major decisions as to future courses of action had yet been
reached although numerous exploratory steps had been taken. As in November, once
the enemy relaxed pressure, the nation's planners seemed to slacken their
efforts to find a solution. The problems facing the United States and the United
Nations Command were more political than military. Such decisions as whether or
not to take action against the Chinese aggressors outside Korea had been raised
but not answered. The problem of whether or not to evacuate had also been
raised, but had been put aside as a result of lessening enemy pressure. The same
fact had befallen the closely related cease-fire problem. The question of
whether or not to reinforce the Far East Command was half answered by the
nation's inability to do so, and the rest of the answer was obscured by the fog
of indecision surrounding the core of the problem, "What is the best course of
action now."
[37] MacArthur Hearings, pp. 588, 1201-02.
Ridgway Takes Over
Christmas found the Eighth Army halted uneasily near the 38th Parallel,
awaiting its new commander and the new enemy. Signs were increasing that the
Chinese were closing the gap and were advancing down the peninsula in a
coordinated effort to feel out the Eighth Army's defenses before launching
another major attack. A tense calm hung over the battle area. In a telephone
report from Korea on 26 December, General Allen, Chief of Staff, Eighth Army,
told GHQ officers, "We got another army. Pick up another one about every day.
They are just building up. Don't know when they will hit. That is all we have. Otherwise dead
quiet." [38]
MacArthur told Ridgway that the best he could hope for was a tactical
success, possibly holding and defending South Korea. He remarked, "We are now
operating in a mission vacuum while diplomacy attempts to feel its way...." Any
substantial military success by Ridgway's Eighth Army would greatly strengthen
the hands of the diplomats. Tactical air power had proven disappointing to
MacArthur, who now charged that it could not isolate the battlefield or stop the
flow of enemy reinforcements into the battle. MacArthur reiterated that the
Chinese were dangerous opponents and that the entire Chinese military
establishment was coming into Korea to win. Touching on his recommendations to
Washington, MacArthur remarked that the Chinese mainland was wide open in the
south for attack by forces on Formosa. He had recommended that such an attack be
made since it would relieve the pressure in Korea. [39]
Ridgway found MacArthur discouraged by the swing of events in Korea and ready
to turn over to him a great deal of authority and latitude in directing combat
operations. MacArthur indicated to Ridgway that he was to be both empowered and
expected to plan and carry out all military operations of the United Nations
forces in Korea. He told Ridgway that he was to act as he thought best. "You
will make mistakes in Korea," MacArthur said, "we all do. But I will take full
responsibility." He also told Ridgway that the X Corps would pass to his control
as soon as it arrived in South Korea. [40]
When Ridgway questioned MacArthur more specifically as to his authority in
directing operations in Korea, including a possible attack, MacArthur simply
said, "Matt, the Eighth Army is yours." "No field commander could have asked for
more," Ridgway says of this full grant of authority. [41]
General Ridgway thus went into Korea carrying a carte blanche to employ the
Eighth Army as he found best and without reference to Tokyo for instructions.
Ridgway could attack, defend, or withdraw; the decision was left to him. But
while he was not required and never did ask confirmation of his actions, he did
notify MacArthur in detail of his intentions. But MacArthur never questioned
him. Whereas Walker had been kept under close supervision and control, Ridgway
was not. [42]
[38] General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies, June
1950-June 1951, pp. 350-53, MS, copy in OCMH.
[39] (1) Ibid. (2) See also Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (New
York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), pp. 82-83.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] General Ridgway recalls that between the time he assumed command and
March 1951, after the Eighth Army had begun its northward march, General
MacArthur stayed aloof from tactical decisions and visited Korea only twice.
Thereafter he visited Korea and Ridgway weekly. Ridgway also expressed the
belief that, had he thought it necessary, he could have led the Eighth Army out
of Korea without recrimination from his superiors. General Hickey, who was
acting chief of staff under MacArthur and, later, chief of staff under Ridgway,
was of the opinion that Ridgway was under no restrictions on withdrawing, and
that it was Ridgway's decisions and actions that eventually tipped the balance
and kept the Eighth Army fighting in Korea. See Intervs, Appleman with Ridgway,
Oct. 51, and Appleman with Hickey, 10 Oct. 51.
Fear that the Eighth Army might evacuate Korea obsessed the South Koreans.
Admittedly, the specter had substance. The final decision awaited the outcome on
the battlefield but the prospects were not bright at the moment. One of
Ridgway's first acts on reaching Korea was to call on President Rhee in Seoul
and to assure him, "I am glad to be here and I aim to stay." To the men of his
new command, Ridgway announced bluntly, "You will have my utmost. I shall expect
yours." [43]
During his conference with General MacArthur, Ridgway had asked for and
received permission to attack in order to regain lost ground, and when he went
to Korea he fully intended to attack as soon as possible. But he found not only
his major commanders but also his Eighth Army staff extremely skeptical of such
an attack. They were not, in Ridgway's words, "offensive minded." Under the
circumstances and in view of these attitudes, Ridgway decided against an attack
in the immediate future, at least during the remainder of December. But he
ordered plans made at once for offensive operations and he set about instilling
an "attack" spirit into his staff. "I skinned Eighth Army staff officers
individually and collectively many times to have them do what I wanted," Ridgway
later recalled. "I told them heads would roll if my orders were not carried
out"; and he warned his staff, "I am going to attack to find out where the enemy
is since G-2 cannot give me clear evidence." [44]
With characteristic directness, Ridgway began forcing the army to turn its
eyes to the front. Step by step, in deliberate and carefully conceived actions
and orders, he bore down on his new command. By example and by exhortation, he
began shaking his staff, commanders, and men out of the defeatist mood. Where
toughness was required, he was tough; where persuasion was indicated, he
persuaded; and where personal example was needed, he set the example.
[43] Ridgway's activities and reactions during the first several weeks after
his assumption of command are well covered in his manuscript, The Korean War,
Issues and Policies, June 1950-June 1951; in his books, Soldier and
The Korean War, in various interviews and conversations with the author;
and in interviews with Dr. John Miller, jr., Major Owen Carroll, and Mr. B. C.
Mossman, 30 November 1956, copies in OCMH.
[44] Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct. 51.
A Decision Hangs Fire
The enemy, meanwhile, had completed his concentrations and other preparations
for attacking the Eighth Army, and on the night of 31 December introduced the
New Year with a general offensive south of the 38th parallel. (Map VI)
The Chinese attacked on a 44-mile front stretching east from Kaesong on
Ridgway's left flank to a point northwest of Ch'unch'on on the east central
front. The main effort came down the Yongch'on-Uijongbu-Seoul axis, obviously
aimed at the seizure of Seoul and Inch'on. General Ridgway, in reporting the
attack to General MacArthur, predicted that the Chinese invasion of South Korea
was a prelude to an attempt by the Chinese to drive his command from the Korean
peninsula by sheer manpower. "The Army Eight," Ridgway told MacArthur, "will
continue
its present mission, inflicting the maximum punishment and delaying in
successive positions while maintaining its major forces intact " [45]
The great strength of the Chinese assault in the west and the imminent danger
of a breakthrough and envelopment down the east central corridors, defended
largely by ROK units, forced General Ridgway reluctantly to direct certain
withdrawals in early January. On 1 January, Ridgway ordered his western
divisions to fall back from the Imjin River to a line slightly north of the Han
River that formed a deep bridgehead around Seoul But when the enemy swiftly
followed up this withdrawal, Ridgway on 3 January decided to move south of the
Han and to abandon Seoul. He was determined that this rearward move would be
fought as a delaying action and so instructed his corps commanders. On 4
January, the Eighth Army started back to a line extending from P'yongt'aek on
the west coast eastward to the coastal village of Samch'ok. [46]
Reports reached General Ridgway that
in withdrawing from the Han River some of his major units failed to damage
the enemy materially or even delay him appreciably. Some units actually had
broken contact with the enemy to fall back. Ridgway addressed his corps
commanders sternly on this matter, emphasizing that he expected them to exploit
fully every opportunity to damage the enemy. [47]
[45] Msg., C 52524, CINCFE to DA (quoting Ridgway), 2 Jan. 51.
[46] Comd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan. 51, Narrative, p. 56.
Page 310
The Joint Chiefs of Staff Consider Options
Even before this January demonstration of Chinese power, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff had concluded that the Chinese Communists had enough strength to drive
MacArthur out of Korea. But they wanted MacArthur to stay if he could. A quick,
massive build-up of the forces in Korea, much greater than that for Operation
CHROMITE five months earlier, might keep the Eighth Army from being shoved into
the Sea of Japan; but a major build-up, especially a quick one, was out of the
question in view of shortages of combat divisions in the United States and the
worsening world situation. On 30 December, the Joint Chiefs of Staff scotched
any vestigial hopes which MacArthur might have held for additional ground forces
by telling him that they would not send any more American divisions to fight in
Korea at that time. [48]
Chinese successes in Korea had, concomitantly, increased the threat of a
general war, encouraging further Communist military moves against other
sensitive areas and heightening the tensions between the Soviet bloc and those
nations allied with the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed this
out to MacArthur and told him bluntly, "We believe that Korea is not the place
to fight a major war." If more American divisions were sent to Korea, American
commitments throughout the world, including protection of Japan, would be
seriously jeopardized. [49]
This news came as no surprise to MacArthur. Collins had told him
substantially the same thing three weeks earlier when he had pressed for an
increase in the strength of other United Nations contingents to a total of
75,000 men. The Joint Chiefs now told him that this could not be done either.
"It is not practicable to obtain significant additional forces for Korea from
other members of the United Nations," they said. [50]
In the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the best way for MacArthur to keep
from being pushed off Korea was to fight and to fight hard. If the Eighth Army
fought and killed enough enemy troops, Chinese and North Korean commanders might
give up any attempt to drive the United Nations out of Korea as too costly. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff expected no miracles. But if the Eighth Army could,
without losing too many men and too much equipment, stop and hold the Chinese,
not necessarily north of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur would have done his nation
a great service. For the prestige, both military and political, which the Chinese
Communists had lately acquired by defeating the
United Nations Command in North Korea, was exceedingly detrimental to the
national interests of the United States; and MacArthur could deflate that
prestige by staging a military comeback.
[47] Ibid., p. 12.
[48] Rad, JCS 99935, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 30 Dec. 50.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.
The events of the past month had shown clearly that General MacArthur's
military mission assigned on 27 September stood in need of revision. The Joint
Chiefs revised it in these words: "You are now directed to defend in successive
positions...." These positions were those which MacArthur had already described
to his major commanders on 7 December. In addition to defending these positions,
MacArthur was to damage the enemy as much as possible, "subject to the primary
consideration of the safety of your troops." [51]
But the Washington authorities fully realized that mere words and military
directives would not halt the Chinese and that enemy pressure might, in spite of
MacArthur's best efforts, force him to evacuate Korea. They saw, too, that it
was advisable to determine, in advance if possible, the last reasonable
opportunity for MacArthur's command to evacuate in an orderly fashion. This was
especially important since the enemy threatened not only Korea, but, in league
with the Soviet Union, posed, by no great stretch of the imagination, a real
threat to Japan. With Japan gone, MacArthur's command could only fall back on
Okinawa, Formosa, or the Philippines.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff told General MacArthur:
It seems to us that if you are forced back to positions in the
vicinity of the Kum River and a line generally eastward therefrom,
and if thereafter the Chinese Communists mass large forces against
your positions with an evident capability of forcing us out of
Korea, it then would be necessary, under those conditions, to
direct you to commence a withdrawal to Japan. [52]
When the Joint Chiefs sought MacArthur's ideas on the timing of such a
withdrawal, MacArthur assured them that there was no need to make a decision for
evacuation until his forces were actually forced back to what he called the
"beachhead line." Since the term beachhead line could be interpreted several
ways, the Joint Chiefs asked MacArthur to be more specific. General Collins had
brought back from the Far East a marked map showing nine possible defensive
positions to be occupied by the Eighth Army in its withdrawal down the
peninsula. One line marked positions held by the Eighth Army along the Naktong
River in early September, and the Joint Chiefs asked MacArthur if this line was
the beachhead line he had in mind. He stated that it was, but pointed out that
exactly where the line would run should be regarded as completely flexible. "In
an actual evacuation under pressure there would be progressive further
contractions to a final inner arc," he told them. "The operation would probably
be generally similar to that at Hungnam." General Collins still did not
understand which line MacArthur meant. He reminded MacArthur that three lines on
his marked map could be interpreted as a beachhead line, and asserted that when
the Eighth Army had been forced back to the northernmost of the three, the
time for final decision would have arrived. [53]
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
Page 312
Evacuation Plans
The rumor of a United Nations withdrawal from Korea spread quickly among men
and officers of the ROK Army. General Ridgway pointed out to General MacArthur
on 8 January that the apprehension among ROK soldiers as to their future was
dangerous and could seriously affect his command. Ridgway suggested that
MacArthur make a public statement which would serve to banish the fears of the
ROK fighting forces. MacArthur passed this suggestion to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff with the comment that "A reassuring statement by me such as General
Ridgway suggests is impossible unless and until the basis for such a statement
is established by policy determination at governmental level." [54]
MacArthur had already directed his staff to continue planning the evacuation
procedures. Since an actual evacuation would be largely a Navy task, General
Wright, the G-3, turned to the Navy for advice. Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke,
Deputy Chief of Staff, COMNAVFE, on 7 January addressed Wright on the problems
and factors to be considered. If the evacuation took place from Pusan, there was
a strong likelihood it would be done under enemy pressure. There would be little
similarity between a Pusan evacuation and the removal of forces from the Hungnam
beachhead. Both in scale and difficulty, the Pusan operation would surpass that
at Hungnam. Consequently, the length of time required to move troops and
supplies would be much greater, and Burke therefore urged the early completion
of advance plans. He advised Wright to designate at once the division which
would hold the final perimeter at Pusan. Burke recommended the 1st Marine
Division since it had special training in naval procedures, including the
requirements for naval gunfire support, and had proven its combat effectiveness
on more than one occasion. For employment on the intermediate perimeter, which
would probably be manned by two divisions, Burke felt that any of the Army
divisions would do. [55]
No divisions were ever designated for these duties, since by the middle of
January the military situation gave General Wright some reason to believe that a
forced withdrawal might not materialize. By 16 January, in fact, Wright was
willing to speculate that, unless political considerations required or indicated
withdrawal as the best course of action, it would be possible for the United
Nations Command to remain in Korea as long as higher authority dictated. He
hesitated to establish an evacuation target date even for planning purposes
since, in his mind, the proper date would be dictated by enemy action and
"political considerations." He did estimate
the time required for a complete withdrawal. On the basis of tonnage to be
removed from the peninsula, estimated at 2,000,000 metric tons, the best
possible out-loading time, using all possible ports of exit within the
contracted defense perimeter, would be fifty days. [56]
[53] (1) Ibid. (2) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS, 30 Dec.
50. (3) Rad, DA 80149, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 3 Jan. 51. (4) Rad, C
52586, CINCUNC to DA, 3 Jan. 51. (5) Rad, DA 80253, Collins (Personal) for
MacArthur, 4 Jan. 51. (6) Rad, C 52712, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins 4 Jan.
51. (7) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jan. 51.
[54] Msg., C 52964, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Jan. 51.
[55] Memo, COMNAVFE for Gen. Wright, 7 Jan. 51 sub: Plans for Possible
Re-Employment From Pusan Area, GHQ, UNC, G-3 files.
As a further step in evacuation planning, General Collins, while on another
visit to the theater, informed General MacArthur on 15 January that if a UNC
evacuation became necessary, President Truman wanted all members of the ROK
Government, ROK Army, and ROK police forces taken out. General MacArthur
expressed satisfaction with this directive, stating that he thought it
essential. Plans for the evacuation were immediately begun, and when Collins
returned from Korea on 19 January the situation was laid before him. General
Hickey pointed out that more than a million Koreans would have to be evacuated
under the President's order. This figure included 36,000 ROK governmental
officials and their dependents, 600,000 ROK police, and 260,000 ROK soldiers.
These latter two groups had about 400,000 dependents. As to the place to which
these people would be removed, Collins and MacArthur agreed that as many ROK
soldiers as possible would be placed on the off-shore island of Cheju-do in
order to maintain, after evacuation, a legal status for continuing to fight in
Korea.
A possible complication in planning and achieving any evacuation of ROK
personnel as directed by President Truman rested in a recent ROK petition to the
United States for aid in strengthening ROK forces. In December, the ROK Minister
of Foreign Affairs had asked Secretary of Defense Marshall to "release to us all
the light arms which are available, in order that our young men may hurl
themselves in the face of the advancing enemy." At the same time, the Korean
Ambassador, Dr. John M. Chang, had urged the Department of State to arm the
so-called Korean Youth Corps, which Chang claimed consisted of 500,000 young
men, all eager to fight the Chinese. The Department of State recommended to the
Department of Defense that this be done, but only after these Korean youths had
been formed into organized units under the control and discipline of the
military authorities in Korea. [57] General Marshall directed the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to look into these requests and to obtain General MacArthur's views on
their propriety.
In General MacArthur's mind, the whole problem of giving more arms to the ROK
Government centered not on whether these units could be created and armed but on
whether any advantage was to be gained by so doing. MacArthur emphasized that
large numbers of small arms had already been given ROK police units,
anti-guerrilla security forces, and special ROK organizations for use in
enemy-held territory. But friendly guerrilla forces lacked strong-willed
leadership and were accomplishing little in enemy rear areas. Enemy guerrilla
units, on the other hand, continued to operate effectively throughout South
Korea. [58]
[56] Memo, Gen. Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC (Gen. Hickey), 16 Jan. 51, sub:
Disposition of U.N. Forces in Korea in Event of Withdrawal From Korea, G-3, GHQ,
UNC files.
[57] (1) Ltr., B. C. Limb, ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Gen. George C.
Marshall, Secy. Defense, 12 Dec. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 149. (2)
Ltr., H. Freeman Mathews, Depy. Under Secy. State, to Maj. Gen. James H. Burns,
OSD, 12 Dec. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 137.
General MacArthur believed that checking the enemy would depend upon setting
up a defense with U.S. divisions deployed in depth and in mutually supporting
positions. This observation strongly indicates that MacArthur felt, in early
January, that his forces would have to withdraw back to the Pusan Perimeter or
even farther. He expressed the opinion that, because of the probably restricted
area of the battlefield in which the United Nations forces might be fighting in
the near future, and the greater value per rifle that might be gained by arming
the Japanese National Police Reserve, training and arming of additional ROK
forces appeared questionable. He recommended that the extra South Korean
manpower be used to replace losses in existing ROK units, concluding:
The long range requirement for or desirability of arming additional
ROK personnel appears to be dependent primarily upon determination
of the future United States military position with respect to both
the Korean campaign and the generally critical situation in the Far
East. [59]
MacArthur had once again taken the opportunity to point out to the Washington
officials that he did not feel their policy was sufficiently clear. Further, if
evacuation became necessary he did not want a bigger ROK Army to evacuate.
The big question in MacArthur's mind, now as before, was whether there was to
be a change in national policy that would make evacuation unnecessary. If there
was such a change, and the steps which MacArthur had proposed were taken,
evacuation would not be necessary. But if the nation's leaders appeared
unwilling to make this policy change, MacArthur felt that eventual evacuation
was inevitable and that there was no reason why the Joint Chiefs of Staff should
not issue their evacuation directive to him right away. If some slight chance
existed that national policy might be changed, even if not immediately, General
MacArthur felt that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could delay issuing the evacuation
directive until the Eighth Army had been forced back to the ninth and final
marked position he had drawn around Pusan in the hope that an extension of
military activity against the Chinese might be allowed and evacuation staved
off. [60]
[58] Rad, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan. 51.
[59] Msg., C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan. 51.
[60] (1) Rad, JCS 99935, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, 29 Dec. 50. (2) Rad, C
52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS, 30 Dec. 50. (3) Rad, DA 80149, Collins
(Personal) for MacArthur, 3 Jan. 51. (4) Rad, C 52586, CINCUNC to DA, 3 Jan. 51.
(5) Rad, DA 80253, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 4 Jan. 51. (6) Rad, C
52712, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins, 4 Jan. 51. (7) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS
(Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jan. 51.