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Bolstering the Forces

Shaping the Unified Command

Even before the U.N. Security Council passed its resolution on 7 July, some nations had offered military assistance to the United States for use in Korea. The first offer came from the United Kingdom on 28 June 1950, when the British Government announced that it was placing elements of the Fleet at the disposal of U. S. authorities for support of South Korea. The United States accepted the British naval force without hesitation and asked that it report to Vice Admiral Joy, Commander, Naval Forces Far East. [1]

Almost at the same time, but through diplomatic channels, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand offered naval forces and combat aircraft. The Secretary of State passed these offers to the Secretary of Defense, who called on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their recommendations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly agreed that these forces should be accepted and the Secretary of State took the necessary steps. [2]

These preliminary offers were encouraging proof of allied support, and on 29 June President Truman told the National Security Council that he wanted to see as many members of the United Nations as possible take part in the Korea action. The Secretary of Defense showed greater reserve, feeling that military necessity might weigh more heavily than political considerations in the decisions to accept or turn down forces offered by member nations. Although Secretary Johnson told the Joint Chiefs that they should lean toward accepting forces offered, he qualified this statement by adding, "to the maximum extent practicable from the military point of view." [3]

[1] (1) Department of State, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis Dept. of State Publication No. 3922 (Washington, 1950), pp. 56-57. (2) Memo, JCS for Chairman, British Joint Services Mission, 30 Jun. 50.

[2] (1) MFR, Gen. J. H. Burns, OSD, 29 Jun. 50, sub: Telephone Msg. From Mr. Satterthwait of State Dept. to Gen. Burns. (2) Memo, Secy. Defense for JCS, 29 Jun. 50. (3) Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, 30 Jun. 50, sub: Proffer of Aid by Foreign Govts.

[3] (1) Truman, Memoirs, II, 342. (2) Memo, Secy. Defense for JCS, 29 Jun. 50.

Since at this early date only vague outlines of the unified command had appeared, forces were being offered to and accepted by the United States, not the United Nations. Meanwhile, the machinery for processing offers of assistance, in the very likely event a unified command was established, came under study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were convinced that military effectiveness, not political necessity, should be the main consideration in accepting forces for Korea, and thus sought a controlling voice in passing on military contributions to the unified command. They told the Secretary of State, through the Secretary of Defense, on 30 June, that if, as appeared probable, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek offered troops from Formosa for service in Korea, he should be turned down. To make sure that such an offer was not accepted by the field commander unilaterally, they cautioned General MacArthur to refer any Chinese Nationalist offer to the Department of State, saying, ". . . the decision whether to accept or reject the proffer of military aid by foreign governments should properly be made at the highest levels in Washington." This veiled warning reflected the resolve shared by the Joint Chiefs that the field commander should not deal directly with other nations in any way. [4]

The Nationalist Chinese Government, through its Washington ambassador, had, in fact, already offered to furnish to the U.N. unified command 33,000 soldiers. President Truman was, at first, inclined to accept this offer, but was dissuaded in a meeting with his Defense and State advisers. Secretary Acheson warned of the danger of bringing Communist China into the war if Nationalist Chinese troops entered Korea. On the military side, the JCS deplored the low state of training and lack of equipment of Chiang Kai-shek's men, and pointed out that moving them from Formosa would tie up ships and planes which could be better used elsewhere. He remained concerned over the ability of the small available United States forces to stand off the enemy. After further discussion, however, the President accepted the position of the majority that the Chinese offer should be politely declined. [5]

Secretary Johnson, on 1 July, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff how he should approach the general problem of military assistance from other nations for the Korean fighting. He wanted to know if the United States should actively solicit other nations for troops and, if so, what kind of troops should be sought. The passing of the United Nations Security Council resolution of 7 July made definite standards for accepting or turning down forces mandatory. Johnson received no answer until 14 July, when the Joint Chiefs told him that a number of unknown factors, including combat efficiency and logistics, made a blanket answer impractical. Because of these very factors they urged that, in every case in which a nation volunteered forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff be consulted. [6]

[4] (1) Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, 30 Jun. 50, sub: Proffer of Aid by Foreign Govts. (2) Rad, JCS 84737, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun. 50.

[5] Truman, Memoirs, II, 342-43 and 348.

[6] (1) Memo, Secy. Defense for JCS, 1 Jul. 50. (2) Memo, JCS for Secy. Defense, 14 Jul. 50, sub: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea.

They saw that some nations which might offer military forces to the unified command might not have the resources to provide effective fighting forces. To accept forces so poorly trained, equipped, and prepared as to be a military liability in Korea would be unwise. Indiscriminate acceptance of troops, without regard to actual combat needs in Korea, could create an unbalanced military team. The Secretary of Defense assured the Joint Chief of Staff that he would seek their comments on any force offered for Korea. [7]

As they moved to set up military control over the procedure for accepting forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioned MacArthur in mid-July on his standards for foreign units to be integrated into the United Nations Command. By this time, when it appeared that the U.S. reserve of trained ground forces would be strained to its limit, the Joint Chiefs felt that some other nations should be asked to send ground forces to Korea. He recommended, in an immediate reply, that foreign units should be sent at no less than reinforced battalion strength of about 1,000 men, mainly infantry, but having organic artillery support. He would attach these battalions to his American divisions. If service units were furnished, they should be large enough to be usable at once. [8]

The normal channel through which member nations of the United Nations offered military forces and other forms of assistance to the unified command ran from the Department of State to the Department of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A nation offering assistance usually approached the Department of State with its proposal, but made no final offer until after preliminary informal talks. During exploratory conversations the Department of State consulted the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, sought the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The latter officials weighed the offer against needs in the field and the probable effectiveness of the forces offered, keeping in mind General MacArthur's criteria. Their recommendations bore great weight. If they were favorable, the nation then made a firm offer which was accepted. Offers of ground combat forces came slowly at first, but gradually increased. By 23 August, the United States had accepted forces offered by seven nations, totaling almost 25,000 ground combat troops. Troops of four more nations had been accepted by 5 September. [9] But most of these troops were a long way from Korea and many would not arrive for months.

[7] (1) JCS 1776/23, Rpt by JSSC, 8 Jul. 50, title: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3, DA files. (2) Memo, Adm. Davis, Dir., Joint Staff, for Secy. Defense, 14 Jul. 50, sub: JCS Views on Proposed State Dept. Request for Assistance in Korea From Certain U.N. Nations, (3) Memo, Secy. Defense for JCS, 21 Jul. 50. (4) JCS History, The Korean Conflict, ch. III, p. 14.

[8] (1) Rad, JCS 85971, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, C 57957, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Jul. 50.

[9] (1) Memo, Col. Williams, International Br, G-3, DA, for Gen. Schuyler, sub: Status of U.N. Aid as of 23 August, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 77. (2) Rad, number unknown, DA to CINCFE, 5 Sep. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 59/16. (3) For a detailed, comprehensive account of forces contributed to the U.S. command for the Korean fighting, their operations, and problems arising from their employment, see the following monographs: Maj. William J Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation During Combat Operations, Military Hist Sec, FEC, 15 Aug. 52; and Maj. Sam Gaziano, Problems in Utilization of United Nations Forces, Military Hist Sec, UNC, 10 Dec. 53. Both in OCMH.

Rebuilding the U.S. Army

Rushing thousands of men and officers to the Far East left great gaps in the defenses of the continental United States and completely vitiated, for the moment, American plans for emergency operations in western Europe and other areas vital to the free world. Yet nothing substantive had been done to repair the damage. Nor did the Army's top planners have any basis for planning to reconstitute the reserve forces.

At a meeting on 12 July 1950 with Secretary of the Army Pace, ranking officers of the Army General Staff complained that they were working in the dark. Lt. Gen. Edward H. Brooks, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, told the Secretary that he had already scraped the bottom of the barrel to find men for MacArthur. He had stripped the United States of trained specialists. But until someone told him just how much the Army was going to expand in the face of the obvious threat to American security, he had no way of knowing how many new specialists he should train. General Bolte, the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, backed Brooks, charging that, without a clear goal, he too was being forced to operate on a "piecemeal basis." The Army's supply chief, Lt. Gen. Thomas B. Larkin, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, told the same story. "Hand-to-mouth" described his supply program, he said, until he knew how many troops were going to Korea and how many would be mobilized to replace them. [10]

Siding completely with the Army General Staff, General Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, told Secretary Pace that definite planning goals must be established for all aspects of the Army's expansion as soon as possible. Pace assured these officers that he would press for definite guidance from above. "It is urgently necessary that a decision be taken as soon as possible as to the forces to be mobilized, because upon this is predicated the vital and related problems of procurement, training capacity, and the degree of required industrial mobilization," he said. [11]

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, assisted by their special planning groups, were of course involved in comprehensive study of these very problems. They were, in certain respects, dependent on the individual services for recommendations and, in this case, required definite proposals from the Army as to the optimum degree of Army expansion.

The General Reserve

The approximate strength of the General Reserve on 25 June 1950 stood at 140,000. One month later only about 90,000 men and officers remained. Of this number, 15,000 were employed in essential operations at posts, camps, and stations in the United States. Not only had the General Reserve lost 50 percent of its units, but also levies for replacements and specialists had reduced most remaining units to cadre strength. Only the 82d Airborne Division, the 3d Cavalry, and certain antiaircraft artillery units retained immediate combat potential. Yet General MacArthur's calls on the General Reserve continued unabated. His requirements exceeded the 50,000 men already sent and he had asked for 32,000 more by 25 July. The strength levels of the Reserve kept dropping steadily. By 6 August the total infantry strength in the Reserve had fallen to 40,000. [12]

[10] Min., 20th mtg., Army Policy Council, 12 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 334 APC, sec. 1.

[11] Ibid.

[12] (1) Memo, CofS USA, for ACofS G-3, DA, 26 Jul. 50, sub: Depletion of Army's General Reserve by Requirements for Korea, in G-3, DA file 320.2. sec. I, Case 14/3. (2) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Brig. Gen. David A. Ogden, Chief, Org. and Trng. Div., G-3, DA, 16 Aug. 50, sub: Status of Major Combat Units-Continental U.S., 6 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA files. This memorandum gives a detailed breakdown of the authorized and actual strengths of General Reserve combat units on 6 August. The 82d Airborne Division, authorized 17,490 men, had 15,805, while the 3d Division had only 5,179 of an authorized 18,894.

Throughout July, Department of Defense officials were aware of the situation, and national leaders had assumed, before Korea, that mobilization, if required, would be all-out mobilization of national military resources. The action in Korea fell far short of global war, but proved big enough to involve the greater portion of the nation's active ground forces by the end of the first month of fighting. With American Reserve military strength so weakened, some degree of mobilization became mandatory. The nation's military leaders had to decide the degree of mobilization required and also the best method of recruiting additional effective forces swiftly with the least damage to the nation's morale and economy. The solution had to be reached under pressure and in haste. [13]

Authorized Strength

The actual strength of the United States Army had been somewhat less than its authorized strength when the Korean War began. But even had the Army's vacant ranks been filled, it would have been too small to fight the North Koreans and at the same time meet American commitments elsewhere. The first step in expanding the Army to take care of the immediate task in Korea without sacrificing its primary mission was to raise the Army's authorized strength. Those directly concerned saw clearly that the void created in the General Reserve should, in the interest of the nation's safety, be filled as soon as possible. When they selected the 2d Division, the airborne RCT, and the three medium tank battalions from the Reserve in early July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told their superiors that these units would have to be replaced. Both President Truman and the Secretary of Defense agreed and on 6 July approved an increase of 50,000. From this first increment, which raised the authorized strength of the Army to 680,000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set aside enough men for two antiaircraft battalions for the General Reserve. They planned to use the rest, when available, as individual replacements for General MacArthur's forces. [14]

When the President raised the Army's authorized strength to 740,500 a few days later, the Joint Chiefs decided to use part of these 60,500 new spaces to bring units going to the FEC to war strength, to furnish more combat and service units for the FEC, and to replace losses in the FEC. But they set aside enough spaces to activate an infantry division to replace the 2d Division in the General Reserve and to form two more antiaircraft artillery battalions. [15]

[13] A comprehensive study of the many and complex problems arising out of the nation's efforts to mobilize its armed strength widely, with analyses of each major personnel action, is contained in a monograph by Maj. Elva M. Stillwaugh, History of the Korea War, "Personnel Problems." Only the most significant measures will be discussed here. The extremely detailed and involved steps taken by Chief, Army Field Forces, in this early period raise troops and to mobilize units are set forth OCAFF, Actions in Support of FECOM, 3 July-30 September 1950, OCAFF, Blue Book. Both OCMH.

[14] (1) Memo, Gen. Bradley for Secy. Defense, 7 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 6, I-A. (2) Memo, Secy. Defense for Secy. Army, same file, Case 19. (3) JCS 1800/97, 6 Jul. 50, CofS file 230.2, Case 35.

[15] (1) Memo, Secy. JCS for ACofS, 10 Jul. 50, sub: Personnel Requirements, SM 1477-50, with attached handwritten notation, 1130, 13 Jul. 50, sgd SGS (Gen. Moore), G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 7. (2) Memo JCS for Secy. Defense 13 Jul. 50, sub: Personnel Requirements in Support of Current Opns in FEC, 2d Increment, same file, Case 48.

By 19 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff had asked for and received a third increase in authorized military strength. The Army limit was lifted to 834,000, a jump of 93,500 spaces. Some of this addition, too, was scheduled for the Far East Command as combat and service support units and replacements. The JCS set aside the lion's share for twenty more antiaircraft artillery battalions and other units to augment the depleted General Reserve. [16]

But a paper army wins no battles and deters no aggressor. The Army's authorized strength had to be transmuted into actual strength quickly. Voluntary recruitment, Selective Service, recall of individual Reservists, and ordering National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps units to active service were means used to fill the Army's manpower needs. When the Korean War began the Department of the Army was relying almost entirely on volunteers to fill its enlisted ranks. Authority existed for procuring new soldiers through the draft under the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950, but the Army had made little use of it. The increased need for manpower caused the Department of the Army to call in late July for 50,000 draftees to be inducted in September. [17]

Recall of Reserves

Congressional action on 30 June 1950 gave the President the authority to order units and individual members of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and units of the National Guard of the United States into active federal service for a period of twenty-one months. [18] On 19 July President Truman delegated this authority to the Secretary of Defense, who further delegated it to the secretaries of the military departments. [19]

[16] (1) JCS 1800/104, Bradley for Johnson, 18 Jul. 50, sub: Fiscal Year 1951 Force Requirements. (2) Memo, Johnson for Secys Army, Navy, and Air Force, Asst. Secy. Defense (Comptroller), and Gen. Bradley, 19 Jul. 50. (3) The major units for which the 834,000 Army strength would provide were at this time 8 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 2 airborne divisions, 8 separate infantry regiments, 4 separate armored regiments, 72 antiaircraft artillery battalions, and 90 combat battalions of other types, i.e., armored, field artillery, and engineer. See JCS 1800/101, 18 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, sec. III, Book 1, Case 48/2. (4) The Congress of the United States controls the size of the armed forces. In this emergency period, approval by the President was a temporary measure, the only feasible procedure in view of the need for speedy action. The President immediately asked for and secured Congressional approval in the form of legislation removing all statutory personnel ceilings and expanding budgetary appropriations. See JCS History, The Korean Conflict, ch. v, p. 20.

[17] (1) Rpt, sub: Personnel Procurement, pp. 19-20. (2) Memo, Secy. Army for OSD, 25 Jul. 50, sub: Additional Selective Service Call. Both in Annual Narrative Hist Rpt, ACofS G-1, 25 June 1950-8 September 1951, copy in OCMH.

[18] PL 599, 81st Congress.

[19] (1) Rpt, sub Personnel Procurement, Tab A, in Annual Narrative Hist Rpt, ACofS G-1, 25 June 1950-8 September 1951. (2) Memo, 8 Nov. 50, sub: Call of Reserves, in CofS, DA file 320.2. (3) Memo, Secy. Defense for JCS, 21 Jul. 50.

In the case of both officers and enlisted men, the Army established and carried out a policy of recalling individuals from the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves. In order to avoid enfeebling Active Reserve units, already understrength in most cases, and to enable these units, if it became necessary to call them into service, to come on duty in some semblance of combat readiness, the Army felt that it should not take their officers and men. True, the men and officers in these units had been receiving pay for attending drills and were, or could logically be expected to be, more ready for active service than Inactive or Volunteer Reservists. Nevertheless, when it became necessary to fill Reserve and Regular units it was deemed necessary to draw on the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves. Persons who were members of the Active Reserve, assigned to units, drilling regularly, and receiving current training were not recalled to active duty as individuals.

Membership in the Inactive Reserves meant, in fact, that officers and men had accepted a Reserve status and all its attached obligations but would not, or could not, spend the time required for training in the Active Reserve. The fact that a man was in the inactive portion of the Reserve did not, however, obviate his obligation to serve if his country needed him. Volunteer Reserves were those members of the Active Reserve who were not assigned to mobilization troop basis units.

Another factor bearing on the problem was that an important provision of Public Law 810, 80th Congress, was in the process of being implemented as of 30 June 1950. This provision required those members of the Volunteer Reserve who had not been sufficiently active to earn the specified minimum number of retirement credit points under the above law would be involuntarily transferred to the Inactive Reserve. The screening of the Volunteer Reserve to determine who should thus be transferred had just begun when the Korean War broke out. It was known, however, that a large number of officers in the Volunteer Reserve would be affected.

When the first order went out for the involuntary recall of individual Reserve officers, no real distinction could be made between the Inactive and Volunteer Reserve since there were so many in the Volunteer Reserve who had been as inactive as those assigned to the Inactive Reserve. The first recall program, authorized by the Extension Act of 1950 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, consequently specified that officers be recalled from either the Volunteer Reserve or the Inactive Reserve without establishing a priority or any other distinction between the two categories.

The Army met numerous problems in recalling Reservists. It had no clear picture of the actual number who would be available for duty. It knew, for example, that on 30 June 1950 it had 416,402 in the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves and 184,015 in the organized units of the Reserve. It did not know, however, how many of these were physically qualified for duty. The required periodic physical examinations for Reservists had been suspended in February 1947. Many more Reservists had to be called for physical examination than the number needed because of the large numbers found physically disqualified. Considerable administrative overhead and delay hindered selections. Further, many Reservists had undergone changes in economic status after entering the ORC which made active duty an undue hardship. The result was authorization of large numbers of justifiable delays which caused further difficulty in filling quotas. Records on Reserve officers were inadequate, and virtually did not exist for enlisted men.

Finally, the recall of Inactive and Volunteer Reservists engendered much ill-will from the public, the press, and the Congress.

Since officers, particularly in company-grade and combat arms, were needed badly, the Department of the Army, on 22 July 1950, appealed to Reserve officers to volunteer for active duty. So few responded that, on 10 August 1950, empowered by the Congressional authority, the Department of the Army recalled involuntarily 7,862 male Reserve captains and lieutenants of both the Volunteer and Inactive Reserves. On the same date it announced a program for recalling 1,063 Army Medical Service officers. These first involuntary recalls of Reserve officers were followed several months later by a larger program affecting almost 10,000 company-grade officers of the combat arms. [20]

The shortage of trained enlisted specialists prompted the Department of the Army to recall, also involuntarily, 109,000 enlisted men from the Reserves during August. All of these men were specialists, slated to fill critical positions. [21]

National Guard Divisions

The only source from which the Army could draw complete, relatively ready, divisions other than from the General Reserve was from the National Guard of the United States. General Collins was extremely reluctant to advise the calling up of National Guard divisions until he was sure that no other solution could be found to the grave manpower situation. His reasons for holding back stemmed from his concern over the great impact upon the economy and morale of home areas of selected divisions. The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in mid-July also opposed federalization of any National Guard divisions so long as it could be avoided. [22]

[20] (1) Rad, WCL 34125, DA to ZI Comds., 22 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, WCL 3t558, DA to ZI Comds., 10 Aug. 50. (3) Rad, WCL 37577, DA to ZI Comds., 10 Aug. 50. (4) Ltr., DA, 15 Sep. 50, sub: Recall of Additional Reserve Officers to Active Duty, AGAO-S 210.4 (ORC), 15 Sep. 50

[21] Hist Summary, 7 Nov. 51, sub: Distribution of Enlisted Replacements, prepared by Manpower Control Div., ACofS G-1, DA, p. 2, copy in OCMH.

[22] (1) JCS 1924/20, Rpt by JSPC, 14 Jul. 50, title: Estimate of the Military Sit in Light of Events in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, I-C, Case 16. (2) MFR, Gen. Moore, SGS, DA, 15 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA files.


Many National Guard units were not divisional in nature, had specialized functions, and were made up of specialists and other men trained during World War II. These units appeared to be a likely source of strength for MacArthur's forces, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although hesitating to call on National Guard divisions, asked for authority to call to active duty some other National Guard units if required. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," they told the Secretary of Defense on 14 July,

   are of the opinion that the emergence of the Korean situation cannot
   be fully met or in time by merely strengthening units already in
   existence or by filling them with untrained men through the Selective
   Service process or recruitment. Also it has developed that the
   requirements for units and personnel cannot be met on the basis of
   voluntary return of Reserves to active duty for which approval
   presently exists.... The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the
   Secretary of Defense obtain at once authority for the three Services
   to call to active duty, within such personnel ceilings as have 
   been or may be approved, such selected National Guard units and
   selected units and individuals of the Army, Navy, or Air Force as may
   be required to meet the demands of the Korean situation. [23] 

More significant reasons than the disruption of regional social and economic conditions lay behind the reluctance of American military planners to call up complete divisions. General Collins, in addressing the Army Policy Council on 25 July, admitted that much public sentiment was developing in favor of a rapid Army expansion, including the calling up of the National Guard. He pointed out that, if the Chinese Communist forces intervened in Korea, the United States would have to federalize from three to six National Guard divisions at once. Calling up divisions immediately, perhaps prematurely, might not be wise. Too, there was no point in building up too rapidly, since the ability to meet American commitments was definitely limited by shipping. He contended that federalization of National Guard units would not help the situation in Korea since it would take a long time for these units to become effective. [24]

The Army Chief of Staff was waiting for an agreement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the size and make-up of the forces which they wanted to develop. There had been a difference of opinion as to whether a small, balanced, and mobile expeditionary force for emergencies similar to Korea should be created and maintained in addition to forces for Korea and the General Reserve. [25]

General Bolte nevertheless kept urging General Collins to call up National Guard divisions. At a meeting in his office on the morning of 31 July, General Collins decided to accept his G-3's recommendations. Later that day, at a conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he forcefully proposed that four National Guard divisions and two RCT's be called to active duty. Collins said:

   In view of the world-wide international situation and recent
   developments in Korea, I have now concluded that we can no longer
   delay in calling into Federal service certain major units of the
   National Guard.... I had hoped that this step might prove
   unnecessary, but it is my firm conviction that further delay may have
   grave results on our ability to insure the security of the United
   States. [26] 

[23] Contained in Memo, Col. Keith L. Ware, ASGS, for Asst. Secy. Army, 14 Jul. 50, sub: Proposed Mobilization of Reserve Units and Calling of Selected Reserve Officers to Active Duty, in CofS, DA file 091 Korea, Case 7.

[24] Min., 23d mtg., Army Policy Council, 25 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 334, Case 7.

[25] JCS 1924/20, Rpt by JSPC, 14 Jul. 50, title: Estimate of the Military Sit in Light of Events in Korea.

[26] (1) Memo, Bolte, ACofS G-3, DA, for Ridgway, DCofS for Admin., 7 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA files. (s) Memo, Ridgway for Bolte, 31 Jul. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2, sec. I, Case 15. (3) Memo, Collins for JCS, 31 Jul. 50, sub: Increased Augmentation of the Army (above 834,000), in G-3, DA file 320.2, sec. I-B, Book I, Case 8/1.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly agreed and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the National Guard units be called to active duty. This action meant lifting the Army's authorized strength from 834,000 to over 1,000,000. On 10 August, the Army received word of approval. President Truman authorized calling into federal service on or about 1 September four National Guard divisions and two National Guard RCT's. These units would be brought to full strength through Selective Service by 1 November 1950 and would be ready for operational employment by 14 April 1951. [27]

The question of which National Guard divisions should be called up had been under study for some time. General Collins had, on 21 July, asked the Chief, Army Field Forces, for recommendations. Less than a week later General Bolte asked General Clark for an expanded study of the same problem.

In considering the problem, General Clark leaned heavily upon the continental Army commanders, soliciting their recommendations as to which divisions within their areas were best trained, best equipped, and most ready to go. After careful study, General Clark submitted to the Department of the Army his recommendations of six divisions most appropriate to be called on the grounds of training, manning, equipment status, and general fitness. The divisions recommended in order of priority of selection were the 28th Division (Pennsylvania); the 29th Division (Virginia and Maryland); the 315t Division (Mississippi and Alabama); the 37th Division (Ohio); the 45th Division (Oklahoma); and the 50th Armored Division (New Jersey). [28]

On 31 July, General Ridgway notified General Clark that the Secretary of the Army and General Collins were fearful of the political repercussions unless there was a better geographical spread among the divisions selected. Clark said that he and his advisers had considered this point very carefully, but had given more weight to other factors. They had, for example, looked very closely at the leadership in the particular divisions, wishing to avoid the difficulties experienced at the beginning of World War II when some of the National Guard commanders had been relieved after call-up. They had evaluated the comparative state of training of each division and had also taken into consideration the divisional strengths in men and qualified officers. On this latter point, the Chief, Army Field Forces, felt it important to keep to a minimum the number of filler replacements which would have to be transferred into a particular National Guard division to bring it up to full strength. Ridgway then asked Clark to consider the readiness status of divisions on the west coast since it might be desirable to choose one division from that area.

Later the same day, General Clark learned that four divisions would be chosen. He was asked if he had adjusted his recommendations to conform with the necessity for a geographical spread. At that time he recommended that four divisions be chosen from among the 28th (Pennsylvania); the 29th (Virginia and Maryland); the 315t (Mississippi and Alabama); the 37th (Ohio); the 40th (California); and the 45th (Oklahoma).

[27] (1) JCS 2147/3 and Incl, Memo, Secy. Defense for Secy. Army and JCS, 10 Aug. 50. (2) MFR, CofS USA, sub: Request for Four Divs. in Korea, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-3, Book I, Case 19/7.

[28] OCAFF Rpt, Actions in Support of FECOM, 3 July-30 September 1950, OCAFF, Blue Book, entries of 21 Jul., 27 Jul., and 31 Jul. 50, copy in OCMH.

The National Guard divisions finally called into service as of 1 September 1950 were the 28th, the 40th, the 43d (Rhode Island and Connecticut), and the 45th. Also called were the 196th RCT (South Dakota) and the 278th RCT (Tennessee). These units would be brought to full war strength. But General Collins directed Bolte to limit the number of troops called up to support the divisions. He felt that this restriction would not involve great risk, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made no commitment to send the new divisions overseas. If it should become necessary to send them to Korea later, they could get by with a far smaller ratio of corps and army support troops than had been needed in World War II. General Collins based this theory on his appraisal of the terrain conditions and limited road nets in the Korean area. If the new divisions reverted to inactive status before deployment, the Army would store their equipment to have it immediately available for another emergency. [29]

The Theater Scene-August 1950

In Korea, meanwhile, ROK and U.S. forces fought off the North Korean Army with stubborn determination. General Walker used his small mobile reserves with great skill and his men, ROK and American, fought bravely. The dearly acquired battle experience and the fresh strength pouring into Korea began to show in greater enemy losses and a slackening of his advance. Nevertheless, the Eighth Army lost ground and fell back toward Pusan.

Walker proved a determined and tenacious commander. He well appreciated the great danger of pulling back upon his base of supply under continuous pressure. He hated to give up any more ground to the North Koreans, but on 26 July, with the enemy pressing in on Taegu where irreplaceable signal equipment was in danger of being lost, Walker called Tokyo and asked permission to move his command post back to Pusan. He did not imply in any way that he wanted to pull his divisions back to the port city. [30]

General Almond, who took Walker's call, told him that he, personally, objected to any such move. To remove the command post to Pusan would damage the army's morale. It might give the impression that the Eighth Army could not stay in Korea and might trigger a debacle.

As soon as Walker hung up, Almond went to MacArthur and recommended that MacArthur fly to Korea and talk to Walker at once. Apparently, Walker's attitude had shaken Almond's faith in the Eighth Army commander's judgment. Almond told MacArthur that he felt the situation in Korea had reached the critical stage and required MacArthur's personal observation. MacArthur pondered briefly, then told Almond that he would make the trip the next day.

On 27 July, MacArthur, with a staff including General Almond, landed in Taegu about 1000. This time, MacArthur did not visit the front line, contenting himself with conferences in Taegu. The most significant conference took place between MacArthur and Walker. Only one other person, General Almond, sat in on this 90-minute meeting.

[29] Min., 26th mtg., Army Policy Council, 2 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA file 334 (APC) 1950, Case 5.

[30] Interv, Lt. Col. Roy E. Appleman with Gen. Almond, 13 Dec. 50, copy in OCMH.

MacArthur did not mention Walker's request of the day before, nor did he criticize Walker for any of his actions. He merely talked over the tactical situation, emphasizing that Eighth Army must hold its ground He told Walker that withdrawals would cease later, in the presence of several members of the Eighth Army staff, MacArthur said that there would be no evacuation from Korea-there would be no Dunkerque.

On 29 July as a result of MacArthur's visit, Walker issued a widely publicized order, in the form of a public statement during a speech to the staff of the 25th Division. Walker stated that the Eighth Army would retreat no more, that there was no line to which it could retreat, and that, in effect, every man in Eighth Army would "stand or die" along the present line. [31]

[31] (1) Ibid. (2) Ltr., Landrum to Appleman, rec'd. 23 Nov. 53. (3) War Diary, 25th Div., G-3 Jnl., Jul. 50, Div. Hist notes.

The defensive line behind which Walker intended his troops to "stand or die" lay mainly on the Naktong River barrier in the west and fanned out from Pusan. Rectangular in shape, measuring nearly 100 miles from north to south and about fifty miles from east to west, the area quickly became known as the Pusan Perimeter. (See Map 1) [32]

Between 1 and 4 August, U.S. and ROK units withdrew behind this line and prepared for a last-ditch stand. Most of the western edge of the perimeter was traced by the Naktong River with the exception of about fifteen miles at the southern end of this line. The northern border ran through the mountains above Waegwan and Uisong to the sea, with the town of Yongdok forming the eastern anchor. ROK troops held this portion of the line.

General MacArthur sent his deputy chief of staff, General Hickey, into the Pusan Perimeter on 6 August to confer with the Eighth Army commander. Walker told Hickey he was worried about the condition of the 24th Division. He appraised that unit's combat worth as negligible after a month of hard fighting. Before it could become effective again, it would have to be completely rehabilitated. His other divisions were in somewhat better condition. The 25th Division, which had seen less action than the 24th and which had been less severely attacked by the enemy, was in fairly good shape. General Walker expressed some doubts as to its offensive capabilities, as he felt it lacked leadership. The Eighth Army commander told General Hickey that, because they were too few, all his army staff members were overworked. That they were not getting enough rest was being reflected in the quality of their work. [33]

The first weeks of August were marked by savage North Korean efforts to break through the Pusan Perimeter. Several enemy penetrations across the Naktong into Eighth Army's lines came perilously close to success, but in each case skillful deployment of reserves along interior lines enabled Walker to contain and beat back the enemy thrusts. Fresh units arriving in the perimeter were quickly thrown into the fight at key points in the perimeter. Elements of the 2d Division arrived from the United States on 31 July, the 5th RCT reached Korea on the same day from Hawaii, and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade closed at Pusan on 3 August.

The mounting toll of American casualties and the depleted ranks of Walker's divisions underscored the great need for fresh fighting men in Korea {And} every feasible means of meeting this need was being exploited by the Department of the Army.

Replacement Troubles

[32] For a complete account of the valiant stand of Walker's forces in the battle of the Naktong during August and September 1950, see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters XV-XXIV. See also Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, vol. I, The Pusan Perimeter (Washington, 1954).

[33] Memo, Gen. Hickey, DCofS GHQ, UNC, for Gen. Almond, CofS GHQ, UNC, 7 Aug. 50, sub: Rpt of Visit to Korea, in CofS GHQ, UNC files.

By 5 August the Department of the Army had stepped up both air and water transportation to the Far East Command, using military and commercial planes and vessels. Most of the surface shipping space had been taken for units and equipment, but airlift brought 340 replacements each day. Still, the Eighth Army was receiving more casualties than replacements. Losses by 5 August totaled 7,859, but only 7,71s1 individual replacements had reached the FEC and only part of these had arrived in Korea. General Beiderlinden, MacArthur's personnel chief, took an optimistic view, believing that the near future would bring a marked improvement in the situation He expected casualties in Korea to decrease as the front stabilized and anticipated a great increase in replacements from the United States by the middle of August. He was counting also on returning to combat many soldiers who had recovered from wounds in FEC hospitals. As an example, the number of men returned to combat from hospitals on 4 August equaled 30 percent of the casualties received on the same day. He told Almond that the Department of the Army appeared to be providing replacements to the limit of its capability. His greatest concern, justified in light of the latest report from Washington, was whether there would be a sufficient reservoir of replacements in the United States to keep supplying the FEC's needs until Selective Service, National Guard, and Reserve personnel could be called to duty and made available. [34]

The optimism expressed by Beiderlinden on 5 August disappeared with startling speed two days later. General Hickey's talk with General Walker erased the slightly optimistic picture conjured by statistics and promises. General Beiderlinden appealed to General Almond on 7 August, pointing out that every division in Korea was suffering critical shortages of men and officers. Almond approved an urgent call on Washington for 8,000 men to reach the FEC within fifteen days. All infantry regiments in Korea were so weakened that unless these men reached them in two weeks, they would deteriorate so badly that major steps would be necessary to rebuild them. Most urgently needed were infantry and artillery soldiers, and company-grade officers. Almond urged, as a matter of highest priority, that airlift be expanded to get the 8,000 men to the theater by 20 August. [35]

The lack of replacements for Eighth Army's divisions resulted to a degree from the way in which replacements were used after they reached the Far East Command. Less than half of the 16,000 replacements arriving in Japan between 1 July and 15 August went straight to Korea. Some were used to fill the 7th Division, but more were assigned to non-divisional units within Japan. About 25,000 men and officers under control of Eighth Army remained in Japan at this time. [36]

The fighting in Korea prompted staff agencies of GHQ FEC to seek more people. They took experienced replacements, particularly officers, out of the pipeline to Korea. At the same time, GHQ section chiefs kept at desk jobs many of their original men and officers who could have been sent as replacements. At other stations in the replacement stream from Japan to the battlefront, men and officers intended for combat duty were diverted to administrative and rear-echelon service. General Beiderlinden warned fellow members of the GHQ staff about allowing this practice to grow. General Headquarters could hardly justify its strident pleas for replacements if it kept these men from the fighting units. On 15 July he cautioned, "Until a flow of replacements commensurate with current critical needs materializes, it is mandatory that . . . the tendency to augment administrative and rear-echelon service organizations . . . be resisted." He urged the fullest use of Japanese and American civilians in Japan. [37]

[34] Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug. 50, sub: Casualties and Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 41, 5 Aug. 50.

[35] (1) Ibid., 7 Aug. 5o, sub: Loss Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 15. (2) Rad, CX 59519, CINC FE to DA, 7 Aug. 50.

[36] (1) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS, 16 Aug. 50, sub: Replacements for EUSAK, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 45. (2) Memo, Col. Grubbs for Gen. Beiderlinden, 8 Aug. 50, sub: Assignment of Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 36. (3) Memo, GHQ for Gen. Hickey, 12 Aug. 50, sub: Replacements for EUSAK, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 54.

[37] Memo, G-1 GHQ for All Staff Secs., GHQ SCAP, and FEC, 15 Jul. 50, sub: Utilization of Personnel, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 7.

This chiding did not deter GHQ section chiefs. General Beiderlinden told the chief of staff, GHQ, in early August that he was still worried by the continuing trend toward empire-building in the GHQ staff. He felt that, instead of looking for more people, the GHQ staff sections should get more mileage out of those they already had. He hesitated to charge the other staff heads with wasting their resources, but he believed that they could, if they tried, achieve greater efficiency without strength increases. At General Beiderlinden's request, the chief of staff talked with section chiefs, stressing the importance of keeping GHQ manpower requirements at as low a level as possible. [38]

So urgent was the need for front-line soldiers in August that General MacArthur cut out the short, intensive training course which had been set up on 4 July for replacements at Camp Drake. He ordered replacements kept at Drake only long enough to receive their individual equipment. As a result of this ruling, replacements were given no chance to fire their individual weapons. Many men went into the front lines in Korea without having determined the characteristics and proper setting of their rifles or carbines. [39]

General Collins sent General Ridgway to Korea in early August to find out from MacArthur what specific requirements had developed since General Collins' July visit. General Collins gave Ridgway a personal letter to be handed to MacArthur which, he hoped, would serve to explain the Army's situation and to reassure MacArthur that everything possible was being done on his behalf.

   In order to meet your requirements for four divisions with supporting
   units [Collins wrote] we decided to recommend to the Joint Chiefs of
   Staff calling for four National Guard divisions to active duty on or
   about 1 September 195O.... On 1 August I recommended the Joint Chiefs
   call up those units. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved, but reserved
   judgment as to definite commitment of all four divisions to your
   theater at this time. This was based on the fact that no one can
   definitely foresee the exact developments of the Korea fighting.

   I have felt all along that once the weather clears up and we are able 
   to get effective results from our air attacks, the logistic support 
   of the North Korean forces will rapidly dry up. This might result in 
   your being able to pass to the counteroffensive more nearly according 
   to your original time schedule and your original plans.

   You will recall that we agreed that this might be possible with  
   troops already definitely allotted to you which, including the full  
   Marine division, and an airborne combat team would aggregate almost  
   seven divisions. On the other hand, if the North Koreans are  
   continually reinforced from the North you may well require the full  
   strength of units requested....

   I am confident that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be willing to 
   accede to a definite request for these troops when the situation has 
   stabilized and you are able to make more definite plans than is 
   possible now. Meanwhile we will proceed with the training of the 
   divisions quickly. They will be permitted to accept volunteers up 
   until the time of actual induction.... Here again I think we must 
   wait and see how the North Koreans react during the next couple of 
   months. I think it is wholly possible that once they begin to fold, 
   and I am sure they will under the pressure of your counteroffensive, 
   that they may go very fast....

   Let me assure you again of my warmest support. If there is anything 
   we are doing now that should de changed or anything further that we could do to 
   back you up in this critical struggle please don't hesitate to call 
   on me. [40] 

[38] Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 2 Aug. 50, sub: Requests for Increase of Staff Personnel (Instant Case, G-3), G-1 GHQ Log, Item 36.

[39] (1) Rad, 59867, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 12 Aug. 50. (2) Memo, GHQ for CofS GHQ, 31 Aug. 50, sub: Rpt of Staff Visit to Personnel Pipeline, sgd Col. T. A. Seely, GSC, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 14.

General MacArthur made his needs known to General Ridgway at once. He repeated the call already made by his staff for 8,000 replacements by 20 August. When Ridgway passed this information to General Collins, he expressed the belief that the Department of the Army could meet the full requirement. The enlisted Reserve specialists, particularly those with prior service, could, with a minimum period of three weeks for processing and training, be sent to the FEC by September and would help cut down the shortages significantly. General MacArthur had suggested that the United States triple its transpacific shipping by using commercial shipping lines. [41]

The principal request which the Far East commander placed upon the Department of the Army through General Ridgway was for the 3d Division. In the relatively near future, Japan would be completely stripped of American combat troops. So that the Japanese islands, doubly vital now as a support base for Korean operations, might not be completely defenseless against a possible Soviet attack, General MacArthur felt that the 3d Division should be sent to Japan by mid-September. [42]

When General Ridgway returned to Washington, he met with the Army Policy Council and, at the request of the Secretary of the Army, reported his observations on the combat situation. Ridgway had come away from Korea convinced that Walker would hold the Pusan Perimeter. Enemy pressure was still great enough to force limited tactical withdrawals from the edges of the perimeter and the actual final line had not yet been developed, but the defensive line would be held successfully and the beachhead kept intact. Regardless of his favorable prognosis, General Ridgway was quick to point out that General Walker had a serious problem. His forces still faced a ruthless and savage foe. Any idea that the North Koreans would weaken or fall back was faulty and dangerous. As an example, General Ridgway cited enemy reaction to the strongest offensive thrust yet made by Walker's forces. Eight American battalions had attacked in the southern sector to stop an enemy move at Pusan. Within an hour after the attack jumped off, the enemy counterattacked fiercely and effectively. [43]

[40] Ltr., Gen. Collins to Gen. MacArthur, 4 Aug. 50, in CofS, DA file 323.3 FEC.

[41] Memo, Gen. Ridgway for Gen. Collins, 18 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA files.

[42] The National Police Reserve of Japan (NPRJ) had been formed only recently, while American forces left in Japan after September were mainly service and headquarters troops.

[43] Min., Mtg. of Army Policy Council, 8 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA file 334 APC, Case 7.

United Nations forces were still too few in number to carry on a defense according to the book. One division held a 21,000-yard front with six battalions. The enemy could infiltrate the thinly defended front at night and attack from the rear the next morning. General Walker had not had time to organize the ground effectively. General MacArthur had told Ridgway that he was pleased with the support given him by Washington, but had asked for more. After Ridgway reported to the council, General Collins told Secretary Pace that the request for more men and units was already being studied by his staff, but that he was gravely concerned by the demands. [44]

At a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff held later the same day to hear General Ridgway's formal report and to consider the Far East commander's needs, General MacArthur's request for another division occasioned a debate. Some members of the Joint Chiefs wanted to send the 82d Airborne or a National Guard division instead of the understrength 3d Division. General Ridgway recommended that the 3d Division be sent since he felt that the combat-ready airborne division must stay in the United States for use in a general emergency. After a 15-minute discussion, the tenor of thought among the Joint Chiefs inclined toward the same view-namely, to send the 3d Division and to fill it up from any and every source. No final decision was made at this time, but (General Collins and Admiral Sherman were charged with examining the matter urgently and reaching a recommendation by 10 August. [45]

General Bolte, Army G-3, did not believe that the 3d Division could be filled and sent to (General MacArthur without seriously delaying the Army's plans for rapid expansion of training activities in the United States. He told General Collins that the 3d Division could reach the Far East by 15 September, untrained and worthless for combat, but that the training and mobilization base in the United States would suffer as a result. If General Collins could see his way clear to delay the division until December, it could be built up with National Guard and Enlisted Reserve Corps (ERC) fillers without ruining the ZI training base and could arrive in the Far East as a reasonably well-trained division. If General Collins considered it absolutely necessary to give General MacArthur another division by 15 September, the 82d Airborne could be sent. According to General Bolte, the 82d, already at about 85 percent strength, would not need many fillers. Furthermore, it would be ready to fight on arrival. Its departure, of course, would leave the continental United States without a combat-ready division. [46]

General Bolte's views did not prevail. The JCS decided to send the 3d Division to FECOM. On 11 August President Truman approved its removal from the General Reserve. [47]

[44] Ibid.

[45] Memos (handwritten), Lt. Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, DCofS for Plans, for Gen. Bolte, ACofS G-3, 1110, 8 Aug. 50; 1125, 8 Aug. 50; 1150, 8 Aug. 50. All in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 19/7. This series of penciled notes sent out of the JCS meeting by General Gruenther reports the progress of the meeting to the Army G-3, so that, in Gruenther's own words, "you won't get crash-landed" and "just to keep you off balance."

[46](1) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 10 Aug. 50, sub: Feasibility of Redeployment of 3d Inf. Div. to the FEC by Mid-September, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 19/7. (2) Transfer of men and officers from the 82d to the 187th RCT of the 11th Airborne, which was being readied for shipment at this time, had reduced the division to an approximate strength of 15,000. See Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 8 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 6/20.

[47] (1) Memo, Ridgway for Collins, 18 Aug. 50. (2) Memo, Bolte for Collins, 8 Aug. 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A, Book 1, Case 6/20. (3) JCS 2147/4, Note by Secys., 10 Aug. 50, title: Reinforcement of the FEC, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac. (4) Memo, Johnson for JCS, 11 Aug. 50, sub: Reinforcement of the FEC.

The 3d Division, although it had three regiments, was very much understrength. Already it had furnished many men, officers, and units to the Far East Command. The division was short 2 infantry battalions, 1 tank battalion, and 2 field artillery battalions. Only drastic measures would place the division in a reasonably effective status, even for occupation duty. By reducing one regiment to zero strength and dividing its men and officers between the remaining two regiments, then assigning a separate regiment from Puerto Rico to the division, the Department of the Army succeeded in building up the division to a semblance of operational strength.

On 10 August, General MacArthur learned that the 3d Division, less one regiment, was being ordered to his command. A supplementary message, explaining that the 65th Infantry from Puerto Rico had been ordered to the FEC, where it would join the 3d Division as its third regiment, followed a few minutes later, but not quickly enough apparently. Before receiving the information on the 65th Infantry, MacArthur fired back a radio objecting to the dispatch of a 2-regiment division and pointing out, ". . . experience indicates the ineffectiveness of a two unit organization whether in battalions, regiments, or divisions." No answer to this {reclama} was necessary, of course. [48]

Fearful, also, that press reports of the planned movement of the 3d Division might tip his hand and warn the North Koreans of his future plans, General MacArthur asked that no press release be made until the division was actually engaged in combat. "Information of this sort," General MacArthur warned Washington, "practically reveals our strategic concepts to an alert enemy." [49]

Unfortunately, General Ridgway had already alerted the Army Chief of Information, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, to release the information on the 3d Division to the press. But the information had not yet gone out when MacArthur's warning was received. General Ridgway was opposed to withholding any such news from the public. "I saw no possibility short of instituting a strict censorship," he said, "of concealing the fact and if we acted otherwise, press reaction would be violent and prompt." When he went to General Collins and expressed this opinion, Collins considered a few moments, then decided to go along with MacArthur anyhow. Ridgway was obliged to notify Parks to make no official release on the 3d Division even though both men knew that the news would leak out at once. [50]

[48] (1) Memo, Ridgway for Bolte, 10 Aug. 50, sub: Additional Combat Forces for FEC, in G-3, DA files. (2) Rad, WAR 88401, DA to CINCFE, 10 Aug. 50. (3) Rad, WAR 88465, DA to CINCFE, 10 Aug. 50, (4) Rad, C 59863, CINCFE to DA, 11 Aug. 50.

[49] Rad, C 59820, CINCFE to DA, 11 Aug. 50.

[50] MFR, Ridgway, 11 Aug. 50, in CofS, DA file 370, Case 12.

General Collins was determined that there should be no misunderstanding as to the great significance of removing the 3d Division from the United States or to certain restrictions on its combat employment. He sent a personal reminder to General MacArthur underscoring both the risk taken by the Army in sending out the division and the need for special handling of the unit on arrival. "In withdrawing this division from the General Reserve," General Collins pointed out, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff have accepted for the next few months a further serious reduction in the United States capabilities to meet other possible demands for combat ground forces, as well as a further serious reduction, during the same period, in the Army's capability to train additional forces for your theater." The Joint Chiefs were sending the 3d Division with the understanding that it would serve for the time being in Japan, as a theater reserve. They were assuming also that General MacArthur would, because of the division's very low combat effectiveness level, permit it "sufficient training time to reach a minimum acceptance training level" before committing it to battle. [51]

Late in August, after comprehensive inspections of the 3d Division, its ranks now swelled from a low of about 5,000 to over {11,000,} General Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, reported the division to be about 40 percent combat-ready. There were no major equipment shortages, and since the division was believed to be structurally sound General Clark felt it could be brought to an excellent state of combat readiness in about two and a half months. [52]

Corps Headquarters

By late July, it had become apparent that U.N. forces, comprising American divisions, ROK divisions, and units expected from member nations of the United Nations, would soon be so numerous that tighter tactical control would be necessary. In anticipation of such a development, General MacArthur, on 19 July, called on the Department of the Army for two corps headquarters. He asked that these headquarters be sent as soon as possible with attached medical and military police units and with two signal battalions. If feasible, these two headquarters should be designated I and IX Corps. [63]

A few days later, General MacArthur revealed that his plans called for using one of these corps headquarters for an amphibious enveloping force, and stated that the operation could be deferred to no later than 25 September. Although General MacArthur had not said specifically what use he intended to make of the other corps headquarters for which he had asked, the Department of the Army planners assumed that it would be placed under Eighth Army to serve in the breakout and exploitation phase following the initial amphibious assault.

[51] Rad, W 88954, DA to CINCFE, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 12 Aug. 50.

[52] Rad, OCAFF 810, Chief AFF to CofSUSA, 24 Aug. 50.

[53] Rad, CS 58234, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul. 50. I and IX Corps had served under General MacArthur in Japan but had been inactivated in early 195O as an economy measure.

Officers of the DA G-3 section conferred on the matter with officers from Army Field Forces and determined that the Army could produce only one corps headquarters by the target date. The available corps (U.S. V Corps) was at 75 percent combat effectiveness. Only one signal battalion, the 4th, suitable for employment with a corps headquarters, was in active service in the United States, and it was at 60 percent strength. A lack of critical signal specialists made its estimated combat effectiveness 50 percent. Chances for a second corps looked slim to G-3's planners, particularly in view of the fact that no other corps signal battalion was on duty in the United States and at least six months would be required to train one. They concluded that furnishing one corps headquarters with corps troops to the U.N. commander for use in the planned amphibious operation was the maximum capability of the Army. The tasks for which the other corps was slated would have to be given to Eighth Army. [54]

The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Wade V. Haislip, disagreed vehemently. In his opinion, a second corps headquarters could most certainly be formed insofar as the staff personnel were concerned. Nor did he accept the G-3's position that it would take six months to train a signal battalion. He pointed out that the signal battalion to be used in defensive operations need not be so highly trained as one slated for offensive amphibious operations and directed G-3 to restudy the problem. [55]

As a result of General Haislip's interest, the Department of the Army told General MacArthur that it would be possible to activate and send to him a second corps headquarters, untrained but having all required staff members. An additional signal battalion could be called into service and made available in six months. Or, if he wished, this battalion could be sent, untrained and at little more than cadre strength, in two months. General MacArthur asked at once for the earliest movement of the first corps (I Corps) and for immediate activation and dispatch of the second (IX Corps). He asked that the second signal battalion be called in and sent to him at once regardless of condition. [56]

On 30 July the V Corps was redesignated as the I Corps and began to prepare for movement, less certain cadre personnel, to the Far East Command in early August. The 4th Signal Battalion was to accompany the new corps headquarters. Meanwhile, in response to a request from General MacArthur that the corps commander and his planning staff come by air to Tokyo to plan the details of the forthcoming amphibious operation, General Coulter, the commanding general, and selected members of his staff landed at Tokyo on 10 August. [57]

The IX Corps, activated by Fifth Army, was to be prepared to move by 15 September. No training time was allowed. The 101st Signal Battalion was called into service on 19 August to meet the requirement for an accompanying signal unit. [58]

[54] Memo, G-3 for CofS, 25 Jul. 50, sub: Request for More Troops for FEC, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 16/4.

[55] Memo, Col. Morse for Col. Howell, 28 Jul. 50, sub: Corps Headquarters Requested by Gen. MacArthur, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 16/4.

[56] (1) Rad, WAR 87493, DA to CINCFE, 29 Jul. 50. (2) Rad, CX 59246, CINCFE to DA, 29 Jul. 50.

[57] (1) Memo, quoting DA radio for CG Third Army, Info CINCFE, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 7, 31 Jul. 5o. (2) Rad, WAR 88025, DA to COMGEN V Corps, 4 Aug. 50. (3) Rad, CX 58926, CINCFE to DA, 28 Jul. 50. (4) Rad, HICPAC 583, GHQ LNO to CINCFE, 10 Aug. 50.

[58] (1) Memo, Gen. Bolte for Gen. Collins, 29 Jul. 50, sub: Request for More Troops for FEC, Tab A. (2) Ibid., 8 Aug. 50, same sub, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 16/4.

In mid-August, General MacArthur was notified that I Corps headquarters and headquarters company, medical, and military police units, and the 4th Signal Battalion at reduced strength were ready to sail for his command. The signal battalion could not be brought to full strength before 1 November. The IX Corps, less its signal battalion, could sail in about a month but would be untrained. The IX's battalion could, if trained Enlisted Reserve Corps fillers materialized as expected, sail for the Far East Command about 1 November, but if trained as a unit in the United States would not be ready until the end of 1950. Artillery elements of both corps, including the additional non-divisional artillery units which General MacArthur had requested earlier and were being activated from Reserve and National Guard sources, would be only partly trained if they sailed with the other corps elements. The Department of the Army suggested that, since MacArthur's requirement for this artillery was not immediate, the units be kept in the United States and trained until ready to fight. [59]

General MacArthur apparently felt that, in this case at least, a bird in the hand was worth two in the bush. He wanted the corps as fast as he could get it regardless of condition. "Walker is now controlling four United States and five ROK divisions," he pointed out. Believing that the green units could get their training faster under him than in the United States, he asked that they be sent to him as soon as they had been filled to authorized strength. His request applied to all organic and attached elements of both I and IX corps. [60]

Late in August, arrangements were sufficiently advanced for a schedule giving anticipated arrival dates of the corps units to be sent to General MacArthur. The I Corps with attached units, including the 4th Signal Battalion at reduced strength, was on the high seas and due to reach Japan on 3 September. The IX Corps headquarters would arrive in Pusan about 10 October and would be followed within three weeks by the artillery units and the 101st Signal Battalion. [61]

Reorganization, Far East Command

Aware that General Walker could ill afford to divide his attention between the battlefield and his responsibilities in Japan, General MacArthur on 24 August established a new and separate command relieving the Eighth Army commander of all duties not directly related to his combat mission. He directed the establishment of Japan Logistical Command (JLC), FEC, with headquarters located in Yokohama in the buildings vacated by Eighth Army. By this order, responsibilities and functions formerly assigned General Walker within the geographical areas of the four main islands of Japan were delegated to the commanding general of JLC, General Weible. Excluded from his jurisdiction, although within these geographical limits, were posts, camps, and stations assigned to the Commanding General, Headquarters and Service Command; General Headquarters, FEC; COMNAVFE; and the Commanding General, FEAF. [62]

[59] Rad, WAR 88864, DA to CINCFE, 15 Aug. 50.

[60] Rad, C 60346, CINCFE to DA, 17 Aug. 50.

[61] Rad, WAR 89882, DA to CINCFE, 26 Aug. 50.

[62] GHQ, FEC, G0 22, 24 Aug. 50.

On 28 August, with the concurrence of GHQ, FEC, General Weible established a subordinate command, the Northern, at Sapporo, Japan. The Commanding General, Northern Command, Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Piburn, was made responsible for the island of Hokkaido and certain areas on the northern portion of Honshu. Somewhat later, on 19 September 1950, another subcommand of JLC was set up, designated as the Southwestern Command with headquarters at Osaka, Japan. Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke was named commanding general of this new command with a zone of responsibility including the islands of Shikoku and Kyushu and all areas of Japan located southwest of Shiznoka and Nagano prefectures, exclusive of those assigned to the British Commonwealth occupation forces and of posts, camps, and stations under control of the Commanding General, FEAF, and COMNAVFE. [63]

In addition to functions in support of the occupation of Japan, the Japan Logistical Command took over the task of getting all supplies from Japan to Korea. The new agency, actually a communications zone command for the Eighth Army, received requisitions for supplies from Walker's headquarters, placed requisitions on the proper agencies in the United States, and processed and transported all supplies to the combat theater, leaving Walker's forces free to fight without worrying about administrative matters in Japan.

The Chief of Staff, United States Army, toured the Pusan Perimeter in late August, visiting all American divisions and conferring with the army commander. He found the morale of the troops at the front to be uniformly high and the major commanders confident and optimistic. But there had been no letup in the enemy's determined pressure. The point of greatest concern to General Walker was still the slow arrival of replacements in the combat zone. He told General Collins, on 22 August at Taegu, that the replacement flow was replacing only about 75 percent of actual Eighth Army losses and his units were fighting at less strength than that authorized them when they came to Korea. [64]

On the brighter side, the North Korean Army had assumed an unbalanced and vulnerable disposition. By the end of August, virtually all enemy combat troops were south of the 37th Parallel and being supported over long, exposed lines of communications. UNC air and naval units, now in complete command of the sky and sea around Korea, kept these exposed routes under constant attack so that North Korean logistical problems worsened daily.

General MacArthur, foreseeing the enemy's vulnerable disposition, had decided early in the war that the old precept, "Hit 'em where they ain't," fitted such a situation perfectly. The golden chance to strike deep behind the enemy's mass, cut his lines of supply, then smash his front-line divisions by attacking from two directions was enticing to the general who, in World War II, had proved so well the value of amphibious envelopment against the Japanese.

[63] (1) JLC GO 10, 28 Aug. 50. (2) JLC GO 58, 8 Sep. 50.

[64] Memo, Col. Everett for ACofS G-3, 8 Sep. 50, sub: Rpt of Visit to FEC and USARPAC, 19-30 August 1940, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 5.

Indeed, a seaborne strike against the North Korean rear had long seemed the logical solution to MacArthur. Of course, before such a blow could be struck, General Walker had to halt North Korean Army short of Pusan and General MacArthur had to build an amphibious force almost from the ground up. By the opening of September, both generals had progressed considerably in meeting these essentials.

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