Toward the Iron Triangle
In leading the Eighth Army according to the
uncommon prescriptions of his instructions from General Ridgway, General Van
Fleet would culminate a long career already noted for unusual episodes.
Graduating from West Point in 1915 with the class "the stars fell on," he
initially matched the rise of classmates such as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Omar
N. Bradley, commanding a machine gun battalion as a very young major during
World War I and becoming a colonel in command of the 8th Infantry, 4th Division,
by the time of American entry into World War II. A hiatus then developed when
Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall, who mistook Van Fleet for a
similarly named intemperate officer who had served under Marshall years earlier,
disapproved his promotion to brigadier general. Ironically, Van Fleet was a
teetotaler.1
|
Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet
|
Rectification came with remarkable
swiftness after Van Fleet led the 8th Infantry ashore at Normandy on 6 June
1944. Within five months he rose from colonel to major general and within nine
months from regimental to corps command. General Eisenhower later rated his
battle record as the best of any regimental, division, or corps commander in the European theater. Van Fleet received his third star
early in 1948 along with an unprecedented assignment as head of a joint U.S.
military advisory and planning group in Greece, where he received wide acclaim
as he guided Greek government forces to victory over a Communist-supported
insurgency. After thirty-six years of service and at age fifty-nine, he would
receive the additional star of a full general in Korea at the end of July
1951.2
From Normandy to Korea, Van Fleet's career
had benefited from the attention of the current Army chief of staff. As
commander of the VII Corps during World War II General Collins instigated Van
Fleet's initial rise into general officer ranks, as deputy chief of staff in
1948 he nominated Van Fleet for the post in Greece, and it was Collins who
originally recommended Van Fleet as Ridgway's successor. "Van," in Collins'
estimation, "was cast in the same mold as Ridgway as a fighting man," and "could
take over the Eighth Army without a falter in its high morale and aggressive
spirit."3
Van Fleet showed some variation in "mold"
when asked during his first press conference on 22 April to explain the goal of
Eighth Army operations under his direction. Notwithstanding his rather explicit instructions from
Ridgway, he replied that he did not know. The answer, he said, would have to
come from higher authority. But if he had yet to attune himself to the
conditions and requirements of the war as Ridgway saw them, from the start he
otherwise would compare closely with his predecessor in attitude and tactics as
commander of the Eighth Army.4 It was perhaps a reflection of his experience in
Greece that Van Fleet, in his initial inspection of the front, went first to the
ROK Army zone in the east.5 In December President Rhee had requested
American weapons and equipment to place more South Koreans under arms, an appeal
that had generated interest in Washington. But General MacArthur had twice
recommended disapproval, most recently on 6 April, largely on grounds that the
ROK Army's past poor performances raised doubt that anything would be gained by
increasing its size. The need to improve the quality of the ROK Army was one
reason General Collins had recommended Van Fleet for the ground command in
Korea. One of Van Fleet's bigger projects, and successes, in Greece had been to
build its army into an effective organization.6
The Enemy's Conspicuous Absence
11-20 April
There was little activity in the South
Korean Army zone when Van Fleet reached Kangnung on 16 April for a conference
with ROK Defense Minister Sign Sung Mo; General Chung; General Farrell, the KMAG
chief; and General Paik, the former commander of the ROK 1st Division now in
command of the ROK I Corps. Since occupying positions around Yangyang above line
Kansas on the 10th, the ROK I Corps had had no contact on its front, and on the
11th a company from the 29th Regiment, 9th Division, had patrolled some fifteen
miles north of Yangyang without encountering enemy forces. (See Map 31.) (The 69th
Brigade, the corps'
longtime, if weak, opponent, had been taken off the line and disbanded, and the
North Korean 2d Division, now responsible for the coastal area, had yet
to deploy forces in contact.) Currently moving to join the corps for seasoning-
small as that prospect was at the time-was the ROK 11th Division, green to
combat except for antiguerrilla operations conducted in southwestern Korea since
October.7 In the narrow ROK III Corps zone
high in the Taebaeks, the ROK 3d Division, despite having to be resupplied
entirely by air and carrying parties in the virtually roadless mountains, had
beaten back detachments of the North Korean 45th
Division to reach line Kansas on the 14th, and
its patrols since then had encountered few enemy forces above the
line.8 The scant opposition to the South Koreans, and especially the
ROK III Corps' want of a good supply road, would prompt one of Van Fleet's first
operations orders.
Next to the west, the three divisions of
the X Corps were just beginning to consolidate positions along the Kansas line
on 16 April. Since the 10th, after it became obvious that North Korean
1st Division forces
opposite the corps left were withdrawing hastily eastward from the ground below
the Hwach'on Reservoir, the 23d Infantry of the 2d Division had swung east along
the lower shore in pursuit. Abandoned ammunition, food supplies, and a fully
stocked aid station evidenced the enemy's haste. Ahead of the pursuing forces,
the bulk of the enemy division's 1st Regiment (also known as the 14th Regiment)
crossed the reservoir at a narrow point three
miles northwest of Yanggu, using boats and rafts that
were burned after the crossing; the remainder moved to Yanggu and then north
around the eastern end of the reservoir. Leading forces of the 23d Infantry
entered Yanggu and reached line Kansas on the 15th.9
The hard spots of North Korean resistance
encountered just above the Soyang River by the 7th Division at X Corps center
and the ROK 5th Division at the right had begun to dissolve on 13 April. The 5th
Division cleared North Korean 45th Division
forces out of their defenses around Inje on the
15th, and after artillery pounded the ridges north of town during the night,
dawn attacks carried the South Koreans to line Kansas with negligible contact.
The 17th Infantry, advancing on the 7th Division's left through decreasing
opposition from North Korean 15th Division
forces, found Route 29 leading into Yanggu
obstructed by booby-trapped fallen trees and cleverly placed wooden box mines
but gained line Kansas and made contact with the 2d Division in Yanggu on the
15th and 16th. On the division's right, the 32d Infantry pushed through brief
but sharp resistance to reach the line early on 17 April.10
Beginning on the 17th, X Corps patrols
ranging above line Kansas found progressively fewer enemy forces.
General Almond attempted to follow the North
Korean withdrawal by establishing forward patrol bases in all division zones,
whence strong patrols were to advance farther north each day in search of enemy
positions. As of 20 April the patrolling had reached a depth of about two miles
without meeting significant resistance.11
On the opposite side of the Hwach'on Reservoir, IX Corps
patrols sent forward of line Kansas by the ROK 6th and 1st Marine Divisions
began to bring back reports of Chinese withdrawal when forces engaged in
Operation DAUNTLESS to the west drew closer to line Utah. (See Map 29.) By 17 April
the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, which had replaced the 7th Cavalry after
the latter's unsuccessful effort to capture the Hwach'on Dam, established
outposts near the dam on the ridge inside the Pukhan loop and on heights above
the Pukhan to the west. On the 18th a Marine patrol crossing the Pukhan four
miles west of the dam found Hwach'on town on Route 17 unoccupied except for
eleven Chinese, whom the patrol took captive. Intelligence officers appraised
the voluntary withdrawal ahead of the two IX Corps divisions as a realignment of
forces with those dropping back in the DAUNTLESS sector but did not overlook the
possibility that the Chinese were coaxing the IX Corps into a vulnerable
deployment. A recently captured document, dated 17 March, extolled the virtues
and explained the purpose of "roving defensive warfare," defined as defense
through movement without regard for the loss or gain of ground which could
"conserve our own power, deplete the enemy's
strength, and secure for us more favorable conditions for future
victory."12 (This scheme of defense had a pronounced similarity to the
tactical concepts General Ridgway set for the Eighth Army in February.)
As General Van Fleet completed an east-towest tour of the
front on 17 April, the first phase of Operation DAUNTLESS was a virtual success.
On the east flank of the advance, the British 27th Brigade of the IX Corps had
cleared minor 40th Army forces from Paegun Mountain above the headwaters of the
Kap'yong River to reach line Utah the day before. The 19th Regiment of the ROK
6th Division was currently relieving the brigade, which, except for the New
Zealand artillery assigned to stay forward in support of the South Koreans, was
withdrawing into corps reserve near Kap'yong town. The relief in part was in
preparation for the second DAUNTLESS phase in which the IX Corps would make a
full advance with the ROK 6th and 1st Marine Divisions. While in reserve, the
British brigade also was to begin rotating units under a British policy calling
for annual replacement. The 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland
Highlanders, was to be replaced on 23 April by the 1st Battalion, King's Own
Scottish Borders; on the 25th, brigade headquarters itself was to leave the line
and be replaced by a new staff and commander from Hong Kong. The brigade at that
time would become the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade under the command of Brigadier George
Taylor.13
On the west flank of the DAUNTLESS attack, at approximately I
Corps center, the 65th Infantry of the 3d Division, reinforced by the Philippine
10th Battalion Combat Team and two companies of the 64th Tank Battalion, had
easily defeated 26th Army detachments in a narrow zone between the Imjin River and Route 33
to reach line Utah on 14 April. In the right half of the corps zone, delaying
forces of the 26th and 40th Armies had been more reluctant to give way before the 25th and 24th
Divisions advancing toward Ch'orwon and Kumhwa. The 25th Division spent four
days crossing the Hant'an River and getting a foothold in the Pogae-San heights,
a series of steep north-south ridges between Routes 33 and 3, and needed two
days more to cover half the ten-mile distance between the Kansas and Utah lines.
East of Route 3, the 24th Division attacking through the Kwangdok-san ridges
shouldering the Yongp'yong River gained scarcely a mile in three days. But by 17
April resistance weakened in both division zones. On that date a company of the
6th Tank Battalion, 24th Division, moved up Route 3 within seven miles of Kumhwa
without contact. On the following day, in the 25th Division zone, a battalion of
the 35th Infantry, two companies of the 89th Tank Battalion, and an artillery
battery moved through the upper Hant'an River valley within five miles of
Ch'orwon before receiving fire. Impeded by rugged ground, heavy rains, and
somewhat stiffer resistance beginning on 19 April,
the two divisions were on line Utah on the 20th except at the left of the 25th
Division where enemy delaying forces held up the attached Turkish brigade along
Route 33.14
Stretched by the DAUNTLESS gains of the 65th Infantry,
the western I Corps front by 20 April lay along thirty miles of the meandering
Imjin, from its mouth northeastward to a point on Route 33 ten miles below
Ch'orwon. At the left, the ROK 1st Division sat astride Route 1 with its tank
destroyer battalion (still organized and fighting as an infantry unit) and 11th
and 12th Regiments stretched out from the mouth of the Imjin to the river's
Korangp'o-ri bend fifteen miles upstream. The 3d Division occupied the
Korangp'o-ri -Route 33 sector with the attached British 29th Brigade adjacent to
the South Korean division and the 65th Infantry on the ground taken during its
recent advance. It was a gaping front, manned for the most part in a series of
separated battalion strongpoints.15
As the Imjin River front had developed to
its present width since the beginning of the month, the two divisions manning it
had patrolled extensively above the river. The patrols encountered thinly
disposed forces of the North Korean 8th Division
along the far bank, most of them ahead of the ROK
1st Division, until the 10th, when they discovered that the North Koreans had
vacated their positions. South Korean patrols later moved along Route 1 as far as
Kaesong, the ancient capital of Korea some twelve miles above the Imjin, without
making contact. The 8th Division appeared to have joined the remainder of
the North Korean 1 Corps west of the Yesong River.16
Other ROK 1st Division and British 29th
Brigade patrols ranging up to five miles above the Imjin after 10 April began to
encounter a sprinkling of Chinese, mostly across the tenmile British front
between Korangp'o-ri and a near ninety-degree bend in the river where its flow
changes from southeast to southwest and where it receives the water of the
westwardflowing Hant'an. Although intelligence agents had in the meantime
identified the XIX Army Group in the general Kumch'on-Kuhwa-ri area and
had discovered the neighboring III Army Group (but misidentified it as
the XVIII Army Group), the minor engagements within five miles of the
river were the first indication that any of these forces had displaced forward.
Five captives taken at scattered locations between 11 and 14 April all belonged
to the 561st Regiment, 187th Division, from the 63d Army of the
XIX Army Group. One prisoner stated at interrogation that the 561st
had a defensive mission pending the arrival of reinforcements. The light
contact and wide dispersion of a single regiment did suggest a screen, but as
South Korean and British patrols continued to probe the thin enemy positions
through 20 April, no evidence appeared of Chinese forces massing behind
them.17
Perhaps the most dramatic- certainly the
most visible- evidence of enemy activity to appear as Eighth Army forces closed
on the Kansas and Utah lines were billows of smoke rising at numerous points
ahead of them. By midApril, belts of smoke up to ten miles deep lay before much
of the I, IX, and X Corps fronts.18
Air observers confirmed that enemy troops, some
in groups of fifty to five hundred, were setting fire to grasslands and brush.
Some observers reported that smoke generators also were being used. Fires doused
by rain showers were rekindled. Maritime air that frequently stagnated over the
battlefront, added sea haze and moisture to the smoke and produced smog. On a
number of days-varying from sector to sectorrain, haze, fog, smog, and
particularly smoke hampered ground and air observation, the delivery of air
strikes, and the adjustment of artillery fire.19
Though the smoke was intended to shield
daylight troop movements, there was not much evidence that enemy forces
were moving toward the front. During the last three days of the advance to line
Utah the 65th Infantry captured a member of the 181st Division, part of the
60th Army of the
III Army Group. Two captives taken by the 24th and 25th Divisions were from different
regiments of the 81st Division, which belonged to the 27th Army
of the IX Army
Group. One of the latter told his captors that
his unit would be committed to offensive operations after the 27th Army finished relieving the
26th. By 20 April
these three prisoners and the sprinkling of Chinese discovered above the Imjin
were the only indications that fresh forces might have moved forward under the
smoke.20
To give some order of probability to the
opening of the expected enemy offensive, Eighth Army G-2 Tarkenton advised
General Van Fleet on 18 April that a "survey of all sources," while failing to
indicate conclusively any specific date or period for the initial attack,
pointed to 20 April through 1 May. Tarkenton considered the latter date
especially significant since it was the "most important day of the year to
International Communism." Having learned that two fresh army groups (the
XIX and III) were in the general Kumch'on-Koksan-Ich'on area, he
believed the "greatest enemy potential" for a major attack to be from the north
and northwest across the Imjin. As of the 20th, however, I Corps patrols had
seen no signs of offensive preparations in this sector, nor had any evidence
that the enemy was about to attack appeared elsewhere. Incoming reports to Van Fleet from corps commanders and
Colonel Tarkenton's own daily intelligence summaries all described enemy forces
as maintaining a "defensive attitude."21
Since all units were on or near their Utah
and Kansas objectives, and since there was no clear sign that the impending
enemy offensive would start immediately, Van Fleet elected to open the second
phase of DAUNTLESS. In
notifying General Ridgway that the I and IX Corps would move toward line Wyoming
on 21 April, Van Fleet also proposed that the X, ROK III, and ROK I Corps attack
to secure the segment of Route 24 running northeast ahead of the ROK III and I
Corps to a junction with the coastal highway near the town of Kansong,
twenty-three miles above Yangyang. This move would give the two South Korean
corps a supply route in the higher Taebaeks, needed in particular by the ROK III
Corps. To secure the road, Van Fleet wanted to hinge an advance at the eastern
end of the Hwach'on Reservoir and swing the forces between the reservoir and the
coast northwestward to line Alabama seven to fourteen miles above Route 24.
Ridgway approved a sweep that would achieve the same end but with a
substantially shorter eastern arc. Van Fleet set the 24th as the opening
date.22
One Day's Notice
The I Corps' final DAUNTLESS objectives lay in
the zones of the 25th and 24th Divisions stretching north of line Utah to
Ch'orwon and Kumhwa at the base of the Iron Triangle. Ahead of the ROK 6th
Division and 1st Marine Division in the IX Corps zone, line Wyoming curved
southeast from the Kumhwa area to the Hwach'on Reservoir. On the 21st the two IX
Corps divisions moved two to five miles above line Kansas against almost no
opposition. Immediately west, the 24th Division did not test the opposition
below Kumhwa but deliberately stood fast in the Kwangdok-san ridges to allow the
neighboring ROK 6th Division to come abreast. In the Pogae-san heights, the 25th
Division attacked toward Ch'orwon but made no substantial progress after
receiving increasing artillery fire during the day and becoming involved in hard
fights right at the Utah line, especially in the zone of the Turkish brigade
along Route 33.23
Neither corps developed evidence of enemy
offensive preparations during the day. The absence of opposition in the IX Corps
zone only confirmed the recent patrol reports of withdrawal. Below the Iron Triangle, the resistance that began to stiffen on 19
April had been expected to grow progressively heavier as I Corps forces moved
above the Utah line. On the Imjin front, daylight patrols working above the
river again found only a scattering of Chinese. General Milburn concluded in an
evening wrap-up report to General Van Fleet that the "enemy attitude remains
defensive."24
The only appreciable change in enemy
activity on the 21st occurred east of the Hwach'on Reservoir in the X Corps
zone. North and northeast of Yanggu, 2d and 7th Division patrols, after several
days of nearly fruitless searches, located several groups of six hundred to a
thousand North Koreans immediately above the corps front. These groups
suggested, as General Almond reported to Van Fleet, that a relief or
reinforcement of enemy units was taking place.25
Summing up the day's findings late on the
21st, the Eighth Army G-2 reported that his information still was not firm
enough to "indicate the nearness" of the impending enemy offensive with any
degree of certainty. A worrisome fact, as he earlier had pointed out to General
Van Fleet, was that a lack of offensive signs did not necessarily mean that the
opening of the offensive was distant. In preparing past attacks, Chinese forces
had successfully concealed their locations until they moved into forward
assembly areas immediately before they attacked.26
The first indication that the enemy would
repeat this pattern appeared during the night when I Corps patrols
reconnoitering above the Imjin ran into Chinese positions that were stronger and
nearer the river than those encountered during past searches. There was no
question that the XIX Army
Group was
setting out a covering force.27
More evidence appeared on the 22d as the I
and IX Corps continued their DAUNTLESS advance toward line Wyoming. The progress of the attack resembled
that on the previous day, IX Corps forces making easy moves of two to three
miles, the two I Corps divisions being limited to shorter gains by heavier
resistance. On the east flank of the advance, the Hwach'on Dam, defended so
stoutly by 39th Army forces only a few days earlier, fell to the 1st Korean Marine
Corps Regiment without a fight. But a Chinese captive taken elsewhere in the 1st
Marine Division zone during the afternoon told interrogators that an attack
would be opened before the day was out. In midafternoon the ROK 6th Division
captured several members of the Chinese 60th
Division, and, immediately west, the 24th
Division took captives from the 59th Division.
These two divisions belonged to the fresh
20th Army. The full
IX Army Group had
reached the front. In the 25th Division zone on the west flank of the advance,
six Chinese who blundered into the hands of the Turkish brigade along Route 33
during the afternoon were members of a survey party from the 2d Motorized Artillery Division. The division's guns, according to the officer in charge, were
being positioned to support an attack scheduled to
start after dark.28
For the scheduled advance to line Alabama
east of the Hwach'on Reservoir, the X CorpsROK III Corps boundary was to be
shifted four miles west at noon on 23 April to give the ROK III Corps, which had been operating with only the ROK 3d
Division on line, a two-division front. The III Corps reserve division, the ROK
7th, began occupying the added frontage on the 22d, its 5th Regiment relieving
the 36th Regiment of the ROK 5th Division and the X Corps right early in the
evening. On the 23d the incoming division's 3d Regiment was to move into a
two-mile gap directly above Inje between the 5th Regiment and the 35th Regiment,
now the right flank unit of the 5th Division. The latter's 36th Regiment
meanwhile assembled three miles below its former position in preparation for
moving west into the redrawn 5th Division zone the following day as the
remainder of the ROK 7th Division came into its new area.29
A similar shifting of North Korean forces
above the X and ROK III Corps was indicated when the
ROK 5th Division, previously in contact with the 45th Division of the North
Korean III Corps above Inje, captured a member of the 12th Division, North Korean V
Corps. Farther east, the ROK 3d Division, which had had almost no contact
since reaching line Kansas, received hard local
attacks that drove in its outposts and pressed its main line before easing in
the evening of the 22d. Thus the North Korean 111 Corps could be shifting west
toward the reservoir and the North Korean V Corps returning to the line from a
point above Inje eastward.30
Aerial reconnaissance after daybreak on the
22d reported a general forward displacment of enemy formations from rear
assemblies northwest of the I Corps and north of both the I and IX Corps, also
extensive troop movements, both north and south, on the roads above Yanggu and
Inje east of the Hwach'on Reservoir. Though air strikes punished the moving
troops bodies, air observers reported the southward march of enemy groups with
increasing frequency during the day. On the basis of the sightings west of the
Hwach'on Reservoir, it appeared that the enemy forces approaching the I Corps
would mass evenly across the corps front while those moving toward the IX Corps
would concentrate on the front of the ROK 6th Division.31
Civilians entering I Corps lines from the
northwest confirmed the enemy approach from that direction, and through the day
British 29th Brigade forces along the Imjin observed enemy patrols investigating
the north bank of the river for crossing sites. The 3d Division meanwhile found
evidence that the III Army Group was included in the forward displacement
when a patrol operating north along Route 33 above the division's right flank picked up a member of the 34th Division, which belonged to
the group's 12th Army.32
At 1700, 25th Division air observers
reported a long column of trucks, some towing artillery pieces, moving down
Route 33 toward the Turks. Aircraft and artillery attacked the trucks until they
dispersed off the road into wooded areas. By 1800 enemy foot troops were seen on
Route 33 marching south in close column and just before dark were observed
occupying foxholes along the sides of the road. Ten batteries of artillery kept
the road and the suspected enemy artillery positions under fire.33
Immediately east, artillery pilots spotted
enemey columns nearing 24th Division lines late in the afternoon and brought
them under fire as they came within range. The approaching forces simply
accepted casualties as they massed above the center of the division front. At
1900 the division commander, General Bryan, notified I Corps headquarters that
he expected to be attacked in about two hours. "I think this is what we have
been waiting for," he added.34 It was. Bryan's prediction of attack
on the 24th Division proved correct almost to the exact minute. The initial
assault of the enemy spring offensive opened an hour earlier, howeveralmost as
if signaled by the rise of a full moon-in the adjacent sector of the ROK 6th
Division.
Notes
1 Biog of Gen Van Fleet,
prepared by Office of Pub Info, DOD, 12 Mar 53, in CMH; Time, vol.
LVII, no. 20, 14 May 1951, pp. 29-31; Collins, War in Peacetime,
pp. 294-95.
2 Ibid.
3 Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 295.
4 Eighth Army CG Jnl, 22 Apr 51; Rees, Korea: The Limited War, p. 255; Middleton, The Compact History of the Korean
War, p. 188.
5 Earlier, at General
Ridgway's urging, General Chung, the ROK Army chief of staff, had established a
forward command post at Hajinbu-ri. Thereafter the two ROK corps zones in the
east were considered as the ROK Army zone.
6 Rad, W99238, DA (G3) to CINCFE, 20 Dec
50; Rad, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51; Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 169; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 315.
7 The 11th's rear area mission
was taken over by the ROK 8th Division, now rebuilt after being shattered in
February.
8 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; Eighth Army CG Jnl, 16 Apr 51; Hq, FEC, History of the North Korean
Army, 31 Jul 52.
9 Rads, X 18473, and X 18493,
CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 and 15 Apr 51, respectively; 2d Div Comd Rpt,
Nar, Apr 51; the North Korean 1st
Regiment's withdrawal is described in 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51.
10 See following Rads from CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army:
X 18473, 14 Apr 51, X 18484 and X 18493, 15 Apr 51 and X 18505 and X 18513, 17
Apr 51; 7th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
11 Ibid.: X 18513, 17 Apr 51, X 18523, 18 Apr 51, X
18535, 19 Apr 51, and X 18650, 20 Apr 51.
12 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div Hist
Diary, Apr 51; 1st Marine Div POR 23, 16 Apr 51; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks,
The East-Central Front, p. 102.
13 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; Wood, Strange Battleground, p.
79.
14 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div G3
Jnl, 10-20 Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 24th Div G3 Jnl, 11-20 Apr
51; Rad, CICCG 4-4, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 11 Apr 51.
15 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
16 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-3, CG I
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 10 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIRs 263-279, 1-17 Apr
51.
17 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIRs 273-282, 11-20 Apr 51; the following Rads from CG I Corps to
CG Eighth Army: CICCG 4-4, 11 Apr 51, CICCG 4-5, 12 Apr 51, CICCG 4-6, 13 Apr
51, CICCG 4-7,14 Apr 51, CICCG 4-8, 15 Apr 51, CICCG 4-9, 16 Apr 51, CICCG 4-11,
18 Apr 51, and CICCG 4-13, 20 Apr 51.
18 The smoke, first noticed
about 9 April, apparently was not mentioned on the 13th when General Ridgway,
just before transferring to Tokyo, canvassed corps commanders for recent
evidence of enemy offensive preparations.
19 Of seventy close support
sorties dispatched on one day, all but fourteen had to be aborted because of smoke in the target
areas. Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; IX
Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G2 SS
Rpt, Sum, Apr 51; Tech Rpt, Weather Effect on Army
Operations: Weather in the Korean Conflict, vol. II, p. XII-I; Rad, CICCG 4-8, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad,
IXCCG 56, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rads, X 18493, X 18505, and
X 18523, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 17, and 18 Apr 51, respectively;
Eighth Army PIR 285, 23 Apr 51.
20 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; Eighth Army PIRs 280-282, 18-20 Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51;
Rad, CICCG 4-12, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 19 Apr 51.
21 Eighth Army PIRs 276-282, 14-20 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG
4-7, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 14 Apr 51; Rad, X 18473, CG X Corps to CG
Eighth Army, 14 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-8, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51;
Rad, X 18484, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army, 15 Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-9, CG I
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 16 Apr 51; Rad, IXCCG 56, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth
Army, 16 Apr 51; Rads, CICCG 4-10, CICCG 4-11, CICCG 4-12, and CICCG 413, CG I
Corps to CG Eighth Army, 17, 18, 19, and 20 Apr 51, respectively.
22 Rad, GX-4-3900 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to CG I Corps
and CG IX Corps, 19 Apr 51; Rad, G-4-3901 KCG, CG Eighth Army to CINCFE, 19 Apr
51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, 19 Apr 51; Rad, GX-4-3847 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to
C/S ROKA et al., 19 Apr 51; Rad, C 60648, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51;
Rad, GX-4-4497 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 22 Apr 51; Rad,
GX-4-1520 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to C/S ROKA and CG X Corps, 22 Apr 51.
23 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad IXCCG 63, CG IX Corps to CG Eighth
Army, 21 Apr 51; 1st Marine Div Hist Diary, Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; Rad, CICCG 4-14, CG I Corps to CG Eighth Army, 21 Apr 51; 24th Div Comd Rpt,
Nar, Apr 51; 25th Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
24 IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, CICCG 4-14, CG I Corps to CG Eighth
Army, 21 Apr 51.
25 Rad, X 18863, CG X Corps to
CG Eighth Army, 22 Apr 51.
26 Eighth Army PIR 283, 21 Apr
51.
27 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
28 Montross Kuokka, and Hicks,
The East-Central Front, p. 103; Ltr, Lt Col Willard Pearson (Sr Advisor
to ROK 6th Div) to Chief, KMAG, 2 May 51, sub: 6th ROK Div; Eighth Army PIR 284,
22 Apr 51; I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Barth, Tropic Lightning and Taro
Leaf in Korea, pp. 78-79.
29 Rad, GX-4-3847 KGOO, CG
Eighth Army to C/S ROKA et al., 19 Apr 51; X Corps 01156, 21 Apr 51; X Corps
Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Sum, Entry 2355, and Briefing Notes
for CG, 22 Apr 51.
30 Rad, X 18676, CG X Corps to
CG Eighth Army, 22 Apr 51; Eighth Army G3 Jnl, Entries 230810 and 230817, 22 Apr
51; ibid., Sum and Entry 1000, 23 Apr 51; X Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51.
31 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51; IX Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Rad, X 18676, CG X Corps to CG Eighth Army,
22 Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr 51.
32 Eighth Army Comd Rpt, Nar,
Apr 51; 1 Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Brigadier C.N. Barclay, The First
Commonwealth Division (Aldershot: Gale & Polden Limited, 1954), pp.
60-61; Lieutenant General Albert Crahay, Les Belges En Coree, 1951-1955
(Brussels: Imprimerie Medicale et Scientifique [S.A.], 1967), p. 75; Captain
Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (London: Frederick Muller,
Ltd., 1954), p. 17; 3d Div Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr 51; Eighth Army PIR 284, 22 Apr
51.
33 Barth, Tropic Lightning
and Taro Leaf, p 79.
34 I Corps Comd Rpt, Nar, Apr
51.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation