Perceptions and Reality
Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950
0n 25 June 1950, the North Korean People's Army of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) swept across the 38th parallel and came
close to uniting the Korean peninsula under the Communist regime of Kim
Il-sung. American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise,
and only the intercession of poorly trained and equipped US garrison
troops from Japan managed to halt the North Korean advance at a high price
in American dead and wounded. Four months later, the Chinese People's
Liberation Army (PLA) intervened in massive numbers as American and UN
forces pushed the North Koreans back across the 38th parallel. US military
and civilian leaders were again caught by surprise, and another costly
price was paid in American casualties.
Two strategic intelligence blunders within six months: yet the civilian
and military leaders involved were all products of World War II, when the
attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly demonstrated the requirement for
intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it happened are
simple, and they hold lessons that are relevant today.
The role of intelligence in America's national security is often
misunderstood. Intelligence information has to exist within the greater
context of domestic US political perception. With the defeat of Japan, our
historically isolationist nation moved quickly to look inward again. The
armed forces were immediately reduced in number, defense spending was
cut dramatically, and intelligence resources met a similar fate. The
looming conflict with Communism was focused on Europe, our traditional
geographic area of interest.
The war had produced a crop of larger-than-life military heroes, and
perhaps the biggest was Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Far East Commander and
virtual ruler of a defeated Japan.
While many considered MacArthur brilliant, his military career also
contained numerous examples of poor military judgment. He had few doubts
about his own judgment, however, and for over a decade had surrounded
himself with staff officers holding a similar opinion. MacArthur was
confident of his capabilities to reshape Japan, but he had little
knowledge of Chinese Communist forces or military doctrine. He had a
well-known disregard for the Chinese as soldiers, and this became the
tenet of the Far Eastern Command (FEC).
In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had publicly declared
a defensive containment line against the Communist menace in Asia, based
upon an island defense line. The Korean peninsula was outside that
Still, America viewed Korea as one of several developing democratic
nations that could serve as counterbalances to Communist expansion. In
March 1949, President Truman approved National Security
Council Memorandum 8/2, which warned that the Soviets intended to
dominate all of Korea, and that this would be a threat to US interests in
the Far East. That summer, the President sent a special message to
Congress citing Korea as an area where the principles of democracy were
being matched against those of Communism. He stated the United States
"will not fail to provide the aid which is so essential to Korea at this
US Intelligence Collection and Analysis
About the same time, US and Soviet troops withdrew from their
respective parts of Korea. The Soviets left behind a well-equipped and
trained North Korean Army, while the United States had provided its Korean
military forces with only light weapons and little training. As US forces
withdrew, MacArthur instructed Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, a longtime
loyal staff member and his G-2, to establish a secret intelligence office
in Seoul. Known as the Korean Liaison Office (KLO), its responsibility was
to monitor troop movements in the North and the activities of Communist
guerrillas operating in the South.
By late 1949, the KLO was reporting that the Communist guerrillas
represented a serious threat to the Republic of Korea (ROK). The office
also noted that many of the guerrillas were originally from the South, and
thus were able to slip back into their villages when hiding from local
security forces. Willoughby also claimed that the KLO had 16 agents
operating in the North. KLO officers in Seoul, however, expressed
suspicion regarding the loyalty and reporting of these agents.
These questionable FEC agents were not America's only agents in the
North. At the end of World War II, then-Capt. John Singlaub had
established an Army intelligence outpost in Manchuria, just across the
border from Korea. Over the course of several years, he trained and
dispatched dozens of former Korean POWs, who had been in Japanese Army
units, into the North. Their instructions were to join the Communist
Korean military and government, and to obtain information on the
Communists' plans and intentions .
These and other collection capabilities contributed to CIA analytic
reports, starting in 1948, regarding the Communist threat on the
peninsula. The first report, in a Weekly Summary dated 20 February,
identifies the Soviet Union as the controlling hand behind all North
Korean political and military planning. In the 16 July Weekly Summary, the Agency
describes North Korea as a Soviet "puppet" regime. On 29 October, a
Weekly Summary states that a North Korean attack on the South is
"possible" as early as 1949, and cites reports of road improvements
towards the border and troop movements there. It also notes, however, that
Moscow is in control.
These reports establish the dominant theme in intelligence analysis
from Washington that accounts for the failure to predict the North Korean
attack -- that the Soviets controlled North Korean decisionmaking. The
Washington focus on the Soviet Union as "the" Communist state had become
the accepted perception within US Government's political and military
leadership circles. Any scholarly counterbalances to this view, either
questioning the absolute authority of Moscow over other Communist states
or noting that cultural, historic, or nationalistic factors might come
into play, fell victim to the political atmosphere.
Fears of another war in Europe against the mighty Red Army and the
exposure of Soviet spying against America created an atmosphere in which
the anti-Communist fervor and accusations of McCarthyism silenced any
debate regarding the worldwide Communist conspiracy. In addition, the
Chinese Communists' rise to internal power created a domestic political
dispute over who had "lost" China. The result was a silencing of American
scholars on China who might have persuaded the country's leadership that
China would never accept Soviet control of its national interests.
Preparations for War
Meanwhile, in early 1950, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung traveled to
Moscow for a meeting with Stalin. They discussed Kim's plans to invade the
South, and Kim asked what Soviet assistance could be expected. Stalin
advised him to discuss the invasion plan with Mao Zedong, who also
happened to be in Moscow. After discussions, Mao agreed that the South was
weak enough to be conquered, and Stalin also approved the invasion.
By the spring of 1950, North Korea's preparations for war had become
readily recognizable. Monthly CIA reports describe the military buildup of
DPRK forces, but also discount the possibility of an actual invasion. It
was believed that DPRK forces could not mount a successful attack without
Soviet assistance, and such assistance would indicate a worldwide
Communist offensive. There were no indications in Europe that such an
offensive was in preparation. On 10 May, the South Korean Defense Ministry
publicly warned at a press conference that DPRK troops were massing at the
border and there was danger of an invasion.
Throughout June, intelligence reports from South Korea and the CIA
provide clear descriptions of DPRK preparations for war. These reports noted the removal of civilians from
the border area, the restriction of all transport capabilities for
military use only, and the movements of infantry and armor units to the
border area. Also, following classic Communist political tactics, the DPRK
began an international propaganda campaign against the ROK "police state."
0n 6 June, CIA reported another interesting international
development: all East Asian senior Soviet diplomats were recalled to
Moscow for consultations. The CIA believed the purpose of the recall was
to develop a new plan to counter anti-Communist efforts in the region.
On 20 June 1950, the CIA published a report, based primarily on human
assets, concluding that the DPRK had the capability to invade the South at
any time. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and Secretary of
Defense Johnson all received copies of this report. Five days later, at four a.m., the DRPK invaded the
South. Both Washington and the FEC in Tokyo were surprised and unprepared.
On 30 June 1950, President Truman authorized the use of US ground forces
The United States was caught by surprise because, within political and
military leadership circles in Washington, the perception existed that
only the Soviets could order an invasion by a "client state" and that such
an act would be a prelude to a world war. Washington was confident that
the Soviets were not ready to take such a step, and, therefore, that no
invasion would occur.
This perception, and indeed its broad acceptance within the Washington
policy community, is clearly stated in a 19 June CIA paper on DRPK
military capabilities. The paper said that "The DPRK is a firmly
controlled Soviet satellite that exercises no independent initiative and
depends entirely on the support of the USSR for existence." The report
noted that while the DPRK could take control of parts of the South, it
probably did not have the capability to destroy the South Korean
government without Soviet or Chinese assistance. This assistance would not
be forthcoming because the Soviets did not want general war. The
Department of State and the military intelligence organizations of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force concurred.
Washington's strategic theme also played well in Tokyo, where General
MacArthur and his staff refused to believe that any Asians would risk
facing certain defeat by threatening American interests. This belief
caused them to ignore warnings of the DPRK military buildup and
mobilization near the border, clearly the "force protection" intelligence
that should have been most alerting to military minds. It was a strong and
perhaps arrogantly held belief, which did not weaken even in the face of
DPRK military successes against US troops in the summer of 1950. It grew
even stronger within military circles in Tokyo as American and UN forces
pushed back the DPRK troops in the fall of 1950. By then, it had become an
article of faith within the FEC, personally testified to by MacArthur,that
no Asian troops could stand up to American military might without being
annihilated. This attitude, considered a "fact" within the FEC and
constantly repeated to the Washington political and military leadership,
resulted in the second strategic blunder -- the surprise Chinese intervention
in the war.
The Chinese Factor
CIA intelligence reports during the first month of the conflict
continued to echo the theme of Soviet control of the DPRK, but they also
began to address the potential for Chinese intervention. On 26 June, the
day after the invasion, the CIA Daily Summary reported that the
Agency agreed with the US Embassy in Moscow that the North Korean
offensive was a "…clear-cut Soviet challenge to the United States…" Four
days later, as President Truman authorized the use of US ground troops in
Korea, CIA Intelligence Memorandum 301, Estimate of Soviet Intentions
and Capabilities for Military Aggression, stated that the Soviets had
large numbers of Chinese troops, which could be used in Korea to make US
involvement costly and difficult. This warning was followed on 8 July by CIA
Intelligence Memorandum 302, which stated that the Soviets were
responsible for the invasion, and they could use Chinese forces to
intervene if DPRK forces could not stand up to UN forces.
On the same day, the Chinese were also addressing how to react to a
DPRK retreat. The first days of July represented the high-water mark of
the DPRK invasion, and, by the end of that first week, US, South Korean,
and UN troops were solidifying a defense line around the port of Pusan,
near the eastern tip of the peninsula. Recognizing that the DPRK momentum
had been blunted, Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai called a national
security meeting to discuss strengthening the Chinese-Korean border area.
At the meeting, it was agreed that the 4th Field Army, the most
experienced PLA combat force, should be moved to the border region by the
end of the month.
On 28 July, the CIA Weekly Summary stated that 40,000 to 50,000
ethnic Korean soldiers from PLA units might soon reinforce DPRK forces.
The article concluded, however, that there were no indications that the
Soviets were prepared to use Chinese reinforcements. This blending of
tactical warnings about possible Chinese units -- first composed of
ethnic Korean soldiers and then of Chinese "volunteers" -- and
strategic analysis that no indications existed of Soviet intentions
to have the Chinese intervene, became the preferred art form for most
Agency reporting through late November. It continued to be based on the
perception that Soviet priorities and objectives would direct any Chinese
By the end of July, tactical intelligence collection on the ground was
becoming organized. Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) detachments were
collecting DPRK and Chinese communications, and US and UN forces were
working with South Korean elements to debrief local residents and send out
agents to assess DPRK positions and strength. Under the control of the CIA
in Tokyo, Marine Lt. Col. "Dutch" Kramer established bases on islands off
the southeast coast of Korea to train local irregular troops for missions
behind enemy lines. These activities quickly began to provide valuable
information. Chinese communications indicated in July that elements of a
Chinese Field Army had moved to Manchuria, and that Gen. Lin Piao was the
PLA commander who would intervene in Korea.
By August, the Communist leaders in the USSR, China, and Korea
recognized that the large-scale intervention by US forces would lead to
the defeat of the DPRK forces. This realization was particularly threatening to
China. On 4 August, at a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo meeting,
Mao stated that if the United States won in Korea, it would threaten
China. Therefore, China had to come to the assistance of the DPRK and
intervene. This decision set in motion China's efforts on
diplomatic, military, and propaganda fronts to defend itself from US
aggression. While Mao's concerns were based on survival of his Communist
regime in China, certainly a shared objective with the USSR, his
motivation in acting had more to do with China's traditional concerns
about its borders, and fears based upon previous US involvement with
Chinese Nationalist forces, than it did with any Communist worldwide
By late August, China was moving aggressively on all fronts to
demonstrate its concerns regarding a defeat of the DPRK forces and US-UN
occupation of that country. On the international propaganda scene,
World Culture, China's official organ, featured an article equating
a DPRK defeat as a defeat for Chinese policy. At the same time, Foreign Minister Zhou En-lai
sent several diplomatic notes to the UN Security Council protesting
alleged US air attacks on Manchuria just north of the Yalu river. Domestically, Chinese media began to focus popular
attention on the vulnerability of the Yalu river border area. And,
militarily, PLA forces near the border area were strengthened in an overt
show of force. By late August, FEC intelligence reports estimated 246,000
PLA and 374,000 militia troops were in Manchuria near the Korean border.
On 8 September, the CIA issued Intelligence Memorandum 324,
Probability of Direct Chinese Communist Intervention in Korea,
which assumed that the Chinese were already providing covert assistance to
the DPRK, including some replacements for combat troops. It stated, however, that overt assistance by the
Chinese would require Soviet approval and a Communist willingness to risk
general war. The memorandum concluded that there was no direct evidence of
indications as to whether China would intervene, but it noted that reports
of Chinese troop buildups in the Manchurian border area made intervention
well within Chinese capabilities. It added that recent Chinese accusations
of aggression against the Manchurian border area could be a setup for an
imminent overt move.
This warning, one of the strongest issued by the CIA before Chinese
intervention, reflected the analytic approach the Agency would stress from
September to November: that the Chinese capability to intervene was
present, but the political decision to do so hinged on acceptance of a
worldwide conflict, which only Soviet leadership could decide. Meanwhile,
General MacArthur was putting the final elements in place for another
signature amphibious landing that would split the DRPK forces and force
Military and Diplomatic Moves
On 15 September, US Marines rushed ashore, captured the west coast city
of Inchon, and began driving DPRK forces north toward their country. This
strategic success was a clear signal that the invasion from the North had
not only failed, but also that the DPRK forces could be destroyed by the
US-led UN force. Two days later, a high-ranking Chinese delegation of
intelligence and logistics officers arrived in North Korea to evaluate the
military situation and prepare the battlefield for Chinese military
By late September, China had sent numerous diplomatic signals
expressing its concern regarding a US occupation of North Korea. The
Acting PLA chief of staff told the Indian Ambassador in Peking that China
would never allow US forces to reach Chinese territory. The Indian Foreign Minister conveyed this message
to the US Ambassador in New Delhi; in Washington, the British Ambassador
passed the same message to the State Department. These private notices were matched by a 22
September public announcement in which the Chinese Foreign Ministry
spokesman issued the statement "We clearly reaffirm that we will always
stand on the side of the Korean people…and resolutely oppose the criminal
acts of American imperialist aggression against Korea and their intrigues
for expanding the war." Also during this period, communications intercepts
continued to identify massive PLA troop movements from southern and
central China into the Sino-Korean border areas.
Discounting the Chinese Threat
In the face of these warnings, the JCS instructed MacArthur to continue
his advance north to destroy the DPRK armed forces as long as there was no
threat of a major Chinese or Soviet intervention. These instructions were
based upon a National Security Council decision made before the Inchon
landing. The Secretary of State also disregarded these
warnings, telling the press that Chinese intervention would be "sheer
By the end of the month, the US Ambassador in Moscow reported that
Soviet and Chinese contacts told both the British and Dutch Ambassadors
that if foreign troops cross the 38th parallel, China would intervene. This specific warning was also repeated to various
journalists, and on 29 September, the Associated Press in Moscow reported
that both China and the Soviet Union would take a "grave view" of US
forces crossing the 38th parallel. Finally, at the end of the month, in a major
public policy address celebrating the first anniversary of the
establishment of the People's Republic of China, Zhou En-lai branded the
United States as China's worst enemy and stated that China will not allow
a neighbor to be invaded.
Once again, these warnings were ignored, and US-UN forces continued to
push the DRPK forces northward. On 2 October, Mao cabled Stalin advising
that China would intervene and asked for Soviet military assistance. Three days later, the CCP Central Committee
officially decided to intervene. US intelligence, however, continued its reporting
theme that while Chinese capability was present, Chinese intent was
lacking. On 6 October, the US Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
stated that the Chinese capability to intervene had grown, but the Chinese
threat to do so was questionable. That same day, the CIA Weekly Summary
advised that the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention continued
to diminish. It also restated the belief that Soviet requirements would
drive any such decision.
Two days later, the Soviet position was delivered to the Chinese.
Stalin advised Mao that the USSR could not provide the military supplies
and air cover over Manchuria that Mao had requested. He also asked Mao not
to engage in a large-scale offensive against US troops, because such an
action might lead to a war between the United States and the Soviet
On 12 October, CIA Office of Records and Estimates Paper 58-50,
entitled Critical Situations in The Far East -- Threat of Full Chinese
Communist Intervention in Korea, concluded that, "While full-scale
Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing
possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion
that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable
in 1950." So, both the United States and the Soviet Union
saw any large-scale Chinese intervention as potentially stimulating a
global war, and the US understanding of the Soviet position was, indeed,
sound. Internal Chinese priorities, however, continued to be discounted by
Washington, which still believed that the Soviets controlled overall
Communist actions worldwide.
The next day, the CCP Politburo decided that China should intervene in
the war even without Soviet military support. Based on this decision, it
was Stalin who relented on his earlier request and agreed to provide
military supplies against a Soviet loan extended to the Chinese. He also
agreed to turn over Soviet aircraft in China to the PLA and to move Soviet
air units into position to defend Chinese territory. Thus, the Chinese not only made a unilateral
decision to intervene for nationalistic purposes, but also intimidated the
Soviets into supporting them.
Through the mid-October period, numerous intelligence reports,
including intercepted communications, indicated Chinese preparations for
military intervention. The CIA reported that China was purchasing medical
supplies abroad for future military activities. CIA reporting from Tokyo, based on information
obtained from a former Chinese Nationalist officer sent into Manchuria to
contact former colleagues now in the PLA, stated that the PLA had over
300,000 troops in the border area. And, on 15 October, a CIA-led irregular ROK force
operating on the west coast near the Yalu river reported that Chinese
troops were moving into Korea.
All this information subsequently turned out to be accurate. On 13 and
14 October, the 38th, 39th, and 40th Chinese Field Armies entered Korea.
The intelligence leadership in both Washington and Tokyo did not alert
either President Truman or MacArthur, who were about to meet on Wake
Island to discuss the conduct of the war. At that meeting, on 15
October, MacArthur told Truman there was little chance of a large-scale
Chinese intervention. And, he noted, should it occur, his air power would
destroy any Chinese forces that appeared.
The next day, the CIA Daily Summary reported that the US Embassy
in The Hague had been advised that Chinese troops had moved into Korea. At
this point, the analytic perspective of the Agency shifted somewhat. It
now agreed that there had been numerous reports on Chinese troop movements
into Korea, but it continued to believe that the Chinese would not openly
intervene. The Agency also abandoned the position that the Chinese had the
capability to intervene but would not do so, and began to accept that the
Chinese had entered Korea. But it held firm to its view that China had no
intention of entering the war in any large-scale fashion.
By 20 October, the Agency had developed another line of reasoning to
explain the entry of Chinese forces in Korea -- they were there to protect
the hydroelectric plants along the Yalu river that provide power to the
Manchurian industrial area. That same day, however, intelligence reports
citing massive numbers of PLA troops in the border region were also
disseminated. Reporting from FEC Intelligence stated that 400,000 PLA
troops were ready to cross the Yalu. The CIA Daily Summary reported that a US
military liaison officer in Hong Kong had stated that 400,000 PLA were to
enter Korea. The Summary concluded, however, that the Soviets and
Chinese were not ready to accept a global war, which any large-scale
intervention would trigger. Apparently no one in either the FEC or the CIA
thought 400,000 PLA troops a rather large number for a defensive
Launching an Offensive
On 25 October, the first phase of the Chinese offensive began with the
ROK 1st Division in contact with PLA units. Chinese POWs, interrogated
that evening by US 8th Army intelligence officers, told of a sizable
Chinese presence. This was reported to FEC G-2. Within the next two days, PLA units decimated two
regiments of the ROK 6th Division and forced the ROK II Corps into
general retreat. Yet, on 28 October, the CIA Daily
Summary stated that only small, independent Chinese units were
fighting in Korea. It totally discounted the possibility that major
Chinese forces were present. By 29 October, South Korean units on
both coasts captured Chinese from regimental-sized PLA units, and these
prisoners convinced X Corps intelligence that the Chinese were being
committed to battle as units, rather than as replacements for DPRK
losses. That same day, however, the FEC Intelligence
Summary advised that Chinese forces had little combat potential
against a modern army. While this view was acceptable in Tokyo and
Washington, combat units in Korea were considerably less comfortable with
During the next two days, Tokyo and Washington continued to doubt the
intelligence reports from the front. On 30 October, MacArthur's G-2,
General Willoughby, flew from Tokyo to X Corps Headquarters to personally
interview 16 Chinese POWs. After this session, he pronounced them to be
"stragglers" rather than members of an organized PLA unit. That same day, the 8th Army reported that
10 separate Chinese POWs stated that several PLA divisions were now
in Korea. While reporting this in its Daily Summary, CIA restated
its belief that Chinese intervention was unlikely, and that these troops
could be protecting the hydroelectric plants essential to the Manchurian
economy. The following day, the CIA Daily Summary carried a report
from the 8th Army stating that its elements were in contact with two
PLA regiments, and that a POW claimed the Chinese entered Korea on
16 October. The Agency commented that while small numbers of Chinese
troops were operating in Korea, it did not believe this indicated Chinese
intent to intervene openly or directly in the war.
Admitting the Obvious
By early November, field reports from Korea could no longer be ignored
in Tokyo and Washington. In addition to POW reporting from both the 8th
Army and X Corps, Marine Corps pilots reported massive truck conveys
moving from Manchuria into Korea. Also, a regiment of the 1st US Cavalry
Division, the first American unit to engage the PLA, took heavy
casualties. By 4 November, the 1st Cavalry identified five PLA
divisions opposing it, and the 1st Marine Division identified three
PLA divisions operating against it. Intercepted Chinese communications disclosed an
order for 30,000 maps of Korea for the forces in Manchuria; US Army
military intelligence estimated these were enough maps for 30 PLA
FEC's G-2 finally acknowledged that the Chinese were in Korea in force.
But Willoughby continued to claim these forces did not represent official
Chinese intervention. By 3 November, FEC had raised
its estimate of
Chinese strength in Korea to 34,000, backed by reserves in Manchuria of
498,000 PLA soldiers and 370,000 Chinese security troops. The CIA Weekly Summary of that date
estimated a similar number of Chinese troops actually in Korea, but
continued to take the position that China's intention was to protect the
Manchurian border and its hydroelectric plants.
Finally, on 5 November, Willoughby admitted that Chinese forces in
Korea had the potential to conduct a large-scale counteroffensive. Later
that day, however, MacArthur advised the JCS that he still did not believe
the Chinese would enter the war in force.
A Brief Respite
Between 4 and 5 November, the Chinese forces broke contact and melted
back into the countryside. This respite provided an opportunity for Tokyo
and Washington to evaluate the situation and assess the nature and size of
the Chinese threat. MacArthur advised that while the Chinese had not
intervened in force, their strength in Korea could force a retreat of his
troops. This seemingly contradictory message caused
some confusion among the Washington military leadership. Meanwhile, Kim
Il-sung publicly admitted that Chinese troops were fighting in Korea, and
a New York Times article on 6 November said that the New China
News Agency had reported that China had "volunteers" fighting there.
Reliable Chinese Nationalist sources also reported that China was
preparing for large-scale combat operations against the UN forces.
On 14 November, The New York Times reported that the Soviet
press described the Chinese as ready to destroy any force which posed a
threat to China, and on 16 November the newspaper reported that Chinese
troops were moving into Korea in large numbers, and that even more troops
would follow. Intelligence from the 8th Army also reported massive
Chinese forces on both sides of the Korean-Chinese
By mid-November, FEC reported that 12 PLA divisions had been identified
in Korea. On 24 November, however, National
Intelligence Estimate 2/1 stated that China had the capability for
large-scale offensive operations but that there were no indications such
an offensive was in the offing. That same day, the second Chinese offensive
started, leaving the 8th Army fighting for its life and most of the
1st Marine Division surrounded and threatened with annihilation.
It took several days for MacArthur and his staff to face the fact that
his "end of the war" offensive toward the Yalu was over and victory was
not near. Finally, on 28 November, MacArthur reported that he faced
200,000 PLA troops and a completely new war. MacArthur again had the
numbers significantly wrong, but he got the "new war" part right.
 Foreign Relations of the United States,
DiplomaticPapers (hereafter FRUS), (US Government Printing Office:
Washington, DC, 1949), vol. 7, part 2, pp. 760-78.
 Robert J. Donovan, Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in
the Coils of War in Asia (New York: St. Martin's-Marek, 1984), p.
 William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: The Covert War
in Korea (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996), pp. 20-21.
 Ibid., p. 23.
 Unless otherwise specified, references to CIA summaries
are from: Woodrow J. Kuhns, Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early
Cold War Years (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence,
1997). That publication lists CIA reports in chronological order.
 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers,
translated by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp.
 I.F. Stone,The Hidden History of the Korean War
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1952), p. 7.
 The reports were noted in Congressional testimony that
was made public. See Donovan, p. 19.
 Breuer, p. 40.
 Kuhns, p. 396.
 Kuhns, p. 409.
 Guang Zhang Shu, Mao's Military Romanticism: China
and the Korean War, 1950-1953 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1995), pp. 58-59.
 Edward Evanhoe, Dark Moon: Eight Army Special
Operations in the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1995), p. 8.
 David A. Hatch and Robert Louis Benson, "The Korean
War: The SIGINT Background," NSA Monograph, June 2000.
 Juergen Domes,Peng Te-huai, The Man and the
Image (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), p. 60.
 Shu, p. 63.
 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New
York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 86.
 John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur
Controversy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), p.
 Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberlain,
MacArthur: 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 386.
 Kuhns, p. 433.
 Shu, p. 74.
 Kavalam Madhava Panikkar, In Two Chinas: Memoirs
of a Diplomat (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 108-9.
 Edwin P. Hoyt, On To The Yalu (Briarcliff
Manor, NY: Stein and Day, 1984), p. 198.
 Shu, p. 77.
 Hatch and Benson, "The Korean War."
 History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Chiefs
of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 3, The Korean War, part 1
(Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff), p.
 Hoyt, p. 198.
 Stone, p. 126.
 The New York Times, 10 October 1950,
 Shu, pp. 78-79.
 Edwin P. Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked:
Korea, 1950 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), pp. 80-81.
 Eliot A. Cohen, "The Chinese Intervention in Korea,
1950," Studies in Intelligence, vol. 32, no. 3, Fall 1988, p.
 Shu, p. 83.
 Kuhns, p. 450.
 Ibid., p. 84.
 Breuer, p. 105.
 Ibid., p. 106.
 John Toland, In Mortal Combat (New York:
Morrow, 1991), p. 255.
 Text of conference quoted in Richard H. Rovere and
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The MacArthur Controversy and American
Foreign Policy (New York: Noonday Press of Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
1965), pp. 275-85.
 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Vol.
II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956),
 Roy Edger Appleman, United States Army in the
Korean War (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1960), p. 761.
 Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked,
 Appleman, p. 755.
 Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold
Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), pp. 287-88.
 Breuer, p. 108.
 Lynn Montress and Nicholas Canzona, US Marine
Operations in Korea (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1957), p. 124.
 Martin Lichterman, "To the Yalu and Back," in Harold
Stein, American Civil-Military Decisions (Birmingham, AL:
University of Alabama Press, 1963), p. 601.
 Hatch and Benson, "The Korean War."
 Spanier, p. 117.
 Appleman, p. 762.
 Hoyt, On to Victory at the Yalu,
 Truman, p. 377.
 Cohen, p. 58.
 Hoyt, The Day the Chinese Attacked,
 Montress and Canzona, p. 129.
 FRUS, pp. 1220-22.
P. K. Rose works in the Directorate of Operations.