Thus we see that war is not only a political act, but a true instrument
of politics, a continuation of politics by other means.|
CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, On War
The first official word of the North Korean attack across the border
into South Korea reached Tokyo in an information copy of an emergency telegram
dispatched from Seoul at 0925, 25 June, by the military attaché
at the American Embassy there to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department
of the Army, in Washington.  About the same time the Far East Air Forces
in Tokyo began receiving radio messages from Kimpo Airfield near Seoul
stating that fighting was taking place along the 38th Parallel on a scale
that seemed to indicate more than the usual border incidents. Northwest
Airlines, with Air Force support, operated Kimpo Airfield at this time.
Brig. Gen. Jared V. Crabb, Deputy Chief of Staff for Far East Air Forces,
telephoned Brig. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Far
East Command, about 1030 and the two compared information. Thereafter throughout
the day the two men were in constant communication with each other on the
direct line they maintained between their offices. Most of the messages
to Tokyo during 25 June came to the U.S. Air Force from Kimpo Airfield,
and there was a constant stream of them. By 1500 in the afternoon both
Crabb and Wright were convinced that the North Koreans were engaged in
a full-scale invasion of South Korea. 
About the time the military attaché in Seoul sent the first message
to the Department of the Army, representatives of press associations in
Korea began sending news bulletins to their offices in the United States.
It was about eight o'clock Saturday night, 24 June, Washington time, when
the first reports reached that city of the North Korean attacks that had
begun five hours earlier. Soon afterward, Ambassador Muccio sent his first
radio message from Seoul to the Department of State, which received it
at 9:26 p.m., 24 June. This would correspond to 10:26 a.m., 25 June, in Korea. Ambassador Muccio said in part, "It would
appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched
that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea."
The North Korean attack surprised official Washington. Maj. Gen. L.
L. Lemnitzer in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on 29 June gave
what is undoubtedly an accurate statement of the climate of opinion prevailing
in Washington in informed circles at the time of the attack. He said it
had been known for many months that the North Korean forces possessed the
capability of attacking South Korea; that similar capabilities existed
in practically every other country bordering the USSR; but that he knew
of no intelligence agency that had centered attention on Korea as a point
of imminent attack.  The surprise in Washington on Sunday, 25 June 1950,
according to some observers, resembled that of another, earlier Sunday-Pearl
Harbor, 7 December 1941.
U.S. and U.N. Action
When Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, at his Long
Island home that night received the news of the North Korean attack he
reportedly burst out over the telephone, "This is war against the
United Nations."  He called a meeting of the Security Council for
the next day. When the Council met at 2 p.m., 25 June (New York time),
it debated, amended, and revised a resolution with respect to Korea and
then adopted it by a vote of nine to zero, with one abstention and one
absence. Voting for the resolution were China, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, France,
India, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Yugoslavia abstained
from voting; the Soviet Union was not represented. The Soviet delegate
had boycotted the meetings of the Security Council since January 10, 1950,
over the issue of seating Red China's representative in the United Nations
as the official Chinese representative. 
The Security Council resolution stated that the armed attack upon the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea "constitutes a breach
of the peace." It called for (1) immediate cessation of hostilities;
(2) authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces
to the 38th Parallel; and, finally, "all Members to render every assistance
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain
from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." 
President Truman had received the news at his home in Independence,
Mo. He started back to Washington by plane in the early afternoon of 25
June. At a meeting in Blair House that night, with officials of the State and Defense Departments present, President Truman
made a number of decisions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff established a teletype
conference with General MacArthur in Tokyo at once and relayed to him President
Truman's decisions. They authorized General MacArthur to do the following:
(1) send ammunition and equipment to Korea to prevent loss of the Seoul-Kimpo
area with appropriate air and naval cover to assure their safe arrival;
(2) provide ships and planes to evacuate American dependents from Korea
and to protect the evacuation; and (3) dispatch a survey party to Korea
to study the situation and determine how best to assist the Republic of
Korea. President Truman also ordered the Seventh Fleet to start from the
Philippines and Okinawa for Sasebo, Japan, and report to the Commander,
U.S. Naval Forces, Far East (NAVFE), for operational control. 
In the evening of 26 June President Truman received General MacArthur's
report that ROK forces could not hold Seoul, that the ROK forces were in
danger of collapse, that evacuation of American nationals was under way,
and that the first North Korean plane had been shot down. After a short
meeting with leading advisers the President approved a number of measures.
Further instructions went to MacArthur in another teletype conference
that night. They authorized him to use the Far East naval and air forces
in support of the Republic of Korea against all targets south of the 38th
Parallel. These instructions stated that the purpose of this action was
to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. On 27 June, Far Eastern
time, therefore, General MacArthur had authorization to intervene in Korea
with air and naval forces. 
During the night of 27 June the United Nations Security Council passed
a second momentous resolution calling upon member nations to give military
aid to South Korea in repelling the North Korean attack. After a statement
on the act of aggression and the fruitless efforts of the United Nations
to halt it, the Security Council resolution ended with these fateful words:
"Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area."
Thus, events on the international stage by the third day of the invasion
had progressed swiftly to the point where the United States had authorized
its commander in the Far East to use air and naval forces below the 38th
Parallel to help repel the aggression and the United Nations had called
upon its member nations to help repel the attack. The North Koreans were
now in Seoul.
Evacuation of U.S. Nationals From Korea
From the moment United States KMAG officers in Korea and responsible officers in General MacArthur's Far East Command headquarters accepted
the North Korean attack across the Parallel as an act of full-scale war,
it became imperative for them to evacuate American women and children and
other nonmilitary persons from Korea.
Almost a year earlier, on 21 July 1949, an operational plan had been
distributed by the Far East Command to accomplish such an evacuation by
sea and by air. NAVFE was to provide the ships and naval escort protection
for the water lift; the Far East Air Forces was to provide the planes for
the airlift and give fighter cover to both the water and air evacuation
upon orders from the Commander in Chief, Far East.  By midnight, 25
June, General Wright in Tokyo had alerted every agency concerned to be
ready to put the evacuation plan into effect upon the request of Ambassador
Muccio.  About 2200, 25 June, Ambassador Muccio authorized the evacuation
of the women and children by any means without delay, and an hour later
he ordered all American women and children and others who wished to leave
to assemble at Camp Sobinggo, the American housing compound in Seoul, for
transportation to Inch'on. 
The movement of the American dependents from Seoul to Inch'on began
at 0100, 26 June, and continued during the night. The last families cleared
the Han River bridge about 0900 and by 1800 682 women and children were
aboard the Norwegian fertilizer ship, the Reinholt, which had hurriedly
unloaded its cargo during the day, and was under way in Inch'on Harbor
to put to sea. At the southern tip of the peninsula, at Pusan, the ship
Pioneer Dale took on American dependents from Taejon, Taegu, and
Pusan.  American fighter planes from Japan flew twenty-seven escort
and surveillance sorties during the day covering the evacuation.
On 27 June the evacuation of American and other foreign nationals continued
from Kimpo and Suwon Airfields at an increased pace. During the morning
3 North Korean planes fired on four American fighters covering the air
evacuation and, in the ensuing engagement, the U.S. fighters shot down
all 3 enemy planes near Inch'on. Later in the day, American fighter planes
shot down 4 more North Korean YAK-3 planes in the Inch'on-Seoul area. During
27 June F-80 and F-82 planes of the 68th and 338th All-Weather Fighter
Squadrons and the 35th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the Fifth Air Force flew
163 sorties over Korea. 
During the period 26-29 June sea and air carriers evacuated a total
of 2,001 persons from Korea to Japan. Of this number, 1,527 were U.S. nationals-718
of them traveled by air, 809 by water.
The largest single group of evacuees was aboard the Reinholt.
KMAG Starts To Leave Korea
On Sunday, 25 June, while Colonel Wright, KMAG Chief of Staff, was in
church in Tokyo (he had gone to Japan to see his wife, the night before,
board a ship bound for the United States, and expected to follow her in
a few days), a messenger found him and whispered in his ear, "You
had better get back to Korea." Colonel Wright left church at once
and telephoned Colonel Greenwood in Seoul. Colonel Wright arrived at Seoul
at 0400, Monday, after flying to Kimpo Airfield from Japan. 
Colonel Wright reached the decision, with Ambassador Muccio's approval,
to evacuate all KMAG personnel from Korea except thirty-three that Colonel
Wright selected to remain with the ROK Army headquarters. Most of the KMAG
group departed Suwon by air on the 27th. Strangely enough, the last evacuation
plane arriving at Kimpo that evening from Japan brought four correspondents
from Tokyo: Keyes Beech of the Chicago Daily News, Burton Crane
of the New York Times, Frank Gibney of Time Magazine, and
Marguerite Higgins of the New York Herald-Tribune. They joined a
KMAG group that returned to Seoul. In the east and south of Korea, meanwhile,
some fifty-six KMAG advisers by 29 June had made their way to Pusan where
they put themselves under the command of Lt. Col. Rollins S. Emmerich,
KMAG adviser to the ROK 3d Division. 
Shortly after midnight of 26 June the State Department ordered Ambassador
Muccio to leave Seoul and, accordingly, he went south to Suwon the morning
of the 27th.  Colonel Wright with his selected group of advisers followed
the ROK Army headquarters to Sihung on the south side of the river. Colonel
Wright had with him the KMAG command radio, an SCR-399 mounted on a 2 1/2-ton
truck. Soon after crossing the Han River en route to Sihung Colonel Wright
received a radio message from General MacArthur in Tokyo stating that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff had directed him to take command of all U.S. military
personnel in Korea, including KMAG, and that he was sending an advance
command and liaison group from his headquarters to Korea.  After he
arrived at Sihung, Colonel Wright received another radio message from General
MacArthur, intercepted by the radio station at Suwon Airfield. It said
in effect, "Personal MacArthur to Wright: Repair to your former locations.
Momentous decisions are in the offing. Be of good cheer."  Aided
by the import of these messages, Colonel Wright persuaded General Chae
to return the ROK Army headquarters to Seoul that evening.
That night the blowing of the Han River bridges cut off the KMAG group
in Seoul. Colonel Wright had had practically no rest since Sunday and,
accompanied by Lt. Col. William J. Mahoney, he had retired to his quarters
before midnight to get some sleep. Beginning about 0100, 28 June, KMAG
officers at ROK Army headquarters tried repeatedly to telephone him the
information that the ROK Army headquarters was leaving Seoul. This would
necessitate a decision by Colonel Wright as to whether KMAG should also
leave. But the telephone message never got to Colonel Wright because Colonel
Mahoney who took the calls refused to disturb him. Finally, after the ROK
Army headquarters staff had departed, Lt. Col. Lewis D. Vieman went to
Colonel Wright's quarters for the second time, found the houseboy, and
had him awaken Colonel Wright. Colonel Vieman then informed Colonel Wright
of the situation. 
The latter was just leaving his quarters when the Han River bridges
blew up. Colonel Wright assembled all the Americans in a convoy and started
for a bridge east of the city.  En route they learned from Korean soldiers
that this bridge too had been blown. The convoy turned around and returned
to the KMAG housing area at Camp Sobinggo. About daylight a small reconnaissance
party reported that ferries were in operation along the Han River east
of the highway bridge. At this juncture Lt. Col. Lee Chi Yep, a member
of the ROK Army staff, long friendly with the Americans and in turn highly
regarded by the KMAG advisers, walked up to them. He volunteered to help
in securing ferry transportation across the river.
Upon arriving at the river bank, Colonel Wright's party found a chaotic
melee. ROK soldiers and unit leaders fired at the boatmen and, using threats,
tried to commandeer transportation from among the ferries and various kinds
of craft engaged in transporting soldiers and refugees across the river.
Colonel Lee adopted this method, persuading a boatman to bring his craft
alongside by putting a bullet through the man's shirt. It took about two
hours for the party to make the crossing. Colonel Wright, two other officers,
and two or three enlisted men stayed behind and finally succeeded in getting
the command radio vehicle across the river. It provided the only communication
the KMAG group had with Japan, and Colonel Wright would not leave it behind.
Enemy artillery fire was falling some distance upstream and tank fire had
drawn perceptibly closer when the last boatload started across the river.
After reaching the south bank, about 0800, the KMAG party struck out
and walked the 15-mile cross-country trail to Anyang-ni, arriving there
at 1500, 28 June. Waiting vehicles, obtained by an advance party that had
gone ahead in a jeep, picked up the tired men and carried them to Suwon.
Upon arriving at Suwon they found Colonel Wright and his command radio already there. After Although in the first few days
some getting across the river Wright had members of the KMAG group report
turned through Yongdungp'o, which, contrary to rumors, proved to be free
of enemy and had then traveled the main road. 
Although in the first few days some members of the KMAG group reportedly
were cut off and missing, all reached safety by the end of the month, and
up to 5 July only three had been slightly wounded. 
ADCOM in Korea
General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, Far East, had no responsibility
in Korea on 25 June 1950 except to support KMAG and the American Embassy
logistically to the Korean water line. This situation changed when President
Truman authorized him on 26 June, Far Eastern Time, to send a survey party to Korea.
General MacArthur formed at once a survey party of thirteen GHQ General
and Special Staff officers and two enlisted men, headed by Brig. Gen. John
H. Church. Its mission upon arrival in Korea was to help Ambassador Muccio
and KMAG to determine logistical requirements for assisting the ROK Army.
The party left Haneda Airfield at 0400, 27 June, and arrived at Itazuke
Air Base in southern Japan two hours later. While there awaiting further
orders before proceeding to Seoul, General Church received telephone instructions
from Tokyo about 1425 changing his destination from Seoul to Suwon because
it was feared the former might be in enemy hands by the time he got there.
MacArthur had by this time received the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive
which instructed him to assume operational control of all U.S. military
activities in Korea. Accordingly, he redesignated the survey group as GHQ
Advance Command and Liaison Group in Korea (ADCOM), and gave it an expanded
mission of assuming control of KMAG and of lending all possible assistance
to the ROK Army in striving to check the Red drive southward. 
The ADCOM group arrived at Suwon Airfield at 1900, 27 June, where Ambassador
Muccio met it. General Church telephoned Colonel Wright in Seoul, who advised
him not to come into the city that night. The ADCOM group thereupon set
up temporary headquarters in the Experimental Agriculture Building in Suwon.
The next day about 0400 Colonel Hazlett and Captain Hausman, KMAG advisers,
arrived at Suwon from Seoul. They told General Church that the Han River
bridges were down, that some North Korean tanks were in Seoul, that the
South Korean forces defending Seoul were crumbling and fleeing toward Suwon,
and that they feared the majority of KMAG was still in Seoul and trapped
there.  Such was the dark picture presented to General Church before
dawn of his first full day in Korea, 28 June.
General Church asked Hazlett and Hausman to find General Chae, ROK Chief
of Staff. Several hours later General Chae arrived at ADCOM headquarters.
Church told him that MacArthur was in operational control of the American
air and naval support of the ROK forces, and that the group at Suwon was
his, MacArthur's, advance headquarters in Korea. At Church's suggestion
Chae moved the ROK Army headquarters into the same building with Church's
General Church advised General Chae to order ROK forces in the vicinity
of Seoul to continue street fighting in the city; to establish straggler
points between Seoul and Suwon and to collect all ROK troops south of the Han
River and reorganize them into units, and to defend the Han River line
at all cost.  During the day, KMAG and ROK officers collected about
1,000 ROK officers and 8,000 men and organized them into provisional units
in the vicinity of Suwon. General Chae sent them back to the Han River.
General Church sent a radio message to General MacArthur on the 28th,
describing the situation and stating that the United States would have
to commit ground troops to restore the original boundary line.  That
evening he received a radio message from Tokyo stating that a high-ranking
officer would arrive the next morning and asking if the Suwon Airfield
was operational. General Church replied that it was.
MacArthur Flies to Korea
The "high-ranking officer" mentioned in the radio message
of the 28th was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. Shortly before noon
on 28 June, General MacArthur called Lt. Col. Anthony F. Story, his personal
pilot, to his office in the Dai Ichi Building in Tokyo and said he wanted
to go to Suwon the next day to make a personal inspection. Colonel Story
checked the weather reports and found them negative-storms, rains, low
ceiling, and heavy winds predicted for the morrow. 
At 0400, 29 June, MacArthur was up and preparing for the flight to Suwon.
At 0600 he arrived at Haneda and, with the assembled group, climbed aboard
the Bataan, his personal C-54 plane. A total of fifteen individuals
made the trip, including seven high-ranking officers of General MacArthur's
staff. Rain was falling when the Bataan took off from Haneda at
0610. About 0800 General MacArthur dictated a radiogram to Maj. Gen. Earl
E. Partridge, commanding FEAF in Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer's absence.
General Stratemeyer wrote it out and handed it to Story to send. It said,
"Stratemeyer to Partridge: Take out North Korean Airfield immediately.
No publicity. MacArthur approves." 
The weather had now improved sufficiently to permit fighter planes to
take off, and at 1000 four of them intercepted and escorted the Bataan
to Suwon. That morning North Korean fighter planes had strafed the
Suwon Airfield and set on fire a C-54 at the end of the runway. This wrecked
plane constituted a 20-foot obstacle on an already short runway, but Colonel
Story succeeded in setting the Bataan down without mishap. Waiting
at the airfield were President Rhee, Ambassador Muccio, and General Church.
The party got into an old black sedan and drove to General Church's headquarters.
In the conversation there Church told MacArthur that that morning not more
than 8,000 ROK's could be accounted for; that at that moment, noon, they
had 8,000 more; and that by night he expected to have an additional 8,000; therefore at day's end they could count on about 25,000. 
Colonel Story, in the meantime, took off from the Suwon Airfield at
1130 and flew to Fukuoka, Japan where he refueled and made ready to return
to Suwon. During the afternoon North Korean planes bombed the Suwon Airfield
and a YAK fighter destroyed a recently arrived C-47 plane. 
General MacArthur insisted on going up to the Han River, opposite Seoul,
to form his own impression of the situation. On the trip to and from the
Han, MacArthur saw thousands of refugees and disorganized ROK soldiers
moving away from the battle area. He told General Church that in his opinion
the situation required the immediate commitment of American ground forces.
He said he would request authority from Washington that night for such
Colonel Story brought the Bataan back to Suwon at 1715. Within
an hour General MacArthur was on his way back to Japan.
Other than KMAG and ADCOM personnel, the first American troops to go
to Korea arrived at Suwon Airfield on 29 June, the day of MacArthur's visit.
The unit, known as Detachment X, consisted of thirty-three officers and
men and four M55 machine guns of the 507th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic
Weapons) Battalion. At 1615 they engaged 4 enemy planes that attacked the
airfield, shooting down 1 and probably destroying another, and again at
2005 that evening they engaged 3 planes. 
The President Authorizes Use of U.S. Ground Troops in Korea
Reports coming into the Pentagon from the Far East during the morning
of 29 June described the situation in Korea as so bad that Secretary of
Defense Louis A. Johnson telephoned President Truman before noon. In a
meeting late that afternoon the President approved a new directive greatly
broadening the authority of the Far East commander in meeting the Korean
This directive, received by the Far East commander on 30 June, Tokyo
time, authorized him to (1) employ U.S. Army service forces in South Korea
to maintain communications and other essential services; (2) employ Army
combat and service troops to ensure the retention of a port and air base
in the general area of Pusan-Chinhae; (3) employ naval and air forces against
military targets in North Korea but to stay well clear of the frontiers
of Manchuria and the Soviet Union; (4) by naval and air action defend Formosa
against invasion by the Chinese Communists and, conversely, prevent Chinese
Nationalists from using Formosa as a base of operations against the Chinese
mainland; (5) send to Korea any supplies and munitions at his disposal
and submit estimates for amounts and types of aid required outside his
control. It also assigned the Seventh Fleet to MacArthur's operational
control, and indicated that naval commanders in the Pacific would support
and reinforce him as necessary and practicable. The directive ended with
a statement that the instructions did not constitute a decision to engage
in war with the Soviet Union if Soviet forces intervened in Korea, but
that there was full realization of the risks involved in the decisions
with respect to Korea.  It is to be noted that this directive of 29
June did not authorize General MacArthur to use U.S. ground combat troops
in the Han River area-only at the southern tip of the peninsula to assure
the retention of a port.
Several hours after this portentous directive had gone to the Far East
Command, the Pentagon received at approximately 0300, 30 June, General
MacArthur's report on his trip to Korea the previous day. This report described
the great loss of personnel and equipment in the ROK forces, estimated
their effective military strength at not more than 25,000 men, stated that
everything possible was being done in Japan to establish and maintain a
flow of supplies to the ROK Army through the Port of Pusan and Suwon Airfield,
and that every effort was being made to establish a Han River line but the result was problematical. MacArthur concluded:
The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability
to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of U.S. ground
combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces
of our Air and Navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.
If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a U.S. regimental
combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide
for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan
for an early counteroffensive. 
General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, notified Secretary of
the Army Frank Pace, Jr., of MacArthur's report and then established a
teletype connection with MacArthur in Tokyo. In a teletype conversation
MacArthur told Collins that the authority already given to use a regimental
combat team at Pusan did not provide sufficient latitude for efficient
operations in the prevailing situation and did not satisfy the basic requirements
described in his report. MacArthur said, "Time is of the essence and
a clear-cut decision without delay is essential." Collins replied
that he would proceed through the Secretary of the Army to request Presidential
approval to send a regimental combat team into the forward combat area,
and that he would advise him further, possibly within half an hour. 
Collins immediately telephoned Secretary Pace and gave him a summary
of Secretary Pace in turn telephoned the President at Blair House. President
Truman, already up, took the call at 0457, 30 June. Pace informed the President
of MacArthur's report and the teletype conversations just concluded. President
Truman approved without hesitation sending one regiment to the combat zone
and said he would give his decision within a few hours on sending two divisions.
In less than half an hour after the conclusion of the MacArthur-Collins
teletype conversations the President's decision to send one regiment to
the combat zone was on its way to MacArthur. 
At midmorning President Truman held a meeting with State and Defense
Department officials and approved two orders: (1) to send two divisions
to Korea from Japan; and (2) to establish a naval blockade of North Korea.
He then called a meeting of the Vice President, the Cabinet, and Congressional
and military leaders at the White House at 1100 and informed them of the
action he had taken.
That afternoon Delegate Warren Austin addressed the Security Council
of the United Nations telling them of the action taken by the United States
in conformity with their resolutions of 25 and 27 June. On the afternoon
of 30 June, also, the President announced his momentous decision to the
world in a terse and formal press release. 
The die was cast. The United States was in the Korean War.
Meanwhile, the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 29 June had
sent a communication to all member nations asking what type of assistance
they would give South Korea in response to the Security Council resolution
of 27 June. Three members-the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia-declared
the resolution illegal. Most of the others promised moral or material support.
Material support took the form chiefly of supplies, foodstuffs, or services
that were most readily available to the particular countries.
The United Kingdom Defense Committee on 28 June placed British naval
forces in Japanese waters (1 light fleet carrier, 2 cruisers, and 5 destroyers
and frigates) under the control of the U.S. naval commander. This naval
force came under General MacArthur's control the next day. On 29 June,
the Australian Ambassador called on Secretary of State Dean Acheson and
said that his country would make available for use in Korea a destroyer
and a frigate based in Japan, and that a squadron of short-range Mustang
fighter planes (77th Squadron Royal Australian Air Force) also based in
Japan would be available.  Canada, New Zealand, and the Netherlands
said they were dispatching naval units.
Only Nationalist China offered ground troops-three divisions totaling
33,000 men, together with twenty transport planes and some naval escort.
General MacArthur eventually turned down this offer on 1 August because
the Nationalist Chinese troops were considered to be untrained and had
no artillery or motor transport.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in Korean War, ch. II,
 Ltr, Gen Wright to author, 12 Feb 54.
 This radio message is reproduced in full in Dept of State Pub 3922,
United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Doc. 1, p. 11.
 Memo, Maj Gen L. L. Lemnitzer, Director, Off of Mil Assistance, for
Secy Defense, 29 Jun 50; S. Comm. on Armed Services and S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, Joint Hearings, Military
Situation in the Far East (MacArthur Hearings), pt. III, pp. 1990-92,
Testimony of Secretary of State Acheson.
 Albert L. Warner, "How the Korea Decision was Made," Harper's
Magazine, June 26, 1950, pp. 99-106; Beverly Smith, "Why We Went to War
in Korea," Saturday Evening Post, November 10, 1951.
 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 1, n. 5, and Docs. 3,
4, and 5, pp. 12-16.
 Ibid., Doc. 5, p. 16.
 Telecon TT3418, 25 Jun 50. For a detailed discussion of the
Department of the Army and Far East Command interchange of views and
instructions concerning the Korean crisis and later conduct of the war
following intervention see Maj James F. Schnabel, Theater Command.
 Telecon TT3426, 27 Jun 50.
 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, p. 4, and Doc. 16, p.
24: The vote was seven in favor, one opposed, two abstentions, and one
absence: the Soviet Union was absent. Two days later India accepted the
resolution. See Doc. 52, pp. 42-43.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch.
II, pp. 11-12.
 Ltr, Gen Wright to author, 12 Feb 54.
 Sawyer, KMAG MS; John C. Caldwell, The Korea Story (Chicago: H.
Regnery Co., 1952), p. 170.
 Sawyer, KMAG MS; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer, 22 Feb 54.
 GHQ FEC, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, pp. 8-9; Capt Robert
L. Gray, Jr., "Air Operations Over Korea," Army Information Digest,
January 1952, p. 17; USAF Opns in the Korean Conflict, 25 Jun-1 Nov 50,
USAF Hist Study 71, pp. 5-6; 24th Div G-3 and G-2 Jnl Msg files, 27 Jun
50: New York Herald-Tribune, June 27, 1950.
 Sawyer, KMAG MS; Col Wright, Notes for author, 1952; Ltr, Gen
Wright to author, 12 Feb 54; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer.
 Wright, Notes for author; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer: Sawyer,
KMAG MS; Ltr, Rockwell to author, 21 May 54; Ltr, Scott to friend, ca.
6-7 Jul 50; Col Emmerich, MS review comments, 26 Nov 57.
 Msg 270136Z, State Dept to Supreme Commander, Allied Powers (U.S.
Political Adviser), cited in Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and
Participation in the Korean War, ch. 2, p. 17.
 Col Wright, Notes for author; Sawyer, KMAG MS.
 Col Wright, Notes for author; Gen MacArthur MS review comments, 15
 Vieman, Notes on Korea, 15 Feb 51; Interv, author with Vieman, 15
Jun 54; Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 52: Interv, author with Col
Wright, 3 Jan 52; Ltr, Col George R. Seaberry, Jr., to Capt Sawyer, 22
 Greenwood estimates there were 130-odd men in the convoy, other
estimates are as low as sixty.
 Vieman, Notes on Korea, 15 Feb 51; Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer;
Ltr, Maj Ray B. May to Capt Sawyer, 2, Apr 54; Ltr, Scott to friend;
Marguerite Higgins, War in Korea (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and
Company, Inc., 1951), pp. 27-30.
 Vieman, Notes on Korea, 15 Feb 51; Higgins, War in Korea;
Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer; Ltr, May to Sawyer, 23 Apr 54.
The British Minister to South Korea, Capt. Vyvyan Holt, members of his
staff, and a few other British subjects remained in Seoul and claimed
diplomatic immunity. Instead of getting it they spent almost three years
in a North Korean prison camp. The North Koreans finally released
Captain Holt and six other British subjects to the Soviets in April 1953
for return to Britain during the prisoner exchange negotiations. Two,
Father Charles Hunt and Sister Mary Claire, died during the internment.
See the New York Times, April 21 and 22, 1953; the Washington Post,
April 10, 1953.
 Crawford, Notes on Korea.
 Gen Church, Memo for Record, ADCOM Activities in Korea, 27 Jun-15
July 1950, GHQ FEC G-3, Ann Narr Hist Rpt, 1 Jan-31 Oct 51, Incl 11, pt.
III. The Church ADCOM document grew out of stenographic notes of an
interview by Major Schnabel with General Church, 17 July 1950. General
Church was not satisfied with the notes thus produced and rewrote the
draft himself a few days later. This source will hereafter be cited as
Church MS. Lt Col Olinto M. Barsanti (G-1 ADCOM Rep), contemporary
handwritten notes on ADCOM activities; Interv, author with Col Martin L.
Green, ADCOM G-3, 14 Jul 51: Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and
Participation in the Korean War, ch. 2, pp. 18-19.
 Church MS; Barsanti Notes: Statement, Greenwood for Sawyer.
 Church MS; Interv, author with Col Robert T. Hazlett, 11 Jun 54;
Interv, author with Hausman, 12 Jan 52.
 Church MS; Barsanti Notes.
 Church MS. Church gives the date as 27 June, but this is a mistake.
 Interv, Dr. Gordon W. Prange with Col Story, 19 Feb 51, Tokyo.
Colonel Story referred to his logbook of the flight for the details
related in this interview
 Interv, Prange with Story; Church MS; Ltr, Lt Gen Edward M. Almond
to author, 18 Dec 53. (Almond was a member of the party.)
 Interv, Prange with Story.
 Church MS; Ltr, Gen Wright to author, 8 Feb 54 (Wright was a member
of the party.)
 Det X, 507th AAA AW Bn Act Rpt, 1 Jul 50.
 JCS 84681 DA (JCS) to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50; Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support
and Participation in the Korean War, ch. 2, p. 26; MacArthur Hearings,
pt. I, pp. 535-36, Secy of Defense George C. Marshall's testimony; New
York Times, May 12, 1951.
 Msg, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun 50.
 Schnabel, FEC, GHQ Support and Participation in the Korean War, ch.
2, pp. 27-R8, citing and quoting telecons.
 Ibid., ch. 2, p. 28.
 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Doc. 17, pp. 24-25,
and Doc. 18, pp. 25-26; Smith, "Why We Went to War in Korea," op. cit.
 United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Docs. 20-90, pp.
Causes of the Korean Tragedy ... Failure of Leadership, Intelligence and Preparation